Hello, and welcome to another episode of the All Thoughts Podcast.
I'm Tracy Alloway and I'm Joe Wisenthal.
Joe, we are here at Jackson Hole, and I know that so much of the focus is on the short term outlook for rates, but really this is a gathering to talk about the longer term framework of monetary policy. Yeah.
It's so funny because it is an academic conference and there are all these like sort of like big think sort of conversations going on about, you know, the changing nature of the global economy something like that. I think it's actually the theme, like the structural changes in the global economy. But like ninety nine percent of the media interest in this whole event is like, are we going to get a rate hike it November December, you know, But there is so.
Much more right And one of the big themes that is emerging is this idea of living in a world where there is more debt outstanding. And we've seen that sort of pop up a number of times in recent months. Of course, you had Fitch downgrading the most credit rating
because partly of the public finance trajectory. You've had volatility in the treasury market, You've had questions over whether or not investors are still going to want to buy bonds at a time when there's enormous supply, and also the FED out to raise rates and potentially bring down inflation.
Yeah, I would say there's sort of two dynamics that I think is really interesting here with regards to sort of like public spending and public debts. So I think there's sort of like some of the technical factors that you've described, and of course we talked about them with Darryl Duffy as well, the capacity for debt absorption. And then we're also living in an age it's very different from the twenty tens in which fiscal authorities are taking
a much more active role in economic management. And so the twenty tens we sort of, you know, fiscal took a backseat, all the pressure was placed on the monetary authorities to get us back to full employment so forth. And the twenties so far feel very different from that because we've had these big spending bills, very active management, and so how that interacts with policy, what that means for inflation, what that means for central bankers, et cetera.
And I think all of these questions like what that means for central bankers, what that means for the macro trajectory going forward is going to be debated, I mean probably for years.
Exactly right, let's get a jumpstart on this topic of high public debt. And I'm glad to say we really do have the perfect guest. We're going to be speaking with, Barry eichen Green. He is the professor of economics at University of California at Berkeley and the man that central bankers here at Jackson Hole have tapped to research and discuss this exact topic. So, Barry, thank you so much for coming on. All thoughts, good to.
Be with you. Before we go on, tell me where did the name odd locks?
Well, it's actually an old bond term for bond trades of non standardized.
When we started the podcast years ago, we didn't really know what it was going to be, but we sort of had a sense that maybe, like you know, we try to find some off the beaten path stories and so what's something that sounded like that, like a odd lots sounded good and it stucks. Yeah, it works.
So Barry, let me start with a really simple question here. Why do governments seem to borrow so much like what is going on that in twenty twenty three. We do have these massive fiscal deficits, and we have had them for a long time.
Governments borrow for both reasons, good and bad. So we've seen that governments borrow to finance emergency responses to great recessions, financial crises, pandemics, wars, and throughout history they have done that when in exceptional circumstances, governments have to resort to exceptional fiscal policies, and they do do so by borrowing,
sometimes big time. On the other hand, it would be nice were governments to reduce those heavy debt burdens once the emergency has passed and restore that capacity to borrow. And that's where the borrowing for bad reasons kicks in. When you have divided government, where you have inability of different political factions to agree on which form of public spending to cut or whose taxes to increase in order to restore fiscal balance restore fiscal sustainability, you have the
persistence of those fiscal deficits in high debt ratio. So again, there are good reasons why governments and current public debts, and there are bad reasons why they persist.
Just a quick question. And Tracy mentioned in the intro that you've been invited to this event to talk about your research in this area and you've done new research, and that this event is more than just an opportunity for Wall Street to say it is the high to be in November or December. There's a lot more. First of all, actually just a very like sort of like not to meet. Yeah, how does this like, how does
it work? I think people are sort of at least I'm curious, maybe knowing not Maybe it just me and Tracey are curious. But how does it work? How do you get like invited? What is the process to like come like a give give a talk and present a paper here at Jackson Hall.
So I can tell you what I what I see and know. Sure, as one of the invited speakers, but you should have the folks from the Kansas City fed on as well. They're the conveners. But what I see is they came to me, and I've done this once or twice before, same story. Then they came to me at the beginning of the year in January or February with an agenda of for topics, and they say this is the one topic number four we would like you
to write on are you willing to do so? And the topic has a title, and it has a paragraph of why the topic is important and what some of the issues that you might discuss in your paper are and then they let you go. So there was a check in a couple of months ago where I had a phone call with the research director and he said, are you on course? Is the paper going well? And I said sure? And he said, all right, see you
and jacksonvill So they commission more experienced scholars. That's a way of saying, this is not my first rodeo, if you will Jackson Hole talk and terminology. And then they just let us go with it. They trust us to produce. And this is the kind of high profile event where the self imposed pressure to produce is great sufficient to deliver the MisOr result.
