This is Bloomberg Wall Street Week.
The global push into infrastructure, breaking the IPO logjam in text.
The financial stories that sheep.
Are were cutting inflation without losing jobs. Do we need rate cuts? And if so? How many? Investing in a time of geopolitical turmoil?
Through the eyes of the most influential voices.
Ten Rogueff Economists of Harvard, former FDIC had Shiela Bert ge CEO, Larry Kulp, San Francisco Fed President Mary Daily Bloomberg.
Wall Street Week with David Weston from Bloomberg Radio.
Europe takes a right turn, Sherry Ridstone takes a pass and the Fed, the Fed just takes it slow. This is Bloomberg Wall Street Week. I'm David Weston this week Bloomberg. Stephanie Flanders on what happened to Europe?
There was a particular humbling of the sort of center and the established parties for sure.
Sharma of Rockefeller International on what happened to capitalism.
Every time we have a crisis, the billouts get bigger.
And Ron also of Munger, Tolls and Olson on his half century at the side of Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger.
Neither Warren nor Jarlie are typical.
And we start with the backward looking economic numbers of the United States this week and the forward looking statement of economic productions from the FED and what the chair Jay Powell had to say about it. And we welcome back our very special contributor. He's Larry Summers of Harvey. So, Larry, great to have you with us. What did you make out if we had some encouraging numbers actually on inflation? The same time, the FED is a little reluctant to talk too quickly about cutting.
The numbers were encouraging.
It's one month, but you know, every month is data, and I think the right posture has to be agnosticism about where we are going forward. It's hard to interpret the Fed's forecasts because they probably had a lot of inertia with everybody having set their view coming into the meeting. So it's not really clear that the projections that people were making genuinely reflected the new numbers.
That was a point that Chairman Bowell stressed.
We also have fiscal policy issues coming up in a sense around the ballot come November. There's increasing discussion about the alternatives between Joe Biden and Donald Trump. There's a fiscal policy, and you've been outspoken on the question, as others have been, about the possibility of inflation with the Trump economic policy.
Take us through that look.
I don't think there's been a more inflationary presidential economic policy platform in my lifetime. Perhaps George McGovern in nineteen seventy two in some ways would be a comparison, But other than that, I don't think there's been remotely comparably irresponsible set of proposals. His tariff proposals are the biggest supply shock, pushing up prices not just of imported goods, but of all the goods that compete with imported goods.
That anybody who's worried about gouging should think that more competition, including from abroad, is a very very important step. And he's for much greater restrictions on the supply of labor, leading to more wage inflation.
Pressures.
And he's for scaling back the subsidies to renewable energy, raising energy costs. So look at it from demand, look at it from supp lie. This is a prescription for a major increase in inflation, and of course the expectation of that major increase in inflation and possibly the fact that the FED will be under much more pressure to
prove that it's credible. This could easily be a prescription for a ten percent mortgage rate, something that I lived through and I bought my first house, but that I didn't think we were going to see again in the United States. This is really dangerous stuff.
Literally, we pick up on the tariff's issue specifically, as we know President former President Trump traveled to Capitol Hill this week and there were reports in the press that he floated, at least as an idea replacing some are all of income tax with tariffs. There was one report that actually would just replace it entirely. Would do from an macroeconomic point of.
View, Look, people miss people misspeak. Sometimes they're not serious about the things they say. That's probably a feature of candidate Trump. But replacing the income tax with revenue with tariff would be the worst macroeconomic policy proposal in US history. It of course burdens the middle class and the poor who purchased goods we goods that exist on international markets. So it's regressive, as many economic commentators have suggested, but that is actually.
The least of it. Think about it this way.
The smoot Hawley tariffs, which did enormous damage some people would say made the depression great, were six tenths of one percent of GDP. If you replaced half of income tax revenues, not all like he talked about, if you replaced half of income tax revenues with tariffs, those would be tax those would be tariffs six times smooth Hally levels.
That's got the potential to do enormous damage to the competitiveness of every US exporter, to do huge damage to all kinds of workers who use imported goods in what their businesses produce. To create a downward spiral at as much higher prices for everything we import means consumers have less to spend on everything else, create worldwide economic warfare as the rest of the world responds. This is a
prescription for the mother of all stagflations. Now, I don't think it's likely to happen even if President Trump is elected, so I don't know that markets should be discounting all of that. But this is something that I think should be viewed very ominously.
