Hello, everyone, and welcome back to These Times. As ever, I'm Tom McTae. And I'm Helen Thompson. In this week's episode, we're going to do our best to think about one of the most extraordinary weeks in recent memory, a week which saw Keir Starmer traveling to Washington to meet Donald Trump after announcing an inquiry. Thank you.
plan, which they hope to present to the US president this week. The question then for this week's episode is, what does Trump's approach to the Ukraine war mean for British defence policy in the context of the row in the Oval Office? Don't tell us what we're going to feel. We're trying to solve a problem. Don't tell us what we're going to feel. Because you're in no position to dictate that. Remember this. You're in no position to dictate what we're going to feel.
We're going to feel very good. We're going to feel very good and very strong. You're right now not in a very good position. You've allowed yourself to be in a very bad position and he happens to be right about it. You're not in a good position. You don't have the cards right now. With us, you start having cards. Right now, you're playing cards. You're gambling with the lives of millions of people. You're gambling with World War III. You're gambling with World War III.
So Helen, often when I start these discussions, I say something along the lines of we've got a lot to discuss in one hour to covering what's happened over the last week. I mean, this week feels particularly acute in that sense. We have got just an extraordinary... amount that's happened and really the question I guess is the significance of each event and that's what we're going to try and discuss today when we first came up with the structure
for this episode. It was actually before that extraordinary scene in the Oval Office. And we were thinking mostly about focusing this on what everything meant for Britain and British security and what kind of decisions that Keir Star... I was going to be left with. And so perhaps this episode will feel a little bit more British-focused than otherwise it might be. But we think there are really good reasons for that, which we'll sort of come to throughout this episode.
In the first half, what we're going to try and do is unpack what happened over the past week, particularly from Keir Starmer's visit to Washington on Thursday, and then the Zelensky trip to the White House 24 hours later. and then the conference in London on Sunday. And then in the second half, we're going to turn to the deeper historical significance of what's happened and the parallels, particularly with a moment which we think we can draw around.
a lot of important points from, which is the period from Suez up until around Britain's entry into the European economic community in 73 under Ted Heath. So Helen, let's start with Keir Starmer's Visit 2. washington on thursday i think the context for this as i mentioned at the beginning was the decision that he took to increase defense spending before leaving for washington and using the international aid budget to pay for that increase in defence spending. Now that is...
Both, you know, has domestic politics behind it that explains it. It's clearly a part of a strategy to appeal to. you know, Red Wall voters and all of that is clearly comes from the kind of strategy that is being pursued by his chief of staff, Morgan McSweeney. And I think you can see that you can see the logic for that going back. You can trace it through his.
speeches whether it's to the Labour Party conference earlier when he was talking about borders and security and defence and all of these questions it's clearly part of a long-term strategy but I think for this podcast in particular it's the geopolitics that are interesting it's also part of of a pitch to the US president. That's why it was announced before the visit. It was part of a pitch to say.
We understand your complaints. We are answering them. We are increasing our defense spending to meet this moment. It also came with this declaration that Britain was prepared to put boots on the ground as part of a peace plan. And so Starmer goes to Washington. And I think I can give a bit of a Westminster lobby perspective here in that it was widely considered to be a successful trip, certainly until Friday afternoon.
That was the perception among most people. There was a lot of work that was put into it. If you speak to people in the British government and the Foreign Office, they will say, look, you have to see this as the culmination of months, 18 months perhaps. of work before the British government was even elected.
with David Lammy making connections with J.D. Vance and Keir Starmer meeting Donald Trump before he became president in New York, having dinner with him. There was a lot of work that was put into this. And the fruits were then on display in the White House. And I think if we were to sort of give the positive spin on this, we would say the US government, or Trump in particular, seemed to back the Chagos deal.
Trump spoke about a potential US trade deal with the UK that would mean that the UK did not get tariffs. And, you know, essentially, they got on well. And it looked like Trump would be treating the UK differently to how he was going to treat the EU. And so this was seen as a great success. You, though, I think were always a bit more sceptical about that analysis from the beginning, even before things blew up with Zelensky. Yeah, I think that there was something that was a substantive gain.
from the trip which was trump's remarks on shagos islands i think that wasn't a given at least looking from the outside before starmer and i went and there were clearly a lot of people including probably quite a lot of people in the conservative party who thought that the Shakeoffs Island issue would
be given some more lift for them by Trump attacking it. And that isn't what happened. And we know that although there are people around Trump, including Rubio, the Secretary of State, who actually are pretty critical about the Shagos Island. agreement then Trump at least said he was minded to support it and I think that was a victory for Snyder or at least it made that issue easier I think on the trade issue
Britain is not actually in such a vulnerable position compared to the European Union because it doesn't have a trade surplus with the United States. It was interesting that there was some... peeling away of any idea of a full free trade agreement which has always been impeded on the British side by the agricultural issue and
a trade agreement that was quite tech-centered, that might be a more viable thing in terms of Britain's domestic politics than anything like a full free trade agreement. I think the point where I was like sceptical when the visit was... over was that on the two central questions the geopolitical questions i mean by that the ukraine issue and the broader issue of whether
the United States remains committed to NATO, then it wasn't clear what Starmer had got on either count. He got a lot of flattery, and that was part, I think, of the optics of it, and that's why it could...
sell well back home, at least with a certain audience. But had he got something from Trump that suggested the Americans were willing to provide a military backstop to any... anglo-french commitment of peacekeeping troops in ukraine answered that there didn't seem to be that was the case and indeed subsequent briefings out to washington after what happened on friday would would suggest that is simply like not there
And could any European government, not just the British government, be confident that the Trump administration is committed to NATO and is committed to the American Security Alliance, to European... member states of NATO, including Britain. Again, I think not necessarily. And indeed, Trump's own comments on that when he sort of said, well, Britain can look after itself. It's kind of implying Britain doesn't really need the United States. And so I think that...
