Our 2025 Geopolitical Power Draft

We need your input. We didn't finish the draft. We're probably gonna have, we'll complete the draft and have some, uh, some feedback on it and argue about different placements and things like that in the next one. So, um, if you have any questions, comments, concerns, you can email me at jacob@jacobshapiro.com. For now, we need to get a, an email address just for the podcast itself, but in the meantime, if you send an email there, it will get to both me and Marco, I promise. Um, otherwise.

Uh, hope you are all staying well out there. Enjoy cousins. We'll see you soon.

Alright, cousin, before we start, um, I think we have to start with the travesty that is geopolitical analysts being forced to fly commercial in this day and age.

I think when we look back 50, 70 years from now, it would be like NBA players, you know, today they wouldn't fly commercial at all, but you know, they used to have to go on buses and things like that, all of which is a wind up to say why has the nation of gutter not provided an airplane for you and I to fly around the world and give our geopolitical briefings? I mean, like, I think we're just as important as President Trump, don't you think?

Can I go off? Please

Uh, the United States of America has donated billions, hundreds of billions of dollars worth of weapons to its allies around the world through either vendor financing or simply through grants. Um, you know, there was like a helicopter, uh, gift to the Philippines, so they wouldn't buy, I think Russian ones like this does happen. So, uh, but if it's gonna revert to a President Trump's personal plane, then hmm. More difficult to defend.

But so the idea is that Trump, the Trump administration will accept the Boeing 7 47 jumbo jet, which can be used in media as Air Force One until shortly before he leaves office, at which time ownership of the plane will be transferred to the Trump Presidential Library Foundation. Sources familiar with the proposed arrangement, told a, b, c news. Um, but I, I was gonna double down here.

Like I, I'm, um, 'cause even, like even my, uh, my evil nemes twin nemesis, Ben Shapiro was out there being like, okay, president Trump, like this is not okay. And I don't get the pearl clutching like, okay, so grab him by the pussy. Didn't matter to you. And January 6th didn't matter to you. And all of the odious and gross and corrupt things that happen in all politics. I think Trump is just a little more open about it than most. But like all the gross things that happen, this is the one.

This is the one where, oh my God, like this is absolutely unacceptable that you're accepting this plane to be used for a couple of years. Yeah, and Trump knows it. Like he has the measure of his base because his base is gonna look at this and be like, he's a boss. He got the Middle Eastern guys to give him a fucking plane. That's awesome.

I also wanna play, and that was my initial reaction too, while the Democrats are like, aha, proof that he's truly evil, this will be the thing that convinces the US electorate that he's really bad. Like my God guys. Come on. Well,

So it's basically okay if there's graft, but if it comes from Qatar, which you know, like supposedly supports terrorism, which it really doesn't. I mean, it's offered a forum for negotiations and for peace for a number of different, uh, you know, parties. It doesn't like, and by the way, who does the finance terrorism? Come on. Give him a break. But when it's cut, they're giving you a plane. Yeah, but

Some odious actors and I think that that's kind of, uh, interesting to me that that was what triggered the, uh, criticism from both the left and the right.

Um, well we could go on for a long time here, but I think this is a good way maybe to back in Marco jokes aside to some serious stuff to talk about before we get into the main reason people are here, which is another geopolitical draft. Um, and I think there's a couple ways to skin this cat, but you know, I think we were prescient to talk about the Middle East and the last podcast and there has been some development there, um, in the past couple of days.

Uh, prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu from Israel, basically saying that Israel is willing to go alone to defend itself after the US Houthis deal. Um. Sources suggesting from the White House that President Trump is frustrated with Netanyahu, like, insert Biden into that sentence. And it could have been exactly the same. Um, and there's also, I, I've been very struck by, you know, the Trump visit and this huge visit to Saudi Arabia where you just were like, Sam Altman is there.

And, um, CEO of Nvidia is there. The United States, um, just yesterday announced that it was getting rid of some export controls on AI chips and imposing completely new restrictions on Huawei's AI chips. You've got people telling local media aha, while investors are gonna have to choose between a Chinese led AI world and a US AI led world.

And I was also just struck, like I saw a picture of Trump standing with all these world leaders and then all these Saudi shakes and all of these like tech bros and things like that. And I'm like.

There is such cognitive dissonance for me because like who in geopolitics could have predicted in the year of our Lord 2025, that the most powerful people in the world would gather in the middle of the Arabian desert and pay homage to the Saudi Arabian King in order to make the decisions that will decide the future of technology and AI and all these other different things.

Like it doesn't, like something does not compute there, seeing like the CEO of Nvidia, like, and Sam Altman like trying to like ingratiate themselves to Prince Mohammad bin Salman and Trump standing next to him. Like all that was missing was Toby Keith, uh, may he rest in peace coming back to like do a, a another con concert from the Dead for the audience. So take that whatever direction you want. But I, I have some dissonance this morning about all this.

If you're on the right, you're like, no, he is, you know, he moved the capital to Jerusalem. I'm like, eh, like nobody cares about that. Guys. Like, uh, people who care about that don't matter. Lemme just put it that way on both sides. Sorry. And then the second thing is like, obviously if you're on the left and liberal, you're like, of course he does. He let Israel do whatever they want. And the truth is that Donald Trump is pro Donald Trump.

I think if you support Donald Trump and you give him a lot of benefit of the doubt he's pro-America, if you are a little bit more nihilist than maybe objective, you're just saying like, look, he's pro Donald Trump. And the problem with Benjamin Netanyahu is that his domestic constraints are forcing him to be extremely aggressive against Palestinians, whether in GA and West Bank. And Donald Trump wants peace and equilibrium. And so, yeah, like this is what we talked about last podcast.

I really don't have anything to add to that. Bibi is playing with fire if he thinks that, you know, uh, the Israel lobby in the United States of America. If he thinks that his relationship with Trump, if he thinks that some idiotic notion of American long-term strategic interests in backing Israel are going to save him and his relationship with the United States, he is absolutely wrong. And this could go sideways, very badly for Israel over the next 12 months.

