Mike Panebianco:
Today's SWAPA number is 117. FAR Part 117 is the regulation that governs flight time, duty time, and rest rules for airline pilots.
Amy Robinson:
So on today's episode, we'll be talking with Captain Scott Hutchinson, member of the SWAPA Safety Committee and the Fatigue Safety Advisory Group about fatigue issues that not only impact SWAPA pilots, but our industry-wide issues.
Mike Panebianco:
I'm Mike Panebianco.
Amy Robinson:
And I'm Amy Robinson. And here's our interview with Scott.
Mike Panebianco:
Scott, we'd like to start this podcast a little differently than we have in the past with a little bit of storytelling opportunity. I don't think everyone knows how insidious fatigue truly is. And I'd like to bring along our audience that may not be well-versed in flight safety and the connection fatigue has on all of us that engage in air travel. Can you tell us about an incident or an accident that fatigue played a major role in?
Scott Hutchinson:
Yes. Well, the Colgan accident in Buffalo in 2009 was very well publicized and known to the aviation community and was actually the catalyst that's got FAR 117 going, and it's still the momentum behind it. And it was a very tragic loss of all life on passengers and crew as well as I believe one individual on the ground. And it had very distinct fatigue problems throughout the crew member's history leading up to that event.
Amy Robinson:
So when you say that, what role did fatigue play in that crash?
Scott Hutchinson:
Well, fatigue hits us from many different angles. The basic definition talks about extended wakefulness and that's when you're awake too long. At some point your body starts saying, "Hey, I need sleep." The flip side to that is insufficient sleep. If you're operating with without enough charge in your batteries, your body starts shutting down as well. And of both of those factors were directly in play during that tragic day.
Mike Panebianco:
Was that an impact on both pilots in that incident?
Scott Hutchinson:
Honestly, I don't remember. I believe so. I know it was definitely with one of them on both counts and I think the other on one count.
Mike Panebianco:
I think there were a few other ones too, weren't there that were directly attributed to fatigue as a causal factor?
Scott Hutchinson:
Well, fatigue has never been identified as the primary causal factor, but it's definitely been listed as a significant contributory factor. And those are distinctions that the NTSB uses. But just within the US we've had definitely some very recent incidents and accidents where fatigue was that direct contributor and we all might remember UPS in Birmingham a few years ago. Luckily it wasn't as tragic as far as loss of life goes in the numbers, but both pilots didn't survive directly related to fatigue in that situation. American Airlines in Little Rock in 1999 was one of the earlier incidents that started building momentum for rule changing. There were a lot of things going on there, but the one thing that we know about fatigue is that it exacerbates all other weaknesses that we may be exhibiting at that time. And so that crew was dealing with a lot of significant operational challenges and fatigue just magnified that.
Mike Panebianco:
Yeah, I think everybody that flies an airplane listening to the podcast, anybody who's driven home after a long day at the office, you can fathom taking that tired and putting it into a very complex and dynamic environment. And I'm sure anyone who's listening to the stories is now wide awake to what the consequences of fatigue are in aviation.
Scott Hutchinson:
And I just named just some off the top of my head that were US-based, but there've been dozens worldwide just in the last decade or so. And some of the more noteworthy ones were some of the over flights that we've seen. So remember Hawaiian Inner Island Go Flight in the early two thousands, they overflew destination because both pilots were asleep and the autopilot was just kind of going off in pigs and space mode there. I believe the same thing happened to Northwest Airlines in the mid- nineties and again, overflying destination. And luckily they were awakened at some point and safely landed, but huge potential for catastrophic loss.
Amy Robinson:
Talk to the programs that we have in place to educate data and combat the impact of fatigue.
Scott Hutchinson:
So we do have a fairly robust fatigue program, and that was mandated by FAR 117. And to be fair, the company jumped in as best they could at the very, very beginning and started off with a very robust fatigue program that was no questions asked based that largely protected your pay and there were no discipline aspects. With that, we formed the fatigue safety advisory group, and that's the FS A, we're the ones who process all the fatigue reports that are submitted by pilots. And from there it's that starts our data collection process on both objective data, the times that people are awake and length on duty, things like that nature with their schedule. But also the very important subjective parts that what they're telling us, what's really happening, why are they becoming fatigued? And so with that, the design is that we're supposed to take that information and improve our processes along the way. It's been a difficult challenge because fatigue intersects our scheduling rules and our contractual rules immediately if there were any mitigations to be put in place. And so that is our definite biggest challenge, cracking that nut.
