This is Gavin Newsom, and this is Richard Haas. Richard, thank you so much for taking the time to come on, particularly at a remarkable time in world history, particularly in history unfolding in the Middle East. Today. President Trump seemed to have a day that he's been looking forward to for years and years and years, pushing NATO to move
from two percent to five percent. What was your takeaway from this NATO summit, at least the first day, and just Trump deserve I think a lot of praise and for an accomplishment here.
I would argue President Trump, well, first of all, got being good to be with you. Thank you, Like I would argue President Trump deserves credit for spurring the Europeans to do they ought to have done years before, they ought to be putting forward a larger share of the effort for what's a common defense.
I was just as an aside.
I would say, much more important to me than whether the Europeans spend three percent or two and a half or four and a half is how they spend it. And I'd actually say something you'd probably agree with. In public policy, how you spend money is almost always more important than how much you spend, and the problem with European defense is not just that they spend too little, but each country pretty much determines how it spends its defense euros, so the whole ends up being less than
the sum of its parts. So I would be pushing if I were advising the president, I would say, yeah, push them to do more, but secondly, also push them in a sense to become more European, rather than country by country by country, which is the way they often go about it.
But I think that part is good.
Less good is I think he's introduced some doubts into the reliability of the United States and when I call the automatic quality of Article five, America's willingness to go to bat for Europe. And obviously there's also some fairly significant differences about how to handle the most immediate threat, which is Russia and the war in Ukraine. So I think it's a mixed bag. But yes, it's good to see the Europeans essentially getting pushed to do more.
And it's interesting just as you unpack and I appreciate how you spend and where you spend. It was interesting just looking at some of the details that their direct spend in support of Ukraine would be considered as part of that contribution as it relates to that breakdown of five percent. It was also, though interesting to see the
breakdown within the countries. Obviously Germany looking to move quicker by twenty twenty nine with close to seventy percent increase in their domestic defense spending, and then Spain, who was called out by the President today, looking not necessarily to reach that numerica. Does that mean much to you or is that just that's just noise?
The most interesting part of that is Germany less what Germany is prepared to do in defense, though doing more is welcome, but Germany has changed its laws and essentially now is able to raise serious debt, which was something that modern Germany had an allergy to because of the whole Weimar experience, and the fact that Germany now can really go into the markets and raise that gives them far more capacity to potentially grow their economies as well as to contribute to national security.
And then even go so.
Far as to say the most interesting figure in Europe right now is the new Chancellor of Germany. And even though he had a rough start and getting confirmed and so forth by his parliament, I actually think the Chancellor Mertz is in a position to in some ways have Germany stake out the leadership position in Europe, something that historically since World War Two Germany has been reticent to
do so. Would I would watch that space, particularly since the French, the British and others are so gridlocked domestically. I think Germany now occupies the critical position.
When you referenced the Article five sort of you know, I think the president when he was flying over there was some ambiguity once again sort of creating some doubt and anxiety. He seemed to shift tone a little bit when he landed, But that is just that on again, off again relationship to the Article five. Is that what you're referring to as sort of a lack of certainty and confidence in the president?
Yeah.
For those who haven't read the NATO treaty recently, Article five is the core of the agreement. We're essentially an attack on one who is considered to be an attack on all. Curiously, it's only been invoked once in NATO's entire history, and that was on behalf of the United States after nine to eleven. But alliances depend upon predictability and reliability and dependability, and I would argue that President Trump has introduced a significant degree of uncertainty into that,
which I think is counterproductive. He would argue, perhaps it was necessary to get the Europeans to do more. I would have said, well, probably there's better ways to do that, but that's where we are, and to the extent Russia sensus, there's uncertainty there putin who as we've seen in Ukraine, can be risk frunt it might be more likely to take risks. So I always believe that the best way
to deter is through certainty. So your friends know you'll be there for them, and just as important, your enemies know you'll be there for your friends. So I would like for President Trump, as the days and weeks and months unfold, to look for opportunities to make clear that whatever our differences are with Europe over their level of defense effort, we see it as in our interest to be there with them.
You're here. What in terms of the actual bombing itself, and I think my most objective standards, it was a success. Whether or not these sites were quote unquote obliterated, that's a separate conversation, is that your assessment that this was a success, that in the spirit of what you just said around some certainty that the President wasn't bluffing in terms of wanting to get diplomatic deal done. They appeared not to want to move in that direction, so then he asserted himself militarily.
I think it was the right thing to do.
For years, we've been playing this game with the Iranians where they were enriching uranium far far, far beyond levels anybody would need to generate electricity, so we all knew what this was about to put into place. The were prerequisites for a nuclear weapons program. I also understood we couldn't allow Iron to get on the threshold, much less
have nuclear weapons. We made that mistake. I would argue with North Korea, we don't want to have it now in this part of the world, because if Aron ever got nuclear weapons, not only would they act more aggressively imposed potentially an existential threat to Israel. But you know, and I know, the Saudis, the Egyptians, the Turks and others would follow suits. And the only thing worse than the Middle East we've known is the Middle East I've
just described. So I think what Israel and then the United States did was warrant it we'll see what the results are. Whatever the Iran, whatever happened, the Iranian program was not obliterated. Elements of their program I expect will have survived the attacks on the three sides. More important, I don't know. You don't know, probably the president doesn't know what amount of uranium or number of centrifuges and so forth are under some roof of some warehouse and
some other part of Iran. I actually think going forward, Devin, we have got to assume just the opposite, that the Iranian program was not obliterating, but elements of that program exist.
