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Hello and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lots podcast.
I'm Joe Wisenthal and I'm Tracy Alloway.
Tracy, It's April and ninth, nine, five am. There's a ceasefire ish, it's sort of there's been something announced that's called a ceasefire. There does not seem to actually have been much of a cessation of fire per se. Maybe it's slowed down a little bit. Some of the headlines this morning are about Israel continuing to strike hard in Lebanon, Iran saying that, well, if there's no ceasefire in Lebanon, there's no ceasefire at all. But you know, overall, at
least as of right now. You know, the market, et cetera. We saw that huge drop in oil Tuesday night. You know, the market's still sort of still sort of buoyant, right, still sort of resilient.
Well, I think the important thing for the purposes of this particular discussion is if you take a look at what's going on in the strait of war moves, it still seems to be shut more or less and shout out to the Bloomberg function. You can hor Moves go. You can see the number of ships that are going through that particular choke point, and I have two as of today, which is basically not likely to today.
There was some there were some headlines about how maybe even in the good case, they would let through ten to fifteen, which is still sort of nothing compared to normal ship traffic, so like nothing's back to normal.
I was gonna say to your point, I think the thing that's confusing everyone is we keep seeing these headlines about like a billion barrels lost of world supply or twenty percent of the world's oil supply now choked out because of the Horror Moves situation. And yet if you look at the oil price, you know WTI Brent definitely up, but they're not up as much as you might think given the scale of disruption.
I think many people feel intuitively the price should be higher. And then of course there's the whole refined products situation, which is more extreme, and a lot of the prices that feel really extreme in general have happened in or we see it in East Asia, whether it's like Singapore jet fuel, et cetera. Or a lot of the headlines that you see about extreme rationting come from East Asia.
I forget which country was. They were, like, you know, they're doing that classic thing of only drive to work if your license plate ends in an odd number on this day.
Whatever, very nineteen seventies.
Yeah, and we're seeing a lot of these types of headlines, some in Korea, some Thailand, et cetera. So it also then raises the question, you know, the straight and formosa is closed, maybe it'll be open, But does this change future energy trajectory in some way? Does this mean there's going to be more comfort with coal mining over the long term? Does this mean that economies are going to
try to accelerate decarbonization efforts more intensely. Could this be a huge boon for the American leng industry, where we know we're building a lot of export terminals, et cetera. And if you know impair there's some sort of impairment to Katari llng than huge questions about even just setting aside market price it right the second or this week the future of energy.
One thing about our current market moment is we are getting like a crash course in real time about the flow of energy throughout the world. And as we will see in this conversation, like it is still very much geographically constrained East versus West, and so as you say, the big question is whether or not the east kind of I don't know, scrambles even harder to adapt to this.
Well, I'm very excited to say we do, in fact have the perfect guest, someone who knows about all this stuff, someone who's been on the podcast before, but we have talked to him in years, which is really sad because we really liked the guy and so very excited to welcome back onto the show. Alex Turnbull. He's an investor based in Singapore, but he's also a researcher with the
Australia National University focused on energy security. Really knows the energy scene very well, spends his time thinking about the present and future of energy. So Alex, thank you so much for coming back on Outlaws.
Thank you very much. It's great to be back on.
Yeah, really really appreciate it. Talk about like right now, you know this phenomenon that we talk about where yeah, prices are up, but you know, by some measures, still within some sort of historical range, Whereas the headlines that you see about rationty, et cetera, like, well, this is extremely dire, et cetera. Give us your lay of the land, from the from the from the Asian perspective, from the perspective of East Asian country, it's like, how dire are
things just like right now? Without that without that flow terrible Franklin.
The challenge right now for Asia is that most of their crede supply does come from the Middle East, or there are some countries which do have some domestic production Malaysia, China of course, but broadly speaking, Asia is a massive crude import, and principally from the Middle East because it's the most proximate supply and generalize the chapest shipping distances
and costs. So Asia is very heavily exposed right now and more acutely thinking about what the impacts might be, how they might want to preenser than the United States, of course, which produces a lot of oil but still needs Middle East in grades for blending and refining. Also Europe, which has access through its quite readily.
How much do the spot prices actually matter at this moment in time, because you know, you can look up something like Dubaioman or some type of oil that you would assume would be maybe flowing into East Asia, and you can look at the spot price, but like if it's not actually moving, does that like moving out of the Strait of War, moves into Asia? Does that mean anything?
