Scipio Africanus – Part 10 (Scipio Takes Command in Hispania)

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Within a remote outpost on the western frontier of Roman-held Hispania, the night air still bit with cold. Even in the late spring of 210 BC, The damp winds that swept across the highland plains made the campfires feel far too small for the Roman garrison, fewer than 40 men. A blend of survivors from the disaster at the Upper Batis. some still nursing wounds, and a few who had arrived months earlier as a part of the emergency reinforcements sent by the Senate. Fewer than 40.

barely enough to watch their section of the frontier, and nowhere near enough to stop what they were convinced was coming. There had been eight Carthaginian raids this month alone, A prelude, they believed, to a far greater assault. A blow meant to wipe them off the peninsula for good. Against the chill, the men pulled their cloaks tighter and kept to silence.

Some stared off into the foreboding dark, others into the glowing coals, listening for hoofbeats they prayed wouldn't come. Their outpost was in rough shape. Timber walls scorched in a previous raid had gone unrepaired, and the ditch beyond the palisade was now half-collapsed from last week's rain. This was the edge of Roman control.

Nothing but undermanned, scattered forts standing between them and the enemy. For those who had survived the calamity, no one spoke of the Upper Betis anymore. Not directly. But it lingered in the way they moved. The way they flinched at distant sounds. Nearly six months had passed since their commanders, Publius and Naeus Scipio, were killed. along with most of Rome's armies in Hispania. Since then, there had been no strategy, no plan, just the slow, grinding fear of a final blow.

Carthaginian raiders, sometimes small bands, sometimes larger. They struck, burned, and vanished. Every man believed the real assault was still coming. Any day now. A full Punic army cresting the hills to finish what had begun in the south. Then, two days ago, a rider came through, mentioning a name, Scipio, the son of Publius. the nephew of neos barely 26 named commander of the roman forces in hispania he was bringing just 11 000 reinforcements

Not nearly enough to face the looming Punic threat, growing stronger. How could this young, untested general turn the tide? They just didn't see how it could be possible. And yet... Some had heard things, stories, of a man bold in both battle and politics. One who had charged headlong into enemy ranks at Tekinas. Who had survived Cannae. led the battered remnants to safety in a daring night breakout, one said to be touched by the gods. But it would still be months before he arrived.

And by then, this outpost could be nothing more than a ruined husk, its men left strewn about the hills. As the night deepened and the cold rain began to fall, no one spoke.

They had learned by now, not to hope too easily. Welcome to the Warlords of History Podcast. I'm your host, Mark Pimenta. And for this episode, part 10 in our series on Scipio Africanus, wherein we'll lay witness to the very beginnings of Scipio's unique military genius, as he embarks on his first major command, landing in northeastern Hispania in the late summer of 210 BC, inheriting a fragile situation, outnumbered.

and with the morale of the bulk of his troops in a dismal state, but wasting no time as soon as he arrived, immersing himself into the rebuilding of his army, men who had known nothing but loss. Moreover, faced with the looming threat of three Carthaginian armies and unabating enemy raids and incursions. But through stirring speeches, forging bonds through personal connection,

and invoking the favor of the gods to instill pride and purpose. He began shifting the belief of this battered force to reinvigorate their motivation, followed by… an intense seven-month period of transformation through the winter of 210 bc into early 209 bc the young roman general imposing a brutal training regimen upon his soldiers sharpening discipline, conditioning, and cohesion, shaping them into a highly mobile, loyal, and elite force, and all the while doing this in the background.

gathering intelligence with relentless precision, studying his enemy, assessing and probing their weaknesses. The means through which Scipio began formulating a plan few would even have dared to consider.

With three Carthaginian armies scattered across the Iberian Peninsula, Scipio narrowing his focus on an opening. Not to face any of the opposing armies head-on, as would have been expected, but rather... march deep into enemy territory to strike at the base of their financial and political power in hispania the city carthago nova the beating heart of punic spain

a coastal stronghold that supplied Carthage with silver, weapons, and strategic control of the peninsula. However, before we get further into the episode, I just want to take a brief moment to acknowledge the Warlords of History Immortals, the patrons of the show, as my deepest gratitude goes out to you.

For your ongoing support of the podcast through the Warlords of History Patreon page and through PayPal, the links for which can be found on the support section of the Warlords of History website.

in the event that others are interested in supporting the show directly as well. Alright, now, before we step into the next chapter, let's take a moment to revisit where we left everything off in Part 9. through 212 and 210 bc with hannibal remaining unbeatable in the field raining down punishing blows and heavy casualties on any roman force he encountered

yet still finding himself unable to hold back the Republic's steamrolling progress, backed by an unprecedented 25 legions following the Fabian strategy, doing what they could to contain Hannibal.

while focusing on breaking his italian allies slowly but relentlessly beginning to reclaim southern italy driving hannibal to march on rome in 211 bc in a desperate bid to divert the pressure on the most important of his allies, the city of Capua, which failed, and Capua falling to the legions to brutal reprisals.

driving many other Italian allies that had thrown their lot in with Carthage to return to the Roman fold domestic victories mirrored by successes abroad as Syracuse fell bringing all of sicily under roman control while the threat from the kingdom of macedon was decisively neutralized through clever diplomacy and political maneuvering

All of this resulting in, by late 211, Hannibal confined to a thin strip of southern Italy, still dangerous, but isolated and increasingly on the defensive. However... Just as Rome appeared poised to fully reclaim the initiative across every theatre, catastrophe struck in Spain, at the Battle of the Upper Betis.