And what's worrisome to me, I'll be honest with you.
I would think that a lot of Iranian leaders have said, Hey, this never would have happened. Had we had nuclear weapons, we could have deterred the Israelis in the Americas. So I worry that going forward, I think their determination to develop nuclear weapons might, if anything, be even greater.
Well, you know, I want to just pick up on that point because that's interesting observation in an important one. And we'll get to North Korea as well in a second. Because your reference goes back to the opportunity the United States had under the Clinton administration to take out their program before it proliferated. But I want to talk a little bit about the Non Proliferation Treaty. People have brought that up since the nineteen seventies. I think two hundred
countries were signatories to that, including Iran. There were a number of countries that have developed nuclear programs that were not original signers to that. Obviously Korea and Israel and the extent they have a nuclear program quote unquote, but certainly India and Pakistan. But those countries as a consequence, would make the claim you just made that they've been they've had that deterrent. Now Iran assumed that they would not be bombed, I presume under the terms of the
Non Proliferation Treaty. Does that put at risk the entire notion of the non Proliferation Treaty?
What's just occurred, So let me give you a slightly convoluted answer.
The Non Proliferation Treaty is only a small piece of the effort against non proliferation. I don't think it's a wildly successful piece in many ways because it really is a gentleman's agreement. We declare what facilities we're doing, certain types of research or engineering in and then the inspectors come look at them. The inspectors can't look at places that.
Are not known.
So the entire treaty in that sense is based upon a degree of faith that I tend.
Not to have.
North Korea withdrew from the treaty and there was no particular penalty or anything for them having done so. Turns out the most important non proliferation tool out there is not the Treaty. It's called America's alliances. By giving countries the confidence that we are there for them, they then don't need to become self sufficient, and the biggest way to accelerate proliferation will be, for example, of the South Koreans or other has come to have doubts about their
relationships with US. So don't get me wrong, I'm not saying the Non Proliferation Treaty doesn't have some utility, and I think in particular the inspection provisions can be useful, but we shouldn't exaggerate it's impact that Iran I would think was going to do and is going to do and what it wants regardless of its obligations under.
This treat So back to what you were saying, I mean, so just let's speculate what goes happens going forward. Obviously, this notion of resim change, people sort of pull back a little bit, or least it appears the President's pulled back. I don't know if BB is pulled back on the notion of regime change. But what won't change is their pursuit, presumably of a nuclear weapon. As you note, we don't
know that the program was quote unquote obliterated. Even if the physical sites may have been, we don't know where this enriched uranium is and centrifugius you imagine. Now your concern is now what that they accelerate that program with the darkness, meaning without any international inspectors.
That's my concern.
It might not be their immedia priority, which I think is to shore up the regime. But at some point I do think reconstituting a program will become a priority, which means, by the way, the day may come where Israeli United States needs to once again use military force if we discover some activity going on in the Iranians won't voluntarily give it up. It's not normal that problems get solved. When I was the head of the Council,
on Foreign Relations. I used to discourage the Fellows from using the words solved or solution, because that's just the way history works. So I don't believe whatever it is we accomplished the other day, however much we accomplished, it didn't solve the problem. It may have reduced it. It may have set back the Iranian program, but that'll pop up again. It's by the way you mentioned regime change. It's one of the reasons that people, I think are
attracted to the idea. If you can't solve the Iranian problem through military force or through diplomacy, then people say, what's left, Well, let's get a benign government. And I think that's why there's so much interest in regime change. The problem is it's easier to talk about it than bring it about. I don't see the prerequisites in place for it, and in any case, you can't base.
Your policy on it.
People don't like it when I say this, but it's a wish more than a strategy. If it were to happen. I think it brings problems but obvious benefits with it. But we just can't count on it, and no president can give the order to say Secretary of Defense or state and say, get me regime change in Iran.
They wouldn't have then the tools to necessarily.
Carry it out when it comes to just issues of trust. And you know, I think one of the questions that I get and I ask myself all the time, I feel like, for most of my adult life, I've been hearing baby Net and Yaho say they're just months away, a year away from having weapons grade nuclear weapons, and you know, a certain point you just stopped believing it.
But your assessment, you know, your own objective assessment this time did appear to be different, that they were getting closer and actually appeared to be within a matter of months in a position where potentially we had a weapons grade weapon coming out of Iran? Is that accurate?
Pretty much? Look, this was a gathering threat. It wasn't an imminent threat. It was a gathering threat. And the question is how close Now we know they had done most of the enrichment work they need to do to get it uranium enriched a plus or minus sixty percent, that's not just sixty percent of the effort, that's actually closer to ninety percent of the effort. For reasons of physics, that I couldn't explain because I don't understand them well enough.
But I think I'm right there. Now. What you don't know is how close they were on some of the other things.