It does certainly for some ride So for Amani Crode can still be loaded and is being loaded those a real price is prompt Brent, there's a and those sorts of trades are real. So you're often saying even for loadings from Yandu and Saudi Arabia OSPs, which cause you know, indications of price are anywhere from twenty to twenty five dollars above whatever the prevailing bread contract is.
So in terms of like the knock on effects on the economy mentioned some of the rational thing. Okay, yes, this is very they're highly exposed to it. What is it hitting now? Is the economic destruction already taking place? Like talk to us about like just sort of like I guess on the ground figuratively and literally, what are some of the ripple effects that we're seeing.
You're certainly saying aious constraints on consumption where they don't really have a lot of refining capacity, and where there is, they just don't have large amounts of crude story. So places like the Philippines and Vietnam are already under some significant stress. A lot of it is also driven by the factors. It's kind of a question of whether you can get credit lines to be able to pay these prices.
And ultimately the decision of the refineries is if they don't have inputs, they have to shut the refinery down, which incurs a large amount of fixed costs and downtime and so forth. So a lot of these players are kind of living hand in mouth and trying to get whatever they can to stay open as long as they can. So that's how you have this extreme willingness to pay for prompt cargoes in order to keep these assets operating
and running. But then you know the future's cove is about thirty sixty days, and that's a long time in the current febrile context where you could get resolution or not. And so that that disconnector is going to remain. I think, so long as there is no sense of a clear path here.
Who's not getting energy? Because all right, if there are some entities that are almost going to be completely priced and sensitive, they have to keep the lights on, they they're going to just pay whatever. So you get these huge short term spot prises. But volume is volume, and so who is actually being forced to turn off the lights or not run a refinery or whatever because they're getting out bid If there are fewer molecules, there are fewer molecules.
Yeah, I mean certainly less high income countries in Asia. You'll start to see quite an acute crunch in the Philippines. So they've recently secured some cargoes from China on one off basis, some Vietnam the same. You know, places like the Pacific Islands, like they're in a not very good place. So it's already starting to begin the demand destruction starting mostly of course, mostly buy income.
So you mentioned refineries there, and one of the headlines that's come up recently is Asian refining margins slip into negative territory, which would seem like a bad thing if you're a refiner. And I take the point that you need to keep these assets going because it's hard to shut them down and then restart them again. But if you're not making any money, how long are these refiners actually going to keep going for?
Well, for some Chinese tape hod refiners, just smaller private ones. They live in a different political slash economic context and as that's told to stay on, they will. You know, it depends on which In many of these countries you don't have purely market priced fuels, So whether that's Vietnam or China. In places where you have market pricing pass through like Australia, the price of fuel is getting very expensive in date.
So in those situations basically where Tracy mentioned, a refiner might be actually operating at negative Mergin. That's in an environment in which the retail price of fuel is not liberalized. There's a set the government sets the price of fuel or sets the band or something like that, and the refiners just have to keep operating until the next time that band has changed. Yes, okay, got it. So what are you seeing Let's talk about you know right now,
is this is there? What's happening with US energy? Is it all being taken up by Europe as you'r is Asia trying to get in on the action or bidding for cargoes like what's happening with American flows.
American plays ago in Asia quite sharply right now. So Asian prices spot in the JackAM futures about European TTF or title transfer facility futures for the next period. That could change quickly, but at the moment, Asia has a much higher urgency and willingness to pay as like into summer, higher powered amount from cooling, air conditioning, and also just a much more acute dependence upon energy in certain countries.
In Europe, you've so you're going into summer, you have this solar wind, and it's not quite panic stations just yet. So I think Europe will be a little bit more slow to fill its storage, but then by just goes on till say June or July. Then that that's when the real panic was set up.
For Asia.
How much of a role does Russian oil play right now in terms of replacing last Middle Eastern supply.
I mean, most of the Russian crew has already been sold anyway, and it has been sold very heavily into Chinese refineries and Tipa, so it's not like it some of them was sitting offshore when it was going through
a period of more robust US sanctions. The offshore barrels of oil and water has been dropping very sharply as all that crude has been absorbed into various places India, China, like I said, so, yeah, so I think I think that's sort of that that has provided something of a buffer to this shock because there was this backup of Russian crew that couldn't know. I'm was quite sure whether they could pay for it without a did sanction by the US. But of course that's melted a way in the current context.