when both Scipio's father and uncle were killed and their armies almost wholly destroyed. As the Second Punic War reached another dangerous tipping point, with Rome's foothold in Iberia on the verge of collapse. Moreover, meaning that, if Carthage remained unchecked there, Hannibal might soon get the reinforcements he so desperately needed to reinvigorate his campaign in Italy. A grave moment of crisis.

in which the 26-year-old Scipio stepped forward, in 210 BC, against the odds, against tradition, and senatorial resistance. He carefully orchestrated a subversive political campaign to seize the command in Hispania. A bold move for one completely unproven as a commander. Battle-hardened, yes. but with no experience as a general, and many in the Senate doubting he was ready. And it's from that moment that we now continue with Scipio's story. In late August 210 BC,

with Scipio standing upon the deck of his lead warship, as Livy tells it in his work from the founding of the city, the lead ship of 30 Quinquereens. carrying 11,000 troops that had set out from the mouth of the Tiber, departing from the port of Ostia, sailing northwards along the coast of the Tuscan Sea, en route to Hispania.

where Scipio would soon assume his first full command, a post he had secured through savvy political manipulation, mobilizing an overwhelming wave of public support to disrupt the Senate's plans. circumstances that had left many in the Senate with a bitter taste in their mouths, including Fabius, the delayer, who was extremely skeptical of Scipio's abilities. Viewing him as far too young and untested for such a critical role. And yet, there he was. And sailing off with the 26-year-old general.

were three key figures that would form the backbone of his high command. Gaius Lelius, Scipio's closest friend, second in command and admiral of the fleet. Scipio's 18-year-old younger brother, Lucius Cornelius Scipio. Possibly leading a small detachment, but with no official high rule for now. But like Scipio had initially done under his father. Lucius was primarily shadowing his brother and Scipio's high command, absorbing lessons on strategy and logistics.

while learning how to interact with the Allies, soldiers, and other officers as a future commander in training. And lastly, there was Marcus Junius Solanus, a capable officer, that had served rather admirably in the Second Punic War to that point in time, appointed by the Senate to serve under Scipio, perhaps to keep an eye on him as well, but in time.

that Scipio would turn into one of his most trusted subcommanders. Their destination being the city of Emporiae, on Hispania's northeastern coast, where they would connect with the 20,000 Roman troops.

holding on to what remained of the roman domains on the iberian peninsula alluding to the terribly daunting situation that awaited scipio in spain where the res publica's position had been greatly weakened and continued to degrade further still due to the three marauding Carthaginian armies that controlled nearly two-thirds of the peninsula.

under Hasdrubal Barka, Mago Barka, and Hasdrubal Gizgo. That's since combining their forces to destroy Scipio's father and uncle's armies at the Battle of the Upper Betis in late 211 BC. had since increased their strength. According to several modern historians, including auxiliary forces, the total Punic numbers were now hovering around 90,000 for Scipio.

altogether amounting to what was viewed as an almost impossible task. Not just trying to keep defended what was left of Rome's holdings, but somehow figure out how to go on the offensive. and revived the republic's dismal situation in hispania moreover doing so with limited resources scipio knowing the senate would be unwilling to commit many more resources to spain

given that Hannibal, even though bottled up in southern Italy, was still a force to be reckoned with. And while the 11,000 reinforcements traveling with Scipio added to the existing... battered Roman forces in Spain would give him approximately 31,000 in total, as Patrick Hunt in his book Hannibal observes. While under the best of circumstances, Spain was not an easy place for a Roman general.

Scipio's situation was uniquely dangerous, possessing inadequate supplies and men, battling such vast Punic assets. These are the conditions under which Scipio's entire campaign would begin. Heavily outnumbered with limited support, and rather isolated in a foreign theatre verging on disintegration.

But to truly understand the magnitude of what Scipio was stepping into, let's take a quick look back as to what had unfolded in Spain before his arrival. More specifically,

what occurred in Hispania between the disaster at the Battle of the Upper Betis in December 211 BC and Scipio's arrival nine months later in September 210. Now, you may recall from the last episode, after those devastating losses in which scipio's father and uncle neus were killed neus at last gasp managed to save just under half of his army nine thousand survivors

who, in a harrowing flight, escaped the slaughter to regroup at the Ebro River. And while this preserved Rome's grip on northeastern Spain, all its territory south of the waterway had been lost. Which drove the Senate to urgently dispatch reinforcements in early 2010. Roughly 11,000 troops. Bringing their total strength in Spain to around 20,000 men. Which yes.

better strengthened their odds of holding onto their domains, but remained a precarious situation at best. Standing in the face of much larger Punic forces, A looming and oppressive existential threat to all of the Roman troops stationed there, eating away at their morale and motivation, expecting the Carthaginians to strike again soon.

with overwhelming force. And Livy capturing this bleak mindset best when he writes, As for the Roman troops in the Spanish provinces, after the slaughter of two great commanders and their armies, For the remaining Roman soldiers, the overriding belief was that the war for Hispania was over, and they would be driven out completely. Because...

From the moment the three Carthaginian armies had destroyed the Elder Scipios in December 211 BC, Hasdrubal Barca had begun regularly sending off detachments of his army, relentlessly. and viciously testing the Roman defenses, along the Ebro, but also deep into the western frontier, as alluded to in the intro story at the top end of the episode.