The actual fabrication of explosive device is the bomb, and so forth. And there there was the Israelis, believe the economists published some very interesting stuff about it, that they had made some breakthroughs, they had had some secret programs and so forth. And I think we have to be tolerant, just like after nine to eleven we were less willing to run certain risks, say about what Iraq could do. And this is not a justification for the Iraq war. I was against it, but just I understand some of
the thinking. I think Israel after October seventh had less tolerance of running certain risks in their case. So I just think the combination of a change mentality in Israel, the evisceration of groups like Hisbella, which couldn't really attack Israel anymore, and this new intelligence would suggested, however, far along the Iranians, for they were farther along. And I think for all those reasons, the Israelis decided to act and we came in behind.
Does this keep BB in power for another extended period of time.
We roughly what sixteen seventeen months to run before he has to. I think the elections are scheduled for October of next year. It certainly helps them. Mean Israel, as you know, is deeply divided about issues on democracy, Gaza, what have you, whether the religious can be drafted and so forth. They are not divided on Iran, left and right, hawk and dove. There aren't a lot of doves in Israel when it comes to rod. So it clearly helps BB.
It changes the conversation a little bit, It brings Israel together. It's seen as an accomplishment, and he has He has changed in many ways israel strategic reality given the change in Syria is volah, the weakening of a masque. Whatever you think, however critical people watching this might be of what Israel's done and how it's done it in Gaza, the reality is that BB nets and Yahou in the last what eighteen months, has dramatically reduced the external threat to Israel.
And on that basis, are you confident that we'll have sort of a you know, Abraham Accord two point zero with Saudi coming in? Is that the map that you see changing or is that still opening end in question with the everything that's going on or not going on in Gaza, West Bank, et cetera. What's your over under on that look?
As you know, for a while it looked like it was going to happen before October seventh, and then because of if you were October eighth and Israeli policy, the Saudis backed off. They got nervous or uneasy about it. Two things may have changed now, though, which is interesting. One is beaving that Tan Yahoo. As you were just suggesting, Gavin politically is stronger than he was, so he might give him more leverage against those in his government who oppose any sort of change in policy on Gaza.
Secondly, there's this guy named Donald Trump.
It's interesting on how many occasions Trump has distanced himself from beving that Ta Nyahoo. He did it on the huties, he did it on the prisoner move with Hamas he told the Israelis a few weeks ago, don't you dare attack around. We're trying to see if diplomacy works. Just the other day, shall we say, I'm rather colorful language. He was out there. So it's possible that tomorrow he would tell the israel Is, hey, knock it off in Gaza or do this on the West Bank. There's an
unsentimental quality to America firstism. And one of the things you see, we've beganned the conversation talking about Europe. Well, one of the things, whether we're talking about security or tariffs or now this being an ally of the United States ain't when it used to be. When it comes to Donald Trump, friends and allies no longer get preferred treatment.
So it wouldn't shock me if Donald Trump, in his hope to get the Saut East to normalize with Israel, put real pressure on bb Nets and Yao and we put the Israelis in a real jam. Trump is popular in Israel. And also it's almost like Nixon going to China. Nixon Wan said, you know, they didn't have Nixon to worry about. Well, you can't do an end run around Donald Trump. So if Donald Trump leans on vving Netshanyahu, who are the Israelis going to appeal to in American
domestic politics. So I actually, I actually think that's a curious possibility that something could happen there.
Do you find him under the influence And I say, that loosely, I mean because of his own financial relationships to the UAE and guitar and the Saudi's sort of the Arab I mean, do you think they will play an outsize role in influencing Trump in that respect?
Look, if they had, you probably would have gone ahead and done the strike. As much as they wanted around cut down to size. They were very nervous that they were going to be in the line of fire of retaliation. So my guess is there an influence but not a determinant of what he does.
And I say that in no way how would I put it.
I'm not comfortable with, shall we say, this merging of the personal the government when it comes to wealth creation or you know, the fact that people don't refuse themselves from things, or they carry on private sector activity. I'm as uncomfortable as I expect you are, or a lot of people watching that, But I don't think they have.
I haven't seen that they have undoing. I haven't seen it.
Over is, you've written a lot about doctrines. You talk about the Monroe doctrine. I think eighteen twenty three you've sort of walked us through the Truman doctrine and aspects of of not only Reagan, but even the freedom doctrine as you refer to it under the Bush administration dealing with terrorism, no place to hide? What do you have any sense of what the hell that Trump doctrine is? Or, I mean, Jade Vance tried to sert one in a
speech yesterday. What America first? What is it? What's your sense?
It's a good question. I think about it a lot.
Well, it might be earlier, it's still early, particularly in the second term, and the second term is a hell of a lot more than a continuation of the first term. You may love that, you may hate it, but it ain't Trump two point zero is more than an extension of Trump one point Oh. There is something with this America first ism that our alliances aren't as predictable, our enemies aren't aren't seen as enemies. There's a kind of perpetual maneuver in American foreign policies. I'm not quite sure
if that adds to a doctrine. In some ways, doctrines lead you to predictable outcomes. In a funny sort of way, Trump America first ism at times leads you to unpredictable outcomes. It's not isolationist, though I would say it's quite unilateral, you know, as we saw the the other day. I also wrote a few weeks ago that there is something of a doctrine. It's the opposite of the freedom doctrine, where under people like George W.
