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Hello and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lots Podcast.
I'm Jill Wisenthal and I'm Tracy Tracy.
This has come up a few times on the podcast over the years, but you know, you.
Really feel dumb there. You could really feel.
Dumb as an investor over the last i don't know, fifteen twenty years if you literally bought anything else besides big tech.
Stocks, big US text, Yeah, big US text docks. Yeah, that's exactly right. And the funny thing is investors have been encouraged to diversify, right, Like this is the mantra of markets is that you shouldn't put all your eggs in one basket, et cetera, et cetera. And so you've heard for the past ten or fifteen years that you
should diversify into international stocks, you should diversify into small caps. Yeah, sixty forty and a lot of those things have turned out to be duds, or at least sixty forty was a dud for like a couple of years, kind of kind of.
I mean, it mostly did well, but like, yeah, then it had some it had some rough years, particularly out of the pandemic.
But certainly you would have been missing out on big gains if you put money into small caps or international stocks versus the big US techtoks.
Right, And you know, we've gotten a little bit. You know, when deep Seat came out, that raised some questions about big tech stocks. Obviously with the policy volatility in the US, which is one way to put it, there have been some questions about, Okay, is now the time to diversify abroad. Yeah, okay, you could have bought money buying Ryan Mattal or one
of the beneficiaries of German defense spending. But so far, you know, it's still not obvious that like there's some other big moneymaker out there for investors besides big tech.
But this is but we may be at a juncture.
Well.
I think the other unappreciated aspect is the importance of the benchmarks in all of this. And I think investors tend to think of benchmark index providers as these very neutral entities that are like holding out a mirror to the market and just reflecting what's already there. But actually a lot of their decisions are very active and have
very very big implications for investors. So you know, if MSCI says that the all World index is going to have small caps and big caps in it, then investors are you know, they're forced to buy small cap exposure.
That's totally correct, and this is core finance theory that the optical portfolio is more or less the global portfolio. We've talked about that with the dimensional guys, you really should have awaited allocation somehow, if possible, to every bond, stock and piece of real estate out there and that's the best you can do, and that clearly has not been the best you can do for a long time. And so we want to talk about the tortured pain of the poor diverse byed allocator and.
The tyranny of the benchmark index providers.
Yeah, very shaped, very Shakespearean. Anyway, I'm really excited. I think we do, in fact have the perfect guest, someone who I've been a big fan of for a long time, someone I've wanted to have on the show for a long time. He's probably one of my top five favorite posters on Twitter, although he's quite a down a little bit lately, but I think he's addicted like the rest of us. We're going to be speaking with Krishna Mamani. He is currently the Chief Investment Officer of the Lafayette
College Endowments. Previously, he was the CIO at the Oppenheimer Funds, which was bought by Invesco. So a long storied career, someone who knows about all of this stuff. So, Krishna, thank you so much for coming on the podcast. Thrilled we can finally make it happen.
Thank you, thanks for having me.
Absolutely what do they teach you in school about diversification. What is when they you know, when you're training to be an investor and asset allocator, what are they actually What do they tell you?
Diversification is the biggest free lunch available in the investment world, and I think from a longer term perspective that is absolutely true and probably something that we are to think about. But as you mentioned, the results over the it's not just last fifteen twenty years.
The results over the.
Last thirty years forty years have been very very, very very different than what you would have expected if you had gone down this path. Doesn't mean that the basic principle isn't invalidated. It just simply means that you have to think about it and acknowledge the fact that it hasn't worked out according to plan.
Where did the diversification thesis actually come from.
Well, diversification thesis basically says that if you have security specific risks in individual securities, you should if you can find a way of diversifying that away, then that is something that you should do because it reduces your overall risk profile without sacrificing too much in return terms. So that's what that's where the theory comes from.
And the like who propagated it. It must have had, like, you know, an endorser, or it must have made its way into the market in one way or another.
I think it came from cap M and William Sharp and you know that quarterie of academicians who basically did the pioneering research in this field in the let's say seventy and early nineties.
Yeah. In my four to one K, I have like a very conservative I've diversified fund. It has not kept up with the S and P five hundred, I don't think. But every once in a while, such as the first couple weeks of April twenty twenty five or the first couple of weeks of March twenty twenty, I take a look at it and I'm like, oh, I pat myself on the back for those moments of diversification.
Is it worthwhile? Just for those reasons?