I was going to ask, does anyone ever say no to the Kansas Fed?
So you know, we don't know that from as authors, but if you look at the list of participants, it's pretty evident that for reasons of both quality of intellectual program and scenery, people rarely say no.
So let's get into I mean, it's a monetary Policy Symposium. Your research is on sort of the fiscal side, public spending, public debt. Talk to us just about how you sort of like see this interaction and I sort of mentioned in the intro the twenty tens it felt like fiscal authorities were kind of on the backseat, not a lot
of active management. How do you you know, sort of big picture and that we could get more granular, like why should central bankers be thinking more about the role of high public debt and high public deficits as they think of charting the course of monetary policy going forward?
Central bankers have to worry about two things. Number one, that fiscal authorities in many countries and here the US is special because of the dollars global role in most countries other than the United States, there will be less
room for an active fiscal response going forward. So there was one in response to the global financial crisis in many countries again during COVID, and as a result of that, debt to GDP ratios on average have doubled worldwide, which means that scope for using fiscal policy in response to the next vis whatever it might be, will be less. So will we have to go back to the world where monetary policy is the only game in town, and
the answer is to an extent yes. Factor number two is that central banks will come under pressure to be more active debt managers. Some people will argue that if they accept a higher inflation rate, that will make managing the debt easier because we'll be inflating away the real value of the debt. I disagree with that, because I think yields will respond in any benefit from an inflation
for debt management will be fleeting. But pressure to keep interest rates slow and tolerate more inflation will be more intense than otherwise because of this heavy debt.
So you touched on it in that answer, But let me press you on this particular point and ask the devil's advocate question. I'm going to channel my inner modern monetary theory. Dearest persona. Here are high levels of debt always bad.
High levels of debt are always worse than low levels of debt. So we would all like to see the debt to GDP ratio in the United States and globally be lower because governments will be able to use more of their tax revenues for purposes other than debt service. We have the green transition we have infrastructure needs, we have all the obvious things that only government can do,
and we need government to do those things. If government is using its limited tax revenues to pay interest on the debt, it has fewer resources left over for those other good things. So from that point, a few heavy inherited debts are a bit of a drag on economic growth. If you believe, as I do, that publicly financed infrastructure and publicly subsidized climate change related and investment will be important for economic growth going.
Forward, it sounds like there could almost be a distinction between bad debt overhangs and good debt. If the good debt is taken out in the name of higher economic growth.
If government is borrowing to finance investments that make people and the economy more productive, so that grows the denominator of the debt to GDP ratio, the debt is less of a problem than it would be otherwise.
What are some historical analogies to right now, because you know, there's we've had so it feels like there's kind of two things happening. Once there was the emergency spending in the immediate wake or when COVID hit obviously, and then there is this sort of at least in the United States, and I think somewhat elsewhere, a certain more aggressive political winds shifting about our willingness to spend and again, you know, infrastructure and climate and chips in a way that we
didn't really see for a long time. There any previous historical analogies that you can think of. Is it mostly wars in which you see the sort of like regime shift to the level of public debt.
I think it is emergencies tantamount to war. I'm an economic historian, but I'm also a firm believer that the role of historical analysis is not simply to draw parallels or analogies, but to look for differences between then and now. What is distinctive about our current situation. I'm worried about
the trajectory of debt. I'm worried about the trajectory of the economy more broadly in the United States, because of the extent of political polarization and the need for a degree of political consensus to bring financial problems generally under control. I think political polarization and fractionalization in the United States
are greater than any time in my lifetime. So from that point a few Debt to GDP was higher after World War Two, but you know, we had the McCarthy years and politics were not exactly placid in the United States. But I do not see a scenario at the moment where the two parties can reach an agreement on raising more tax revenues and bringing entitlement spending under control, which is what you would need in order to flatten the debt trajectory.
What is the political appetite to bring down debt because it feels like you're always going to have politicians who maybe are eyeing short term gains, you know, cut taxes, boost public spending in order to win another vote, versus maybe a longer term gain of actually bringing down the public debt. And that tension seems really hard to surmount.
