2008: The ETF Retrospective

have many vivid memories, less than I thought. Neither did I. I actually, for me that it was I can bring this back to a podcast because Planet Money did this amazing episode about the financial crisis, and that I was not in financial journalism yet, and that was the thing that actually helped me understand what what was happening around us. I was in financial journalism at the beginning of my career in the late nineties, so I very much remember

the Clinton years. But then I went to data. You know, I was working in funds, but we just had to get the n A V up, the shares out the holdings. Our job was much more mechanical than tied to the markets, whether markets up or down, you still have to get that data in there, and that was my main focus. That's why most of my memories are from my own account and remembering the political aspect to that crisis more

than you know the financial aspect. But going back surprised me actually, And there's many different ways you could call call it a tenure anniversary, right, but I think the one that that everyone's gonna hang their hat on is gonna be the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, which pappens September. And I also think that over time two thous eight becomes this boogeyman that is so big you just assume the whole year was this giant black hole. It cast this

long shadow. It still gets brought up, but when you go back, there were definitely some some rough points, but it was much more diverse than just this general general black hole of of market. And then let's bring it back to et S because that's what we're going to spend the episode, talking about both what happened that year and what's happened since. And you found what five or

so data points that we're gonna walk through. Yeah, So in preparing for this, I went through I just found I thought five stats that I found interesting, surprising, and pointed to deeper issues within how ETFs handled and behaved in two thousand eight. And because neither of us were

really on the front lines. Were joined by a wonderful guest, Christine Harper, who is the editor of Bloomberg Markets magazine, and in two thousand eight she was actually covering banking for Bloomberg News, so she was literally at the front lines. That's basically the world started to crumble. So she'll be joining us and kind of helping us bring a different perspective of what it was actually like to be watching this thing in slow motion this week on Trilliance, Remembering

two thousand eight and what it all means. Now, Okay, so Eric, you've got a stat that you want to start with. Christine Harper is joining us. She's the editor of Bloomberg Markets Magazine. She's also the author of a book forthcoming book about Paul Volker, which we're all really excited about. Eric, what's the first step. The first step is e t f s took in a hundred and seventy five billion dollars in flows in two thousand and eight.

That is a bit right. So first of all, the context is I find this data shocking because the word on the street, especially from active funds, is hey, all you people going to passive that they're all weekends are going to flip out as soon as the market gets tough, and it's gonna the market will blow up even more because of all these e t f s. But if you look back in two thousand eight, e t F took in a hundred and seventy four billion, index mutual

funds took in another looks like ninety billion, and active mutual funds lost two hundred and fifty nine billions. So if anything, it was the active mutual fund investors who got um you know, scared or panicked and left, whereas the e t F investors. Again, this is a net number over the year. Within months, there was definitely some volatility in and out of some products, but that is quite a shocking number in my opinion, given that you would think that e t fs are used more by

retail and advisors, less sophisticated investors. They trade intra day and so they would be sold off in mass and people running for the hills. Christine, I want to I want to rewind the clock too. You were on the finance team covering Goldman Morgan Stanley. How familiar were you

with ETFs at that point in time? So at that point in time, we I knew they existed, but what I'd like to say is that at that point you can almost think of the run up to the financial crisis as a run up in investment in a liquid products.

I mean, Goldman Sachs disclosed in early two thousand seven that they had a hundred and eleven billion dollars of assets that they defined I gotta read this phrase as more difficult to fund on a secure basis during times of market stress that was up, that was more than double two years earlier, everybody was, you know, plunging into mortgage backed securities that were put into c d O s and then into c d O squares, things that were almost inherently illiquid, with the assumption that they would

always go up in value or they could always find liquidity. And they always had these you know, great acronyms of nbs and c d O s. But the point was they were all traded through banks that none of them were on exchanges. They were very difficult to get out

of when people wanted to get out of. So my theory is that E t F s, almost by dint of the fact that they were exchanged traded funds, became the one of the go to assets just purely for I mean, t bills were trading trading negatively at that period. People just wanted liquidity, no matter what the cost. So it makes a lot of sense to me that all this money that was desperately getting out of a liquid

credit was going into exchange traded funds. Because also another thing that was happening at that point for the banks, there became this vogue for reporting what did you ever hear this term level three assets? Probably it rings all that became very, very very important to investors during the financial crisis because what it is is it's the most hard to value assets on banks balance sheets, and those were the ones nobody wanted, right, So exchanged anything exchange