Every once in a while you're like, okay, you know what, this makes me feel good. I'm not going to panic last, I'm actually my port. You know that four one K it actually stays close to all the time highs. I keep, you know, allocating it a little bit. How much is that worth in terms of that comfort that I get for like five minutes every twenty years, and relative to the cost of underperforming a simple S and P five hundred, paying a.
Price for a peace of mind?
Yeah, well so I Again, my argument isn't that diversification is a bad thing. I think from an economic principles, from financial principles, diversification is a good thing. And if you can find a way of dis or mitigating your
overall security specific risk, you are to do that. The point I'm trying to I would like to make is the fact that it hasn't worked, and therefore, kind of relying on thirty years or forty years or one hundred years of history to come to some sort of investment principles that people follow very religiously, you know, hasn't worked. So shouldn't we kind of think about that and try
to delve into what are the drivers? And it opens up a new research field because I would argue that the overall research in financial kind of investing is basically hasn't evolved a lot since the nineties. It's basically redoing the same papers with a little bit of changes here and there, but the core thinking cap im core thinking
really has not changed. So I think the right way to use this period of underperformance, whether it will sustain itself or whether you know, twenty twenty five change the paradigm altogether or not, is kind of kind of irrelevant. The key point is, let's kind of look at this period.
Let's look at it a little in a little bit more detail, rather than being extraordinarily Doctornaire about things, which is, you know, anytime you post on Twitter that while my international funds haven't really worked for me, I get schooled by all sorts of people. But the fact is they haven't worked for me, and I continue to do that. I mean, I have a very diversified portfolio, and I
will probably stick with it. But I think it is also fair to recognize that it hasn't worked, and therefore we should look at it in a little bit more detail and kind of not take the mantra of diversification as religious, which is what it is right now.
So in your opinion, what are the drivers or the reasons why it hasn't worked, because I imagine, you know, you could tell a story that the big tech stocks in the US have just been phenomenal companies that continue to throw off cash. You could maybe tell a story about the benchmark indices, which we spoke about in the intro. You could tell a story about flows and investors crowding into stocks. Why hasn't diversification worked well?
So again, let's just kind of narrow it down. When we are talking about this level of diversification, what we are talking about is US stocks not working or US stocks doing better than international stocks. So that's what we are talking about. I think there are several drivers. I think the kind of the tech supremacy of s and P five hundred is certainly one of them. The profitability of the tech franchise is another one. Low interest rates in the US, where growth was higher than interest rates,
certainly was a factor in driving returns. So and and kind of the existence of private equity which got multiples high. So there are a plethora of reasons as to why things haven't performed, and therefore, you know, it is it is worthwhile spending a little You know, these are speculations on my part, but this is worthwhile spending a little bit of time figuring this out in a little bit more rigorous way than we have done so far, because you know, right now, again, if anybody puts up a
notion that diversification is bad, they'll get schooled. But I think given the length of time that it hasn't worked, and given the length of the magnitude of how it hasn't worked, I think it is worthwhile spending a little bit of research focused to analyze what the drivers were, as you say, and see if there are there are some other things that we can divine out of this thirty year episode.
So I totally appreciate the need for additional research and I would agree with you on that. But is saying that diversification hasn't worked the same as saying that investors should only buy winners and avoid all the losers.
Well, so I think there's an element of that in for sure. That is, international markets have done poorly relative to US markets. One anecdote here, I used to be the spokesperson for Oppenheimer Funds with respect to globalize your thinking in twenty eleven when the campaign came out.
Oh so you were a messenger.
I was the messenger of this thing, and I kind of diversified my portfolio based on that thinking. The idea about portfolio construction with respect to diversification, isn't that diversification is a bad thing. I think that's a right approach. I think given the history over the last thirty forty years, we are to think a bit more about are there other drivers, rather than just simply believing in the historical track record and the volatility context of that historical track record.
So I am very partial to the idea that a big part of the story is the unique profitability of large.
Tech companies in the US.
But that is clearly not the only story, because it's not just that global stocks have underperformed in many instances, They've just performed badly against anything. I'm looking at a chart of EWZ, a popular ETF to exposure to Brazil. It's basically flat for twenty years. I assume the Brazilian economy has grown quite a bit in the last twenty years, but it has not redounded apparently to the benefit of an American shareholder investing in Brazilian.
Stocks at all.
So obviously this can't be the entire st story that it's just about US outperformance. It's actually that global stocks have done bad.