Okay, Larry, thank you so very much for being with us. That's Larry Summers of Harvard, our very special contributor here on Wall Street Week. Sunday's elections for the European Parliament delivered a surprise set back for incumbents in France and Germany, even leading French President Macran to call a snap parliamentary election in France next month, and markets have reacted accordingly.
To explain the situation on what's likely to come next, we welcome back Bloomberg Senior executive editor for Economics and Government, Stephanie Flanders. So, Stephanie, not only does your job require this, but you also have a podcast called voter Noamics where you talk about economics budding up against politics. We certainly see that in Europe right now. We see a lot of movement in the French market particularly, but I guess it was really triggered by these European parliamentary elections.
Yeah, and you have the European Parliamentary elections, which is, you'll remember, its elections for the European Parliament, which is controls some parts of European policy, not all parts of European policy. And the sort of headline sounds uninteresting in the sense that the sort of center grouping that's led by represented by ursul LeVander Lyine, the current European Commission President, did still emerge as the largest grouping. It got about
sixty percent of the votes. But as expected, you did have quite a lot of success. About quarter of the votes went to far right parties. And as you say, there was a particular humbling of the sort of center and the established parties in France and Germany. Olaf Schual Socialist Party was completely hammered by the Alternative for Deutschland and other parties in Germany, and you had the rise of Harassan Bleumre Nacionale used to be the National Front, the far right party in France.
So let's turn to France from her, because that was an immediate aftermath of this. As we saw President mccront I think surprise, maybe even his own party and say let's have a snap election right away.
Here.
At the same time, there's a real resurgence of the right of center, maybe well right of center of Marie Le Penn and her party. What could that mean the selection in terms of the French economy, you know.
It's extraordinary.
We had at the start of the a few weeks ago we had the surprise decision by Richie Sounact to call an election, but he did have to kind of call one in the next months, and we were just surprised that he was doing it sooner in Matt Kroll's case, and he surprised people in his own office. As far as we can see, he held it very close to that decision. He's kind of got a reputation in the
past for having taken enormous risks. He took an enormous risk in running for president without an established party all those years ago, so you can see this as kind of part of his mo o. But it has left open a wide range of outcomes and.
The one really source of stability, ironically appears to be Italy and Ms Maloney, who came out of these elections rather well. There was a time that lot that long ago where we thought she was sort of an extreme but now she's seeing a reasonable centrist.
Yeah.
I mean, it's very interesting, isn't it. And we are going to see her the end of this week.
We've had her.
Leading the hosting the G seven summit in Pulio, which is not a bad place to have it this time of year, and very amicable, considered to be a very credible leader in Europe, has very much been normalized and become the acceptable face of the far right in Europe. I would you know, she's got some problems percolating under the surface. The Italian debt, always an issue, is becoming
more and more of an issue. It's now on a more unsustainable path and could has already in fact is violating the European Union's rules on how much you can borrow. So she's going to be having a tussle with them about how much she has to tighten policy, and that could make her more politically unpopular in Italy. But you know, it is interesting you see the likes of Marine la Penn in France, who has a very odd mixture of economic policies, quite far left policies that I think investors
would be concerned about. She you know, many people are saying the best path for her if she would be the sort of maloney path of actually building credibility with the markets and being mainstream in economic ways even as you are being quite far right or certainly culturally right on immigration and other things. So that's another interesting doesn't look like Marine la Penn's really going to be able to pull off the same trick that Georgia Maloney's pulled off.
Stephanie, thank you, so, it's always great to have you with us. That is Bloomberg's own She's Stephanie Flanders. Coming up, we look at where the Indian economy heads next, as Prime Minister Mody begins his third term with the Rasher Sharma of Rockefeller International.
Even though Moody one, it is seen by many people as some sort of a Motori defeat.
That's next on Wall Street Week on Bloomberg.
This is Bloomberg Wall Street Week with David Weston from Bloomberg Radio.
This is Wall Street Week. I'm David Weston. Prime Minister Mody has begun his third term after an election that did not give his party the clear majority many had expected. To take us through what we should expect next, Welcome back now Rashir Sharma. He's chairman of Rockefeller International and author of the new book What Went Wrong with Capitalist and Welcome back.
