Meet the Unsung Hero of the $11 Trillion Index Revolution

But the real birth of the fund was four or five years before that. And so the guy behind it was interviewed in Sam's story, and this is a there was a lot that was going on pre Vanguard, and I think getting at that and looking at that is really interesting. But largely, look, it's the fiftieth anniversary the Index Fund. This is an e t F show et y s would not exist if it wasn't for the

Index Fund. So the Index Fund is sort of the the route which has sprung all of this, UM, all these other things, and it's been obviously taking people have taken it and run with it. So to talk to the person who is even pre vogel uh, you know, is really exciting, and we have them today. His name is mc McCown and he'll be joining us from California for this episode as well as Sam Potter from London.

This time on Trillions, Meet the man who started eleven trillion dollar index Revolution, Sam mac Welcome to Trillions, Thank you, good morning, and hello from Sonoma Wine Country. Okay, Sam, can you set the stage? How did you decide that this was going to be the story that that you were going to pursue? How did I How did I find mac? Well? Um? About six months ago, so I was actually on a cool with Salim Ramsey, who's the glogle head of ice Shares at Black Crop and um.

It was just an introductory called. You know, we haven't spoken before, so we were just chatting, and I was telling him that I was getting really interested in the sort of science of indexing, you know, what was what was kind of underpinning the E t F tidal wave if you like, that's coming through markets and and he and I said, I'm kind of getting into the history of it of how the how Wall three got Bill? And and I said, I'm reading Capital Ideas by by

Peter Bernstein. You know the history of Wall Street. And he said, ah, well, you you must know about Matt mcclown. Then, Um, I said, I don't actually know that name. He said, he said, you must know this guy. This is this is the guy. This is where it started. And I did the obvious. I thought it was Vogel or whatever. He said, No, it's Matt. He's still around. He's in Wine Country having you know this great life. I said, I haven't seen his name in the book though, and

he said keep reading. And then sure enough I was reading couple ideas like one or two weeks later, and I read this. The first wedge into this system was driven by a man with the fine Scottish name of John Andrew mcquowen. Mcquowan has a boyis mop of hair that, though now gray as white, still tumbles down over his forehead. So I thought, okay, I gotta I gotta track down Mac. Um. So, yeah,

I I sort of tracking down. He's also on the board of Dimensional Fund Advisors, which of course is just getting into the TF industry now, and they helped me get ahold of Mac and he was gracious enough to do an interview and it was. It was fascinating stuff. Mac. Can you rewind the Clark fifty plus years now and tell us how did you get the idea for the

index one? Well, it's the story is kind of convoluted, as as all kinds of evolutionary transformative processes seemed to be when I when I was doing graduate work at Harvard, I was Harvard Business School. I was working with a professor from from Sloan School at M I T. Who had collected a bunch of data from Barrens on common

stock on Friday closes. And I was doing programming. I had been involved in programming, and I was fascinated by the parent discrepancy between the behavior of share prices over time from a normal probability distribution. You know a nice bell shaped curve. Well, it doesn't actually look like that.

And fast forward about four or five years and I'm in New York and I ended up at a meeting through more serendipity at Merrill Lynch when Jim, Professor Jim Lorrie, and Professor Lawrence Fisher we're presenting there are initial findings on return on common stocks that Mary Lynch had funded.

And I went up to p pressor Lori afterwards, and I asked him a question about these fat tailed distributions as they were coming to be known, and he said, WHOA, Well, we have a graduate student who knows something about that subject.

That's his dissertation. His name is Gene Fama. And one thing led to another, and I went out to visit my family was to Chicago, and I ended up spending them the Monday morning after Thanksgiving of I remember vividly having a conversation with Jeane Farmer, and he introduced me to Merton Miller, and uh, all of a sudden, I realized that this is what I was suspicious of, was maybe not entirely ill founded, but it was naive relative

to what Jean was actually working on. Well, one thing led to do another, and I ended up being asked by an executive at IBM to give a talk at the IBM Executive Center at San Jose, south of San Francisco in January of sixty four, and in the audience was Ransom Cook, who was the chairman of Wells Fargo. Well I went back to New York and in a few days later, a week later, I got a phone call from from Ransom Cook and he says, I would like you to come back to San Francisco and meet

