Hello, and welcome to the History of Japan podcast, episode 546, The Extreme Right in Postwar Japan, Part 2. On December 25th, 1991... The Soviet Union ceased to exist. Its end, honestly, was not very dramatic, consisting simply of the handover of government powers, including nuclear codes, by Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev to the new Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, the lowering of the Soviet flag, and a vote within the Supreme Soviet, the legislature, to dissolve the government.
Really, by this point, the drama had already happened, with the breakaway of many of the Soviet republics like Latvia, Ukraine, and Georgia, the dissolution of puppet regimes in Poland, East Germany, and elsewhere, and the failed August 1991 coup by Soviet hardliners, hoping to take over the government and roll the clock back. The final end of the USSR was, compared to all of that, far more of a whimper than a bang, and to be honest, that was probably a good thing.
Now, I've heard it said many times that the hardest part about understanding history is that we know how things end. And here in particular, that's very true. Nobody really expected the USSR to implode as quickly as it did, and for such a long time, Soviet power was treated by so many people outside of the communist world as an existential threat.
the notion that the USSR was planning revolution worldwide, that it was a threat to every government around the world that wasn't already aligned to its side of the Cold War, and that its ambitions could trigger a nuclear third world war, had been embedded into cultural consciousness for half a century. Now that threat was just gone, and that absence changed the world landscape in a great many ways.
One of those changes was a dramatic remaking of Japan's ultra-right, the disparate hardline nationalists composed of political parties like the Aikokuto, as well as less organized groups. For so long, the justification among the extreme right for all its actions, the rhetoric, the violence, all of it, had been the existential threat of the Soviet Union. A Kaobin himself had railed against the red fascists who were coming, he claimed, to overthrow Japan's government and social order.
And while that was largely very self-serving, it's ironic that he used fascist as a pejorative given his politics, I do think it is true that part of how he was able to reach his audience was the widespread belief that he was right. the Soviet Union was genuinely a danger to the social order. But now, the threat was gone. Without it, the Japanese ultra-right began to change.
That change, of course, didn't come from nowhere. The fact that the Soviet threat was so prominent in right-wing discourse had hidden some aspects of right-wing politics, which had already existed for decades, but which started to gain more public traction in the 90s. Dr. Zhou Guanja has written a fascinating paper on this, where she tracks the history of Japan's extreme right by virtue of an interplay with an unlikely partner, the radical left.
There's far more to her thesis than we could possibly do credit to here, of course. The very shortened version is that there has always been a degree of rhetorical overlap and intermixing across the far left and far right. around two areas in particular. The first is anti-capitalism, and a suspicion that Japan's mega-capitalists are not acting in the national interest.
For example, during the 30s and 40s, one of the big drivers of ultra-right-wing policy, particularly among the military and the economic bureaucracy, was the idea that the Zaibatsu megacorporations were acting in their own interest...
rather than the interests of the imperial throne and state, and that their capitalistic desire for profit... was decadent Western individualism, which needed to be reined in by traditional Japanese communitarian spirit, or some good old-fashioned legislation and policing.
The second common thread is anti-Americanism, which among the extreme right was obviously pretty big during the Second World War, for reasons that we don't really need to get into because they should be pretty clear. Of course, this fell out of fashion once the war ended. But there would always be an undercurrent of anti-Americanism on the right because of the imposition of the liberal order on post-war Japan by the occupation.
which of course, if you were an extreme rightist, was a blemish on what should be the untrammeled authority of the emperor and the throne. For many on the left, meanwhile, America was the enemy in the Cold War.
Both sides could agree that Japan was being treated as a puppet, even if they disagreed about why that was bad. Thus, for example, you might remember the radical student movement of the 1960s, which we've talked about in a few different episodes, born out of the 1960 anti-security treaty protests and opposed to America's presence in Japan on the grounds of international peace.
That student movement was opposed on campuses around Japan by a right-wing student movement with which it often physically clashed. but even as they fought, the right-wingers tended to ape the left-wing movement's rhetoric about the dangers of American imperialism and the need for peace. It was just that they saw peace as coming from a sort of armed neutrality,
plus a return to an emperor-centered government that would fix Japan's domestic instability rather than socialist revolution. Indeed, in a certain sense during this period, the right was more revolutionary than the left. Both young rightists and the more established ones like a Kaobin were, after all, calling for the end of American-imposed democracy and a reversion to something closer to the Meiji government.