Uh, so that's the first thing I think. I mean, you don't wanna, you wanna pick a fight with the US president, like whoever you are, it's just, it's not something you want to do, but especially if you're a country of 10 million, you know, like why would you do that?

And I think he's many things, but he's not gonna be your monkey. You're not gonna pull the strings. And I think it was in Trump's interest in the first term, and you also had Kushner very deeply inside the administration to where, and you know, Trump had made promises about Iran. Israel was gonna be a partner there, like Israel was useful to him and that was all useful to his base and he pushed it forward.

And I think I. My hunch is that Netanyahu thought, oh, I have this good standing relationship. I'm just gonna say nice things. I'm gonna be the one that's in his corner. You might remember Israel was like one of the first countries to say zero tariffs, like, we're good. Like please no tariffs. And then the Israelis were shocked when they were on the penguin tariff list because they thought that they had headed it off at the past.

Um, so to your point, like President Trump cares for better and for worse about President Trump, and so he will do whatever is in his interest and he's not a moron as much as people may want to think he's a moron. Howard Lutnick, I think the discussion about whether he's a moron is actually a much more pertinent one. The second thing though, and I, and I want to tie this in before you take, take it.

Before we get to Saudi Arabia, says, I wonder if there's a little bit of a metaphor here also on what's happened with India and Pakistan because the last time we spoke, India and Pakistan were going back and forth. Things were ratcheting up. You and I were both getting questions on Twitter. Thank you. Or X or whatever. Thank everyone for asking you. What do you guys think about this as an investment perspective?

Is it World War II or things spiraling outta control and then we have a ceasefire, but we have the United States and President Trump in particular claiming credit for the ceasefire and not really taking a Proin Indian stance. Like Narendra. Modi's not happy about the way that the US has intervened here. He didn't even say that the US had done anything as part of the ceasefire in his official comments yesterday.

And it, it was a lot of, what about is like, Trump's quote was basically like, stop trading bombs, trade the nice things that you make with each other. Can't you guys get along? Rather than being like, no, India has a right to defend itself against terrorism. India is the rightful holder of Kashmir. India is all the things that India wants to be. So I wonder like, you know, we can talk about Israel until we're blue in the face. It's honestly not that geopolitically important in the end.

But I think the same thing just happened with India, which is India and Ra. Modi thought, Hey, Trump is in our corner, so if we have to go after Pakistan or Kashmir these other things, they're gonna support us a hundred percent. JD Vance was just here, probably told us something like that, and yet you get this little breakout of war and Trump is like, please stop bombing each other. I don't want any of this. I'm not gonna support you.

I just want you guys to stop bombing each other and I wanna take credit for it 'cause I'm building my resume for a Nobel Peace Prize. Okay. Sorry, you go.

It's acting like the most powerful country in a world, in a multipolar world. It's not acting as a provider of hegemonic stability. Um, and President Trump said something yesterday that quite frankly is the most profound statement by any American legislator legislature on foreign policy, maybe this entire century, if not even since World War ii. Um. Hillary Clinton famously said, America doesn't recognize fears of influence, which as I joke, is like a ridiculous statement. It's like, okay, cool.

Um, what does that mean? You know? But what President Trump said is the diametrically opposite of that, which is, and I'm gonna quote it, is, it is God's job to sit in judgment. It is my job to defend America. I will never hesitate to wield American power to defend the United States. But the point is that it's actually a really like profound statement. Uh, the US is not going to judge. It's not going to be making moralistic, normative, moralistic, or normative calls or claims.

It's not gonna pursue a moralistic or normative foreign policy. It's going to focus on the American interests. And I think that in a way that is far easier for the rest of the world to deal with because it's cleaner, it's more objective, and it doesn't change with who's in charge. You know, presumably, unless of course somebody replaces President Trump who says, no, no, no, actually we will sit in judgment. Um, so I thought that was very important in dovetail with everything you're saying.

I mean, that is the change that's happened. And so that's why President Trump is open to making deals and being a peacemaker in an objective way. In a way. Um, so it's going to rankle. It's going to rankle and it's going to frustrate a lot of countries that thoughts that they were morally superior, that they were on the right side of history, that they were, uh, fighting with America against evil and tyranny around the world. You know, that's who's gonna rankle. But I think from a just purely.

Objective perspective. It's also going to make it easier for the US to actually act as a peacemaker and create libria around the world. Not a popular take, especially with a lot of our listeners who lean more progressive and liberal. But in a multipolar world, I think it's very dangerous for the United States to pursue normative judgment calls because it doesn't have the wanton power to effectively prosecute. Moral judgment.

One of the things that Chinese President Xi Jinping said in his opening address to the Clac Summit was China's and the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are important members of the global South. Independence is our glorious tradition. Development and revitalization, our natural right and fairness and justice are common pursuit. And as part of that, president Xi has opened up a new $66 billion Yuan credit line. That's about $9 billion.

Has talked about all the different sources of funding that he wants to do there. Uh, president Lula from Brazil had some very strong things to say about President Trump, basically lashing out at everybody else on planet Earth that China is the one. That has been treated like an enemy, except it's the one that is quote, behaving like an example of a country that is trying to do business with countries which have been forgotten by others. End quote. So like more shots fired at the United States.

So while you have Trump and scent and the Nvidia CEO and all, and you know, Mohammad bin Salman sitting there in, in Saudi Arabia and announcing all these investments and plans and multipolarity and great deep things, you ironically have Xi Jinping taking up the mantle of, I won't call it liberalism, but using some of the vocabulary of lib liberalism, using China to say, we will be the force for good. We will be the force for development for a better future.

And by the way, all these countries that are in America's backyard that America has ignored, they're off gallivanting around the Arabian desert. Uh, you, Brazil, you Chile, you Columbia. Come to China, take our yuan credit, swap lines, trade with us. We're interested in closer relations. The, the juxtaposition couldn't be sharper to me.

We will give you a loan. And I think that that's, so it kind of dovetails with what I'm saying. I think it's, China's always done what you just described, I think over the past 20 years at least, uh, with a belt and road initiative with, um, I. Rebuilding supply chains around the world. I think it's the US that's catching up to Chinese foreign policy. In other words, both sides are kind of pursuing the same thing. By the way, I apologize for my dog.

