Episode description

About Corey Quinn

Over the course of my career, I’ve worn many different hats in the tech world: systems administrator, systems engineer, director of technical operations, and director of DevOps, to name a few. Today, I’m a cloud economist at The Duckbill Group, the author of the weekly Last Week in AWS newsletter, and the host of two podcasts: Screaming in the Cloud and, you guessed it, AWS Morning Brief, which you’re about to listen to.

Links

• CHAOSSEARCH
• @QuinnyPig

Transcript

Corey: Welcome to AWS Morning Brief: Whiteboard Confessional. I’m Cloud Economist Corey Quinn. This weekly show exposes the semi-polite lie that is whiteboard architecture diagrams. You see, a child can draw a whiteboard architecture, but the real world is a mess. We discuss the hilariously bad decisions that make it into shipping products, the unfortunate hacks the real-world forces us to build, and that the best to call your staging environment is “theory”. Because invariably whatever you’ve built works in the theory, but not in production. Let’s get to it.

Corey: This episode is brought to you by Trend Micro Cloud One™. A security services platform for organizations building in the Cloud. I know you're thinking that that's a mouthful because it is, but what's easier to say? “I'm glad we have Trend Micro Cloud One™, a security services platform for organizations building in the Cloud,” or, “Hey, bad news. It's going to be a few more weeks. I kind of forgot about that security thing.” I thought so. Trend Micro Cloud One™ is an automated, flexible all-in-one solution that protects your workflows and containers with cloud-native security. Identify and resolve security issues earlier in the pipeline, and access your cloud environments sooner, with full visibility, so you can get back to what you do best, which is generally building great applications. Discover Trend Micro Cloud One™ a security services platform for organizations building in the Cloud. Whew. At trendmicro.com/screaming.

Welcome. I am Cloud Economist Corey Quinn, and this is the AWS Morning Brief: Whiteboard Confessional. One of the nice things about how I do business is that I don't actually know when I record these episodes, who is going to be sponsoring it. Today, I'm going to talk about secrets management. The reason I bring this up is that should whatever sponsor has landed the ad slot for this week be talking about a different way of handling secrets management, you should of course disregard everything I'm about to say, and buy their product and or service instead. That said, let's talk about secrets management and how it can be done in some of the most appalling ways imaginable.

There are a depressing number of you listening to this, where if I were to steal your laptops, A) you potentially would not have hard drive encryption turned on, so I could just pull things off of your system. That said, most modern operating systems do this by default now, so that's less of a threat. Now, let's pretend that I wind up instead surmounting an almost impossible barrier. That's right, getting a corrupted browser extension onto your system that somehow has access to poke around in your user's home directory. 

Think for a second about what I might find. Would I find, oh, I don't know, SSH keys that would grant me access to your production environment? Well, that wouldn't be that big of a problem because there's no possible way I would know what hosts they go for unless I look at the known_hosts file sitting right next to your SSH keys. But even that's a little esoteric because that's not something I would ever do at grand scale. Let’s instead consider what happens if I poke around in the usual spots and find long-lived IAM credentials, or whatever your cloud provider of choice’s equivalent is, which I believe is IAM in most cases unless you're using IBM Cloud, in which case, it's probably an old-timey skeleton key that is physically tied to your laptop. 

Now, the reason this becomes a common pattern is because it's honestly pretty convenient. You're going to need to be able to access production environments or your cloud environment, and have permissions that are generally granted to you, and ease of access is always juxtaposed with convenience. And invariably, convenience tends to win out. Sure, you can mandate the use of multi-factor authentication for those credentials to get into production, but that means you have to type in a code or press a button on a Yubikey, or something else. That fundamentally means you're going to be spending a lot more time pressing buttons or digging out passphrases than you're going to spend getting into production in a hurry. 

So, we make trade-offs; we cheat; it's human nature. And of course, once you get into your production environment, things are rarely better. It seems that you have a choice. You can either have the same password shared absolutely everywhere within an environment, or you have these incredibly secure key management systems, but in return becomes virtually impossible to rotate credentials. We've seen this before, and we've talked about this before. When we look at what happens when someone leaves a job unexpectedly, and suddenly the credential rotation causes four site outages in the next two days.

There's always a trade-off here. And the problem is, is that these elaborate multi-step secret retrieval processes that people can deploy are no stronger than their weakest link. I've talked about it in an early episode, but probably one of the most bizarre I've ever seen was for regulated data, where in order to start the database server, it required a long key that was cut into pieces, and then we needed to have multiple staff contribute and turn their key like we were launching a freakin’ nuclear missile from a submarine. And it worked, sure, but at the same time, it meant to restart a server, you needed at least two people nearby, and that became a little nutty. Let's also ignore for a minute the fact that this was just for encrypting the data at rest. 

Once the service was running, it was loaded into RAM. There was no real guarantee that this was going to be any more secure than anything else. And let's face it, we're living in an era now where people stealing the server out of our cloud-hosted environment is not the primary or secondary or tertiary threat modeling that anyone has to do. For better or worse, you can give an awful lot of crap to the cloud providers, but they've pretty much solved the ‘someone rams a truck into the side of the building, grabs a rack into the back of said truck and peels off into the night.’ Except IBM Cloud. So, what are some patterns that work for this? Great question. But first:

Corey: This episode is sponsored in part by ChaosSearch. Now their name isn’t in all caps, so they’re definitely worth talking to. What is ChaosSearch? A scalable log analysis service that lets you add new workloads in minutes, not days or weeks. Click. Boom. Done. Chaos...