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We're going to bring the companies back. We're going to lower taxes so further for companies that are going to make their product in the USA. We're going to protect those companies with strong tariffs. Because I'm a believer in tariffs. I'm not sure that you are. I don't think you are, but I congratulate you in your career. But to me, the most beautiful word in the dictionary is tariff, and it's my favorite word. It needs a public relations.
Firm.
Welcome back to Vhotonomics, where politics and markets collide. This year, voters around the world have the ability to move markets, countries, and economies like never before, so we created this series to help you make sense of it all. I'm Stephanie Flanders joining you this week from the Bloomberg New Economy Forum in South Pawlin.
I'm Adrian Waldridge and I'm Algra Stratton. And both Adrian and I are in the Less Glamorous London.
So we started the show with that clip from former President Donald Trump's conversation with Bloomberg's editor in chief John Mickelthwaite at the Economic Club of Chicago last week. For about an hour, John asked Trump about his platform. They talked about taxes, immigration, but what they talked most about and obviously which made voter nomics excited, was tariff's And I guess it's not so surprising when, as you just heard,
tariff is Trump's favorite word. I guess another surprise, Allegra and Adria was not just that, but the fact that there was so much support in the audience. This Chicago Economic Club members respectable business folk.
You know.
Some people have said that they must have packed the room the Trump people, and there were quite a lot of staffers there. But actually I think the main reason my colleagues who were sitting at tables during the event waiting for them to come on, said no, absolutely, these were These were regular, respected members of the Midwest business community who really like tariffs, even though most economists think
that they're bad for business. So I thought it would be exciting for the three of us to get into whether we should be so surprised by all this. We're going to talk to a very distinguished economist about it, Danny Roderick, who's not so surprised, And we're going to have a chat with John Mickelthwaite about the event itself and what he took away from it. But Adrian, you think America's history provides part of the answer to this.
Yeah, yeah, absolutely. I think America has always been a very pro tariff country, and I think a lot of British people, British free traders in particular, tend to think of America as being like a giant version of Britain and a giant free trading nation. And I think from the foundation of the country, from Alexander Hamilton's infant industry reports,
America has relied on tariffs. It's relied on tariffs to raise revenue because the federal government wasn't allowed initially to raise taxes, and also on tariffs to sort of shape industrial policy to catch up with the United Kingdom at the time. And in particular, the Republican Party has been a very tariff focused party. The industrial Republicans have really relish tariffs as a way of keeping out British competition, Britain then being the most industrialized country in the world.
One peculiar, rather unpleasant example of this is that during the Civil War, the economists had a great internal debate as to whether to support the North or the South. The Economists magazine, that is, whether to support the North
or the South. And on the one hand, of the North was on the side of abolishing slavery, but on the other side, the South was in favor of free trade because they depended on trade in cotton, and the Economists rather unfortunately came out with the conclusion that free trade was a more important principle than abolishing slavery, so they decided for a while at least to endorse the South.
So you get very counterintuitive things. And it's only really after nineteen forty five, when America is by far the most powerful country in the world that it embraces free trade and free trade because it doesn't really have any competition. So there is this muscle memory in the United States, particularly in the Midwest and particularly in the business community, of tariff's being really rather good American things.
Can you imagine in the UK that being something that had a prime minister I will want to be would go out and say I'm going to do an hour's interview. A you can't imagine that, or not many of them, but then B that they would say this is going to be my news line, my news line is going to be, you know, tariff's the most beautiful world my
favorite word. And then secondly, I think it really for me round home the United Kingdom and the debate in this country obviously understandably focused on the budget net week, but that we have not processed what the economics of the next American president might mean for the United Kingdom.
You know, this thing that is quite boring. I mean, in general, tarifsts have been considered pretty boring. A bit
of international trade has been very politically potent. There was a fantastic bit of research that David Ortor did, the economist who had also did a lot to put all of the information about the China shock to manufacturing workers on the map, and he's looked at whether or not the tariffs and the first Trump administration helped employment in those protected sectors, those bits of manufacturing, and in fact, it didn't sort of help or hurt in those sexes,
and it definitely hurt in jobs, as you'd imagine, in the industries that found that their costs were much higher because these imports were now more expensive, whether it's on steel or other things. But even though it hadn't been economically successful, like it actually hadn't helped the groups it was supposed to help, and it had hurt other groups.