And even after those emergency reinforcements arrived from Rome, the situation remained dire. Still heavily outnumbered, with no forward-looking strategy and no real prospect for victory. the Roman forces were simply holding on, assailed by constant Carthaginian raids and incursions, all the while bracing for what they believed to be an imminent, overwhelming Punic assault.

Try to imagine being a Roman soldier at that time, wrestling with defeat, battered and bruised, both physically and mentally exhausted, watching the horizon every day. never knowing whether the next figures cresting the ridge would be a raiding party or a full Punic army. Day after day, the fear of a full-scale attack gnawed at their nerves. Weeks passed.

and then months, yet the dreaded assault never materialized, only the steady pressure of uncertainty and stomach-churning unease. Which might be begging the question for you, Why didn't the Carthaginians press their advantage when they had the chance? Well, partly because the legions were fortified, dug in, and unwilling to engage in open battle. Accordingly.

rather than launch costly assaults on the Roman-held cities, Taraco and Emporiae. The Carthaginians opted for a strategy of pressure instead, relying on raids and threats, hoping to lure the Romans into the open. where they could be defeated once again. But the main reason, as we'll explore more deeply later, is that the Punic commanders essentially viewed the Romans as a secondary concern at that point. Being that...

As David Potter points out in his book, The Origin of Empire, both before and after Scipio arrived, The three Carthaginian armies were concentrating on restoring their control over the Iberian tribes that had gone over to Rome, under the now-defeated Elder Scipio brothers, during their seven-year campaign. which also helps to explain why, during this period, the total Punic numbers continued to grow, eventually pushing toward 90,000 men. Not in preparation for a Roman offensive,

but to regain full control over their own fractured territories. Also given that, with Scipio Sr. and Neoscon, so too were the established lines of communication.

and relationships rome had built with the iberian tribes residing beyond their much reduced domains in spain domains that although not yet subject to a major attack remained under near constant pressure, invariably taking a heavy toll on the 20,000 Roman troops stationed there, with no viable plan to counteract the reversals they had experienced.

much less deal with the looming shadow of a full-scale Carthaginian assault. And it was under these conditions, when Rome's fortunes and prospects for victory in Hispania were at their lowest.

that scipio finally arrived having departed from ostia before the end of august sailing northwards with his fleet hugging the western coastlines of the italian peninsula Then, as described by Livy, sailing past the Alps and the Gallic Gulf, and then rounding the promontory of the Pyrenees, Scipio landed his troops at Emporier. A voyage that would have taken about two weeks to complete, arriving in northeastern Hispania around early to mid-September 210 BC.

spending a short while there before proceeding by land 230 kilometers southwest to the city Tarako, where he set up his main headquarters. A good place for us to go through a quick review of the total forces under Scipio's command. Scipio, bringing with him from Rome, 11,000 reinforcements and 30 quinqueremes.

Which, added to the survivors from Scipio's father and uncle's campaign, and the emergency forces that the Senate deployed to Spain in early 210 BC, altogether counted 31,000 men under Scipio's command. further broken down to 28,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, and 35 Quincarims. Not a small force by any means, but still dwarfed by the combined Carthaginian strength in Hispania.

which now hovered around 90,000 soldiers. But immediately upon arriving, thanks to his father and uncle, being that the Carthaginians were busy stamping out the Iberian tribal rebellions that they had triggered.

this bought the young commander valuable breathing room time he used to prepare and what he began doing right from the get-go according to basil hart in his book scipio africanus greater than napoleon Before attempting to formulate any plan, he visited every one of the various parts of his army, energetically conducting a comprehensive tour of all his troop positions.

his soldiers garrisoning in poirier and taraco the main roman forts located along the ebro river and even the smaller remote roman outposts scattered throughout the region tirelessly

traveling throughout the Roman-held domains, while doing several key things. 1. Reorganizing the Roman defenses to ensure they could better withstand the unabating Carthaginian raids. 2. re-establishing communications with the Iberian tribes that had been cooperating with his departed father and uncle, while three, trying to gather as much information and intelligence about what was happening deeper south in the peninsula.

However, all of this superseded, most critically at this moment, was as Basil Hart goes on to point out, the emphasis that Scipio placed on restoring and fortifying the confidence of his troops. in order to reignite the fighting spirit of his men. Because what would have been painfully clear was that the morale of his men, especially those who survived the disaster at the Upper Betis, was shattered.

And since then, they'd spent the last nine months fearing an all-out Carthaginian assault, demoralized, directionless, and haunted by the Senate's tendency to treat survivors of any such defeats with dishonor.

However, immediately upon his arrival, what they found in Scipio was a commander who was very different in appearance and perspective than was typical. Surprisingly, much younger than what would have been expected to, only slightly older than the majority of the rank and file, and although untested as a commander, possessing of an undeniable charisma.

and unshakable confidence and from Scipio's perspective seeing the dismal mental and physical state of two-thirds of the forces now under his command he immediately became aware of the pressing need to reinvigorate and re-inspire his men, rebuilding their confidence and fighting edge. First and foremost, proceeding to quickly dispel any notions of dishonor attached to their conduct.

as highlighted by Livy when he tells us that Scipio at Emporiae and Taraco repeated again at the various outposts and forts. Scipio warmly praised the soldiers. Because, despite suffering disaster at the Battle of the Upper Betis, forced back across the Ebro, continuing to be assailed by Carthaginian raiders, he celebrated their courage and dedication.

holding the province despite their bleak outlook, and loyally protecting the allied cities Tarako and Emporiae. But with Scipio's efforts going much deeper than that, because always during his visits, A defining feature of his leadership style, highly uncharacteristic of Roman generals of the time who typically led from a distance, was the emphasis he placed on personal interaction with his soldiers.

