Hello and welcome to the forecast. I'm Krishna Guru Murthy. The Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan is threatening to explode again after a militant attack in Indian administered Kashmir in which 26 people were killed. The Indian Prime Minister is promising to pursue those responsible and punish their backers and by that he means Pakistan and the Pakistani
military. Diplomatic relations are now at an all time low and India is also taking action against Pakistan by threatening at least to restrict the flow of water in the form of Three Rivers that pass through India before they get to Pakistan. And that could be extremely serious for Pakistani people, their farming, their whole economy. So where is all of this going? There is a huge drum beat for war in the Indian media. Is that where it's really going to end up?
Joining us to discuss all of this, the Indian journalist Manoj Joshi, who's held many positions across lots of Indian publications and is also an academic and has recently advised the Indian government on its security measures. And our correspondent, Sukunda Kamani joins us from the Pakistani capital, Islamabad. Sukunda is is the Pakistanis who have been retaliating with their diplomatic measures. Does it feel like this is getting to a a a new high in
terms of tension? Certainly tensions are absolutely escalating. We saw today, as you said, this kind of tit for tat diplomatic measures announced by the Pakistanis almost really repeating blow for blow what the Indians had announced the day before. For example, banning Indian flights from using Pakistani airspace, revoking Indian visas, closing the Pakistani side of the of the the border. That land border crossing with
II had already closed. The Indian side of that Pakistan particularly actually angered and belligerent around what I think is probably the most significant action that India has announced so far, which is its plan to withdraw from the what's known as the Indus Waters Treaty. Now, this is a kind of rather technical agreement there's been in place for around 60 years governing how water from six rivers is shared between the two countries.
It sounds kind of as if it's not particularly interesting, but it's crucial particularly for Pakistan. It feeds around 80% of its agriculture. And so if India were to divert significant amount of water from coming into Pakistan, that would be a kind of almost close to existential issue for for Pakistan. It's not clear, you know, how quickly significant diversion of that amount of water really could, could, could occur.
But the Pakistani authorities today after a senior government meeting saying that they consider any act to divert that water to be tantamount to an act of war. But of course, everyone's concerned here and in the region that there could well be, you know, further escalation that these diplomatic, this diplomatic flows that are being traded will be replaced by military strikes. And that's what we've seen happen in the past after certain, you know, previous flare ups of this kind.
Manoj, from the Indian point of view, I guess the act of war has already happened. Absolutely. Meaning, you know, what is the extraordinary about the Pentagon incident Was that for the past 20 years, tourists have not been targeted. Tourists have not been targeted because the terrorists, their ostensible reason for being in Kashmir is to fight for Kashmir's independence.
And so they, in the interest of the Kashmiris who benefit from the massive tourism that comes from India, they had not targeted tourists. The very fact that they have targeted tourists indicate a qualitative shift in the Pakistani tactics. And I deliberately say Pakistani because I have no doubt in my mind that these people who come, they come through an extremely militarised line of control, you know, a ceasefire line of control which marks the border
between the two countries. This is extremely miniaturised and they can't possibly make their way to the Indian part of the border without assistance from the Pakistan Army. And and so India's belief is that the Pakistani army are behind this in some way. Oh, absolutely, absolutely. They they have no doubt in their mind.
I mean, just to jump in there, Chris, I mean, of course you know the, the Pakistani officials have have you know here have been strenuous in denying that they have any responsibility or any role in the attack. I mean what is clear is that historically certainly Pakistan has absolutely sponsored pro Kashmiri militants.
Many in Indian administered Kashmir actually at times have resented Pakistan's role and they see them as having hijacked a kind of a local insurgency that was that kind of began due to nationalist reasons or ethno nationalist regions and and tried to kind of transform it into a a more Islamist one and one that was more aligned with Pakistan's strategic interests.