It was left-wing parties like the socialists and communists, which, ironically, were defined by their desire to protect the post-war constitution, which had given them the freedom to organize, something the Meiji system denied them. Again, political divides over the Cold War specifically and the role of the Soviet Union tended to obscure this ideological convergence, but by the 1990s, that sort of old-school anti-communism was less and less prevalent in the Japanese right.
The Soviet Union was no more, and while the mainland Chinese People's Republic was still around, that government's embrace of socialism with Chinese characteristics meant things looked pretty different from the Mao years. And so you started to see a more overtly anti-American extreme right emerge in Japan, and I think the best way to explain this is to look at the career and ideas of one of its more public figures, Kobayashi Yoshinori.
Kobayashi Yoshinori is very much a child of post-war Japan, born in August of 1953 in Fukuoka. His family was actually from old samurai stock, his father was a former soldier, who had been slated to go to Okinawa to fight the Americans, before defeat saw him demobilized. Kobayashi the Elder then went into civil service after the war,
and there eventually got involved in the Marxist left. He apparently had a habit of doing mocking impersonations of the Showa Emperor slash Hirohito. Kobayashi Yoshinori was raised as you might expect in such a household, he'd later recall making scrapbooks as a child using articles from Akahata, the newspaper of the Communist Party. His father, however, was not the only influence on his young life.
Kobayashi's mother was a devout Buddhist, and his maternal grandfather was a devotee of esoteric Buddhism. The young Yoshinori spent summers with his grandfather, who was also a war veteran, perhaps the source of his later rightward turn. From an early age, Kobayashi Yoshinori was also interested in being a manga artist, but was convinced by parents and teachers to pursue a college degree at minimum first to shore up his prospects.
and so he enrolled in Fukuoka University's French language department. Like many a young college student before him, he got involved in left-wing politics in college, but became disillusioned before long. He was going to school in the early 70s, at a point when Japan's student movement was losing steam, both due to its repeated failures to actually influence policy, the growing affluence of Japanese society, which tamped down the desire to rebel,
and the movement's growing and increasingly violent infighting. Instead, like many of the children of 1950s Japan, Kobayashi became increasingly apolitical. reacting against the left-wing energy of the students of the 60s by rejecting politics altogether. After school, Kobayashi would reload Kit to Tokyo to make a go of things as a manga artist,
largely of satirical or more lighthearted fare. I am not a connoisseur of such things, but the consensus is apparently his work was very okay, not really standing up from the crowd at this point, but competent enough. All that began to change in 1992, when Kobayashi published a new series in the weekly tabloid SPA called Gomanizumu Sengen. This is roughly a declaration of arrogance, as Gooman is the Japanese word for haughtiness or arrogance, Sengen, declaration, thus Goomanism, declaration.
This new series was not a lighthearted comedy, but more of a graphic novel-slash-essay-style approach to political commentary using manga as a platform. Academic Sakamoto Rumi refers to the style as an illustrated essay, because there's a lot more text than you'd usually expect given the format. And the series was a hit. As far as I can find, there have been 32 volumes of the series, plus a whole lot more shorter run specials, like 60 volumes worth.
Some of these are more infamous than others. Perhaps the most famous is the miniseries Sensouron, roughly On War or an Essay on War, which lays out a right-wing defense of Japan's actions during the Second World War. But Kobayashi has talked about basically everything from Japan's foreign relations to the idea prevalent in the 2000s that the imperial household law should be amended to allow Princess Aiko to potentially take the throne.
She is the daughter of the current emperor, Naruhito, but talk of changing the law was abandoned in 2006, when the emperor's brother, Prince Fumihito, had a son of his own. In his essay on Kobayashi, James Shields describes gomanism ideology as it's laid out in these works as, quote, a graphic and rhetorical style marked by withering sarcasm and blustering anger.
at what is perceived as Japanese capitulation to the West and China on matters of foreign policy and the treatment of recent East Asian history. To give you an idea of what that looks like in practice, let's take a bit of a closer look. In Sensoron, for example, the view of Japanese history that is espoused is, frankly, pretty classically fascist. In Kobayashi's telling, the Japanese post-war order has suppressed the natural patriotism citizens should feel.