What's going on?
Why in a world in which the economy is generally, you know, more or less growing elsewhere, have international equities actually just done bad on an objective basis.
The old adage is the economy is not the equity market. Yeah, yeah, and that is that is absolutely true. I think the period from let's say twenty ten onwards in the US is especially galling. And I think if I had to come up with a reason as to why that has kind of worked out, the way it has worked out is basically because of dollar related global flows.
Okay, that is I.
Think the profitability basically attracted a whole lot of things that were going to come to a whole lot of flows that were going to come to the US because of the perceived strength of the dollar during that period. Because as I said before, growth was higher than interest rates in the US, so it was a natural kind of place for those flows to kind of arrive at.
But like again another one, Mexico, it's just flat for twenty years, so in your story, it's not quite flat for two Yeah, it's where it was in two thousand and seven, so it flat for like eighteen years. Like there's a bit The flows are a big part of the story. For the fact that these stocks can't deliver anything over a decade time horizon.
Well, so I think domestic flows relative to international flows are really very important in determining the state of the equity market.
Okay.
And the best example counterpoint to what you're talking about that I can give you.
Is really India. Okay.
So India used to be a market that was supported entirely by foreign flows and foreign flows, and when there was a panic in New York, all sorts of money would leave India and come here and the stock market would create. Over the last let's say ten years, as the Indian economy took off, and financialization and the saving vehicle in India change, and the equity market as opposed to land and property became the primary source of savings
and deployment of those savings. I think the characteristic capital depth, yes, capital get financialization of the economy, and right now, the drivers in the Indian equity market, at least for the last five years, really has been the domestic investors as opposed to foreign investors. So I think that is really the from a flow standpoint, that is the difference.
Yeah, And if you look at the MSCI India Index, it's like.
The exact act looks like it's done well.
Mexico and Brazil Joe, you know what I always say I do. Are you going to say it?
I want you to say it flows before pros.
Yeah, he did it, all right. That makes me happy.
By the way, I stole Tracy's joke in the intro, She's not happy about that. I said that thing about how Shakespeare. Tracy said that right before we went on air. I want to give her credit.
Oh thank you, Joe. But now I feel petty. I didn't expect you to, Okay, going back to the conversation.
I'm trying to make you feel petty. You made me feel bad, so now I'm trying to make you feel petty.
All right, all right, fair, going back to the conversation. Can you talk a little bit more about the role of the benchmark index providers in all of this.
The thinking in this world is always benchmarks are terrible, but they're terrible, but better than anything.
Else that we have.
So I think there is a role for benchmarks, and benchmark providers are important participants in the market. And you know, the market capitalization of companies like MSCI and SMT Global kind of tell you as to how valuable that those franchises are. The way, as an investor, you know, if you are an asset manager or if you are kind of an asset allocator, you know, how you are doing has to be evaluated in some sort of a rigorous framework, and that's where benchmarks come in. And that's why we
need benchmarks, because otherwise it'll be free for all. You know, I can as a asset allocator, I can you know my returns were ten percent. Let's say I can always claim that I did a fabulous job when my benchmark outperformed by you know, a thousand basis points. So it's a you know, there is tyranny of benchmark, but this is a necessary tool that we need. I think a separate question is the extent of the kind of the
diversification of the of the benchmarks. So you talked about MSCI AQUI and even things like Russell three thousand, things like that, So there are issues with diversification. I think S and P five hundred. On the other hand, for the large gap US market is a very very solid benchmark.
I mean there are peculiarities with respect to additions and taking out of the index, but I think that is to be expected in a dynamic market, and I think for most, for the most part, it has worked out reasonably well.
You are an employed person. You have had a career despite imbibing the gospel of diversification. You have had a successful career.
In the markets.
Talk to us though about like your peers and career risk, et cetera. Because you know, at some point, like you keep making less money than you could have by buying the US What does that do and what have you seen?
You know, when you look across the industry, do you see an evolution whereby people who were taught the same thing as you about diversification have increasingly felt pressure to not be diversification or to disguise their diversification in some way that they could tell their investment committee, we're diversified, but actually, like we just found a way to like go extra long Nvidia.
I think in the institutional world as opposed to retail war, yeah, I think diversification is still the matter. And again to emphasize that it is the right thing to do.
But why do you keep saying that.