Bush or even Reagan.
Or Carter, we cared an awful lot about how governments treated their own people. This is just the opposite. This is all look the other way foreign policy. What you do inside your boards is your business. All we care about is that our business. So there's almost amoral quality to Trump be in foreign policy. And again, doctrines have to explain and predict. So I'm not quite sure yet we have anything that quite rises to that level.
Interesting. I mean, the only thing that would that would contradict that modestly was JD Vance's speech in Munich where he's lecturing the Europeans one hundred percent.
You're right to point out that contradiction. It's the one area where it's almost like there's an equation of elite Ivy League universities with elite Europe. And that's the one place where the administration is willing to tackle internal situations or circumstances in foreign countries.
But I think that's the exception that kind of proves the rule.
Interesting. So where where's Putin now? What's he seen? What's what? What do you think he's made of the last twelve days? Where is he in relationship? I mean he's got a free pass in some respects. The eyes are off him. He's stepping things up in Ukraine. Is it status quo ante or is he now reconsidering things?
Probably a mixed bag. Well, as you say, I think you're a hundred percent right. He has to be happy with the fact that both at the G seven and then at Nato Zelenski and Ukraine were not quite center stage yep. And that very much fits or feeds Putin's idea. The time is on his side, so I think he has to feel pretty good, pretty good about that. Anytime there's instability that increases energy prices, not that we've seen a real price bike, that's got to make him feel good.
Given his economy, it's got to.
Feel a little bit uneasy with this demonstration of American power, with the discrepancy between what the United States can do and what say Iran could do.
That's got to make them a little bit.
Uneasy, but I would think all things equal to the last few days probably made them feel okay.
For one other reason.
I don't know if you noticed, the won my Hutzpow Award for the month the statement by the Russia Foreign Ministry critical of ISRAE for not respecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of a UN member.
And I'm sitting there reading that, going really really so.
But the Russians have to like the idea that we are we would unilaterally decide that certain uses of force were somehow acceptable, and that's got to be something that Putin might actually, you know, welcome.
And do you welcome? Sort of I mean, look from a tactical perspective, turn the page. In terms of trying to negotiate peace in Ukraine. Obviously stubborn, he wasn't able to get it done before he took the oath of office. He wasn't able to get it done within the twenty four hour time clock, and he set himself up for but sort of the overtures to Putin, sort of negotiating Putin's talking points and putting Zelenski on the spot. But where do you think Trump is right now in relationship to.
You know, he's been a little more critical, at least publicly, been willing to be slightly more critical Putin, do you where do you think the administration is move into to a conclusion or solution here.
They're caught in the inconsistency of their own policy. They're right to say that we need peace there. And I think they had one improvement over the Biden policy, where the Biden administration would never speak honestly with Zelenski, at least publicly, and say, look, you know and we know that you're not going to militarily liberate Crimea or all the East. Let's go for a deal that we get a cease fire. It doesn't prejudice your long term goals,
but let's stop this war. That's Trump's idea, and I think that's smart. I think that's realistic. Where he's inconsistent is he sabotaged. He's sabotaging the chance for getting it by not being supportive of Ukraine. That gives Putin again the confidence that time is on his side. If this president would announce this summer, when the pipeline begins to run dry, we're going to re up American aid for Ukraine,
not so they can militarily liberate all their land. That's going to have to be done diplomatically, but so Russian efforts will not succeed. I think that would turn the war out, and I actually think we may with the more specifical I think that would persuade Putin over time that more war would not lead to more territory. And I think that actually would be the way to get things at the negotiating table, not for peace, but for
cease fires. So the administration has the right goals, it's just not going it's going about it in one hundred percent the wrong way.
Is she looking at you know, a year whatever we're in with Ukraine? Is that make him more or less likely to pursue and make advanced pursuits in Taiwan? Or has he seen something different the asymmetry of warfare now, the nature and change the transformation of warfare. What's your sense of where she is at this moment as well in relate not only to Ukraine, but also perhaps more broadly as well to what the Trump administration just initiated in bb in around.
My glim answer to is going to be both or yes. I think on one hand, he looks at Ukraine. He looks at the sanctions that have been introduced. He looks at how Putin overestimated the capabilities of his own military. He's seen how the West came to bat indirectly but decisively for Ukraine.
That had to have given him pause. I mean, look, think about it. There's no general in the Chinese military who has military experience. Yeah, they have.
The least time they fought to wars against Vietnam, they didn't. They didn't do so hot. And for the Chinese government to go to war against Taiwan and not succeed, imagine the domestic political consequences of that, The questions of legitimacy they would raise, not just for she as a person, but for the party. So I actually think they're they're
somewhat cautious here. I also think they have to find it impossible to read Donald Trump again, given the tariffs, given what he just did the other day, and I think that must introduce a role of caution. I think they've got some internal issues. He's been purging a lot of military leaders. They've obviously got their economic challenges. So he hasn't given up. Don't get me wrong, that Taiwan is his legacy. That's his way to make himself a
major figure in modern Chinese history. But I don't think the moments arrived. I think he wants to get a better reading on Donald Trump. We still don't have a good feel for the Trump administration's relations with Japan, Taiwan, Australia, but none of it's going particularly well. I think he probably wants to see some more about the lessons of the modern battlefield. He still wants to build up, among other things, as nuclear arms.