It had been more politically successful. He'd gone to these counties and found that there were there were more tariffs, there was less support for Democrats, more support for Republicans. So you can see why he's continued down this road.
One reason why America can afford to be pro tariffs, of course, is that it's a gigantic internal market. It's a huge America when it was hiding behind these tariffs, also had behind it the world's biggest market. And you know, Europe was absolutely crisscrossed with tiny countries and all of which had barriers to trade in tariffs. America was a
free trading you know, subcontinent hiding behind barriers. The other thing about in the early twentieth century, the Republicans and the business community were a pro tariff community, but then there were a rising power that wasn't really central to the world economy. Now they are central to the world economy. So the implications of the world's most important country intertwined with the rest of the world institutionally and through commerce
to tariffs is absolutely massive and massively negative. In a way that it wasn't historically.
Yeah, and we'll get into some of that. We're going to talk to the Harvard professor, Danny Rodrick, Professor of International Political Economy at Harvard Kennedy School. But first we thought we should have a quick chat with the man himself, John Michaelthwaite. Let's have a reminder first of some of all that tariff talk in his interview.
You're going to basically stop trade with China. You're talking about sixty percent trade on that, sixty perent tariffs on that. You're talking, as you said, one hundred two hundred percent or things you don't really like. You're also talking about twenty ten, twenty percent tariffs on the rest of the world. That is going to have a serious effect on the overall economy. And yes, you're going to find some people who were gained from individual tariffs. The overall effect could be massive.
I agree, it's going to have a massive effect. Positive effect. It's going to be a positive Let me just no, no, let me get me committed. You are to this, and it must be hard for you. You know, spend twenty five years talking about tariffs has been negative and then have somebody explained to you that you're totally wrong. It will have a negative.
It will have.
If you don't forty million jobs. There's a lot of jobs to rely on. They're all coming back. What about consumers people out there, they're going to be the biggest critics. Say, your tariffs will end up being like a national sales tax because the country, if you have America at the moment, has three trillion dollars worth of imputs. You're going to add tariffs to every single one of them. That is going to push up the costs for all those people
who want to buy foreign goods. Is just simple mathematics, President Trump.
It's not. Yeah, it is, but that the way you've figured that was always very good in mathematics.
Let me tell you.
You're saying three trainia those companion dollars and they don't have to pay. And the higher the tariff, the more likely it is to have them come into.
The higher the tariff, the more you're going to put on the value of that those goods, the higher people are going to pay in shops.
John, thanks so much for joining us on voter nomics. You're here with me in South Paulo, where we're both interviewing some very exciting people. I have the US Trade Representative Catherine tie which I think will be Gates, and I think both of those will be quite different from
your interview with the former President Trump. Now you've said you want the interview to stand on its own and not do commentary around it, and we're obviously going to respect that, but I did want to ask you whether you were surprised by the focus on tariffs and sort of whether it changed your understanding of how much that was going to drive his policy and might continue to shape our world if we do see Trump reelected.
I've left the interview to stand there because I think what's important is what he said rather than particularly what I think that on the issue of tariff's. I think it was a surprise to many people just how clear he is about what he wants to do there, and I think it makes it quite difficult for people in the business community who've sat there saying, well, look, he isn't really going to do this, when I think it's
one of his core beliefs. It's something that goes all the way back to his initial opposition to n after a long long time ago, when that was very unfashionable in the business community. And I think it's something that's actually a kind of key part of Donald Trump. And I think he feels frustrated that he wasn't able to do more in the first in the first term, and
he's coming back in it. And you look at the region where we are, you know, Brazil, Brazil suddenly beginning to think about the European Union in a different light. You look at what's happening up in Mexico, the idea of one thousand percent tariffs landing on particular factories. These are things that could change the world fairly dramatically.
Do you think we're exaggerating the difference between him and quite a lot of previous certainly Republican presidents. I mean, even in the eighties, you know, there has been often been a very transactional approach to trade, and one sided deals have been done. Pressure was put on Japan at key moments and everything else. I mean, if you were just looking at this through an America first lens, could an America first lens actually achieved quite a lot for the American economy.
You can argue that it did a bit in the first term. Is that it didn't cause as much damage as some people thought, but it was just a lot smaller. I think it was on three hundred and sixty billion dollars worth of goods. Now he's aiming at the whole three trillion dollars of imports, which is a much bigger zone, I think, compared with previous efforts in this regard. Yes, America has always had had something of an industrial policy.
