The Best Iran War Breakdown You'll See on the Internet with Aimen Dean & Richard Miniter

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Hello everybody and a very warm welcome to our very special live update on the situation in Iran. We are super excited, if it's an appropriate word, to bring this to you because we have literally two of the very best guests in the world to discuss this.

Uh we have the amazing American investigative journalist, former repeated former guest of trigonometry, of course, Richard Minata, who's written a number of bestsellers, uh, including about terrorism, losing Bin Laden, mastermind, and leading from behind. And in addition to that, he's based in Washington DC, from which he can bring us all the inside Scooby.

And in addition to that, we of course have Eamon Dean, another former guest of the show, who is a former Al-Qaeda member, became an MI6 double agent, and he is now the co-host of the Conflicted podcast. With Thomas Moore, another of our former guests, which covers the various conflicts in the Middle East. And he's coming to us live from Dubai where he's literally got fighter jet.

uh uh zooming past them behind them. Uh so welcome to you both uh gentlemen and thank you so much for joining us. We really first and foremost just want to find out uh Richard tell us first and first of all what has happened in the last two days. Well, the it is the largest uh series of air sorties that Israel has ever conducted and one of the largest in US history as well.

Uh so we're looking at in the last forty eight hours, something approaching two thousand separate sorties, looking at Israel and uh the United States combined. Uh the this air operation is one of the largest in human history. Uh the number of targets on the ground destroyed, uh they're still doing battle damage assessments. uh but is immense. It is interesting what they're not striking. They're not striking uh water.

power uh and other things for the most part, except where those power facilities uh enable launching of long range missiles. Uh the most interesting thing to have happened which suggests that this will be a much longer conflict than necessary than might be strictly necessary if you think about it in terms of the twelve day war that was waged earlier this uh l late last year. Or you look at um the Gulf War, for example, the shock and awe campaign of the Gulf War.

Is that the Ayatollah Hamani before he died apparently issued standing orders to individual military units? Allowing them to act on their own. Iran's foreign minister in complaining on state run uh broadcasts.

about the attack on Oman, said we have no control over those units. They're f they're functioning on standing orders. They didn't mean to attack Iman Oman, but which has served as a a vital intermediary between The Europeans and the Americans on the one hand, and Iran on the other, long seen as a kind of Switzerland of the Gulf region, for them to be attacked.

indicates that the there's no longer centralized command and control over the military. They're deciding on their own targets and they're in a use it or lose it situation. In other words, if they do not use their rockets and missiles now, their drones now, uh, they may not exist twenty four, forty eight hours from now. So there is they're doing their own their own target selection.

What does all that mean strategically? It means that getting control, getting someone to negotiate with who could actually stop the Iranian attacks will be very difficult. The Iranians are very intelligent, very sophisticated, three D chess playing kind of uh people and have been for centuries. And the fact that that the Ayatollah figured this out in advance knew his life may well be taken and that of his top leadership dispersed authority down precisely to lengthen the war.

So this person who had has directed attacks against Israelis, Americans and Europeans for more than four decades, even in death. set up an autopilot to allow for the continuing carnage. This is a bloodstained legacy. He will not be mourned by many outside of the inner circle. And Richard, before we bring Eman in, just very quickly, uh you mentioned that they've got use it or lose it situation. If you don't launch them the missiles they're gonna be get destroyed.

How many do they have? Uh have they launched most of them? Have they launched a tiny fraction of them? How long is this gonna carry on? It's hard to know. I mean, there are almost certainly people at the uh Ministry of Defense in Israel or at the Pentagon in here in the United States who have very accurate counts based on satellite data and on the ground intelligence.

Uh we don't know what capacity of theirs is functioning. Uh and it's not just the functioning of the rocket or the missile or the drone itself, but it's the ability to gather target targeting information. Uh as we see these missiles go wide uh or or drones or what have you, these attacks go wider. Uh it indicates that their targeting capability is declining.

Uh and of course those things are being actively found and bombed. But also bear in mind that they have units in caves and underground bunkers that can emerge. uh under the sky, launch and then retr and then automatically retract back into those underground bunker situations. The Israelis have a limitation. They cannot generally drop bombs of more than five thousand pounds. Uh so those will require US uh strikes.

And there are frankly more targets than there are planes to take them all out. So how many do they have left? People give all sorts of numbers. I don't think any of those are reliable. And for the people who would be in a position to know, they're not telling us for obvious operational security reasons.

Eamon, uh give us your perspective, particularly given that you are in Dubai and know the region very well. What what is what is your take on everything that's been going on? What has happened in the Middle East? Well I mean it was Coming. I mean basically it was inevitable that this clash will take place.

Um and there was no going back. Um at the end of the day the uh the Ayatollah's regime uh you know of the Islamic Republic of Iran were for decades building a terror network within and outside of Iran in order to challenge, you know, the a status quo within the region, to challenge, you know, both the American, Israeli, Saudi, Egyptian, Turkish, um uh

i you know, power in the region. I mean, first of all, we have to understand that their ambition for a nuclear um uh weapon was born out of the lessons um uh gained from N North Korea and how North Korea um was able to withstand or at least like I mean um have this immunity uh from invasion due to the fact that they d they developed a uh nuclear device. And so from two thousand and five onward, so twenty years.

they accelerated their nuclear weapon program but then of course they were under far more scrutiny than North Korea for all the obvious reasons because of the fact that they have uh proxies across the region, you know, including Hezbollah, and then they built um, you know, the Iraqi militias after the US invasion of Iraq and then they built the Houthi militia starting from um some people say like in from 2009, but I do believe it started really as early as 1994.

In addition to that, of course, they supported Hamas since 2009 onwards. Um, in my opinion, the all of these activities put so much scrutiny on their nuclear for him programme and the fear that if they become a nuclear armed state. And since they are the largest terror sponsor state in the region and across the world, then that would make it extremely difficult to counter their expansionist ambition. I mean, after all, the dear leader of North Korea, whether Kim Jong-un or his father

or grandfather never had any proxy militias or any expansionist ambitions, you know, taking over Japan or establishing a militias in the Philippines. I mean basically like you know they were content. The problem with Iran, given the fact that it's 1.7 million square kilometers, it is a 92 million population, and they have an ideological flavor to their constitution. that makes it imperative that they export the revolution to other states.

under the ideology of the Shia Muslim faith which believe in eschatology and the return of a savior, a messiah figure, a Mahdi. All of these meant that they will use the Shia minorities of the region as a Trojan horse in order to undermine other governments. One way or another, I know, a clash was inevitable, especially with Israel and of course with Israel's, you know, a most important ally, uh, the United States. So what happened on uh February twenty eighth was the inevitable outcome.

of decades that was of policies, accumulated policies and accumulated strategic um milestones that led to that moment.