One of the.
Lessons I think Shiesh Jing learn gav was the United States did not get directly involved in helping Ukraine, and he I think from Xijianpingk's point of view, that was because of the mass of Russian nuclear arsenal. So China right now is the owner of the world's fastest growing nuclear arsenal. They're adding hundreds and hundreds of nuclear weapons
each year. They want to get they kind of want to get the bronze medal in the Serious Nuclear Arsenal's Olympics, and they're moving as quickly as they can in that direction. But my guess is they don't want to show down over Taiwan. For several years until they believe they can offset or deter any American pressure because of our nuclear advantages.
What do you make of the new president in Taiwan? He's rolling out I think this week a unity tour, is giving speeches. He seems to be you know, you know, it's sort of not poking the bear, but certainly trying to sort of suggest more muscularity visa the mainland China. Is that you know, what do you what do you read into that?
Yeah, I mean, some of that's politics, some of it spoken to bear. My view is what I really want to do is see Taiwan get stronger. In Taiwan's the level of defense effort is not in the right zip code. Still, they've got to do a lot more. I look at I mean, we talked about Israel a lot, and you know, Israel's and shall we say, difficult strategic situation at least
it has been for most of its existence. And you look at the level of military effort they've produced, or even US during the Cold War, we were probably spending i don't know, on the average of maybe six five, six seven percent of GDP. Taiwan's nowhere near that. And look at the disparities between the mainland and Taiwan. So Taiwan more important than what they say is what they do, and I would say they've really got to make a
much larger effort. They've got to also look very carefully at what just happened in the Middle East and what's happened in Ukraine and ask themselves whether they are incorporating the right strategic lessons. Too much of the Taiwan military historically has elements almost of ours, a small number of expensive aircraft and so forth. I actually think they need something much larger numbers are smaller, cheaper systems would probably be helpful. The other country to really watch there is Japan.
I actually think we're at a moment in history where Japan's our most important ally still the world's third largest economy, and militarily it's central to any scenario involving Chinese pressure against Taiwan. And I worry about the deterioration and that relationship of late. So again, things like that might actually affect Chinese calculations as well. But all I said, even though you know, I worry about a lot, and I worry about this as a strategic, medium, long term challenge.
I don't get the sense this is a near term challenge.
Interesting only slight correction. Japan is fourth to California's third. I just had it comment on that four points. I'm just saying, I'm waiting for my G seven invitation. That's all you know, our G G five. I mean, I don't know whatever G four of three. It's interesting you say Japan is the most important. I've heard people others sort of you know, suggest that Australia plays an outsize role in terms of just you know, looking at the
sort of strategic realignment. Where do you make I mean that president or the leadership there surprised some punderance and pulling out a pretty healthy margin and the victory. Obviously they're overtures back and forth to China. But you made a point which I don't really reflected on Trump's sort of ambiguity with those relationships South Korea obviously and Japan and the trilat that the Bidy administration had. Now we're seeing that taking shape with she and obviously Australia seems
to be sort of the plus one right now. But give me your sense of where Australia plays.
Look, Australia does play an outsize role.
I think that the relationship isn't as robust as it ought to be, hasn't gotten a whole lot of attention, a lot of you know, a lot of our economic policy has alienated our friends, you know, the tariffs in particular. Most of the line on defense is do more, do more, do more, and that gets a little bit old after a while. So I would like to see if you will more consultation with them. And again, you can't have economic policy and military or strategic policy carried out in
separate silos. It's very hard to hammer an ally or friend over trade issues on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, and expect on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays. The strategic relationship is going to be just fine. Doesn't work that way, So I would say this is again I'm critical of a lot of the economic policy on it its own merits.
I don't think it makes sense full stop.
But even putting that aside, it certainly doesn't make sense because it ends up penalizing more than anyone our friends, just those with the exception of China. It's our friends and neighbors who are, as you know, our biggest economic partners.
Today. Donald Trump in his press conference when I was confronted on why he hasn't solved the conflict in Ukraine immediately, well, he pivoted to his success in immediately solving the crisis in Pakistan and India. Overstated, understated? Is that an early success that he deserves more credit than perhaps he's been given.
It sounds slightly ungenerous my part, but I think it's a bit exaggerated. And it also has rub raw US Indian relations.
I was going to ask that next.
Yeah, and look, it's always been difficult dealing with Pakistan and dealing with India. But I think the great breakthrough, and it was a bipartisan one of them the last several administrations, was that US Indian relations got on a firmer, more important strategic footing made sense given India's demographics, economics, relationship with China and so forth. We bean, as you know,
to bring Indian into various Asia Pacific strategic groupings. I've always seen Pakistan more as a problem than as a partner. It was a problem in Afghanistan in many ways, and you know, the questions of democracy and human rights, the role of the military and politics it's been a very uneasy country. If you had asked me years ago what keeps me up most tonight, I might have said Pakistan, in part because the potential loss of command and control
over nuclear materials. So the even handedness that we've reintroduced. And then the shorthand for this is that we've we've once again, we've once again hyphenated the relationship.
