Western Civ 2.0: The First Punic War

Hello, then welcome to Western CIV. As I do on occasion, I wanted to drop a bonus episode into the feed from Western SIV two point zero. You can get access to this by clicking the link in the show notes, and for a few dollars a month, you can get access to the total backlog of all the episodes that I have. Essentially, Western SIV two

point zero is a reboot of the original podcast. I love ancient and classical history, as you've probably guessed right now, but when I recorded a lot of those episodes many many moons ago, audio equipment wasn't as good and I didn't have a good sense of what I was doing. So I decided to go back and have another crack at it and really delve into some of the

stories then kind of glossed over the first time around. Today's episode is the bonus episode that I recorded on the First Punic War, which I gave very short trift to in the original feed, But as you'll see, here goes into a lot greater detail as to how the Romans ultimately come out on top over their Carthaginian opponents. So this gives you a sense of what's available.

This is episode sixty three, the First Punic War. If you'd like to try out Western SIEV two point zero, you can get a seven day free trial by clicking the link and following along. Now, of course, while this episode, because it's in the main feed, does have ads, the paid episodes do not, And in fact, if you would just like to access our regular episodes are regular weekly, but without ads, you can get that for one dollar a month or twelve dollars a year. As usual,

I very much appreciate any and all support that I receive. So then, without further ado, let's take a listen to Western Hip two point zero, episode sixty three, The First Punic War. Once the Romans and Carthaginians had committed themselves to the aid or aggression toward Syracuse, the die was cast. The First Punic War would be fought on and over Sicily. Well, certainly,

the fleet and the army for both sides worked together. Most historians I have read break the various campaigns down between the war on land and the War on sea. I, given that I am not a historian and am in no way in a position to question the wisdom of this approach, will do the same. You shall begin with the land war on Sicily. Syracuse provided the Romans with a secure base of operations on the island, while Masana was quickly taken, which was the whole basis for the beginning of the conflict.

There is no indication either side attempted negotiations. Carthage saw no reason to negotiate. Its early losses could be easily reversed, and they saw Sicily as theirs. The Romans were upstarts and needed to be pushed back off the island as soon as possible. The Romans, for their part, believe the Carthaginians needed to understand that they had lost and they had to come to terms favorable to

Rome, just like Hero the Tyrant of Syracuse had done. Plus, it certainly did not hurt that Sicily was rich and they the Romans wanted it for the next several hundred years. Those two factors, in fact, are going to justify quite a lot of conflicts. Carthage immediately went to work raising a mercenary army. Rome responded by dispatching both consuls and four legions into sixty two. Carthage decided to use agrigentum about midway along the coast of Sicily, on

the southern side, as its base is for operations. But the Roman consuls moved quickly, and by the time the commander within the city had a chance to react, forty thousand Roman legionnaires were bearing down upon him. This commander, named Hannibal, because of course, pulled everyone back within the walls, which Romans took as a sign of weakness. It happened to be harvest time, so the consuls sent their men out to forage for food. Hannibal saw

the chance, and he took it, launching a vigorous sally. The only thing that held back a complete Roman disaster was their camp picket line, which, though badly outnumbered, put up a stout defense. In the end, the Romans were able to regroup and Hannibal suffered major losses. Both sides came away chastened. Hannibal knew that he couldn't afford to keep taking such losses,

and the Romans realized they needed to stop underestimating their foe now. The easiest way to take a city during the Punic Wars was by surprise or treachery. An attacker might launch a surprise offensive at night and seize key defensive points before the defender knew what was going on. This was all the easier if there happened to be a disaffected group within the city that might aid in the attack. In the Punic Wars, more cities fell by treachery than by any other

means, but that wasn't the case here. Agrigentum would not be betrayed, so the Romans would need to resort to their other options. Assault or blockade. Assault was the one aspect of ancient warfare most affected by technological advances. It involved the attacker finding a way over, through, or under the defender's fortifications. The simplest method was escalade, when the attacking infantry carried ladders up to the wall and attempted to scale them, but this always involved heavy casualties

and was rarely successful unless the walls were virtually devoid of defenders. Mobile siege towers, which dropped a drawbridge onto a rampart and allowed men to cross while providing covering fire from archers or artillery on top, were essentially an extension of the same basic ladder principle. The main alternative was to create a breach in the walls by battering rams or tunneling underneath to what was called undermine them.

But this all required extensive preparation, scientific knowledge, and labor to create siege works, allowing engines such as a battering ram to pass over any defensive ditches and then reach the wall. All the time the defender would be employing artillery to hinder this activity, countermining to thwart the attackers, tunneling and launching sallies

to burn the siege engines. The ingenuity of both sides was constantly tested as they struggled to find countermeasures like a constant ping pong or a back and forth. We saw this a lot with Tire in Alexander the grid. Once the defenders had been breached, then ingenuity and technical skill went out the window as the assaulting infantry had to storm their way inside. Casualties would still probably be

heavy, and failure was a real possibility even then. Such was the massive effort and uncertainty of the outcome that assaults on major cities were not contemplated lightly. Convention decreed that a defender would normally only be permitted on terms to surrender if he did so before the first battering ram touched the wall. If they

did not, then the city would be subject to a sack. At this period, the Roman army lacked the technical skill to undertake such a project on a city as large as Agragentum with any real prospect of success, since the only choice available to the Romans at Agrigentum was blockade, and they took it. Luckily for the consular armies, Agrigentum was not on the coast, which

is a rarity for a Carthaginian city. Without ships, the Romans never could have blockaded the city, but because it was situated on a plateau several miles inland, the Romans were able to construct a series of forts and ditches to effectively hem the city. In Sensing that the situation was quickly becoming dire,

Hannibal called for aid. After just five months, The Carthaginians sent all the troops they had fostered, perhaps as many as seventy thousand men, which would have given them a slight advantage over the Romans, at least in terms of numbers. The Carthaginian army quickly cut the Romans supply lines, and the weakened men began to fall sick in their crowded camps. The Carthaginians followed up on this success with a lightning cavalry strike that was also successful already in Sicily.

The Romans were discovering that their cavalry was just no match for the light numidian horse of Carthage, and we're going to see that again, but much more decisively, in the Second Punic War. The Romans and then Carthaginians then started a sort of cat and mouse game, each offering battle in turn, only to have the other side to climb. Ultimately, forced by desperate messages from Agrigentum that the city was soon to capitulate, the Carthaginians gave in and accepted

the Roman offer to fight a pitched battle. Olybyus gives few details of this battle, but it seems that the Carthaginian army was deployed in more than one line, with a front line of infantry supported by a second containing more infantry and the elephants. It is possible that the intention was to tire out the Roman infantry, weakening their formation and destroying the impetus of their advance, but

this is no more than pure speculation. Presumably, the cavalry was on the wings and the Romans were in their usual triple axis after a long struggle. It was the Romans who drove back and routed the Carthaginian first line. As these mercenaries retreated, the panic spread to the reserve formations, and these fled. The Romans captured the Punic camp and most of the elephants. Theodorus claims that the Carthaginian commander Hanno lost three thousand infantry and two hundred cavalry killed and

four thousand men captured. Eight elephants were killed outright and thirty three disabled, but this is included in the total losses of the earlier cavalry battle. That being said, Deodorus also admits that Roman losses in the siege and battle amounted to over thirty thousand infantry and five hundred and fifty cavalry, but this is from an army of one hundred thousand, which he claims the besiegers were able to muster. Both the size of the army and the casualties seemed too high,

although the latter may well have been substantial. Another historian, Zenarius, provides a different version of the battle, in which Hanna hoped to coordinate his attack with a sally by Hannibal's garrison within agrigentum, but this was thwarted when the Romans learned of the plan and ambushed the main force while easily defeating the

garrison's raid with the outposts guarding the camp and siege lines. Zenarius implies the battle began late in the day, and the same thing is claimed by Frontotius, who attributes the council Postidimus the stratagem of refusing battle and remaining close to

the camp, as he had already done for several days. When the Carthaginians decided that the Romans were unwilling to fight and began to withdraw, satisfy that they had demonstrated their better fighting spirit, the Romans suddenly attacked and defeated them. It's just not possible to know how accurate all of these different traditions are, but we can say and our sources at least agree that the battle ended in a clear Roman victory. Hanno's use of elephants has often been criticized given

their failure to support the first line. It has been suggested that the Carthaginians at this point were not used to employing elephants and unaware of correct tactics. This being the first recorded instance of their use by a Punic army. However, lacking a more detailed narrative, we cannot be certain what Hanno's battle plan act actually was, or if it went wrong, precisely what went wrong. The failure of the different elements in his army to support each other effectively may

have been a reflection of its armies composition. Most of these troops were recently raised and had not had much time to maneuver as an army or to become familiar with their commanders. After the loss, Hannibal was able to get the majority of his army out of the city in the dead of night by secretly filling a section of the Roman ditch with earth. The upshot of this,

however, was that Aggregentum fell to the Romans. While the campaign had tactically been a success, neither Roman Council was awarded a triumph, suggesting some displeasure with how often and how close to disaster the Romans had frequently come. Still, the Senate now voted to expand the Roman War aim to include the complete ejection of Carthage from Sicily. What had begun as a minor border dispute with