And Eamon, that being the case, what role did October the seventh play in this? Was it a catalyst or did it make the inevitable even more inevitable? It it it did really make the inevitable more inevitable because if this is what one of the smallest, uh least uh supported proxies of Iran could do. um and thus from a a space of 340 square kilometers, which is the Gaza Strip, if Iran was so reckless that they would uh send Hamas

and the entirety of the population of Gaza on a suicide mission, what would they do with Hezbollah in Lebanon later? What would they do? And of course, remember that uh during October 7th the Assad regime was still there in uh in power and they could have also stormed from the uh Golan Heights. Um so at the end of the day they realized that You know what? We have tolerated a state sponsor of terror and the existence of the cancerous phenomenon of the uh heavily armed and numerous.

um non-state actors who could threaten nation states across the region and wreak havoc across the region. And so there was that moment, that realization that We can no longer, no longer whatsoever, tolerate the presence of non-state actors supported by this ideologically driven, high on eschatology, I would say, high on prophecies of saviours.

uh and Yemen, which combined killed two million people and displaced twenty five million others. Many people don't understand that the uh legacy of Iran in the region is extremely bloody. Unlike the um unfortunately leftist rosy vision of Iran which present them as freedom fighters or oppressed minority and therefore, like Amin, we need to treat them with velvet gloves. And Eamon, before we move uh over to Richard, has there been broadly support from the Arab nations for this war? I mean...

When the news of Ayatollah Khamenei being killed were broadcasted across the region, There were celebrations, not only in Iran itself, where people went out and started playing music and dancing on the streets. That's in Iran. Can you imagine the scenes in Syria, you know, where people were distributing sweets and celebrating the fall of the tarant? fueled their 14 years bloody civil war.

um and in Yemen, where people are still suffering, you know, from the uh outcome of the civil war that was fueled by him. Um and so you can imagine you know, the people of Saudi Arabia, the people of Bahrain, the people of Kuwait, the people of the UAE.

Um you know, these are people who did not have any favorable view of uh the uh Islamic regime in uh Iran. So there is a broader support uh under the basis that This is a Kind of a chemotherapy that the region needs in order to get rid of a cancerous tumor, um, which is the institution and the ideals. of the Islamic uh revolution in Iran and its IRGC, the you know, the spearhead when it comes to funding and equipping and training terror organizations in the region.

And Richard, I I imagine that all of us here are happy to see scenes of people in Iran celebrating this person and this regime uh no longer being there to brutalise them, to kill them in their thousands. We see people of course all over the world celebrating. But I also think those of us who grew up in in the era of the the war in Iraq in particular, whenever people utter the words regime change, I sort of get a a bit of a shiver going down my spine. And I I don't

necessarily get that excited about it. You know, and you see, uh it one of the things I'd like to for us to discuss as well is w where this is going because uh I was just looking while uh while you guys were talking at the Calci odds. For Reza Pahlavi being the next leader of Iran. It's like twenty five percent. So it it doesn't look like that is gonna be the direction of travel. So is this a regime change war? And if it is, what is the next regime actually gonna look like?

Well, is it a regime change? Uh we have to look at first of all that Israel and the United States have very different desired end states. Um in Israel they would love to see uh Reza Palavy or someone like him have a constitutional monarchy. that focuses around on rebuilding its civil infrastructure. I mean there are massive water shortages.

Uh seventy percent of its provinces are without uh twenty four hour electricity or without ready access to water. Five of the reservoirs that feed um Tehran, which is a city of about ten million with the surrounding area of about eighteen million. Five of those reservoirs are at ten percent or less capacity. So they're profound there's a profound humanitarian catastrophe. that was underway before this bombing began, which this bombing will only accelerate.

So the Israelis would like to see a peaceful transition uh with a monarchy that supervises elections and a more modest uh Iranian state that focuses on solving the problems of its own people. That does not appear to be the desired end state of the Trump administration.

Um they just simply want an Iran that leaves its neighbors alone. Uh, if there can be some rebuilding projects that benefit American and European companies, fine. Uh But the the uh the most important element here, which has not been reported, is the CIA has given a no kill list to the Israelis. Uh a group, we don't know how who's on that list, but five to ten names, maybe more, of people that are not allowed to target.

That indicates to me, and this is just my private interpretation, that they are the CIA already has someone in mind from the power structure that would take That is not a regime change. That is a pruning and a moderation of the current regime. Um now events on the street may make that CIA change impossible, but The CIA tends to like continuations based on variations rather than wholesale change, because wholesale change is impossible to predict the outcome.

So let's look at Iran for a moment, right? So you have depending on which census numbers you believe, ninety one, ninety-three million people. Спасибо. Um all a a majority, a large majority, report that they are Shia Muslims, but of very different persuasions. Outside of that, um, uh who are native Persians, you have a lot of minorities, Azeris, Azerbaijanis, a lot of Kurds. um uh other uh ethnic groups as well.

A growing number of Christians, a growing number of Zoroastrians. We don't have good numbers on any of this because it to report religious conversion is to invite punishment and death under the old regime. But these people have very different ideas about what they'd like to see take over. Uh regarding Pollavy, who I've met, but it's been a few years. Um, who is a very urbane, educated, liberal minded man. The Israelis are entirely uh

uh enamored of him. The Trump White House appears to actively dislike him as treacherous, double-sided, um, not understanding that He has to unite factions and make lots of side deals, which means that at different times and at different places he will say different things. Um, this is something that they feel is not business like. Uh and they it's they find him as frustrating to deal with as Zelensky, maybe more so.

Uh the Arabs have also the Arab governments of the Gulf have been alienated by Pallavy when he demanded large sums of money, uh, and including payments to his Swiss bank accounts. Um, without a lot of accountability or a plan. So it it there are and then the Europeans

uh aside from the French, also seem a little bit cool to Pavy. So I think the uh prediction market of twenty-five percent may be generous. He doesn't have an outside supporter uh who seems to like him. On the other hand, The younger people, those under twenty five, which is a majority of the population in Iran. uh do seem to like him. Uh they have a remember, these people were not alive when the last Shah was ruling their country.

And so they don't have a nostalgic view, they have an idealistic view. And he may be able to summon them. And if he has a large swell of popular support, it may not matter what dreams the CIA has concocted in its quiet cubicles. Okay. If on the so this is very much a jump ball, the Trump people are also looking at political reality in the United States. Somewhere between a quarter and a third of the of Americans surveyed are in favor of this bombing campaign.