As Howard Scullard emphasizes in his book, Scipio Africanus, soldier and politician, inferred from ancient sources, Scipio made it a priority to forge direct, personal bonds with his men. in order to have them feel personally invested in him as their leader. And although not explicitly detailed by ancient authors, such modern historians go on to reasonably infer

that Scipio would have done so by doing things like eating with his men, addressing them directly when walking among their tents and encampments, and engaging in small talk. We can imagine. Asking about things like their wounds, experiences, and their families. Perhaps offering up encouraging words or compliments on something they had done.

while also probably tossing around good-natured insults with the best of them. Since, as mentioned back in part 2 of the series, even as an 18-year-old under his father's army, Scipio had quickly adapted to military life, completely at ease, interacting and building a rapport with a regular rank and file.

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Praising their conduct and bravery under such harsh conditions and starting to forge personal bonds was only part of the equation. Because the next step to rebuilding their confidence and motivation

was, interestingly, a spiritual one. In that, as related by Polybius in his work The Histories, Scipio made the men under his command more ready to face perilous enterprises, by instilling into them the belief that their fates were now tied together and that their campaign in hispania had the backing of the gods now to us this might sound way too abstract or exaggerated

but to the romans of the time this would have been deeply compelling their worldview was shaped by omens dreams and signs in the natural world around them and genuinely believed certain individuals could win and hold divine favor. Moreover, that such favor could change the destinies of those around them. And for any soldiers that knew little about Scipio,

rumors would have quickly circulated among their camps, filling in the blanks. He was already well known. His early military and political exploits were already legendary. And with those tales came whispers of a young man possessing a unique connection to the gods. Scipio himself, always careful never to speak about any notions of direct divine connection.

But he didn't deny it either. Instead, he allowed the myths surrounding him to grow subtly, sometimes adding fuel to the flames by sharing that the gods had spoken to him in his dreams.

shaping his decisions now as to whether scipio truly believed himself to have a personal divine link is uncertain but according to polybius he seems to clearly argue the point that while Scipio had indeed been blessed with many admirable gifts and qualities from the gods, it wasn't that Scipio was a special conduit or anything of the sort, but rather...

He possessed sharp intelligence and a deep understanding of human psychology that he used in a calculating way, leveraging Roman belief systems to further his goals, being that Scipio recognized.

most men neither readily accept anything unfamiliar to them nor venture on great risks without the hope of divine help a notion that modern historians like patrick hunt echo when he writes that Scipio is one of the best examples in history of a leader who planned carefully, not only for his battles, but also how to bend people to his will. Scipio knew that many people are persuaded more by religion than by reason, and that the power of devotion often trumps power of deduction.

And what seems clear is that Scipio's approach worked exceptionally well, as the troops began to believe not just in him, but in the mission itself. And although, I would add in, they were primed for it. Demoralized, desperate for purpose, now moved by a leader who showed them personal respect, I think more than that, they began to feel chosen. That their earlier suffering hadn't been meaningless.

They were the tip of the spear in Hispania, handpicked by the gods for this noble cause, through which the res publica would be preserved. However, Despite this notion of a divinely inspired mission beginning to take root, what may have still lingered among those who were, let's say, of a more cynical nature or less religiously inclined, was what their new general lacked.

experience leading an army which at this point although undeniably true as philip freeman emphasizes in his book hannibal rome's greatest enemy Young Scipio had been shaped by the war with Hannibal like few other Romans. From the age of 18, right from the onset of his military education, he had grown up under the shadow of the Second Punic War.

Present for some of the Republic's worst setbacks at the battles of Tequinas, the Trebia, and Cannae, likely also serving in Campania during their early defense of the region after Capua defected to Hannibal. Scipio had witnessed firsthand where Rome had gone wrong, how Hannibal pried away nearly all of Magna Grecia, and how the Republic, through the Fabian strategy, had begun clawing it back.

But that still doesn't tell us, where did he actually learn to lead? Was it from Hannibal, as most accounts, both ancient and modern, tend to argue? Well, it's hard to deny the notion, that indirectly. And somewhat ironically, as Barry Strauss in his book Masters of Command puts it, that Hannibal's best student was in fact Scipio, from whom he learned to emphasize mobility and the element of surprise in war.

In addition to that, learning many other important foundational lessons from Hannibal, not the least of which included innovative battlefield tactics, which we'll spend more time on in later episodes. when we get to Scipio's first full-on set-piece battles. But what I'm referring to here goes beyond battlefield tactics. It's about how Scipio absorbed broader strategic principles.

on how to conduct a full-scale military campaign from the Carthaginian commander. Lessons that included the clever use of propaganda and psychological warfare, the power of deep scouting and intelligence gathering, the impact of rapid marches and bold, unexpected action, and the use of deception. not just in battle, but across entire campaigns. These were tools Hannibal used masterfully, and ones rarely seen in traditional Roman military doctrine.