Messana was now an all out war of conquest. The defeat of Hanno outside Agrigentum was one of only four massed battles fought on land throughout the twenty three years of the First Punic War, which is incredible and a marked contrast with the Second Punic War, where as we're going to see, pitched battles were by far more common, which I suppose to an extent is what makes the Second Punic War a little bit more interesting. And trust me, I'm very

excited to break down any of these battles. Now. Two of these four battles, so half of them, occurred in the relatively brief African campaign of Regulus, and this is something I'm going to get to later, and the only two in Sicily, despite the deployment of large number of soldiers there by

both sides for much of the war. Now, look, part of the reason that we don't have a lot of pitch battles in the First Punic War is just the topography of Sicily. There's a lot of rugged terrain in most of central Sicily and it just doesn't favor the movements of large armies with so many good defensive positions. It was difficult for a commander to force a battle on an unwilling adversary. More importantly, the bulk of the island's population lived

in the numerous walled cities or in their dependent villages. These were the key to Sicily, and only through controlling these communities could the island be secured. The territories controlled by Syracuse and Carthage had little unity, being composed of by a patchwork of these small city states, most of whom enjoyed almost unfettered local

autonomy. From the earliest actions to break the blisscade around a Messana, the operations of armies were dominated by the need to secure each individual town and cities. So it's very much sort of a plodding most World War One style warfare that we have going on here. The outcome of a pitch battle was always uncertain, and a defeat might well involve very high casualties and the demoralization of

the rest of the army. Even a victory merely left the successful army to pursue its main task of subduing cities more freely, which might not actually be any easier depending upon the nature of that victory. Under normal circumstances, the potential gains were insufficient for both sides to be willing to risk joining battle. It is significant that both the major battles to occur in Sicily were fought outside and for the control of cities. A high proportion of the troops deployed in

Sicily were probably dispersed in small garrisons to hold the various cities. As always in siege warfare, the advantage remained with the defender. It was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to keep armies in the field in one location for very long. At the outset of the Punic War, Rome lacked the technical expertise that it needed to take walled and well defended cities. Hence, if a city fell, as I mentioned before, it almost always fell after treachery,

or more often, it just switched sides after one side. Cartha Jerome won a pivotal battle. Treachery, though, was also well treacherous. It was hard to determine how much to trust a group willing to betray their fellow citizens. There were several times during the First Punic War when a commander believed an offered to defect, only to find himself and his advance guard surrounded and massacred. Frankly, given our sources, it's difficult to provide a chronological narrative

of the First Punic War on land. There are a lot of sieges, surprise attacks, raids, and then frequently long periods when absolutely nothing happened at all. What I can say is that over time the Romans were willing to devote more and more resources to the island. Well Carthage was not. Eventually this tipped the scales in their favor in such a way that there simply was

no coming back for Carthage. But I guess it's important to note that throughout the First Punic War, and maybe this explains why there's a second Punic War, Carthage never really loses a decisive battle on land. They're going on sea, but not in land. There was much more war of attrition. In two fifty six PCE, the Romans launched a full scale invasion of North Africa. This was as a result of the massive naval victory at Econdomus, which

I will discuss in a minute. The hero of the day was the Roman counsul Marcus Attilius Regolous. Many myths came to be surrounding Regulus And, as was all other important figures of the First Punic War, including Hero the Tyrant of Syracuse and hamilcar Barka. It is now impossible to know what sort of a man he was. He was clearly an able commander, and if he was perhaps over regressive, this was a common trait in Roman commanders and not

considered a vice. One tradition claimed that Regulus and was impoverished by senatorial standards, and it was only reluctantly, following an assurance by the Senate that they would provide for his wife and children at statics events, that he accepted the Africa command. However, that this antecdote is highly moralistic and therefore almost certainly a later invention as part of the myth surrounding Regulus. Regulus's army in Africa

consisted of fifteen thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry. It was probably a standard consular army, if maybe an understrength one, since Polybius later mentions a first legion which implies that he had at least two The disproportionately low number of cavalry was, of course results the difficulty of transporting the horses across the sea from Italy. Now, once Carthage realized it could not prevent Regulus from landing nearby

Cape Bam, it immediately looked to its own defenses. Two generals were elected, and a third, Hamil Carbarka, was recalled from Sicily, with five thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry together. We're not sure how large Carthage's army was, but no source indicates a disproportionate advantage on either side, so it

was probably about as big as Rome's army. While the Carthaginians were not about to risk a pitched battle, if they lost, then Carthage would be totally undefended, they did their best to shadow the Roman force so it could not pillage with impunity. However, the Romans believed they had the advantage, so in a somewhat surprising move, they immediately advanced on the Carthaginian camp, though

Carthage held the high ground. We should remember here that the goal was probably to put enough pressure on Carthage to force a surrender on terms favorable to Rome. It was not to conquer North Africa, not yet at least. Olybius tells us that the Romans attacked the Hilltop camp at dawn, but another historian says the assault occurred at night, although his claim that many Carthaginians were killed

in their beds seems unlikely. It is possible that a nighttime approach march was followed by a dawn attack, for it seems that the Carthaginians did not have a significant enough warning to deplore more than a part of their army. Two Roman columns assaulted from opposite sides of the camp. A group of mercenaries did manage to form up and drive back the first legion in considerable disorder, but then it pursued too rashly. They were attacked from the rear by the other

Roman force and themselves routed. Their defeats seemed to have marked the end of an effective resistance, and the rest of the army abandoned the camp in a panicked flight, although the cavalry at Elephants escaped with few casualties once they reached the level ground. The bold attack had been an outstanding success, but the

repulse of the first legion emphasized the risks involved. The twin attack does not appear to have occurred simultaneously, perhaps as a result of the nighttime approach March, although in the event that this resulted in the fortuitous appearance of the second Roman force in the mercenaries rear. Had the Romans been detected during their approach, they risked having to fight a deployed Carthaginian army attacking down from high ground.

However, it is worth noting once again that a recently created Carthaginians force failed to coordinate its different elements effectively, and successful Mercenary counterattack was never supported. The Romans followed up their success by taking Tunis, using it as a base to mount raids in the area around Carthage itself. Carthaginians at this point

were depressed. In the last year, their proud navy, which had put to sea with more ships than ever before, had been decisively defeated at Econmus, and now their army tasked with defending the capitol itself had been beaten with eats by Regulus. At the same time, they were involved in bitter fighting with the Numidian kingdoms resulting from attempts to expand Carthaginian territory in Africa, a

policy which had been pursued alongside the struggle with Rome. Refugees from areas raided by the Numidians as well as the Romans flooded into Carthage itself, spreading panic and creating some food shortages. According to Polybius, it was at this point that Regulus guess that the enemy might be willing to negotiate to end the war, and sent peace envoys, which were welcomed at first by the Carthaginians.

He was said to be nervous that his first year of office had nearly expired, and that he might not have finished the war before a successor arrived to gain an easy victory. Similar motivation clearly did influence the behavior of the other Roman magistrates. All our other sources agree that it was the Carthaginians who actually began the negotiations after their recent defeats. Only Dio of all of our historians claims to preserve the details of the terms dictated by regulars, but their absence

from all earlier sources can only make their authenticity unlikely to dubious. For what they're worth, these were that the Carthaginians should give up both Sicily and Sardinia, release all Roman prisoners freely, while ransoming their own pay. The Romans and indemnity and amual tribute, only make war and peace on the approval of Rome, and only retain one warship for their own use, but to provide fifty to serve under the Romans whenever they requested. In several respects, notably

the inclusion of Sardinia. These terms are harsher than the treaty, which actually does conclude the war into forty one BCE. Whatever the precise details, it is clear that Regulus sought to impose a treaty which forced the Carthaginians to admit defeat of his total defeat their war with Rome. All our sources state that the Carthaginians felt the terms were far harsher than their actual fortunes in the war. Despite its recent setbacks, the cities was by no means out of resources.

Faced with a Roman refusal to grant any concession, the talks failed. During the winter of two fifty five, the Carthaginians reformed their army. According to our sources, most of the actual reforming was done by a Spartan mercenary

named Xanthipius. To an extent, this is probably our sources waxing romantically about the glorious Spartan military prowess of old, but Xanthipius was critical of Carthage's prior decision to fight the Romans on unfavorable ground where their cavalry and elephants could not be brought to bear. Regardless, Carthaginian morale improved, and by spring Carthage had assembled a new army of twelve thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry, and

one hundred elephants, all prepared to fight using Spartan techniques. The scene was now set for the only true land battle of the First Punic War that resembles anything like those of the second. This is referred to in our sources as the Battle of Tunis, though no one knows exactly where it was really fought. The Romans eagerly accepted Carthage's offer of battle because they wanted to inflict the

decisive crushing blow. Xanthipius is credited for the Carthaginian battle formation, which placed the citizen failings in the center, with mercenaries on the right, and left the cavalry on the wings and the elephants out in front of the inventory in a single line. We're told that Regulus lined up the legions in deeper maniples

than usual. What this means remains a matter of conjecture, but the most likely interpretation is that the Romans still lined up in the triple axis, but that each line was a little deeper, not that they abandoned or substantially modified their usual battle formation. The Romans consequently wouldn't actually abandon the triple axis until the first century BCE. The main advantage of deeper lines was that it would make it harder for panicking men to turn and run at the side of the

elephants. But because the lines were deeper, they couldn't be as long, leaving both flanks vulnerable and possibly enveloped. After a delay of the type that's so common before these sorts of pitch battles, Xanphipius ordered the Elephants to attack, and the Romans move forward to meet them, raising a battle cry and rhythmically their weapons against their shields in what Polybius describes as their usual custom. The Roman cavalry, facing odds of at least four to one, were almost

immediately routed. The two thousand men on the left flank of the Roman infantry line, who normally would have been allied troops actually achieved considerable success. Eager to avoid the elephants and contemptuous of the mercenaries again we're quoting Polybyas here, who had been defeated in the previous battle, they just charged the units on the enemy right flank, routed them immediately and chased them back to their camp.