I dunno what's going on, but you know, hopefully he's not gonna tear someone apart. I'm,

And in return you get access to the Chinese market. And if you raise protections against these commodities, if you raise tariffs because the United States told you to do so, if you say bad things about China, or if you embrace Taiwan, uh, you know, some of these countries, the countries that are remaining in the world that still recognize Taiwan over the United States, most of them in, uh, uh, Latin America, really Central America. And those have been sort of falling by the wayside.

So Xi Jinping is, he's saying, no, we are the country of openness. We want free trade. We want everything to go together, and we have these needs. And if you get these needs, like you'll get access to the Chinese market, you'll, you'll get your things going forward. And, and as for Trump, like, um.

I don't know, like you're saying, like, I, I hear you in, in, in trying to make something out of that speech, and I, I saw, I saw that speech making the rounds and about defending, um, the United States, but it's a particular view of the United States, and it's about closing the United States off to some countries. I mean, he's picking a battle with China in the long term. There's something normative about picking China as this adversary, although of course tariffs have gone away now.

So he's like sort of capitulated. I don't know, but I, I, the, the only thing I'm trying to say is I think there is something normative about China being the force for openness, trade openness, and the United States saying, no, it's a protectionist world. There are spheres of influence. If you, if you, if we don't like you, you don't get our ships. And if you're a company that does bad things, like we're gonna sanction you. Whereas China doesn't want any of that.

But I think push back if you want.

Uh, but yeah, no, it's, it's very interesting and I think that, uh, uh, going back to your original point, you know about, you know, your shock, that like Saudi Arabia is at the epicenter of a lot of these things.

What I would say is, so to, to take the other side of that, you know, I've been going to Saudi Arabia for 10 years. Uh, I grew up part of my life in the Middle East. And so, um, been on the ground in Saudi Arabia since probably 2014, uh, once a year except for Covid and a subsequent couple of years when nobody really traveled. But, uh, no country has changed more on the planet than Saudi Arabia. And I compare what's going on there to the Maji restoration. Like that's how profound I think it is.

Uh, I think Saudi Arabia has been beset by a lot of, uh, existential risks over the last five years, 10 years. I. And, uh, I think that their pivot is 180 degree turn.

And the reason that they're able to do the 180 degree turn, and this is where I think Western analysts and just commentators, I think what they don't realize is how, uh, you know, how absolutely unnecessary, not, not unnecessary, but how arbitrary the conservative tilt in Saudi Arabia was in 1979, Saudi Arabia had very low state capacity. What does state capacity mean? It like ability to, like collect revenue, build an army, defend itself, pursue a foreign policy.

In 1979, Saudi Arabia had really no state capacity. Um, it had existed as a modern state for like 15 years at that point, quite frankly. And so in 19 79, 2 things happened that really threatened the very existence of this country. One was the Islamic Revolution in neighboring Iran. It brought a dramatic shift to the region. And the other ones was the attack on the Grand Mosque in 1979 in Riyadh, um, which Saudi Arabia couldn't resolve by itself.

It had to bring in French intelligence and French special forces to liberate the Grand Mosque. So these two things accelerated Saudi Arabia stern towards conservatism. This idea that there's some sort of a wahabi link with the origin of Saudi Arabia, that would be like saying Americans have a link with Puritanism. You know what I mean? Like relax, like the alliance between the wahabi in the bin South family is freaking 300 years old.

What happened was in 1979, the leadership in Saudi Arabia had to fight against like this global threat, which suddenly shows up in Mecca. And so they make a decision, which ultimately was a wrong one, uh, to, you know, effectively make a deal with, uh, religious conservative. Part of society. Um, and, uh, they spend the next 30 years building state capacity thanks to massive oil wealth and material. Wealth is the foundation of geopolitical power.

And nowhere can you really see that more than in Saudi Arabia. They become more competent in defending their interests abroad and at home. And I think that the turn in Saudi Arabia over the last five, uh, five, 10 years is really a product of that buildup of state capacity. Saudi Arabia does not have to have this alliance, uh, anymore with, uh, social and religious conservatives. And so it's discarded them massively. And I think that nobody understands just how thorough this discarding is.

And also I think most people don't understand how arbitrary and non culturally correct or religiously correct the alliance was in the first place. Uh, so yeah, I will, I will say that Saudi Arabia by 2050. Will be more or as liberal as Israel in 2050. There's my profound and uh, controversial statement. I think this is an inexorable move and I think that, um, it's the reason why Saudi Arabia has become a factor of stability.

I mean, you've got Iranian and Israeli cruise Miss cells flying over Saudi Arabia, and it hasn't impacted the country at all economically from an investment perspective. I mean, what's impacting the country more is price of oil as it always is, right? So this isn't, this isn't some argument you should go and buy Saudi stocks. That's not what I'm saying. I. I'm just saying that you should probably get on a plane and go to Saudi Arabia and see what I'm talking about.

But even when people do that, the problem is that if they don't have the frame of reference or if they haven't been visiting Saudi Arabia, they don't have the data points in which to actually understand just how profound, uh, the changes happen. I.

But, um, you know, there's the point on Saudi Arabia and then there's the larger point that even if you're right, and I, I'm not sure, like I'll take the opposite side of that, like the idea that they're gonna transform oil wealth into a glittering liberal democracy in the heart of the Middle East, or glittering liberal constitutional monarchy, whatever you wanna call it.

I don't know, like, okay, Dutch disease is no longer real then if they were able to take the oil wealth and change centuries of entrenched interests and all these other things, I, I would take the other side of it, but fine, leave that aside. Um, it still doesn't make sense to me that the most powerful people in the world, or some of the most powerful people in the world are going to, to Saudi Arabia to make these decisions. That this is the epicenter of where things are happening.

Because even if I grant everything that you just said. How is the future of like AI and things like that being announced in, in this country right now? Like, why is President, president Trump? Well, to be so drawn to it rather than some of the other places in the world that are more geographically and geopolitically significant?