You can remember the stuff about Japan in the nineteen eighties, you can see what they've done on chips more recently, and you can just take the basic attitude that there isn't a lot of There isn't that much difference between what has happened so far because Biden has hung on to most of Trunk's tariffs. I think the difference is
now that he is massively expanding that front. I mean that there is a big difference between hitting three hundred and sixty billion dollars worth of goods and hitting three trillion. I mean that that is much larger. The sort of numbers he's implying he's going to do are much bigger. And the interesting question will be whether other countries kind of cave or whether they unite. Possibly against it.
John's just said that that tariffs are much deeper in the Trump psyche than we perhaps had imagined. It's really a core for foundational belief for Trump, and I think you could also say that tariffs are much deeper in the American psyche than we'd often imagined. If you go back to Hamilton and the infant industry's arguments, you know, he based his entire text system on tariffs. The federal government couldn't tax, so it paid for itself by tariffs.
You had very high tariffs protecting American industries all the way through the nineteenth century. So America's pro tariff country, particularly you know, in Chicago and places like that, and particularly with the Republican Party. But nevertheless, when you had Smooth Hawley coming in in nineteen thirty, which was an imposition of new tariffs, a large number of big new tariffs on top of already existing tariffs that plunged the world economy and the United States into a deeper depression.
So even if you have a background of tariffs, if you exaggerate and increase that predilection, you can you know, two enormous damage. He does have a smooth All these sort of mindset.
I mean, it's quite interesting that he is this time. You know, he would be taking on many of the bedrocks of kind of other people's economies, so German cars, that is a very big deal.
You know.
He boasted about how he persuaded Macron to kind of give in over things, but by mentioning champagne and wine. But there's some point where luxury goods. If he goes for that again, it's going to be difficult, and I think it does. You know, it is the danger you mentioned smooth Paulo. The danger of tariffs is that it begins to create a narrative, is that there is a limit to how much another country can quietly give in. I do think in America there are deep antecedents on this.
As Adrian pointed out, the favorite word which I saw Howard Lutnik use on television was, you know, McKinley is the is the go to president for a lot of the Republican Party at the moment, because it provides a reason to say it won't be that bad. This is how it's a great strong American tradition, and there is you know, there is definitely an advantage in being America because the economy is so big, so I think it definitely could correct me. I think it's like twenty seven
percent of the American economy is reliant on trade. I think other places it's much much higher because they're small. You know, you're Britain, I think you're twice that or totally one and a half times that. And the reason why is, you know, in Britain is a smaller place where you're almost bound to be importing the exporting things.
Just a bit of Devil's advocate a bit. I mean, his view is that America being the biggest still the biggest kid on the block in these negotiations. You know, we didn't in your interview, didn't explicitly talk about retaliation. But of course a lot of the costs that we see for the US economy from this from having tariffs is the response that other countries would make. You know, that it would be harder for US country companies to export.
So you might be helping some, you might be helping some import competing industries, but you would be damaging those exporters. I think his implicit line is, well, let them try, because we're big enough, we can threaten them with something else, we can cut them off swift or whatever it might be. You know, he's talking, he thinks everything's on the table, you know, short run, that's probably true, I think.
I think also it's part of a narrative whereby he thinks that America has been hoodwinked, has been given everything away. Lutlik on the on the television was complaining about the Marshall Plan. You know, America is trying to do everything for everybody else and it's and again that slightly goes against history in the sense of, you know, you look at all these things like what happened with Japan, what happened with chips. Secondly, quite interestingly, and Faried Sigaria has
made this point quite entertainingly. If you know, these people who think that America has sold itself down the river. By virtually every measure, the American economy has grown at the expense of the European one. So if the Europeans are doing something devious, they're not doing it very well. And the worry is that this actually could come back. You know, there is a point at which every politician cannot keep giving.
In my reflection, to take two of your points. The one you just mentioned there around Trump thinking that you know, America's kind of been you know, bailing everyone out or whatever is around defense spending, and we've talked about it before, talk about it again. But we've got a budget coming next week where they may or may not get up to two point five percent on defense spending. But the question I have and lots of people have, is is it going to be enough for a possible second president Trump?