Elsewhere. The Roman infantry didn't do quite as well. They reeled under the onslaught of a mass of elephants and took heavy casualties, though to be fair, the depth of their formation prevented them from breaking. A few manipoles and small groups fought their way past the animals, and, after reforming, moved against the Carthaginian failings. Low were now gone and greatly outnumbered. However, they were easily defeated. In the meantime, the Carthaginian cavalry had swept

in against the flanks of the Roman infantry. Their attacks robbed the Roman formation of what forward impetisit had left, as flanking manipolds had to turn to face the new threat. Struck by missiles from cavalry or trampled by the elephants, the Romans were destroyed. Whether they stood their ground or turned to flee Regulus,

and five hundred men initially made their escape but were quickly captured. Only the two thousand men who had broken through the mercenaries were able to retire in decent order, eventually making their way back to Aspes, which, with the troops left there, they successfully defended until evacuation by a Roman fleet later that

year. This was the only substantial portion of the Roman army to escape, though Polybias records losses of eight hundred men amongst the routed mercenaries, but it doesn't give us a figure for the casual he suffered by the rest of the army. This was the most striking success achieved by Elephants throughout the course of the Punic Wars, and had a great moral effect on the Roman armies in Sicily, who for the next few years didn't dare to try to contest control

of open ground with the Carthaginians for fear of being attacked by elephants. However, it's important to note that the victory had not been achieved by the elephants alone, and it owed a great deal of successful cavalry actions which had allowed the envelopment of the Roman infantry, which is kind of what I warned was

the problem with the Roman formation in the first place. If Regulus's plan had been to use his superior infantry to break the enemy's main line before the numerically superior cavalry could come into play, it had simply failed, and in part it had failed, probably because of the elephants at Trivia in two eighteen a future battle, a substantial part of another Roman army, which had been defeated

on both wings, was able to burst through the Carthaginian line. In his Sisape, however, Regulus's army was about one third the size of that later force, which made it much easier for the Punic cavalry to envelop the infantry center, even more so as its deeper formation could only have reduced the front of the lines. Xanthipius, interestingly enough, departed after his success, aware and this is according to Polybius, of the jealousy of the Carthaginian nobility,

and subsequently he actually served under the ptolemise in Egypt. Later, there was this deeply romantic tradition that developed around Regulus, claiming that the Carthaginians sent him as an ambassa to Rome to negotiate for the ransom of Roman prisoners, but he, again this is romantic and famous, advised the Roman senate against making

the agreement bound an oath to return to Carthage. Regulus nobly kept his faith and refused to stay in Rome in spite of the fact that he knew that if he went back he would suffer a cruel death by and guess what he did. One source says that his eyelids were first cut off, and then he was finally trampled to death by an enraged elephant. Another tradition told how his wife was given two eminent Carthaginian captives, and, in vengeance for her

husband, had them brutally maltreated until one died. Sometimes scholars have been tempted to accept this part of the account and claim that the Regulus story was invented to excuse his family's cruelty, but it's probably safer for us to honestly just reject the whole thing, especially because absolutely none of this is mentioned by Polybius. The African campaign was one of the most dramatic events of the First Punic

War. It ultimately revived Carthage's confidence. Rome made no further attempts to invade after Regulus's defeat. The question has actually been ever since, why did the Romans invade North Africa in the first place. The most logical response is that to put pressure on the Carthaginians to force the city's ultimate captitulation. But I think there's another reason here. Opportunity. Regulars had the opportunity, and aggressiveness

was what Roman commanders were supposed to be. Some later writers blamed Regulars for trying to get treaty terms that were too harsh after his first victory, but it's difficult to imagine another Roman general doing anything else. Rome always fought until its enemy admitted total defeat and a subservient status. Carthage fought wars like they were part of a business strategy. Rome fought to the death to a large extent, it explains why they won. By the late two fifties, Carthage's

Sicilian possessions were reduced to the northwest corner of the island. When Penorius fell, one of the few large cities still loyal to Carthage, it seemed like Carthage's time on the island was over. In late two point fifty, a Roman army routed at Carthaginian one at Lillibaum, which had fallen to the Romans

years earlier and had subsequently traded hands quite a few times. Essentially, in this case, the Carthaginian commander allowed himself to be drawn closer and closer to the walls until the Roman reinforcements poured forth from the gate and destroyed their opponent. According to our sources, Carthage suffered between twenty to thirty thousand men lost, but this is clearly a gross exaggeration. Regardless, this was one of

the last masked land actions of the war. The last few years of the conflict only saw various blockades and siege actions as the Romans painstakingly took city after city. It is in the last years of the war in Sicily that the most famous of all Carthaginian generals of the conflict appeared on the scene, hamilcar Barkup. His name was a suitably dramatic one, derived from the Semitic word

for lightning, or perhaps sword, like the flashing of a sword. But his greatest achievements were to come after the war with Rome, and it's doubtful whether or not he would have gotten as much tension as he has in history. Were he not the father of Hannibal and this time yes, I'm talking about the Hannibal. Nevertheless, Bolibius considered him the ablest commander on either side throughout the First conflict. By the time that he landed in Sicily in two

forty seven, the Carthaginians had been hemmed into a small enclave. He established himself on a hill called Herkit, not far from Honorius, a secure base with command of a good anchorage. For three years, he skirmished with the Roman forces near the city, winning minor victories but not achieving anything in the long term. Then in two forty four he withdrew at night and sailed to Ierks near Dapana. The Romans had captured the abandoned town in two forty eight,

installing a garrison there on the mountain summit. Hamilcar captured the town in a surprise attack, cutting off the force on the summit, which was occupying the Temple of Venus, from the main Roman forces at the foot of the mountain. He managed to maintain this position and besiege the force for the remaining years of the war, again winning minor successes in the frequent raiding and skirmishing that was pursued by both sides. Hamilcar didn't have the resources, though,

to do anything. More. Certainly, he could not face the Romans in an open pitched battle. We do not know this for certain, but historians now believe that it's highly likely that Carthage was dealing with internal revolts back in North Africa and could no longer afford to devote the men or money, really money, to what looked like a losing cause in Sicily. Again, for Carthage, the war was really a business decision regardless. The land action in

the First Punic War was all practical purposes irrelevant. The First Punic War, as we will turn to now, was decided at sea. The First Punic War was the greatest naval conflict of antiquity. The resources both sides lavished on their fleets were truly enormous, and their losses in men and material staggering. If our sources are correct, then the Battle of Encomis in two fifty six

may have involved more people than any other sea battle in history. Sea battles were more common than major land actions during the war and ultimately proved decisive. Bolibyas marveled at the scale of the Naval War, but even more at the speed with which the Romans, who he claims had never before built a warship, adapted to the sea, and created a navy able to defeat Carthage with

its long maritime tradition. The early years of the naval conflict witnessed a spectacular, almost unbroken string of Roman successes over an enemy whose ships were better constructed and whose crews far more skillful. When the war ended in two forty one, Rome will have replaced Carthage as the unchallenged sea power in the Western Mediterranean.

The navies created during the war made possible all the later victories over Carthage again in the second Third Punic Wars, and then in the Eastern Mediterranean against of various Hellenistic kingdoms. Polybius's assertion that the Romans had no experience at all at sea prior to the First Punic War is hyperbole, but not by much.

The Romans had not needed sea power to conquer Italy. Only in three eleven had the Romans created two posts responsible for the construction and maintenance of warships. Even in the early third century, Rome continued to rely upon its Italian allies for its fleet. Indeed, in the early stages of the First Punic War, it was Allied ships, not Roman ships per se, that transported

the legions to Sicily and provided naval support. Bolybyus was not wrong in his assertion that, however small it was, the Roman navy truly developed in the First Punic War. Regardless, So in two sixty one BCE, the Roman Senate voted to construct a fleet of one hundred quin quareems and twenty triremes capable of directly confronting the Carthaginians. It's very possible that this vote mirrored a change in war aims resulting from the fall of Agrigentum, but we can't be certain

of that. There is one record of a council arguing for the construction of a fleet as early as two sixty three. Either way. Honestly, given the reality that Sicily was and still is an ireland, I cannot see how the Romans ever thought that they would be able to claim it using land power alone. Hence, whenever the idea came about with the construction of a fleet, it was an inevitability. If the Romans truly wanted to win the war.