The calculation of the Trump people is If this turns into a quick victory, that support will jump to sixty percent. Americans love victory the way the Romans did. Uh uh and for for similar reasons. Um and A quick victory means the bombing stops. Uh there is not a prolonged s the civil war or even much of a civil war at all. An Iran seems to be uh going on with the business of tending to its own uh affairs and stopping the financing of Proxy is uh terror attack.

Uh the quickest path there is a Maduro like solution. But they that might be the reality on the ground. Venezuela, as Francis knows, is a much different country than Iran. Iran has many centers of power. Uh it is a the geography is important here, uh dividing the country with uh mountain ranges which form cultural pockets. It has uh very different numbers of minority uh ethnic minorities and religious minorities that have different views as well. Um and there are outside groups.

uh such as the Baluch in Pakistan, who they have cousins, uh Baluch cousins across the border in southwest Iran, or southeast Iran rather, uh, who would like to start taking out coastal batteries and uh uh elements of the Iranian Navy that are um laying sea mines to block the the Strait of Hormuz and drive up oil and gas prices. Uh to exact pain on the West of course, but they would want some guarantees and some uh С smaller subsidiary sovereignty for the Baluch people inside Iran.

Uh so th this may which is not in the CIA's plans. So it is i it's a jump ball. Who knows what's going to happen.

But one thing we do know what's gonna happen is that the Iranian vision the sorry, the Iranian vision, the Israeli vision, and the US vision, three different visions, will separate over time. And um They have very different short term political needs. Um, Israel is probably a longer term view because they their scheduled elections are not for several years.

But the US has scheduled elections in November, early voting begins in mid September, so the desire for something quick that could be reported as a victory is intense. Meanwhile the Iranians uh are also very short term thinking because they are starved of electricity, of water, and increasingly of food. So um it may not there may not be philosopher kings who can design the ideal outcome and and uh we don't know what it'll be.

Uh well one vision that wasn't mentioned there, Eamon, is what is the vision of the Gulf Arab nations which have a as you were describing earlier. I mean everyone bangs on about Israel being behind this, but like they're ignoring the fact that the Saudis were literally on the phone to Trump in the week before going, Do it now, do it now from what we are told. There was a an article in the Washington Post. What about the Gulf uh countries? What do they want?

Well, look, at the end of the day The Saudis in particular, along with the Emiratis, are the drivers of the overall Sunni Arab state policy towards Iran. And it the policy was always trying to do containment.

um up until twenty fifteen. But then after twenty fifteen, um, th the containment policy turns out to be completely counterproductive because Iran um after feeling emboldened, the Islamic regime after being emboldened by the successes they had in building um their proxies in Iraq, uh saving Assad in Syria. um uh uh from falling during the civil during the civil war and of course by emboldening Hezbollah.

They built up that uh capability of the Houthis, which then was at the southwestern flank of Saudi Arabia, and suddenly the Saudis found themselves surrounded, you know, from three you know, the east, which is Iran, and now suddenly the south, which is uh Yemen. They always felt that only one strait was vulnerable, which is the Hormu Strait, and now they have Babamendeb Strait to worry about. And suddenly like you know, they felt that their uh energy export security was threatened.

They felt that their, in particular also, food security was threatened because they were dependent on overseas imports. into Saudi Arabia but then It's a water security too. I mean, many people don't understand that Saudi Arabia is ninety five percent dependent on water desalination. um during the war between Iraq and Iran and the introduction of the ballistic missile, you know, tit for tat.

Okay, they are attacking each other's oil rigs. What if like any one of these missiles find their way into one of the three major water desalination plants in the eastern province on the Gulf? um w you know, we will have a total collapse of society because Saudi Arabia wasn't designed to hold thirty eight million people. In fact, it's not even designed to have three million people based on the uh water uh shortage that they have.

And that's why King Fahad decided to build 17 more water desalination plants of smaller sizes in the Red Sea. only for the Houthis then to appear on the Saudi's Red Sea flank threatening the water desalination.

So the Saudis felt since then that only confrontation, you know, is the a real policy and this is when the temperature started to rise. But then then while the Saudis felt that they were frustrated of course because of the fact that air campaigns never succeed in dislodging groups like the Houthis I mean just look at America with the Taliban in Afghanistan but nonetheless they felt that Um when there was a change of administration from uh

President uh Trump and the first administration to President Biden, or shall I call it like you know, Obama's third term? Um, you know, when that happened, and of course there was a rather pathetic rather like basically you know Uh I'm becoming, you know, of the United States' desire of restoring um the nuclear programme, you know, uh agreement, like in the you know, the nuclear agreement, uh the JCOPA with uh Iran.

And because of certain figures within the Biden administration, whether it is the former Obama administration figures like Valerie Jarrett, Or a new uh figure like Robert Maly in the uh Biden administration, they put significant pressure on the Biden presidency to in order to يجب أن يجب أن يجب أن يجب أن يجب أن يجب أن يجب أن يجب أن يجب أن يجب أن يجب أن يجب أن يجب أن يجب أن يجب أن يجب أن يجب أن يجب أن يجب أن يجب أن يجب أن يجب أن يجب أن يجب أن يجب By then, the Houthis over eight years period has

launched more than 1,000 ballistic missiles and 2,000 drones against Saudi Arabia. And all of them were Iranian-made, by the way, and Iranian smuggled to them. give up the access to the sea uh so they don't threaten uh international maritime traffic and just keep this in mind please.

And then, if they give up any long-range offensive weapons, more than 150 km range, if they do that, we will end the war and they can form a power-sharing agreement with the other Yemeni parties. And we will end the war.

The Biden administration said that no the Houthis will not accept that, but because we have far greater priority is that in a pathetic nuclear agreement that we need with the Iranians, so we're gonna stop you know, giving you the munitions, you know that we agreed, you know, to supply you, you know. And that you purchased and paid for in good faith.

we will not give it to you uh so you can't carry out your war and the saudi said you know by all means like i mean we'll make our own um but then the bad administration went further And that was a rough between between November and December of twenty twenty one, when they said to the Saudis, Well, we're gonna stop supplying you with the Patriot um missile system. that are necessary to intercept the Houthi ballistic missiles so you become sitting down

And so, and when the Saudis are saying, well, we have enough Lakinami supply for about six months, seven months, we'll continue the fight. So by March of 2022, Um Biden administration gave the biggest stab in the back to the Saudis by saying we're not gonna update the software. So you truly gonna be sitting ducks now.

your water, your oil facilities, you know, your uh and already like in in twenty nineteen, if the Saudis you know, uh Saudi Aramco was struck and almost five point seven million barrels of oil every day for twenty two days were lost to the uh global uh production.

that you cannot rely on America because America was slavishly, you know, seeking the satisfaction of rabid That changed the equation and that's why the Saudis decided that if Iran is so powerful that even America is kissing the ring and asking for forgiveness for what Trump did before in terms of tearing apart that. uh awful nuclear deal, then you might as well like in a you know do a deal with them. And that's why the Saudis went to China.