So certainly historically, yes, there have been very close relationships, particularly with some of the militant groups like Lashkar Daiba. That's the group that Indian officials alleges is actually behind this attack in Pahalgam, even though another far lesser known Group, A much more kind of recently established group, the Resistance Front, has has claimed credit for it. What's not clear to me is is yet whether there is definitive evidence linking this particular
attack to the Pakistani intelligence services or not. It's conceivable that they were involved. On the other hand, one questions what Pakistan would feel it has to gain from doing something at this time when it's trying to stabilise its economy. Its own government is quite
unpopular. The military establishment for the first time, one of the first times in in it's history, it it has faced a a serious public backlash by by by critics and supporters of of opposition parties that that the military establishment has been kind of cracking down on. I suppose conversely, you could say maybe that's the reason why they might want to kind of conduct A foray like this.
But but it, it, it doesn't seem clear cut to me that there is, there is as yet firm evidence of, of Pakistani involvement. And of course we do know that, you know, there is, there are genuine grievances within Indian administered Kashmir. It's one of the most heavily militarised places in the world. There are, you know, frequent reports of, of human rights
abuses by those security forces. So it's also conceivable that an attack could be carried out by, you know, local, local militants who wanted to, you know, put the Kashmir issue back into their headlines and back into the global agenda in a way that, you know, after many years of it having fallen away. Really as a, as a, as as an issue even within the region,
let alone, let alone globally. Manoj, the point is, from India's point of view, they are absolutely clear that Pakistan has always been linked to militants acting in Kashmir. And the big question is, is, is not sort of, are they going to provide the evidence to the outside world because they don't feel the need really. The big question is how are they
going to respond? And Modi is talking in a way that Indian leaders haven't really spoken about before when he talks not just about going after the perpetrators of the attack, but the backers. What does that mean? Well, it means a certain level of frustration in India in the sense now this has been going on for 30 odd years. I wrote a book on the 1st about the 1st 10 years of this
militancy. I've looked at that in detail and Sikandar is right that there was a Kashmiri movement for separatism, but the Kashmiri movement has been taken over by the Pakistanis. And today what we are really seeing, it's the quality of training, it's the weapon systems that are used which marks out the the jihadi elements between Lashkar E Taiba elements from the Kashmiri
militancy. Because, you know, and also the action itself, because the Kashmiri militancy would never have done something which has actually hurt Kashmir enormously, being the livelihood of many Kashmiris has been affected by the collapse of tourist, the tourist season right now. So I have no doubts in my mind now why Pakistan did this. And I think Sikandar also referred to this, that this has to do with the internal situation in Pakistan. It's not too good.
There are internal insurgencies in Pakistan, the armies flicked, the economy is in bad shape. The polity, the most popular man in Pakistan is in jail, meaning Imran Khan. And so so the point I'm going to make is that with all the domestic problems drawing, you know, throwing attention to Kashmir and Kashmir's so-called struggle for freedom, it's an ideal way for Pakistan to escape from its domestic troubles.
So that that's the hypothesis. But then the question is, you know, how big is the military action going to be? You know, we've seen air strikes the last time around in 2019. It's going to have to be bigger than that, isn't it? Well, that's my point my you really don't need meaning. I believe that with the what you India has done on the India's Indus Waters Treaty, cancellation of the Indus Waters Treaty, that alone is like, you know, the Pakistanis had their
hands on our throat. We've got their hands on their throat. Now. This is a warning to Pakistan that Europe put us in a kind of an existential situation. We are going to put the do do the same to you. And so you don't really need those air strikes and those military that military action. So you so you don't think that this will be a big military response right now? It may be from the Pakistani side because they're they're going to be desperate.
My own feeling is that the government will also incorporate diplomacy in this. They will get hold of the United States, Saudi Arabia, UAE, maybe Turkey and other countries into maybe China and tell Pakistan that, look, guys, you've gone a step too far and you've got to undo this and you've got to take do some systematic work in undoing your jihadi machinery. Now, similar diplomacy had worked a little earlier.