some of my colleagues. So of course, I took a couple of days off and went back to San Francisco, and I met a number of people, and I went back into Ransom's office. He said to me, so, how much how much money are you making in your in your job in New York? And I said six thousand dollars a year. And he said, how about I offered you a job for eighteen thousand. Would you come to work for me starting immediately? Well, you could have. You

could have knocked me over with a feather. So I get back to New York and I told my wife about this, and then she's not exactly thrilled. But the long and the short of it is, I took the job, and we moved to San Francisco and we began to work on what Ransom called the investment management problem. Bear in mind that computers had just come to the four in in in major banks, and they were mostly being

used for accounting purposes. That was, which is exactly what had been handled by those with green eye shades and arm bands prior. But now the costs had gone up by an order of magnitude, and Ransom said to me, I think it's about time we started looking at what's going on in the data. Well, you gotta get that he was incredibly forsightful, and the fact that I was hired by the chairman really meant that the primary operatives

in the Investment Department and in the Trust department. Um really didn't have very much to say, especially since he wanted me to set up an independent group to do the work, which we did and he personally funded it. We were removed from the Wealth Fargo budgeting process and given a budget by the Chairman. Well, Um, I have to tell you. The first thing I did was go back to Chicago and have a conversation with Jane Farmer,

and we began. He introduced me to Myron Scholes and Fisher Black, and I made a deal with those guys to come work on this problem. Uh. And before all of the death settled, which was several odd years later, we had had twelve different academic consultants working in various in various ways and the various aspects of this puzzle. But what's really interesting about those twelve is that today, if you look back at those twelve. Six of them

have won Nobel Prizes. So there was a heady group and how that happened I don't know, but Ransom Cook and his successor, Dick Cooley funded that research effort. And the upshot was what we called market portfolios. That you you were better off with a portfolio containing every name in the market than any subset, including any index. In fact, Larry Fisher made an astute observation and he simulated every possible portfolio from the original CRISP data set, which started

in and ended in nine six. And what do you noticed was the distributions were bimodal, and what differentiated the two modes with whether the portfolio contained IBM or not. So if you had missed IBM, you would have had a distinctly different investment experience if you had owned everything on the New York Stock Exchange. You mentioned the investment management problem as you described, and can you tell us a little bit more about what that issue was as

you guys saw it? Well, I don't. I'll tell you, Sam, I thought about that question an awful lot of in over the years, for various reasons. But I can I can kind of give you my synoptic view of the investment management problem. Ransom didn't like the way UH this the investment management process was working at the bank. He was suspicious of the way portfolios were being constructed, just

pure intuition. Let me give you a specific example. Wells was just getting into the trust UH advisory business for pension funds at the time, and the largest client they had, whose name I remember vividly and will not identify, had a pension fund of about a half a billion dollars and it was invested in twenty five names. And his intuition was, and he wouldn't have stated it quite this way, but that that part was under diversified. Well that would

go down as the understatement of the month. And he and he couldn't get an answer out of the investment department that satisfied him. And that is exactly why he went it was invited to and went to this conference that IBM had put on about down in San Josey about bringing analytical procedures to databases, and so it just it just was an outcropping of his intuition. Well, of course he was exactly right, as you work through all of this stuff that we were doing in those days.

The one thing that struck me and a lot of us as just how representative of the New York Stock Exchange is or isn't. So we discovered that NICO had collected a bunch of data on Japan East first section of the Tokyo Exchange, and Wells Fargo used this relationship to NICO, actually too the Industrial Bank of Japan who had in turn and introduced me to NICO, and we got an opportunity to run some tests on the NICO data.

And basically what we found was the same thing, which is the best portfolio with the portfolio that contained all names, same exact algorithms, same assumptions, same everything. So talk about an out of sample experience that's about as distant from from sample bias as you can get. So anyway, that is kind of the base and we call it from which what we called, as I said, we called the

market market funds. And we began to look at the SPS just and remember the SNP didn't actually exist until somewhere around nineteen fifty seven or fifty six, or fifties seven or eight or nine somewhere there. Prior to that, there were variations that SMP had but the five itself, I think originated in the early in the mid fifties, and then they went back and and and back assembled the data to recalculate the SMP five hundred back I forget how far, quite a few decades, several decades, four

or five decades. So while they were doing that, we got to know the SMP people and what was the basis upon which they chose the five stocks. And that made a lot of us pretty suspicious because instead of having a random sample or some kind of like the doll thirty index, which is pretty subjective as well, the investment committee at SMP was choosing the five hundred, So we were kind of right back in the same puzzled.