You mentioned that the Philippines has imported some gas from China, and I'm curious, like, what has has China. We know they've been a big accumulator over the years, generally of natural resources, and they have strategic stockpiles and so forth. But right now, what are they doing and are they trying to play some role in stabilizing or easing to crunch for a region overall?
I think they've been very strategic. Then they're not. Certainly there's more or less control on exports of oil products right now, which is not very helpful for the region because they have a time been large exports. They are clearly doing this in a very targeted fashion, and I would assume there's other considerations behind that.
Oh wait, say more, Well.
For example, China has territorial distributes with the Philippines and Vietnam and the South China Sea, and they've now got something oh so interesting.
Okay, that makes sense.
Yeah, oil is geopolitical tool. Is a tail as old as.
Is all as time.
I was gonna say time, but I guess as old as what two hundred years or something like that. Okay. So we were talking about the potential for an energy crisis to actually hasten decarbonization efforts in Asia, and this is something that came up before on an episode we did on China's teapot refineries. Are you seeing rumblings of that at the moment or are people still in sort of weight and see mode.
Ah No, there's definitely been a notable pickup in certain areas where there was already a bit of momentum. So in Japan, they have been undertaking a number of nuclear restarts. They were moving very tentatively as the public got behind nuclear and the politics became less challenging. That that is all apparently accelerating now, so Japan will push very hard on nuclear restarts, and more importantly, the public polling is really strong for it, so there's not a lot of political risk.
And of course Takehi had a massive election win, so she's in favor of the publics behind it, and there's a matter of necessity now, so I think that's something one could assume is only going to move faster. And then in Korea there's also more of a push for nuclear restarts, so that's that's moving quickly. China is doing some very pointed stuff to try to reduce sell and
G burns and use in chemicals. It's tricky and tricky to if you've got a plastics plant, that's kind of hard to do, but they're having a red hot go at it. And similarly, you're also starting to see a staggering acceleration in IV adoption. If you do calls to auto dealers around Asia and ask them how much time electric vehicles stay on the lots down to single days, and many of them are back or now, So if there probably wasn't, maybe.
What you're doing are you calling up the car lots and asking them this?
Yeah, of course, wait, say more about this and what would they have said? This is actually this is this is not this is new. Uh, this is new is underground information. But talk about this, like, what would they have said a month ago? What are the type of dealers you're talking to? What would they have said? A month ago.
And now, I mean, you know in January when there was yeah, you would say b white cause, for example, a couple of deals in Australia, Singapore or the pots of Asia that would be on the lot for twenty five plus days. You know, the inventory turns were kind of a bit slow and the market didn't look kind of glotted. We're down to single digit days in most places now. So anything China can't produce out of the
review sector, I think we'll get solved this year. That's just really the constraint is on the supply side, not of the demand side.
Now, I don't know the degree of granularity that you pay attention to American politics. Are you familiar with you know who Thomas Massey is? Is this name Ringlebell? Oh yeah, yeah, he's a Kentucky from congressman from Kentucky who drives a tesla with a bumper sticker that said this this this tesla is powered by Kentucky cole. So he's like, you know, he's a politician from Kentucky or public Aga is very pro called, but he's also a pro testla. So is
his coll powered tesla? Is that basically the sort of near or medium term future of Asia, which is like okay, ellenng is impaired BYD's are flying off the lot, and so essentially we have a lot of like de facto col powered tesla's driving around or sorry, col powered BYD's flying around to.
A certain extent, yeah, I mean it's also there's also very hard analytic math behind this, in the sense that there are the streets of holl moves do not aside from the East West pipeline which looks like it got pretty badly hit today over the last twenty four to forty eight hours, there is no way for that oil
to make its way out otherwise. So this is very different to twenty twenty two, where you have sanctions, you have this and that, but the spice will flow if it can physically move or be moved by pipelines, by
rail and what have you. And so in twenty twenty two I was pretty sanguine about the impacts on the oil market because russ has got a lot of pipeline capacity to China through Kazakhstan and there was clearly not really the appetite to do full on shadow fleet sanctions that will be requited to slow down in this case you actually just can't get it out. That's all there
is to it. And so if you look at that vulnerability with oil where twenty plus percent of the market comes to the Middle East an LNG, which is about the same numbers. And then if you look at say a big network flow graph model of global coal market which I've done, the coal is not really dependent upon checkpoints. The biggest producers are places like you know, first of all, trying to produce the enormous amount domestically it's the world,
it's the largest producer. India does too, Australia, South Africa. These are all places with access to open ocean, no quirky straits, and so you don't really have to worry too much about whether some geopolitical event takes out coal. That the most reliable option, of course is just producing stuff in country, whether that's solo when batteries nuclear, but in a pinch, and currently I think coal is going to have a bit of a comeback for that reason.