And, you know, by you know ma March of twenty twenty three, the Chinese broker the deal between the Saudis and the Iranians for a detente, you know, for a non-aggression pact. Um and that was born out of the fact that the Saudis cannot trust any American administration after that of betraying them, just in order to seek a deal with the Iranians over the national security interests of the Saudis.

What happened? What changed? Trump came back. And what changed everything was the B2s in 24 June last year. smashing the nuclear facilities in Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan. That changed the mindset of the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, MBS. that aha, okay, maybe now there has been a s in a significant shift.

in American policy, we can now trust that there will be a regime not change necessarily, what they were looking at a actual regime containment that could actually like you know finally push them back into their own borders. uh in a way that would deter them from interfering in their neighbors' affairs. And that's why the UAE and Saudi Arabia, despite their differences in Yemen and Sudan and elsewhere, they were united in the fact that

It's now or never. And so when the Saudis saw the two aircraft carriers and the biggest build-up in the Middle East since 2003, they realized that it's now or never and they agreed with the Israelis.

But that being the case, Eyman, you outlined what was happening beautifully in Saudi and the and the other countries. It's still one hell of a gamble, isn't it? It is. I mean One of the things I've been I've been talking to people of course like in a from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Saudi Arabia and in UAE and uh other diplomats and ambassadors and security services, intelligence services, like in and they tell you like you know, we are worried about refugees coming across the water.

uh like what happened after the Iranian revolution in nineteen seventy nine and um you know could we could have a s a destabilizing civil war, we have ethnic uh makeup. But I I I disagreed with them in a sense that look Civil wars generally in the Middle East happen because of external pressures are actually pulling the country, you know, in question apart. But in this case, there is almost a consensus among Iran's neighbors.

you know pakistan turkey and the gulf states that you know iran posts ترجمة نانسي قنقر Uh should remain united. Um, you know, they wanted to be united, that's the first thing, because a divided one will be a catastrophe for the region because of.

um ethnic and sectarian strife will tear the rest of the region apart because of it. Just look what happened in Syria. We don't want a Syria ten times over. Um and yeah, but however It was inevitable because of the fact that the regime built itself over the bureaucracy of the Shah.

So it built itself layer after layer, but then these layers were really rotten and they're gonna collapse at any time. The reality is the fact that the Iranian society, if you want to really like you know, get a simple simplified, I'm simplifying it here. Uh if you see wanna simplify the uh the you know the sentiment, twenty five percent of the Iranian population would gladly kill, you know, the regime and the Ayatollah.

And twenty-five percent of the society would gladly kill for the regime and the ayatullahs. You know, they are the other end of the spectrum, the zealots, you know, the fundamental ثم يوجد 50% في المدلين الذين يريدون أن يريدون أن يريدون أن يريدون أن يريدون أن يريدون أن يريدون أن يريدون أن يريدون أن يريدون أن يريدون أن يريدون أن يريدون أن يريدون So they are uh the ones who always uh were looking to live and they are trying to uh they are pragmatists. One of the things about the

Um, you know, Iranian people, whether Persians or Azaris, you know, or Kurds or Lures or Arabs or you know uh or Balush, you know, they are amazing. They are actually people who are pragmatic. Uh however they want to live. The problem here is that exactly in this, you know, uh four letters, L-I-V-E, they want to live. is where the regime was hit. you know, in a Achilles heel spot. In our podcast conflicted, like, I mean, on 21st October episode, I was talking about the fact that

Since I was a banker once, I was choosing one form of terrorism to another into banking. But I was a banker once, I was the head of the financial intelligence unit in the Middle East for one of the global banks. Uh one of the things I was looking at is uh stability linked to currency um uh fluctuation. And so I was looking at the fact that uh on the eve of the end of the twelve days war, the Iranian currency was six hundred thousand uh reales per dollar.

Then, of course, on 21st October, with my co-host Thomas, we were discussing the fact that the currency broke through the 1 million per dollar. I told him that Thomas I'm worried because if if it passes And that's all in that episode of 21st October. I said, if it passes 1.3 million per dollar, that's a mass protest territory. It passed to 1.35 and this is when the Bazaris, you know, the trading classes, the business classes, I mean, they called for the stripes and the protests.

because that's it. This is now incompetence of the regime. Um and because of the perceived incompetence of the regime, not even perceived, it's real. They are inc they are a bunch of incompetent people when it comes to managing the economy. Uh they actually like an invited that on themselves. By not only um degrading the living standards of the people, but also without giving the people some light at the end of the tunnel that we know what we are doing and

we know how to negotiate with the US to lift the sanctions or to ease them in order to improve uh the living standards. No, they they were but just arrogant. in their belief that the people will follow them no matter what, even in the darkness of a tunnel that has no light at the end of it. Um and that's uh where things went

Too bad. Now I said in that episode also, I said if it reaches 1.6 million, that's a civil war territory. Now it is at the moment standing at 1.6, 1.65, uh possibly 1.7 even. It means that they have mishandled the economy completely. And that's why we need to understand that the fact of the matter is that the Iranian people after the uh Twelve Days War ended They woke up on the reality here is the fact that the regime, since 2005 until 2025, these 20 years, they wasted.

Roughly two trillion dollars of the equation. GDP. Accumulated GDP losses every year. 30 billion, 40 billion, 60 billion, 80 billion. Every year they were losing these figures due to sanctions over the a nuclear program that hardly cost about twenty or thirty billion dollars.

and in addition they spent During this period, three hundred billion dollars on Hamas, on Hezbollah, on the Houthis, on Propping Assad regime on the Syrian civil war, two point three trillion dollars to Mani Savi Iranians is so much to take. But they were always told it's for the pride of the nation. We're gonna be a nuclear power. We're gonna have this beautiful kind of like in a mushroom cloud in a test of uh nuclear strength in front of everyone, we flex our muscles.

But then it all went up in dust when um, you know, President Trump authorized the use of the GBU fifty seven uh bunker busters. And these bunker busters like you know basically did not only just penetrate deep into the mountain and collapsed it over there enrich uranium. It collapsed it over their uh hopes and ambitions and they realize we are led by donkeys and idiots. You know, and as a result, like I mean we lost everything. So it's like the children who saw their, you know, uh compulsive

uh drunken gambling in a father in a Vegas casino, wasting the entire family silver on a hope and a prayer, you know, and a prophecy that one day they will win the jackpot. Um only to become jackass here, fortunately. So and that's why they were angry and they went out of this race.