traded as a level one asset, that's great. Then level two are things where there's some inputs that are a little bit less clear. Level three are the ones where they're basically it's their own model that tells them how much it's worth. And so literally investors were demanding, we were sending headlines on the amount of level three assets that banks had and that banks were trading on how

liquid they were. I'm sure those stories were getting highly highly read, yes, and so any amount of any any It makes sense to me that people are going into exchange traded funds purely for liquidity. And the other thing which we've talked about a lot, the you know c d O s and if he has were part of the problem was that you didn't know what you exact There was no transparency, and so almost the perfect antidote to that was an exchange trade exactly where you could

see what you're you were getting. When when Um in the book I wrote nameless plug, one of the advantages that I don't want to hear it again. You don't even know what it is, and that's not the name the institutional e t F two. Okay, all right, we're friends again. Okay, all right. Um. One of the advantages that I will riff off this, which was when I was going through and interviewing people by advantages, is fiduciary vehicle.

And I think that speaks to the level one asset, the fact that there's a prospectus tied to it, the fact that it's a forty act fund. I do think that probably give people a lot of comfort in a time of derivatives, and the fact that you know it trades like futures, but it is backed. Those stocks that are in the e t F are with a custodian physically backed probably did help that year in terms of being a contrast to these other products. And there's real

time pricing, right, that's very transparent. Okay, Point number two, this one riffs great off of the first conversation, which is that each f S traded just about trillion dollars worth of shares. Now that's significant for a couple of reasons. First of all, it's more than the US GDP. That's a lot of money exchanging hands. Second, that is by and far the most et f s ever traded in a year ever to this day, and they only had

a sixth of the assets back then. Why. Here's why, and it just speaks what when the going gets tough, E t f s tend to be traded more and more. They sort of thrive in volatility. They are trading vehicles, so when people are uncertain, that's when they tend to go up. And they tend to be about of the equity trading every day, but in highly volatile times they can be and this has been indicated since then. Um. In fact, I've frequently charted sp wise dollar volume with

the VIX. I mean it perfectly overlays. In other words, it's almost like E t F volume is a fear gauge. And part of the reason is people can use et F to short there's options on them. There's all kinds of ways you can use them to protect yourself, go along, speculate, and ultimately their liquids so on the portfolio. If you don't want to disturb your individual holdings, the E t F might be the first thing you move around to

deal with what's happening out there. I like the idea of E t F s a the fear gauge, right, And we talked about that actually a little earlier in the year with what happened back in February when we also saw some volatility. When you look back and can kind of compare the volatility at those two moments and the volumes that were happening, what do you what do you notice between what we saw earlier this year? How do they compare? Just size? Uh, you know, early February

was pretty intense. Uh. The spy traded about ninety billion on a couple of days. That's almost its record was a hundred billion just about back in two thousand eight, So it had a day or two in February where

almost trade as much. But you have to remember SPY is much bigger than it was back then, so if you adjust for the asset size two eight, you could argue was two or three times more than anything that's happened, since that's how mega that year was in certain days, and there was even a month where SPY traded over a trillion dollars into this day, that's the most it ever traded in a month, which which month was that October? That was the roughest month of the of the year.

So what what how much bigger is the et F market now than it was ten years ago? Six times? So now it's got three point six trillion and it had about six billion back then. So that is why that number, that dollar volume number, because when you make a dollar volume, you adjust for the assets. So that's that is an I mean, if you take six billion and put into trillion, what is that that's the amount of turnover that year in e t F. It's a

large number, way larger than normal. And Christine, can you now that we know October was that that that month with that volume, can you put us back in what it was like then, Well, October, you're right, I mean that was the most dire month. That was a month where you know, so it was September every but you know, Lehman got went bankrupt. Meryl was acquired by Bank of America. A week later, Goldman and Morgan Stanley converted to bank holding companies supervised by the FED. They also both got

equity injections. In Goldman's case it was from Warren Buffett and uh Morgan Stanley's case it was from this Japanese bank. Um. But it wasn't until October that Paulson then sent Secretary of the Treasury Hank Paulson brought all the CEOs of the nine biggest financial institutions at the time to Washington and basically told them they were going to all get equity. This was the tart the first round of the tarp, and that was the point at which people started to

feel like, okay, there's a bottom to this. But right up to that point, and that was Columbus Day. I remember, it was a it was a national it was federal holiday. Um so one of those convenient federal holidays where everybody actually works, but yeah, exactly. The markets were open, I think yeah, so um, but it was it was really unclear. And there was also that vote in Congress I think in early October before that when they voted down the TARP originally, and that was I think you'll remember that

was when the market really went. That was one of the worst days in the equities market we saw, and then they reversed the vote. But I wouldn't be surprised if that day when the vote on TARP, the first vote on TARP happened, whether that wasn't the day when you saw the biggest trading. And one thing to add here is even though E t F s I think got a good grade in two thousand eight were trading and I think they did well. I just saw the