brainwashing them via consumerism as well as left-wing propaganda, which, as in classic fashion, he claims mostly comes from academics and teachers. As Sakamoto Rumi puts it, Kobayashi contrasts the image of today's youths... who have been living in a wealthy society without any inconvenience, isolated from the community and history that support their individuality, with the image of wartime Japanese whose highly developed self-discipline and sense of community...
enabled them to sacrifice their personal feelings and even their lives for the public good. Wartime Japanese had something to believe in. Today's Japanese are apathetic relativists and nihilists. Wartime Japanese felt and accepted a strong connection with their birthplace, family, history, and community. Today's Japanese ignore and even reject such connections, floating around without any solid sense of belonging.
What is expressed here, then, is an anxiety over the growing effect of modernization, urbanization, and globalization in Japan. With many references to youth violence, cult religion, lack of order and security in contemporary civil life scattered throughout its text, Sansorone effectively speaks to and exploits the generalized sense of anxiety in contemporary Japanese society, and nostalgically constructs wartime Japan as the good old days, unquote.
As a part of this, Kobayashi also revives the classic argument that the Greater East Asia War, as he calls it, was fought to liberate Asia from Western imperialism. That it was, in fact, a war fought for the right reasons. That, of course, includes a healthy dose of atrocity denial. Everything from the Nanjing Massacre to the Comfort Women program is a result in his eyes of anti-Japanese propaganda.
To be clear, that is a pile of crap, as is the notion that the war was fought to liberate Asia, but it's crap that would appeal to someone who wanted to believe the war wasn't wrong. The mastermind behind this whole nefarious new order, according to Kobayashi, is the United States. To paraphrase Dr. Zhou Guanja's essay on the interplay between the extreme left and extreme right in Japan,
It's a narrative that borrows heavily from the rhetoric of opposing American imperialism, which used to be big in Japan's left-wing student movement. And remember, Kobayashi was once a member of that movement. That kind of historical revisionism is heavily influenced by the left-wing notion that Japan is a de facto US colony, very different from the rhetoric that would have been used in the 30s and 40s by the fascists of the wartime government.
who were more interested in justifying their actions as forcibly modernizing backward parts of Asia. So Kobayashi's ideas definitely borrow from his time on the left, but he also just is straight-up a rightist in most of his thinking. For example, his essay on Yasukuni Shrine, set up during the Meiji years to enshrine the souls of those who died in Japan's military, quite literally states the shrine, quote,
is the final stronghold in defense of the history, spirit, and culture of Japan, something nobody on the left would ever say. According to Kobayashi, accusations that visiting the shrine is inappropriate given the fact that it honors multiple war criminals, or because its board and leadership have a history of ties to extreme right-wing nationalists. These people all, he claims, distorted the truth...
that Yasukuni Shrine is just a modern form of traditional ancestor worship, and not overtly political or nationalistic. Instead, it's just a symbol of a cultural practice of comforting the spirits of the dead. As James Shields puts it in his essay on Kobayashi, quote, The shrine is a place in which we the living can go to meet with the dead. By paying homage at the shrine in a traditional manner,
and simply by paying attention to these spirits via an exchange of glances, we confirm our own history and establish both our individual and national identity. In short, we are engaging in a populist version of spirit pacification, Tamashizume in Japanese, a ritual that dates back to the original state Shinto instituted under Emperor Tenmu in the late 7th and early 8th centuries CE.
Now, there's a lot more to say about Kobayashi and his ideology, which again are all pretty influential judging by how many copies Sensoron has been able to sell, but I do want to switch tacks here a bit.
Kobayashi's history is important for shaping public discourse on the right and in other places in Japanese politics today, but he doesn't write policy, he's not a politician. To understand how the extreme right is involved in Japanese politics day to day, you have to look elsewhere, specifically to one of the organizations that exists, to make the vision of Japanese politics promoted by men like Kobayashi Yoshinori a reality, Nippon Kaigi.
That name is a bit innocuous, it just means something like the Japan Conference, but that simple name obscures a very extreme point of view. Nippon Kaigi grew out of a merger of two older right-wing groups, the Nippon-O-Mamoru-Kai and Nippon-O-Moru-Kukumin Kaigi, respectively the Society to Protect Japan and the Conference of Citizens to Protect Japan.
