Hey, they're Odd Lots listeners. We have a very special announcement. Joe and I are hosting our annual Front Lots Pub Quiz on Thursday, February thirteenth in New York City, and it's gonna feature some very special guests and prizes. So come test your wits in finance, markets and economics for a chance to win the ultimate Odd Lots glory and hang out with your fellow listeners. Tickets are on sale now at events dot Bloomberg Live dot com, slash Odlots
Pub Trivia. You can also find links on our Twitter feeds or in the newsletter, and you can find the link also on our show notes. We hope to see you there.
Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, Radio News.
Hello and welcome to another episode of the All Thoughts Podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway.
And I'm Joe Wisenthal.
Joe, do you remember when you first heard the term mag seven?
You know, I don't if I'm being honest, but you know these achronyms that for big tech stocks, like they kind of you know, people used to talk about Fang, right.
I know, I was just thinking that, like, when did the handoff from Fang to mag seven actually happen.
We need to do one of those like Google trends and gram things. That's a good question because and then there was like fang plus and then fam and but they're all kind of the same thing. It's just big tech stocks, right.
So the terminology the acronyms might change, but I think the subject is always kind of the same and the concern is always the same. It's this idea that there is like a handful of big companies, usually tech stocks, that are driving the entire market.
Yeah, and it drives people crazy, right, they're so big, and they've grown so much, stocks have done so well over the years, and all these old strategies of like oh we're gonna like buy cheap or buy cheap low book value, you know, price to book and all these traditional investing patterns. It never mean reverts for years and years and years, except for like five minutes in twenty
twenty two. They just go straight up. And the only test of whether you're a good investor or not is whether you're over whether you bought ten Yeah.
That's it, is it?
Really? That really is the alpha now is But you know, you see these numbers thrown around like I think Goldman Sachs said that the top ten stocks now account for something like thirty eight percent of the S and P five hundred, which is a record, yeah, and seems quite a lot on the face of it. And I saw another number out there saying twenty six stocks now account for half of the entire value of the S and P five hundred. So I think it brings up a
bunch of interesting questions. How bad is the concentration? Is it intrinsically bad in and of itself? Is it actually that risky?
Yeah?
And also how are financial professionals and the market itself actually reacting to this concentration risk?
So I think we should talk about it totally.
You know, I look at myself in the mirror, and I say to myself.
Do you point at yourself like that meme?
I And some days I point and say you're a good because you know, I'm just like a boring index fund investor for my retirement, you know, So I point say, oh, you're a good investor because you've been really long tech. And then I and then on other days they wake up and say, oh, you are really heavily exposed to twenty six stocks, And so you know, it's like to you know, glass half full. It's like good, but also makes me a little anxious.
You shouldn't take credit. You should give that credit to SMP and thank you, and then when the market collapses you should blame them.
I do.
I say thank you to the wonderful fund managers at SMP. I only wish you hadn't. You know, every once in a while they have a dud. It's like why did you pick that one anyway?
Or why didn't you include?
Yeah?
Kay, exactly, all right, Well, without further ado, we do, in fact have the perfect guest for this topic, someone that I've wanted to speak to for a long time and I can't believe we haven't had him on the podcast before major oversight on our part. We're going to be speaking with Kevin Muhror. He is, of course the Macro tourist and a long time voice on finn Twit and writing on his blog as well. So Kevin, thank you so much for coming on all thoughts.
It's great to be here. Thanks Joe and Tracy.
Maybe just to begin with, it's the first time you're on the show. I've always sort of known you as this voice that's hanging around in the finance BLOGI sphere. But what's your background?
So I was the equity derivative institutional equity derivtive trader at RBC Dominion Securities in the nineties. I was kind of at the forefront of the technological boom and the automated trading and the index trading and the taking off of all these index products. And then in two thousand I actually went off on my own and I thought, maybe, you know, I'll go work for a hedge fund. And I thought, well, at the same time, I could go and trade for myself for a little bit and see
how that goes. And that's kind of twenty five years later and I'm still doing it.
You write the macro Tourist, what's your goal? What do you for those I we're both big fans of your writing, But what do you what do you like to write about? What's your sort of goal with your writing?