In my paper four Jackson Hole, we look at some of these historical experiences and thereof two varieties. Number One, if you have a crisis that's enough to galvanize thought and action such that governments are able to bring down debts. The Greek government crisis in twenty ten, Iceland crisis in two thousand and eight have been able to run budget surplus' technical term primary budget surpluses excluding interest payments for the last ten years, and think about the United States, that's
inconceivable here. But what impelled them into action was serious economic and financial crises and the conclusion that there was no alternative but get this problem under control. And the other historically cases have been those in which there has been a broad political consensus where one party or typically coalition of parties in the European setting where you have coalition governments have been able to agree on a program of bringing fiscal policy in the debt under control. So
bring those two cases to the United States. The first one, the crisis scenario, is not one we want to contemplate. In the second one, broad consensus on what to do is hard to imagine.
We would probably really need just like one party to sweep in massively with some sort of effort to either cut spending or race taxes. But it's interesting because, like I've read a little bit in the eighties and the nineties, even as recently as in the eighties and nineties, there were occasionally multi party efforts to cut you know, I mean, George H. W. Bush like famously like promise not to raise taxes. They read my libs and then he did
raise taxes a little bit. So it's like, even fairly recently, there was some appetite in DC among both Democrats and Republicans to address deficits from time to.
Time, and not only George HW. Bush, but William Jefferson Clinton right as well, that the budget was broadly balanced through the nineteen nineties. And I would remind you that at the end of the nineties we were talking about the disappearance of US Treasury that and how financial mar markets would price assets in the absence of treasury bonds because the wow, what are your time running surpluses? So it has been possible in the US context, But then we got the tea party and we got social media.
You know, everybody will have their favorite culprit for why we've had this increase in political polarization in the US. But it's a fact.
You mentioned the dollars reserve status earlier. Does the idiosyncratic role of US assets in the global financial system, the safe haven status of US treasuries, does that insulate the US somewhat from experiencing a crisis on the scale of a Greece or in Iceland.
Well, it certainly gives the US Treasury more room to run. In other words, there is this significant and expanding appetite for US Treasury bonds on the part of central banks around the world which hold them as foreign reserves. And as we show in the paper, there is significant and expanding appetite for US treasuries on the part of the private sector, corporate treasurers, institutional investors of all kinds that view them as kind of a safe asset that they
can hold as the bedrock of their portfolio. So we can keep adding to the stock of treasuries in the hands of the public for a longer time than can other central banks that don't enjoy the same exorbitant privilege
that their currency is a global currency. Things can change, so I think, to my mind, there are The big risk would be a disorderly debt ceiling blowout, which the debt ceiling will be back on the table, if you will, after the presidential elections, so that problem and the danger it poses to the dollar's global role are not off the table.
Is this going to turn into a coin episode?
No, No, it's always you who thinks it's going to And I wasn't going next.
I live in perpetual fear but.
You know, I was going to ask, like, okay, and you sort of anticipated. But when you think about like what are tipping points and for when the government's public debt suddenly people go from thinking it's safe and it's something they want to hold, it's something lickdid to something
they're anxious. Is the scenario that's more likely to create a tipping point something where it's like a ratio, where it's like, okay, there's some level and we're concerned about debt service, like sort of like a classic credit concerns. Or is it more like something the public starts to lose faith and not necessarily even do a ratio or do to a stock of debt, but something about the US political system in which people do not feel good
about what that government guarantee means. Whether it's something technical like the existence of not raising the dead ceiling, or just a sort of like further degradation of the quality of politics in DC.
I think it's the politics that are the real and present danger. If financial conditions deteriorate very gradually, yields will rise very gradually, and hopefully that will get the attention of policymakers sufficiently to at some point address the problem. Similarly, I do not think that aggressive US use of sanctions
will prompt flight from the dollar. I don't think so called weaponization of the dollar is the other either, because there are no alternatives and the bricks can hold all the summits they want, and they talk a good game about creating an alternative to the dollar, but it's easier said than done, as the Chinese among the others, have learned.
Just on that note, how much is high public debt, at least in the US. The sort of other side of the coin of a lot of countries like China having these big savings surpluses that they need to put somewhere to what extent is the deficit I guess enabled by those savings.