Line, yeah, sending coal aside for a second, when you look at alternate sources of energy, do you have like I don't want to say a personal favorite, but which one which one of them? Do you think comes out on top in the sort of medium to longer term. From this particular situation, it's like.
Asking someone, well, you know what one should I grow? What? What what should I plant? I'm like, well, okay, where are you? So if you're anywhere close to the equator, we'll have a good solibaries or a solaries crisy shape. And if you've got to year round batteries are also pretty cheap, because that's that's how to be. If you're somewhere in the Baltic or something, then it's wind right.
So I think the appeal with sola, which is that you can roll it up very quickly, particularly with households. And it's interesting you're already starting to say the impacts of Australia's government pushing residential batteries, and that is that the interday spreads in power in Australia are very subject and the gas five generators, I'm not really pricing the market anywhere near as often as they used to, and gas burns have actually collapsed, as they have in California.
So if you want to kind of decouple from gas prices, batteries plus storage, solar plus storage is a very quick fix and can be rolled out very quickly, and it seems to be working very well in Australia that the price impact of this shock is fastly less than twenty twenty two already.
This is really interesting talk about that spread. So to some extent, would it be fair to say that a proxy or a gauge of how well solar plus batteries is working or affecting a market is not in lower prices per se, but in a diminishing spread between the highest and the lowest price of the day, and that you have this like growing You know that it's a sign of a sort of like pure power stability.
Yeah, I mean one thing in power Marx is the spark spread. So what is the what is the cost to get out of bed for a gas fired power plant? So you take the heat rate times whatever the gas price is and you work out how many hours a day over a week are effectively priced by gas and what happens. What happened in Australia was we had a lot of solo and not much storage, and still the peaks were still very expensive because that was the gas
plants knew they could set the price. What's happened with this proliferation of storage is that gas no longer reliably sets the price in those hours and sickly in Australia, where it's often somewhat oligobalistic market structure, having a lot of residential batteries tied together in a mesh network which then bids into the market is really crushing those peaky times of the day and that has a disproportionate impact
on average daily prices. The problem in places like the UK is there's a lot of renewables, really nice storage, so they're not getting much benefit out it's because they still get priced on the margin by gas.
Is it just because they haven't made they have to bite the bullet and buy a lot of batteries from China? Or like, what is why is there the lack of storage to complement the renewables in the.
UK marketstruction design that they're fixing this right now. I'm sure they'll be in a very different place in two years, but it was something of another side, I would say. So.
One of the things that stood out from a previous episode we did on the energy situation with our Bloomberg colleague Javier Blasts was he was talking about how the world is still very much divided between you know, I guess east of the Suez Canal and west of the Suez Canal. And if you're east at the moment, you have energy problems because of the situation in the strait of our moves. And if you're to the west, maybe
the pressures aren't quite as acute just yet. And one of the things we keep hearing from the Trump administration is, well, we have a lot of oil here in the US. We are hashtag blessed in carbons and molecules and all of that. When would you expect or would you expect at all, the pressures from the Middle East to start really filtering into the western part of the world.
Well, I mean, like I said earlier, you've already seen it in LNG. So Asian buyers are outbidding European buyers for now. That's obviously pushing up prices for Europeans. You are seeing more and more tanker traffic from the Atlantic base and move towards Asia. As Asia just is happy that there's maybe ten or fifteen dollars more shipping costs, but they are willing to bid those barrels at this point.
They do not care. So the idea that any of these systems are going to be There are frictions caused by shipping and time, but if the pull is and the need is that acute in Asia will absolutely find its way to the Western hemisphere.
So there is this view, and I think it really started with well, some people have had the dream for a very long time, some of the great pioneers of the industry. And then but then in twenty twenty two, with Russia's invasion of Ukraine, there's like, Okay, the future belongs to us l G exporters, that this is just weird.