However, I'm convinced that Hannibal's influence explains only part of the equation. Because, beyond his introduction to military life in his first campaign within his father's army, Scipio Sr., Since that point up to the present moment, Scipio had also served under some pretty talented Roman consuls and generals, such as his father-in-law, Lucius Aemilius Paulus, in the lead-up to Cannae.

and then afterwards for a time, serving under Marcus Claudius Marcellus, once he assumed control over the survivors that Scipio had led to safety, as mentioned back in part 6 of the series. proven commanders, perhaps with Marcellus being the most gifted, who were nonetheless all skilled leaders, from whom Scipio would have also honed his craft, learning core Roman military fundamentals.

logistics, discipline and preparation. But in many ways, Scipio, grounded in these Roman fundamentals, blended in with the lessons he had taken from Hannibal, and his broader experience of the Second Punic War. What's truly fascinating to consider here is that the young Roman general would show himself to be an innovator in his own right, coming up with something that the Carthaginians

nor the Romans for that matter, had ever seen. Scipio didn't just fight, he designed his campaigns, carefully envisioned, meticulously prepared, and structured from beginning to end. Yet he remained flexible throughout, constantly considering alternative paths to achieve his objectives, doing so with troops who were not only highly trained and disciplined, but also fiercely loyal.

and not just to the res publica but even more so to him and as expressed by philip freeman whereas the carthaginians in spain had grown accustomed to competent though fairly conventional fighting from Scipio's slain father and uncle. Scipio had a much bolder plan in mind, combining meticulous preparation with swift and unexpected action.

granted at this early stage being that Scipio's initial steps and plans for Hispania were still taking shape the foundation of anything he intended to do now that he had reignited the belief of his men centered around needing to forge his troops into a force that could carry it out and for the next six months through autumn winter and into the early spring of 209 BC

That's exactly what Scipio did. Reshape his army by instituting an extensive training program, one built on intense preparation and strict discipline.

like basil hart emphasizes when he mentions that scipio spent his time in winter quarters preparing his men for a counter-offensive while formulating a plan that he concealed from everyone except his trusted second-in-command, Gaius Laelius, having the wisdom to realize that military success depends largely on the thoroughness of previous preparation.

Which, as a quick side note, concerned about enemy spies within the Roman domains, Scipio, possessing of a wisdom beyond his years, was always careful to keep his plans tightly secretive. Furthermore... Although relatively young and inexperienced as a leader, I tend to strongly believe that Scipio had developed considerable expertise in military administration.

returning to Rome in late 216 or early 215 BC, having spent the next five years there, nearly constantly involved in the organizing of levies and likely training new legions.

even during his tenure as an aedile. Through this, gaining a deep appreciation for rigorous training and discipline, perhaps more than most Roman commanders. Now, when it comes to discipline... it's important to note that, for the most part, most Roman commanders heavily, if not exclusively, relied upon a severe system of harsh punishments to ensure discipline was maintained among their men.

For example, Polybius details an extensive list of punishments, from fines, reduced rations, to flogging or even execution, for both individual soldiers and units, pending the severity of the offense. for infractions ranging from falling asleep on guard duty to desertion in battle, Polybius linking this to the uncanny success of Roman armies. And while Scipio retained this structure, he didn't rely on fear alone.

He seems to have also focused just as much energy on instilling pride-based discipline, motivating his men to want to excel. He treated his troops with respect, restored their belief in themselves. But make no mistake that in return, he demanded nothing less than excellence. Excellence only befitting that of an elite force.

bringing us to the extreme training regiment that Scipio imposed. Because, while you may recall that for any newly raised legion, this was typically followed by a strenuous initial four-month-long boot camp, so to speak, on the campus martius or field of mars just outside of rome the thing is after this period once a legion was fielded training was never as strenuous nor as consistent

as to what they had endured during those first four months due to the duties and demands associated with being on active campaign. However, what Scipio implemented was reportedly A grueling training program. Far, far exceeding even that of what they had gone through on the field of Mars. Polybius provides a detailed account of what this looked like. Certain days...

marching them unheard of distances of up to 40 kilometers under the full weight of their arms, approximately 80 pounds of equipment. Some days, completing long-distance runs, and others, organizing mock fights for both individual and unit combat with the troops using wooden swords covered with leather and javelins buttoned at the end so as to protect the soldiers during these drills all the while

using rest days in between, wherein his men would be required to thoroughly examine their own equipment and weapons, keeping them clean and in excellent condition. Through the fall and winter of 210 BC, Into the early spring of 209, this is what his men were focused on, preparing for what was to come, even though they had no idea what exactly.

And it wasn't just Scipio delegating these tasks to junior officers, as would have been typical for most Roman generals. But Scipio himself, tirelessly, traveling to wherever his forces were stationed. often personally overseeing and joining in himself, further entrenching the loyalty and discipline of his soldiers. Even, as detailed by Basil Hart, his naval forces, when Hart writes that,

The rowers and marines would push out to sea when the weather was calm, maneuvering their ships in mock sea fights. The general went round to all the works with equal attention. At one time, he was employed in the dockyard with his fleet. At another, he exercised with the legions. And what's more, this wasn't a temporary effect. Scipio's emphasis on preparation

would become a hallmark of all his campaigns, drilling his men relentlessly whenever they weren't on the move or in combat. Accordingly, going back to the words of Barry Strauss, By the time the spring of 209 BC took hold in Hispania, what's clear is that Scipio trained his men to fight with a professionalism far exceeding that of most Roman armies.

drilling his troops relentlessly and turning them into an excellent fighting force. Also because the moment was soon approaching to show what this force under his guidance could do.

in a bold and unexpected counter-strike on the Carthaginians that they would have never dreamed possible. Now, at this point, you might be wondering, didn't the Carthaginian commanders see this resurgence coming?