Thanks David.
So we're going to talk about your new book. Before that, let's just spend a minute or two on India, because we've talked about it before. You were one of the first ones that I saw who suggested maybe it wouldn't be a landslide for Moti. What are the possible consequences you think for economic policy of what we've seen.
Well, I think that the way the election result has been interpreted is that in some ways it's seen as if this is a two speed economy going on in India. That the urban consumer is in good health and almost booming, but the rural economy in India in many parts at least, is in some sort of distress. So I suspect that there'll be some shift in terms of the spending priorities of the government in favor more of the rural economy and trying to do something a bit more about that.
But I'd say the big takeaway of this election, and I think that this is something which I think has been really underappreciated. If you look at elections around the world, and particularly if you look at even India's electoral history, after an election, it is usually viewed as a mandate for some thing, and at the same time, the opposition, at least for a while, goes into retreat. They've just lost an election. They go into retreat and try and regroup.
What's very unique about this Indian election is that even though Modi one, it is seen by many people as some sort of a model defeat just because the benchmark was so high and he's ended up with seats which are well short of the majority mark, just for his own party. On the other hand, the opposition is already behaving as if it won. It's been emboldened. It's out there much more aggressive, and a lot of the postport
analysis is why did the opposition do so well? So this is a very strange election that way, that it's not been a cleansing or a catharsis. In some way, it's been like in terms of the consequences are going to be that the opposition from day one is going to be emboldened and I dare say almost disruptive. So I don't see that much policy action take place in India given this verdict.
You mentioned urban versus rural. What about socioeconomic distinctions, because there have been some reports I've seen that. In fact, one of the things that turned on providence fromorality was the fact that the lower income people felt that they'd been left behind.
Yeah, but I think there are many stories in India because you know, what is true in one state is not true in another state. And I think that's the part about India which we have spoken about, and something which I think is not you know, fully understood by many people that what happened in this election also is
that there was no wave. There was no wave for Modi. Instead, we ended up in the traditional India where every state had its own contest in many ways, and so therefore you got an outcome which was an aggregation of what the various states were doing. And you're right there was some feeling in some states which even I traveled to, such as Maharashtra, where a lot of people felt that they were not getting the benefits of what was being promised and they were facing some sort of local issues.
So that's true in terms of socio economic divide. And yes, more of the poet it seems, did vote, and more of the so called what they call it India, the backward cast, they voted for the opposition parties rather than more these So that's true, but it's a much more nuanced story. But the broad takeaway, as I said, is that I expect very little to get done in terms of new policies over the next year from an economic perspective.
One of the things we talked about in the past, was the growth policies of Premiercermoti combined with relative restraint on inflation being able to really contain That is it likely that in order to reach out to some of the people that he did not bring along with him, Premian Soromoti will be driven to drive higher inflation through more stimulus.
I hope not, because I feel that if there's one relative success story that the government had over the last five to ten years, it was on keeping inflation relatively low. And of course in India's case, whenever you go out and talk to people, they will always tell you that rising prices is an issue because in India's case, so many people are living at the margin they can't afford any increase in prices. But generally, in India's case, the
inflation performance was much better. In fact, the big problem with the previous government was that they let inflation get out of control. So I think if he has any sort of you know, like sensitivity to what people want, and I think this is true everywhere we see it in the US as well, that we don't know whether good economic growth gets you re elected, but we do know for sure that if you end up with high
inflation that gets you into big trouble. And even the US, which we'll speak about, the high inflation rates of the last three to four years are a real problem for the Biden administration.
Congratulations for share another book out. So let's talk about it exactly the thesis of this book, because it is a statement, not a question about what went wrong? So what has gone wrong? How do you know it's gone wrong?
When I look at the poll numbers, for example, that on one hand, you have, like, you know, all this great data that the American economy is relatively resilient. But if you look at the number of people who are happy in America with the state of the economic union, it is at close to record lows. According to many Poles, there are about seven to ten Americans today who want the major change to the economic system or, in the language of the polls, have it completely torn down. You know,
that's pretty dramatic. There are only about thirty five percent or so Americans today who feel that they're going to be better off than their parents. Fifty sixty years ago, about seventy eighty percent of Americans felt that they would be better off than their parents. So there's a real feeling that something has gone wrong. And I think that it's particularly the fact to do with capitalism that most young democrats in particular in America today say they would
rather have socialism than have capitalism. Now that's such a big statement for this beacon of American capitalism and all that we've spoken about of global capitalism. Rather, they are saying that they would rather have socialism a large cohort of the millennials and the young people, rather than have capitalism. So something has gone wrong. And what I've done in this book is to sort of look at deep down what's gone wrong, because, as they say, the first step
to a cute is to first diagnose the problem. But I feel that in America today we're not even diagnosing what the underlying problem is.