Mike Panebianco:
We talked about the outcomes, the negative outcomes. What types of things are pilots encountering out on the line that are pushing this fatigue? And the reason we're having this podcast is because the numbers are high, we'll talk about the numbers in a few. But what's hitting the pilots right now that is causing fatigue- related issues and those numbers that will cover the dataset?
Scott Hutchinson:
Yeah, what's hitting us more now, but it has always been there, is that we have some pretty challenging days just by design in the planning phase. Since our post-Covid return to flying, we're doing what we call shoulder flying, where we're starting earlier than early and we're planning to finish later than late. And the joke I hear on the line all the time is you're going to be awake at 3:00 AM as a Southwest Airlines pilot. That means you're either starting your day then or you're ending your day then. And 3:00 AM is a very challenging time because it's squarely inside the WOC or the window of circadian low, where it's proven scientifically we are not performing anywhere close to optimum levels.
But we also have a lot more block hours pushed into the pilot group. And SRC has been very vocal about that with our high level of reserve percentages. So instead of spreading all of our flying amongst let's say 90% of the pilot group, we're jamming that into 80%. So everybody's starting off with a much higher amount of flying individually. And then as the operation moves on, we all know that it never runs as planned.
Mike Panebianco:
What's the structure, Scott, between SWAPA and the company? Is it like other safety programs where it's part government, part regulator, part company, part union? Is it an equal partnership? How does that work?
Scott Hutchinson:
We're slightly different. So ASAP has that three legged partnership between the FAA, the company, and SWAPA. Fatigue does not include the FAA largely because it wasn't mandated. However, we do have an equal partnership between SWAPA and Southwest. And the way the FSAG is built and designed is we have two SWAPA representatives, one from safety, one from SRC, and then the company has representatives from scheduling, planning and their safety department.
Amy Robinson:
So Scott, one question I think most pilots would ask is that much like the ASAP program, if they submit a fatigue concern or report, is that considered protected? I mean can they be punished or disciplined from that?
Scott Hutchinson:
That's a great question. A lot of misunderstanding when it comes to that. So our fatigue reports are very, very well protected. Nobody outside the FSAG sees them by design. That includes management, chief pilots, et cetera. So pilots should know that they could be very candid with us and they are, overly candid sometimes. I'm surprised how much they'll be willing to tell us. But that information is safe. It never leaves the FSAG.
Mike Panebianco:
What is a pilot's role in fatigue mitigation and how do they participate in the FSAG's programs, in our fatigue reporting program?
Scott Hutchinson:
Well, the fatigue call process is truly our biggest mitigation tool that we have in that Southwest depends on. Short of integrating recommendations from the FSAG, how to do business better with regards to pilot scheduling and so forth. They put that huge entire burden squarely on the pilot shoulder. And that's evident every day when you're on the line and you're signing your fitness for duty statement on the release. And that's designed for you to take a quick assessment, say yes or no, and then move forward. And that's an area where I think our pilots don't really quite understand the significance of that declaration.
I mean the true definition of fit for duty is being physiologically and mentally prepared and capable of performing your duties with the highest degree of safety, to also include being properly rested for that duty. That's a pretty high threshold. My concern is, and this is through reading over 14,000 fatigue reports since the beginning of our program, our pilots tell us quite often how they tough it out and they push themselves farther than that standard requires. It's a very insidious culture that carries over from being type A personality to mission-oriented and wanting to not impact or inconvenience our pilots, crew members, our passengers and our company.
Amy Robinson:
So Scott, you were talking about pilots, that personality where they want to do the best for the company, they don't want to call in fatigue because of that type A personality. Do you think that there are a higher number of fatigue events than actually those that get reported?
Scott Hutchinson:
Oh, absolutely. We're told that directly in fatigue reporting, people can file what they call a fatigue concern report and that means they're highlighting a fatigue area which they did not remove themselves from. So we definitely get fatigue reports on that. Just anecdotally talking with pilots, I mean I talk with them all the time outside of the reporting process. And I hear it time and time again how, "Oh, I should have removed myself and I didn't." It's an easy trap to fall into. The good news is I think we're slowly starting to see a cultural change in that as our pilot group is aging, the older folks came from that got to get the mission done type of a thing. It came from the military or other airlines when there was no fatigue programs in place. But now that FAR 117's been around long enough, we're getting people from the regionals where you're getting people from the military where fatigue has been addressed. And so they are familiar with the program, the principles, and they likely have some experience actually participating in it. And that's helpful.
