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Hello and welcome to another episode of the Authoughts podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway and I'm Joe. Isn't Joe? I love doing American history episodes in part because I feel like my own knowledge of American history is fairly simplistic. And I do remember a huge culture shock when I went from high school to college. And I think I told
this story before. So I went to college university in London, and I had always heard the American Revolution described as the American Revolution, right, and then as soon as.
I get to the UK, what did they call it? What they call it?
Yeah, they call it, I think the American War of Independence, which has a different tonality too, definitely, but it definitely demonstrates just how subjective tensions, conflicts, and policies can actually be in history, depending on who you're talking to. And we're going to talk about not just a pretty subjective American policy, but one that has been reinterpreted and amended many many times.
In the past. Right.
So obviously for us this has been a venezuela week, and there's all sorts of immediate questions that are sort of most directly relevant to we've been talking about the market elements mostly, we talked about oil, we talked about the sovereign debt, et cetera. But then there's all these questions, of course about international law and what is legitimate and what is illegitimate. And I mean, I couldn't even believe the headline when I saw it that we had arrested I know, I was flabbergant.
I just the idea that.
If we'd arrested a head of state from another country is just absolutely job smacking. And then people talk about international law, and then they say, this international law even exist and so forth, and what it feels like to some extent truly uncharted territory here.
Yeah, uncharted territory. But people are drawing on a parallel, yes, which is the Monroe doctrine. Yes, the Monroe doctrine of I think it was eighteen twenty three, I want to say, basically said that America would assert its dominance over the entire American region. And since then it's changed a number
of times. But the way it's being talked about now is as the Trump corollary or the Donroe doctrine, which was described in the National Security Strategy Document that the Trump administration put out back in December, and that one's a little different. So we keep seeing these amendments to the doctrine. By the way, I should just say, do you remember back in twenty thirteen, John Kerry explicitly said that the Monroe doctrine was over, it was dead.
I don't remember that.
And now it's back, it's arisen.
Some version of it is certainly back. You know.
It's very interesting because the US clearly has a longstanding history of various operations, overt and covert, of involving itself, shall we say, with the politics and domestic affairs of our neighbors, particularly in the South and Central America and so forth. I suppose any country is naturally going to have some security interest in what's happening. It's proximity. I don't think that itself is particularly weird. I really like
this term the Donro doctrine because there's two things. There's this long standing history that the US wants to have a role to play in everyone else's politics among our neighbors.
But then there's this other element with Donald Trump specifically, where it feels like a lot of our policy and principle is Essentially, he's the president and it's in his head, and his ideas are legitimate because they're his ideas and he's the president, so yes, there's precedent, there's norms and so forth, and then there's this sort of novelty that everyone's trying to read his mind.
And we're in this very very strange.
Situation which has come up on our last two episodes, in which you have the president talking about oil.
And ex implicitly yeah, and yet people.
Say are like skeptical. It's very strange.
It's a very strange situation because you have torpiicly it's like, oh, he admitted it, it's about oil, and yet everyone's like, is there's something else in play beyond here.
It's the total inversion for.
How people have talked in the past about the legitimacy or illegitimacy of how we involve ourselves internationally.
That was part of the original Monroe doctrine as well. There was this weird tension between like pro democracy, anti colonialism, keep the European powers out, yeah, and America basically kind of creating its own in formal colonies. That tension has always been there, and we should talk about that we should talk about whether or not there might be, you know, different strategies at play in Venezuela, different goals. And I'm happy to say we do, in fact have the perfect guest.
We're going to be speaking with Greg Grandin. He is a professor of history at Yale and the author of the new book America America, a New History of the New World. So Greg, welcome to odd Lots. Thanks so much for coming on.
Oh thanks for having me.
How important has the Monroe Doctrine actually been in the history of American policy and development.
Well, it's certainly been influential, and it's certainly been cited repeatedly over the years. I mean, first, I think we need to back up and say exactly what makes it a doctrine?