Why does it make sense from your partu view having studied this, Now, if you didn't know anything about our society, if you didn't read any of the media, you didn't read any of the polls, and you looked at our growth rate, which is add or above historical trend lines. You looked at unemployment which is close to lows of all time, most indications would say this should be a pretty happy economy.
So why is it not exactly so? Because after I said that, there's a sliver it at the top, which is doing very well, But we have this two track economy out here that even now if you look at it, you know, the bottom fifty to sixty percent, they don't have any excess savings. They're not being able to spend that much. And as I said that, there's a feeling that they're being squashed by what's happening at the top.
That today in America, economic mobility, social mobility, all of declined significantly, Like this is a country where people would move around, a lot of people would be in search of an opportunity. As I said, there's a real feeling in America today that they don't have equality of opportunity.
Is it the government's fault in this sense? Two and eight, two thousand and nine, we had the Great Financial Crisis. There was concern about a depression, not just a great recession, but a depression, and there was a lot of government intervention, both on the monetary side and the fiscal side. A lot of people thought that was necessary to save us and maybe the world from depression. Then you had a pandemic and we brought the economy to a stop, and
again it was start. There did be a lot of stimulus. Was it the government's fault? Didn't they need to come in and have this level of stimulus and support.
Yeah. As I say in the book that when we have a crisis, I can understand that the government needs to intervene. I'm not a kind of person who's you know, liquidation is that we just let things sort of, you know, go and melt away on its own. What I'm trying to it would have shown in the book is just look at the progression of capitalism over the last one
hundred years. We have gone from this liquidationist argument which caused the Great Depression in the nineteen thirties, to now an impulse where you liquefy, liquefy, liquefy that the moment you have even the slightest crisis like you had last year with the SVB or some the impulses, that we got to intervene, we got to save. And the problem is that we only have one case point, which is what we use all the time to justify intervention, which is that we think, if you don't intervene, we'll have
another great depression. That is the argument used all the time. But what's the result today. The result today is the fact that bankruptcies are close to a record low. We have the number of new startups instead, which have been coming up, right, but until the pandemic like have been declining. So if you keep so much deadwood alive, and you keep so many incumbents and entrenched billionaires and oligopolies alive, you're not allowing new things to really surface. And the
middle in particular is getting squeezed. So the argument in the book is that you're right that when we have in a crisis, you need some government help. But this is not just about crisis. This is about every time there's a minor flutter, you end up getting domin intervention. And it's not just about government spending. As I said, look at the amount of regulations every year, Like in America we introduce three thousand new regulations. How many regulations
have we withdrawn over the last twenty years, twenty in total? Right, So we got a regulatory state, a bailout nation that in America in the sixties and seventies, and all bailing out a private sector company in America was considered heretically. We are America, we don't do this. Then you begin with the nineteen eighty four first big financial institution bailout in terms of continental Illinois, and after that, progressively, every
time we have a crisis, the bailouts get bigger. And so that's again sort of you know, leaves a feeling with people that are you really a bailout nation? And if these you know, rich corporates are getting bailed out, the Irish person thinks, why am I not getting moored out of this? So it's about regulation, it's about bailouts. It's about government spending, which has gone up from three percent of GDP one hundred years ago to thirty six
percent of GDB today through every administration. We're almost regarding some air pockets here there or the other, we have seen an increase in government spending.
Every administration, incruing Reagan because people tend to think of Ronald Reagan as being a smaller government philosophy.
Yeah, but the facts just don't bear it out. Because under his administration, government spending increases slowed down a bit, but they kept on sort of you know, carrying on at pretty high levels. And then if you look at it in terms of what happened under him as far as regulations were concerned, even though under Reagan too those kept on going up. The only deregulation we saw was
the financial sector. The financial sectors a lots of deregulation, but outside of that, for the small and medium sized businesses, the regulatory burden has kept getting bigger. And this has real consequences, David, because it means that if you're looking to start a new business, the cost of doing that today is way higher on Wall Street, where for example, if you're looking to start a fund today, it's ten times in terms of the cost compared to twenty years ago.