And then the second point is the effect for Britain, an open economy, of being in the middle of what could end up being a trade war. We're having this debate about a set of fiscal numbers and budget that feels slightly like it's not even processed. The content of your interview last week, John.
You could argue that no country in the world is kind of more exposed in some ways to trump Ism than Britain. In this way, because it is possible, or it would be very difficult, it's possible for the European Union to kind of unite around the idea that they also have a market and maybe they can do deals with countries like Brazil and Mercers or Africa. Then they can have a big enough, free enough market to get
quite a lot of the benefits of free trade. In the same way as if America cuts itself off from the world, it can do fairly well. The one the one country Britain is, you know, possibly alongside places like Singapore, is very badly based on that because we were part of this big market where we could have been really quite that might even have worked somewhat in Britain's favor if we were still part of the European Union. Now it's much much harder.
Well, the only thing I would say is I think the one thing that could protect the UK, which I agree is otherwise very vulnerable to a global trade war is the fact that Donald Trump does seem to see in his transactional approach he judges where the country has good trade policies by what the trade balances with the US, and we are one of very few countries that actually has a has a deficit with the US, so he may he may let the u UK off, whereas he's
definitely you could tell from the interview he's got Europe in his sites, because there's there's a big, big surplus of a lot more goods coming in from Europe than going out to Europe. From the US John Mick, thank you very much.
Thank you.
Let's talk now to Danny Roderick. Danny is a widely respected economist Ford Foundation Professor of International Political Economy at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, also the author of many books on globalization, trade, and related subjects. Danny Roderick,
thank you so much for joining us. We've just been hearing some of the snippets from our edister in chief's conversation with Donald Trump last week, which was surprisingly to some dominated by talk of tariffs, and it certainly I think brought home that interview how much the America First approach frames his way of looking at a lot of policy, and certainly international policy. And we hear a lot about how terrible that is and all the risks and downsides
from sort of traditional economic standpoint. But I'm interested, given your record of being quite open minded and often critical of the mainstream approach to globalization and global integration, I just wondered where you thought that his approach might be getting it right, and whether protectionism more generally, you know, maybe has its place in a more balanced view of global integration.
Yeah. Actually I don't think, you know, he's getting it right. It's not because I think tariffs are going to be tremendously costly. I think it's more because I think a strategy that focuses on tariffs is just going to miss the bigger picture, and it's just going to be frankier distraction from the agenda that does need to be pursued to revive of the middle class and create good jobs and strengthen the uran's economy. I don't think there's anything
wrong per se with in a Matria first policy. I don't think there's anything wrong per se with economic nationalism. In fact, I think all elected governments are elected to advance the interests of their nation, the interests of their own national economies. When they do it right, actually they do a service not only do their own electorate, they
do service for the world economy as a whole. I think, especially for an economy that's systemically as important as the United States, there's no creator gift that a US president can provide to the rest of the world than by generating a strong, thriving, innovative US economy. But I think the problem with tariffs is that it's just not the way to go about do that. And I can get into the details if you want, but I think the main point is that tariffs are a distraction.
Well, I just just to follow up on that, because I saw you'd also written a piece about sort of being a bit more when you talk about countries moving in a more nationalistic direction economically and specifically policies, which are you know, we've sort of got used to thinking
that a level playing field. We must be looking for a level playing field at all times, and then when countries introduce policies that seem to try and skew the playing field or are very supporting their producers over others, we've tended to always just condemn that as against free trade and against integration. But you suggested we should be more nuanced in the way we look at those kind of more nationalistic policies.
I think all successful economic strategies are a mix of letting markets and private firms in their thing, and then governments giving them a little nudge here and there. Sometimes it takes a form of subsidizing them. Occasionally in the past is taking the form of trade restrictions. So I think we need to be open minded. I think the problem with just focusing on town first and foremost is
that it just doesn't give the necessary note. You basically are just telling producers I'm going to allow you to raise prices, and generally speaking, if you allow them to raise prices, they might produce a little bit more so you might get a domestics supply response for those industries that will receive the trade protection. But there's nothing in tariffs per se that will get them to innovate, to create good jobs, to bring online the industries of the
future and technologies of the future. Tariffs are okay as a temporary shield when you have a genuine industrial strategy or a genuine economic strategy that is targeting all the challenges of our day, whether it's good jobs or climate change or addressing the needs of lagging regions. But on their own, they're just a very instrument. They're lack essentially any power to achieve those ends.