Now recounting just how naval combat functioned in the ancient and classical world, it's extremely difficult. In general, the ancient sources are far less informative about operations in sea than they are on land. The problem is made worse by the essentially alien nature of or warships. To the modern age, maritime archaeology has started to provide some information, although RECs of warships rather than merchantmen are

exceptionally uncommon, and much less has been learned by reconstruction. Therefore, nevertheless, there are numerous gaps in our understanding of the construction and maintenance of classical galleys, which is what we imagine when we imagine classical maritime warfare, and

especially of the strategic and tactical uses of these fleets. An indication of all of this is our uncertainty as the precise design of what was the standard warship of the Punic wars the Quinquerim, the great naval battles of the fifth century, when the Greeks had defeated the Persian invaders and Athens and Sparta had vied for dominance, were fought in one by trirems. The evidence for this type of ship is actually pretty good, much of it coming from the literature of

classical Athens and excavations of shipyards in the Piraeus Harbor. The full scale reconstruction of an Athenian Triyrem in the nineteen eighties and its extensive sea trials vastly increased our knowledge. The Trirem, or three as I'm going to call it, derived its name from the basic growing group of three men. Each man sat on a different level and operated an or of about fourteen feet or so in length, those of the upper row projecting from an outrigger. Considerable skill was

required in each oarsman for the successful functioning of the ship. It was long and sleek. In fact, the Athenian Triyrem was about one hundred and twenty feet in length, but just under twenty feet across its widest. It carried a crew of about two hundred, around thirty of who were deck crew officers and marines, and the remainder of which were all rowers, so about one

hundred and seventy rowers. In trials, the reconstructed version reached speeds of eight knots and could maintain a steady four knots for hours on end, with half the rowers resting in any one given time, turns through one hundred and eighty degrees were completed in a distance equivalent to two and a half shipped lengths. These speeds were achieved despite the comparative inexperience of the modern crew and their use of ores, which were probably heavier than the originals. Under sail, the

Trirem was able to achieve eight knots in a favorable breeze. All in all, the performance of the reconstructed Trirem was remarkably good and challenged many past assumptions about ancient naval warfare. In the fourth century, several Hellenistic states began to construct larger warships than the Trirem. The Carthaginians were the first to build fours or quadririms, while Dionysus, the first the tyrant of Syracuse in the early

fourth century, was responsible for the design of the five. This is called the panius in Greek or the quininquirm in Latin. The kingdoms which emerged in the Hellenistic world in the late fourth century were able to lavish huge resources on the construction of their fleets. Some of the largest ships were built by the Tallamac Kingdom of Egypt, including according to legend, such massive ships as Ptolomae the seconds, thirties and forties, but there's no record of anything actually larger

than a ten seeing real combat. The realization that although the Trirem had three banks of ores, its name derived in fact from the number of each team of rowers, goes a long way towards understanding the design of these ships. Clearly, galleys with four or five banks of oars would have been incredibly impractical, and ones with ten or more impossible. In fact, there's no evidence for any warship in the classical world ever, having more than three banks of

ores. Therefore fours and larger ships like quein Kareems fives who might call them, at least some of these ores had to have been operated by more than one rower. The quin Kaream had a basic team of five rowers, but how are they arranged? Did it have one level of ores rowed by five men each two levels, one road by three, one road by two, or three levels with two ores operated by a pair of rowers and one by

a single man. There were navies of the Mediterranean powers in the late Middle Ages, including many galleys, and all of these had a single bank of ores, regardless as to how many rowers operated each one. Two men can sit side by side and they can operate an or effectively. But if there are more than two rowers per ore, that's necessary for them to rise to their feet and dip the blade and then hurl themselves back to the bench when

they deliver the stroke. Now, this was the method that was employed in the Middle Ages. It must also have been used in some of the larger galleys in the classical world of necessity. This design required a somewhat broader and heavier hull to accommodate the rowers, which probably made them slower and less maneuverable

than the sleeker types like trireams. There has been a suggestion by different historians that this system of having multiple rowers per or was actually more effective, and the reason is is because you actually only need one skilled rower as long as the other two could just simply follow the instructions of that man, then you

don't need quite as many. And this was the basis on which historians have assumed that Carthage came into the conflict with the superior navy now that they had tens of thousands of expertly skilled rowers, but that they may have had ten thousand that were then spread out across all the various ships at different points. This might explain why the Punic ships were individually faster and more maneuverable than their

Roman counterparts. However, Polybius tells us explicitly that the Roman ships were copied from a captured design of a Carthaginian five, and there seems no good reason to reject this evidence. The superior performance of the Carthaginian ships for most of the war was a reflection of their more highly trained crews and at the very beginning, better construction, not from a fundamentally different design. On the whole. It's more likely that the queen quareams of this period had more than one

bank of ores. Two levels of ores with three and two rowers respectively would have meant an uneasy combination of two different designs, and it's more probable that the quin kerriam had three levels, the lowest with a single rower and the others with a pair. This would make the quinquerream a more logical development from the Trirem. Directly, levels of ores in a trirem were mounted in an

outrigger and this has sometimes been perceived as a weakness. Even if that's true, it would have remained a failing in similarly designed fives, and it's distinctly possible that the quin quareems of the Punic Wars were constructed differently. There were two main tactical options open to ancient galleys, ramming and boarding. Given the limitations of technology at the time, there simply was no amount of projectiles that

could be launched by any one ship to incapacitate another. Missiles were useful to clear an enemy deck before boarding, but any decisive result, just like on land, required two opposing ships to close with one another and fight it out. Ram started out as pointed, but even by the fifth century they've been refashioned into blunt objects. Why well, a pointed ram just ran too much of a risk of being stuck to the end enemy hull. This is why

rams were built onto but were never part of the ship's keel. Likewise, ships never tried to ram each other head on. That is to say, you would never aim for the bow of an opposing ship. That was the strongest part of both ships and would almost certainly result in major damage to both should it have been attempted. Instead, any decent captain would try to ram a ship's side. Ideally you would actually strike the side at an angle,

puncturing not just one hole, but a series of holes. In reality, what this meant was that ancient naval warfare devolved into a series of one on one duels, much like aerial combat during the First World War. There were some larger strategies, likely employed by squadrons of ships, but it's highly unlikely whole naval squadrons worked in tandem somehow, and certainly not an entire navy. That's just not possible given the limitations of communication. Such seems just unbelievable.

Now, the likely are scenario wasn't ramming, it was boarding. This is for a few reasons. Ramming requires a lot of technical skill, and not just for the commander either. All the rowers needed to be highly trained and needed to spend hundreds of hours learning how to row together. This worked in a state like classical Athens, which had manpower, resources and a willingness to devote the time to developing these skills, but Rome needed to fill the legions,

not the rowers benches. Boarding, on the other hand, required a lot less skill. You just had to get osen off to grapple the enemy's ship, and then it basically turned into a land battle on the water. That was what the Romans wanted to do, and by and large it was what all Hellenistic kingdoms sought to do as well. It's worth remembering that all of these vessels were powered by oarsmen, thus their crews were huge by comparison,

of course, to later sailing ships. As a result, it was both only common to take on marines directly before a major combat, and also impossible for these sheeps to spend long periods of time on the water since they couldn't carry many supplies. The majority of the ships that the Romans constructed for the First Punic War were fives so Quentin Quarnes with five rows for oarsmen. Bolivias tells us that the designs for these ships were modeled on a Carthaginian craft

that ran aground during the initial phase of the conflict. I mentioned that two episodes ago. Actually, whether it's completely true or not as pure speculation, but it is interesting to think that an incident of pure happenstance might have altered the course of history. Certainly, Southern Italian Roman allies have been making fives

for decades. However, it has long been thought that this particular design for a five was different, specifically Carthaginian design, that it was superior to at least have been or thought to have been superior to anything else presently in construction. Regardless, what we do know that the Romans used the same template for all the fives they constructed throughout the wars. We know this because the remains of these ships have markers still present on the beams showing the workmen where and

how to cut them. This allowed the Romans to fit together multiple beams using joints which were much longer than the natural wood. Using a template for consistent designs is something that had hitherto been thought impossible before the Industrial Revolution. As with many things, the Romans were a bit head of the curve. These huge ships took not only massive crews of workmen to build, but also would have required in total thirty thousand rowers if we multiplied out for all the ships.

Certainly some of these would have been provided by Roman allies. However, I think it's certain, despite Roman attitudes at the time toward naval warfare, that a good number of these oarsmen were the urban poor from Rome itself. These men would not have met the property qualifications for service in the legions. Now. One of the earliest engagements of the naval war in the First Punic War was a painful setback for Rome. One of the two Roman consuls for

two sixty BCE Nya. Scipio, received word that Lepara, a crucial town not far from Masana, wanted to defect the Roman side. Scipio believed them and took seventeen ships and occupied the harbor. What happened next is still a matter of debate whether this was all a ruse. From the beginning were not sure, but regardless, Hannibal sent twenty ships of his and blockaded the Romans in Their crews panicked and quickly surrendered, and Scipio found himself in captivity.

Don't worry too much about him, though. He won the consulship again into fifty four. But soon after this success, Hannibal managed to stumble upon a major Roman fleet while his fleet was scattered and unprepared. Our reports for this are murky, but he seems to have lost at least twenty five ships as a result. What these two events highlight is just how difficult it was to maneuver a large fleet in the classical world when no one really knew where the

enemy was. The Romans remained eager for a major confrontation. However, their desire for such was only heightened when probably one of their best commanders of the entire First Punic War arrived, Caius Julius. The Romans realized that their ships

were neither as fast nor as maneuverable as their Punic counterparts. They'd copied the methods of their construction, but as of yet they couldn't implicate the skill of the Carthaginian shipwrights, and even more importantly, Roman crews were far inferior. It was clear that they could anticipate little success if they relied on ramming to defeat the enemy, and that therefore they have to depend on getting close to

boarding. To this, someone put forward the idea of a new type of boarding bridge, known to modern historians by the Latin word corvus, which means raven, although no ancient author employs the term, and Polybiates uses the equivalent