And yet it conquered the entire planet. The empire ne the sun never sat on the British empire. So the reason I say this is because there's a concentration of wealth and capital, and there's a tabula rasa approach to innovation in these countries. UAE, Oman, Qatar. Uh, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the tabula rasa is very important. This idea that you can have like basically a blank slate. You have capital, let's do something with it. Now Saudi Arabia is actually not taking the tech approach.

To be clear, you're not. This is the first time that I've actually really seen like emphasis on tech bros in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia is doing, I think what's very intelligent. They basically fired order McKinsey consultants 'cause they realized that they're taking them for a ride. Well done and they've start done and they're called

They're focusing on actually kind of dirty, like, you know, they're trying to employ 22 million Saudis. So they're much different from the other countries. They're actually a real country. Mm-hmm. With like social stratification. Not every Saudi is a millionaire, you know? Uh, and this is something a lot of people don't understand. It's a country that needs a service sector, industrial sector, and they're doing it very, very correctly, I would say. But yes.

Are they gonna get de link from oil price? No, it's gonna take time. Or maybe never happen, but UAE. However, Jacob, I would say think about that country as a country that does have some advantages when it comes to ai. Okay. What are they, well, first of all, what's the biggest downside risk to ai? It's job losses. I mean, we all know this. Well, guess who doesn't care at all?

Uh, sorry, not Saudi Arabia. UAE does not have a problem with. One of the interesting advantages that United Arab Emirates has is that their biggest sort of social problem, socioeconomic problem, national security problem, is that they have to rely on expats for everything. From accountants to doctors, to nurses, to hotel staff, to Uber drivers to housekeepers. And wouldn't it be great if you didn't have to do that? And so what are the vested interests?

What vested interests exist in UAE that will prevent the deployment of ai? And the answer is kind of fewer than exist in the rest of the world. And so I would say that there is an interesting link there. But overall all I would say is that I think that the Middle East is moving in the right direction. I think it's gonna become a financial capital for global south flows. So south to south connectivity, I think what Abu Dhabi is doing with financial like capital is really interesting.

And I think what Saudi Arabia is doing with its industrialization is interesting too. Too many Westerners over index on the line nail 'em. Hero projects, you know, like Yeah, I think, I think that's

All, all, all I would say is that, you know, uh, if the worst that Saudi Arabia has done is the death of one single journalist, I would say like, let's not start comparing the ledger on crimes against journalism of other countries. Yeah. We

Yeah. You know, because caliphate doesn't mean that you're gonna go to Rome or Paris or New York. It means you need Mecca. And I think that was the moment when Saudi Arabia, it was precisely because of its overt support for Sunni Islamism, that it has changed today so profound.

So, and yes, it's not gonna be a smooth sailing, it's not gonna be a straight line, and you have all sorts of, you know, you are always gonna have empirical data points to prove that it isn't working or that there's like illiberalism. But I think that, again, you gotta go to Saudi Arabia physically, I think, to see the changes. Otherwise, you know, is just not gonna stick.

Well, that's fine, fine. Now they have big coffers and all these other things. Like I get that they have material wealth, but it can't go there. But I think that, um, the, the points we were making about the UAE and the power of city states relative to big states, it actually plays very well into our power geopolitical draft. But before I hand over the mc duties to you, I think we should spend literally max two minutes, 30 seconds on what's going on. A little update on Russia, Ukraine.

'cause there's supposed to be negotiations in Istanbul tomorrow. Will they happen? Won't they happen? Is there a ceasefire? Is there not a ceasefire? So give me your 60 seconds and maybe I'll do 60 seconds and then let's get to the fun part.

And if Putin makes a mistake here, like if I was Putin's advisor, I'd be like, listen bro, you gotta cut your losses and proclaim victory ASAP. Now I know what the problem for Putin is. He hasn't conquered them yet, which is part of, right. So he needs to bring all of Donbas home or else a lot of right wing nationalist bloggers are gonna like, you know, go after him.

He just needs to cut his losses, sharpen the bone, saw since you're obsessed with that point, and start putting some of those bloggers, uh, in jail. Because the truth is you're gonna have to swallow a deal. You're gonna have to swallow a deal, uh, that maybe some nationalist right wing lunatics in Russia don't like. But you know what, who cares about borders? Don, I'll tell you who, who does not give a fuck?

And I think that's true today because like what was the first things that Zelensky said when the US was talking about peace negotiations and Istanbul? He said, I'll be there as soon as Putin is there. Like he has been Yes sir. Every step of the way. And he's also gotten the Europeans squarely in his corner because they're afraid of the big Donald in the White House.

'cause you've had Macron, Germany both come out and say, if Russia does not show up to the summit, additional sanctions for Russia, we're gonna get tougher. So I think Zelensky actually like pushed back against Trump a little bit. Got the Europeans on board. Looks like he's the one that's actually playing ball in the aftermath, whereas Putin is now the one sitting there. But he wasn't though, like not quite figuring it out.

And I think he used that net meeting to shore up some domestic support home, get the Europeans freaked out so that they would support him more. And now like he walked it back. So when negotiations got a little further down the road, he's the one that's meeting Trump in the back. Well, that's important. Yeah. He's the one who's saying, I will show up in Istanbul immediately. You tell me where, when, how high to jump, how many rare earth minerals Fine.

And it's Putin is now the one that looks recalcitrant. I think he played it right.

And uh, but to his credit and where we do agree is that he is smart enough to know. Oh. Oh, okay. Oh, okay. So that's what you want. You want me to show? I'm willing to negotiate. Alright. Balls in Putin's court then. And look, I mean, again, I think that the big risk for both Netanyahu and Putin is to assume is to read New York Times, you know. Don't read mainstream media and become intoxicated with this view that Trump is somehow pro your side.

You better start dancing when he plays the tune or else you're gonna feel the full wrath of the US And if us and Europe get on the same page and they get those secondary sanctions on, on, on Russia, I think that's kind of game over.

We have 45 minutes to do a geopolitical draft. Take the mic away, my friend.