But in any event, the S and P five hundred was becoming the benchmark by which people were judging portfolios. So it was perfectly obvious that the thing you should do is just offer the SMP five hundred at a price about a quarter of what they were selling investment management for at the time, which was by way about about a hundred basis points versus. And of course now

that is down to five or whatever it is. But the point of the matter is what was clear to us that I think pretty much at the beginning was that the more names you had in the portfolio, the better. And we were instrumental also in getting the beginning of data collected for the American Exchange and also the OTC market, which became NASDAC. You mentioned the s and you a portfolio that s and pole of hundreds of way to go, but that that wasn't the first fund, wasn't. That wasn't

what you did with the very first one. Can you tell us a bit about the construction of that one? Well, the first the first fund was actually the the All New York Fund, which was about six hundred names. But we made the mistake initially of equal weighting the portfolio in our simulations, and it became apparent right away that

there was something wrong with that. And of course what happened was we realized that it needed to be market capitalization weighted, not equal weighted, because of course, what happened when you equal way of portfolio like that as you overwake the riskiest stocks. So the market cap weights were became all of a sudden the unambiguous preference for those

kinds of portfolios. But it was not the SMP. It was the All New York I have a question, so, and I like asking this about people who were right there and at the option moment, when you locked into that moment where you're like, the more stocks the better, the diversified portfolio is better, which is obviously the inception

moment of what would be the index fund. Did you know is a big idea at the time or was it just another you know, part of your day and you had your mind on other things like how much did you identify the legs this idea had? Well, I can tell I can tell you right now I did not have my mind on anything else. That I promise you my work week and those in those days was about eighty hours and you know, and and the Wealth

Fargo people, to their credit realize that. And you know, within a very short time, my my wages went from eighteen thousand to forty So I was by far the highest paid, uh young vice president at well Fargo Bank. And I was the reason I I got away with it. It was because the chairman approved it. But if you don't think I wasn't conscious of the fact that we had uncovered something serious that I was, all of us were. I don't mean to say that I was alone by

no means. I mean Myron and Fisher and and we we had a lot of We had a lot of influence from Jack Trayner, who was a very important thinker about this topic in the beginning. Uh. And the more we had conversations with various academics, including people from M I. T. And and Berkeley and Stanford and so forth, the more academic interest was surfaced. And I think that while the Chicago guys were leading the crowd, and especially Jeane Parma and Larry Fisher and Jim Laurie and and and the

godfather I think was really Merton Miller. You have to give him probably the seminal original credit for the analytical foundation that just the Chicago School was based on. But when you got right down to it, uh, this was still with the influence of computers and data and it's very nascent years. Remember I'm very fond of pointing out that the first stock traded was that was the India East. It was the East India Company. It was traded on the on the fledgling Amsterdam Exchange in sixteen o two.

And it wasn't until nineteen that we had an algorithm for measuring risk adjusted performance. So for three d and sixty six years people were constructing portfolios with no fee back loops. Yeah, I think, you know, we take a lot of that for granted, for sure. And I guess I would say, Okay, so you have this big idea. You know it's a good idea. Can you talk about how you tried to implement it and the first funds and and you know how it went to try to

get to actually put money into in indexing. Well again, you know, all I would say is serendipity rears its proverbial head, all right. Keith Schwaider it was a graduate of the Graduate School of Business from Chicago and his family owned Sampson I in Denver, and Jim Laurie and introduced me to Keith, and he came to San Francisco and we had company. We had discussions about this and immediately, uh, he wanted to see some of the samson I pension fund invested in and what we did call an index fund.

So we we we kind of invented an index fund that would would work. And that was the first one. Well. Immediately thereafter, or very close to immediately there after, the the Wells Fargo Pension Fund. We had a big shot of capital put into Remember this is a commingled trust now it's not a registered mutual fund. But the long and the short of it is, it became apparent very

soon that we needed broader, diversified portfolios. And because of SMP five was such a popular a referent, it became apparent that that was one of the places to go. And of course it wasn't long thereafter until we had an opportunity to meet Jack Bogel and and and he was interested in and he was already interested for his own reasons and the idea of what amounted to an index fund. I'm not sure he called it that. In fact,