Uh look, Eamon, I I quite agree with you on this, but I think one part of the puzzle that we haven't addressed yet is the Islamic Republican Guard. Because you look at them and you think to them s and you look at that the number of people that they've got in that army, anywhere from a hundred and fifty to two hundred thousand people, you've also got the secret police. The regular police I mean this is going to take one hell of an effort to try and defeat these people, surely.

It's 265,000, you know, if we look at the entirety of their force. Um because under I remember the the IRGC is multiple factions. It's not only one faction, you know, and but I always simplify it. you know, by the economy faction, you know, the money faction I will call it basically, and the real zealot faction. Um the the reality is that the IRGC controls forty and up to forty five percent of the entire economy thanks to the sanctions.

And thanks to the way they created these companies. I mean, I used to be a financial investigator, like you know, I mean, in counter-terrorism finance. And so I used to see um looking at their infiltration into you know more than a hundred sectors from telecommunications. um, you know, uh the medical sector, pharmaceuticals, export, import, uh, construction, um, and of course, like in above everything else, um, you know, the energy sector, gas and uh petrochemicals and uh oil.

Everything they do, I mean, it was about enriching the IRGC to become a very powerful benefactor of all of the proxies they have across the region under the umbrella of the Quds Force which is a part of the IRGC responsible for their external Oh and Hamas and all of that. Like in at some point numbered seven hundred thousand people combined within the entire Middle East under arms in outside of the state control. Like in that was scary. But then also what is their mission?

If you look at the IRGC, the IRGC doesn't stand for the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, it stands for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. Um and their entire mission is not only just in it the in the because they have fanatical in allegiance to the uh supreme leader. Because remember by the way, like you know, that the um Article 5 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, which is weird by the way, um, you will be surprised, like you know, who's the head of the state is.

you know the head of the state you would expect will be either the president or the supreme leader himself but the reality is that neither of them are the head of the state according to the article 5 of the iranian constitution the head of the state is actually a you know uh a five year old boy who went missing twelve hundred years ago. um you know, which is the figure of the Imam Mahdi. Um and

You know, and and okay, of course for me, you know, and for you and for everyone else, like in a basically listening, like in a that's a bit weird, but for them it is faith. It's an article of faith, you know, and you know uh okay, I I respect their, you know, uh faith, but not to the extent where

it bec you know it becomes that a disputed figure like in a basically you know whether real or mythical you know becomes the head of a state in a modern nation state in the twenty first century um and that Uh who then becomes the head of the state on his behalf? um will be the jurist, the grand jurist, in the grand cleric who would be the steward on his behalf until his much anticipated return.

Um and because of that allegiance that the IRGC give to that figure of the Supreme Leader, that deputy on behalf of that either mythical or religious figure, depending on where you sit or uh you know, which side of the fence you sit on. Um you end up with a fanatical zeal, the readiness to kill 30,000 people of your own people. In two days, on the eighth and ninth of January this year, to defend that regime because you do believe that it's a divinely ordained.

that if this regime survives, it's the regime that would be there to give the banner and to be the vessel through which the empire of this a much awaited messiah will be established and to vanquish all the other rivals in the region with his divine powers. I mean I know it sounds foreign to you, foreign to me, but remember when people tell me we you know, oh They are rational at the end of the day. I say no. They are pragmatists sometimes.

Mm. And anyone who falls into the uh you know illusion that they are rational will hit the wall, just like Trump said.

You know, I don't know why they are not surrendering. They I don't know why they are not coming for a deal. Well, because they are not rational. Don't deal with them as rational. That being the case, Richard, thank you for your patience. It I it strikes me that Francis question

was exactly right, but Eamon covered the one side of it. I'd love you to cover the American side of it. Francis said this is an extraordinary gamble. And given what Eamon's just described about the dedication, the the religious dimension everything else. Is President Trump gambling his presidency and his legacy on this? And is this a big risk to him and to his entire administration? War is always a big risk. But sometimes not going to war is a bigger risk. I think that Trump chose a time.

well before the midterms, so he has got off ramps and options so that this does not dominate the headlines in the in the critical voting. The view from Washington is that there is a three-seat majority in the Republicans in the House of Representatives. Three elections could turn control of the house. If the House is lost to the Republicans, the next the last half of the Trump administration will be entirely investigations, impeachments, uh paranoid claims.

And justified claims, right? Unfortunately, right? Uh the administration is staffed with human beings and some of those human beings are flawed. Um, and so nothing will happen. So he the president needs foreign policy victories and more most importantly, foreign policy quiet. uh so that he can focus on domestic reforms uh that would win votes. Because ultimately there's never been a case in American history that I'm aware of.

uh including the Vietnam War, that foreign policy was the number one issue for American voters. Um so that that's one piece of it. Another is that I think the president is aware, certainly his advisors are, and I've talked to those people, that what's called Twelver Shia Islam, this particular sect of Shia Islam, let's not point paint with such a broad brush. Yeah. share this perspective.

But the Ayatollah Hameni absolutely did, and his followers among the Houthis in Yemen absolutely do, and many aspects of Hezbollah, many of the factions of the Hezbollah share this. What is important about this? You've heard uh Emman talking about the missing imam.

They believe that in a in a kind of messiah, a Mati, will return in the form of this five year old boy who disappeared one thousand two hundred years ago, apparently down a well, and that to bring about his return, you need the end of the world. So giving these people atomic weapons means they will want to end the world for deeply religious reasons. and see themselves as glorious until that final moment, kind of like beneath the planet of the apes in which the whole world explodes.

Um this, these are the absolute worst people to have atomic bombs, people who actually want to use. Other more normal countries that have atomic bombs use them in a different way. They use them by threatening to use them and therefore never using them. Right. That is the real power of an atomic bomb. We could do this, so instead make a deal with us. That is why, for example, the West has not fully backed Ukraine in the Biden years. They were afraid of uh Russia launching atomic attacks.

Also the Iranians have studied the Libyans, the Ukrainians, and the South Africans. Those are the only three powers that have were declared to have public uh and believably had atomic weapons. Other nations claimed to have atomic weapons that didn't, right? But of those that we absolutely know for certain had atomic weapons and gave them up. How did the rulers of those countries turn out? Well, from the Iranian perspective, the South African the white South African government lost power.