Not terribly original names, I know, but I didn't pick them. Basically, the way to distinguish these is that the Kokumin Kaigi was primarily a secular group, while the Nippon no Mamoru Kai... was a religious one defined mostly by its antagonism towards Japan's new religions, particularly Soka Gakkai and its affiliated Komeito.
It was also closely affiliated with a different new religion, Seichou no Ie, about which more in a second. These conservative groups came together in the 70s and 80s to push a series of conservative reforms. Many of these viewed on their face were pretty innocuous. For example, one of the big wins touted by these organizations was the passage of the Gengol Ho, or era name law, which came into effect in 1979 and gave a formalized legal structure
to how the era name system of Japan operates today, including requiring the use of the era and year in government documentation. Causes like this, which frankly might not seem that important, but which were touted by conservative groups, as a step back towards an emperor-centric nationalism, united these groups with other conservative movements. Two of the biggest were the Shinto Seiji Renmei, or Shinto Political Alliance, a lobbying group of major shrines, and Seicho no Ie.
one of the most conservative of Japan's new religions. Seicho no Ie also tried to get a blanket abortion ban passed in the 70s, as an example. Nippon Kaigi emerged out of this heady mix in 1997. in a merger organized by one of the odder figures of the Japanese right, the avant-garde music composer Mayuzumi Toshiro. Mayuzumi's cultural cachet as an artist slash intellectual enabled him to bring these groups together
though he himself died of cancer a few months before the merger was finished. In the intervening decades, these organizations which would become Nippon Kaigi had mostly been focused on trying to amend the 1947 Constitution, largely to either get rid of Article 9 or give the Emperor more power, or on fighting legal reforms to, for example, give married couples the option of using separate surnames.
which is currently prohibited by Article 750 of the Civil Code, but which reformers have been talking about changing for about half a century. Today, Nippon Kaigi remains focused on subjects like this. For example, blocking reforms to Article 750 remains high on the priority list. Nippon Kaigi has also grown substantially.
The group claims north of 30,000 active members and a majority of LDP members in the Diet have some sort of affiliation with it. It also includes in its membership a host of subsidiary groups. For example, the Jinja Honcho, or National Association of Japan's Shinto Shrines, is affiliated to Nippon Kaigi. It's worth noting that Shinto-related organizations form a big part of the constituency of Nippon Kaigi. In addition to the Jinja Honcho, it is still affiliated with the Shinto Seiji Renmei.
which, by the way, is devoted to fighting the excessive individualism of post-war Japan and passing down Shinto tradition to build up Japan's pride and confidence. All of that is a direct quote from their website. But the group's support doesn't just come from the Shinto right. It's also got backers among Japanese Christians, and from more conservative Buddhist sects, for example, Jodo Shinshu, or the True Pure Land sect, and Nichiren Shu.
Seicho no Ie, of course, still remains very involved with Nippon Kaigi as well. Today's Nippon Kaigi leadership is largely composed of people who, like Kobayashi Yoshinori, became adults in the 60s and 70s during the heyday of the leftist student movement, and whose views are shaped by opposition both to the politics and to the violence of that movement.
Many of these leaders have quite frankly discussed their radicalization upon seeing students in the 60s shut down university campuses or throwed Molotov cocktails at cops, and how their current politics grew out of concerns regarding the dangers of the left. That history is reflected in the politics of Nippon Kaigi itself, which strongly rejects any ideas associated with the historic Japanese left, except for that anti-Americanism and anti-capitalism.
The organization lists as its core policy agenda six major focuses, which range from passing on our beautiful national character to building friendships throughout the world in the spirit of coexistence and prosperity. If you actually look at the legislation they've lobbied for and supported, you get a much clearer portrait of their politics. One of the main goals of Nippon Kaigi is to return the imperial family to a more central role in politics.
Thus, for example, they have pushed for amendments to the 1947 Constitution to remove limits on the Emperor's political authority established in the first section, and of course they also want to get rid of Article 9, which limits the scope of Japan's military.