Mike Panebianco:
What do you think holds pilots back from participating in the fatigue reporting?
Scott Hutchinson:
I'm a hundred percent convinced our filing rate has dropped. Out of all of our fatigue reports, in the beginning we had mid-seventies percentage of voluntary filing their reports, which was considered excellent by all industry standards. However, that number now has dropped down to 40%. I firmly believe it's because the pilot group overall feels their reports are ineffective. I mean they tell us that directly in reporting and it was actually a warning that I try to instill within the leadership when we were first building the program. We have to show continual improvement. We have to show that these reports are impactful and that they affect change. But if 10 years go by and you're still writing in about the exact same scenario, at some point you're going to give up. We've had people tell us that very, very clearly.
Mike Panebianco:
What are some of those scenarios that pilots are seeing repeated that tells them that the program's not being effective?
Scott Hutchinson:
Oh boy. I could talk a long time on this. I think it'd be better characterized if I give you our top three reasons we see time and time again why fatigue takes place and then you'll understand this scenarios behind them. So number one without a doubt is extended wakefulness due to extended duty. And that's either delay in your schedule due to operational stress or being rerouted by crew scheduling. Absolutely the number one trigger. It's hard to prepare for something that you don't know is coming. So reassignments and the lack of common sense in reassignments is the largest frustration that our pilots tell us. And a real simple example is you're being rerouted from your PM trip to now a very early AM report the next morning, 5:00 AM.
PMRs just aren't ready for that and vice versa. Our second root cause is hotel failures. We see a whole variety of problematic issues with hotels, particularly with noise. Noise from guests, noise from your room, location being in the wrong spot, whether it's near the elevator or ice machine, PM/AM cruise next to each other, noise from your window facing the loud highway or even an airport.
Temperature issues, lack of food issues are huge problem during Covid and still exists quite commonly today. Our third issue are short overnights. When your rest gets reduced down to absolute FAR minimums, which is 10 hours, it's just not enough time to recover and 10 hours on paper looks great and that's a whole nother issue that we have with the company. But as we all know, there are all kind of delays that eat away that 10 hours to the point where people aren't even getting a true eight hour sleep opportunity.
Amy Robinson:
Let me ask you this, Scott, I know the FSAG meets pretty regularly with the company and brings up these issues. Is the company lumping fatigue and their minds in with sick calls or is it an overall ignoring of the fatigue data? What do you think is going on there?
Scott Hutchinson:
I wouldn't really be able to connect those dots in that respect. I will say though, building the data-driven argument is a challenge because the data is pretty complex and even though we have mountains and mountains of data, it's not for the lack of it's more for I think a lack of truly wanting to build mitigations that aren't going to impact the flexibility that scheduling wants. That department quite honestly has had zero desire to implement any mitigations that the FSAG has mentioned over these years. Now I've talked pretty negatively about that and I would like to say that I don't want the takeaway is your fatigue reports are worthless, don't file them anymore. I would actually like to say the opposite.
We are making improvements. It's just comes very, very slow. Your fatigue reports have given me the data and the ammunition to improve the fatigue call process significantly. We've improved it in many, many respects over time and I think our pilots probably don't understand all those subtleties involve, but it definitely is a better system now than it was when we started. Now that we've matured, we are actually starting to crack into more of true day of ops mitigations. We've got several in the frying pan right now. Again, the challenge is the companies like government, it's just incredibly slow to get things pushed through the process.
Mike Panebianco:
Scott, I had a senior first officer that I flew with recently. He looked over at me and he said, "If more management pilots flew the line and experienced this, do you think that the fatigue issue would get fixed?" What's your response to that statement?
Scott Hutchinson:
I would love for management pilots to fly more to see what's actually going on. I don't know if they would make a difference just because I just haven't seen the motivation otherwise. I think they just have a different set of priorities and they're balancing a lot of things and I think they're putting too much hope that the pilots are making the right call. The problem is, I think pilots think they have to be absolutely exhausted, ready to fall over and just immediately go into an uncontrolled nap. That's not what the removal process is designed for. If you've gotten to that level, you've gone way too far. And so I think as I said earlier, I believe our pilots are pushing themselves harder than what the standard calls for.