Greek word korvacs. The name of its inventor has not been recorded, so some have suggested that the man was a Sicilian Greek, a foreigner with whom the Romans had no wish to share the glory of the subsequent success the corvus brought, or even that the inventor may have been the young Archimedes, but

of course this is just conjecture. Later sources view the corvus as some sort of grapnel, which encouraged historians to doubt Polybius's description, but the reliability of his account was finally confirmed when later on a constructed, viable, working model of the engine was made in the early twentieth century. The corvas was a boarding bridge. It was four feet wide and thirty six feet long, with

a knee high parapet on either side. The last third of its length formed the two prongs, separated by a long groove slotted around a twenty foot four high pole erected on the deck of the ship. Pullies allowed the bridge to be raised at any angle against the pole. Underneath the raised end of the bridge was a heavy pointed spike resembling a bird's beak, from which the device probably got its name. When released, the corvs fell onto the deck of

an enemy ship. The spike embedded itself into the planking. The groove allowed the bridge to be swung around in a wide arc to fall ahead or on either side of the ship's bow, depending on the direction of the approaching enemy. Once the bridge was securely fixed in the other vessel, the Roman marines

could swarm across and overwhelm the enemy crew with their skill as swordsmen. It was a simple practical device allowing the Romans to extend their advantages in land fighting to naval battles, and it enjoyed spectacular success during its relatively brief career. Soon after his arrival with the fleet, Dulius received a report that the Carthaginian fleet had been raided around an area called Malai, a city situated on a

peninsula on the northern coast of Sicily. The entire Roman fleet put to sea and moved around the coast towards Malai, and soon as this was reported to Hannibal, he prepared his fleet to meet them. Polybius tells us that the Carthaginians mustered one hundred and thirty ships, which seems more likely than Deodorus's figure of two hundred. Hannibal himself led the action from a Heptaris or seven, which might have actually been captured from Peris way back in two seventy six.

The Romans had what was left of their original one hundred and twenty ships, minus the seventeen that were lost with a Scipio plus. However, many Punic ships were captured in the earlier engagement, they had been able to salvage and man, as well as any other vessels provided by their naval allies. The bulk of ships on both sides were presumably quin Querim's fives, and it's improbable

that either fleet was markedly bigger than the other. Polybius tells us that the Carthaginians were confused by the strange appearance of the tall corvas near the prow of each Roman ship, but remained supremely confident of their own superiority over their inexperienced enemy. It was extremely difficult for the commander of an ancient fleet to exercise much control over his squadrons during a battle, but Hannibal appears to have allowed

his fleet to just get out of hand. Out the gate, Punic ships surged toward the enemy, with the Great Seven in the front. Some of the Roman ships were rammed, but each was able to drop its corvs, whose beakspeared through the deck of the enemy vessel and held them tight. Thirty Punic warships, all those who had first engaged, were grappled and held fast.

Amongst them was Hannibal's flagship, attacked by a trirene according to his Zenorius, although he tends to use that word as a generic term for a warship, and was more likely that the ship was a Roman five, since the difference in height between a seven and five would have been just unbelievable. In each case, the Roman marines poured across the boarding bridges and swiftly defeated the enemy crews. Hannibal abandoned his flagship and escaped in a small rowing boat.

The remainder of the Carthaginian fleet then took advantage of the superior speed of their vessels and swung around outflanking the Roman line and attacking it from a stern, hoping in this way to avoid the corvas. Somehow, we don't know how the Romans were able to maneuver to meet this new onslaught, and once again any Punic ship which came within the range was pinned and held tight by the corvas. Polybius describes how boarding bridges quote swung around and plunged down in all

directtions end quote, but were not clear what he means by this. A corvus mounted near the prow of a ship would have been able to be dropped ahead and for a short distance to the port of starboard, but clearly it could not have reached the stern. Evidently, a Roman ship, seeing an enemy vessel approaching, would have tried to turn to bring the enemy within the

arc. Many historians have suggested that the Roman ships may have been formed into two lines, and that it was the second line which turned to face the second Punic attack, But while this is certainly plausible, our sources are simply too brief for us to be able to confirm or deny it. These with which Carthaginians were able to subsequently disengage and retreat, once again confirm the superior speed of their ships, but they had failed to achieve anything positive Because of

this advantage. It was a spectacular success for the new Roman fleet, owed almost exclusively to the ingenuity of whoever designed to the corvus. According to Polybius, fifty Punic ships were lost, although our later soores give thirty three one captured and thirteen to fourteen sunk figures, which may derive from the inscription that

was later erected by Julius himself in commemoration of his victory. It's called the Kolomna Rustra, although this has survived in fragmentary form, so only the first X of a numeral can be read. The tone of the surviving text is very typical of the Roman aristocracy self promotion, with its emphasis on having been the first Roman to ever defeat a Punic navy, claiming in his land operations,

Julius defeated all the greatest of the Carthaginian forces. This text actually mentions only trirems, and is being reconstructed as also mentioning quinquarems, which might offer additional confirmation for our suspicion that the fleets of this conflict were not exclusively quinqueramines or fives. The new Man Julius celebrated Rome's first naval triumph ever, decorating the speaker's platform in the Forum with the prows or raw ustra cut off from

captured ships from which the speaker's platform would later derive its name. When Dulius went out to dine at Rome, he was accompanied to and from his host's house by a procession of musicians. But interestingly enough, in spite of all these great honors, he never went on to accomplish much more later in his career. Now, Hannibal survived the disastrous defeat, but not for long.

He was put to death by his own officers not long afterwards. There were no other major sea confrontations until two fifty seven, when the Roman consul Caius Regulus managed to inflict a relatively significant defeat on the main fleet, capturing ten ships and sinking eight. The main Punic force, however, withdrew not interested in fighting a full scale battle at that point. In two fifty six, the Romans made their bold but characteristic decision to escalate the conflict by mounting the

invasion of North Africa I talked about before. To accomplish this, they amassed an enormous fleet of hundred and thirty vessels, which moved along the Italian coast and crossed to Messana before sailing south along the Sicilian shore, pasted Syracuse and then linking up with the main army. The pick of the Roman infantry were taken on board to serve as marines and provide an invasion force, so that now each queen quareim had a complement of around one hundred and twenty marines.

Polybius claimed that the combined total of the cruise at marines and the Roman fleet was around one hundred and forty thousand men. The Carthaginians had managed to put together a grand total of three hundred and fifty ships, which sailed from Africa

to Lillibayum before moving around to the southern coast of Sicily. Polybius gives us their strength in men is more than one hundred and fifty thousand, presumably calculated on the assumption that their crews were roughly the same size as those of the Romans. Certainly, most modern historians believe that Plybeus's numbers are inflated, but it's impossible to say by how much. So. For the purposes of the Battle of Encomness, the only major battle of the war, frankly, I'm

going to assume the numbers are roughly accurate. Essentially, the Roman fleet set sail with two intentions. Either there would be a major engagement or they would continue on to North Africa, but it seems that the Carthaginians had resolved that a battle off the coast of Sicily offered them the best chance of protecting their capital city. Such was the importance of this venture that both of that year's

consuls Lucius Manlius Vulso and Marcus Attilis Rigolus, were present. They divided the fleet into four divisions, numbered one to four and labeled as either squadrons or legions. This was simply a nickname and bore no relation to their actual size, and it seems that the four divisions were not equal in numbers. The first two groups were led by the consuls themselves, who's two two sixes headed

the Roman formation. The other ships from these squadrons took station from the flagships in line echelon back to either side, so that each ship's prow lay behind and to the side of the ship in front. So imagine now in effect, these squadrons formed the tip of a triangle. The base was then composed of the third squadron, which was arrayed in a line of breast, each

ship towing one of the horse transports. The fourth squadron was behind this group and probably more numerous than the third because its ships overlapped its line on either flank, protecting the rear of the formation and acting as the ultimate reserve. This fourth squadron was also nicknamed the Triari. The Roman formation was praised by Polybius for its practicality, being relatively dense and keeping the fleet together, but

also permitting it to turn and face a threat from direction. It was a sign of the improved quality of Roman crews and the greater experience of their commanders that they were able to adopt such a plan, and there's no good reason to doubt Polybius's account or assume that he had misunderstood but was no more than

an accidental formation. Macarthaginians made some changes to their deployment once the Roman fleet came into view, having apparently advanced in a normal battle formation in simple line abreast, the Carthaginian line was formed with the coast of Sicily to its left. The left wing, one quarter of the fleet ships reached forward towards the shore. Angled away from this was the remainder of the fleet to the extreme right, which was commanded by Hanno. He's the same general who had failed

to relieve Argagentum back in two sixty one. This was made up as the fastest ships and extended beyond the flank of the Roman formation. The center was led by the overall commander in Sicily, Hamilcar, who had instructed the captains of his division to begin by withdrawing in the face of a Roman attack. Hamil Carr's plan appears to have been to break up the compact Roman formation so that his divisions on the right and left could sweep in and attack the enemy

from the flank or, best case scenario, the rear. This would produce a series of smaller encounters between parts of each fleet, in which the Carthaginians might hope to exploit their skill in ramming tactics and avoid frontal attacks on the corvus equipped Roman ships. Some historians have made efforts to suggest a far more complicated Carthaginian battle plan, but to be honest with you, those are speculative

and not convincing. The battle began just as Hamilcar had hoped. The Romans saw the large gaps between the Punic ships and the center, and they drove straight at them as instructed. Hamilcar's ships withdrew and the Roman compact formation began to spread out as those ships towing the horse convoys couldn't keep up. When enough of a gap opened up, hamil Kart gave the signal and his ships wheeled around. Both sides engaged, and a series of individual duels developed,

with fierce fighting up and down the lines. Meanwhile, Hanno's right wing was successful in enveloping the third Roman line, which had to cast the horse convoys adrift to effectively take part in the action. Hence, what we have here is actually three separate battles within a battle. You would expect that this would probably favor Carthage, but it didn't. Why well, there's a few reasons. First, the Romans were just much better trained than they had been back