So you know, that just means that if you're already in business, or if you're a big person in business, you're able to benefit. So capitalism today in its distorted form, has become pro incumbent, and it has become a pro big business, whereas its true form capitalism should be pro competition and pro Churin the.
Book is What Went Wrong with Capitalism and the author is Rushirm Sharma of Rockefeller International, coming up the unique partnership of Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger through the eyes of they're a lawyer for over fifty years. Ron Olsen of Munger, Tolls and Os, I'd know no partnerships that have lasted as long as the two.
Of them had.
That's the next time Wall Street Week on Bloomberg.
This is Bloomberg Wall Street Week with David Weston from Bloomberg Radio.
This is Wall Street Week. I'm David Weston. Warren Buffett or Charlie Munger would have been historic investors individually if they'd never met one another. But they did meet and formed a partnership for over fifty years. One which they're a lawyer. Ron Olsen of Munger Toles and Olsen observed from close up almost since it began. We talked with Ron about that partnership, what made it work and what made it different.
Neither Warren nor Charlie are typical. Did they have problems that were similar, Yes, but Warren and Charlie had the owner's attitude from day one and took a deep, deep interest in any problem. They did their own more. They didn't believe in consultants. They didn't believe in uh, you know, figuring out compensation for the managers with a compensation consultant. They operated independent of Wall Street, so they were very different than most other clients, I would say, and the
fact that they owned the problem. They each had a deep understanding of every problem I got into. Maybe the first one was that was significant was when they acquired the Buffalo Evening News and within a few days thereafter, the competitive newspaper, The Courier Express, filed an anti trust case with a rather loudmouth planet Off's attorney from San Francisco that I knew well it had a lot of
fun with actually Fred Furd and uh so. I spent a good part of that winner on that case, and Warren, of course was deeply interested in it as well as Charlie. He claimed that the process that was being used by really Warren developed to introduce the Buffalo Evening News as a competitive morning paper as opposed to an afternoon paper,
was monopolization. Judge Briant in the trial court wrote a lengthy, lengthy opinion against us and basically made the point that Berkshire had not complied with the rules the marquee Queensberry and Henry Friendley, and his opinion said, I've searched the antitrust laws up and down and I couldn't find that rule of the marquee a Queensberry. But at any rate, Warren and I got to know each other, and of
course many other sins. I would say that we were in the trenches the law longest in the Solomon problem, and they're after you know, you build a relationship that always goes beyond the problem. Ron talks about risk.
I mean at risk is at the center of investment decisions, and it's also an important part of what lawyer does is assess risk and a prize clients at that risk. How does Warren Buffett approach risk in your experiences as lawyer?
Well carefully and he approaches it also often with Charlie. I mean they would talk rarely, and particularly if you're talking about risk associated with an investment that was a regular occurrence, and each of them approach that, I think somewhat differently. They have a different set of priorities, a different set of readings, a different set of life experiences. Born as you know, very gregarious out front. He's the
one who cuts the deals. Charlie is still sitting in his chair, as his kids say, he looks like a book with two legs, reading every day. Now. The two of them had this unique partnership. And it's another reason I don't have a lot of clients with a unique partnership like that. There's complete trust. There was a grounding in I would say Midwestern values. Warren had and Charlie too, had both had big, developed accounting capabilities. They both read
all the financials, knew them well. But they didn't buy companies without an established record of consistent profits for five years or more, a leadership that they trusted with, that were that had integrity and had run the companies that they were about to acquire. And one question Warrenois asked was is this person going to love the money more than he loves the business, because Berkshire is about to make him very rich? And if they did, it wasn't
a deal. They did. If they loved the business more, that's who we want. And so it was a combination of risk assessment. But as I say, I think Charlie added the perspective that uh and he was guided. He read every great psychologist and knew all the biases that exist in judgment and the enthusiasm of deal was more evident and warn u but confirmation bias was something Charlie guarded against and everything he did, and.
