ISIS will be looking at the situation and trying to identify any possibilities for having some sort of a resurrection. The. Kurds were doing, as it were, The Dirty work for the worst, particularly the Americans. The Kurds, they will see this as a huge blow. Many of them do not want to be integrated completely into a centralized Syrian state. I think there's a great danger
of continued guerrilla warfare. There isn't much of A call for to improve conditions in these camps for people who are regarded as terrorists, and without that, they have become a breeding grounds for radicalization. This has been a mistake repeated again and again, you know, in our modern history. Hello and welcome to the forecast. It was hoped the fall of Syria's dictator Bashar al-Assad would usher in a period of stability, unity and perhaps eventually democracy.
But now the country enters a new and unpredictable phase as President Ahmed Al Sharah tightens his grip on power in the North East. The Kurds were the West key ally against Islamic State. Now their control in the region is collapsing after days of fierce battles with government forces. A tentative ceasefire is in place but the fallout is far from clear, including the fate of thousands of ISIS prisoners and their families who were in
Kurdish controlled camps. Regional players like Turkey and Iran, as well as China, Russia and the West, are also jostling for influence. Could these developments finally bring a period of calm and stability in Syria or just open the door to new dangers? I'm joined by our international editor, Lindsay Hilsum, and by Lina Khatib, the principal analyst at geopolitical foresight company Extrac. Lina Khatib, First, that hope of a unified Syria. How hopeless is that looking right now?
It's actually looking more likely than before. For the longest time there was speculation that Syria could go down the line of federalism, with, for example, a Kurdish autonomous area in the North East becoming a permanent feature of Syria. But since Ahmed Shara came to power, there has been persistent messaging by the Syrian government that decentralisation is not going to be acceptable, that they want to centralise governance in Syria. And now they are closer to that than ever.
And what has happened in the North East sends a message all over Syria that the model for governance going forward is a centralised 1. So, Lindsay, sum up for us, if you would, the sort of military and political landscape right now. Well, I think that Aslina says the central government under Ahmad al Sharra is trying to pull in everybody, the Alawites, the Druze and now the Kurds.
But from a Kurdish point of view, they held this area of northeastern Syria called Rajava as a semi autonomous state in the time of Bashar al-Assad. And that was something that they
wanted. And you look to Iraq and you have Iraqi Kurdistan, which is semi autonomous and what has been happening over the last few days, which is fierce fighting between the Kurdish forces and the central Damascus forces and which has resulted in most of that area, Rajava, being taken over by the the central Syrian forces. For many of the Kurds, they will see this is a huge blow. Many of them do not want to be integrated completely into a centralised Syrian state. They want to retain some
autonomy. And I think that they will see this, as, you know, less and less possible. And I'm not sure that they would all accept it. I think there's a great danger of continued guerrilla warfare. Exactly on that point lean, I mean, the idea of moving towards unity doesn't actually happen if the Kurds don't accept this, does it? It certainly will be difficult because not everyone, as we heard, is on board. And also the issue is not just about the Kurds.
There's other communities in Syria that we're hoping for autonomy as well. And here we're mainly talking about the Druze in the South, as well as perhaps some communities are in coastal areas which come from the Alawite community. So the Syrian governments way of handling the situation in the northeast is meant to also be about those other communities further down the line. And those communities in the South, for example, food, also form groups that do not toe the
line of the government. And so there is the potential of seeing not just guerrilla groups in the northeast, but guerrilla groups and other areas in Syria as well. And the challenge for the Syrian government here becomes twofold. On the one hand, it's a security challenge. When the security sector capacity of the new Syrian government is quite reduced, it's still not very strong.
And 2nd, it's a political issue because solving all these issues ultimately has to be through political inclusion. And that is something that is not quite there in Syria at the moment. There had been talk, you know, with the the new government that there would be elections. How likely is that now? Eventually there have to be elections because this government is currently presenting itself as legitimate on the basis that it's a
liberation government. But the Syrian people want to see actual political representation going on with genuine political participation by the people and we will see whether President Sharia will deliver on his promises that in few years time Syria will have elections. Otherwise, I think masses of Syrians will be very disappointed. Is that, you know, the latest development sort of lightning move move movements over the last couple of weeks that make elections less likely?