India never managed to punish the Pakistani perpetrators of the Mumbai attack of 2008, except the one man they caught and who had hung for it. But in 20/21/22, the Pakistani were forced to jail Hafiz Saeed, the leader of the Lashkar E Taiba and Zakir Rahman Lakhvi, his number 2 and as well as Sajid Mir, who was the actual mastermind of the Mumbai project. And they were forced to do this not because on account of terrorism, but on accounts of
money laundering charges. So what I'm trying to say is that there is room for diplomacy, there is room for coercive diplomacy, if I may put it that way. You know there is room for that and maybe India will take that path. I just do want to pick up on on what Manoj was talking about on the on the pressure that Pakistan had been exerting on groups like Rashke Teba in more recent years, particularly after the the last kind of flare up that we saw of violence in 20 in 2019.
Because I think it is significant. And it did, you know, I was based here at the time with for the BBC. And so I saw a lot of it unfold. And we, you know, everyone was quite skeptical about exactly how firm the Pakistani action would be. And of course, you know, a lot of these figures were placed under house arrest rather than being placed in kind of, you
know, unpleasant jail cells. But it did seem under for a while under a former army chief, under a different Prime Minister that Pakistan actually, after long having been the kind of a bit more of a pariah state and being kind of widely seen as sponsoring militant groups, actually was wanting to try and build a new path for itself within the international community and move away from that policy.
Having seen that actually it's sponsoring of jihadist groups literally and quite tragically and bloodily could blow up in its own face with home grown, you know, Islamist insurgencies targeting themselves. So, you know, that that's another thing reason why, you know, I would just somewhat cautious against blindly accepting the kind of Indian allegations of that, that Pakistan was necessarily 100% behind this. It's, it's, it's possible.
It's also possible in my view that it wasn't the case. You know, just as as India has long accused Pakistan of sponsoring Kashmiri militants, Pakistan has long accused India of sponsoring an insurgency in the West of the country by separatist secular Beloch ethnic rebels who are fighting for an independent or more autonomous state there.
In terms of what happens next, you know, I think we can look back at the like I said, the last episode when you had a big attack in Pulwama in Kashmir, around 4645 Indian soldiers were killed in an attack again blamed on Kashmiri militants linked to the Pakistani intelligence services. India, after initially kind of announcing some diplomatic measures, then launched its first air strike into Pakistani territory for something like 50 years, I believe.
And Pakistan then retaliated with its own air strike. That it seemed like a really dangerous moment between these two nuclear armed countries that have fought a number of wars since they were they they became independent from from British colonialism. And and the only thing that really stopped that cycle of escalation was that Pakistan downed an Indian pilot and that his release provided something of a an opportunity for an off ramp.
But you know, that Indian air strike that we saw in 2019, to me that sets the baseline of what I think the public in India, Manoj will know better would demand to see. And, you know, it's a, it's a public that's also been stirred by a very nationalist media from, from what I can see as an
outsider. And so I would have thought there would be a clamour, particularly as Modi has presented himself as a strongman, as a man who, who, who is, is facing down what he terms as, as, as kind of Islamist, the Islamist threat or the jihadist threat. There would be real domestic pressure on him to go beyond what he's already announced and react militarily. And if we look back at previous instances, that military action has come around a week, 10 days, two weeks after the initial
militant attack. So I think what we might be seeing now is the kind of preparation, Indian officials kind of preparing the international community, briefing foreign ambassadors, for example, about their narrative. Pakistan's trying to do the same, laying the groundwork potentially for some kind of military action that could, I think, quite likely supersede what we've already seen in the past.
I mean, Maurice, let's just talk about the domestic politics of this in India as well, having talked about the domestic situation in Pakistan. I mean, the the news channels in India are sort of screaming for revenge right now. And you also have in Modi a nationalist, but a nationalist who didn't do brilliantly at the last elections and could do with something that pulls his side together as well.
You know, how much of a temptation is there going to be to him to have a short victorious war? Any war between Pakistan and India. The notion of victory is somewhat dubious in the sense we don't what would victory mean? So short victorious war, You know, it's almost an oxymoron in in a certain way, because both are nuclear weapons powers, you know, both new air distinct.