If you think about it in statistical terms, you know there is a way to diversify the tail risk. But what I'm saying is we need to evaluate that and see or re evaluate that and see if there are some other techniques and methodologies that we can use where this doesn't become the only way for you to mitigate your overall risk in the portfolio.
So what would be another technique methodology?
Evaluating from a track record standpoint, let's say, or from a performance standpoint, let's say, does adding emerging markets to a globally diversified portfolio? Does that really add a lot of value to the process. Does just a let's say development market index both the US and Europe and perhaps Japan? Can that deliver some level of correlation to the overall index without you being stuck in places like China for a long period of time, or Brazil or Mexico for
that matter. So I haven't found the solution. If I had found the solution, I would have implemented that in my personal portfolio. My point is we ought to think about that, and we don't really think about it because diversification on a global basis has been the mantra and the accepted doctrine forever.
But say more about the careerrisk.
Okay, at the institutional level, they're fine, It's like, oh yeah, diversification, But you know, for example, I'm always a big fan of reading the Bank of America Fund Manager survey every month, and these are discretionary fund managers that could do everything and for like ten years with a few exceptions, and there they say long textocks is the most crowded trade,
but also it's the trade that continues to work. Talk about this effect, this sort of the anti diversification success on the sort of thinking of a fund manager who probably doesn't love being in a crowded trade, but also doesn't want to underperform well.
So I think an active manager is a kind of caught in a way. Right On the one hand, you know, you have to outperform your peers. On the other you have to outperform the benchmark, and that is a challenge, and that challenge leads to the sort of things that you are talking about. That is, well, they may do very well relative to the benchmark without crowding into the most crowded trades, but if their competitors are crowded in there and do much much better than them, that's an
issue for them. So you know, that's their way of solving that particular challenge. I think the the the crowded trades are have been there for a long period of time.
But I think the way I would evaluate that is how much of a portfolio manager's performance is really driven by, you know, the core views that they express as to what their edge is, Right, I don't understand so what that You know, every portfolio manager would tell you that their stra is we look at roc and that's what we focus on, and therefore that's how we kind of structure our portfolio to pick companies individually.
Yeah.
Now if they say that thing and they are kind of focused on and that's how I hired them, Yeah, and instead they focus on getting into let's say crowded trades because they are going up, then that's really a red flag from analogat.
So Joe alluded to this in the intro. But you know, if you were diversified into international stocks, there was well, there were a couple moments this year where you actually looked really smart and you did get a little bit of peace of mind as the S and P five hundred was selling off. You know, European equities were surging earlier in the year. But what do you need to see for a durable change in international versus US stocks and specifically US tech stocks?
Well, so I think the underlying economic environment has to change for that dynamic. Actually underlying economic and industrial environment has to change dramatically for that to kind of play out. So if you look at the world from a capitalization standpoint, what we are talking about is US on one side, and Europe, you know, Japan, India, and China, Brazil, those are really the places that we.
Are talking about.
So structurally, you know, US economy has done better. The dollar is the reserve currency, and the growth outlook over the last ten years have been much better in the US than it has been, so the flows coming into the US ought not to be a surprise in that environment, okay, right, And for flows to go the other way, you know, basically, the fiscal expansion in Europe has to get going in a massive way, and that fiscal expansion has to lead
to companies and the institutions that can take advantage of that fiscal expansion and and therefore deliver superior returns to their shareholders. And therefore I've been interested in buying those companies.
Tracy, do you know how much without looking the decks Germany's benchmark index, do you know how much it's up in dollar terms?
This year.
I do not, although I will confess I have a chart of the MSCI all world versus the S and P five hundred.
Yes, but take a guest.
I have no idea.
Tell me, Wow, the German stocks in dollar terms of forty two percent this year, France up seventeen and a half percent dollar terms, neurostocks fifty up twenty two percent. I mean, this is serious, and this is like, these are numbers that we're really not used to seeing in me and Tracy's entire career, this kind of divergence because as of the time we're talking about, the US benchmarks are actually flat on the air, which is pretty impressive actually,
given where they were a month ago. Like, at what point you're like, this is a seed change?
What would it take?
Not from an economic standpoint, but like, you know, what does it take for the other fund managers around the world to like, oh I believe in I mean, I don't start with is this the seed change here or not?
In your view?
Well, so you know, again these are spectacular returns, yeah, and definitely spectacular relative returns.
Yeah, it almost to give some spectacular objective returns.
It's only may. But anyway, keep going.