Well, Joe, it originally started off as a diary, and I just kind of good traders, you're supposed to keep a diary, and and I would start writing things and then people would pull me up and ask me what I thought of the market, and I would send it off into the mot just so well, here's what I wrote my diary. Eventually they started to ask often enough that we just started to put it up on the net, and then it took off from there, and from there I ended up going and actually started my podcast and
meeting all sorts of people. And one of the kind of just great parts about being on the podcast is the fabulous people I got to meet along the way. I meet people like Jim Lightner and I've had Mike Masters on the podcast, and those people are market wizards. They're terrific, and I get to share ideas with them, and it's just that considers myself one of the luckiest guys in the world.
So let's get to the topic at hand. Then give us some context around concentration risk in something like the S and P five hundred right now. I threw out some numbers earlier, But how extensive is this concentration and should we be worried about it?
Well, Tracy, one of the things that people will kind of push back on when you say that the US has become more concentrated is they'll say things like, oh, but if you go look at other indexes around the world, they're also very concentrated. And that's absolutely correct, There's no doubt about it. This is something that is experienced in Canada. As I mentioned, I'm a Canadian and I was on the index desk at a time when Noortel was actually thirty five percent of the entire index.
Wow.
So if you think that you guys are we're having troubled dealer with this, now, just imagine having thirty five percent of the index being one stock. It was actually even worse than that because we had kind of a palm at triple M situation where Bell Canada was one of our next biggest stocks and it main holding with
all of its Nortel holding. So it ended up being that the index managers were stuck because if you think about it from a fiduciary point of view, it doesn't make sense to have fifty percent of your portfolio, you know, exposed to one stock. It's risky. And so one of the things that I well that I'm hearing now when you bring up the problems about concentration risk in the US is they'll say, oh, no, but don't worry. It's actually much better than the rest of the world. And
I won't deny that for a second. But isn't that kind of like saying, you know, my Mercedes is now using plastic knobs, but don't worry, the Honda uses plastic knobs too. Part of the reason that we've been that investors have been attracted to the US is that it is a diversified basket of many stocks. And just think about you know, Warren Buffett, Warren Buffett tells you can buy the S and P five hundred, you can sleep
at night. But if you go and talk to investment advisors around the world and you ask them, do you think your clients really truly know what's underlying that basket? I think they most of them would say they would assume that it's it's roughly equal weight, and they would be shocked to learn that, you know, Microsoft and Navidia Apple are each almost seven percent of their basket for a total of twenty one percent. And so it's ends up being it's a worrisome kind of new development in
the US. And I don't buy the argument that just because other countries are more, you know, it's concentrated, that we shouldn't worry about.
It in the US. And all you have to do is look you, Teresa.
You mentioned that Goldman Sachs stat and they have another one that they published and they went back, they looked at concentration risk throughout the last century, and if you look at it, we are now just as concentrated as we were right in front of the Great Depression in nineteen twenty nine, in the nifty to fifty in the early seventies, and the dot com bubble in the late nineties. Well, all those times were not good times to buy stocks
for forward returns. So increasingly I think that we need to be aware that this is a risk, and there's more and more conversation happening around that.
I'm happy that in Nvidia has been seven percent or somewhere south of that. In my portfolio, I didn't even have to do anything, and I made a big allocation to one of the best performing stocks in the world. And not only that, I mean, I take your point
about concentration and et cetera, and obviously very alarming. These are also account for a huge share of the actual earnings too, So I mean, you know, there was a lot of concentration in ninety nine, two thousandth tech, but a lot of those companies weren't really making that much money. These companies are earnings juggernauts.
Well, no doubt, you're absolutely correct, Joe. And that's kind of the pushback to this argument that we're concentrated world. They'll say, oh, it's bang seven. It's a wide variety of different companies that do with different things. It's not like it's all one industry. And not only that, the valuations aren't as crazy as they might seem, no doubt about it. You can make that argument. But let's just imagine tomorrow that the AI bubble doesn't live up to
its hype. Let's imagine that all of a sudden we have some sort of earning surprise and these stocks get had. It's not that hard to imagine. We went through it in twenty twenty two. So if that occurs, I think that people will be quite shocked at how they're supposedly diversified basket of stocks performs. And more importantly than that is that we can sit around and we can debate whether you should own this or whether this is prudent.