Michael Pettis has made that argument, and I think that is part of the story. But the traditional story about trade surpluses and deficits that countries like China are running trade and current account surpluses and therefore they are accumulating dollars. That logic worked well in a world where capital wasn't mobile internationally. So with Chinese investment abroad and foreign investment in China, which has been important until very recently, I
think the story becomes more complex. So I don't think it's mainly about high savings and current account surpluses in countries like China and Saudi Arabia. I think it's mainly about the dollars, liquidity, about US treasuries liquidity in their safe haven.
Since you mentioned the bricks and there was just this sort of brick summit, and there's this you know, perpetual I don't know, fantasy or people science fiction about one day. This sort of alternative.
Possibility is a nicer way of discising.
Instead of science fiction hypothetical. But you know, people do talk about this a lot, and I'm curious, you know, since you mentioned that, you know, the real risk to US dollar standing or US treasury standing might be political politics. Would you say it's politics that's also the impediment to sort of something else raising. I mean, to your point, you know, people talk about maybe China needs to run its own current account deficit for UN internationalization or et cetera.
Is the flip also essentially that we're not going to see a credible alternative to the dollar until there's just sort of much more global political confidence in the leadership of whatever country. Would theoretically be behind that currency.
Absolutely, so it's not only an open financial markets open to the rest of the world, which China doesn't have, but confidence in the political system of the issuing country, presidency and the pollop euro can change the rules of the financial game even more grammatically in response to events than the US Treasury did when it led the drive
toward Russian sanctions in twenty twenty two. And I think mister Putin's actions have reminded the world of the risks of putting your financial legs in the basket of an authoritarian leader, and China has been moving in that direction rather than moving away.
We've been talking a lot about foreign demand for US debt in the form of reserves from other central banks, but you briefly mentioned that there are, of course private investors who snap up treasuries too. One of the big groups of private investors are the banks who are basically mandated to buy bonds because we have all these capital rules and things like the supplementary leverage ratio. To what
extent is that sort of bank bondage. For lack of a better term, or financial repression a solution to this problem. Can it help offset some of those exploding levels or at some point does it become an issue sort of how we saw in March of this year.
We used to talk about the diabolic loop or the doom between government budget deficits and banking problems, that if you force feed government bonds to the banks, you end up with Silicon Valley Bank big time. So I think there are obvious risks with what you described as financial repression. Carmen Reinhardt, who was the commentator on my paper at Jackson Hole, is the specialist in that she believes that there's more scope for that financial repression approach to managing
our debt problems than I do. Financial markets are open and global, and if we weaken US banks by force feeding them bonds, they're going to lose business to foreign banks. So my views there there are real limits to going on that road you mentioned.
Reinhart was the assigned discusser of your paper. What sort of questions do you get give us an insight on what that discussion actually looks like when you present your paper.
It's very much personality specific, so it helps if you're discustant. Is a personal friend is commonness in my case? And on the other hand, you're a little bit on edge if you know that your friend and discust and has very different views than your own.
Sounds like a fun, fun funne like me and Tracy set up.
Maybe maybe one day in our dream world, they'll invite us to discuss one of the page.
One of us will send it a live episode, and one of us will critique the other. Can we talk a little bit more? Hey, Like, so we imagine like it does not feel like there is some imminent big fiscal consolidation coming. Maybe there'll be a crisis or something. Hope hopefully not. But you know, as you say in your paper, it looks like we are in an era of high public debts that will be sustained for a while.
Can you talk a little bit more? I mean, you mentioned perhaps this constrains fiscal authorities in terms of what they can prioritize and so forth. Can you talk a little bit more about what you see as some of the implications of this world, maybe both for the US and countries that don't enjoy the same status as the US, Like, how do you think that that world looks versus say, the last decade in which it seemed like, you know,
ample demand for debt no real issue. Well, how does this world look different?
We learned it in the global financial crisis and again during the pandemic, that being able to adjust fiscal policy, being able to mount an assertive fiscal response to events can be invaluable, can be critically important for stabilizing the economy, and there will be much less scope for doing that
in a wide variety of economies around the world. So I would caution us collectively that this is not only a story about the United States, but it's a story about one hundred and eighty economies around the world, many of which, most of which are more heavily indebted, significantly more heavily indebted than they were before, and their governments will not be able to use fiscal policy in the same way.
We focus so much on the US context, and we've talked about the sort of political degradation and the dead ceiling and things like that, But I don't know if is it a similar story elsewhere, Like why in the other one hundred and seventy nine countries have we also seen this sort of dead trajectory and perhaps a similar unwillingness or similar difficulties to constrain the fiscal response.