in two sixty. Second, Carthage's own naval expansion watered down the effectiveness of its cruise. Third, and, by far and away, most importantly, at least in my view, Carthage still had no answer for the deadly Corvus. The Romans quickly defeated the Carthaginian center after Hamilcar's ships gave up the fight and fled. This allowed the Roman consuls to wheel back and help the third line. There Carthage had actually been winning, but now the Romans closed on

their rear and effectively sandwiched to the remaining Punic fleet between them. The battle was over. Rome had triumphed. Before this war, no one would have thought it even conceivable that Rome would defeat Carthage in a major naval engagement, and it is a testament to Rome's willingness to adapt and change. In the end, the Romans lost twenty four ships, all sunk. Carthage lost sixty four ships by boarding, plus another thirty that sunk to the bottom of the

sea. A total disaster. It was the largest clash of the war and might even still to this day have been the largest naval battle in history in terms of the number of people who took part, which is saying something. Afterwards, the Carthaginian fleets retreated in three different directions. The Romans returned to Sicily and made repairs before continuing their voyage to North Africa, the result of which I discussed earlier. In two fifty five, after Regulus was finally beaten

in North Africa, two new Roman consuls sailed to North Africa. There they gathered the survivors and even defeated another Punic fleet on their way, but their success was short lived. A massive storm struck the fleet as it made its way back to Sicily. According to Polybius, all but sixty ships were lost. If this is true, that Rome might have suffered a loss ratio in this storm of nearly eighty nine percent. We have no idea if these numbers

were one hundred percent accurate, but clearly it's a huge loss. Some scholars have argued that the corvus actually made the galley more susceptible to sinking in a storm. That's saying something. Galleys are already really susceptible to sinking in the storm because they just kind of ride so low on the water. Modern recreations suggest that this was highly likely, though how much of a role that played

in the catastrophe is hard to say. The following year two fifty four, two hundred and twenty ships new ships were built and floated in just three months, an incredible achievement which shows just how Rome didn't so much always win in combat. Is it just simply refused to lose. It was this fleet in two point fifty that then blockaded and took enormous perhaps the last major Carthaginian city on Sicily, so from this point forwarding the First Punic War, most of

the engagements are quite minor. Rome continued to raid the North African coast, but in two fifty three it lost another one hundred and fifty ships in a storm, suggesting that Carthage would have been better off never engage at the Romans and just letting the sea do its work for it. In two forty nine, one of the two consuls for the year, Publius Claudius Polkar, decided to launch a surprise attack on the last Punic naval depot on Sicily, Japana.

It was an audacious move, but Claudius was an audacious man. This is the man who, famously, when told that the auspicious signs for a battle were poor because the sacred chickens wouldn't eat, grabbed them and hurled them overboard, proclaiming that if they would not eat, then he would let them drink. However, despite his reputation for arrogance, Claudius's initial preparations were careful

enough. He put to sea at night to avoid being spotted, and news of his departure being carried by land to Jirpana and sailed along the coast. However, and in the darkness, it was difficult for the Romans ships to remain in a close formation, especially since they were crewed by a mixture of

experienced rowers and brand new draftees. The route was simple to follow since it hugged the coast, but throughout the night the Roman fleet straggled, and by the morning it was a long, scattered line as it approached the enemy base. Claudius's flagship was somewhere, not sure where, near the rear the Romans were spotted and word brought to ad Herbal actually someone not named Hannibal or Hamilcar, the Punic admiral, who then took the bold decision to put to sea

and confront the enemy. He didn't want to permit himself to be plockaded into the harbor. He gathered his crews and collected large numbers of mercenaries to act as marines. It now became a matter of time as to whether or not the Carthaginian fleet would escape from the harbor and gain the sea room before the Roman ships were able to block the entrance. The disordered and scattered formation of the Roman fleet and the poorer quality of their crews proved decisive, but honestly

only in the narrowest of margins. The entrance to the harbor at Tripana was wide, and as the first Roman ships were entering its southernmost edge, o her Ball's flagship was rowing out past the long spit of land which formed the northern edge. He signaled the rest of the fleet to follow him. So the Carthaginian ships proceeded in line astern, rounded the two small islands opposite the harbor mouth, and then turned southward parallel to the coast, but further out

to the sea than the Roman fleet. Claudius knew he had just missed his chance and sought to signal to bring some sort of order to his fleet, which was now spread over a wide area. Dreadful confusion resulted as the ships which had entered the harbor tried to turn around and escaped back into the open sea. Some ships collided and ships had oars sheared off by friendly vessels.

Eventually, the Romans managed to form a rough line of ships close in the shore, with their rams facing out to the sea, the flagship now being on the extreme left of the Roman line. In the meantime, odd Herball had outflanked the left of the Roman line with five ships, angled forward and placed his own ship facing the Roman line. As the rest of the fleet came up, he ordered them to form a line on his vessel, subordinate

officers regulating the deployment, presumably in smaller boats. After this delay, the two fleets formed up, ad her Ball signaled his ships to attack. It would prove the only significant defeat suffered by the Roman navy throughout the war. Ninety three Roman ships were captured in the disaster. Many more were sunk. This was the only time when Carthage was able to use its skill advantage to bring about a decisive victory. The Romans were evidently no longer using the corvus,

which had protected them from ramming Claus. With their sterens firmly to the coast, the Romans just simply had no room to maneuver. Had the battle been fought on the open sea, things might have been different, but Claudius had gotten himself into a really difficult situation from which he was at a significant disadvantage. From the word go. Carthage just had much more room to maneuver

than the Roman ships. Did. The next year, Rome lost another one hundred strong fleet to a storm, but this time was different the storm I mean because it came after a defeat, not a victory, so things seemed a lot more serious. Rome could not afford to build yet another fleet and abandoned for the moment the war at sea. Roma had taken a lot of

losses in this war so far. The census in two fifty one showed that there were two hundred and ninety seven thousand, seven hundred and ninety seven registered Roman male citizens, but in two forty seven, four years later, that number had fallen to two hundred thousand, forty one seven to twelve. That's a loss of over fifty thousand men. But once again Rome refused to give

in. In two forty three, the Romans realized that if they were going to win the war, then they had no choice but to build another fleet. This one, however, two hundred quinquoreems strong, would need to be financed by wealthy individuals who would be paid back after the war. The Senate,

you see, was broke. One of the consuls for two forty two, Ulius Posthumus Albinus, held the priest shood known as the Flamen Martalus and was forbidden by religious taboo from leaving the city, so the fleet was entrusted to the command of his colleague Caius Lutellus Catullus, backed by the senior Prietor. The Romans immediately renewed their pressure on the enemy's last major strongholds in Sicily, moving to capture finally the harbor at Drepana, and tried to cut off

Lily Bayham from the sea. Hamilcar Barca, who is now the major commander on Sicily, was now cut off from resupply by the sea. Olybyas tells us explicitly, the main Roman objective in these operations was to provoke a major encounter with the Carthaginian fleet, since they felt its defeat would be a greater blow than any successes might have achieved in Sicily. To this end, Katullus took a lot of care to exercise his ships at sea each day, training

the crews to the highest level efficiency that he could achieve. His sailors were never allowed to waste away in heavy labor, but were kept healthy and provided a good diet of food, and by two forty one the Roman fleet was in superb condition, its crews experienced and skilled, Its ships built to a far better design than in the past. The number of ships constructed in the preceding twenty years and the Roman's practical experience of naval operations only refined the skills

of their ship rights. The Carthaginians were far less well prepared for the upcoming encounter, for they hadn't made little use of their naval superiority, which they achieved after Japana and the Roman losses to weather. The Punic navy had done little in the years since then, and it appears that relatively viewships had actually even been kept in commission. It took them time to muster the crews for the fleet of two hundred and fifty or so ships, which they ultimately gathered

to send to Sicily. For probably the first and maybe only time in the war, the average Carthaginian crew was less well trained than its Roman counterpart. It's also possible that many crews were under strength, although certain tea is impossible. Their objective was twofold. In the first instance, the priority was to load the ships with supplies of grain for Hamilcar's army and the remaining Punic garrisons in Sicily. The Roman pressure on these troops made it difficult for them to

survive by foraging. Once the supplies had been offloaded, the idea was that the fleet would then take on board the pick of Hamilcar's soldiers to serve as marines, and then seek out and destroy the Roman fleet. Command in this operation was given to another guy named Hanno, and we actually don't know. He might have been the same guy who had presided over the defeats at Agrigantum in two sixty one and in Commness in two fifty six, if so,

bad choice. The Carthaginians followed the same route as the fifty ships carrying reinforcements and supplies which Hannibal, son of Hamilcar, had sailed into Libeium in two fifty Crossing to the Agates Islands, which are just to the west of Sicily. They stopped the westernmost of these, which then was known as the Holy Island, and waited for a favorable breeze to carry them all the rest of

the way. The Romans were not aware of their presence yet. However, Katulus received a report of their arrival and immediately took on board extra marines drawn from the army and crossed to another of the islands in this same Agattes group. That next day, this is now the tenth of March two forty one, the wind brew strongly from the west in just the direction that Hanno had hoped for. The Punic ships raised their sails and begun to run in line

to link up with their land forces. Katulus now had a tough choice to make. The heavy swell was really against the Romans. The rowers would have to battle hard against the wind if they were going to move and intercept the Punic fleet. In the past, Roman commanders, who had treated the elements and storms in a cavalier manner, had presided over the largest disaster of the war. However, if Katullus delayed, then he was unlikely to stop the

Carthaginians joining Hamilcar and taking on board large numbers of experienced soldiers. Katulus took the risk and put to sea. This time, though the Punic fleet stood little chance. It was overburdened with grain and had few marines. The Romans crashed straight into them, and by the end of the day the Punic losses were one hundred and twenty ships. Either lost or sunk. The Romans suffered losses as well. Actually, nearly thirty ships sank and another fifty were crippled.