And you know, a lot of these returns are dollar driven as well. Yeah, so significant portion is really the thing, and a lot of it is because of the upcoming fiscal expansion in Germany.
Yeah okay, So for this to.
Be sustainable in the long run, I think the economic picture for the for the CONTINENTAH has to change.
Men.
You know, by the way, just the Bovespa, the Brazilian stock market is up twenty five percent in dollar terms. Chilean stocks, which have never looked at it, but it's right here when I go to the WI page on the terminal, that's thirty two percent. It's not even I actually hadn't quite realized this. It's not even just a Europe story. Later Am too is actually in dollar terms having a phenomenal year.
The confluence of dollar weakness, tariffs, Yeah, you know, those are really the things that have kind of had an impact on dollarized returns.
Yeah.
If they remain sustainable, then it will be worthwhile looking into those markets and the.
Thesis would be proven.
But we have also had episodes where we have had these types of moves and pretty soon in six months, a couple of years, you give back all of these spectacular relative returns.
But if the argument is diversification is good for protecting you from tail risks, then you know, what's been happening this year, specifically in April, seems like a pretty big tail risk, and diversification worked.
In this case. Absolutely diversification worked. The question is, is the diversification or the relative performance of European markets and the rest of the world. Is it all concentrated in, you know, in a very short period of time?
What do I mean by that?
I think the if the expectation is that the US, because of tariffs and all sorts of policy responses, the things that drove the dollar and the flows into the US go away on a sustained basis, the trend will probably persist. I would posit that that probably isn't, or at least that probably isn't a very realistic scenario at this point.
What time frame should you be judging diversification success on?
Actually, that's a really good question. So successive diversification, from my mind, has to be evaluated over a reasonably long period of time, So five, ten years, even twenty thirty years, I think those are the timeframes that you have to evaluate it on, so that everything that has you know, everything economically has had an opportunity to play itself out, and all we are talking about is the security specific
volatility for individual securities that benefits from this diversification. So I think it has to be evaluated over a long period of time. And that's why when it hasn't really performed for as long period as it has not, despite their recent perform moments, the point I would make is, let's kind of think about that a little bit and look at why that has been the case.
Wait, I want to make a counter argument, why shouldn't we evaluate a tail risk hedge, which implicitly is what diversification seems to offer in just very short term, because like in March twenty twenty, there was a possibility, you know, the economy could have unraveled further, I could have lost my job, I would have been on the hook for
paying for my own health insurance and so forth. I was very excited in that moment that RACH went to zero and the bond portion of my poor one K or whatever shot up, right, that actually helped me in an acute moment. There's obviously, you know, we haven't hit a recession yet in the US. In those acute moments where there's suddenly a risk and your sort of your career is correlated to your portfolio. Can't it be enough for diversification just to pay off in the short term.
Okay, So let's kind of make sure that we are talking about the same diversification. Okay, so you know, diversification between equities and bonds. I think that from a risk management perspective, because of different volatility characteristics of the two instruments, that is still very much valid.
Okay.
You know, one has you know, double digit volatility, the other has five six percent, and they react in the you know, in different economic environments, you know, very very differently, So that is that is valid. I think what we are talking about is really international diversifity. Yes, And if you look at the correlations of international equities relative to
US domestic equities, correlation is very very high. So it's it's giving you, it's giving you some diversification benefit, but it is not giving you the level of diversification benefit that you think you are getting.
Have you done anything in your own portfolios to take into account some of these thoughts over diversification.
So I've been a victim of this diversification because I constructed my portfolio and I have posted this on Twitter for everyone to see, which is you know, I have bought you know, international small cap, and I bought US small cap, and I bought developing markets, and so I have constructed a portfolio in a very diversified way. It has worked out fine, but it could have worked out a lot better. For that, am I doing something relative
to you know that? I think the thinking with respect to that has to be about some valuation context in the environment. So if you were going after sticking with it for thirty years, if you were going to flip that switch, doing it when US markets are the most expensive probably isn't the right thing to do, But that doesn't take away us thinking about what the drivers of that when that is.
Not the case.
I see, so that.
When the opportunity comes back, we are kind of thinking about it the right way rather than just sticking to the mantra that we have thought about for the last thirty years.
If you flip and suddenly you're like, you know what, everything I was taught I was wrong and I'm going to lean more heavily into the US. Will you let everyone know so that then we can then diversify exposure, Like, will you put out that alert I've finally caved. I've finally caved. I finally don't believe anything I learned in school because maybe the rest of us can use that as an opportunity to go heavy into EEM.