And the ringer. He has this thing for basketball, which is the, I think, trade value draft, right? Jacob

We wanna think about the next, uh, I think 30 years. Jacob. Let's, let's look, look at, that's fine. Yeah. Like, so not a hundred year time horizon. 'cause that's insane. We don't know what technologies are gonna be out there. We wanna really focus on the next 30 year time horizon. And we wanna think about countries that are, um, going to be, you know. The most powerful country geopolitically.

Now, in terms of what, um, what sort of rubrics we're gonna use, what sort of, um, variables, what sort of attributes one would use for this? We're gonna probably have different views on this. So, uh, there's something called a National Capability Index. It was created by the Correlates of War Project in 1963. Um, this is an extremely outdated way to measure geopolitical power. It has things like military personnel, like how many men with weapons, you have iron and steel production.

Um, it has, uh, although, you know, somebody like Donald Trump might be overindexed on this since he's obsessed about iron and steel, but it's a very Cold War era index. You can go and you can take a look at it. Um, the political scientist who created it back during the, uh, cold War was David Singer. He was the founder. He's a political scientist, university of Michigan. You can download it online. China's actually number one on this, and I think that it's because it's outdated.

You know, it looks at demographics in a very one-to-one basis. Uh, in my own research, I've created something, um, that I call the Geopolitical Power Index. And it, uh, looks at, uh, a little bit of different four variables, uh, on population. Uh, I adapt the original population, me measure by penalizing countries with large dependency ratios, so old to youth. Um, and so, uh, I make make the argument that it's not just the size of your population, it's also the demographic, uh, pyramid.

Uh, the second is global economic relevance. So the original index really failed to capture a relevance for the global economy. So there was no globalist future. So what I look at is contribution to the global final demand. The more an economy imports, I argue the greater its bargaining power in terms of trade vis-a-vis geopolitical rivals. So what matters to me is imports as percent of uh, GDP. And then for the military, I don't really look at things like, uh, maned wood weapons.

I look at whether you have technological cap capacity. Uh, so I have this quantitative measure. There's a couple of other things as well, r and d. Um, I look at that as well. That's part of the index. I'm not actually going to use this index. I'm gonna deviate from it because we're thinking about the future. But I'm just saying that there's a quantitative basis for some of my picks. Did you wanna say anything before we start, Jacob?

Um, I was actually, I, I, I'm actually reminded of something that, um, I, I don't know if Roger trained, trained you, Marco, but when I was a, an intern at, at Stratford, Roger was the one who was like overseeing Roger Baker development program. He's still

He was the one actually training a lot of us in the brass tacks, but he always told me, geopolitics is not a science, it's an art. Agreed. It's more like agreed making pottery than it is about, you know, figuring out statistics and quantitative measures. And I've always remembered that.

It was always super helpful for me when going into really quantitative spaces and having the confidence to be like, okay, like, great, you have statistics. I also have statistics, like I have a very nice index here. I can make the index say whatever I want. I can find a chart or a piece of data that will support any viewpoint. In the end, the more important thing is to qualitatively say, what do I think? This is gonna happen.

And so when I think about power, for me it boils down to really one key question. Can this country make you do something you don't wanna do? And to the extent that a country can do that to you, I will add checks in in the power basis. So it's not like I'm just throwing darts at the wall here. Then we have to think about things like, like you said, population. I think nuclear weapons is a really tough one here.

And one I really struggled with, is it all the nuclear countries first and then non-nuclear countries? Below are are, if you're like a middling nuclear power, like in Israel or a Pakistan, okay, you have nukes, but does that mean you're more powerful than in Japan who doesn't technically have nukes but has all these other, like that was one thing that I really struggled with.

But yeah, for me it's all about we can have all these indicators, we can look at all these different things, but comes back to the question, can this country make another country do something that it doesn't wanna do more than other countries? And that was my ultimate sort of rubric.

Um, I, I would answer that question to you, Jacob, by saying that there are countries out there that are nuclear powers. You know, like Japan, let's not joke here. If Japan wants a nuclear weapon, it's, it has one. Yeah. The other one that, that I think is interesting is population.

Uh, I think that you will notice that I will, uh, completely and utterly dismiss demographics. I think that, I think that we are way too obsessed with it. Um, probably because anyone can download data from the UN and then be an expert. And the truth is that we're getting a ton of innovation in AI and automation that literally makes humans irrelevant. And so not irrelevant, but like I. Population size.

And I still hear this nonsense about Russia not being able to feel the military 'cause his population is declining or China having a problem 'cause it has not enough men. What are people talking about Jacob? We're not fighting wars with millions of men. Right? Like

You know, just having a lot of young people doesn't mean that you're gonna be fine. In fact, in many ways you're not gonna be fine because you have too many young people that you can't employ. So anyways,

Alright, so let's start, I'm gonna start this time around because, um, you know, I've spent a lot of this, uh, uh, podcast relationship with you, Jacob, uh, kind of bashing the idea of American, uh, unipolarity and hegemony and, uh, you know, I've been talking about the multipolar world longer than Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, for God's sakes. You know, so I'm gonna start off by picking the United States of America as number one. Of course.

I think, you know, I think we all agree, um, and this is very important for those who listen to this. America is not a hegemon. It does not have preponderance of power. It cannot force you to do things with a phone call, as it did famously in the Sue crisis is 19 56, 57, I believe. Uh, but it's still the most powerful country in the world.

And I wanna, this is about the next 30 years, and I just think that, um, I. Not to be glib, but in this particular case, I think it does help that geography is what it is. Uh, to give Peter Zion the point, you know, it is surrounded by two oceans. That is absolutely correct, and it's really far from everywhere. Um, technology is narrowing that geographical gap, cybersecurity, other issues.

Obviously we all agree with that, but he has a lot of natural resources, and most importantly, even at its darkest moments, it does rediscover itself. That is kind of the beauty of the American Democratic experiment. Uh, many people who are losing their mind about Donald Trump today should just read more about 1971, honestly, and see how dark that period of time was. Or just watch some movies that were made in that period.