Why didn't they launch a preemptive attack on the Romans earlier, as many had feared? The truth is, while the Carthaginians almost certainly had spies and informants near the Roman camps, especially at terraco and emporiae completely aware of the arrival of a new scipio in hispania interestingly the pattern of punic raids and probing skirmishes

once common as a way for the Carthaginians to monitor Roman positions, began to sharply taper off not long after Scipio's arrival. This shift coming about for several key reasons. Firstly, the Romans were now far better organized and reinforced. Thanks to Scipio's sweeping reforms, the Roman borderlands had become significantly harder to penetrate. Their defenses tightened.

as Scipio's cavalry and scouting dramatically increased. No longer reactive or confined to Fort Walls, they were now boldly riding out beyond the frontiers to the west and to the south, beyond the Ebro. aggressively patrolling the hills and river valleys, intercepting raiders before they could even reach Roman ground. Vicious skirmishes erupted all along the edges of Roman-held northeastern Hispania.

Scouting parties collided in the dark folds of forests and narrow ravines. Close quarter, brutal work, where blades flashed fast and the ground ran slick with blood. Roman cavalry and light infantry, once cautious and reactive, now operated with a new purpose, meeting Punic raiders head-on, harassing their paths, ambushing their camps.

forcing them into retreat. Ambushes turned into pursuits, and pursuits into patterns, and gradually, the tide began to turn. The Romans weren't just holding the line anymore. they were pushing outwards. Every clash won, every incursion turned back, perhaps minor on its own. But collectively, these small victories, more and more, began to secure the frontier.

and reshape the battlefield dynamic while also helping to rebuild something far more crucial the confidence of Scipio's army furthermore as a result the Carthaginians began losing their eyes and ears on what the Romans were up to. The one steady flow of intelligence on Roman movements drying up almost completely. Granted,

Even if this signaled a shift to the Carthaginians, that something was different with their Roman enemies, more actively guarding their lands in the northeast. Apparently, this was of little consequence. Because... Secondly, and to put it plainly, the Carthaginians were overconfident. Scipio, to them, was little more than a boy playing at war, another Roman they expected to bury like the rest.

As Philip Freeman writes, the Carthaginians were confident that they had neutralized the Roman threat to Iberia and had little concern about the young commander playing general across the Ebro. They expected a few local skirmishes and posturing by Scipio, but no real threat. Plus, the Punic generals believe that their considerable numerical superiority

Three armies totaling around 90,000 troops meant that they had the upper hand. As such, if Scipio dared to venture out, they felt they could crush him in the field, just as they had done to his father and uncle. moreover they weren't really eager to assault the roman forts along the ebro nor the well-garrisoned roman-held cities they knew such sieges would be costly better to wait let the romans make the first move

and strike them on open ground. After all, time was on Carthage's side. The pressure was on Scipio to act, not them. So, while this partly explains why the Carthaginians didn't make an attempt on Scipio and his men, thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, something we briefly touched upon earlier in the episode,

But deserving of a more thorough examination is because the three Punic generals in Hispania were already heavily distracted. Understanding that... While Carthage controlled most of the Iberian peninsula on paper, that grip was far from secure. Still dealing with a surge of rebellions, many of which had been triggered by Scipio's father and uncle. What David Potter highlights as one of the Elder Scipio Brothers' biggest accomplishments during their seven-year campaign.

which was beginning the process of breaking down Spanish tribal alliances with the Carthaginian regime. As if the two heroes of the Republic were reaching out from the grave. continuing the fight against their Punic foes, and lending aid to Scipio. Being that Hispania had essentially been a powder keg waiting for a spark, provided by Scipio Sr. and Neus.

igniting revolts that were still fiercely burning when Scipio arrived on the scene in 210 BC, forcing the three Carthaginian armies to operate independently, traveling throughout the peninsula to suppress the uprisings. the most dangerous of which were in the south, deep into Carthaginian territory, threatening to disrupt their lucrative silver mines, prolonged affairs that were painstakingly difficult to put down.

being that the Iberian tribes typically relied on unconventional guerrilla tactics, disappearing when faced with large Carthaginian forces only to re-emerge later and harass them again. And as a quick side note, even for Rome, this type of resistance would become a nightmare for them to deal with in later years. such as during the 140s BC, as covered in my series on Varithus and the Lusitanian War of Fire, in case you're interested. Now, it's worth remembering.

That Carthaginian control over Spain was still relatively new. Their expansion had only begun with Hannibal's father, Hamilcar Barca, in 237 BC. And by this point, much of southern Spain had been under their rule for only 25 years. But, as Polybius observed, their rule was often harsh and exploitative, earning them plenty of enemies across the peninsula.

Even where relations were more cooperative, Carthaginian alliances were often shallow, held together by fear more than loyalty. Scipio's father and uncle understood this, as did Scipio. certainly forming into his overarching strategy. In that, he knew that gaining local support and help, particularly military aid, would be a vital element to his ultimate success in Spain.

not just to bolster his numbers, but also for the quality of Iberian auxiliaries, light infantry and cavalry. That could complement Roman heavy infantry exceptionally well. But here was the challenge. Rome wasn't at all in a position of strength. The momentum clearly favored Carthage. And though many tribes were discontent with the Carthaginians,

they weren't yet willing to risk switching sides. Even the Iberian tribes closest to Rome's northeastern holdings remained on the fence. Cordial, but unwilling to provide military aid to Scipio. What the Roman general needed now was a victory. Something meaningful to demonstrate that Rome was not only still in the fight, but capable of defeating Carthage outright.