But more and more fiduciaries, more and more risk managers, more and more institutional portfolio managers are looking at it. And saying this is dangerous and they're looking for ways
around it. And one of the things that many of these managers are bumping up against is that although the S and P five hundred is actually in line with this following rule of this thing called the twenty five five point fifty, which means that no one stock can have more than twenty five percent and the five stock the biggest stocks that are over five percent can't add up to more than fifty percent of your portfolio. That's an IRS rule that is called the twenty five five
to fifty rule. There's no problem with the SMP five hundred currently with that rule, but there is some thing called the Russell one thousand growth index, and increasingly more and more institutional managers are benched to that index. And what we're seeing is within that index, we're bumping up against that. And what's happened now is that Russell's realized that this isn't just kind of a fiduciary point of view, this is actually an IRS issue in terms of that
they cannot go over those things. So what we're seeing is there's changes in the rules coming to make sure that these indexes capped.
By the way Tracy Kevin mentioning how exposed everyone is to AI beta, so to speak, And I just want to give a plug. We had a really good contribution in the odd Lot's Newsletter from a Skanda recently on this whole thing. There's just both in stocks and the economy and the real economy. There's just this like we get they better get this AI thing right.
Yeah, seems kind of important. Kevin. You mentioned finance professionals reacting to this concentration risk. So okay, maybe your average mom and pop retail investor doesn't realize that the S and P five hundred is not you know, five hundred equal weighted stocks, but certainly finance professionals do, and they're aware of both the risk involved in having a large concentration in just a handful of stocks and also some of the requirements around diversification, so legal requirements that you
just mentioned. Before we get into some of those changes, can you maybe just give us a little bit of background on the importance of the index providers to the finance industry itself. This is sort of a pet topic of mine that I've written about occasionally, But how big a deal are the index providers now?
Well, You're absolutely right to highlight that, Tracy, and I'm glad to see you have such a an enthusiastic come attraction to index providers.
One of the you're the only one that gets excited about it. But it is a big story.
And one of the issues is that as indexing has become more popular, some of the kind of traditional the first of the indexers have started charging more, which has created an opportunity for other index providers to jump into the loop. So obviously we all know the S and P five hundred, but then there's the foot seat, which is rustle, but there's also things like morning Star and even you guys at Bloomberg have a lot of great indexes and you're competing on a lot of these things
as well. So what's driving that is kind of two factors. One of them is that there is the cost associated with the big ones, so they're just trying to clients that have to pay tens and hundreds of thousand dollars for this index data. Is our changing the providers trying to get something cheaper. And then the other thing is is a little more kind of nefair. There's some indexes that are easier to beat, so if you have an index that you know the rules, you can actually front
run them. The When I was researching this and learning about this, someone told me that it's important that you buy the products of the index of the indexes that are difficult to beat, and then from a kind of
client perspective, you choose. If you are a portfolio manager, you choose the indexes that are easier to beat, because if you're using, you know, for example, the S and P five hundred as your benchmark, that's a lot more difficult than to beat than another index that might have one annual revision that is easy to kind of forecast and run ahead of.
Joe.
I should just mention Kevin was kind enough just then, because he's a very polite Canadian, to basically do our disclaim for us, which is that Bloomberg LP, the parent company of Bloomberg News, does own a bunch of different indices, but probably most prominent among them are the Bloomberg bond indices, and those were the Barclays indices before. So I should just mention.
That there you go, Thank you, Kevin, and thank you.
Can I jump in with you a little since a lot of people are getting Bloomberg users. One of the things is if you go when you want to see, for example, the index move and the S and P five hundred, and you to type in hmov, you'll see that they actually unless you pay for that data, you
don't get the index point changes. But Bloomberg has the B five hundred, which is very similar, and you can plot it in and then all that functionality that you have to pay for on the other things, it actually works quite well on the Bloomberg indyssees.
There you go. So if you have a Bloomberg terminal but don't feel like paying for the S and P data specifically, Kevin just gave you a little bit of a little bit of alpha there.
But you know it.
Actually you talked about foot running index changes. Why said it easier?
Right?
Like S and P they announced, oh, some new company is joining an index. How can you make money from those announcements?
Well, you used to be able to.
There's a huge opportunities before, and there was hedge funds that devoted themselves to doing it. But now everyone knows the ones that are due to go in. And then there's hedge funds who actually have portfolios of all the stocks that are due to go in and even not just hedge funds, even pension funds will quote and front run them because they realize that there's some malfa there. So at the end of the day, Joe, the problem is that the more people look at it, the less
money there is to be made. Yeah, and kind of trying to guess those things.