When it comes to the impact of what we've just seen in northeast Syria on the political trajectory of Syria when it comes to elections, I think the move towards centralisation actually makes it more likely that elections will happen further down the line. Because now you can say Syrians more or less all over the country will be able to
participate in those elections. Whereas until not too long ago, the government could argue that there is one area of Syria that is outside of its remit and therefore elections cannot happen. And so hopefully things should actually become a bit more positive in that regard.
But then a lot of that then on the conduct that it depends on whether the different Syrian groups, where it's the Kurds, the group we're looking at, or the Druze or the allies and so on, except the authority of the central state and everything comes down to that. And if it came to elections, whether they felt free to elect their own representatives who would inevitably represent their own communities and whether they felt that those representatives would actually have an influence
over the central authorities. And I think that all of that is still unclear at the moment. And whether that would allow them still to push for this sort of autonomous region? I don't think they're going to get their autonomous region, but there is still negotiations going on about what kind of, you know what, how that could work out because it's perfectly possible to have a semi autonomous region or a federal
system or whatever. Now that is not what the Syrian government is looking at at the moment, but those things are still to be discussed and that is also something which would come up in elections. And Lindsay, the Kurds are particularly interesting in a way, aren't they? Because they were pivotal allies against ISIS. Yet it seems now they're being effectively abandoned by the West. The Kurds are relearning A brutal lesson. Loyalty means nothing.
They have no permanent friends. Well, and this goes back to the the history of of the Kurds. So as you know, Kurdish people up to 45,000,000 spread across four countries, not just Syria, but also Iran, Iraq and Turkey. And they don't have their own states. They don't have a Kurdish country as such. And over the years they have teamed up with the Americans particularly many times. They teamed up with the Americans to try and overthrow Saddam Hussein several times in in Iraq.
What happened nearly every time the Americans abandoned them, the CIA abandoned them to their fate. And many Kurds will be seeing exactly the same Now. The Kurds were doing, as it were, The Dirty work for the West, particularly the Americans. I was there in Rajava, which is this Kurdish area of Syria, several times between 2016 and 2019.
They were there, the Kurdish forces fighting on the frontline, killing and dying in order to defeat Islamic State, partly because they wanted to do that themselves. They have a very different ideology from Islamic State. They have women with female brigades in their armies. They live a, you know, many of them are quite secular, not all of them. They're still Muslims. And they have a very leftist way of looking at at the world.
But they were doing it also on behalf of America and on behalf of the West. And most significantly, they have been guarding the ISIS prisoners, prisoners, male prisoners who are in in ordinary prisons, as it were, and female prisoners in camps. And here I'll just mention Shamima Begum because that may be her name that's familiar to many British people. She was a a young woman, aged 15, a child really, who fled her home and went to join ISIS.
And she ended up becoming very embroiled in that and she's overheld, we think in a camp called Al Raj at the moment. Now the Kurds, they were looking after those people or keeping those people prisoner while Western countries refused to have their own nationals back. And now, well, suddenly they're not useful anymore. The Americans have decided that Al Sharar and that government they can more or less look overlook after the the prisoners say Kurds sorry about that.
Can I just add that one key reason why the Kurds were fighting ISIS is not just because of course ISIS posed a real threat to them, but also because they thought that if they play this role, then they can eventually get autonomy. Then the West would back them in this political goal of theirs. And unfortunately, the situation has been one in which they were simply being instrumentalized by the international community in
the fight against ISIS. And now the US envoy, Tom Barack, has basically said that their role has ended. That's it. Their role in fighting ISIS has ended, and therefore their role as custodians of security in the Northeast is over. You go back to Henry Kissinger, don't you? Who was the one who said that America has no permanent friends and no permanent enemies, only permanent interests? And so the Kurds acted in the American interest. And now the Americans say, look
at it like that. And so you come back to another. This is one, I'm afraid it's another cliche what the the Kurds always say because they feel that they're always betrayed. No friends but the mountains. So Lena, what are what are the political, the geopolitical consequences of the West in a sense letting down the Kurds here? Well, one of the bigger issues for the West, of course, is that of ISIS and what to do about
ISIS detainees. And what the US indicates doing is moving reportedly 7000 of those ISIS detainees from the prisons that the Kurds were overseeing to Iraq. So these prisoners are being moved to Iraq. Why is this happening? It's because now that area, the northeast, is under the control of the Syrian government. And as I was saying earlier, unfortunately the Syrian government's security sector capacity is still quite weak.