I'm not sure anybody did. But I got introduced to Jack Bogel by a former SEC commissioner who I had met at the University of Chicago's Center for Research and Securities Prices that LORI engineered. Shortly after the the you know, the security that Center for Security Research and Securities Prices, the christ Data came into existence. He created this bi annual seminar twice a year seminar. It had about thirty different major financial institutions attending, and and and that that

Pow Wow two Day, Powell Spring and Fall. I went to the very first one, which was in sixty four, and I went to everyone until I left well Fargo, and they invited me back on several occasions uh thereafter. So I was not only through my my period that through seventy four as well, but pretty close to n I was still going to the CRISP Seminar. Well, that's where all this stuff was being discussed. First National Bank of Chicago, JP, Morgan, Chase, you know, all the major

names in banking. They were all members of the CRISP Seminar. And we're listening to all this stuff going on. Well, so this, this this influence that that index Funds was beginning to have, wasn't was not limited to Wells Fargo by any stretch of the imagination. And a quick quick question. You mentioned meeting Bogel. Were you still in the early early seventies here or is this more towards I was around seventy four. I'm going to say, Okay, so did

he come to you. That's after he left Wellington, which was an active fund he was it was it was during okay, it was during the formation of Gotcha it's interesting um that obviously was a huge situation UM where Bogol was basically fired by the people he had acquired it. Uh. When he was running Wellington's he was an advocate of active funds to a degree. Then he starts Vanguard as a back office company. The index fund just is a is a way for him to not manage money while

managing money. It was kind of an interesting loophole. My question to you is, as you saw a Vanguard come out with this unique mutual ownership structure and then they go and get the index fund, how did you see that? Like, because the mutual ownership structure I think probably deserves a lot of credit for constantly lowering the fees of the index funds over the years, But how did you see the potential of Vanguard or only on as well? Well, Eric, you put your finger on one of my hot buttons.

Let me tell you what actually happened at Wills Fargo. We got registered at the SEC what was called the Stagecoach Fund. But in June, the Supreme Court came down in a decision of the Investment Company Institute versus the Controller of the Currency As giving permission to City Bank to sell commingled mutual funds being a violation of Glass Stiegel.

Remember Glass Steagle separated investment banks from commercial banks. We were ready to sell the Stagecoach fund in in Ransom Cooks Branches, and it got shot down by that Supreme Court decision. I see I v. Camp Descent June. Look it up. The banks could sell co mingled trusts, but they could not sell registered mutual funds. They were securities, not loans, and not trusts. Remember the idiocy emerging from

Congress created those laws. They did not know what they were doing, and I guess I would say as usual. So you basically were unable to really capitalize and commercialize on the idea because of that ruling in law and that when when I met Jack Bogel and told Ransom and Dick what Jack wanted to do, he said, give him Allery's Our research were restricted. We can't do it, but it needs to get done. You can read in Jack's writings too, he he gave us credit for it.

Did you and Jack exchange Christmas cards from therefore? Yeah? I mean I had a very personal relationship with Jack. We weren't really very close, remember we were we were oceans apart or not like what a continent apart. I mean I saw him fairly often. And before Jack died, you know, we got the the CMME Award. I can't even think when that was for innovation in corporate finance. So mac h Wells Fargo was limited in in the way it could deploy this, and obviously Jack benefit immensely

from that. But I think we should also note that um Wells Fargo did, did capitalize on on it, and had an incredible legacy because what you built, what you started at Wells eventually became Barkley's Global Investors, if I'm right, and that Lawrence Stye Shares, which was then brought by black Rock. So um, it was an incredible it was the beginning of an incredible uh kind of achievement. Well

that's right. I mean, you know, we created well for our investment advisors to be the advisor to the Stagecoach Fund. That was the original plan before I see I V Camp came down. Ah and as a matter of fact, Coolly made me the chairman of of w f I A and we hired an independent guy to become the CEO. Came from outside the bank and uh, and we were all we were all literally we were literally ready to go to market when I see I V camp came down and I remember June one, like I was yesterday,

we were on the on the cost of doing that. Mac. I have a question related to that time. How what was the computing speed and prowess like at that time, because obviously I'm I'm guessing these machines were huge. How what was it like to feed data into that? And how long were you waiting to get the feedback? I mean, your feedback loop was one thing, but like you know, this was state at the state of the art at

the one at the time. Right. Well, you're that's something very very good question, Joel, because well, you know, another another innovation that was just coming to the four in those days was what we call time sharing. Well, time sharing was the idea that you could hook up a bunch of different as it were, teletype machine to a single computer and the computer could multiplex the input and output from a teletype machine to a computer. And the IBM three six seven was the first from commercial scale

computer of that kind. And well farther we were just adopting three sixties at the time, and I convinced coolly to let us buy a sixty seven and so that we could have a terminal, actually two terminals in the