Uh you could argue that was a good outcome or a bad outcome, but that's the result. Uh, the Libyans gave up their weapons that they seem to have, including chemical and biological weapons as well. And where's Qaddafi now? He died an ignominious death on the side of the road uh and his country's beset by civil war. And of course we know what happened in Ukraine after its nineteen ninety-four treaty to give up the atomic weapons that the Soviets had left behind in that country.

So they said, one, we need to have atomic weapons and two, we need to never give them up. The North Koreans have s learned the same lesson uh about not giving up weapons and they will not give up easily. uh, but they do not have a religious reason to bring about the end of the world. So if you are looking at this, so what is what is Trump playing at? Ending a threat to mankind.

from a regime that has shown great willingness to kill millions of its own people if we add the Iran Iraq war, these various bombings, the starvation that has occurred in many of the more distant provinces. uh the malnourishment that has occurred in others and then the massive terrorist attack. Also greatly overlooked is another thing, which is Putin's letter following the death of Ayatollah Khameni, right? He called it a cynical murder by the US.

But read the less rest of his remarks. He clearly saw Iran as an ally. Iran wasn't always the world's largest sponsor of terrorism, state sponsor. The USSR was. Terrorism is not a Muslim invention, it is a Russian invention. It is the Nov Novemberists of the eighteen thirties, the anarchists of the eighteen sixties in Russia. It becomes a tool of the Tsar in the eighteen nineties, using the Armenians against the Turks.

Which ultimately led to the genocide uh carried out by the Turks. But the Turks had a long line of atrocities against themselves to point to in justification. I'm not saying it makes it right. I'm just describing the history. Uh and then under the Soviets, terrorism becomes a key foreign policy tool in the Middle East. In Europe, look at the

Red Army faction, the Biden Meinhof guys, look at South America, and look at the Weathermen in the United States and others, right? They clearly think they can amplify their power through proxy force. And so the the Iranians fully absorbed these Russian lessons. And don't forget also there were three hundred until recently three hundred Russian engineers at Boucher working on their atomic weapons program. Those are the ones we know about.

We also know that the Iranians manufactured drones uh for the Russians to use in Ukraine and elsewhere. So there was one some of the people who do not want a regime change in Iran are Russia and China because this will put them on their back feet. Now this would be if if it is accomplished, something that Trump can point to as a victory. This massively decreases Russia and to a lesser extent China's influence in the region.

if a non sectarian regime takes over, even if it's composed of former military elements and is not a democratic dream. Because also bear in mind, Trump is making a distinction which his critics simply don't understand. The difference in rebuilding a regime in America's image versus in its interest. Image means it's a copy.

of, you know, Westminster and Washington. You know, there are elections and by-elections and neutral counting of votes and an independent judiciary and property rights and all these wonderful Anglo-Saxon institutions. Uh, this is not what they were attempting to do under the Bushiers in Iraq, but it is certainly what the critics charged them with. Uh in fact when I talked to uh the Rumsfeld's deputy, uh Paul told me straight up, he said our best outcome for Iraq in ten, fifteen years

is Romania nineteen ninety-five. So they were much more realistic in their planning, the neocons that we've been told. But the image, regime change, is carbon copy of Britain and America. But that's impossible given the people and the pressures acting on those people. Uh but that's America's image. Now let's look at its interests. Its interest is much simpler. An Iran that is not at war with its neighbors through proxy terrorist forces or directly, right? In any way.

An Iran that is not a a humanitarian catastrophe. It Iran has today one of the highest inflation rates in the world, right? Uh and as Eman said. Inflation always predicts civil war if it's hyperinflation. So We're not gonna see boots on the ground, uh in any f uh certainly if it's the Trump administration has its way.

But somebody's gonna have to stabilize the currency and perhaps dollarize Iran, either through a currency board, which is unlikely given how rotten its institutions are, probably complete dollarization replacement of the currency with the US dollar. Uh that's easier in Iran than it sounds because their exports are mostly they receive dollars for oil and gas.

Uh and they pay their elect they import electricity from Turkey and Azerbaijan and they pay for those in US dollars. Uh so it's so moving and with a with a nearly worthless currency now, um And it may well be that the Israelis have been helping by counterfeiting currency inside Iraq. Remember a million Iraqis go into Iran every day to go to work and then go home at night?

So it's very easy to carry countervived countr uh currency into that country. Um so but their own mismanagement of the currency. Uh so stabilizing the currency. And enabling people to have Electric power, food and water, stability and not a threat to their neighbors. That's what that those are the two things you need to maintain an American interest in the region. That doesn't mean we that there is a a democratic utopia.

That doesn't mean that all the problems of Iran are solved as if by a magic wand. It means that Iran is no longer a tiger devouring its neighbors. It's a den of wolves who stay in their den of wolves.

Well that makes a lot of sense and you laid that out beautifully, but I think my question remains because you I guess what you're describing is you know, you take out Darth Vader and you install his lieutenant who's not as not quite as bad, right? But Eamon's point is well, the Ev Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, these are fanatics.

And who is it in a country like Iran where there's two hundred something of them with guns that is likely to take over once you take out the top leadership? It's probably not gonna be You know, as you suggest, it's not going to be some some but some liberal minded person. So is it actually realistic? even to have what you're describing which is a regime that is in America's interest, a la what happened in Venezuela. When you take out the top guy and you replace them with

Another person of the same milk who's just going to be much more compliant and much more friendly. Is that actually likely in Iran? That's why I'm asking you if Trump is gambling. Well, all wars gamble, but he is absolutely gambling because If you leave it up to the Iranian people to decide and different Arab and non-Arab outside groups provide them with arms, you're going to have one of several outcomes. Either the Mujadin al Khak, the M E K, takes over.

Um, those are people that are that the US can work with. But it would be a mistake to call them liberal minded un humanitarian. Right. They have a a severe creed of their own. Um there is a smaller chance that the the Shah, the the son of the Shah can take over.

Uh there are ethnic groups that may want to have control over their own regions. Uh I think the chance of a civil war is very high, uh unless somebody can establish order uh very quickly and have the loyalty of the military to do it, which is less ideological than the Islamic uh Revolutionary Guards.

And it you know, the Israelis are already at the decision that you just have to kill as many of these people as possible. You can't change their minds. You have to stop their minds. The US is not there. Uh and the fact that it's giving a no kill list, um, which I don't think is publicly known, uh, indicates that the US has a very different view. They would like this to be over as soon as possible. Um a four week campaign is what the Israelis were able to get out of them, but uh if there was

a shorter campaign option, I'm sure that Trump would take that. The the the threat needs to be neutralized, not utopia created. And Eamon, do you think a four week campaign maximum is realistic? Because to my completely untrained eye, I think this could potentially last for years. There is no way, I mean absolutely no way, of uh having a a more pragmatic leader uh in Iran without getting rid of the IRGC. Because the IRGC call all this.

you know, in terms of military ideology, you know, they are the elite fighting core. It's like saying basically that I'm going to install a Roman Emperor but without you know against the will of the Praetorian Guard. Good luck with help of the Praetorian Guard without their agreement and there will be no Emperor.