So they will not be able to really hold that area effectively, especially as ISIS will be looking at the situation and trying to identify any possibilities for releasing some of their prisoners and having some sort of a resurrection. So the US is trying to play safe by moving these detainees to Iraq. Now here, of course, we have another situation, which is the presence now for the first time of the Syrian government's forces at the Iraqi boulder.
Until very recently, it was the Kurds who were present in a security capacity. So now the Iraqi authorities will have to coordinate with this new government in Syria, which is going to be also a bit of a delicate political situation considering the varied political leanings that are present in Iraq compared to Syria. And here I'm talking mainly about the still very influential role for Iran in the Iraq, influencing many of the militias
that are present in that area. And so they will also, these Iraqi militias be seeing in this new movement in Syria a bit of a threat to their own authority as well. So, Lindsay on on how the Syrian government react to all of this, I mean, how does Ahmed al Shara's government differ regime differ from Bashar al Assad's? Well, look, it's hugely different. I mean, obviously, he comes from
an Islamist background. And I think that that is one of the reasons that many people look on his forces taking over these camps and prisons and think, are they really seeing themselves as the enemies of the men and women inside? Or would they actually like to release some of them because they could they could be partners in the future. And that is that is an open question.
But clearly he represents, you know, ethnically, religiously, a majority in Syria, which is Sunni Muslims, unlike Bashar al-Assad who was an Alawite, which was a minority. So arguably that gives him an advantage. The other advantage that he has, I think, is that there is a lot of goodwill towards Ahmed Al Sharah, and that primarily comes
from the Gulf countries. And one of the reasons, I think that all the main reason that we've seen this big change in American policy and this big support for him, even though he does come from this Islamist background, is because the Gulf country has said to, to President Trump, look, you've got to support this man. This man has a chance of uniting Syria, of pulling Syria together as one country, not as a broken,
fragmented state. You've got to lift sanctions, which Donald Trump did, and you've got to give him all the the backing you can. So that is the policy that the Americans are following very much after the the lead of the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia.
And if I can add one key thing about Sharaf's political positioning, which relates to my point earlier on Iran, is that he is vehemently anti Iran. Obviously the Syria situation under Bashar al-Assad was was really optimal for Iranian influence in the Middle East. And with the fall of Assad, that situation changed radically for Iran. It lost a huge advantage when it comes to its strategic influence in the region with the fall of Assad. So now you have Sharia, who's anti Iran.
But another thing about him is obviously as the previous leader of, he also fought with his factions against ISIS because they were political rivals. So for a while you had rivalry between, hey, Atahrid Sham under a shadow and he was known at the time as Abu Muhammad al Julani and ISIS. They were arguing over power and fighting bitterly and hey Atahrid Sham prevailed. And so in this sense, Haiah Pahri, the Sham, still sees ISIS as a threat and as a rival and
as an enemy and vice versa. And so this situation with the prisoners, I don't think personally is going to lead to more cooperation between the Syrian government and some of the prisoners. I think it's the opposite. I think they are concerned about their own security when the situation might present openings for ISIS.
And Lindsay, of course, President Erdogan in Turkey, it must be pretty delighted at how things are panning out for the Kurds. Oh, he's crowing because President Erdogan in Turkey is the Kurdish separatist movement was see it was his biggest enemy. Now he did a sort of deal with them, which is kind of stalling at the moment. It's not completely clear what
exactly is happening on them. But to see their autonomous area reduced and potentially crushed in Syria, that's a big advantage to to President Erdogan. And that may be another reason that the Americans have withdrawn their support for the Kurds in order to, you know, to, to reinforce that connection with, with Erdogan and Turkey, which is a which is a NATO member. But can we just, I just want to bring it for a moment back to the human side of this, because
I visited those camps. And one of the things I think is really important is you have all these women in those camps and all these children. And these children have been brought up without an education and they have been radicalized because many of the women in the camps a fanatical ISIS supporters. It was extraordinary being there. They were so angry and the fury at me because I just wore a headscarf and didn't cover my
face. I mean, these kind of feelings and beliefs are very prevalent in the camps. And I wonder what is going to happen to those children now, because now for many years, you know, sort of 5-6, what is it 7-8 years they've been brought up without an education. And with this radicalization, how are they ever going to be integrated into a new into a new Syria? And what about, you know, the suffering of all those people?