Turkey et F traded fine through all the drama. Briggs that they did well, but they've had a couple problems. August fifteen, that was that was some crazy days in the market. That day, in particular, what happened was E

t F started trading at discounts. And it wasn't just some exotic ones like X I V. There's been some sort of exotic blow ups here and there, but this was like Vanguard Dividend e t F, and I think what what really is important remember here is as long as the exchange is having pricing for the stocks and the bond market is it available to investors, and there's futures pricing. As long as these inputs are available to

market makers, ets will trade fine. I called that the plumbing when the some hiccups start to emerge on August, they had made rules from the flash crash that had limits. So if an e t F started to trade, um, I think it was belower above ten percent, they just halted it. So what happens is stocks were halted, but the e t F wasn't, and so market makers did not know how to price what the e t F was worth. That's the worst they've cleaned that up since then.

That's why Bragg's it did fine. But that's so I just want to point out that e t f s are they have a good record, but there have been some cases. Usually it's involved if there's lack of pricing in the underlying holdings of e t f s. That's when you can have a problem with the e t

F trading. That's interesting because I think it was an October two thousand night also when they halted sword sales because the bank started complaining that their stocks were falling to and uh and so it's interesting that e t F survived that without any hiccups because that caused a lot of issues. If that happens, the e t F will trade, but it will move away from its fair value, and sometimes that fair value is actually stale. It hasn't

taken into account like other data. Um, So the takeaway here is that, uh, you know, they're not they are vulnerable if in fact there's a problem with the anything that they hold. Okay, Number three, we're gonna talk about active, right, Yeah, because two thirds of active mutual funds underperformed the S and P five. This was big for a couple of reasons. One, the market was down, so you had to be really

bad to underperform it. That to me, I think left the bad taste and a lot of investors mouths because I think they thought, hey, look, I'm paying you this money. Couldn't you have sidestep this at all? And you're seeing some high profile people actually pull off, like, you know, the biggest win of all time basically with some of their bets. Yeah, and normally two thirds of active equity

funds will underperform the benchmark. But a lot of the active managers will say, well, that's just because of quantitative easing in this bull market, it's made it harder to outperform. But this data shows that it's kind of doesn't matter the market and the two thirds number, to me, is really the cost issue. If you took away all their fees, you'd have two thirds of them outperforming. So cost is a big issue why they underperformed. But the other issue

is that active managers. I have empathy for them. If you're an active equity fund, a lot of times you you can't not hold these big stocks in the sp because if you don't hold them when the market's going up, you'll lag and get fired. So that's what's developed what's

called closet indexing. And I don't quite blame them because advisors like something that mirrors the index, and so a lot of them were just holding the same stock, so there's no way they could have possibly sidestepped it when they're holding the same thing perform and that's the conundrum they're currently in. I mean, I'd talk of fund managers all that year, and there was a sort of desire on the part of a lot of them to believe

the worst was over. So you had the Barristern's collapse in March, and then we interviewed financial stock investors who were convinced, Okay, that's it, you know, let's get in, and of course they got slaughtered. In the second half of the year, the same thing. People were getting into Fannie and Freddie convinced that there was no way it would I mean, there were just nobody had ever seen anything like this, so they kept jumping in trying to

catch this falling knife and getting burned by it. And then and also I mean, I think, I think, I think hedge funds didn't didn't prove themselves to be such great hedges. And with a few very notable examples, and here's one example. The worst of the big active funds was Fidelity Magellan. It was down that year. That must have been one of the falling knife catchers. Okay, number four. Number four Gold showed the meaning of zero correlation. And what I mean by that is gold is perceived as

a safe haven. Gold was up three percent that year, so while it didn't go down, it didn't exactly offset the losses in the SP correlated with anything correct, It's got zero correlation, which interesting the next year when the

market rebounded, gold rebound rate with it. Well, I think what it is correlated with is inflation fears, and so as the central banks went in and started pumping in liquidity late in two thousand eight early two thousand nine, that's when you saw a lot of big investors say, oh, this is a time to start hoarding gold and buying real estate and preparing for you know, hyperinflation, which of course by two thousand twelve they realized wasn't coming. And