And if it's a minute sorry to interrupt you and you're the expert here, but I think even that does a disservice to what we're actually talking about, because the Praetorian Guard on many occasions murdered the Emperor and installed the one that they preferred. But what you're talking about is a religious one. And then and then rather that one. What you're talking about is also a religious fanaticism on top of that, which I think is much harder still, surely.

Exactly. And that's why I'm saying that the reason why we have now four people controlling Iran at the moment. You know, you have the head of the judiciary who is bloodthirsty in a nasty person who handed the you know thousands, if not even tens of thousands, of death senten in his entire career. Then you have Ayatullah Arafi, who is an extremely

hardline jurist and he is now the spare you know ayatollah i can call him then you have the extremely useless um president president and then you have of course the you know the wily the that Um Ali Larojani, who is a man of all seasons, in the Oliver sorry, the you know the Thomas Cromwell of uh um Iran. And these four people are now controlling Iran. Like in the first of all Ali Larjani as the head of the National Security Council, but the other three, the president

عيطالله عرافي وهو السبير عيطالله والأهدى الجنسية. هؤلاء تنظرون المنظرين الانترام الانترام الانترام الانترام الانترام الانترام الانترام الانترام الانترام الانترام الانترام الانترام الانترام the indications at the moment that maybe even they will confirm uh Ayatullah Arafi as you know the current leader. Why? As the as a permanent Supreme Leader, because he is the IRGC top pick.

Um and the IRGC, as long as they call the shots in Iran, there will be no reformist, there will be no someone you know who will act in America's interest, I'm afraid. Um and so anyone who comes and try even to act in America's interest, he will be murdered. before even they take in office. That's why we have to understand that without dismantling you know, absolutely dismantling, uprooting

you know, the IRGC's, you know, uh as an institution uh and as a fighting force from Iran, there is no hope for the future. It is a state within a state. It is a cancerous tumor inside Iran. And you know, without taking it down, there is no future for that country.

And so how do you so for answer to Richard, you look like you wanted to win, feel free if you did. Uh yeah, a couple of things. One is the regime is humanitarian catastrophe for its own people. But those people are largely because they're Iranians and they are very Iranian and they're Iranian-ness, uh, riven into factions and uh and hard to unite and they're unarmed for the most part. Um, so who is on that no kill list is the question the White House press court should be asking.

Uh I suspect Lorajani is on that list that the CIA would like to work with him. Yeah. Yes. Uh that will not lead to it might lead to a more tempered regime, but it will not lead to the regime that all of the Democratic performers are dreaming about. He might weaken uh the dress requirements for women, which are massively unpopular.

There's a great video out of a r a morality policewoman being forced off a train in Tehran a couple of days ago by a crowd of women, some of whom had completely uncovered hair. Um so the the the among the educated of which there are a lot in Tehran, uh a great hatred of these so-called Islamic rules, uh, which are not in the Quran, by the way, right? These are the interpretations of Ayatollahs over the years.

So he may do some things there. He's certainly gonna have to do some economic reforms. Um and when he's pressed to undo the ties to various terror groups, is unlikely to comply because that's the only counterweapon he has. Also, accelerating this is two things which have not come up before. One is current experience in America, and the second is American history, quick American history. In 1979. Fifty two American diplomats were held for four hundred and forty four days.

When I asked a senior uh the head basically the head of or the deputy head of the Iran desk in the State Department. In the Obama years, whether these two numbers meant anything to him, fifty-two and four hundred and forty-four. He just shook his head like these are random numbers. I said, okay, how old are you? And he says thirty-seven. I said, Well, for everyone over forty five, these numbers are in their brain for the rest of their life.

That is how many hostages were held for how long and the national dishonor. And there was Ted Koppel on network television, which had a big audience in nineteen seventy nine. Held a special every single night called American Hostage. Uh America Held Hostage. And it had the number of days that these has gone on and it frequently have video of blindfolded American diplomats and American Marines being beaten. There is an almost Roman sense of American honor that needs to be slaved.

So anybody over 45 or over 50 who's looking at the Iran situation, that is also in their field of vision. They remember that. So the amount of sympathy for this regime, uh, among those who are over forty five in America is a negative number for the most part, right? So unless you're highly ideologically motivated, even then, right? The the dislike of this regime is intense. So American history also influences current American experience.

So we had a stabbing and shooting attack on the Washington DC Baldway, which appears to be linked. to an Islamic militant who may have been motivated by Iran with all the facts have not come out. And then we had an attack in Austin, Texas. with a guy wearing a shirt that says property of Allah, and underneath that shirt, an Islamic uh an Iranian Islamic revolutionary flag.

Uh and we have the FBI admitting that there are some seven hundred Hezbollah, not Iranian, just Hezbollah terrorist cells, uh sleeper cells that are believed to be in the United States, not and very few of which are under direct surveillance. So as these proxy attacks increase in the United States, the American thirst for war will go up massively.

And so this will become a major if if these attacks continue and Iran is seen as to be behind them, the ability to end the war halfway, the way the CIA would like to do it. In three or four weeks and have their guy, Larjanny, whoever their nominee is, run things, that may not be politically possible. If you're killing Americans in America The political calculus will instantly change.

And the the since the Iranians have lost centralized control both of the terror networks and of their military units. This might not be within the Iranians' control either. In other words, say Larajani or one of his ilk is put in power, he may not be able to stop them any longer. This may in fact have been the design of the Ayatollah before his death. So the the is it a gamble, Constant? It is absolutely a gamble on multiple levels. But it might have been a bigger gamble to do nothing. Yes.

That being the case, and we're talking about American attitudes to war. Surely when they start seeing servicemen coming home in coffins, that is going to affect All of America, but particularly the MAGA America first element of Trump's base, which is incredibly lar an incredibly large part of it. Yes, but This is a a very popular misunderstanding even in America. Americans are not turned off by body bags. They're turned off by people dying for no reason.

If there's a clear cause that Amer that Amer the American people think is just. then the de the the World War II death tolls did not deter people from uh supporting the efforts against Germany and Japan, right? Uh it's where these political goals do seem hazy and not directly tied to US interest. If there are more terror attacks, if this is what they were, we know the the evidence is still emerging.