In that sense, is that the expectations that have been piled onto the trip, not necessarily by Starmer himself, I would say, reflected sort of a disengagement from the absolute... immensity if you like of the problem that faces like european governments is what do you do about an administration in washington that wants to detach
from supporting Ukraine wants to normalize relations with Russia and is far from convinced that the United States can maintain security guarantees to NATO members whilst its also dealing with its geopolitical competition with China and the concern that geopolitical competition with China has brought for this particular group of politicians in Washington at the moment in power about the US.
borders. And you can't fix that problem in terms of the uncertainty about what the American position is by one trip. No, because I mean, ultimately, what are we talking about here? We're talking about... the trump administration pursuing a strategy of normalizing relations with russia now that is a big deal. That is a big strategic change of direction that lies at the root of Europe's panic in the week leading up to that.
to Starmer's visit and, of course, Emmanuel Macron's visit earlier in the week. I think it was on Monday where Macron visited the United States and was a bit more forceful with the US president correcting him in the Oval Office in a way that didn't actually, interestingly. result in him getting the kind of ire that Zelensky would get on the Friday, which I think gives you a sense of Trump's deeper frustration with Zelensky that we can come to.
in a minute a few sort of reflections helen on that i think in one sense the expectations of starmer's visit were so low or there was such a fear that they could go so badly that he could be harangued or you know Peter Mandelson could be attacked directly, or I don't know, the Chagos Island deal could be torpedoed in front of Jonathan Powell, who was sat there. There could have been any number of things that could have gone wrong, which would have, you know, been playing on...
the minds of British officials that presumably this is part of this plan that they've been working on for a long time just to make the trip look visually look a success what we consider a diplomatic achievement coming away from a visit with Donald Trump is actually quite low when you it in those terms rather than talking about those enormously substantive things that you're talking about and then trying to think about
what that means and what kind of language Trump uses that we then grab onto. So it reminded me very much of the first visit that Theresa May made to the White House when she managed to wrangle out of him some kind of commitment. to article 5 of nato you know the mutual defense
clause that was trumpeted then as a sort of great victory. And obviously, it's still under question today. But Starmer, there was a question in the Oval Office to Trump, which was specifically about Article 5. And he said, yes, I support it. But as you say, it's kind of... a throwaway remark in response to a question from the media which is is that the basis
of the transatlantic alliance, that it's this sort of what Trump says in a moment in response to a journalist. That can't be the basis on which to build an entire alliance or a deterrence against Russian aggression. It's just not enough. kind of flippant in a way to say that all that means success and if he answers it more ambiguously that means not success and that the relationship is off it just seems that itself gets at the kind of fragility
of the relationship itself. I think one substantive point that I thought was interesting watching Starmer's strategy for dealing with Trump, and which was what he was trying to do was to present to Trump. the Europeans as a kind of guarantee of his own success, Trump's own success. So Trump is, I mean, this has been briefed out by people close to Trump. Trump wants the Nobel Peace Prize. You know, that is something that is, you know, in the back of his mind.
to bring this war to a close having he has set his officials a 100 day target to get this thing closed. And so he is sort of raging at obstacles to getting to this. And what Starmer's done is said, thank you, Mr. President, for your great initiative. It is the correct initiative. Peter Mandelson has been saying something similar. over the weekend as well.
But what we need to make sure that it holds and that the world can be grateful for your great peace initiative is that it needs to hold, it needs security guarantees. I mean, I think on that sense, you could say that was, it's not a complicated diplomatic strategy. But it seemed to be a reasonable one that seemed to at least it wasn't rejected by Trump. But on that core point, as you say.
If Starmer had a mission, it was to get from Trump, not a commitment to Article 5, which he assumes is still in place, but a commitment to the US acting as a backstop. two british and french troops who will in theory protect this peace agreement he did not get that i think though there's a really interesting question here tom which is what is the hierarchy
For any of the European governments, including Starmer at the moment, are they actually dealing with the short-term problem? And when I say short-term, I mean the next year or so rather than... Anything longer than that? Or are they dealing with the long-term, medium-to-long-term problem? The short-term one being, can something be enticed from the Trump administration? That is a military backstop.
to a European commitment of some kind for peacekeepers in Ukraine. And the answer to that turns on the mineral deal. And we'll come to that in a moment because it's at the centre, obviously, of what happened in the Oval Office on Friday. And then the medium term question, so like where is this in the hierarchy, is are the Americans still committed to the security guarantee to NATO, European NATO states, to Article 5?
And you might say at a certain point is that decisions have to be made about which of those things is the most important, because I don't think there can be any doubt there is deep panic. in European capitals, including in London, about whether the American commitment to NATO is going to survive. Absolutely, yeah. And so if you then turn to the short-term question, is... It would seem that the decision that Trump administration has taken is that some sort of ambivalent, ambiguous backstop.
can be provided via this minerals deal. It is essentially saying we can't give an explicit security guarantee to Ukraine, because there's no basis for normalising relations with Russia on that basis. But we can give ourselves a set of commercial interests that might would involve Americans actually physically being in Ukraine. And that would act as a deterrent to Putin taking further military action after a peace settlement against Ukraine. And then that's as good as it gets.
I think that's what the Trump administration position is. So this then is the context in which Zelensky goes to the Oval Office on Friday. The presumption it looks to be the case anyway. inside the trump administration certainly marco rubio's assumption was that this deal absolutely was going to be signed there was going to be the press conference that was seen there was going to be a second press conference that was zelensky and trump and
in between probably the agreement would be signed. And I think then that is the context in which we have to interpret what happened in the Oval Office. And the questions might be, well, were there people in the US administration who actually were not that keen on the agreement being signed and were quite willing for it to go wrong, possibly. But I think it's clearly the case looking at Rubio's body language in the Oval Office where he looked.
absolutely humiliated by what had happened in very sharp contrast to vance's body language that he was aghast when he understood that the consequence of what was happening was that the mineral agreement wasn't going to be signed and without the mineral agreement being signed there isn't even this wishy-washy ambiguous basis for any kind of American military backstop and without that it's very difficult for the European governments particularly for
Starmer and for Macron who are the ones who are most committed to doing something of here of saying well we'll send our troops as part of a peace settlement to Ukraine. There's also no basis for the kind of peace deal that Trump wants to negotiate because it depends on him gaining some kind of foothold. It seems that he locks in some kind of American interest on one side in which then to strike a deal with Russia on the other.