I think that's true. Gold has a lot of currents coming at it um. You know, there's there's emerging markets, buyers that come in and weird you know. You I learned to appreciate the zero correlation because it doesn't do what anybody thinks it should do. And that's why I think it's a decent diversifier, because it's that's special. Almost everything is negative or positive correlation, but it's not. It's a shaky hedge, and I think that's where it gets

miss characterized a lot. But what was a good hedge, what really worked was long dated treasuries T l T which is the twenty plus your treasury e t F was up the exact same amount of the market was down, So if you had long dated treasurys, you completely offset your losses in the market. And the best performing e t F that year was e d V, which is an extended duration TRIST Treasury strips the duration on that's like twenty seven years, so it has the highest interest

rate sensitivity possible. That was up fifty that year. And as long as we're talking about performance, you pulled a couple of other numbers that are sort of noteworthy to write the VIX right. So the VIX was up and um, their vix et p s are controversial because they always they have role costs that can be a year. So VXX is down since launching. However, in a crisis, that role cost can turn into roll yield. So the VIX Futures Index, which VXX tracks, because VXX wasn't around two,

it was up a hundred and twenty. In other words, if you help vicks futures, enrolled them because the demand for short term VIXED futures was so high, you actually were buying low and selling high constantly, and you actually made a one guy in his garage did that, Well, that's like the black swan, right. Well, that to me, I call that the jackpot potential. And that's why the vix products are media proof. They've never gotten a good review.

They're like an Adam Sandler movie, like they've literally never They always get trashed, but they see a lot of volume because when they work, there's nothing like it um where I like, I like when people UM give possible black swans, I'm like, if you know it, it's not the black swan, right, because you're being trading it, right, Yeah, it's some unknown thing that we don't know. Okay. Number five, the junk bond etf saw inflows of one point five billion.

I found this astonishing because h y G is the big junk bond I don't know. In fact, what's interesting is if you look at the h y G s performance that year, it was okay until about October, and then it went down thirty percent in ten weeks. I mean, this was a blood bath. It was the It was the reason people worry about junk bonds. This was the kind of sell off that has people shorting junk bond ETFs every now and then. In mass and it went down that much, and there was a couple of days

of outflows, but mostly it saw inflows. There were buyers apparently for the e t F at that time. I don't remember. Again, I wasn't studying as it closely, but um, that's when it saw its most inflows and then when it hit that bottom boy, where the flow is really

coming in. So clearly there are these vulture type buyers out there, which should give some comfort because h y G to me is the canary in the coal mine in terms of people worrying about the et F structure because they're like, well, yeah, sure to can do equities, but junk bond you can't really wrap that up. I mean Carl Icon and Howard Marks had both come out and said you cannot have a liquid instrument tracking something

in liquid. And it was a rough year. There was premium discounts of eight percent, but it it survived, It saw inflows, and then after that it's obviously built its fan base. Was it relatively small at that stage? Yes, I will say the small is a double edged sword, because yes it was. And that's a great point you bring up, because I will say that prims and discounts and h YG have shrunk so much over the past ten years because more and more market makers make a

market in it. However, h y G has vampired away some of the liquidity from the high yield market. And this is my big worry about et f s is not the asset growing, it's the vampire of liquidity. Because if more and more people just get lazy and say I'm just going to trade h y G instead of trading high yield debt myself because it's easier, that does

steal some of the liquidity. So we have a stat that says h y G is still only two percent ownership of all the junk bonds, but it accounts for of all high yield debt trading today and it was nowhere near those numbers back then. So on one hand, there's more market makers watching it, which you could argue is good, but another hand, it's way bigger part of the market, which means there's probably arguably less liquidity in

the junk bonds. And this gets back to something I think Christine can talk about, which is complacency that now, I mean, you know, when everything's going up, as we've just described, all of these products and everything going up for the longest period. So everything was terrific in two thousand and seven when all of the subprime c dos seem to be performing and people weren't so worried, So

that's why people were loading up on them. But as soon as it turns around, people were completely shocked at how a liquid and how you know, little they understood these products. And the fear I think is that E t F have become such a part of the furniture now people just assume they're always going to work. There's no example of them failing in a big way, and

so people get complacent about that. And and yet the market is morphing in really important ways, as you've been describing, and so that could mean the whole landscape is extremely different if and when as a classes fall, especially if they've fallen some kind of correlated way. Yeah, and I think E t F s right now, Um, they own about eight percent of stocks, but the account for about like I said, twenty five, the trading in a crisis, as long as the stocks are trading, somebody can rbin.