So rather than having a strategic relationship with India and.
A lesser relationship with Pakistan, we now once again have India Pakistan policy. And it seems to me that is not a wise approach given what I would argue is India's greater inherent importance and potential.
You know, how close they really were?
You know, I don't think things were that close to escalating or getting out of a hand that said, Look, anytime the United States can dampen down actual or potential hostilities, you know, great, and I would you know, say well done to the President or the Secretary of State or anyone else who had a hand in it. But yeah, I wouldn't exaggerate it here. And again it may have come at some cost as well.
Yeah, well, and then there was also a price. The largest I think one of their crypto exchanges in Pakistan now is yeah, well, and we'll get back into the corruption questions, or at least questions of corruption.
Look, I've heard that, and yeah, I don't know, but yeah, it is what it is.
It is what it is. So you've been writing a lot about, talking a lot about, and obviously only highlighted with the last few weeks, But what the hell's wrong with American foreign policy? We get so damn bogged down in the Middle East. You've made the point there's a whole world out there. We talked, we've sort of jumped around different countries, different regions, but the reality is we have been for decades and decades and decades bogged down
in the Middle East. You you e've an interesting history working in Republican administrations, Bush administrations, But you made the notation earlier, and it's important point to highlight you were opposed to that last war in Iraq, and so you've seen some light and some wisdom through all this. But what the hell has happened to the United States over the last I mean, my entire lifetime been consumed by countries none of us could pronounce. No one knows the
difference between Iraq and Iran. I think there was a song about that, and you know what's going on, Richard help.
Us a fair question.
Just for the record, I didn't work for a democratic administration. I worked in the Carter Pentagon. And one of the big issues then was the Middle East. Is nineteen seventy nine you had the revolution in Iran, then you had the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan.
Look when the Cold War ended, what thirty five years.
Ago, I don't think anyone would have predicted Devin that the Middle East would be such a focus of American fire policy. The first real crisis of the post Cold War era was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. We President Bush forty one rallied the country in the world to Kuwait's defense.
It was quite extraordinary. I think it was actually to me.
Like I duly note that I was part of the administration, I worked on the Middle East. But you know, credit I think is due to the President, bren Scokropt, Jim Baker and others. It was quite remarkably done well, and I think what we did was necessary. The two thousand and three Iraq War was a war of choice. I think it was misguided and some other I think with the other day what we did was I think was warranted.
But in general, if I look at the map of American farm policity and that you still have forty thousand troops in the Middle East, it seems to me that it's a disproportionate focus for US. It's the one it's one of the parts the world where you don't have a great power presence, you don't really have much great power competition, and that it's you have regional powers, not great powers.
I would say.
Ultimately twenty first century history is going to be much more written about what happens in Europe and above all the Asia Pacific. Asia Pacific is where the people are, it's where the wealth is, It's where the militaries are going to be. US China competition will be defining. So it seems to me strategically there is still something odd about the emphasis that the Middle East gets, and I
think we've we've gotten too ambitious there at times. I think, in particular forty three's effort to transform it to bring about democracy was.
I think still advised.
I'll be diplomatic here and so forth, and some other things that we've done again were I would say we should do no more than is necessary in the Middle East, because there's other parts of the world that I would argue are strategically more important, and we just.
Find ourselves more about that.
I don't have a good answer for you exactly why at times, but somehow it's captured our imagination. One of the odd things for secretaries of state, and I worked with quite a few. How getting heavily involved in Middle East and diplomacy was almost part of the job after Henry Kissinger, and I like it or not, people found themselves doing it, and yeah, less my take on all that is, no mediator can ever be more successful than
the protagonists want or would allow him to be. And I think at times we've too often substituted our own efforts for what was missing on the part of the locals. So my argument is not to get out of the Middle East, but I would where possible dial it down.
So you know, it's interesting. We had Steve Bannon on this show, and I don't get the merits and demerits of that conversation, but he's had a lot of more public conversations about what he perceived, or at least asserted was the wisdom of Trump focusing on things like Greenland
or countries like Greenland, focusing on the Panama Canal. Looking at it more from a strategic prism sort of you know, hemispheric framework and sort of creating a stronger consciousness to sort of regionalize our American first framework and to put it in, you know, in at least creating a narrative around what some of us perceived as just the absurdity of these threats to take over Greenland, make Canada fifty first state, and invade or take over the Panama Canal.
Is there any merit to that argument or is it just folly?
Folly would be generous the terrible idea. Look, it seems to be setting up a kind of spheres of influence approach to the world. So we would have the lead role in this part of the world, presumably Russia would have a lead role in the European theater, China and the Asia Pacific. Russia and China would be very happy with that arrangement. No one in this hemisphere would be so in a f any sort of way. We wouldn't succeed at playing an outsized role because it would be resisted every inch.
Of the way.