I mean, I think the importance of, as you have sort of alighted on there with Rubio's humiliation in the Oval Office is absolutely central here. I think we can look at both what Rubio said. after the event, but also importantly, I think Lindsey Graham, the senator. Now, Lindsey Graham is a Republican senator, Trump supporter, but a hawk.
on russia and he has been pushing this minerals deal from very early on and he clearly sees it as you've set out as a way to persuade trump that there is an american interest in Ukraine, it is the kind of the best that he can do. And the best that the Republican Hawks can hope for is to sort of somehow present Trump as not just as a, you know, as a Nobel Prize winning peace president who's able to strike grand deal.
and normalised trade relations with Russia, which is Trump's strategy, but also to win something specifically economically for the United States from the Ukraine deal. Now, both Rubio and Lindsey Graham... essentially laid into Zelensky after the meeting, disowned him. I mean, Lindsey Graham essentially said he was finished, that he had to be replaced as Ukrainian.
leader. My understanding of that is this kind of culmination of repeated attempts to get Zelensky to sign up to this minerals deal. But to be fair to Zelensky, by rejecting the deal on numerous occasions in which each time he is being criticized heavily criticized by rubio previously in fact
There have been shouting matches in Kiev, in Munich and elsewhere because he refused to sign it. It has been watered down. You could say that Zelensky is playing very poor cards quite well up until the point he arrives at the White House. And he pushes further, both in the Oval Office...
sort of sparring, verbally sparring with J.D. Vance, the vice president, who looked sort of put up to criticize Zelensky, but also by continuing to push even further to try and get the security guarantees that not just he wants, but Europeans want from. the Americans. And this is something clearly that is just too far, that the Americans are not going to give it. And I think that this kind of reveals the sort of the big picture here, which is that the Americans are not prepared to
directly fight the Russians for Ukraine. And that presents Europe with that exact same dilemma. Well, are you prepared to fight? the russians directly for ukraine so far i still think that question has been dodged because starma and macron are talking about forces boots on the ground but they are asking essentially
for the Americans to stand behind it. Now, what does that mean? It's ambiguous. At the moment, I think what you could say it seems to mean is that the Brits and the French will be a kind of giant tripwire that would then bring the Americans into a war. But that is not what they're getting. So it's presenting Europe with a dilemma, I think, both in the short term and the medium term, as you say, which are absolutely existential to the transatlantic alliance. It is...
Are you willing, Europe, to take this moment, stand up and to essentially say that you are willing to fight for Western Ukraine against Russia if it crosses some kind of peace border that has been agreed by Trump? and in the medium term as you say are you prepared to stand in for the united states in nato
I think we should just go back one moment, Tom, and just go through the chronology because I think it is revealing on these rows about the mineral agreement. So the first thing... is that scott besant the u s treasury secretary went to kiev and was expecting that the mineral agreement would be signed there and in the round of interviews that he did after what happened in the
Oval Office, he said that he and Zelensky had a row, quote, at a very loud decibel. The outcome of that from Besant's point of view was that Zelensky had promised him that he would signed the agreement in Munich so the Munich Security Conference that's where Vance made his very aggressive speech against Europe but the person who was central to
the agreement that was supposed to be signed was not Vance, but Rubio, who was also at the Munich Security Conference. It seems another argument ensued there, though not of the same volume of the first one. And then Zelensky pressed to come to Washington to sign the agreement. So I think the context is that Trump and people around Trump, they didn't really want Zelensky.
to come to Washington in the first place. From their point of view, that was kind of a concession. And so then what happens is that Trump had set up this kind of almost like a style of doing these Oval Office meetings during the course of the week. He'd done it with Macron, he'd done it with Starmer. This was Zelensky's turn to perform, if you like, like in front of.
not just Trump, but in front of the American media. And either because he didn't quite understand what the consequences of what he was doing in terms of the language that he was using in the room or because... he didn't actually want to sign the agreement again and still thought that he had leverage. Either in terms of getting more concessions on the terms of the agreement or thinking that there was a way of forcing the Americans to make a whole...
harder security guarantee than the minerals agreement. Thought that was on offer in some sense if he used what he thought was his leverage. And then what happened was his humiliation. because essentially he's being told really, I think ultimately by Trump, who I thought adopted a rather different approach with him than France did, that you don't have enough.
cards in your hand, to use the language that Trump used to make the move that you are doing. And then what was really striking about that was the fact that it's all... being played out in front of the cameras and that's what distinguishes it from the row that went on between besan and zaleski in kiev we hear about that like afterwards but it's the brutal humiliation with all the world watching
that makes this a different moment. And then I think has an effect in terms of the way in which Starmer's trip was perceived. I think the perception of Starmer has changed again over the weekend, but it has an effect on the way that Starmer's... trip was perceived because then you can see really clearly that actually that the Americans have got no intention of going beyond the minerals.
deal and that they want that signed and then i think it's if you say then well what starmer's approach to this being since friday it has been well putting his literal and metaphorical arm around like zelensky saying you really have no alternative but to go back and do this again, in some sense, and accept the agreement. And there's no actual cards, to use again Trump's language, that he, Starmer or Macron can play.
that can actually get more out of Trump than what's on offer at the moment. Yeah, you've kind of reached the end of the road. I mean, I think it's quite interesting if we cast our mind back just very briefly that... Trump and Vance and Rubio and Besson, they're not the first people to get frustrated with Zelensky, actually. You know, there have been remarks. I remember it quite clearly when I'm thinking about it. Now, the former British Defence Secretary Ben Wallace complained.
that sometimes it didn't feel as the Ukrainians were being grateful enough. He said actually that he felt like that we were being treated like Amazon. Yeah, I mean... to listen to ben wallace over the weekend you'd sort of you you would think that he never said that you know but also the biden administration were very frustrated at times with zelensky now you can completely defend zelensky in this respect and say well he doesn't have any cards i mean this
is the problem you know he is losing ground in ukraine facing a formidable army that's trying to take his country and he is completely dependent on foreign nations for their support and nobody fundamentally is prepared to go into ukraine to fight for ukraine like they would fight for other countries poland the baltics or countries that are
in nato so he's in a very weak position and he has to do everything he can just to unlock as much money as much weapons as possible from the united states and europe so it's a sort of a constant must presumably exhausting emotionally tolling job of fighting at home and abroad to get as much as you can and so you could i guess you could forgive him for making diplomatic
mistakes or losing his temper or pushing it too far perhaps that's just you know part of the job but actually it's quite telling that If you paint the bigger picture here, Trump is just maybe the sort of end of the line, that kind of brutal backstop, if you like, where he's just said, right, that's it. You're getting no more. And he's saying so publicly. I think that I actually think.