Danny Cauld ask you a little bit about about history, because I think the British in particular, but also the economic profession in general, tend to think of America historically as being like a big version of Britain, and they
think if it's as being a free trading nation. But actually, surely tariffs have been central to American history, the free trading regimes relatively recent, and so if you saw the reaction to Trump's talking about tariffs, that hits something quite deep in the American psyche, doesn't it.
I think that's right. I think it is good to bring in history. And it's true that America basically caught up and surpassed Britain the second half of the nineteenth
century behind very high levels of tariffs. But if you looked at that experience and you thought it was just the tariffs that did it, you would really mess everything else that was taking place, whether it's the land grand colleges, whether it's the investment in public infrastructure, whether it was or the other encouragements to domestic industries that was taking place.
They don't like to be doctrinaire about tariffs, and I do think that much of the discussion today about the cost of Trump's tarffs really paint a picture that sort of it's the worst possible outcome. I mean, I can give you a scenario where Trump's tariffs, let's say ten percent across the board tariffs on all imports could generate a catastrophe. But I sort of think it's unlikely that that's what will happen. I think again, what I worry about is that that becomes the US strategy.
But just to repeat a historical point, you could easily argue that the Republican Party is essentially historically a protectionist party. It was a protectionist party in the late nineteenth century, it was a protectionist party in the nineteen twenties. There was an aberration with Reagan. But basically Trump is taking that party back to its roots, which is why the guys in Chicago were cheering him.
That is true. So the Republicans were, of course the party of high tariffs because they were the party of business, and business were you know, trying to was trying to compete with Britain, which was of course the major economic power of the day. But there's another tradition in US economic history, which is actually a free trade tradition that
comes from a somewhat different side. Historically, one of the most significant populist traditions was the one that rose to the four in the United States in the eighteen nineties with the US People's Party.
Norman It's almost the great socialist presidential candidate. I think six times presidential candidate it was a free trader, and Cootel Holl of course is a free trade it's much more on the left, the free trading tradition and the rights much more protectionist.
I think, you know. So there has been in the progressive tradition certainly a kind of a free trade, strong free trade stream, and part of it is as the US progressive believes that Tariff's high tariffs were actually a giveaway to the business. And that's why US progressives, for example, didn't like Taris because they thought there was a pro business it was a kind of it was a pro elite policy.
So what I'm trying to get at is that Trump is not necessarily this great aberration for the Republican party. He's actually going back to quite a deep Republican business tradition of protectionism.
Well, yes and no. But again, I think the US position in the world economy has changed so much that I think it's difficult to draw a very I think the reason that the US conservative establishment and the business established and became free trader after the Second World War was just the sense that the US economy was on top of the world, that their interests were going to be best served by free trade, So maybe going back to that tradition is also party that the US has
lost ground that is balling behind.
Denny, you've made a name over the years for pointing out the sort of inconvenient truths about international economics and highlighting when there were several objectives that we'd like to think we can achieve all at the same time, and you would say, no, you can only achieve two out of three. You talked about trilemmas. There was a very famous one more years ago about globalization, which I don't
want to get into. But more recently you've highlighted that if we have countries like the US but also European Union it's now imposing tariffs on China other countries concerned about restoring the middle class in advanced economies, countries can't do that and combat climate change and still provide a sort of path to development for places like China but also other developing countries. You can't do all three of those, you've suggested, you could only do two out of the three.
I just wondered if you could go into that a bit more, and I guess sort of highlight you know, if whatever we think about Donald Trump's policies. He's not alone in wanting to support and sort of re level the playing field in favor of advanced economies and to some extent protect the middle class from competition from developing countries. That's pretty damaging for the countries that have yet to develop.