All right, So let's get into how not just the benchmark index providers are reacting to increased concentration, but also how finance professionals are. You mentioned the Russell one thousand, so give us a little bit more detail on what's happening there. So Russell one thousand is aware that there's intense concentration risk.
Right, so they're jumping so they are actually getting ahead of their problems of potentially going and bumping up against this twenty five to five fifty rule. And for those who don't aren't aware of it, this isn't a new phenomenon. We actually had this in the summer of twenty twenty three when Microsoft became too large of a position within the QQQS and there needed to be an emergency rebalance
where they reduced the size of Microsoft. And then we also saw this in the sector select XLK spider where Navidia ran up and it actually ended up again we bumped up against that twenty five to five to fifty rule and they needed to be an emergency rebalancing there. And that was the situation where there was the way
that their capping worked. It was this kind of very violent shift from selling Apple and buying Navidia, and then kind of the next quarter it flipped the other way because of the way that the stock price has moved and they had to do this rebalance again the other way. And so this is the problem with that many of these index providers are are kind of bumping up against it in terms of they don't want to be too
violent with their shifts. They don't want to go and get into situations where they're rebalancing all the time, trying to keep within this limits. And that is why the Russell in this R one thousand growth which is one of the most popular growth indexes out there, they chose instead of using the five and the fifty rule, they used four and a half and forty five, meaning that any stock above four and a half, if all those stocks add up to forty five percent, then they do
this rebalance. So they've kind of given themselves a little bit of extra, you know, room there in terms of the rebounce. What's interesting is that they had announced this I don't know what's a year ago because they saw this problem coming. Nobody was talking about it.
Oh yeah. I actually went back to try to find articles on this. I couldn't find any.
Yeah.
The way that I came upon this idea and this kind of revelation about that this is coming up was actually one of my subscribers and a buddy sent me something from Kevin Ja from Discipline Alpha, and he'd written this whole piece about it and just highlighting it. One of the reasons that he highlighted is he was a mid cap manager during the two thousands and he distinctly
remembers Sebel Systems and another one. I can't remember the other one, but there was two big stocks in the S and P four hundred that were due to go into the S and P five hundred, and when they did it, the trouble was that the guys that all bought it for the S and P five hundred, and then when the SNB four hundred guys went to sell it,
there was no bids. And then coincided with the top of the Nasdaq market, and he's very kind of adamant that this is could be another situation where we have a situation where the MAG seven has to go down in waiting in one of the biggest indexes out there in terms of after the S and P five hundred, this is probably the next biggest growth index out there. And when this rebalance occurs, which again is in March, ironically, it's the same deal. There's going to be millions and
millions of shares of these mag sevens for sale. And so for me, when I was trying to learn about it, I went and said, okay, I went to an old buddy at TD and they were one of the few, and I think he said he was the first cell side dealer to actually start talking about this. But increasingly over the last month there's been more and more folks paying attention and realizing that this is a bigger deal than they really.
By the way, as tracing those I love dot com you're trivia and talking about that, and so like you talk about Sebel and you talking about the three comm Palm situation and all the these are like these are some of my CATNP for Yeah, this is a total cat.
You know.
It occurs to me like the sort of the very strict Chicago school. There's no such thing. Everyone people love to say, there's no such thing as that you can't as passive investing. You can sort of get close to it, you know, the strict Chicago school people is like, you know, you buy the global market portfolio at their market value,
every investable asset in the world. These rules essentially make it impossible, right because if you had some stock that was I don't know, got so big it was twenty five percent of the index or whatever, but you're not allowed to do it technically, like you really couldn't buy the true market portfolio given some of these constraints.