The bit where you can say that the radical change actually in US policy under Trump became clear was not actually what happened in the White House on Friday. I think that was sort of... pulling off the veil more than change it was something that was true and that wasn't being said out loud and it was done in a humiliating and aggressive way particularly from
The moment I think that was the bit that really shows the depth of the Trump commitment to normalise relations with Russia was what happened on the 24th of February, which was the three year anniversary of the Russian invasion. where the Americans voted with Russia on a UN resolution about Origen's justification of the war. And so at the same time as Zelensky is being asked to accept a week.
a very weak basis for American military backstop. He's also been confronted with the rewriting of history from the Trump administration because the Trump, as it decided...
that some acceptance of the Russian narrative about the war is necessary to get Russia, to get Putin to move. And I think that gets to something which I don't think has been, you know, like... brought out like enough and actually then is a problem despite the diplomatic achievement that Starmer had on Sunday in terms of like the British position is it's not at all clear that actually Trump can.
bring Putin to the negotiating table. And then, if you're the British and the French-like government, you're going to be confronted with the war continuing, the US effectively withdrawing from... at least large-scale military support and maybe all military support for Ukraine. And it's all going to be on the European governments because all this...
talk about backstops, et cetera, that we've ourselves been engaging in, presumes that there is a basis of a settlement with Russia. And it's not clear that there is. Yeah, I think a few points on that, Helen. I mean, we have to go back to the basics with what... Putin seems to want from Ukraine. Now, we can take what he has said publicly, which is that NATO needs to be pushed back, not just...
not going into Ukraine, but be pushed back from the frontiers of Eastern Europe facing Russia. That was the maximalist position he set out before the invasion in 22, either late 21 or before the invasion in February 22. He certainly the position. was that Ukraine had to demilitarize. There had to be a kind of federalization and a veto over foreign policy for the Russian-backed oblasts in the East, effectively blocking Ukraine.
ability to move into the Western sphere. So at the moment, that appears to still be the Russian position and they are saying that they are winning. And so they don't have to concede. Now, that seems to be, at the moment at least, too much of a humiliation for even Trump to bear in terms of a peace deal. It seems hard to see how he can agree.
To that, I mean, who knows? I think the other thing that is worth kind of stressing here is that, as you say, the big change in foreign policy... from the american perspective is the pursuit of the normalization with russia it's not the security guarantee for ukraine because we can say that's not just this american position from minsk
The Minsk agreements of Merkel and Hollande threw Biden into Trump, even going back as far as Obama, no Western government has offered a security guarantee. Except the Bush administration.
at the bucharest summit in 2008 and if we play on ironies there that was rejected by the french and the germans the french and the germans so you know in some sense there's these weird sort of historical ironies playing out here and that if you go back to that kind of time who were the ones that were pursuing normalization
With Russia, that was French and the Germans again, and not the Americans. Now it's the Americans that are pursuing normalization, and it's creating a kind of existential panic in Europe. But that did used to be a kind of European policy, in fact, and we'll turn to this in the second half. That was a kind of... core part of european strategic autonomy was to have normalized relations
with Russia. But that is the change here. And it's the degree of Trump's commitment to pursuing normalization, what he's prepared to sacrifice. That is where the ambiguity comes in. And that is what we have to understand as the objectives of Starmer. and Macron and the European leaders in general, what they are trying to do is clear up that ambiguity and trying to almost save the previous position, trying to ensure that America ultimately remains.
committed the backstop you know in whatever form and that's where the minerals deal that's the kind of chink isn't it that's the kind of the first step towards protecting the old system but it's not at all clear that it is salvageable I think what's really striking in all that Tom is that if we look at the way in which the European leaders, particularly Starmer and Macron, have reacted over the weekend to what happened on.
Friday and indeed to the overall situation. It is absolutely clear that their priority has been to try to bolster Trump's position. in the conflict with Zelensky. They don't want it to look like that's what it is, hence the embracive. Zelensky being in London and then Zelensky having his meeting with the king. But the underlying message is you have to make things up with Trump because...
That is the only way that we've got some possibility of keeping the Americans engaged in this problem, in your problem, our problem, that we can't deal with by ourselves. So the reaction... that came from some people in Europe on Friday itself as events were happening, which is this shows...
that this is a moment for European strategic autonomy to use Macron's language. It turns out over the weekend to be completely hollow. Because there is no basis for that. And if you go then into the reasons why that... is the case if you look like historically you can obviously see this
in macron's position back in 2019 when he was talking about strategic autonomy and then into goals which we're going to come to in the second half the premise we just stick with macron the premise was reset with russia If you go back to the speeches that Macron was making in 2019, it's essentially Europe is in danger of disappearing, of dying. He does use that language in disappearing between the power poles of.
United States and China and in order for Europe to live then it has to become sovereign and in order for it to become sovereign it has to reset relations with Russia. Indeed he was going as far as saying we must not lose sight of the fact that russia is part of european civilization he's quite happy making civilizational arguments about that you can't possibly then use a weekend in which everything that happened from monday to friday before that of saying well
What we want is to be more confrontational with Russia, to put European troops into Ukraine, to give some kind of military guarantee to Ukraine at the European level. And that we're doing European strategic autonomy. I mean, because that's just a completely different project of what European strategic autonomy means when you're confrontational with Russia than when you're looking for normalisation with Russia.
it's so much harder. And that comes back to your point about medium and short-term goals here. And in a sense, it seems to me that Europe is not... ready for the medium-term goal of American withdrawal. It just hasn't got the ability to backfill for an American withdrawal. So right now, it's desperately just saying, just stay. grab hold of anything. But I think what you're saying there about Macron is incredibly important because...
Macron is not the one pushing for strategic autonomy right now. That's not the main message that's coming out of the Elysée, which is extraordinary if you think about it. I mean, I spoke to a French diplomat.
late last week, who said the sort of great irony of this was that the Germans were becoming gaulists, the French were becoming British, and that Macron was going over and sort of saying, we'll be your best friend, and I'll use my special relationship with you to persuade you to remain. And the British were becoming...