The global pandemic was global by definition, so most governments around the world face the same imperatives. People were locked down and government had to provide i'd support for households that couldn't otherwise feed themselves. And secondly, yes, there are political problems. Some people who believe in small government at all costs prefer starve the beast kind of policies where you cut taxes now in order to force government to cut spending later, And you don't always get the later
part of the equation. When governments are unstable or alternating in office, those in office prefer to spend on their preferred programs now before the other party comes into power, and both parties engage in that kind of behavior. So political dysfunction is part of the story, to be sure.
In your conclusion in the paper, when you talk about the implications of living with high debt, you sort of sum it up and say, basically, it means we'll have to try to avoid steps that make a bad situation worse, and you list a bunch of those potential steps, things like raising taxes in the good times or lowering unproductive spending. But you had one line in there, I'm not entirely sure what it means. It's targeting social transfers as a way of limiting pressures on the expenditure side.
What do you mean by that means testing? Oh that in the United States, certainly, entitlement spending is a big part of the federal budget, the majority. And it's not clear from an economist's point of view why the one percent should be receiving social security payments every month.
Oh interesting, Okay, ask a question.
And maybe it's a little bit more short term focused. But you know, throughout the twenty tens, I don't even know why, and retrospect it seems like a silly chance. But we kept missing inflation from the downside. It doesn't seem like a terrible problem to have, but that's how people characterize it. We couldn't hit the target from the downside.
And one of the arguments that you heard a lot the twenty tens, well, we should have we should spend more, and we should boost demand, should boost domestic demand, use the government's power to spend. And what never really happened again due to politics. When you look at the challenge right now that the central bankers here face with high inflation,
and surprisingly resilient inflation. Rapid rate hikes have not had the effect yet at least of getting inflation back to target as people might have guessed, how much is that? Essentially the flip story of the twenty tens that it's the aggressive fiscal policy is contributed to the current inflation and makes the challenge of getting back to target difficult for policymakers.
Boy, you're bringing me back to the much discussed issue of what caused.
Our current Yeah, well, I loved what's an answer?
And we know the answer is one of three things. Supply shocks, starting with COVID, excessive fiscal stimulus, notably the early twenty twenty one Biden stimulus I think was a bit more than we needed. And number three, the FED was about a year behind the curve, a year like the rest of us. I include everyone in this room,
everyone in this podcast, about a year late. We're all implicated in all of us realizing that the inflation environment had changed and a very different central bank policy was needed. So I think all three factors played a role. And if we're really now experiencing soft landing, something between a soft landing and no landing, where inflation comes down with only a very modest increase in the unemployment rate, if any, we should have that discussion about how to narrow the budget deficit.
Can I just ask though it just to follow up? I mean, there's a lot of talk about, like, well, what were the policy errors, and you sort of identified two very popular ones, which is excessive fiscal and central bankers coming slow. But on the other hand, we have three and a half percent unemployment multi decade lows. Other measures of labor market realization are very impressive prime age employment to population ratio. How should we think about like
weighing the costs and benefits? And I'm not talking about like, oh, we should like formally accept three percent inflation or something like that, but there are good things that seem to have come out of the government's aggressive response to the pandemic. And how should we think about, like weighing those benefits against the cost of the higher inflation that we're talking all everyone's talk about here.
Yeah, I think the benefits were considerable. So you Joe asked me about the sources of inflation, and I pointed to a couple of macro policy mistakes, if you will, that contributed to the inflation. But overall, I agree with the implication of your question that we responded quite well compared to the response to earlier crises to the most
recent pandemic and energy crisis related shocks. That's quite remarkable that two years on we're back to three percent inflation and three and a half percent unemployment.
How do you view the impact of monetary policy in a time of higher debt, because there is I mean, there are multiple arguments on this topic, but one argument, for instance, is that it's harder for interest rates to stay high in an environment where you have lots of public debt because the impact of those higher interest rates is going to be more painful and also cause higher debt servicing costs for the government. So how are you thinking about those two issues.
We talked about that a little bit earlier. I think my view is that the Fed really is committed to its two percent inflation target, despite the pressures you allude to that keeping interest rates higher than otherwise in order to bring inflation all the way down to two percent will make debt service a bit higher in the short run than it would be otherwise and add to the fiscal problem. And Chairman Powell was clear at Jackson hole,
that is not his immediate concern. His immediate concern is convincing the public in the markets that we are on track to two percent, And I take them at his word.