That's correct, and that's an IRS constraint. And then not only that, just stop and think about if you go and you try to recreate these portfolios at a broker. I spoke to one investment advisor. He said, if I went and made a portfolio of the qqqs, like if I just made it from scratch and did all those things, that compliance would tell me that I'm too concentrated in tech stocks. So he says, I'm not allowed to buy this from a compliance point of view, but I'm allowed
to buy the client's qqqs. And that's back to my point is that we all just kind of been lulled into this feeling that everything's okay. It's a it's a broad index, and it's no longer as broad. And ironically, you're talking about this idea about the mart the indexing, and if you remember Mike Green and his theory that the big will get bigger because of indexing, and more and more people will just continue and this will create a situation where the biggest stocks will continue to just
get bigger and bigger and bigger. Well, we're here, this is happening. And my pushback to that argument has always been that he's assuming the market doesn't work. He's assuming nobody goes and says, hey, wait, those stocks are too big. I'm going to go and no longer be benched to the S and P five hundred. I'm going to be benched to Russell one thousand or maybe three thousand. I'll
change it and see. This is the problem is that many clients have kind of career risk, So if they're bench to the S and P five hundred, they can't go and put this huge bet where they don't own the mag seven or they just say no, I can't own it, it's too expensive. They need to go and they need to own those stocks. But if you're a fiduciary that's managing money for someone, and you go and you say, listen, this doesn't make any sense.
We're buying this s and P.
Five hundred And the original reason what we did it was because it it was supposed to be this diversified basket of the whole market. This no longer makes sense. Let's go try to find something else so you can change your benchmark. Now, ironically, that actually takes a lot of hassle and it's difficult.
You have to go and you have to convince all.
The users of your product or the or the end clients to switch it. And that is why in this situation with the Russell one thousand growth, instead of making a new benchmark that is capped, they said, no, we're just going to change the existing rules of the existing index. So if you want an unconstrained Russell one thousand growth, there is a new index that Russell has created, But in this case it's going to be everyone that is the Russell one thousand growth, and it's a lot of them.
Like you go, you pull it up, you'll see twenty billion, forty billion, lots of people with big, big accounts that are benched to this. They're gonna all of a sudden find themselves overweight mag seven because there's a shift that's occurring on the March expiry March twenty first.
So, Kevin, you mentioned Russell making this decision to change the existing index rather than create a new one, And this is exactly what I wanted to ask you about, which is, you know, when we talk about benchmark index providers, we talk about them as being passive, right. They always say they create these indices that are basically holding up a mirror to markets and trying to reflect them as they exist right now, and that kind of I'm a little skeptical of that approach because I do think index
construction affects things like flows. It's kind of reflexive, and I do think there are a lot of you know, judgment calls that are embedded when you're deciding what to include and what to exclude. But if they're making an active decision to change the weighting on something like tech, does that perhaps open them up to more or scrutiny perhaps from regulators.
Well, I wouldn't say from regulators. It's more scrutiny from the clients. But in this case, they're not actually saying they don't want more tech. They're saying, we need to comply with this twenty five to five point fifty rule, which is an IRS rule. It has nothing to do with, you know, a decision that they think that the mag seven's gotten too risky.
Right.
The index providers are there to provide whatever index they think they can sell to their clients. If their clients want something, they're going to do it and by that token. Interestingly enough, we see the S and P five hundred Earlier this spring introduced a capped version of the S and P five hundred, which has individual stocks capped to three percent. Now Here in Canada, we've actually already listed
an ETF based upon this index. But the reason that SMP has created in nexus because there's a demand for it and ultimately the clients will drive it. What I thought was so interesting about this whole development is that we're seeing index providers having to change their rules because of this twenty five five point fifty. Then we're also seeing institutional pension funds endowments starting to question whether they want to continue with benchmarks that have such a large concentration.
And this is combined with the fact that many retail don't really understand what they're buying when they buy the S and P five hundred. So when I look at this situation and think about how this is going to play out going forward, I can make the argument that we're kind of at the peak of concentration here and that this is the market correcting what has become too concentrated of a market.
You know, going back to this idea that the big just keep getting bigger, and you mentioned some of Mike Green's theories, and you know, there is this view that some have that like the funds themselves, the ETFs, the index funds like create this mechanical flows and that flows to the biggest stocks and they keep going up and et cetera.
Flows before pros.
As Tracy has coined it, Do you still have that in your message, Nim Tracy?
I think I do, but only because I'm lazy and haven't been bothered to replace it.
But on the other hand, we're recording this January twenty second and one of the biggest stocks in the market. Apple has significantly underperformed all year. So the QQQ the indices are up, but Apple's actually significantly down this year
concerns about iPhone sales. It still looks to me that maybe there's some mechanical flows going on, but there is individual security selection and marginal price setting still happening, so that despite like all these the flows that on some level you know that they're you know, if a company is if they're concerns about a company's performance, it doesn't just mechanically go higher.