These could be volunteer efforts by random lone individuals. It is possible, right? But it is more likely that it is organized at some level by the Iranians. If these continue Then just like Pearl Harbor, just like 9 11, the American interest in war will go up massively. We are not Europeans. We do not tolerate mayhem. caused by foreign actors against innocent civilians, especially women and children, that is simply not tolerated by a large number of Americans.

And so Trump's ability to end the war, his vaunted off ramp, may politically disappear if the terror attacks increase in number or in lethality. That is a much bigger gamble. And there might be political risk in stopping the war before the American people feel that security and safety has been returned. And if these terror attacks are if they are directed by Iran, and if they are k if they're if they continue, two big ifs.

Then nothing less than complete eradication of the Islamic uh Republican Guard will or Revolutionary Guard will be the desired outcome. So this is a mouse calculation by the Iranians of an enormous amount. Y well it's it sounds like this is gonna potentially run and run and really will be a thing that could have a huge impact on on geopolitics, uh on American politics, on the Trump presidency. And we've got five minutes left.

Um i and I wanna touch on geopolitics before I but before I do, I think our audience would have been enjoying uh this so far. And I just wanna remind them, Eamon Dean, the conflicted podcast, they can go and listen and check that out. And of course Richard with you.

uh losing bin Laden, Mastermind, Leading from Behind and a whole bunch of other very successful books that you've written about issues that really very closely to do with this. So I hope people go and check both of your work out after this. But the final issue that I think we should tackle before we wrap up is

The geopolitics of it. We had um we recorded an interview with Canadian opposition leader Pierre Polyev this morning with Francis. Um And he you know, his view was the US is effectively engaging in what you might he didn't use the term proxy war, but this he did feel that the dealing with Iran in this way is a direct anti Chinese dominance.

move, anti Russian dominance move. Eamon, you're shaking your head, Richard, maybe g just briefly, very briefly, a minute and a half each on the geopolitic of this. Is this about Russia and China? Is this just about the Middle East? And what is likely to be the geopolitical impact of all of this?

You want me to go first? Yeah, please. Ninety seconds, Evan. Ninety seconds. Okay. Imagine you're on the BBC, mate. You've got ninety seconds and I'll interrupt you seven times. No problem at all. I'm used to it. Well, look here. First of all, we have to understand that the Iranian regime established proxies, established terror cells all across the world.

You know, uh with Hezbollah, of course, like in a basically in places from Latin America, West Africa, uh, the United States, from Dearborn, Michigan. All the way to Romania in uh and Eastern Europe, like in all the way to Mauritius where they have their banking empire. So at the end of the day, it's not about China or Russia, it's about the fact that Iran itself is a gigantic beast.

of terror networks, money laundering networks, worth about seventy four billion dollars a year. You know, you are talking about

a radicalization uh movement that is trying to um subvert Islam and the Islamic nations. You have a movement that is actually within the IRGC that is trying to swallow their neighbors, which could upset Um, you know, especially when their neighbors and with Iran together, they control about sixty percent of the world's oil reserves, forty percent of the world's natural gas reserves. This is a threat to global, you know, energy security and energy safety. When you say America first.

America cannot be fast at home unless if it is fast in the world. And therefore, you cannot allow a regime like this. to threaten the safety, stability of the global energy markets for ideological reasons that have no place in the realm of rational thinking and logic. And the idea that it's about Russia and China, no. Iran is as big a threat, if even more, than Russia and China combined. And it needs to be dealt with in a by b you know with as a problem by itself.

Not because it is linked to either Russia or China. Okay. Richard, your final thoughts particularly on the geopolitics of all of this? Yeah, so let's just focus on on Russia and China. If the regime changes in Iran Drone production for Russia disappears. That has an enormous impact on the Ukraine war. This may be a piece of a puzzle for Trump to get to peace in Ukraine.

uh and it may force the Russians' hand. That's one. Two, the source of cheap oil. Remember with sanctioned oil, the Chinese are able to buy Iranian oil at below market price. We've now seen in the last month a brand new relationship. Um with India. They've ta the Trump administration has taken the eye out of bricks, with India being the eye. And the the Indian Navy is boarding and in some cases sinking. uh the shadow fleet of Russian and Iranian oil tanks.

that will increase and be increasingly coordinated. The ability of the regime uh to f to fuel China will go down, uh, and then with the change of regime, it will cease to exist. What does this mean? This means that China will not have the oil and gas that it needs from Iran to cross the Taiwan Strait or to do other things. Uh and its economy will almost certainly slow down. So its ability to menace its neighbors will slow down.

So for those China Hawks at the Pentagon and elsewhere in the administration, they see that undermining Iran is key to weakening China. If you look at what Rubio, the Secretary of State, has been doing in South America, not just uh in uh Venezuela, but the ongoing negotiations with the President of Colombia, who will

in the short the next few months almost certainly step down. His wife has fled to Sweden and is seeking asylum in that country. Uh you will start to see changes in Nicaragua and in Cuba and eventually Mexico. That also pushes China and Russia out of the Western hemisphere. Maybe they can hold a toehold in um in Bolivia and in Brazil, but even those are fragmentary, right?

So if you look at it on the world, if you spread out the world map and you see what they're doing, Iran is the latest move and a continuing of chess moves to fundamentally weaken Russia and China and eventually to turn them against each other. This is a level of almost Nixonian, Kissingerian complexity being done. by eight people, one of whom is Trump, who only talk to themselves. Uh, and that includes, you know, Rubio, Hegseth, and so on. That's so called gang of eight, Susie Weiss and so on.

But this is a very complicated chess move. Critic. tend to look at these things as isolated episodes and then try to make historical parallels. Oh, this will be another Stalingrad, this will be another Iraq, it'll be another Afghanistan and so on. They simply do not they have not spread out the world map and put pins on the map to see all of the different moves being made, to see the pattern that is obvious only at the highest level.

This is a fundamental recalibration of global geopolitics against Russia and China. Iran is just a piece. Gentlemen, thank you so much for sharing your knowledge and wisdom and expertise with us. And uh thank you so much for tuning in and watching it. Uh we had

uh tens of thousands of people watching this live. There'll be hundreds of thousands who who watch it in the final analysis, if not millions, and listen to it. Thank you for being here. Please hit the like button and leave and comment so more people see that this has been here.

And thank you for uh being with us for an hour and a bit. Richard, Eamon, thank you so much for joining us. Uh it's been a real pleasure to get your knowledge and to help to understand a little bit more of what's going on. Uh with that we'll be signing off and we'll see you. Thanks guys. Dej, jag skulle ju köpa några nya palstält i lagret. Det kanske blev lite mer grejer. De hade ju allt, man hade skribord, jag köpte en sån här. Och kontorstolar, och så hade de en skit snygg till.

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