Let me ask this question in a slightly different, perhaps more provocative way. In that case, what should central bankers do in response to higher public debt levels?
Well, they have to be aware that the economy will not receive support from fiscal policy in the next downturn in the same way that it did in twenty twenty, twenty twenty one, in the same way even that it did in many countries ind and eight two thousand and nine.
So they have to be prepared to respond. I think they have to make clear that they will not fall prey to what economists call fiscal dominance, that monetary policy will not become a slave to fiscal and debt problems, and they will have to look even harder than otherwise at financial stability risk. Who is holding this public debt? Are there concentrations of public debt? Are their unhedged interest
rate exposures related to those holdings. Because central banks are monetary policy makers, they're also regulators.
One last question, and it's sort of an x us question. So obviously, the FED has a credible balance sheet capacity, and we saw it step in big time in March twenty twenty to buy all the treasuries and stabilize the market. We've also seen the beginnings, though, I think of other
smaller central banks do something similar. I think Brazil, for example, bought some of its own government debt and going forward, do more central banks around the world have that capacity or the credibility to use their own balance sheet to smooth government debt markets than perhaps there was in the past.
Yes, I think that's the case. More generally, monetary policy, central bank policy has gained credibility over time in emerging
markets in particular. So we saw that in the fact that many emerging markets moved more rapidly than the FED did in twenty twenty one twenty twenty two to begin to hike rates and bring inflation down, and that monetary policy credibility, that anti inflation commitment gives them more room for maneuver, including when circumstances dictate expanding their balance sheets.
All right, Barry, it was fantastic having you on all thoughts. Thank you for giving us I guess our own personal presentation of your paper. We really appreciate it.
Thank you both.
Thank you so much. Those great.
So Joe, obviously, that was really interesting. I did think that his warning about maybe next time the fiscal response won't be as big, you know, it will be restrained in some capacity. That was interesting.
There are two things I mean, yeah, like in a period of high inflation, right, like already you would expect that that is going to constrain the appetite of policymakers to spend further, et cetera. But I was really struck, and I think that very telling, like the discussion of politics, and then ultimately like that manifests itself into different ways manifest itself. The lack of appetite for fiscal consolidation, it could manifest itself or people just freak out as like
I don't trust the United States anymore. Right, it could be a debt sealing trip. Like it feels like that's really like where like things did go from stress to crisis.
Yeah, and that was that tension. That's the reason I asked that question about, well, how do you ever get politicians to sort of sacrifice the next four years in exchange for longer term gains about bringing down the deficit. It seems really hard. But his answer about you kind of need a crisis to crystallize it, I mean, it makes sense. It's also a bit worrying.
Well, and again, you know, like history unfortunately seems like kind of cruel on this point. And you know, you could even go back like, well, what did it take for us to get to full employment and above trend inflation from the twenty ten Well it took COVID, right, And history seems to be like you have some stable macro regime and then a crisis comes and then you
have a new macro regime. I just thought it was interesting that, like his sort of skepticism that an alternative to the dollar would come about by like sort of like the mechanics of who's running a trade deficit or trade surplus or something like that, and that the flip side of our political dysfunction is the lack of political confidence in any other issuing authority of another currency.
Yeah, that's a good way of putting it. The other thing I thought was interesting was, well, I think one thing that I'm hearing both from this conversation and from the one we recorded with Daryl Duffy is because so much of the financial system is built on bonds. It feels like the risks are higher as we enter this period of higher inflation. Right, there's a tension between bringing down inflation and also having bonds as the sort of stable,
boring bedrock of the financial system. And he mentioned the sovereign bank loop. No one believes me I invented that term.
I don't believe you.
Listeners should see Joe's face right now. He definitely doesn't believe me.
I believe you.
I think it was twenty eleven. I was the first one to use it in an alphaville post during the Green Care You get to google it, all right, see it?
Do it? Shall we leave it that?
Let's leave it there.
Okay. This has been another episode of the Audlots podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy Alloway.
I'm Joe Wisenthal. You can follow me at the Stalwart. Follow our guest Barry Eichen Green He's at b Underscore Aike and Green. Follow our producers Carmen Rodriguez at Carmen Arman, dash Ol Bennett at Dashbot, and our special Jackson Hull producer Sebastian Escobar at under de si bas. For more odd LODs content, go to Bloomberg dot com slash odd Lots, where we have a blog, transcription, a newsletter, and if you want to hang out with other odd Lots listeners
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