The organization has also lobbied against those debated changes to the Imperial household laws, which would have allowed Princess Aiko to inherit the throne, and organizes welcome receptions whenever members of the Imperial family do visits around the country. Nippon Kaigi also levies against what it calls masochistic history, essentially any historical narrative that discusses Japanese atrocities during the Second World War, its culpability for the conflict.
or its aggressive imperial expansion in parts of Asia. In their telling, the Nanjing Massacre never happened, the Comfort Women are all liars, and the current Japanese government's diplomacy of apology, that's what they call it, is undermining the nation.
Much like Kobayashi Yoshinori, the members of this organization blame a history curriculum that portrays Japan negatively for undermining patriotism and promoting individualism instead of true Japanese spirit, which is also why they oppose, and this is a direct quotation from their Japanese language website, an education that places excessive focus on individual rights.
In recent years, they've also embraced other notions from the global conservative movement, such as opposing any discussion of the social construction of gender in the classroom. In the long term, Nippon Kaigi aspires to a return to a legal and social order far closer to that of the 1889 Meiji Constitution, and one which recognizes in legal form...
principles going back to the 17-article constitution of Prince Shotoku, with its emphasis that one should, quote, not fail to obey the commands of your sovereign. He is like heaven, which is above the earth, and the vassal is like the earth, which bears up heaven.
This new order should also eliminate the clauses in the current constitution, most notably Article 20, which limit the government's power over religion, so that Japan can return to a concept of saisei-ichi, the unity of government and religious rights, and of Matsuri Goto, one of the readings for the character for Government, but with more religious undertones.
In his excellent talk on Nippon Kaigi, Dr. Levi McLaughlin makes excellent note of one of the aspects of its activities that's overlooked by many observers outside Japan. We tend to focus on Nippon Kaigi's influence over politics and especially the LDP, and there's good reason for that. LDP cabinets in recent years have included many politicians with ties to Nippon Kaigi, and former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo was actually a special advisor to the group.
One of their former chairmen was even Chief Justice of the Japanese Supreme Court. But ironically enough, Nippon Kaigi's leadership does not view that political influence as its primary goal. They are focused instead on what they call kunizukuri, literally country-making, or what Dr. McLaughlin calls cultivation activities. What's being cultivated, in essence, is support for the core agenda of the group, not even Nippon Kaigi itself, but the politics the group is associated with.
In essence, the group's main focus is cultural activities they can use to shift the Overton window, so to speak, around Japanese politics. to shape the discourse around politics and culture so that Nippon Kaigi's ideas become increasingly culturally acceptable. What does that look like in practice? Dr. McLaughlin highlights an event from November 2019, the somewhat verbosely named or National People's Ritual Celebration of the Emperor's Enthronement.
This is a celebration which took place on the eastern edge of the Imperial Palace Grounds, the part that's publicly accessible, right next to Nijubashi. The occasion, of course, was the abdication of the former emperor Akihito, and the enthronement of his son, Naruhito, also marking the start of the Reiwa era, thanks to that Gengoho, the predecessors of Nippon Kaigi, had fought for.
This particular ritual celebration was put on by Nippon Kaigi, but not alone. The occasion was financially supported by both the Keidanren, the Japanese Business Federation, and the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, two of the biggest economic organizations in the whole country. It was also endorsed and or attended by athletes, celebrities, business leaders, and of course politicians, including, naturally enough, then Prime Minister Abe Shinzo.
It was also co-sponsored by the Jinja Honsho Shrine Association, which also encouraged parishioners to make the trek to Tokyo to be a part of the festivities. Apparently you could buy a ticket for 35,000 yen. that included the bus to and from Tokyo, as well as visits to both Yasukuni Shrine and the Showa Ten no Kinen-kan, the memorial museum dedicated to Emperor Hirohito.
The celebration was apparently quite a spectacle, including a full orchestra, taiko drumming, several bands, and even some solo opera performances, though the highlight was, of course, the appearance of the newly enthroned Emperor and Empress. who came out to wave to the crowd. The whole thing reads more like a carnival than anything else, which was probably why it was so widely supported, and drew a decent crowd of around 40,000.
At no point did anyone talk about changing the constitution or masochistic history or anything like that, but of course for Nippon Kaigi, that wasn't the point. The point was the celebration itself of the emperor and the throne. Even the term they used for this, saiten, carries the connotation of celebration that has a religious undertone. The celebration was thus a kind of kunizukuri, getting people used to the idea that major occasions related to the throne
were times for raucous celebration, an affirmation of something distinctly Japanese. Kunizukuri and its related cultivation activities are also for Nippon Kaigi and its supporters, bound up very deeply with hitozukuri, person-making, in other words, shaping attitudes among individuals in such a way as to make them receptive to, or openly supportive of, the organization's ends.