Yeah, and we just never voted on, no court ratified it.
It didn't actually assume the status of doctrine until a couple of decades after it was pronounced in eighteen twenty three, when James Monroe was president at the time. And this was around the time that most Spanish American nations were breaking from Spain and their successful wars of independence, which were much longer and dragged out than the US War
for Independence. By eighteen twenty three, it was fairly clear that Spain was going to lose its empire, and the United States finally decided that was going to issue a statement. And you have to understand that the doctrine itself, or Monroe's statement, it's really just a kind of you know, four or five non contiguous paragraphs in the State of the Union Address of six thousand words.
You know, you have to cut a.
Cherry pick through the State of the Union Address to find what is the doctrine. And it's hesitant, it's cautious. The United States wasn't really sure where it wanted to land on any given issue, and there were obviously tensions and differences of opinions within Monroe's cabinet. I mean, to put it in more modern terms, you had isolationists, you had internationalists, you had unilateralists, or you had different people thinking of different ways on how the United.
States should address.
And deal with on the one hand, these new republics that were coming into being in South America and in Central America and in Mexico, and on the other hand their former colonial rulers in Europe. And so it was actually written by John Quincy Adams, who was Monroe's Secretary of State, And as I said, it was insert in different parts, and it's true, it is a bit of
a contradictory document. On the one hand, it announces that the United States considers the independence of Latin America at the time Spanish America to be irreversible, and that it was recognizing a number of states that had established effective sovereignty and unbroken with Spain. Did warned off Europe, not just Spain, but any country Spain might recruit to help them, or the Holy Roman Empire or Great Britain against trying to conquer or reconquer the Americas, any part of the Americas.
So that's the kind of anti colonial part of the doctrine. And again in quotation marks the doctrine. Then other paragraphs said that the United States and Spanish America, being of the Western hemisphere, shared certain special interests and ideals, although it didn't specify what those interests and ideals were, but people kind of presume they meant the difference between monarchy
and republicanism. But at least there was a kind of gesture to a kind of shared fraternity of nations that had common interests, and so that's another part of the Monroe doctrine. And then there was the part that was referenced that it didn't exactly grant the United States much
power in terms of leasing the hemisphere. It was a vague sentence that said the United States would interpret events that happened anywhere in the Western Hemisphere on how they bear on the quote peace and happiness of the United States.
It was.
So so it was a document that could appeal to a lot of different constituencies within the United States, like Thomas Jefferson's expansionism, this notion that you know, the New World was shared a certain unity of purpose.
John Quincy Adams was a famous isolationist and unilateralist, and so there was this notion of the United States could act if it wanted, if it's sort of threat. And you have somebody like Henry Kilay who imagined a kind of large American system, a mercantile system in which the US would be a great manufacturing base in Latin America, Spanish America would supply re sources in order to rival in the United Kingdom and the Empires of Europe. But
the point being it really wasn't much of anything. Latin Americans did like it. I mean, they had a lot of time to read. It was a different period. There were no iPhones, you know, people read closely and said, oh, that's an interesting paragraph. And what they read and liked mostly was they thought it was They read it as a kind of anarchust brief for their own anti colonialism. Spanish Americans were very much vocal in their idea that the doctrine of conquest was no longer valid, the doctrine
of discovery was no longer valid. There was no undiscovered land in the New World waiting for Europeans to stumble upon and claim as their own, and they read the Monroe Doctrine as largely supporting that position, especially the part that warned Europe against trying to reconquer any countries that had claimed their independence. But over the years it was interpreted it in a different way. Politicians and diplomats, particularly in skirmishes with Europe, say Great Britain, when Great Britain
wanted to build a canal through Central America. That was around the time that those kind of vague, scattered remarks were elevated to the level of doctrine, and it became the Monroe Doctrine or the Doctrine of Monroe, and from that point forward it was progressively incorporated into something we might call customary law. I mean, again, what makes a doctrine a doctrine and who gets to enforce it? It really
is just a question of power. It goes to what you were talking about in the introduction about what is international law and how is it enforced? I mean, most countries have statements of principles. The United States gets its own doctrine.