You could have a short skirmish, a short skirmish, a short an Indian attack, maybe a missile attack, let's say on Muritke, the headquarters of the Lashkar E Taiba, you see. But in my view, the real problem is the Pakistan military and unless and until there is some way in which the Pakistan military can be deterred from its operation against India, its military operation against India. But now I would hesitate to say that India has no intelligence role. Quite possible that India take
exploiting this. If you look at the long history, we are looking up Pakistani involvement in terrorism in India since 1980s. It began with the harvest on thing and then it went on to the Kashmir thing. Then there were terrorist incidents in India. So this is a very, this has a very long history and if today Pakistan is suffering a kind of a blowback, if I may put it that way, it has only itself to blame. So what we're really trying to persuade Pakistan is that
dismantle that machinery. We may talk of Lashkar E Taiba and Jaish E Muhammad Lashkar E Taiba in particular, that they have been defanged. I'm not so sure. I'm not so sure, but because as I pointed out to you that those people have been jailed on money laundering charges. If the Pakistanis are serious, extradite them to India when they are wanted on the on the Mumbai attack of 2008.
We need the Rashkari Taiba chief, Hafid Mohammed Saeed, Zakir Rahman Lakhvi was the operational commander, Sajid Mead and the eyesight people and there and there are dozens of names which we got evidence. And it's not just the evidence with us. Foreign intelligence agencies also had picked up evidence. So that's why Tawarana has been extradited to India. You know, Pakistan should send these guys. They're accused of a very, very violent crime in Mumbai, so whatever that could be.
You know, you know, as well as I do that, I mean, that's, I mean, given the history of the relations between the two countries, I mean, that's, that's, that's completely, you know, unfeasible for the, for the Pakistanis to to do. I mean, I'm not coming, You know, I'm not saying that in any defence of, of Pakistan's previous actions, but it's, it's, it's something that I think would be. Completely impossible for, for, for any government, even with
the best will in the world. I mean, I'll tell you, I'll, I mean, I'd like to hear your thoughts on it. But the impression I got when I was when I was based here in this region kind of day in, day out, which was kind of between 2017 and 2022, was that actually after many years, many decades really of Pakistan being to be simplistic, the bad guy and being absolutely a sponsor of of militancy.
Actually there had been a very belated realization even within the Pakistani military that this policy was self-destructive, that it was doing immense damage, not only in terms of spot kind of unleashing militants who were fighting against the Pakistani army itself, but also in terms of the country's image and how it was seen as a pariah state. And actually even within the Army, there was a shift that was
occurring. And that's why we saw, for example, you know, the last few years across the Line of Control after there'd been a, a renewal of a renewed commitment to the ceasefire. There, there'd be, it'd been much quieter, much less cross-border shelling between the two sides infiltrations. It'd been, it'd been less.
I know the, I'm sure the Indian government might take some credit for, for the security measure that they've been, they've been implementing in in India administered Kashmir, which human rights groups criticized. But I think, you know, there did seem to be a deliberate policy from within the Pakistani military establishment and intelligence services to move away from that model.
And actually, conversely, in India, after having reacted for for many decades in a much more restrained fashion, I think compared to Pakistan was growing increasingly belligerent, particularly under Modi. And you saw a much greater nationalist, Hindu nationalist further and desire to, to kind of talk about taking revenge on Pakistan. It, it seemed a great tragedy to me that kind of the opportunity for peace or greater dialogue between these two sides was like
2 ships passing each other. And that, you know, when one side was, was more open to it, the other side wasn't. And when the other side was more open to it than, you know, conversely across the border, they, they weren't open to it. And, and, and that's what seemed to me to be the the kind of dynamic of the last few years. Manoj, the other thing that has obviously changed since the last time we saw a cross-border
skirmish is the geopolitics. Trump in the White House offering his unconditional support to Modi, a man he clearly gets on very well with. JD Vance was in India just a couple of days ago. So that relationship is really good. The relationship between Modi and Putin is very, very strong and has been over the last few years because of that sort of oil deal that the two countries have been enjoying during the Ukraine war.
So it's a Modi diplomatically and geopolitically is incredibly strong and doesn't need to worry about the outside world telling him to stop. Modi has a strong wicket very in international diplomacy. And as I pointed out to you earlier that along with this, that's why I'm arguing that maybe there will be no military strike and maybe it's this Indus Waters treaty which will be the instrument.