Thus, for example, one of Nippon Kaigi's closer affiliates is the Rinri Kenkyujo, or Rinri Research Institute, a conservative NGO that once again has ties to one of Japan's new religions. In this case, Hito no Michi Kyodan, now known as PL Kyodan, or the Church of Perfect Liberty. The Rinri Kenkyujo is mostly focused on offering ethics trainings to various corporations. It claims to work with over 60,000 Japanese companies to that end.
but also offers courses in reverence for the emperor, filial piety, respect for one's parents, and other more traditional Confucian-style moralities. It has local affiliates around Japan, where members assemble every day but New Year's at their local shrine at 5 in the morning for readings from P.L. Kyodan texts and lectures, but also for artistic pursuits like poetry and calligraphy. All of this is person-making.
Honestly, the best way to think of it, at least in my view, is a type of New Age Confucian morality. Remember, in Confucianism, the goal is to be a kunshi, a superior individual whose moral integrity and virtue... inspires those around you. You become one of these through self-discipline and austere moral cultivation, as well as deep personal virtue expressed by your knowledge of the arts.
This sort of modernized Confucian morality is very central to a lot of the NGOs that support Nippon Kaigi, in essence offering a return to the more hierarchical norms of Confucian morality as an antidote for the perceived extreme individualism or lack of ethical character that, in their view, plagues Japanese society. Now, in the long term, it's hard to say how much of a difference this has all made.
Certainly Nippon Kaigi's claims around membership are impressive, but those sorts of claims are also notoriously hard to verify independently, so maybe we shouldn't give them blind credence. In terms of shaping public opinion, it's hard to say... Certainly the events affiliates like the Rinri Kenkyujo put on are popular, as well as a celebration of Emperor Naruhito's enthronement, but how much is that changing people's actual perception of Japan's political future?
Polling suggests maybe not as much as Nippon Kaigi might hope. For example, its opposition to the idea of a female emperor is not widely shared among the Japanese population, whereas of the most recent polling data in May of this year, almost 90% of respondents said they were fine or even supportive of the idea of a woman on the throne.
Still, maybe opinion shaping doesn't really matter, because Nippon Kaigi has such close ties to the LDP by this point that its ideas will influence policy regardless of what people actually want, at least until a credible opposition party... can come together to push the LDP on these issues. In that respect, I'm not holding my breath. I want to conclude this two-parter with one final observation about the tenor of the current extreme right in Japan.
Nippon Kaigi, Kobayashi Yoshinori, and those that share their views are unabashedly anti-liberal. They are opposed to the current democratic post-war order in Japan, and want to see many, arguably most, of its reforms rolled back. In this, they share a lot in common with the older post-war right, men like a Kaobin and his Aikokuto. But they're different in one respect, they're far less violent.
Right-wing violence is not gone in Japan. In particular, extremist groups targeting Japan's Korean population with violence are still an issue. But the age of political assassination, for example, by the extreme right, at least, is now over.
The extreme right has gone a lot more mainstream than it used to be. These days, it influences far more in the realm of cultural activities than stabbing. Perhaps that's because it's a better way to influence actual policy. Perhaps it's because, unlike in the 60s, there's no way anyone in current Japan would believe the socialists and communists are mere moments away from the revolution. But I have to admit that personally, I still think groups like Nippon Kaigi are very dangerous.
I believe very strongly in the ideas of liberalism, the importance of individual liberty, representative government, and I think I've been pretty clear that the suggestion that Japan doesn't have its own individualistic democratic tradition... that those are foreign ideas imported or imposed by the US is not supported by the actual historical record. And just because nobody from Nippon Kaigi is running around stabbing people for suggesting that doesn't mean they aren't dangerous.
Their program for Japan's future means rolling things back to the order that led Japan to the Second World War, after all. As for how successful they're going to be, as always, we'll just have to wait and see. That's all for this week. Thank you very much for listening. This show is a part of the Facing Backward podcast network. You can find out more about this show and our other shows at facingbackward.com, and you can support the network at patreon.com slash facingbackward.
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