Can keep growing, export, adding export terminals forever because there's just going to be all that we have, all this gas, so there's just incredible demand for it all around the world. Is that story at risk? I mean again, like if part of the thing that's going to happen is that around the world there is this and the political appetite for restarting nuclear and so forth is higher. Are there any weaknesses in the us LNG growth straight up lineup forever story.
I think there's a lot of problem with it. But then mostly due to overall problems with gas. First of all, the gas turbines are used to build a power plant and nasua are the same ones you use to build a data center. And the cost of a turbine is now it's over five hundred dollars per killer what it
was used to be about one thousand. I mean this is that there's this crunch in gas fired turbines, is you know, well well noted, I would say, Then you have the issue of so you're kind of being your customers have been priced out of using gas for that reasonle line. Then you have this geopolitical risk attached to
supply from the Middle East. There is no certainty that if there is some sort of toll on the straits of Horus that the Huthis might say, well, add like some of that too, please, and then we have another issue in the Red Sea. So I think while US supply is probably lower risk, depending on the actions of the US government. Of course, people are role looking at this market and thinking well, is this really what I want to build my powder it on? And the answer is probably so I got it.
So us llen G, yes, that is this perfect substitute for LERG from anywhere else. The big question is if LLERG generally has the potential for such volatility. Then maybe a country just decides, oh yeah, okay, the US exists, but maybe a country just decides this is not the future of energy for me.
Yeah, the might just look at this and say like, I don't I don't want this. This is far too much crazy in a five six year period, and I'd like, I'd like something boring place.
We're all full up on crazy. Yeah. So one of the reasons we wanted to speak to you is because you are in Singapore, and you know, in Singapore you can literally see the tankers sitting out there in the street of Malacca, but talk to us about the general vibes in the city as you know, a big hub of oil trading.
It's very interesting. People in the physical business are same levels of stress that are extraordinary, and then they look at their phones at equities and just they don't get it.
Yeah, we don't get it either.
And it's also what is quite challenging. It's people who have been in the physical trade and dealing with this part of the world and have a deeper empathetic, anthropological sense of how a toll is likely to be received in a lot of that world, or whether that's a stable configuration they have their doubts on whether we can get back to normal terribly quickly. So there's that people in government are taking this extraordinarily seriously. They're very concerned.
They are.
Singapore, I think is more than most places as a real sense of what a wartime economy looks like due to historical reasons from the fall of Singapore of World War two, and so I can tell that a there's a real gravity and done. I think that's coming out for some of the comments of the Foreign Minister Vivian Bealaprishian.
Do you think I mean talking just pure politics, like okay, the US and Israel they start a war and suddenly everybody around the world immediately has to do rationing, higher energy prices, et cetera. You know, for years it was this talk like okay, the US is going to pivot to Asia and try to have closer relationships with some of the non China Asia countries and so forth, and
just generally like does this we hear about this? The version of this conversation we hear most about is in Europe, right, and like, what is the future of our relationship with the US? What is the Asian version of this conversation and thinking about the future of the US, either as some sort of like business or political partner.
The problem is this is that if this is what one side of politics is going to be about on a sustained basis, which is doing stuff which doesn't make a lot of sense and is very damaging and unpredictable, and the other side is maybe a bit of a wet noodle at times a bit a bit more predictable. You kind of need to live through the full cycle, right.
A Republican what you're saying, they're more, okay, more stuff like this, and the Democrats of the wet noodles many people, Yeah maybe okay, we keep going. But then I'm just trying to make sure, okay keep going.
Yeah, sorry, So so I mean so so if if there's that perception that there is going to be this regular source of volatility, and also, you know, politics animated by things which do not really animate asia, like evangelical Christianity or a desire for a catacom or fighting with the pope. Like if this is kind of what the US is now, then there is going to be a natural desire to insulate oneself from it as much as you humanly can and that there are real limits to
what you can do. It's a big economy, it's very important, but you know, food, fuel, you know basic material flow security I think is going to be looked at very differently going forward, and I think there is that that will lead to a drive towards much high energy security, which is not going to go well with US efforts to promote fossil exports for sure.
Is China the natural alternative in that scenario? I mean we already talked about some shipments from China going to places like the Philippines. Are we seeing the emergence of that sort of energy diplomacy?