The E t F investor will have a market. But if there are no buyers for junk bonds for that time, there's probably going to be a huge discount that uh happens in H Y G or whatever E t F it is. So I always tell people, ask yourself this question. You have three choices. You can use the E t F, you can use the active mutual fund, but that manager will have to try to sell those securities the end of the day anyway if you redeem. And the third

thing is do it yourself. So on a really hurricane type day when the big one hits, which would you rather try to sell? Because none of them are going to be great, and so you sort of have to just decide from there. And if you pick the E

t F knowing like all of that, it's good. But if you go into the E t F thinking it is utopia because it has traded so perfectly, I do think you'll be disappointment disappointments because you went in there thinking it's like this perfect magical vehicle, but in effect it's not. So I also want to talk about a few people who who doubled down in the midst of all of this. Can we talk about that? Sure? Because Vanguard in particular, what what happened when you looked at

those investors. This is this is unbelievable numbers. I was shocked. Um Again, I looked this up because on Twitter, a lot of people will say, oh, wait, till the big one hits these passive investors, they're going to lose their marbles. So I go back to Vanguard. Vanguard took in money every month, including October. They took in ninety billion dollars that year. The rest of the industry combine lost I

think about a hundred billion. It's in these times of crisis that Vanguard UM sees their absolute flows go down a little bit, but they increased their market share. That's when they gobble up a little market share against the other competitors. But I was stunned. This is navy seals like disciplined if you're actually putting in money. In two thousand eight October, Vanguard at acts really like hardcore discipline

bogel head type investors. Now, some people say since then they've attracted more common folk who aren't like bogel heads, and we'll we'll see if that plays out. But I have seen these mini crisis Vanguard does seem to be stickier than most. There's one other uh two eight anecdote that I think, because we're talking about two th eight, we have to bring up which was smart Bata was

around then, and there's a product called called PRF. And we talked about this briefly before, but smart Beata basically starts its process every quarter and then rebalances, and PRF sauce up thing and took advantage of it. Do you want to describe what happened? Yes, So in the industry we call this the immaculate rebalance. That's just the best name this is because if they don't have that on their shirts and hand get credit to Ben Johnson at morning.

Sorry he came up with it, but it's it's actually really fascinating. In two thousand eight, let's face it, it was it was a tough to buy bank stocks. If you're an active manager, you probably fired on the spot if you went in and bought City Group, right. Well, smart data products are just active but put into a rules based index, so they're like robots. They have to just screen the stocks every quarter, and if they're cheap

and they passed the screens, they have to buy them. Well, PRF is a smart data product and it it bought up all these bank stocks in late two thousand eight to the point where it had fifty financials in two As we've said before, it's like walking into the burning building. Yeah, oh yeah, yeah, and we trace PRF in the next I think it was like six to seven years that one trade, that one rebalance accounted for just tons of alpha that kept giving for years and years and years

after that. And what's interesting is the guy who runs that index, which power Shares license had institutions using that index in separate accounts. They called him up and said, do not do the rebounds. We're not buying City Group, and so he didn't, and of course the et F outperformed the s m A and that I think it's

value to the robotic nature of smart beta. But my colleague Ben will bring up that a lot of investors were unable to hang in there in PRF, So the this brings up behavior and the importance of hanging in there. If you pick a strategy and you like it, you gotta stick with it. I mean, what what was it? Was there any robout buying Lehman Brothers but in sort of July or August, I'd have to see if it checked.

That's a good question. That's a good research note. I don't know if Lehman would have checked off momentum, but Lehman fell right so fast that it didn't even it would have been a quarter because these things usually look over quarters or semi annually. It wouldn't have become a value stock for long, right, Like it didn't. We didn't hang it like a low p for a long time, depending on when the robot resets, right, But it's possible.