You're right, Joe, But I would push back and say that I'm cliff as in Camp that it's become a lot less efficient. There's less and less fundamental investors going out and actually buying and selling stocks based upon fundamentals. And not only that, Cliff won't tell you this, but if you think about it, part of the reason the market has become less efficient is because of quants themselves. They become a larger and larger portion of the trading
in the market. These pod shops, and I have nothing against them, they're producing some absolutely stellar returns risk adjusted.
They're out of the world.
They're terrific but a lot of it is based upon following momentum and doing things like earnings revisions and other kind of pro like short term pro cyclical movements, so there's very little of the kind of dual David Einhorn, I'm buying a stock because it's for you know, a four pe, and I'm planning on selling it at seven pe. When everyone figures out that earnings are going to be better than expected, now it's much more. Next quarters, EPs
is going to be slightly higher. That means the earnings revisions ticked up, and therefore all of our models mean that you need to buy, and everyone rushes into it, and then the CTAs follow and it just ends.
Up feeding upon itself.
So I'm not quite sure I completely agree with you, Joe, that that everything is great with the markets. It really does feel to me like it's become less efficient, not more.
All Right, Kevin Muir, I am so glad that we finally got you on the show and we have to do it again. Thank you so.
Much, my pleasure, Thank you for having me on.
Thanks that's great, Joe, that was so much fun. I'm so glad we finally had Kevin on the show and he even brought you, you know, dot com era of femine.
I know, I love it. I love this topic. I mean I just think about it all the time. I even wrote about it in the newsletter this week. Every month Bank of America does their hedge fund or their fund manager survey, and one of the questions they ask is what do you perceive as the most crowded trade? And basically, like almost every month for years now, it's been some it's some version of big tech. And you know, like you're like, typically you think, oh, this is a
crowded trade, it can't go on. But the move has been to play the crowded trade.
Yeah. Absolutely, and you're right to some extent that's been justified by earnings. But I think I think there is like this reflexivity that I mentioned at play in the market, where you know, the big attract more inflows, they get more capital, they get bigger, maybe they get more pricing power, and then that leads to more earnings. So you have this sort of cycle going on.
I mean, well, for whatever reason, we're in an era and I would say there is a winner take all this across the economy. Yeah, that you see for sure, And how much of that is financial flows, how much of it is real economic outcomes. I guess my inclination is still to look and say, you know, the earnings growth of these names are unbelievable, but whatever the reason,
everyone is now all in on the same bet. And Kevin made the point about career risk, which is really key, which is that even if you think you've identified something else or maybe a better way to diversify, et cetera, do you really want to be the one person who like, oh, I'm gonna like shave down my Nvidia exposure or do you just want to ride with everyone else at the same time.
You know, one of my favorite benchmark controversies is there's actually a lot of if you think about, you know, like including Chinese bonds, including Chinese shares and things like that. But there there was this big kerfuffle among frontier and em investors.
About Kuwait huh.
Kuwait was included in the MSCI Frontier Index for the longest time, and a lot of people didn't like that because Kuwait is this like fairly small country with only four million people and like a pretty small GDP, and everyone was like, why can't we have more Vietnam or something like that. So eventually they kicked Kuwait out of the Frontier Index and sent it to em and everyone was happy, that's a good story starting Kuwait. Presumably it's a good story. Yeah, thanks. Shall we leave it there?
Let's leave it there, all right.
This has been another episode of the Odd Lots podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy Alloway.
And I'm Jill Wisenthal. You can follow me at the Stalwart Follow or guest Kevin Muir. He's at Kevin Follow. Our producers Kerman Rodriguez at Kerman ermann Dashel Bennett at dashbot and kill Brooks at Kilbrooks. For more Oddlots content, go to Bloomberg dot com slash odd Lots. We have transcripts a blog in the newsletter, and you can shout about all of these topics, including index concentration and markets and investing in our discord discord dot gg slash odlog.
And if you enjoy all lots, if you like it when we talk about benchmark index providers, then please leave us a positive review on your favorite podcast platform. And remember, if you are a Bloomberg subscriber, you can listen to all of our episodes absolutely ad free. All you need to do is find the Bloomberg channel on Apple Podcasts and follow the instructions there. Thanks for listening behind it