European. And that was the kind of everything was completely shifting. I don't get that bit because the British aren't becoming European. I mean, because the British were going, Starmer was going to the White House and offering. And playing the same trick.
Well, we're doing the same thing. It's kind of like saying to like Trump, trying to get as close to Trump as possible. Yeah, I guess what that diplomat was saying was that the British were using security, their sort of their leverage on security. to be influential in europe that that was the sort of long-term strike i mean that's always been the strategy as we're going to discuss in the second half i mean i think we should use that point to bring
this half to a close, and we'll turn to those questions. But we should just stress that sort of the deep panic in European capitals and why they're not... demanding strategic autonomy because they are panicked you know i was speaking to one very senior official over the weekend who say we are here at the death like we are witnessing the death of the transatlantic lines and he's just in a sort of total panic about it
And hence why, as you say, look beyond the dramatics, the sort of theatrical spectacle of the week, of the conference in London on Sunday. And what you have is them ordering Zelensky back to Washington to make up with President Trump. turn to why we think the historical parallels for this are important in the second half.
Welcome back, everybody. So in this half, we're going to turn to some important historical parallels that we think really help to understand the predicament that Britain and Europe is in at the moment and why a lot of the talk at the moment about this being a sort of unprecedented moment of crisis for the Western alliance. not really true and that there have been
really significant moments of crisis in the past. And I think we're going to start, Helen, with one, which is the Suez Crisis of 1956. And we've touched on this in a number of previous episodes because of its significance. I mean three in recent months, one being the...
Europe's Trump shock, we called it on the 28th of January. And a second one, a follow up to that, which was Can Europe Survive Trump that we released on the 4th of February. We also touched on it in Trump, Putin and Europe's historic crisis earlier in January. And I think each of those episodes, we try to focus in on this parallel. And it's because it's a moment which, as you kind of put it earlier in this episode, Helen, where...
The veil is lifted off an underlying reality about power in the world. And I think that's what the Suez crisis did in a way. It was a shock, particularly to the British establishment, because it revealed... that you couldn't rely on the Americans to protect. protect your position as much as you thought. And it also revealed how much weaker you had become in relation to American power than perhaps you were willing to admit, or at least even if you understood it implicitly.
I think that the importance of Suez, it's the culmination. And this is something I think is just important to stress to listeners. The conversations that are happening in Downing Street and in the Foreign Office here in Britain at the moment are...
completely wrapped up in these historical parallels and that's why it's important to talk about it it's not just a sort of flight of fancy in which we are picking out the parallels this is something that the british officials are thinking about and they talk about as a twin-track approach between the end of the War of 1945 and Suez in 1956. And actually, we can extend that out to 1973 and Britain's entry into the European Common Market, which is what we're going to do in this half.
And the twin approaches, as it's being talked about internally, is a sort of Churchill-McMillan approach, which is to do everything you can to stick close to the Americans. And that is in terms of industrial cooperation. nuclear weapons, defense. This is the best strategy for protecting British influence in the world.
keeping the defense budget at a reasonable level and maintaining Britain's power and then you have a slightly different approach under what they call the sort of Eden Heath approach which is that you have to stick close to the French and The idea is that in both of these approaches, Britain went too far in the years between the end of the Second World War and Suez. And Suez was the moment that the...
The sticking close to the Americans and the sticking close to the French kind of fell apart because we stuck close to the French. We went in, but we went in without American backing and it all fell apart. And from that moment, you have a divergence between. The British and the French reaction. The British reaction is you can never afford to not be close to the Americans again. You can never get into that position. And on the French side, Helen...
they take the opposite conclusion, that you can't trust the Americans, you have to be autonomous. Yeah, I think that what's really interesting about the Suez crisis is that it shows how, in many ways, the US... or the British-US relationship, given that we're looking at it from the British point of view, was significantly more complicated than it is now. In this regard, that in 1956...
The US given via NATO a military security guarantee to Britain in the context of the situation in Europe and the Cold War and the threat from the Soviet. union and britain was committed to play its part in the security arrangements of europe with the americans in particular through the deployment of British troops in West Germany, the front line of the European Cold War. On the other side of it was that...
British military power was to be used to not just protect British energy security in the Middle East, but West European energy security in general. And the corollary of that was that the Americans, as the British understood it, would in an emergency, but only in an emergency, be the oil supplier of last resort to.
the British. What you have in 1956 is then a situation in which the British with the French and the Israelis decide to use their military power against Egypt after the nationalisation of the Suez Canal. And that what Eisenhower does is to bring to bear American economic power to veto that action. So the action militarily is going successfully. And then Eisenhower tells them to stop.
and tells the British actually to stop and then the British have to tell the French. And the mechanism by which he can do that is Sterling's weakness. So the withdrawal of financial support for Sterling and... to make things worse from the british point of view there is no emergency oil that comes from the united states so in that respect The shock is that the Americans will act as a veto power on Britain's ability to act.
as an independent military actor in the Middle East and one that they're supposed to do according to the American understanding of West European energy security hitherto and they won't provide an oil guarantee. in the emergency when the British think that's what they
If you look at it in terms of the military security aspects of it in Europe, there is a dimension to it, but it is quite different. One of the reasons why Eisenhower makes the decisions that he does is because Khrushchev threatens that. nuclear attacks on Britain and France if they don't withdraw from Egypt. And this does worry Eisenhower, even though it's pretty clear that Khrushchev was bluffing given...
Soviet nuclear-like capability at that time. But there isn't any question at that moment of the American military guarantee in Western Europe, like not. been there what's different in terms of the french and the british reaction to events is that the french conclude well if the energy guarantee let's call it that and the veto power is going to be used in the middle east we can't now trust
the Americans over the military security guarantee in Western Europe. The British reaction to say is there is no reason to doubt the American military security. guarantee to Western Europe and we can move to patch things up with the Americans in the Middle East because actually they do want us to act.
as the military guarantor of West European energy security. And in that respect, the British turn out to be right, because when you get to 1967 and it becomes impossible for Britain to continue in that role, the Americans are... This is obviously Lyndon Johnson being president at this point. Americans are begging the British to stay, even if you go before that to 1964, this time when Wilson's become black prime minister, so Labour has come in.
the pound is under considerable pressure. So the very weakness that allowed Eisenhower to do what he did in 1956. And this time, the Johnson administration says, we will help you prop Sterling up if you keep. your military presence in the Middle East. So there is, in that sense, I don't think it's a situation where you can just say, well, the...