And I think that one of the things is also worrying when you look at the the Kurds, they have, there has been a certain under the autonomous region, there has been a certain amount of freedom for women. And many of them will fear that despite Ahmed al Shahra's declaration that women are equal. And so they will fear being reintegrated into Syria because they will fear losing some of those freedoms. I don't know, Lena, whether you think that those those fears are justified or not.
Well, I was in Syria in December and one thing I noticed and that was my first visit since before the conflict, so 15 years, and I did not see explicit signs in Damascus regarding increased Islamization, however. Behind closed doors there were quite a few concerns expressed by people that there were informal things happening that they saw as leading society down that particular route. So I think these concerns that you are talking about are not baseless.
And, and the point is, I suppose, that there isn't much of A call for to improve conditions in these camps for people who are regarded as terrorists, their families. And without that, as Lindsay says, Lena, you know, they have become people say, breeding grounds for radicalization.
And unfortunately, this has been a mistake repeated again and and again, you know, in our modern history that we in the international community become so concerned with immediate security measures and we don't think long term about causes of instability. And right now I'm seeing, for example, the movement of detainees, let's say, from Syria to Iraq, but I'm not seeing plans for what to do about the children and the women that Lindsay has been talking about.
Where is the solution to try to de radicalize these individuals? This means that, yes, for now, we may be able to deal with the problem by keeping them locked up. But this is not going to be a long term solution. And unfortunately, we keep seeing the same mistakes repeated. And this was one of the reasons why ISIS rose, you know, around a decade or so ago. It's because people at the time also did not pay enough attention to the root causes and.
They're not small in number, the people being held, the women, the children. Now, I don't know the exact number, I don't know if you do need it, but just our whole camp had 24,000 in it the last time I looked. So we are talking about a lot of, we're talking about a lot of people. And that's one of the is, it's the worst because, you know, the Kurds dealt with them as best they could with some money, but not a lot.
And, you know, Western countries refused to take back a lot of their own nationals and didn't want to put money into the education and upkeep of these of these people. But whether they are being held by the Kurds or now by the Syrian authorities and possibly again by the Iraqi authorities, this is just passing the buck from one person to 1. You know, organization or one place to another is not actually
looking at the root cause. And it's continuing to create further anger amongst those people. And one day, one day that's going to break out in some way or another. And you know, as we look ahead, I hesitate to say this, but all roads often lead to President Trump or certainly he he believes that the Americans role in this. What key difference, if any, might it make? Well, the US has shown that what the US wants is basically what happens in the Middle East.
And we have seen a huge change in the region, partly as a result of changes under the Trump administration. And here we have explicit support as well as implicit support for the administration of Ahmed El Shadda. We are seeing increased partnership between the US and Saudi Arabia. We are seeing close coordination between the US and Israel, which I expect will eventually lead to significant change in Iran as well.
So the geopolitical landscape in the Middle East is changing, partly because of the way the US is dealing with the region. So I expect that ultimately no regime is going to be acceptable to the United States in the Middle East unless it's a regime that is find one way or another with US interests.
Lindsay, last word to you. Well, one of the things which the the Americas and the Israelis disagree on actually is Syria, because Israel is controlling a small section of Syria saying that they're there to support the Druze. And that actually is a point of friction. But I agree with Lena, I think that the future of the region is very looks very different now from how it did say 2-3 years
ago. And that is primarily because of Donald Trump's close association both with the Gulf monarchies and with Israel. And I think that as we look in the coming years, those are the places which are going to dictate what happens and we see declining power for Iran and for any countries which are allied with Iran. Lindsay Leena Khatib, thank you so much for joining us. That is it from this episode of THE FORECAST. Until next time, goodbye.