And this instrument is something which right now India is simply flashing before the Pakistan, but with the help of the international community. And when I say international community, I mean Putin, I mean Trump, I mean Saudi Arabia, I mean UAE. Who can tell Pakistan, who can push Pakistan in a direction? I think Krish, it's, it's interesting. I mean, I, I think you're right.
Of course, India is in a, in a strong international position and, and, but actually, if you look at the language that we've heard from the US so far, they haven't mentioned, from what I could see, at least Pakistan. So I'm, I'm not, I'm not sure necessarily that there's there any. Well, I think we can be certain that no one in the world wants to see two nuclear powers go all out at each other's throats. I mean, it's disastrous for everyone.
And, and I, I think the danger here lies within if, if there is one, if one side carries out what it sees as a fairly restrained, perhaps almost face saving limited strike, how is that perceived by the other side? Because inevitably, the other side will feel actually they need to save face to they'll need. To that, that is always the fear when it comes to injury in Pakistan. Isn't it exactly?
And then where does it go? And so I think that that is a very realistic possibility and a massive danger. I don't get the impression that either side are irresponsible enough that they're really going for for an all out war or wanting that to to to happen. That's always the danger, though. I mean, all, all out war is obviously horrific for both sides. And I, I, I suppose I'm not talking about all out war.
But if you, if you, if you listen to the drum beat, if you, if you listen to the, you know, the way, the way the news channels are screaming, the way the speeches are being made and the language that's being used and the context of as well of a, of a world in which strong men do whatever they want. And that, you know, you've got this war going on in Israel and Gaza in which Netanyahu does pretty much whatever he wants.
And I, I think Modi is probably thinking there's an expectation on him to hit back militarily as well. And it's going to be quite a strong expectation. You know, sort of the the kinds of responses that we've seen in the past won't cut it with his base. I'll let Manoj talk about more, but I mean, I think you know, to me we have an interesting history.
You have a in 2016 you had an attack that that was in Yuri that was that was met by what India termed by a surgical strike, a very limited kind of special forces into kind of raid just just across the border targeting. They say military can't. 2019, you had this other very large scale suicide bombing carried out by a militant group and you saw an Indian air strike on what it said was a a training base. That didn't result in any casualties as far as as far as
we could tell. So, but it was still an escalation from what we saw in 2016. Now we're in 2025. But the international pressure in 20/20/19 was quite different, wasn't it? I. I, you know, I'm going to disagree with you. I, I don't think it's, I don't think there's been a substantial shift. I don't think, I don't think that that right now that, that there is anyone saying to, to India, go ahead and do, do
whatever you want. Perhaps there was a perhaps at that time there were less distractions. And so I mean, the US did play something of a mediating role between the, the, the, the, the two sides. But I find it hard to believe that that the US would be kind of OK with a really serious, major, massive military escalation in South Asia, given it's already struggling to deal with current crises in the Middle East and in and Europe. And, you know, Trump doesn't want to see more wars.
He wants to be the peacemaker, right? Supposedly, anyway. Minaj, you know, I really don't see Modi pushing for the military. Maybe the the Indus Waters treaty is the atom bomb in itself. It's a nuclear weapon. The consequences of the action are extremely severe, meaning they're probably worse than war in some ways. When you can, you starve A neighboring country of water. So it's already a pretty serious action.
Modi has underfunded the defence establishment in India, meaning Indian spending as a percentage of its GDP has gone down in the Modi years so dramatically. So I'm not too optimistic in in that front. I'm saying here we have the Indian Air Force chief screaming about what the disastrous situation the Indian Air Force is in now. Is this going to be the instrument of of revenge? Certainly one thing has happened. The Indians are angry. They are very angry.
And yes, you hear the screams in the TV, they want retaliation, But I think to my mind that retaliation has already begun, and I think it's much more drastic than is being made out to. You. Well, we'll leave it there. Manoj Sukhandar, thank you both very much indeed for joining us. That's the forecast for now. Bye bye.