I mean, they're all dark and rainy and depressed and everybody's sad and, you know, like doesn't wear deodorant and like, you know, just lots of like. Bad cars and dark, dark themes. And so what I would say is that, yeah, I would pick United States of America. I don't even think we'd really talk about it, but US is the most powerful country in the world. Uh, it's head and shoulders above everyone else. And as I always say, that doesn't make you a hegemon. To be a hegemon.

To be unipolar, you have to be head, shoulder, torso, hips. That's not the case anymore. Yeah. But it may be in the future.

So like part of the, the sea change in, in, you know, us, uh, posture towards the Houthis was about not even being able to do what, you know, the US did to the Houthis under, or excuse me, not to the Houthis, but to a, an Iranian threat to Persian Gulf shipping in the late 19, I believe it was. Was that Reagan or Bush? I can't remember which one it was, but the late Reagan 1980s. But to your point, operat, I als I also praying. Yeah. So sorry, praying Mantis.

Yeah. But I also had the US number one, even, even though I say all the things that you do, um, and I, my guess is that our first two picks will be the same and then things might get interesting.

Um, but my second pick is gonna be, um, I'll, I'll take China number two on the board. Um, I think that's also pretty clear. Um, and I think the greatest threat to our multipolar thesis, and I say that all the time, is that it we're really headed towards another bipolar world where it's the US on the one side and China on the other side. Um, China has huge problems. It has structural economic problems.

It has hundreds of millions of, you know, impoverished peasants that need to enjoy enrichment that the coastal cities have enjoyed thus far. Um, it has resource constraints, so it, for the first time in Chinese history, it can't feed its own population. It has to go out and import, you know, food and energy and capital and technology and all these other different things.

So there's lots of different challenges that China has, but, uh, you know, don't put me in the category of any of these people who have been, you know, your Gordon Changs or your Peter Hans who have been predicting the imminent collapse of China for decades. Which is to your point, like, you know, if you, if you're worried about the United States, go back, watch the 1970s, could say the same thing about China. Go back to like the um.

The cultural revolution, or go back to the, the famines that Mao caused with some of his, uh, disastrous policies. Even go back to the demographic decline that people were predicting for China in the 1980s, 1990s. This is the country in the world that makes things. It's the manufacturing heart of the world. All of that expertise, all of that human capital. Um, it's positioned geographically like it's going to be here for the long haul.

Uh, maybe it's not the Chinese Communist Party, like it could be a soft sort of revolution and some, some other sort of regime gets ushered in. Like, I'm not wedded to it being necessarily the current regime. I think it will be the current regime, but I'm not currently wedded to that.

But I don't think we're gonna go back to like a warring states period where the different regions of China will be fighting each other and different regions around, or different countries around it will go take points. Like I think China is very clearly the number two and probably, you know, 30 years from now, probably nipping on the heels of, of US power as, as being the first in that multipolar world.

I mean, I still write physical checks, you know, like, and, and I remember, uh, uh, my good friend who worked with me, um, at my previous job, he would always like joke. He was like, he had to write a check 'cause he lived here in Santa Monica. He was like, what is this? You guys don't have like instant payment solutions. Like, this is America, you know? So, uh, I agree with you. I think China is second. This is the one of those where demographics is real problem. You know, like, yes.

Chinese demographics are not great. The problem is that it could stall their GDP per capita, but it could also actually help maintain some upward trajectory. If GDP continues to grow at even a three to 5% pace as the per capita part narrows, your wealth could actually Yeah,

The other thing is that China has hundreds of millions of people, I already referenced them, who are impoverished living in the interior. So most countries don't have hundreds of millions of people that they could bring into the middle class to increase consumption and things like that. So are you gonna get a baby boom in China over the next 10 years?

No. But if you could redistribute income to those hundreds of millions of poor people and have them buying made in China, air conditioners and everything else, then you get the equivalent of that consumption boost as a result. So if they handle the macro correctly, it's not like Japan has an interior where it can go find 200 million poor people that it can get to consume things like most countries don't have that relevance.

And the other thing I wanna say here is that demographics, you said it's a double-edged sword, it's also a static present indicator. Like, you know, we're fighting linearity. You have, we have no clue what decisions Chinese families are gonna make and how many babies they're gonna have 15 and 20 years from now. If the Chinese government comes out and says, there is now a three child policy.

Maybe they'll have a huge demographic boom, 20 years from now, maybe the Chinese people will get more optimistic and start having more kids may, you know, there's a whole bunch of different opportunities there. So I think we can point to demographics as saying this is a big issue and it requires focusing on everything from robotics to internet of things, to enriching the interior of China, et cetera.

But the idea that we're gonna project the decisions that a billion people are gonna make about how many children they're gonna have, like, I don't have the hubris to, to make that call. And I think we've seen that, you know, there are ways around it and more ways around it for China than there are for other countries. Okay. Sorry.

If that is your mark of success, then you will disagree with me. But I do think there are alternatives to a federal union, and one of them is Switzerland. You know, it's, it's a confederation. Um, the first iteration of the United States of America, the articles of Confederation was going to be something similar. Uh, obviously the United States at the time was a very weak, weak country, afraid that the United Kingdom would come back, which it did. And so it needed a federal entity.

Instead of a confederal. I don't think Europe needs that. Um, several things that are going for Europe. First demographics again. Everybody thinks Europe has terrible demographics. This is false, and no, not because of Syria. Asylum seekers, for God's sake, stop watching YouTube videos. Europe is fine because it has one of the greatest. Western Europe has one of the greatest heists in geopolitics. It's called the EU labor market.

It allows somebody from Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, to move to any place in the EU and get a job, which means that Western Europe gets educated, ready to work families to just show up and start working. Now, the problem was that United Kingdom stole most of these immigrants because Eastern Europeans speak English. They don't speak French or German. But now that the UK has decided to pull out a revolver and shoot itself in the foot and depart the EU precisely because of this one advantage.

Um, it can have fun trying to find immigrants somewhere else. Western Europe doesn't. It has ready-made, educated, hardworking eastern Europeans to suck like a vampire from Eastern Europe. So if you wanna pick Poland, if you wanna pick an Eastern European country, just beware that they are going to struggle to keep their demographics, which are already bad, stable. Uh, so that takes care of the usual reason people hate in Europe, which is demographics. The other one is technology.