Luckily for Carthage, the wind picked up and allowed the remainder of the fleet to escape, but that counted for very little. The Battle of the Agatees Islands decided the war. Hamilcar Barka was now totally isolated in Sicily. Carthage made no effort to rebuild on other fleet and instead conceded defeat. The resources expended in the naval campaigns in the war had been massive, Bolibya's claiming that the Romans had lost about seven hundred warships and the Carthaginians near five hundred,

although the accuracy of these figures has been doubted. The heaviest Roman losses all occurred in storms, and this ensured that the casualties suffered by the crews were disproportionately high. Many of the crews of the Punic ships were saved, although this sometimes meant going into captivity. It was the victors, ironically who

suffered the greatest losses at sea. Ultimately, the Romans won because of their ruthless determination and the pursuit of victory made them willing to accept its high price in men and ships. The initial decision to create a Roman fleet may have at least been motivated in part by a desire to defend the Roman coast from the Punic navy, but the Romans used their naval power in a consistently aggressive

manner. The support of the navy allowed the Roman landforces in Sicily to press on more successfully with the task of subduing Punic strongholds there, And of course we can never forget the ingenuity of the Corvus, which really swung the naval theater in Rome's direction for those first crucial years when we might have expected the Punic naval tradition to carry the day. Carthage, however, never displayed the

aggressiveness that allowed the Romans to win. They had naval advantages in two sixty four to sixty three and again briefly in two forty one, but they never used them. Punic commanders in Sicily only lost territory, they never even attempted to win any back. The Roman approach to the war was very different from what Carthage had encountered before, and it seemed not to know what to make of it. If you ask me what one Rome the First Punic War came

down to one word attitude. Okay, fine, maybe two words attitude and corvus. After the disastrous defeat at the Agatas Islands, the Carthaginians gave Hamilcar barka full authority to negotiate a peace with Rome. In fact, Hamilcar, eager to disassociate himself from any admission of defeat, acted through one of his

subordinate officers, gus Go, the consul. Catullus's year of office had almost expired, and the desire to gain credit for completing such a major war before his successors arrived to steal the glory may have made him actually a little bit more conciliatory. An initial Roman demand that Hamilcar's Sicilian army should immediately surrender its weapons and hand over for punishment all Roman and Italian deserters was swiftly rejected.

The mercenaries would leave the army with their arms and honor intact. Yet this seems to have been the only concession that the Carthaginians were able to gain, and as we'll find out in a minute, it wasn't much of a concession. In other respects. The peace terms made it clear that they had been defeated and that Rome was not negotiating with an equal Peace was declared between Roman

Carthage, provided that all the following conditions were matt hey. The Carthaginians were to evacuate all of sicily be Neither side was to make war on the other's allies, nor seek to subvert their allegiance by allying with them directly or becoming involved in their internal affairs. They were not to recruit soldiers or raise money for the construction of public buildings in the territory of the other. See. The Carthaginians were to give up all Roman prisoners freely, while paying a ransom

for their own. And finally, deep the Carthaginians were to pay an indemnity to the Roman states of twy two hundred Eubuoyan talents over a twenty year period. Now, Roman council did not have the authority to make a final peace treaty himself. The Roman people had devoted in their centuries to ratify any treaty.

Thus Catullus had to take these terms back to Rome. The Roman people in this case felt that the terms were too lenient The indemnity was therefore increased from two thousand, two hundred to three thousand, two hundred talents, with the one thousand increase payable immediately. The only other change was a minor clause requiring Carthage to evacuate all the small islands between Sicily and Africa. The Romans

had clearly accomplished their war aim. Carthage was completely expelled from Sicily. Moreover, Carthaginian naval power had been broken. Yet for the moment, Carthage had lost no territory in Spain or North Africa, and it even held on to Sardinia for a time. The Romans recognized that Carthage was different from the sam Nights or any other Italian community they had subdued. It couldn't simply annex all of Carthage, not yet at least. The war also brought an administrative change

for Rome, its first province. Historians are not sure exactly when the change happened, but by two twenty seven BCE, Western Sicily got its first Roman governor and became the first Roman province as we understand the term today. With hindsight, it's honestly difficult to pinpoint any point during the war, when the Carthaginians came close to victory, the most serious Roman losses were due to bad

weather and not to enemy action. Perhaps in the earliest phases, if Carthage had been able to prevent the Roman expedition from crossing the Straits of Messina, or had defeated Claudius's army after it landed, then they might have dissuaded the Romans from further adventures in Sicily, or at least in the short term. But that in fact would have been to prevent the crisis from developing into a war in the first place, so that when count is winning the war.

Yet it was extremely difficult for squadrons of galleys to block a stretch of water, and the Punic forces in Sicily in two sixty four were totally inadequate to achieve such a quick victory over a Roman consular army. Apart from the decision to continue the struggle and send a large army to Sicily after Rome's defeat of

Syracuse, the Carthaginian war effort was basically passive. They were always reacting to Roman moves, all intended to protect their existing positions in Sicily, never expand them, even when they sought to harass the enemy by raiding the Italian coast. The main objective was to draw Roman forces away from Sicily on the island

itself. Their strategy followed the traditional Carthaginian pattern of enduring an enemy onslaught and trying to maintain and control over as many strongholds as possible, waiting for the enemy to weakend so that eventually the lost ground could be regained. Carthage had been involved in sporadic conflict in Sicily for centuries before the Romans arrived, and if car Which had never gained full control of the island, neither had Carthage

ever been completely expelled. The Romans were not like Peris, though, who would abandon his offensive when he failed to gain widespread support from the Greek communities of Sicily. Nor was their power as precarious as that of all the tyrants of Syracuse over the years. Roman persistence was at least the equal of Carthages, but it was married to an extremely aggressive mode of war making, applying

continuous pressure on an enemy in an effort to force capitulation. Throughout the conflict, they consistently assumed the offensive methodically expanding their territory which they controlled in Sicily, continuing to do so even when their armies morale reached a low EBB after the defeat of Rigolus. More importantly, they were willing to escalate the conflict in an effort to defeat the enemy invading africast of all, deciding to create

a fleet and pursue the war at sea. In spite of their colossal losses. Rome's huge reserves of manpower made it possible to absorb appalling losses, but this in and of itself doesn't explain the willingness with which the population continued to be ready to serve in the war. Another change in Roman behavior during the war was the election of consuls based on ability and experience rather than pure political connections. After Durpana in two forty nine BCE, there was a market change

and who was elected. In fact, after Dripana, the Romans appointed a military dictator to control the operations in Sicily for a period, the only time in the war that that happened. Still, Rome continued its practice of appointing two consuls by and large, and they still rotated command went in the field together. The only reason The weakness in this system was not more apparent during the First Punic War was because there weren't more pitched battles, but that is

soon to change. True. Carthaginian commanders may have been more quote unquote professional than the Roman counterparts, and certainly remained in their posts for much longer periods, but few would have had much experience of commanding such large forces as frequently employed during the war. This was totally true of the admirals appointed to the control of the operations of what were unprecedentedly large fleets, which were formed on

several occasions. Their inexperience of command at this level added to the already major practical difficulties in coordinating the movements of hundreds of ORed warships, and was perhaps another factor in denying the Carthaginian Navy the advantages it ought to have derived from the superior skill of its crews. Several Punic generals were crucified in the aftermath of military failures during the war, usually it seems, by order of their

own immediate subordinates. Yet other defeated leaders escaped punishment and went on to hold for their commands, which suggests that political influence as much as actual responsibility determined their fate. The Romans were considerably more lenient toward their magistrates, who presided over disasters, awarding triumphs to successive admirals who had lost most of their fleets to bad weather. Only Claudius was prosecuted on the charge of what they called

perdulio. In a sense, it meant sort of like bringing the state into disrepute, and that was for his behavior at Rohana. But he even narrowly escaped condemnation and was instead found guilty of a lesser charge than fined. After the war, Carthage faced another conflict that nearly saw the complete destruction of the city itself, the Mercenary War. This was one hundred percent a self inflicted

wound. Normally, mercenaries were returned to Carthage by nationality, paid and then sent back to their country of origin, but this time Carthage decided that no one would be paid until all the mercenaries were present, a huge mistake. Compounding this mistake, Carthage decided that it would try to renegotiate the amounted ode to the very men whould risk their lives and served Carthage well for years yikes.

As a result, and after numerous disturbances on the streets of Carthage, the mercenaries were sent to the town of Sika, were they encamped without a commander and with no duties to maintain their discipline. Understandably, the mercenaries, who had fought loyally and well for their masters and according to their contracts, were reluctant to accept any payment less than their due. They felt totally betrayed.