But I just did recall seeing some of the bigger banks in there that have gone yeah, yeah, yeah, I remember distinctly going for drinks with somebody who was a consultant and he was he was bragging to me about how he just loaded up in Fannie and Freddie because it was so low. I couldn't go any lower, you know, very very badly. You know, this idea of buying stuff cheap, it's it is really tempting. We see this all the

time with with stocks. And my wife actually like she wants to buy J. C. Penny and she's just she's like a natural value investor and I understand that, but you know, it can go lower the floor there's a trap door, but I mean there were yeah, I mean there, I think one of the you know, several of the hedge fund managers sort of made their names also for recognizing that some of these banks, for instance, we're not going to be allowed to fail, right, and so City

Group was a good investment because there was no way the government was going to let it fail. Christine, can we bring it back and you can help us maybe put a bow on all of this. You were on the front lines. You've seen how everything's evolved for ten years. You've seen Eric stats. Now can you help us make sense of this? What what's the takeaway that you get from this conversation that we thought? Well, for me one

of the biggest lessons of the financial crisis. Having been a reporter covering financial companies at that point for maybe five six years, I was pretty convinced that these people all knew what they were doing. They're they're very smart, they're highly sophisticated, very numerous, very data driven, and I was shocked the number of them who were completely taken by surprise and didn't see it coming at all and

actually didn't really understand how things worked. So it gave me a sort of much more skeptical view of the experts in the financial industry. I mean, you know, people who were running these firms really didn't know what was happening. So I get I just kind of always keep that in the back of my mind, no matter how good something sounds, and no matter how well it's worked. I I think it's always a good idea to remain somewhat

skeptical and do your own homework. And the people who came out looking smart of the people who ask the most questions and to that point, you know, uh. In going back to the very podcast, when he talked about why he thought Passive got so big, he did bring up these large sell offs where it did the experts did look a little bit like the Emperor wearing no clothes, and that over and over, I think is where you have a lot of investors going, you know what, screw it.

I'm just gonna put it in this like dirt cheap SMP thing and then that that's all I'm doing. But there is some concern if everybody feels like that and there's a crowd into this one, you know, dirt cheap SMP trade, that's I think where I have to think there's some credence the SMP in particular, that index is so all powerful because it's it's big and passive, but also active managers are orbiting around it too, and I think that is where there's some legitimacy to it. But

I agree with you. I think if you just judge this stuff not versus not versus reality, and you think of the other options available to you to get exposure when you make a choice that way, I think it's much better our approach than just buying it because you saw commercial or you know, you heard somebody talk about it. Everybody else is doing it, right, Christine. One final thing, can we talk about your book for a second. What's

it called? It's First of all, I will say it's not My book helped Paul right the right his memoir um so he has written the story of his life. He's almost ninety one years old. And for those who are not familiar with Paul Volker, so, Paul Vulgar was the chairman of the Federal Reserve. He killed in the hyper and we're not quite hyper inflation, but serious inflation problem we had in the United States in the late seventies early eighties. And he's a very important rule named

after him. He has the Vulcar rule named after him because he was really he was shocked and horrified during the financial crisis and how everything suddenly got treated as it was a bank. Right, banks are supposed to be special entities, right that you have special rules, I have special protections. Suddenly of Goldman, SAX and mor eanxamily were treated like banks. Suddenly all mutual fund money market mutual funds were treated like banks. Everything was getting bailed out

as was a bank. And he thought this was a problem, which I think a lot of people do, and uh, and wanted to make a distinction. You know, if you're a bank, there should be certain things protections you get because you're important, you're kind of utility for our society. But you shouldn't put yourself at undue risk. And that's

a vocal rule. But anyway, so but he covers everything, you know, the end of Bretton Woods, you're fighting inflation, financial rulemaking, his personal life story, lots of things he did after he left the FED, and so it's a it's a good book. And he does it all in about three pages, so it's not along yet and the books called keeping at It and it comes out. It comes out in November seven, can wit good Christmas gift.

Thanks for listening Trillions until next time. You can find us on the Bloomberg Terminal, Bloomberg dot com, Apple Podcast, and where else you would like to listen. We'd love to hear from you. We're on Twitter, I'm at Joel Weber Show, He's at Eric Baltunas, and you can find Christina Harper at the cr Underscore. Harper Trillions is produced by Magnus Hendrickson. Francesca Levy is the head of Bloomberg podcast by