Yeah, I mean, I think there's there's there are two
paths here. I mean one and the one that I worried about when I wrote about this new trilemma is that if we go down a path where we basically say the only way that we can lift up the middle class and address climate issues in the United States and Europe is through trade restrictions and through industrial policies that significantly discriminate against the rest of the world, then we're at the heart of that trilemma because we're going to really make it very difficult for the rest of
the world, especially in low income countries, to access markets in the rich countries. And so that's essentially the core of the trilemma. The other path is to realize that, in fact, if you wanted to add resk climate change and restore the middle class, you know, trade restrictions and this communitary industrial policies is not really the way you
would go about it. And so that's why I want to stress this is a trilemma that can be overcome if we manage to overcome two fetishes that we're having currently. One is a manufacturing fetish, the other is a kind of an overblown fear of China in the West. I think the manufacturing fetish shows up that in the idea that to create good jobs and show up the middle class you need protectionism. But of course there are very
few jobs in manufacturing today. Around eight percent of full labor force in the United States are in manufacturing, and there's no way no amount of protectionism is going to make a huge amount of difference to that. So if you want to address the middle class, both in the United States and Europe, you have to pursue policies that are very different from trade policies or industrial policies that
focus on manufacturing or high tech. And I think on climate change, there's no way you're going to address your climate change objectives without managing to allow developing countries to access the kinds of technologies and renewables and new kinds of investments that the US and Europe are trying to incentivize to their own industrial policy, so you'll have to facilitate that as well. So there is a trilemma on
the path that we're on. But it's in many ways it's kind of a false trialams it's driven by a kind of a false consciousness of manufacturing fetishism, an excessive concern about China, which sort of is driving is in fact a large part of this economic nationalism.
I can't imagine, given the sort of tone of the conversation, what would have happened if our editor in chief had accused Donald Trump of having a manufacturing fetish I think the conversation could have done a whole different direction. And I know you're particularly interested in the climate agenda. I wonder what you thought of well.
I mean, the thing that we discussed in the hey was something called the carbon border adjustment mechanisms. So I think you can do two of your three, which is essentially, if you make the import of goods that have relied on that appear to be cheap, that's because you've not priced carbon. If you make them more expensive, then you can then make more competitive goods that could be made within the United Kingdom, and so you create jobs and so on. So you can see that two of your
three have been hit. In that way, you have reduced the amount of carbon that's being imported, and you have also beefed up the number of jobs that you're making within in our case the United Kingdom, but it's relevant for lots of different countries. What you're then needing to do to be able to try and get anywhere close to the third you know, lever or the third leg of the trilema or lemma of the trial memor or
whatever we call it is. You're then having to think about how you use either the aid budget or other levers to support the international community, as you say, with
their transition to lower carbon technology. Some of the wealthier developing nations will do it without needing the support of rich nations because they're getting very rich themselves, but some of them will not be able to When you have what we have seen occasionally in the United Kingdom, which is this kind of worry about the eight budget being too generous and so on, that becomes difficult.
But I think that's a great example of both in the trial eva under our current path and the mist opportunity. In terms of the alternative path I presented the mist opportunity here is that the carbon border adjustment mechanism is actually raising revenue for the EU, and the point of the adjustment mechanism was not to generate revenue, was to
actually protect domestic industries. So why not use that revenue to rebate them directly to the countries exporting countries that will be harmed by these higher border tariffs and essentially providing an immediate plank between these revenues and incentivizing them through this transfer of the rebates of these revenues that you are being countries to incentivize them to engage in investments in renewrmal.
I suppose Professor Roderick, because one of the things that particular when we think about it with the United Kingdom hat on, and this is true some European countries, is that those countries electorates don't feel very rich. We're about to have a budget in the UK next week which will be fraud and it is not obvious how they can raise money in a way that is not painful
to some part of the electorate. So even though you know, compared to developing nations and so on, it's you know, in the United Kingdom, population is comfortable it's a fraud public debate.
And clearly in the UK has A has a bigger problem here because of I think an artificial sense of the pytical constraint. But for certainly the EU is something could have done that because the revenues were not a big part of the consideration in putting in in phasing in the border adjustment mechanism.
Daniel Rodgers, that was fantastic. I think we could have carried on a lot long and gone back into more of your analysis over the years of all these things, which has often predicted some of these debates, although I guess you probably didn't exactly predict Donald Trump, but certainly you predicted some of the tensions that produced him. But thanks very much, thank you, thank you, thanks for listening
to this week's vogion Nomics from Bloomberg. This episode was hosted by me Stephanie Flanders in South Paulo, with help from Adrian Waldridge and alegra Stratton. It was produced by some of Sadie, with production support from Isabella Ward and sound design by Moses and special thanks to John Mickelthwaite and Professor Danny Rodrick. Please subscribe, rate and review highly this podcast, wherever you listen to it,