Yeah, it's really interesting, isn't it, Because, like to some extent, when I think about American involvement, it's like.
All around the world at any time.
We sort of feel the need to fight against communists, right, that seems to be a very common thing, and fight for democracies or any country that sort of has something similar to our we have government or something like that. We seem to be on principle we have to be the ones or we feel compelled to intervene. And then
here is this geographical element that seems very different. Can you talk a little bit about the intersection of the geographical impulse to sort of exert your influence among your neighbors and how that intersects with this other I don't know what we call it, principle, a doctrine, etc. Where there are just certain kinds of leaders that we don't like, and when they're in power, we do what we can to eliminate them.
Yes, and this ghost of the history of the United States, its relationship to its own hemisphere and.
The power that it is exerted over the.
Latin America and Spanish American Brazil, and then efforts at times to go global, to become a more global superpower. There's you know, there's long different iterations of this in which the United States kind of tries to escape the boundaries of its hemisphere and become a world power at different moments, and then and then it falls back to the Western hemisphere. This has happened over and over again.
It happened with the Great Depression. It happened in some ways with you know, after Vietnam, the United States turned back to Latin America. It happened after the certainly after
the catastrophic War on Terror. I mean, in many ways, what's happening now with Trump is an example of this, this kind of you know, Trump is his own problem and a lot of the things that are wrong is of his doing, but he did inherit a country that was in profound crisis as a result of the catastrophic War on Terror, the financial crisis, the inability of politicians to deal with corporate wealth and inequality. And so there
is a kind of turning back to Latin America. And we can get to this a little bit later if you want. But Trump's actions in Venezuela are a perfect example of what happens when you know the United States, you know it's bid to go global, fails, and it has to return to its hemisphere. And that's why the Monroe doctrine is so important. Latin America is the first place in which the United States got a sense of
itself as an overseas power. You know, it was able to project its power, its financial power, it's cultural power, it's military power beyond its own borders. And even saying that is a little bit tricky because the United States borders were always changing. I mean the United States borders, the expansive nature of the United States where it actually took Texas and took Mexico. So it wasn't just that
it was dealing with Latin America. It was literally gobbling up Latin America on its way to the Pacific, but setting that as working within the hemisphere and learning how to deal with other nations. Latin America is absolutely central to that, and that's one of the reasons why the Monroe Doctrine rises in importance, because it supposedly provides a.
Kind of guideline for that.
Now, over the years that Monroe Doctrine itself has expanded, Presidents explicitly expanded over a boundary dispute in Venezuela and Guyana in which the United States was supporting Venezuela and Great Britain was supporting British Guyana. Grover Cleveland declared that the Monroe Doctrine granted the United States absolute sovereignty over the whole Western hemisphere. That's a pretty big jump from you know, we're gonna interpret any event that happened somewhere on our peace and happiness.
There's on a peason happiness.
To buy Fiat our will is law in the hemisphere. And then in nineteen oh four, along similar lines, Theodore Rosa, when he was president, he expanded the doctrine with his own corollary to what he called international police power. To suppress chronic wrongdoing in Latin America. Now, I must say that most of that chronic wrongdoing was provoked by US
banks and US mercenaries and US oil extractors. And you know, there's a long history and of like forcing loans on countries that they can't pay off, and it leads to all sorts of instability than civil war.
And then the US government is called in to.
Settle the problem that these private interests created. So Roosevelt expands the Monroe doctrine into a kind of standing universal police warrant that will allow the United States that act whenever it will and whenever it wants.
So didn't FDR also reinterpret it, But it didn't last long another Roosevelt reinterpretation.
No, not really, but FDR actually reverse course one hundred and eighty degrees.
Yeah.