Another common thing that we see a lot are pilots like saying, I'm not sure are they able to call the company or scheduling or even talk to the chief pilot in the knock and ask, "Hey, do you think I should be okay for this based on what happened? The fire alarm last night, I'm out in the parking lot in my pajamas for three hours. I got three hours of sleep." Mathematically, you should be able to figure out if you're not getting anywhere close to a reasonable amount of normal sleep, you probably shouldn't be flying an airplane. I can't put a number on that. I would say if you're getting 2, 3, 4 hours sleep, you're nowhere in the ballpark of being fit and ready to perform a Southwest flying day.
Amy Robinson:
You mentioned earlier that minimums were 10 hours of sleep opportunity. What's the difference between what it should be versus what it is?
Scott Hutchinson:
So we have 10 hours minimum rest and within that is designed an eight hour uninterrupted sleep opportunity. And easy math says eight always fits up within 10 and that's the company's position, but it absolutely does not. We have all experienced all type of delays getting into rest, whether it's transportation, the hotel room not being ready, or maybe not even having a hotel assigned. And the company's well aware of those issues and they're doing their best to try to fix those. But in the meantime, pilots I believe are accepting less than what they are designed to have when it comes to that eight hour opportunity.
Mike Panebianco:
Scott, talk to me about the eight hour sleep opportunity. Is that up to the pilot to determine or does the company try to determine that?
Scott Hutchinson:
It's interesting you asked that because the framers of FAR 117 looked at all the factors involved and specifically determined there are so many that the only person in position to make that determination would be the pilot and not the company. But yet, Southwest Airlines has a policy within scheduling that some reason gives them the right to determine you have the opportunity despite what you tell me. And that is been a longstanding objection of ours and it's been something that we are readdressing constantly up until the point now where we've been reaching out, I say we as in SWAPA, are reaching out to the FAA wanting help, understanding how that's possible.
Amy Robinson:
So Scott, we've talked a lot about the various issues that go into fatigue. So what do we need to work towards as a union so that we can make sure that our passengers, our crews, our pilots, have the highest level of safety?
Scott Hutchinson:
Well, again, we've had those challenges that have spelled out, but I also believe we are making momentum of change in the right direction, albeit slow. So those issues that I just described are being addressed. It's taking years, but they're not being completely ignored. So I'm hopeful with that. I'm hopeful that the FSAG and not just me as one of the SWAPA representatives, but the entire FSAG has definitely shown more of a motivation to solicit recommendations going forward. And largely at my request. Again, going back to we have to prove to our pilot group that your fatigue reports matter, that this program has an end game to it other than just removing you when you say you need to. We have to show improvement. I think we're getting there. It's just going to take a little more time and I think hopefully leadership will wake up to the fact that you can't ignore this stuff forever.
Mike Panebianco:
How much of this has been built into our contract 2020 proposal? I know a lot of our pilots are probably wondering what kind of language can we expect or what are we shooting for anyway trying to get to with contractual language to address fatigue?
Scott Hutchinson:
Well, I'm not privy to all the particular details. I was certainly there when we were building that plan and I knew that we were asking for more specific hotel improvements, which would directly help our rest abilities. I know that the pay aspect on premium trips, many people are aware that there's a potential, you could lose some pay again based on the circumstances, by making a fatigue call while on a premium trip. And that is something that I know that is being asked to be remedied so that pilots aren't making a monetary decision over a fatigue decision.
A lot of that, again, based on not pilot action but being rerouted. You sign up for a trip that nobody wants, it's one leg out overnight, one leg back, but then when you show up it's five legs tonight and four legs tomorrow. It's harder to be prepared for something like that with no notice. And honestly, most pilots probably wouldn't have been on in the first place if they knew they weren't fit. But they scenarios like that are very, very frustrating. And I think not only undermine the program, but it gives the pilots a bad taste and sentiment towards the fairness of how that system was designed with pay.
Mike Panebianco:
Very true. And as a guy who's approaching his mid- fifties, starting as a regional pilot, flying five to six legs a day, very long days, very short overnights, I'm almost seeing my career evolve or return back to a pattern that I left in my twenties. And it's becoming much more difficult to recover on days off after some of the trips that were flying because as you said earlier that they're so dense and there's so many legs and there's so many operational upsets. And the hotel experience for anyone traveling post-Covid is absolutely horrific in a lot of our markets and in any market around the country. So we appreciate that work that you guys are doing because I know the line pilots, this is their life three to four days a week.