Yes, China is obviously challenging, uh, European manufacturing, but one of the things I would never discount is German ability to reinvent itself. Germany reinvented itself numerous times. It's not gonna de industrialize. Uh, there's a lot of mythological technological innovation that only Germany has and uh, so I'm gonna pick Western Europe. I think that the reason the world will remain multipolar. Is because what?

Because Donald Trump has bestowed upon Europe and also Vladimir Putin, a reason to finally integrate. As we talked before, you know Jacob, I don't think countries are born out of love. I think countries are born out of fear. And finally, I think Europeans have sufficient fear to integrate further. So I'm picking Western Europe.

I, I have to have a single country. And if, um, I would've had France as my number three. Oh, wow. My number three choice was France, just by itself.

Off the board though, this is where it starts to get really interesting, like beyond these blocks. Like, okay, what's next? And I know, is it nukes versus this thing?

I, I'm taking Turkey.

Who is the one who's gonna have the Navy that actually controls access to the Mediterranean and to the Persian Gulf? Who is the one that is already stealing market share from the Europeans on manufacturing? Who is going to dominate the Black Sea Basin and your Balkan homelands in the future? This is Turkey. This is not any other country. This is the rise of the Neo Ottoman Empire over the next 30 years. Probably the strongest military in NATO outside of the us.

Like maybe France has something to say because of nukes, but if you're just thinking about military spending and capability and deployments and things like that, I'll take the new Ottoman Empire at the heart of the Mediterranean in this multipolar world. 'cause this Mediterranean powers do very well when they're controlling these trading lanes at the center of the world.

Russia just has access to the Iranian drones, but those are trash. Turkey has actually, um, you know, I follow military spending a lot 'cause I think it's a great indicator. As I said, uh, it's, it's a sign of geopolitical power and Turkey, along with South Korea, is one of the world's largest, uh, movers up the, the chain. So I think this is a surprising pick, but it's about the next 30 years. And I think that, uh, you know, I respect this, I respect this pick.

It's, it's got, I, I mean, how do I push back on it? I mean, you know, I don't really want to push back on it because I think it's, it's cool. It's a great pick. And by the way, we didn't get a chance to talk about PKK and the government. Mm-hmm. You know, uh, that's, that's a really positive development for Turkey from a domestic stability perspective. Yeah. Yeah. So, you know, it's

The less they can worry about the Kurds in their backyard, the more they can project power into the Black Sea, into North Africa, down the horn, into the Balkans. Like, I like the way the map looks for them. I think the biggest shot to the argument is, um, Erdogan's power base and what happens when Erdogan is no longer there. And does Turkish politics revert to this secular versus religious clash?

And like, does it get mired in this own domestic politics inflation trap that hap that has happened to Turkey several times over the past 40

Number two, it is like the largest population in the world, which is not like insignificant. And also, even if there's some sort of an economic crisis because of its demographics, which everybody just louds, is a positive, it is not a positive. Um, I think that ultimately policy in India will strive towards competence even if there's a crisis. Uh, I worry about AI replacing its service sector. I think AI is going to impact India extremely negatively.

Um, a lot of its service sector is geared towards, um, the kind of technological services that AI could re replace. Uh, but what we're starting to see is manufacturing start to slowly, very slowly move to India. And I do think that it, it will be a country that can't really be ignored. Um, so I'm gonna take it as fifth. Now. Please note it has fallen to fifth. I think most people would've clearly thought it's top three. It's the best performing market over the last five years.

I'm picking it because I think it cannot be ignored over the next 30, 30 years. I don't want us to be too controversial. I think I'm playing the role of Reow here saying you can't ignore size, you know, come on. Like, I think this is a seven foot five giant that can, uh, potentially develop a three point shot. And I just think we have to give it, you know, that

And it might start, it might take 30 years to do so, and in 30 year, like if this has been a 50 year time horizon, it might have been a different question. But if we're just thinking about 30 and all the things India has to fix that it hasn't fixed yet, and its ability to project power beyond the subcontinent, like all plus there's other things with climate change and wa like all that stuff sort of says to me, okay, like they're not gonna be able to force people, um, to do things.

Um. This, I hate, I hate having to make this next pick. 'cause you're sort of caught between the declining powers of like your Russias and your UKs. So they've got some of the fancy things that we would say are good indicators for power today. But will they really be there in 30 years? Will they even exist in their current form in 30 years?

But then you've got like your Brazils, which okay, like Dugal said, or Dugal has reported to have said, I don't think he actually said it, that Brazil is the country of the future and always will be. Yeah. So I'll probably be picking Brazil 30 years from now for the exact same reasons. Um, and I, I even want, you know, Japan also in that declining power maybe, I don't know, is it sort of in there? Um, just to say I really struggled.

And I think that ultimately if we go down to like forcing action, I, I think I, I don't like this pick, but I think I'm picking Russia. I think I have to have Russia there. Wow.

Tearing the place apart. Without strong leadership, I think you're gonna have, um, problems in the future. I'm also, uh, concerned about technological innovation. I. Um, a lot of things that Russians are very good at, like military technology, other countries are starting to nip at their heels. Um, I think they need to have a period of peace and security so they can recenter on technological innovation, on education, things like that. And that hasn't happened.

In fact, there's been a brain train outta Russia to places like Georgia or Serbia or Armenia, and that's a really big problem for the country and I don't like it for the next 30 years. Um, so this isn't a pure demographic play at all. Um, you know, we're willing to deviate from that, but yeah. Uh, I've got, I've got concerns about Russia. Um, so who am I gonna pick? Um, so actually the country that comes next on my list, I'm gonna skip it. This is the quantitative one.

Mm-hmm. And I'm gonna pick South Korea. Hmm. So South Korea may have the

Um, so that's something Japan doesn't really have, not to the same extent as South Korea, mainly for political reasons. Um, they're effectively a nuclear power. If they wanted to, boom, it's done. Like don't worry about it. Um, and I like the fact that they are, uh, fit. I think the problem, the difference between Japan and South Korea, obviously Japan has doubled the population, larger economy and so on.