Americans, including a lot of the Maga people, wouldn't want us involved in imperial wars in this part of the world, whether it's Panama or Mexico, or Greenland or Canada.
So I just think it's unnecessary.
We can have the access the influence we need without an imperial coercive role. And again, the real strategic challenges of the century are not going to be met here.
They're going to be met.
In other parts of the world, above all Asia and the Pacific. So I think it's really a truly misguided approach. But it makes me uneasy because I can see something of it, and this kind of people don't yet speak about spheres of influence, but it's kind of in the air of the water, and I'm uneasy about it. But it's not a recipe for order. We would be resisted here, and history suggest wherever there'd be a lot of opposition. And by the way, it would become a real recipe
for proliferation. Watch how if something like that were to begin to gain momentum, Watch countries in e urbeer in Asia decide they need nuclear weapons of their own. So I think that kind of an approach to the world would be quite honestly catastrophic.
Questions around the globe in terms of concerns we so often neglect. Continent of Africa was a reference today of Congo from the President the only time we tend to focus on Africa as a relationship to China's investment. The same with the Central America or South America as well. I mean parts of the globe that seemed to be under resourced in terms of mind share and investment, strategic investments. What's your over under in terms of America's posture in
South America, Central America. But first let's start in Africa.
What makes Africa, siouey generous, What makes it unique going forward is demographics. Most of the world is getting a shrinking in number and getting older. South Asia is the one partial exception. Africa is an enormous exception. Africa is going to be increasing by what more than a billion people over the next generation or so, and the question is whether that's a burden or a bonus, and that.
Remains to be seen.
So I think Africa is important, not in the sense of great power strategic competition. That's a sideshow for the most part, but really it's a human story. It's with you know, all these people, and the question is can economically these people, can they be employed?
Can governments provide services?
You can you have good enough governance, So in places like Nigeria, South Africa and other countries that you don't.
Have civil wars and so forth.
So I think that's the big question for Africa, and by the way, pretty true of Latin America as well, without the democraptic dimension. But again, the biggest problems in Latin America are not whether Brazil is going to invade Argentina or whether Russia or China going to do.
Some of the biggest issues they are internal their governance. Can the Mexican.
Government meet the responsibilities and challenges of sovereignty within Mexico? Can they deal with cartels and drugs and criminals and the and the light and where possible. I think our policy ought to be to help these countries meet their challenges, because it's good for them, but it's also good for us.
Then there'll be conditions of stability, better chance for democracy, better chance for trade and investment, better way to deal with whether it's health challenges or climate challenges or what have you. So we do it it's both. Again, it's not either or it's the right thing to do. It's helpful to them, but I think it also very much works in our favor. It's one of the reasons, by the way, I'm so critical of what we've done to
the Agency for International Development. The real folly of that is not that it provides opportunities for China, which it does, but again, we weaken the ability of these societies and these governments to deal with their immediate challenges. That can't be good because ultimately failed states become places where terrorists set up shop, where disease breaks out and spread, Pirates do their things, criminals do their things. So again, even out of narrow self interest, we ought to be doing
more in these places. So I just think it's quite short sighted.
So let me move back, and I see it. You've got a book behind you that I want to talk about in a moment, and it brings us back a little bit more domestically, and it brings back sort of just to the prism of you know, my lens has changed dramatically in the last few weeks since I have just shy have five thousand members of the US military on the streets of one of America's largest cities, Los Angeles, without council consent on the support of the state revere
the men and women in uniform that are out there just not their assignment. But it also sort of assigned some consideration and consciousness to this administration and what distinguishes
it from the first Trump administration. I know you've got a blog You've written a little bit about this where you said Trump is organized a cabinet that are more of amplifiers than more traditional sort of metrics of people that would sort of, you know, great sort of a governing of our framework, regulatory or regulate some of the thinking. I mean, where's where are you today in terms of
this administration? One hundred and fifty or so days in however many days, it's been growing concern simmering concerns We overstate authoritarianism. Is that a word that we should even be using. Is democracy hanging in the balance or are we fine? What's your sort of over under what's the temperature right now?
The fact that we have to have this conversation tells you something am uneasy. I'm uncomfortable with words like authoritarianism all that that's something to be avoided ultimately, but there's tendencies that worry me. We haven't had. There's two major lines that the administrations walked right up to and played footsoe with but hasn't quite crossed in a decisive way.
One was the one you were alluding to, which is the use of the American military inside our borders, and that to me has all sorts of implications for American democracy, but also it's terrible for the American military. It reduces readiness, It politicizes what has been in some ways the most successful modern American institution that we.
Have. So that's one thing that makes me uneasy. We're not.
We haven't quite crossed that line, but we've tiptoed up to it, as you know better than I do. The other is defiance of decisions by the judiciary, and again some of the quasi defiance, not quite hearing what the courts were saying on deportations and so far.
So that leaves me uneasy. But I don't think.
Either yet has reached the point of shall we say, broad crisis or crisis of the first order.
But I think there's grounds for being uneasy.