Management Sciences department. And the reason he went for it was that he another group at the bank we're working on the idea of an automated teller terminal, and it became apparent that we could utilize we could have teller terminals that were being multiplexed by the same kind of a computer where when you went into the bank to cash your check, you could actually in real time discover whether or not there was a balance into your account. So there was there was a movement in the direction

of what I call remote computing. And we had we the Management Science department had access to that three sixty six seven immediately upon them when it came out, and that was about nine sixties six or six seven, something like that. So we had gone from having to fuss around at an IBM data center h to having our own U teletype machine with access to the data that

we stored on the three seven. So that was another very critical thing that that addict Cooley did was introduced time sharing or multiplexing, right terminal multiplexing into the picture. And that was about the same time so all of a sudden, the productivity of of these guys doing analytical work skyrocketed because you didn't have to go stand in the front of a computer and feed punch cards into it. The long and the short of it is, it was

concurrent that that occurred. And again I would characterize that as yet more serendipity. You know, you said earlier you worked with what was it six people who went on in one Nobel Prizes um And I mean just you were, you know, a pioneer effectively right and working with a ton of smart people. And I'm just wondering, like, for those of us who get to, you know, you know, look back on your story, what do you feel like

the keys of that of good collaboration were. Well, that's a that's a very that's a very interesting question, Joel. I mean, we spend the rest of the day on that question. A. H. Well, you need to have a certain openness. At the same time, you have a very critical mind, and you're you're and you're willing to challenge anything. I would characterize it as the Chicago school at work. I mean, I think that you know, Milton Freeman was a champion of that point and several others before him,

including fa Hiak and so forth. But you know, really critical thinking and and economics was generally missing. And tell about that same time. Now. When I say in economics, I'm referring to predominantly macro economics and not micro econ comics. But critical thinking kind of came to both and with the onset of the computer and the database, and prior to that there was an awful lot of I regard Kenes, for example, as gibberish. It just it doesn't make any

sense when you put the blade to it. It doesn't stand the test. That just wasn't available until considerably later. I guess it was like a perfect storm in that period, and it was influencing all kinds of things, index funds being only one. So can you apply that that critical thinking to the current moment? Oh well, I'm not a very big fan of um, I'm not a very big out of Let me call it h on grounded meaning

without data analysis. I just I can't characterize it as subjectivism versus data driven science, and the world is a wash in subjectivism and data. Data driven science is only beginning to invade the hallowed halls of subjectivism and and of course politics is the is the epicenter of subjective is along with religion. And I can't tell the difference between politics and religion, but Matt can. Matt, what about for the investment industry, for the state of indexing now

with you know, eleven trillion or whatever we are at now? Um, when look at that, now, what's your sort of critical thought crisis? Well, Sam, you know, eleven trillion is a major understatement, right, because that's only the admitted indexing. Just think about the closet indexing. There's a lot of incentive to keep fees high, and the way to do that is to do an index fund. But call it something else, or let me put it another way to do a

market portfolio. Right, it's not necessarily an inda, but there's a you know, closet passive is everywhere. I would my guess is at least two thirds of the market is passive and maybe maybe maybe more like But it would be very difficult to put a number to that because you have to collect an off lot of data. But

it's eleven trillion is an understatement by a lot. Um, let me jump in here with that whole premise, because um, eleven trillion is the public fund that's quote passive, but some of that is in smart data where they took the index fund and they put active metrics and overlays and on the flip. You're right, there's a bunch of active discretionary funds that basically hold the S and p UM. So it's very blurry, which is my answer to people when they say, oh my god, passive is taking over.