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Fortunately, however. Scipio had one other advantage, name recognition. As Patrick Hunt points out, his father and uncle had already courted and had been held in good standing with many Iberian and Celtiberian tribes. With Scipio installed as the new Roman commander in Spain, the continuity of that name was a valuable asset, securing a measure of ongoing goodwill to the Romans. Also,

as a future potential means to help overthrow their Punic overlords. And despite not securing direct military aid from any Iberian tribes at this stage, Scipio's energetic diplomatic efforts yielded something just as critical, military intelligence. Through these renewed communications, gaining vital informational puzzle pieces,

which Scipio had been reassembling in order to give him a detailed map of the Punic operations in Hispania. In this, Scipio certainly mirrored Hannibal, spending much of his time when not rebuilding his army.

Focusing intently on intelligence gathering, collecting data, corroborating and validating reports, building the foundation for a surprise strike. As Patrick Hunt notes, There is firm evidence for Scipio's capable use of military intelligence long before an established Imperial Roman spycraft service, and that Scipio was disposed to and had learned from Hannibal's example.

of how to gather intelligence and was also fully able on his own to carefully consider source information and plan accordingly sourcing intel through a variety of methods and though the exact processes aren't detailed by ancient authors the methods used likely included beyond as mentioned leveraging diplomatic communications by also recruiting iberian informants

dispatching Roman cavalry scouts far and wide over land, but also by sea, using his fleet to sail down the length of the eastern Spanish coastline. disembarking at various points to question anyone that might have some insights, while also doing things like interrogating captured prisoners, enemy scouts, and speaking with others who regularly traveled as part of their jobs.

such as merchants and fishermen. Philip Freeman goes on to detail. The young Roman general spent his first winter in Spain collecting intelligence on his enemy, familiarizing himself with the land, city locations, insights as to their garrisons, and trying to recruit allies among any Iberians who had grown disaffected with Carthage, all the while planning his daring campaign for the spring. With, perhaps,

Among the most vital insights uncovered were the locations of the three Carthaginian armies, when in the early months of 209 BC, Polybius tells us, scipio learned that the carthaginian forces were overextended and disunited at a far distance from one another magobarca stationed in the extreme south of the iberian peninsula Operating from the Carthaginian city Cadiz, today Cadiz, working on pacifying the Canii tribe. Hasdrubal Gizgo with his army 500km to the northwest.

near the mouth of the tagas river near modern lisbon portugal engaging against the lusitanians and approximately 600 kilometers northeast of there has drubal barca further inland besieging a city belonging to the Carpatani tribe, the modern equivalent of which would be near the city of Toledo, which lies in the central Spanish plateau, at the headwaters of the Tagus River. Of the three.

closest to the roman held lands was hasdrubal barca's force but still at a considerable distance of some 600 kilometers west of taraco and yet where as suggested by howard scullard Many of Scipio's high command and the Carthaginians themselves wagered if he dared to venture out, Scipio might initially strike. However... while the roman general was confident that he could potentially defeat any one punic army in isolation he recognized the danger of such a move hasdrubal could simply delay

giving time for the other two armies to envelop the Romans deep into enemy territory as had happened to his father and uncle in 211 BC. Scipio knew better than to repeat that tragedy.

though the pressure was on Rome to act he was wise enough not to be goaded into such a reckless engagement instead he focused on finalizing his plans for something far more unexpected the carefully corroborated information laying bare a huge vulnerability one that as philip freeman writes scipio wisely kept to himself fearing spies among his allies

He told only his second-in-command, Gaius Lelius, what he had in mind, something that the Carthaginians clearly didn't believe possible. Instead of trying to crush one of its armies, Scipio, in a stroke of strategic genius, aimed to critically hobble the Carthaginian war effort by capturing its most important city in Spain, Carthago Nova.

built around his realization according to polyvius not one of the three punic armies were less than ten days march from carthago nova alternatively known as new carthage or what is today the city of cartagena located on the southeastern spanish coast carthago nova was one of two major punic strongholds in hispania the other being gadez

And although Gadez was far older, Carthago Nova, founded only 18 years earlier in 227 BC, had quickly eclipsed Gadez in terms of strategic value. As Livy explains,

becoming Carthage's most valuable asset in Spain due to its large natural harbor and excellent location closer to the Punic capital in North Africa. Moreover, now serving as the political administrative and logistical heart of punic spain home to major supply depots and elite weaponsmiths but above all it was its proximity to the silver rich mountains to the west

that made it so absolutely critical to the Carthaginian war machine, where wagonloads of silver were regularly hauled in, minted into coins, and then shipped off to the Punic capital. Patrick Hunt describing Carthago Nova as a tremendously valuable city, vital to Punic ambitions, where perhaps more silver bullion was stored than Carthage kept at its capital.

An irresistible lure for Scipio, if only he could take it. Because, though not a large city, Carthago Nova had been constructed with strong fortifications. and notably high stone walls, enhanced by a naturally strategic defensive barrier surrounded almost entirely by water, with a large bay to the south and west.

that channeled into a lagoon to the north leaving only a narrow 300 meter wide isthmus or land bridge to the east as its only connection to the mainland which going back to philip freeman The Carthaginian generals in Spain had such confidence in the strong fortifications of the town that they routinely left a relatively small garrison protecting the city of about 3,000 troops.

believing this sufficient to hold out against any potential enemy sieges until one of the three armies could come to its aid, not to mention the Roman presence. 450 kilometers away to the north at the Ebro River and across enemy-held territory, seemed not only far too remote to pose any real threat, but near well impossible to overcome.