British just get into line with what the Americans want here. The British still have some leverage in that situation. Things completely change when we get to 1967, 1968. But the interesting thing then is what the French... Because the French translate the absence of the energy security guarantee into we cannot trust the military security guarantee either.
I mean, there's a lot of talk now, Helen, isn't there, that de Gaulle and the French were right, that 70 years later, it's true that you can't trust the Americans on these things. But listening to that story, I mean, I'm struck by... a number of parallels, not just on that question of trust. Where the Americans want the Europeans and particularly the British to lead in the Middle East, you could now say that what is happening is they are...
pushing Britain and France to play that role in relation to Ukraine. That is the parallel now. And we are desperately... trying to maintain the balance that we think was lost at Suez. But then we managed to sort of wrestle back after Suez, which is a balance in our commitment to Europe. and the united states the sort of the twin track approach that we don't have to choose that we can we have to stick as close as possible to the americans to lock them in
as much as possible. And you heard, I think, Starmer over the weekend, I think it was in Lancaster House on Sunday, saying that he doesn't accept the premise that they are not trustworthy partners. And that goes right to the heart of what you're saying, the sort of the historical...
lessons that people are drawing from these moments and the French drawing a lesson that the Americans ultimately cannot be trusted in. You have to take responsibility for your own security. And Britain saying that is not the case. I mean, the other significant thing. about this, Helen, is that it prompts discussions in London and Paris about the scale of independent military power.
And you then have, and in particular on the question of nuclear weapons, and then you have different approaches in Paris and London to what is necessary in terms of national control over nuclear weapons. It's still playing. out to this day, despite the fact that we have had attempts, starting with David Cameron, to try to coordinate between France and Britain.
on the independent nuclear deterrent and you've now getting to this point where the germans are asking to be sort of allowed into this group that there is somehow we can turn this into a european nuclear deterrent actually we can trace it back these questions and the choices that are being made and how you lock the Americans in on that specific point, the nuclear point, right back to Suez.
Yeah, I mean, I think it's fair to say that the French are already pursuing the nuclear issue themselves before the Suez crisis. So that's when it's still the Fourth Republic. So before de Gaulle has taken power. But de Gaulle is very focused on the nuclear question.
And so in a different context, the crucial thing from the British point of view is that the Americans make an offer for these missiles, a sky bolt missiles, and then they stop the development of it. And the British government said this is like Macmillan. is looking for an alternative and persuades the Kennedy administration that something should be offered, which is the Polaris system. The agreement for that is struck at the Nassau summit in
1962 and it effectively excludes the French. Now why this is important from the French point of view is that the agreement that Britain strikes with the United States for these missiles puts these missiles in a multilateral context, so in the NATO context.
Macmillan gets out of Kennedy a concession that in an emergency and the emergency that Macmillan's got in mind is something like the Suez emergency where quote supreme national interests are at stake then the weapons can be used independently and it's
The Nassau agreement, or it's one of the things that de Gaulle cites when he vetoes Britain's first application to join the European Economic Community, is saying, well, this is why it's a Trojan horse for American interests in Europe. The French response is to say... we have to have an entirely independent nuclear capability. And then once de Gaulle has gone down that...
The question of how can France have an independent nuclear capability and be under unified NATO command is what comes to the fore because de Gaulle's not willing to put France's nuclear forces under. NATO command and it's in the context of that that he makes the moves culminating in 1966. to take France out of the unified military command. And that is a big deal because it's been preceded by essentially saying that unless the NATO troops are out of...
France that this is what he's going to do. And it involves actually moving the headquarters of NATO from... Paris where it had been to Brussels where it remains so this is a seismic moment because essentially the British position is to say actually if we are going to have the Americans as our ultimate security guarantor, then we have to do this largely on American terms. And we'll try and carve out a little bit like around the edges that recognises that.
Britain is an independent military power in the Middle East at the time, albeit that wasn't going to last. And the French saying actually know that to be a power...
To be a sovereign power has to be to command your own military force, particularly nuclear weapons. Now, there's several things that we can then say about this is that in the end, the French position doesn't last because we go back to... where we've been before, talking about the French defence response to the fiscal constraints of the crash of 2008, President Sarkozy would put France back under unified military.
commands. If this is a strategic autonomy project for France, it can't be said to succeed in the long term. When I spoke to French diplomats last weekend, I was struck that this... question was still really central to how they were thinking. about France's options, you know, both short term and medium term, to use the language that we used in the first half there. And again, I think the point to stress is that the choices are really difficult.
Even if we think about Britain and France's independent nuclear actors, at least they have some independence, some small level of independence, perhaps. If you just look at the kind of stockpiles that you're talking about here. So according to the people I was speaking to, the French stockpiles are around 300 nuclear warheads. And I think Britain has something similar.
The Americans have something like 3,000 to 4,000, as do the Russians. This is a different order of magnitude here, and obviously no other European power has. nuclear warheads so you're when the germans are saying that we're going to be sort of covered by the french and the british nuclear umbrella that is both a would be a dramatic change if you were to create some kind of European nuclear deterrent you know that it's a change from what has existed since Suez but it's also
It would have to be the beginning of something remarkable, which would be a nuclear buildup in Europe, which poses huge financial costs, but also political, logistical costs and questions that have not been... anywhere near, you know, address beyond just the sort of fiscal constraints of doing that. Already in French politics over the weekend, you had people saying, we cannot extend, you know, French's nuclear guarantee to Germany.