It's going to ruin the stock market. We're all going to die, which is this sort of fear of But I'm like, it's so nuanced and gray between active and passive it just doesn't bother me. But I guess I would like to get your take on some of the people who fear that passive is growing too big and is distorting fundamentals could result in some kind of a market structure issue. They don't they just don't understand the situation. Eric Com, I'm right back to my basic point. It's

subjectivism versus data driven science. When you when you allow the data to speak to you, that clears up that fog. Remember, share prices get formed because people are buying and selling shares. Right, if buying and selling shares stopped, I don't know what you would have for prices. You wouldn't have any prices. But do you think buying and selling is going to stop? I mean, it's and it's not because somebody thinks they

know more than the market does. There's a whole lot of reasons why people buy and sell, and some of it is valuation related, and some of it is liquidity related, and some of it is a trust account related, and I mean it's just there's an impossible assortment of motives behind people buying and selling shares, and that's just that's just never gonna stop. I mean, I'm never worried about that one. And just generally the e t F Right, so you've got index funds were launched. Bogel popularized them

with Vanguard. He was not a fan of e t F. He he wanted people to stick in the long term. E t F s come out, they trade, some of them are used in place of futures. What's your take on the e t F world? And did you ever meet Nate Most and Steve Blueman am X when they

were coming up with their E t F for spy host? Yeah? Sure, you've got to remember what on E t F his Remember what preceded, You remember closed down the mutual funds, and then there was opened end mutual funds, and you t F is just an amalgam of those two things, right, And we were talking about e t F way before they existed. It Again, it's it's right back to foolishness in Congress of trying to distinguish between closed end funds and opened end funds. It was protocols that were put

in place by regulation, not not by economics. So you you could have an e t F that was closed and would be called a closed end fund, and you could have a conventional mutual fund that was that is open ended, whose shares were traded in a competitive market, that would be an e t F. Right, there's just there's nothing novel and new about an e t F. It's just a it's an amalgam of opened and closed funds. We should have had him a long long time ago.

We we talked about that idea going way back. We talked about that idea to the commissioners at the SEC. And again I'm the ex commissioner whose name I'm not going to use because I haven't seen him in years, and I don't even know whether he's alive, but he was a champion of thinking through new things, even though in his days as a commissioner of the SEC that was the last thing that they were doing. They weren't thinking,

they were just regulating. There's a distinction, Mac, I want to ask before we we finish, Presumably you're invested in index funds. I imagine, Oh, yes, indeed we are. Are you like, are you like a by the total market fund kind of guy or do you sort of have maybe more index funds that you specialize at all or customize. Well, if you take all the different kinds of index funds and put them in a portfoli you get a market port. So your port you're a very simple portfolio, you know

kind of investor. Okay, yeah, well I'm an entrepreneur. Most of my wealth is involved in startup companies. Right. Well that actually I had a really question which was, um, you know, Sam in the article reminded me that you were a mechanical engineer by training and I'm by by schooling, Just wondering how how do you think that informs your your outlook? I mean, obviously you're you made a really clear point on being you know, praising objectivity and data

above all else. But like talked about talk to us about how you look at the world through the lens of a being a mechanical engineer. I grew up on a farm. I split my early life between my mother and father. My father was a businessman. We lived in the edge of this little town, and his elder brother rand the family farming operation, which was seven miles away. So I ended up growing up in two families uh one uh in literally in the country where we were.

We were growing all kinds of grains and lagoons and so forth, of feed, the whole assortment of livestock right. And I've I've been often asked what because I'm very fond of my early life on the farm, And I'm often asked what did you learn and when you are on the farm? And I have evolved a good answer to that question. I learned that you can't bullshit the bull It does not work. And if you get into the world of data, it's the same point if the data doesn't if it's not in the data, it's not

there now, mind you. Teasing conclusions out of big data sets is a complicated topic, and of course I began to do just exactly that when I was in an engineering student. And remember that was when computers first began, So I started programming computers when I was still an engineering student. I mean, I mean, don't don't ask me why because I have no idea. That's just the way it was. Um. The last question we always ask gun trillions. Really curious what you're gonna say? Um, what is your

favorite each you have ticker? Well, uh, I have a good answer to that. None, I have to tell you, I think um. Jack Bogel had a very similar response. Now, Vogel's response was, because you know, he wasn't a fan of ets, was c r z y, which isn't a ticker, but it's what he thinks of them. You guys are similar in that in that answer with not really giving one. Mac Sam, thanks so much for joining us in trillion. My pleasure, You guys, thanks for listening to Trillions until

next time. You can find us on the Bloomberg terminal, Bloomberg dot com, Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and wherever else you like to listen. We'd love to hear from you. We're on Twitter. I'm at Joel Webber Show. He's at Eric Faltunus, and you can find Sam at Sam J. Potter. This episode of Trillions was produced by Magnus Hendrickson. Francesca Levy is the head of the Homeberk podcast VI