And yet, it was precisely this overconfidence that would set the stage for what I think should be right up there, among the most brilliant surprise attacks in Roman military history. With Scipio knowing. that if he was to take the city, both speed and secrecy were paramount in this race against time, needing to get to Carthago Nova rapidly and not settle down for a siege, but rather storm the city.

and get this all done before any of the three Carthaginian commanders could react, bringing their armies in tow. Now just take that in for a moment. Scipio was preparing to march an entire army. 450 kilometers through enemy territory, with no guarantee of success and no backup from Rome. This wasn't just audacious, it was unheard of. Most certainly.

a high risk high reward operation but also won that through the early winter months of 209 before the onset of the spring Scipio and Laelius tailored their troops' intense training for this very mission, fine-tuning every logistical and tactical detail, while maintaining utmost secrecy. and continuously updating their intelligence on the city's garrison and the surrounding territory. Once again, meticulous preparation, a defining feature that both Polybius and Livy repeatedly emphasize.

was not just a hallmark of how Scipio waged war, but of how he approached everything he undertook. And just as spring took hold of the region, Once Scipio had confirmed the positions of the three Carthaginian armies, each positioned far afield and overextended. This is when Polybius says, Scipio abandoned all other projects and plans that he had been considering while in winter quarters, fully focused on readying his forces for an attack on Carthagonova. Well organized.

but in a fury of activity whereby in the first days of april 209 bc everything was ready scipio leaving behind one of his most capable officers marcus junius solanus with a garrison of 3 000 infantry and 500 cavalry to protect the roman holdings north of the ebro river while summoning his brother lucius and the rest of his army 25 000 infantry and 2,500 cavalry, Gaius Laelius and his entire fleet of 35 Quinqueremes, to assemble at the mouth of the Ebro, where it flows into the Mediterranean Sea.

At the dividing line between Rome and Carthage's respective spheres of power in Hispania, with the army Scipio had rebuilt from the ashes. No longer the demoralized remnants he had inherited seven months before, but now a hardened, disciplined, and loyal force. A Roman army forged through brutal training.

inspired leadership and the belief that they were part of something greater than themselves and soon it would be time to move but not before securing the favor of the gods In full view of the assembled troops, according to Livy, Scipio first calling upon the augurs, the prophetic Roman priests, to seek the will of the gods for their upcoming endeavor.

Now, as to whether the Roman sacred chickens were consulted here, released from their cages to begin eating greedily at the feed thrown before them, we don't know for sure. But in any event... Some type of natural phenomena was interpreted as being a particularly auspicious omen, proving that the gods were behind them. And I have no doubt that this would have been orchestrated by Scipio.

exerting his influence over the augurs, looking for every opportunity to entrench the belief of his men in him and their mission, and even though they still had no idea where they were heading. None questioned their young leader, who then, with calm, steadfast confidence, addressed his troops. According to Livy, who surely adds dramatic flourish, Scipio declared,

Fortune laid me under obligation to you. You men, earlier beset by great disaster, but by your courage held on in Hispania for the Roman people. And now, the immortal gods. who are protectors of the Roman Republic, who inspired the people to order that the command be bestowed upon me, by auguries, auspices, and even visions in the night are forecasting only success.

My own mind too foresees that all of Spain is ours, and that the Carthaginians will be banished from these lands, with their bodies covering seas and lands in their disgraceful flight. And with that...

Scipio gave the final orders, commanding groups of his 2,500 cavalry to fan out, riding hard to the south and west, hunting for enemy scouts, silencing any. who might warn of what was coming. Also ordering Gaius Lelius to return to his 35 warships, preparing the fleet to mirror the army's every move along the coast, always visible. Always in step of Scipio and the main body of 25,000 troops who began their rapid march. Tightly formed ranks of legionnaires churning up the coastal road into dust.

amid the low thunder of thousands of boots, and Scipio riding at the head of the column, with his gaze fixed, 450 kilometers to the south, to the city. that none thought was within his reach. Carthagonova. In the next episode, we'll continue from here. as Scipio embarks on his lightning-fast 10-day march, taking the Carthaginians completely by surprise upon his army's sudden arrival at Carthagonova, setting up camp.

blocking the only land approach to the city, while Lelius and the Roman fleet seal off the harbor by sea. From that position, launching a brilliantly fierce multi-pronged assault on the city. Combining clever deception with supposed divine guidance, most importantly, a waterlogged path through the lagoon north of the city, said to have been revealed by the Roman sea god Neptune.

but in truth, had been earlier uncovered through Scipio's diligent intelligence work, providing the avenue for a stunning breakthrough of the city's defenses, and unbelievably, the capture of Carthago Nova in a single day. Scipio's first major success, delivering immense strategic gains for Rome, but with the Senate refusing to send reinforcements.

As Carthage's most seasoned general in Spain, Hasdrubal Barca moves in closer for a counter-attack and the pressure mounts, driving Scipio to respond with characteristic resourcefulness. drawing men from the fleet to bolster his land forces, while intensifying his diplomatic efforts to win over Iberian allies. sparking a sudden surge of momentum behind the Roman war effort in Hispania, yet with everything still hanging in the balance, as Scipio reaches the brink of his next great trial.

His first full-scale set-piece battle. This and more to come in the next episode of the Warlords of History podcast. And in the meanwhile... if you want to support the podcast there are many ways you can help you can tell your family and friends about the show please rate review and subscribe on whichever platform you happen to access the show on

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