Look, it's the irony of this isn't lost here we are. It's now what late June and approximately what twelve months. In a week we're going to be marking the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of this country. And to me, the lesson is not to take democracy for granted. You've done good things, by the way in your state with Josh Friday, I think in terms of promoting volunteerism and public service, which I think is great both for the
values enhances, but also it brings Americans together. I've tried to make a big thing about Civics education. We shouldn't assume that people don't need it or somehow get it automatically. The answers they do need it and they don't get in their schools. For the most part, that ought to become much bigger priority, and we ought to think a lot about what we need uh to do to make sure American democracy works. But I get uneasy with some of the attacks on civil society, whether it's law firms
or universities or or what have you. So I think there's a lot of yellow lights flashing, and so my view is we ought to we ought to be mindful of them and not again not take anything for granted, or you know, you know Churchill has always quoted for everything. Uh, and one of them is that you Americans can always be counted on to do the right thing after they do everything else.
There's a kind of sanguine quality.
Or yeah, we get in trouble, but we've always come out in the right place and never sell America short.
Probably, but let's not take it for granted. That's my only view.
I think it's just a we ought to feel a sense of urgency and the given how enormous the stakes are. I don't think anybody kind of how to put it, democracy can't be a spectator sport. And whether you were in positions of authority like you, whether you're a quote unquote justice citizen or you're a CEO of some business or what have you.
I just think there's ways for people to make a difference, and again, we just can't. It's too valuable to not.
How I put it, none of us wants to be in a position where, if things do heads out, we wish we had done things that we know that we simply sat on the sidelines.
You talk about citizenship, you've written about citizenship, and you've challenged us to reconsider what you refer to as sort of a lopsided notion of citizenship, that it's not just about rights, it's about obligations. You wrote a book, the Bill of Obligations, and you enumerate a framework about the critical importance of service and civics, the common good, the best of you know, the wrong and republic, Greek democracy,
and I think the principles are founding fathers. To talk to us a little bit about what inspired you to write the book. You wrote it a few years ago, I imagine inspiration today would be even more acute. But it's an important and essential read. And by the way, it's fantastic for anyone that's listening. Talk to me Richard a little bit and all of us about what inspired this book and what you're really trying to communicate.
Well, first of all, thank you.
Years before I wrote another book called Foreign Policy Begins at Home. And you know, I'm a fart as you look, as we can see from this conversation, for better or worse, I'm a foreign policy guy. That's my educational training, that's my professional experience. But probably about a decade ago I started to see much greater connection between what we were doing or not doing here at home, and our ability to be effective abroad. I wrote about everything from indebtedness
ten years ago. A big issue was energy dependence. By the way, shows we can work through things. Quality or lack of it, of our public education, strength of our democracy.
And I was worried very much.
A decade ago about our inability to generate majorities to deal with the challenges increasingly, particularly at the federal level, less so at the state level. We were gridlocked. And what I noticed in the year since that things weren't getting better, things were getting worse. And so I just decided, I can't quite answer your question what inspired me, but I was just thinking a lot about it. And I take long walks when I think about a book, and
Central Park becomes my co author. And just then went back and reread or in some cases read for the first time, a lot of the great works of American political history, and I was just struck by how much explicitly a lot of our modern are not so modern history was about the expansion of rights what Lincoln called the unfinished work, and I get it, and it's actually been one of the great things civil rights and so forth. We have a lot to be proud of in this
country towards a more perfect union. We're not there, but we've made some real strides. But it seemed to be lost in that. Increasingly was the other side of us that no one was any more talking about obligations. It's interesting the founding fathers didn't talk about it a lot explicitly. I think they assumed it. Gavin, I think it was implicit. They didn't think they needed to remind people about it.
But increasingly it seemed to me we did. You look at the numbers of the people who are eligible to vote and don't vote, the amount of people who get their information quote unquote from TikTok rather than from serious sources, the polls that show young people don't value democracy, don't think it's worth saving, the lack of public service opportunities increasingly, the failure to require quality the civics to be taught in classrooms, growing threats or realities of pe to go violence,
and on and on, and things like COVID and so forth, showed me that a lack of what you mentioned before about the common good, whether to get vaccinated, to wear a mask. It's not just for me, but it's also for the other person. So it just all added up and I just decided that I would I would put my hand to it. So it's for me as an author. It was great. But I learned more writing that book than any other book I've ever written, because I knew less about it going in.
And you've written what sixteen book? How many books?
I've written a dozen and edited a few more. So it's a it's a large it's up to sixteen. But I'm not done yet. I got a few more in me.
There's plenty of chapters of your life left and and and look, I'm grateful for this opportunity to share a little bit of your time and your your your action and passion as it were. And when we get you back, I need you back for the original conversation we haven't had, which is what the hell is going on with my party, the Democratic Party?
Uh?
And how we're going to take back the House, what we need to do? Uh? And uh, how we get back on the right side of these presidential elections.
You give me thirty more seconds.
I was going to raise that which is out everyone's talking about bda battle damage assessment in terms of Iran. I was going to raise Bda in terms of the New York mayoral primary.
Uh okay, is that how we're going to end this as opposed to begin this conversation. Uh? That is for all of you listening a preview of the next podcast or your us I guess on well, part one of this two part pod. Richard, thanks for being
Here, Thank you sir, enjoying us