Scott Hutchinson:
Yeah, Mike, you make a great point on the age thing. And that was something that was completely unaddressed in the rulemaking with FAR 117. But I'm in my mid-fifties as well, and I definitely notice I don't have the bandwidth that I did when I was in my twenties and thirties.
Mike Panebianco:
Scott, this is one thing that I hear repeatedly when I hear of a pilot telling a story of their fatigue call. That somebody asked them when they felt that they could be back ready to fly and they were almost taken back like, you can't question my fatigue call. Is that questioning the fatigue call or is that just part of the recovery plan? What can pilots expect when they call in fatigued?
Scott Hutchinson:
Yeah, you're absolutely right. It's no questions asked as in we're not questioning why you're fatigued, but scheduling has to understand what's possible going forward. They just can't go on a maybe or a what if or hey, we'll wake up in the morning and tell you. So they want to set a plan and in the absence of the pilot telling him anything, they're going to go to the absolute minimum 10 hours that they can. Now, as a pilot you can say, "Oh, I need 12 or I need 15 hours," or "I might even need a full physiological night rest," which would create 20 hour rest opportunity. And that sounds extreme, but in many ways a scenario like that is really appropriate because it would likely be keeping you on the current sleep pattern that you started with.
Mike Panebianco:
Yeah, I think that makes more sense as we move towards the possibility of red eye flying and with all this shoulder flying, you really mess up your body clock when you're getting up. And I think on the East coast, one of the early bands is like 2:45 in the morning. I live in Central timezone, but I'm flying off the East coast and I think there's a 5:15 departure local, and that's very, very early for us. So I can see how that 20 hour sleep opportunity that that's something that's, while it's extreme, it's probably something that's well within reason.
Scott Hutchinson:
You bring up a scenario that I would like to expand upon a little bit, and again, directly related to the FSAG and trying to make improvements. You talked about the planning touch on. Which pilot is doing that East coast three o'clock report time or wake up time? And in the very beginning we often found West coast pilots on that early East coast. And we just asked a simple question, "Hey, we have these bases on the East coast, Baltimore, Orlando, why aren't we using those pilots for that early wake up?" They have a three hour advantage right there. And to the company's credit, they have done a lot on the planning side to offset up bench, and that was one of our very first successes in the FSAG and that we significantly, we didn't get rid of it all together, but we significantly reduced down to very, very tiny levels West coast pilots originating on the East coast.
Amy Robinson:
So Scott, what is it you want our pilots to know from this conversation? What's the most important thing that you would want them to take away from this discussion we've had?
Scott Hutchinson:
Number one, make a true honest assessment of your fitness for duty and don't unnecessarily power through a situation that you would objectively look back and say that was a mistake or a bad idea. Number two, filing your fatigue reports are helpful. SWAPA wants them just as much as the company does. The company likes them because they like showing, look at all this data we're creating and they can make pretty slides and track different trends. SWAPA wants those reports because we are trying to take the lead on implementing change and continuous improvement. Number three would be become more educated in how the process works. Our pilots have a tremendous reluctance to make a fatigue call and they tell us time and time again, "This was my first fatigue call in 27 years of professional flying," their hearts are bleeding on their fatigue reports. And once you can get past that reluctance and actually understand the process, you'll see, and I want to get props to scheduling in that they do a fantastic job most of the time.
We do have our hiccups here and there, but the actual part of getting it removed and then deciding what happens next, that's an area that our pilots often don't understand. And it's everything from building a mutually agreeable recovery plan, how you could possibly catch up to the remainder of your trip or not, being released altogether or being given must ride status. Not back just to base, but to anywhere in the system. So you do have rights and protections within the program, but a lot of our pilots don't seem to be aware of that still, and so we're constantly trying to continue that education process.
Amy Robinson:
Thank you to Scott for taking the time to talk with us today. We know he's been busy as of late and we appreciate him taking the time out of his fatiguing day to speak with us.
Mike Panebianco:
We want to hear from our membership, so if you have any comments or any feedback for us for the SWAPA number podcast, drop us a line at [email protected].
Amy Robinson:
Finally, today's bonus number is 40. That's the participation rate of fatigue reporting and that's down from 70% in the early days as Scott mentioned. Fatigue reports are the only way to affect change, and without those, we don't have the data needed to make recommendations to Southwest Airlines. So please remember to keep filling those out as Scott asked.