The thing is though, I think Japan's gotten a little bit lazy and I, I, I say that because I think that South Korea has been in much more of a, uh, antagonistic. I. National security environment, uh, and that's made them fitter. They've been preparing for a war a lot longer than Japan has. Um, I also find that it's, uh, you know, soft power is interesting. It's not part of my rubric at all, but I like it.

I like when countries have the ability to make fun of themselves, to create art that crosses cultures. And no country has punched above South Korea's ability to do that. I mean, South Korea has absolutely like crushed soft power. So, um, on all of those, I, I really like South Korea. I think that innovation in robotics, automation and AI are going to allow them to overcome that demographic burden. And so, yeah, I absolutely love South Korea.

I think that they're going to be, uh, one of the top 10 countries, uh, in terms of geopolitics. And so I actually picked them, uh, three spots above my quantitative, uh, number. They're actually 10 already.

Like now I'm, I'm listening. I think it's a speculative play. I think it, it's a, it's either a hundred or, or maybe a zero.

I mean, they're very early on in this, but green shoots of innovation, manufacturing capacity and also like the United States oceans away from enemies, has a, has a nice little hemispheric and maybe dominate and push back against the United States with, I'll, I'll take Brazil at this point. Off the board.

Um, also I think that the population growth is shocking. Immigration has been huge. Uh, now there's been a backlash against it. But, uh, as Canada builds out infrastructure, you know, it has an ability to basically accept an endless amount of human beings. This is a country with one of the largest freshwater basins. It can grow food for the entire planet if it wanted to.

Um, and it has, you know, all the kind of governance issues, like, think of Canada as almost like a superpower with, you just have, it's a turnkey superpower. It has everything you need. From sort of the Western developer perspective, um, you just need to put humans into it. And so I think that Canada is going to be a top, top 10 player over the next 10 years,

Uh, I will take Iran off the board now. Wow. Again, thinking on a 30 year time horizon, a country that basically already has nuclear weapons, uh, strategic access to the Persian Gulf, lots of different oil resources, uh, history of projecting power into Central Asia, into these other Shiite parts of the world.

Um, like maybe not your typical power, but if we're thinking about a country that can make other countries do things like Iran has already shown, it can be a focal point of decision making even in its poultry state right now. What happens 30 years from now when there's a leadership transition, when Iran is welcomed into the family of nations once again, like, again, 30 year time horizon. I think I'll take Iran as a major player, um, in that part of the world.

And if that happens, honestly this is gonna be the best pick of the draft. Mm-hmm. So at 10 Iran, great pick.

Um, the next one for me, uh, there's a symbiotic gravitational pull, you know, uh, and if you pick a Brazil, I think that I have to pick Argentina. I think that Brazil and Argentina are going to advance. I think what's happening in Argentina is a good example of your Iran analogy. Argentina, you can think of it as having discarded its status system of garment. Obviously I am projecting the current pace of Malay reforms as continuing and benefiting.

And so I think that, uh, yeah, I think there will be innovation and I think that there will be reform in Argentina, so I'm gonna pick them. You'll love it.

Um, I will take Singapore at number 12. I'm thinking about the Strait of Malacca. I'm thinking about material wealth. I'm thinking about the ability to project power with advances in AI and things like that. And there is no place in the world that is better suited to deploy AI and all these different fancy things at scale than a city state with the relative stability, material, wealth, and strategic location as Singapore.

So if we're thinking about who can shape global trends and how they can use that power, I think in multipolar eras we'll see the return of very powerful city states. And I think Singapore is the top one. So I'm probably picking too high 'cause I wanted them, but I wanted them, I needed, I needed the crown jewel at number 12.

Saudi Arabia is my 13 pick. Now I am including in this, first of all, Saudi Arabia is doing what Iran should have done just 10 years earlier. The second thing is I think that when I see Saudi Arabia, I do really mean the region as well. So, um, no offense to anyone, uh, but I think Saudi Arabia is going to harness the power of innovation, not just in Saudi Arabia, but also in neighboring countries as well. So I'm gonna pick that at 13.

Uh, and that includes some of the city states that are around Saudi Arabia. Mm-hmm. You know, so that like, it's like Saudi Arabia plus like three Singapores, so I'm gonna take them 13. Exactly.

'cause I don't think Japan is gonna collapse anytime soon. So at this point I will bend the knee to Japan and say, sorry we left you off. Yes, you have lots of demographic issues and all these other things, but if there's any country that is gonna respond to the continued growth of China, it's gonna be Japan. And Japan is gonna be at the front lines of doing that. And they technologically all different sorts of ways. Like they know how to exist in this world. So I'll take them.

Well, the west is gonna have to stalk Ukraine with a lot of good governance, anti-corruption, money, innovation, and so on. So I, I like Ukraine and, and I almost feel like I took it way too low here. I think that it's a large country, it's in the West. It's got a lot of natural resources, not energy, but it's gonna have to work on that. Um, so yeah. Now look, we have four minutes and we have to do five. So here's what I'm gonna say. Let's do second part of this next week. Next, yeah.

If you agree. That sounds good. Uh, we've got top 15, uh, we got five more and then maybe we can do some thoughts. You know, for example, uh, Russia didn't fall as much as it did. Japan seems to have fallen more than I think both of you and I. Like if I took South Korea seventh, like, you know, should Japan really be 14th? Like I think there's a lot of things here that, that maybe we can talk about next time. Um, but yeah, that, that can be part two of our trade value.

So, no, I, I, I think it's gonna be interesting. Uh, YOIC needs help last night's game where he just had a crazy stat line that three pointer or like just, I mean. It was just sad to see that. Uh, but, uh, but yeah, um, all I would say is like, uh, don't write off Denver yet, because it's gonna go back to game seven, I think in Okay. C and then maybe, um, you know, we'll see the youth versus experience that might work.

Uh, other than that, uh, you ended up being right about Tatum, but I gotta say I don't feel good about it.