In Britain, actually, we did talk about, under Boris Johnson, when there was a review of Britain's military strategy, in the strategic review, there was... A decision made that called people's attention at the time to increase Britain's nuclear capabilities with the ability to use them in warfare, not just, you know, the large scale strike. So this was something that is already playing into people's mind.
comes back to bringing in this question that you've raised before, Helen, that it really raises the question of not just Europe and what Europe does in relation to the United States. But it raises the Polish question because what you're talking about really is putting European nuclear weapons in Poland to defend Western Europe. So this is the most...
change that you can imagine. And what is I think interesting now is that what is happening is not a pursuit of that policy, but a pursuit of the status quo in a sense. that what Britain is trying to do is trying to maintain the position that it has had since Suez, which is to maintain the United States presence in Europe. And I think that gets to the centre, Tom, of why this is so...
difficult as a moment for any conception of European strategic autonomy. We just leave aside for a moment the fact that the British nuclear deterrent is not independent from the Americans. So if you put the Germans into it, you're not ending. the relationship between the American nuclear umbrella and German security. Looking at what de Gaulle's position was on this is, I think, revealing because de Gaulle was making the moves in which he did.
in which the division of Europe between Western Europe and Eastern Europe, or between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, if we look at it in those terms, was a given. He wasn't having to engage with the question of the future of Poland. Ukraine wasn't there to engage with because it was part of the Soviet Union. And so the options that he had in terms of...
thinking about what France could be independent in relation to were very different than the ones that Macron has now or that any European, West European government has. And if you look at de Gaulle's positioning on the Soviet Union, There's a thread that runs through it from well before he was the first president of the Fifth Republic. So when he's leader of the Free French, December 1944, he travels to Moscow.
He signs a Franco-Soviet treaty of alliance and mutual assistance with Stalin. Now, obviously, that's in the context of fighting the war against Nazi Germany, but... Already at that point, then de Gaulle seeing this alliance as a counterweight in the post-war world to Anglo-American dominance. If you look at what he says when he first becomes president or the first years of his presidency before he turns against NATO.
He talks about Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. If you look at what he did in 1966, so the year when he's saying that France is coming out of the unified command of NATO. He becomes the first Western leader to go to the Soviet Union since the war's end. He signs another cooperation agreement. It's got the prospect of...
energy cooperation as part of that. And by this point, there has been a more general turn, including in West Germany or attempted turn in West Germany towards Soviet trade on energy. Just like Macron in 2019, de Gaulle thinks that rapprochement with the Soviet Union, some kind of normalisation with the Soviet Union, is a necessary condition of France asserting itself against the...
the United States. But that's not the world as it is now. I mean, it's interesting as well that even before he goes to the Soviet Union, he makes an agreement with the Chinese in 1964. This is détente before détente. This is French. And then that's the context in which his vision of how France can be an independent power from the United States happens. And it requires Britain to be outside.
of the European economic community as it then was. And that's the context then for the two vetoes in 63 and 67. which stay in place until his death you know that's the important point here there is a kind of moment of historic opportunity for britain which comes in 1970 with the election of Ted Heath, who, as I sort of mentioned at the beginning, has from... The very start of his political career, when he enters the House of Commons, I think it's in 1950, he is pursuing a Europe first.
policy. Now, he never entirely gives up on the American relationship, but he is clear from the beginning that it's a Europe first policy. Now, that coincides with de Gaulle's resignation from the presidency in 69 and his death. a year later in 1970 to provide this opportunity for Britain to get into the European.
economic community. And so you then have the decision in 1971 by the House of Commons to go in, which we eventually do in 1973. And I think that is a moment that, again, is an interesting moment for us to dwell on. briefly, because it's a moment where Heath pursues a policy, at least to begin with, and I think we have mentioned this previously, Helen, where he actively seems to reject the special relationship with the United States. Now, part of that... is as an attempt to get into the European.
It's an attempt to display to Pompadou that Britain is not what de Gaulle characterized us as, which was, you know, a Trojan horse for American interests, that we were European, we felt European and we could commit to a project that was... european and the west or transatlantic that it was something of its own and that was the demand and actually in heath i think you can make a very solid case that says ted heath is the only prime minister we've had who actively felt.
in that kind of emotional way that was right that that britain was part of a european civilization first that was different to a transatlantic or free world civilization that no we were european primarily And the relations with America needed to take second order. And if that meant actively rejecting any kind of special relationship with the United States so that Washington treated Britain, France and Germany.
as one equal group, then so be it. We will jettison the special relationship. At least, Helen, that was the kind of, that's what he began with as a pretext. I think what's interesting about this, Tom, is that with the carrier... about the Middle East I'll come to in a moment, at no stage is Heath a NATO sceptic. He's not in any way doing anything.
that he thinks will jeopardise the American security commitment to Western Europe in general and Britain in particular. And I think one of the things that's interesting about this, and it is a parallel moment, which I think that we've, in the economic context, talked about before, but not quite.
the military context, is that you have people in the US Congress at the time who are putting amendments to bills that are essentially calling for Europe to do, or Western Europe, to... to carry more of the burden for defence and that if they don't then what is going to happen is that the US is going to end the security commitment. There's one of these amendments called the Jackson-Nunn Amendment, which required the Western Europeans to...
quote, recoup the portion of the American balance of payments deficit created by the stationing of American forces in Europe. That's very Trump-like. Yes, extraordinary. It's tying the same issues that Trump is tying, which obviously the trade... the surplus bit doesn't include Britain, which is saying is you cannot simultaneously rely on us for defence and run a trade surplus for us. And through all that, Heath is not doing any dissenting.
And he's very notable compared to quite a few of the other European leaders in being astonishingly reluctant to criticise the Americans about the bombing of North Vietnam that's going on during this period, an issue that drives Nixon and...
accusing you to apoplexy about some of the other European leaders. The one thing that Heath does that tries to break, if you like, with the solidarity with the Americans in military matters is... not allowing the Americans to use Cyprus for refuelling in the context in which the Americans are supporting the Israelis during the Yom Kippur War.
causes such frustration in Washington that there's a period in which Kissinger effectively cuts off intelligence cooperation with the British. But his move, I know he doesn't stay in office much longer than that because Wilson's back by February 74. But Heath is looking, at least as far as one can see, to repair at that point. And so I think that what's interesting is at that moment, the British government is thinking, actually, that we don't really have to choose.