Sounds like a good idea. I'll be I'll be again, as I said school on whichever platform I kind of put that out, you know, as an investor who has kind of stuck with this for almost forty years, Yeah, it has been a challenge, and what I am doing is acknowledging that challenge. That is, the lack of correlation that we were expecting from international aquities hasn't worked out.
That's it.
But just on this point, and you've been in a few different seats, how do you you know, what do you have to do career wise to maintain that discipline because this is a big thing, right, career risk in any seat and they're different. You know, some people are on a very short leache at a big institution that has longevity of over a century, maybe of long leash, et cetera. What is you know, how does career risk and career longevity play into this type of thing?
Well, so you know, again you have to distinguish between the type of investors you are. So if you are an asset class investor and your mandate is international investing, international may not have done well relative to domestic investing, but somebody allocated money to you and they're looking for you to do better than international benchmarks, and your peers in doing the same thing, so they're career risk is really not direct. The career risk is in terms of flows.
That is, if if you had a global mandate or an international mandate.
You know the the So it's not like you're getting fired from nder performance.
It's just that no one allocates, no one allocated, got it.
If you are an allocator, then you know it's it's kind of the performance is relative to your benchmark, and your benchmark that's how you are evaluated, and your benchmark is for the for most institutional portfolios, it's still very much MSCI acued for the equity component.
Christian MoManI, that seems like a really key point. As long as that the benchmark, some institutional allocation will survive. Really appreciate you coming on odd lots. We're all going to be looking out for that tweet when you decide to go into meg seven.
Yeah sounds good.
You know what I really appreciate. Krishna is probably the only person on social.
Media I knew you were going to say this.
We will admit that they didn't time the market perfectly, and we're all in techtoks. Over the last ten years, everybody else timed them. Oh I went to cash, you know, blah blahlah. Oh, you know whatever. I'm glad someone admits the truth, which is that most people have just been, at least in recent years, overly diversified.
Well, it's also interesting to me to see a big institutional investor tweet at all.
Oh yeah, well that's true.
All right, So that was really interesting. One thing I am coming to really appreciate is that peace of mind point and the idea that there is a price to pay for peace of mind. It's not necessarily free, but every once in a while maybe it does actually help you in acute moments of stress.
Well totally.
And look, if the markets are going down, if you're let's say you're employed in America and you have a lot of this is something I think about a lot. If you're employed at an American company and you have a heavily exposed American Index. When markets are tanking, that is often associated with recession, right, and that is associated
with an increased probability of losing your job. And an increased probability of losing your job is associated with having to sell your investments, maybe even take a tax hit at a time when you can least afford to pay it, sell your investments to literally continue your life, which is sort of like the worst correlation you could, you know, the worst confluence events. So the idea that like, okay, like if you lose your job and you have to dig into your savings, at least you're not selling at
a local bottom in the market. That seems like one benefit to diversified allocation.
Yeah, so you're not so invested in basically America squared and you won't panic.
I mean, this is the other thing, right, Like people, we're all we're animals, and you see the line go down and you sell and so forth. Perhaps if the line is a little bit more stable, then you know you're overall top line, then you don't you know, then you don't make rash emotional decisions as quickly, which I think there's a lot of benefit to not doing.
Do you think there's a difference between how much diversification helps the retail investor versus big institutional investors.
That's a really good question. I mean, the nice thing about the big institutions, right is they have longevity themselves. And yeah, it's a good question. But I don't think any American retail investors diversify anymore. I think that, you know, most it seems like retail investors in America, like, you know, it's not enough to go long mag seven. You have to sell puts on mag seven, Right, that's right, like and like hyper whatever. The opposite of diversification.
Is hyper concentration.
Hyper concentration.
Yeah, all right, shall we leave it there.
Let's leave it there.
This has been.
Another episode of the Audlots podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy.
Alloway and I'm Jill Wisenthal. You can follow me at the Stalwart. Follow our guest Krishna Mamani. He's at Krishna Mamani. Follow our producers Carmen Rodriguez at Kerman Arman, dash O Bennett at Dashbot and kel Brooks at Kalebrooks. More odd Lads content go to Bloomberg dot com slash odd Lots, where we have a daily newsletter and all of our episodes, and you can chat about all of these topics, including investing, diversification, market and so forth in our discord Discord dot gg slash odlogs.
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