They were especially bitter towards Hamilcar, who had made lavish promises of future rewards during the operations in Sicily, only to abandon them to the whims of a government and the generals they did not know. The Carthaginians soon realized the negotiations were not succeeding, and aware that they would have the difficulty in controlling twenty thousand well equipped veteran soldiers, agreed to pay the full amounts the men

were due, But it was too late. The disfrontled mercenaries had become aware of their own strength, and they steadily increased their demands, forcing one concession after another out of Carthage. Resentment at their unfair treatment gradually turned into deep hostility toward the Carthaginians. Like all Punic armies, the veterans for Sicily were a mixture of many different peoples Libyans, Gaulls, Spaniards, Ligurians, Sicilian

Greeks, runaway slaves, disorters from Rome. Lacking a common language and without a unifying force of a Carthaginian command structure, the mercenaries at Sicca had fragmented into groups along ethnic lines. The Libyans were the largest of these, and it was they who finally turned mutiny into open revolt when they seized and imprisoned the unfortunate Gezgo, the man the mercenaries themselves had chosen to deal with as

the only Punic officer that they trusted. It was the presence of this Libyan element within the army which was to make the rebellions so serious, because they were able to swiftly rally most of the countrymen to their cause. Carthaginian rule had always been harsh and unpopular for the Libyan peasantry, but during the war with Rome, the burdens of taxation and conscription had grown far worse. With very few exceptions, the Libyan communities declared for the rebels and swelled the size

of their forces. They were joined by many of the Numidian princes, whom the Carthaginians had been fighting to control over the last decade, and who now saw an opportunity for revenge. Soon, an army many times the size of the one Regulus had led began a blockade of Carthage. The main rebel leaders were Mathos, a Libyan, and Spendius, an escaped Campanian slave who feared

being returned to his former master for execution. These were supported by a gall A torriatas, a chieftain of remarkably unreliable band of warriors in the war, or, if we were being fair, some of his followers had actually deserted to the Romans during the war and later went on to betray them as well. Though veteran soldiers, Spendius had an especially distinguished record during the war with Rome. None of these men had experience of high command, and the movement

of the rebel armies were clumsy and poorly coordinated. This is one of the few advantages that the Carthaginians enjoyed in the conflict. It was always difficult for them to raise large armies quickly, but the situation worsened when their own mercenaries turned against them, in addition to the rebellion in Libya. This denied them

access to revenue and resources of manpower in which they could normally rely. The forces which were able to raise, composed of some still loyal mercenaries who felt no particular bond with unfamiliar Sicilian veterans and newly raised citizen soldiers, were heavily outnumbered. Further problems were caused by a divided command, similar to the appointment of three generals to lead the operations back in the Punic War in two fifty

six to fifty five. Hamilcar, Barka, and Hanno, who was better organizer than commander, didn't get along with each other, and the operations of their armies were hindered by the sort of disputes which were normally actually more typical of the Romans. Hannah was later forced to resign by a vote of the army or probably just the senior officers, and replaced by a more amenable Hannibal,

son of Hamilcar. It is in these campaigns, far more than in the war in Sicily, that we see evidence of Hamilcar's skill as a general. Consistently out maneuvering the larger rebel forces. He combined force with diplomacy. For instance, when Navaras, a Numidian prince, offered to defect with his followers, he was rewarded with a marriage to Hamilcar's daughter. Both sides mide extensive and ever escalating use of horror and atrocity, Hamilcar ordering captured mercenaries to

be trampled to death by his elephants. Eventually, the two commanders, Mathos and Spendius were both captured and crucified. Well, the unfortunate Gezgo and the other hostages were dismembered and tossed into a ditch where they bled to death. Eventually, by two thirty seven, the rebel armies had finally been defeated and the Libyan community surrendered and the mercenary revolt collapsed. Yet in the end, the message is clear, guys, just pay your mercenaries now. I mentioned

that Carthage would hold on to Sardinia, but only for a time. In two forty Punic officers and their soldiers on the island mutinied. They called to Rome for aid, promising them land in Sardinia if they allied against Carthage. Someone. Surprisingly, Rome said no, it would abide by the treaty, but by two thirty seven, when the same thing happened again, the Romans

lost their scruples and sent a force to take the island. Carthage objected, but it was in no position to do anything about it, so Rome got another province that being said I should mention. Sardinia proved a tough nut to crack, and Rome had to fight until two thirty one to subdue the resistance

there. Sicily and Sardinia were lost, and in the aftermath of the Mercenary Rebellion, Africa was too unstable for further expansion to be contemplated, so Carthage turned its attention increasingly to Spain. In two thirty eight to thirty seven, Hamilcar Barka was sent at the head of an army to take charge of the province there, and the choice of such an experienced and aggressive commander for a region which does not appear to have faced a major threat can only mean that

the objective was expand For the next nine years, Hamilcar fought almost continuously securing Punic control of the coastal stirrup of southern Spain and pushing up the Valley of Guadalavie until he was killed in an ambush by a Celtic Tiberian tribe known as the Orentai in two twenty nine. One source actually claims that he deliberately sacrificed

himself to save his sons. He was succeeded in his command by his son in law and second in command at the time, Hasdrubal, who continued the program of expansion, achieving more through diplomacy than war, even marrying a Spanish princess to cement one alliance. The succession seems to have been voted for first

by the army in Spain and subsequently approved back in Carthage. This was certainly the case when Hasdrubal himself was assassinated in two twenty one, and the army or at least its officers, gave the command then to Hamilcarr's eldest son, Hannibal, a decision later ratified by the popular Assembly in Carthage. So the basic story of Punic expansion in Spain under the Barque family is pretty straightforward, and it's not controversial at all, even if our sources sometimes contradict each other.

On minor points. Still, many important questions remain unanswered. It's unclear how and why Hamilcar was given Spanish command in the first place, and to what extent his activities once there were supervised. One extreme view is to see this period as a triumph of a sort of popular maybe even populist party in

Carthage. Hamilcar the demagogue, winning the support of ordinary citizens or tired of the incompetence displayed by the old aristocracy during the First Punic War with Rome and then subsequently in the Mercenary Rebellion. This allowed him to secure an unlimited command in Spain, with the freedom to wage war and enrich himself for his own purposes. There may be a few indications of political change at Carthage, since the Council of one oh four seems far less important during this period, and

the importance of two annually elected Sioux fights may have increased. However, it must always be remembered that any evidence that we have for this constitution and internal politics of Carthage is exceptionally poor and sometimes non existed completely. Most of our sources do portray the Barkeet family as facing strong opposition from rivals who feared their growing power and from those who objected to their policies, but it's unclear how

strong and consistent such opposition was. In one tradition, Hamilcar used the booty from his Spanish campaigns both to secure the loyalty of his soldiers and to buy himself political support at home. It is equally possible to interpret the same evidence as showing Hamilcar as nothing more than a servant of the state, appointed with the general approval of the elite at Carthage, and frankly, my guess is

the truth is somewhere in between. The Second Punic War really begins in Spain, making the activity of the Barquet family there in the years after the first war especially important, But our sources awareness of this only makes it more difficult to understand sort of regime they created, How significant was it and why did

it matter that command was always exclusively held by members of one family. It's not entirely clear whether the Carthaginians just ratified the army's choice of leader because they felt they were powerless to change this, or because that was always the plan. There may have been practical benefits from this, since it was far easier for the Spanish tribes and leaders to focus their loyalty on an individual general and on his family rather than a distant Carthage a concept, and these are emotions

which the Romans would later exploit. The activities of the bar Kids in Spain may simply be seen as an effective way for the Carthaginian state to expand its territory, there allowing them more easily to exploit the resources of both mineral wealth and military manpower. For other historians, these years saw the creation of what was in effect a semi independent principality ruled by the bark And family for their own ends. Our evidence, however, isterly inadequate to resolve this debate.

The same series of coins produced in Punic Spain in this period have been interpreted as showing hamilcar and Hasdrubal depicted as Hellenistic kings even with divine associations. Hasdrubald, definitely, we know, founded a major city called New Carthage, which is modern Cartagena. But whether this should be seen as a seat of provincial government or a capital of a semi independent kingdom depends on the view that you

take of the Barkheads themselves. The Romans certainly kept a weary eye on the Carthaginian activity in Spain, although as of yet there was no direct involvement from Rome in the area. In two thirty one, a delegation of some owners went to Hamilcar to ask him about the motives for his aggressive campaigns, and was told that these were necessary if Carthage was to pay that massive indemnity that

it owed to Rome. Later, sometime around two twenty six, another set of envoys went to Hasdrbal who formerly agreed not to expand me on the River Ebro. And this is of course going to be the spark later that's going to start off the Second Punic War. As possible that Rome's interest in Spain was encouraged by her longtime ally Messia. That's modern day man say in Spain or in France. Excuse me, but the concern over growing Carthaginian power may

well have been genuine. As yet, Rome had no direct connection at all, to be clear, with the Spanish peninsula. Latin traders were certainly active there, but they didn't have any government influence. In fact, between two forty one and two eighteen, Rome found itself mostly occupied around the Po River. In modern northern Italy. This is the region around Milan, but referred

to in our Roman sources as Cisalpine Goal. It took the Romans until two eighteen to finally subdue the people there and continue what had turned into a lengthy process of colonization. Spain and northern Italy would see much activity when the war was finally renewed between Rome and Carthage. In addition, many of the individuals on both sides were prominent in the campaigns in the two twenties and would later

play a significant role in the war with Hannibal. For a generation of Roman commanders who grew up between the wars with Carthage the First and Second Punic War, their military experience was in Sardinia, Illyria and as I mentioned, most of all Ssalpine Gaul, and they got accustomed to warfare against armies which were

tactically unsophisticated. Though the individual soldiers were skilled and very brave, it was though poor preparation for confronting a general as skilled as Hannibal at the head of a well trained army. Next time discussed the beginnings of the Second Punic War,