I think what people have not appreciated well is that China responds well to strength. The US now responds well to strength. So who does Trump not mess with China? Because they've restricted breaths and basically threatened put Detroit into cardiac arrest and strike their shoulders. And I think what Europe in particular is missing is that there are hands they could play that maybe are nonintuitive to them, but
doesn't mean they wouldn't work. The IRGC appears to have beaten the US to the most humiliating geopolitical defeats and suets and looks like they're going to get a toll out of it. So what like, what is the takeaway from how to deal with the US going forward? But similarly with China, I mean, they've been very aggressively coercive on material supply chains with technology. So I think this kind of idea that is a mid sized power you should be thinking that you need a pimp to keep
you safe on the streets. I mean, actually, all the pimps are that we need, we need more panbrea.
All right, you want to leave it there?
I think that's a good place. That's all the pimps are bad. Strike me as a pretty good place.
Yeah, sorry, that's wrong.
It's like it's like a good uh, it sounds like a good spot to leave it. Alex Turnbull, it's always great catching up with you. Really appreciate you taking the time. Very interesting conversation.
Thank you about.
Setting everything aside, And there's a lot in that conversation to talk about. I think a story that I want to do more coverage of is essentially like how solid is the US energy story?
Actually?
Yeah, because I think there is this view that okay, we're we have achieved oil independence basically. I know, we still refine bring in some blends of crude from our kinds of crude from anywhere else, but we have plenty of oil, and then we're going to have plenty of gas, and gas exports are going to go to the moon.
And I think that, like you know, Alex prison sense an argument, and there are good reasons to think that maybe the future isn't going to be a gas related and there are reasons to not for economies to not build an LERG dependent economy. And then you know, I think there are like questions about like, well, what what if the oil depletes a little bit faster than people think and so forth. So I just want to do more on actual like stress testing the assumptions about American domestic energy.
Absolutely, And it's really interesting what Alex was saying about just the EV dealership. Yeah, right, like you can see some of this starting to happen, and like the alternative so far is not you know, turning to us gas. It's not even buying a tesla, it's let's buy a
buid right. The other thing just on like a pure basic oil and gas basis, I think to Alex's point, earlier, Like there are these interconnections in the overall market which we haven't necessarily seen, like the pressure from one half of the world come into the other half of the world. Yeah, just yet, and there's an open question over like how
that happens. Sorry, the reason I'm not expressing myself well, but one of the papers I was reading from Alex's substack actually, or one of his substack contributions is a paper from twenty twenty two called the Myth of US Energy Independence. And so I think there is this like open question just on a pure hydrocarbon basis. Yeah, how much of the hashtag blessed America story actually it is true?
Yeah?
No, I mean, like, you know, a lot of things don't seem to be going great for some things are going better for the US than others these days, So not so much. I do think a lot is like, well, you know, at least we have energy, at least we're not.
Like it's not a relative basis, sure, but like.
If that were to change, if they if they were sort of get a reassumption, sort of reassessment about America's energy stability or energy independence or that would be like a very that'd be a really big story. I also just think, you know, it's very interesting that the nuclear reacceleration, et cetera that's happening, that there's.
Political will insia. There's nothing like an energy crisis to change like political will towards nuclear power.
And on that political will. His last point, which is like what is the lesson that we keep learning? Is like strength matters, and you know, it's like Trump hasn't gone very hard against China because China went very hard against the US. Iran may end up in a situation in which it comes out stronger than it was two months ago, where it actually is collecting a toll, you know, getting a cash cow for the straight of hor moves.
So it's interesting is his point where it's like, okay, Europe other parts of Asia, like what is the lesson that they learned from this? And maybe the lesson is that sort of like biding your time and trying to be friendly and uh, obsequently is it Maybe that's not the answer. Maybe maybe stronger lines are the answer for global diplomacy right now.
Also, the pimps are bad. Pimps are bad. All right, shall we leave it there.
Let's leave it there.
This has been another episode of the Authlots podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy Alloway.
And I'm Joe Wisenthal. You can follow me at the Stalwart. Follow our guest Alex Turnbull. He's at Alex b H. Turnbull. Follow our producers Carmen Rodriguez at Carmen Erman, dash Ol Bennett at Dashbot and Kilbrooks at Calebrooks. And from our odd Laws content. Go to Bloomberg dot com slash odd Lots or have a daily newsletter and all of our episodes, and you can chat about all these topics twenty four seven in our discord Discord dot gg slash odd Lots.
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