In nineteen thirty three, he renounced the right of the United States to intervene in his longstanding demands by Latin American jurists and politicians and diplomats to give up the right of conquest. I mean, the United States continued to hold on to the right of conquest throughout the nineteenth century. Basically justified the war with Mexico Indian removal. The right of conquest was taught in US textbooks up until the nineteen twenties. Latin America had revoked the right of conquest
with its independence. Because Spanish American nations came into the world together already a league of nations, seven nations that had to learn to live with each other on a crowded continent. The United States came into being a single nation on the eastern coast of a great land mass that it imagined as empty.
Obviously it wasn't empty.
There was Native Americans, that was Mexican, and spanions, but the United States. There was no doubt that the United States was going to reach the Pacific, and it held on and use the doctrine of conquests in order to justify taking all of that land. Latin America was constantly trying to force the United States to accept that the doctrine of conquest was abrogated, was void, and it wasn't
until nineteen thirty three that it did. And it was Roosevelt who did that, and he recognized the absolute sovereignty of Latin American nations and he gave up the right of intervention. And that was an enormous turnaround in US power. It didn't weaken US power by any means. It actually strengthened it because I focused it. It taught the United States how to exercise power more efficiently, and it organ Latin America.
It was ten years of goodwill.
That really got Latin America kind of on board for the coming war against fascism. There was a lot of fear among strategists within the Franklin Roosevelt administration that all of Latin America could have gone the way of Spain. I mean, a lot of the sociological variables that led to the rise of fascism or.
Falangeism in Spain were present in Latin America. There was a.
Large group of servile peasants, small group of land owners, patrician conservative Catholics, increasingly militant unions and peasants threatening the power of the landed class.
You know, that was Spain, but was also Latin America writ large. And if Latin America fell to Falangism, then you know, the United States would be kind of cornered between Nazism, fascism, and Falangism. Roosevelt's conceding to Latin America's demand to give up the right. Intervention basically tilted the playing field to the left in Latin America. You know,
Roosevelt tolerated economic nationalists. He let revolutionaries in Mexico nationalized standard oil and appropriate massive amounts of US owned property, and they created an enormous goodwill and set the stage for the United States's entrance into World War II from a position of strengthen you and continental unity.
So you mentioned, okay at various times the jurists in Latin America, and they push back against this notion of American absolute sovereignty in these fights. This gets to a question I see it debated on Twitter a lot. What do you say to someone who says international law doesn't exist? What is international law doesn't exist? And how is this term useful or not?
Well, I'm an a historian, I'm not a lawyer a jurist, so I tend to see things in turns of power relations. So I think I see law as a moral venue that is created, that creates a set of normative principles in which people can fight over. So, you know, obviously the international law doesn't exist in some void in which absolute justices is.
Going to happen.
You know, the most powerful country decides the exception, and you know, the United States. To the degree that countries like the United States submit to a system of international law, it usually was during moments of weakness, like when Roosevelt did it in nineteen thirty three, at the height of
the Great Depression and with fascism on the rise. But it does create these norms and these principles that people fight and argue over, and so yes, and the liberal international law order that has supposedly governed the world since the creation of the United Nations in nineteen forty five.
The hypocrisies and the variances and the exceptions are many, and there's always workarounds, and the United States and the Soviet Union certainly found ways to skirt, you know, any kind of limits that were placed on them by international law. But it does kind of create a venue right, a moral arena in which right and wrong could be understood and argued over. You know, there's very other, very little
recourse for poor and weak nations to defend themselves. I mean, we can go back to ducidities right, the strong to do what they will, and the weak suffer what they must, and the conceit that there is such a thing as international law that is somehow transcendent of power relations is you know, it might just be a conceit, but it still at least creates terms on which nations could deal
with each other. And you know, and again Latin America and the United States is absolutely a perfect example of that. For Latin America's commit meant to sovereignty and cooperative relations was largely forged in relationships living under what was becoming the most powerful nation and world history, as it moved across the Pacific, as it took Texas, as it took Mexico, as it took Cuba, as it took Puerto Rico, as
it took Panama. You know, so you had these jurists like writing law books and coming up with these legal principles and the way they get implemented though often is
really about power. So you know, Argentine the legal theorist, for instance, Luis Drago, for instance, at the early twentieth century, when Italian and British and German war boats were showing up at Venezuela trying to collect debt, debt that had gone back to the colony that European banks were claiming that Venezuela owed because of the Spanish crown, you know, contracted loans in seventeen seventy six, and whenever they did, Drago issued a principle, the Drago doctrine, that you cannot
use coercion to collect debt. Now, the United States collected plenty of debt through.