do the European community economically. And we can still, when it comes to security, absolutely rely on the Americans. And if there's any doubt about that, because of what's going on in Congress, we'll get close to the Americans. I mean, to me, Helen... A lot of that suggests that when you look at Keir Starmer today or any of the many previous prime ministers we've had in recent years,
Actually, the policy has not changed, as even after Brexit, the policy has substantively not shifted. So if we have a look at just a few of the moments from the past week, talking about... a trade deal with the united states what we're talking about is a tech deal we're simultaneously pursuing closer economic relations with the european union a reset i think it's being called
in Whitehall that will specifically look at farming and agriculture, an SPS agreement. So the significance of a smaller trade deal. with the United States with agriculture carved out is that it maintains this kind of hope in Whitehall that there is still a best of both worlds future relationship for britain in which you can be close to the europeans on things that make sense to be close to europeans on agriculture food and all the rest
while cherry-picking a better relationship with the United States where they're strong. You can see this in military matters as well. We should just look beyond some of the more flowery language and look at what is being pursued. We are not talking about jettisoning an American relationship at all. We are desperate to pursue a relationship which we maintain close ties. If we look at what happened previously, one of the diplomatic achievements as it is seen.
in the Foreign Office and in Number 10, is carving the Australians away from the French to create AUKUS, which is the British Americans and Australians working together on nuclear matters.
This is the basis which a lot of people internally think that you can use to maintain close relationships militarily with the United States. I was speaking to somebody, a very senior military advisor, who was saying that if you... you could easily see a situation where actually, over time, Britain drifts further towards the Atlantic relationship than the European relationship because of the importance of...
AI in military matters, the size of the American military industrial capacity and the structural realities of that. And you speak to French diplomats and they'll say they think the consequence of Brexit is in the long term Britain will maintain.
closer relations with the Americans. All that can be true, and two things are important. One, it doesn't solve the question at the heart of this crisis, which is that the Americans do not want to give the commitment to Ukraine that we want them to give, and we are not yet prepared.
to play the role in Ukraine that they want us to play, which is ultimately, we should be clear, it is that without an American backstop, a security guarantee to ukraine means fighting the russians if they want to take you further ukrainian territory after a after a peace deal that is what we are fundamentally talking about and on the europe from the europe's perspective there's little indication that
want to compromise in any sense to bring Britain into a European orbit and to try and drag Britain away from the United States just to make one point Helen which I think is remarkable in this context but it goes to show you the lack of kind of structural cohesion about ideas of European autonomy. If Britain and France are the two leading military powers in Europe today, Britain is seeking a security pact.
with the european union as part of this reset with the european union a pact is the kind of lowest level agreement that you can have the european union has one with i think south korea with Norway, with other countries like this. It doesn't have one with Britain. It's currently being held up because the French demand access to Britain's fishing waters. I think it's an extension, as they would see it, of the current access that they already have.
That doesn't suggest that there is some kind of this existential moment of panic for Europe is creating the conditions for something truly significant if you're still basically rowing about fish when it comes to... security and you're prepared to just jettison a relationship so i think there is
structural reasons to understand why Britain is trying to maintain the twin track approach that it's had since Suez, even though that might be disappearing before our eyes. But if that goes, it doesn't mean that we're going to end up siding with the Europeans, for structural reasons, it may mean that we drift closer to the Americans.
I think there's lots of reasons to think that the structural drift is the American way on the security side, including in terms of defense procurement. If you just look at BAE systems, the business leading manufacturer, then... at least 40% of its market is in the United States. But, and I think this is a big like but here, is that these issues are playing out in a way.
not just that aren't true for the French project, if you like, with strategic autonomy, whether it's French or whether it's European.
or sort of the rationalisation of French as European and Macron's like mine, but for us too, is because we have not had to make any of these decisions before. The British government has made these choices in a context in which the... independence of a state that sits between Germany and Russia is at issue and is threatened by Russia and that it doesn't end ultimately with Ukraine.
question marks about the future of the baltics and conceivably poland and the problem from the british perspective in this and this is where different kind of history comes into play is that the more unstable ukraine after a peace settlement if one comes which is as we've been saying like a big if the more that instability moves into western ukraine gets closer to the poland border then the polish question comes absolutely to the
And if you want to go back to some point of like comparison, historically, I mean, there's lots of ways in which this is different. Britain went to war in September 1939 over Poland, but it did so in relation to Nazi Germany. It did not do so in relation to the Soviet. And it has not been the case that West European governments have used military force in response to Soviet now.
Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. And that is a question for which the Americans under Trump think that they can detach. I'm not so convinced that they can when it comes to. But even if they can't in the end, we're still in a moment when you have an administration in the White House.
at least considering the possibility that they can. And that changes British choices fundamentally. I think, Helen, we're going to have to draw this episode to a close here. I think maybe with this point, really, that the choice now emerging... for Western European governments is the one that the Americans are now seemingly imposing.
upon on the west particularly britain and france it seems but also we'll see over the course of the coming days which countries want to join what Starmer and Macron have called the kind of coalition of the willing that are prepared to put boots on the ground in potentially in Ukraine itself to defend whatever peace agreement comes but as we should you know as you pointed out a number of times in this episode that is
The peace agreement depends on getting a minerals agreement, which has not yet been reached. So there are many hurdles before you even get to a peace deal. Assuming that Trump...
can bring Putin to not just to the table, but to accept the kind of terms that would be acceptable. But this fundamental question is being revealed by Trump's refusal to offer any security guarantee for ukraine and that fundamentally is where is the line that europe will draw to defend territory in europe it may not be anywhere in ukraine we don't know yet but at the moment that is the question that is emerging and effectively it's a challenge to europe and all of these questions about
strategic autonomy. This is the moment you have a standing army in Ukraine that is fighting a Russian army. That is, as it's seen in Washington, that is Europe's principal weapon. You can then supply it, but you are now being asked to stand behind it. And the European response at the moment is to say, well, we'll stand behind it if you stand behind us. And the Americans are saying no. were not standing behind you or they're saying
They're offering some kind of tentative, well, maybe if we had some kind of economic asset there, that would be a kind of guarantee. We're entering, I think, an ambiguous. And that is why I think it's particularly dangerous, because the ambiguity, presumably, will be tested at some point. And that is what we don't know is going to emerge. But I mean, they're questions.
for the future that we can turn to. In future episodes, we must bring it to a close there because I think this is one of our longest episodes. But as we said at the beginning, there is so much to pack in. So thank you so much again for sticking with us through that episode. We covered a lot and we hope to cover. a lot more over the coming weeks thanks a lot