Those are some of the thoughts having watched this partnership for over fifty years, as you say, from a pretty close distance, Actually what caused it to sustain it.
Has to be clear. Charlie joined the board in nineteen seventy five, but the partnership of the two of them informal and then later very much a part of Berkshire Hathaway existed.
Yes, so that partnership what sustained it, because we have seen other partnerships that are based on mutual trust and different contributions to the two partners and that have been close partnerships, but they don't tend to last for over fifty years.
Well, I would say a couple of things. I mentioned the common backgrounds. They both had IQs that are off
the chart. They both respected that they both had memories that exceeded mind, and they respected that they both were interested in building a company that would have permanence and committed themselves to it, particularly when Warren went along with Charlie finally and moved from buying what were referred to as cigarette companies with a few puffs left at a cheap price, and Charlie convinced them that it's far better for permanence to buy wonderful companies at a fair price
than fair companies at a wonderful price, and they were dedicated to that. And as Warren said in his Tribute to Charlie and the Annual Letter, he let him take the bows. And he also knows in the letter that after he had blundered and made a mistake on something, Charlie never reminded him of it, and that Charlie was to Warren very much like the combination of a brother and a father.
You talk about permanence and the fact that Warren and Charlie wanted something that was permanent. Unfortunately, in human institutionions, nothing's permanent. We've lost Charlie Munger Sadlely, Warren has no inclination in fears of goingwhere at the same time there will come a time when he's no longer with us. Have they succeeded? You think in setting up something that can be permanent, that can outlast even Warren Buffett, that's.
Not only the idea, but I am confident that that's what says been built by the two of them, and the board understands that it's ongoing obligation post Warren and let's not get ahead of ourselves. He's not going anywhere soon. I had a wonderful conversation with you yesterday morning, and you know, the enthusiasm, the thinking is still there, just
like it always was. But I would say that the Board has done a very good job in helping to maintain the post Warren permanence by having Gray Gabel as a designated successor.
That was Ronallson of Munger, Tolls and Olsen. George Bernard Shaw advised that those who cannot change their minds cannot change anything. Our leaders typically tend to want to change things without changing their minds, or at least admitting they're changing them, epitomized in the immortal words of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to.
Those waiting with bated breath for that favorite media catchphrase, the U turn. I have only one thing to say, You turn if you want to. The ladies not for turning.
But there are exceptions, as when then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the United States would make a pivot away from Europe and toward Asia in its policies going forward.
We have reached a pivot point.
We now can redirect some of those investments to opportunities and obligations elsewhere, and Asia stands out as a regent where opportunities abound.
This week, we've had any number of leaders political and business very publicly changed their direction, starting with Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, who thought better of his decision to cut short his time of the D Day commemoration and hurry back to campaign, admitting he'd made a bad mistake. Israeli opposition leader Benny Gantz changed his mind about participating in a wartime cabinet and said the Prime Minister Netanelle is now quote preventing us from advancing to real victory.
What is the actual plan and that's not clear yet, and that frustration is what led Benny Gants to decide we can't do this anymore and take his party out.
A lot of European voters apparently changed their minds about where the European Parliament should be headed, as they flocked to more conservative opposition parties.
This right wing search did actually take place in the two most important countries in Europe, not across the entire continents.
Which caused French President Macron to shake things up by calling a snap election of his own parliament.
Above all.
I hope that on June thirtieth and July seventh, the French will elect as many MPAs as possible from the presidential majority.
But perhaps the biggest about face we saw this week came from Sherry Redstone, who had been flirting for months with a big deal that would merge Paramount into David Ellison's sky Dance. Just as Global Wall Street was getting ready for the big announcement, just as a special committee of her board was getting ready to approve the transaction, Miss Redstone apparently changed her mind and decided she wanted to stay in the entertainment business her father had founded.
After all, at least for a Now, there's a fifty percent chance that nothing happened that in the end, Sherry says, this is too much.
I will just keep the company.
This is not the first time Paramount has needed to turn things around, as his own miniseries They'll offer on Paramount Plus recently explained it was in bad shape in their early nineteen seventies. Now all Sherry Redstone needs is a godfather. Paramount is going to come crashing down.
We need his You've read the guy Father, right? Godfather? Sure? Who has that?
Does it? For this episode of Wall Street Week, I'm David Weston. This is Bloomberg. See you next week.