Coercion, and we could.
They can look at Donald Trump and what's going on in Venezuela right now. But the United States kind of liked the Drago doctrinn They didn't want Italian and German and British warships flitting around the Caribbean bombing the coast of Colombia or Venezuela trying to seize hold of the custom house to get the receipts. They thought that, okay, so we'll support the Drago doctrine. This, this will give us a leverage and keeping Europe out of our backyard.
So you kind of see the back and forth between law as a kind of moral principle that transcends social power. But then it's hot, you know, it's obviously subordinated and implemented through social power.
What's your sense of the actual goals behind the Venezuela move because if you look at the National Security Strategy document, they talk about the US reasserting its pre eminence in the Western hemisphere. And I don't know how you measure pre eminence, right, that seems a pretty broad term. Meanwhile, Trump has talked very explicitly about Venezuelan oil belonging to the US. There's no regime change on the horizon. They're
not pressing for that. So what is the ultimate goal of all of this, What are they aiming for?
Well, you know, it's odd to say, as I said earlier, Trump is doing what a number of its predecessors have done during moments of the US kind of recession of US power in the world. They turned back to Latin America. But in some ways it's pure Trump, right, It's just.
This theatrical spectacle. You know, he said it was about oil.
Well, first it was about immigration, then it was about gangs, then it was about fent and oil and drugs, and then he landed on oil, getting our oil back. Oil is trading at an all time low. Maybe not an all time low, but it's pretty low. The market is filled glotted with oil, and to get Venezuela back online is going to cost an enormous amount of capital investment, and there's not a lot of oil companies that are rushing you're going to rush into Venezuela, then do that?
You know.
I think Trump there was just playing to his base. I think he was, you know, I think his base likes the idea of Trump as a pirate, Trump as a colonial plunderer, you know, and.
Yeah, yeah, we'll get our oil back.
You know, just like with the Iraq war in two thousand and three, There's always ways to get oil, right, There's many ways to get oil.
Like, you don't have to.
Start a global war on terror in order to secure Iraqi oil. You could have just you know, made a deal with I'm saying and got the oil. You could have did the same thing with you know. So material interests are always understood through a prism of ideology, and so part of it was that Venezuela has been in crisis for a long time.
And that's a whole nother story for a whole nother show.
And you know, a hegemon like the United States can't have that kind of crisis. I mean, millions of Venezuelans were fleeing the country I mean, you don't have to be carrying water for Trump's nativism and its border policies at all to say that that kind of disruption and that kind of chaos can't go on forever in a regional hedgemon's hinterland, and so you have to kind of do something. The question is what are you going to do? And Trump seems to like these targeted attacks, right, whether
they're in Iran, whether in Nigeria. You know, these one and done attacks, and I think he was sold on the idea that, you know, if they just took out Maduro and left the Maduda state intact, because it is very much ingrained and embedded in Venezuelan society. I think there were a couple of intelligent people in Marco Rubio's State department that didn't want to see a repeat of two thousand and three with what happened after Debeedification in.
Iraq, the complete chaos.
So Trump was convinced that, you know, you do this one and done thing and then you just kind of continue to threadn in the country in order to it corresponds to his way of being. There's no morality, there's
no normative sense, there's no idealism. You know, normally when presidents turned back to Latin America to kind of regroup or rebalance after global crises, they kind of come up with new kind of world views to widen their electoral base, that deepen their coalition to you know, they try to create a sense of hegemony.
Right.
So you had FDR using Latin America to put forth a kind of social democratic continental New Deal. Then Reagan after Vietnam a kind of muscular anti communist liberalism, but understood in moral terms, kind of reassertion of American purpose. American sets of itself as a defender of world freedom, you know, and these become kind of governing ideologies that are durable. They last, I mean, the New Deal coalition
lasted for decades up until the nineteen seventies. Reaganism lasted, you know, at least until Baraco bum if not even even further. In terms of the worldview, I mean, Trump isn't even trying to cobble together a new worldview, right, Trump isn't coming up with any kind of you know, he's not doing it for freedom. He's not doing it for individual rights. He's not he's certainly not doing it for social democracy. You know, he's demanding tribute, right and
just trying to turn Venezuela into a vassal state. And I think that speaks to the moral emptiness of him and his and his political movement.
And Reagan and.
FDR presided over majoritarian movements, right, they won overwhelmingly at the electoral you know, Trump pretty much is running a minority movement that is only in power because of the anti majoritarian political structure of the United States and Trump's dominance of the Republican Party. So he doesn't seem interested in all in turning trump Ism into a governing coalition.
He just wants to continue to stoke the culture wars, continue to you know, stoke the grievances of tribal nationalism of the American Firsts, and hence the Monroe doctrine, you know, to bring it back to the Monroe doctrine, the Monroe doctrine and American First nationalism. There was always a strong kind of correlation between the two American First nationalists, right, even the pre Trump ones, the ones from the nineteen twenties and leading up into World War Two, they liked
the Monroe doctrine because it wasn't universalist. It wasn't international law, it was customary law specifically related to US power within its hemisphere. And so the Monroe doctrine. It makes sense that Trump, as the standard bearer of today's iteration of America first nationalism, would latch on to the Monroe doctrine as a kind of substitute for liberal internationalism.
Yeah.
I think this is maybe the most fascinating element of all, the complete lack of pretense, really, right, And obviously you mentioned at various times international policy has had some storyline. We all know what the story all. We were going to turn Iraq into a democracy, and then that would spread throughout the Middle East, and then there would be other democracies and then be rich, would be stable, et cetera.
There's some story I think that is so striking about trump Ism, or at least this particular move, just sort of the complete lack of like a broader story you mentioned also, of course, which I think is notable about Trump foreign policy, this appeal of these sort of one and done things, because okay, there seems to be a post of rock, this sort of national backlash towards or certainly post Afghanistan, this backlash towards boots on the ground,
long wars, forever wars, et cetera. But there also does seem to be this impulse of just yeah, but we still want to do something powerful, we still want to show that we're tough. And so then the way that they solved the problem is by these one offs. We're gonna do a one bombing run in Iran, We're going to arrest a foreign leader. Is there any precedent for that or is this truly like sort of feel uncharted territory when you think about these arcs of foreign policy?
Yeah?
Yeah, Well, in Latin America, there are two precedents. One is obviously Manuel Loriega. In nineteen eighty nine, when George H. W. Bush sent about thirty thousand Marines in to capture Noriega on a warrant, basically to arrest. It was considered a police action, and that's how it was legally justified. Noriega was an ally of the United States. He was a CIA asset in the nineteen eighties. He was very much involved in the complexities of Iran contra, but he played
all sides against the other. I think he was selling information and intelligence to Cuba. He was also working with Mossade, and when the Cold War ended and the Berlin Wall fell, his usefulness had largely come to an end, and the United States decided that they were gonna take a mat. There was a sy Hirsch report in the New York Times that detailed his deep involvement in drug running and it couldn't be ignored anymore, and so they went in and they arrested him. So that's one president. A lesser
discussed one is in Haiti. In two thousand and five, Jean Patron Aristeid was president of Haiti and there was
a US back coup. But it was one of these coups that were kind of carried out by democracy promotion organizations that were funded by AID and the National Endowment for Democracy that destabilized the country to the point where Iristeed couldn't govern and George W. Bush sent marines in and basically put a gun to his head and flew him to the Congo where he still lives now, where it's in exile.
So it's happened before.
I think what is unprecedented is this idea that we are just going to accept oil tribute from Venezuela, that we're just gonna give these directives to the Venezuelan government and they're gonna send I mean, I mean we talked about international law.
All of this stuff is just.
Unilateral US projections of its power. I mean, the United States place sanctions on Venezuela, that's not international law. I mean, the papers talk about it. As you know, Venezuela is trying to violate sanctions by find the workarounds to sell its oil. It's like, why not, it's theirs, the United States just putting his ancients on just because it's not like it's not like the nations of the world voted
on putting sanctions on Venezuela. But in any case, I think what is unprecedented is what they're working out, and they seem to be working it out on a as you go basis. It doesn't seem like they have a clear plan.
You're right.
They don't want it to be two thousand and three Iraq. They don't want boots on the ground. They know the rank and file of Trump it has a very low tolerance for casualties and fatalities, and America first nationalism doesn't want to be involved in nation building. But what you're seeing is I think two distinct trajectories. On the one hand, they're imagining some system in which is that as well, it just continues to kind of pay a tribute to
the United States through oil. But then when Marco Rubio talks about it, he says, well, we have these different phases of reconstruction and transition to democracy planned out in Venezuela. So that kind of suggests more of a direct role in pushing the country in a certain direction politically, not just leaving it as it is, as long as it continues to send the ships, you know, just like during colonial times.
I mean the colony sent.
The ships filled with gold to Spain, sending the ships filled with oil to put off the Texas.
All right, Greg, we're going to have to leave it there, but thank you so much for coming on all thoughts. That was fantastic, really appreciate it.
Thanks thanks so much.
Having Joe, that was absolutely fascinating. The point that stood out to me was this idea of going into your own backyard to assert your dominance as a sort of replacement or offset to a line of multilateralism elsewhere in the world. Like that kind of makes sense, and.
It's very interesting that there's this pattern, this historical pattern in the United States that essentially Latin America is where we go to dominate when we're internally weak. And of course I think people would agree that the US is feeling particularly weak on a number of angles. There's obviously the sort of existential threat anxiety about the rise of China, et cetera. So maybe is this kind of thing, Okay, we are not going to be, at least for the moment,
the global power that we once were, et cetera. But in the absence of that, at least we could still establish that we get to decide.
Who the president of various Latin American states.
Right, Latin American dominant path. Yeah, by the way, have you seen me Marco Rubio meme where he's like covered in all these different flags from Latin America basically responsible for everything.
I know I have seen the memes about the various jobs. Is that Marco Rubio is y sort of de facto having to play on this. Rubio strikes me as like a sort of interesting bridge figure between this sort of because you know, I think of him as sort of being like a sort of retro like cold warrior type and someone who does probably have like believes like, oh, we're going to like spread democracy throughout the world, and wants to see Latin America sort of be you know,
run by liberal democrats, capitalist countries and so forth. But obviously he's in an administration that does not have the same impulse for that, and so, you know, to some extent it feels like this operation it's like it's like they're going to like split the difference, right, So he gets to be involved in taking out a Latin American leader,
which he finds to be hostile. But the idea that like, it does not feel like this administration is going to have much follow through in terms of, Okay, now we really want to set Venezuela on a new political course.
Right, I Mean, I guess we'll see, well what they prioritize there. But in the meantime, shall we leave it there?
Let's leave it there.
This has been another episode of the Odd Lots podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy Alloway and.
I'm Joe Wisenthal. You can follow me at the Stalwart. Follow our guest Greg Grandon, He's at Greg Grandon. Follow our producers Carmen Rodriguez at Carman armand dash Ol Bennett at dashbot and Kilbrooks at Kilbrooks. For more odd Lags content, go to Bloomberg dot com slash odd Lots with the daily newsletter and all of our episodes, and you can chat about all of these topics twenty four to seven in our discord discord dot gg slash.
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