Munich Fallout: NATO, Iran, and America’s Credibility Crisis

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Those links are in the description or if you're listening, it's in the show notes down below, so you can click it real quick and easy, and it helps us keep the lights on. So we appreciate it, and we appreciate you guys listening. Thanks a bunch, everybody. Welcome to another episode of Eyes on Geopolitics. I'm here today with Andy Milburn, Mark Polilaroppos, and Mick Molroy. Some housekeeping. Mark

is gonna be joining us regularly now. He's gonna be taking over my role as like host slash moderator because like, I never wanted to do it, and I just did it because the team needed it. So what I got, Yeah, I'm replacing myself in terms of hosts I'm still gonna be here and rule with an iron fist, don't get her twisted. But with another Greek, and thank god not another Marine.

Mick your your claim to fame as you were one of the two former ground branch officers who gave me a really terrible nickname in Iraq. If you remember the fighting lambshop, which I will when I'd walk down the halls and c I A when i'd see one of you, all premier tribe, when they would scream that out, I would like duck into a corner and shame.

fun to be back, and especially in Ason too. But I think the biggest kind of the story we should start with is the is the Munich Security Conference wrapping up today in fact, uh and you know, and and after last year is kind of debacle where Vice President Vance basically insulted everybody on the planet if you're in Europe or everyone in Europe. Certainly, I think Secretary of Rubio and his speech was certainly something that people were looking forward to to see if there was perhaps a

softer tone. And I have my thoughts on this. I have a very good analogy I want to make, but I'm going to save that till after I get both andy and mixed views on that. So, Andy, what are your what are your thoughts on Munich a good place here? But and what what did Rubio accomplish or what did he not?

policy and understand a little bit of history. And I think, you know, I think this was honestly, I thought this was Rubio trying to draw, trying to walk the line between what in his heart of hearts, not inside Rubio's heart, but in his heart of hearts he realizes is important, you know, the fact that the United States depends on partnerships and alliances, and that we represent something in Europe, something that you know, as Rubio points out himself, he

grew up with the security stability, all of these things. But at the same time, there was that pointed message right that Europe needs to step up to the plate to take charge of its own security, which I don't think anyone in this group would argue with right. So it was a balancing act. It didn't like most balancing acts.

It didn't give any of the audience exactly what they wanted to hear, but at least there was a little more PLACATORI than Vance's speech last year and didn't leave the United States looking quite quite such an outlier.

out here open invitation obviously for that. But again it's gonna going to be broad foreign policy national security topics, but it's always going to keep its kind of core uniqueness, which is special operations and CIA type spin. So specific to the actual Munich conference, agree with Andy, the issue I think if I was Europeans is everything that Vice President Vance said that was controversial is codified inside the

national security strategy. So even with Rubio's I think a moderated tone, which I do believe is more in line with his actual philosophy. I think he's more of a traditional Republican on the foreign policy stage. But even with that, even with his comments that were more conciliatory and more positive toward Europe and you know, our tied heritage and everything like that, if I was a European leader, I'd

still look at the strategy, right. It didn't change the actual plan for the US going forward, just was a better way to present some of it. So, and we saw a lot of comments from you know, the Chancellor of Germany Mertz and that, you know, really question US leadership going forward. And I think we saw that from several countries. Obviously some europe Being countries like Denmark are super upset about the whole Greenland thing. Not to go down that road, but there's a lot of resentment in

the Europe right now towards the US. It was probably and I'm not saying a lot of it isn't earned. I mean, I agree with Andy, they kind of didn't take their security serious. They thought, Okay, we have the big brother that is the United States, so we can spend on social programs.

we have pre stage forces there. Also, Europe, even though it's you know, as I just said, not taking its security serious, is now it's going to be the partner that we always wanted, right It's in the future. So that's even more of a reason. In addition to long standing ties and being the pinnacle of our security structure since the end of World War Two, they're going to be even more on par with what we wanted soon.

Right these countries are spending a lot more on their own security, and eventually they will be the partners that we always wanted, and we don't want to rupture the relationship at a time when that's going to happen. It would make no sense for the US. We'd actually have to spend way more on our national security, didn't have the strong partners and allies that I think we've always

had in Europe. And yes, they might have neglected some of their own defense, but let's not forget that they did go to war with US for twenty years after Article five was triggered after September eleventh. So they are the partners I think philosophically, and they're going to be the partners that we want practically in the sense that I think they're taking their security very serious right now.

And also remember Ukraine is still fighting Russia. Russia's only taken twenty percent of their territory and they've basically fought them to a draw. Right, that's one country in Europe, not NATO, but one country in Europe who's probably now the most effective fighting force in Europe right now. And I think the lessons learned need to be brought into the rest of NATO. We just heard about this NATO

exercise where the Ukrainians essentially wiped the floor with NATO. Right, that needs to be in corporate rate, it into European NATO, and that needs to be a benefit to the United States. So anyway, I'm getting on a diatribe here, but these are all the things that I'm sure we're discussed on the sidelines of NATO, and hopefully the US delegation understands this.

So let's go back to college. When you get a middle of the night drunk text from your ex girlfriend saying hey, I want to come over, and it's all giddy and you have a great time. But then you wake up the next morning and you realize, what the hell did I just do. The Europeans kind of embrace of this, the standing ovation, I thought was a little preposterous, because you know, they're they're, they're they're you know, this

is the whole idea of signal versus noise. So so Rubio had a nicer speech, well, great, that's your that's your ex girlfriend calling you up and saying, hey, I want to get back together tonight.

facts on the ground. And if you take and so Rubio's tone was nicer, got it, vance was a total jerk last year, But if you look at actually what was said, the substance of it was not all that different. And there's a couple of pieces of this too, which I still think are a bit weird and insulting. I mean, you know, this whole idea that that Rubio talks about, and the State Department tweeted this out about let's let's

you know, we have to celebrate our old heritage. I mean, you know, that's that's like a dog whistle for some weird ship in terms of kind of white nationalism, the notion of the US now supporting think tanks in Europe that kind of promote the far right. I mean, look where Rubio then jetted off to Slovakia and then he's going to Hungry the two European countries that actually are not for unity on Ukraine for example, And so, uh,

you know, I'm looking at you guys. You didn't like my analogy about the girlfriend thing the middle of.

came from the Russians. That is when Sweden and Finland, I mean, that is when Finland decided to join NATO. That is when Poland made the decision to up their their defense spending, you know, and it's already one of the you know, the leading countries in Europe as far as military strength and if you look at the rhetoric coming from France to and Germany, it all started there

in early twenty twenty two. Yes, the US may have may have thrown cold water on on any any lingering belief that the United States was behind it all on the side of freedom and all of this. Uh, but but that wake up call was already under effect thanks to you, thanks to booting.

right after this, but one last piece, because it has to do with European agency, and that's the notion of how much can Europe actually go it alone? I mean, one of the things that that that kind of struck me is that there's still this this notion of dependency. But the dependency, if you think about it, is probably in the intelligence sphere and things like like big items such as satellite you know, i R things, things in which you know, perhaps Europe can't uh, you know, deliver

to Ukraine as much as we can. But how much of that is actually true? I don't know the answer to this, But with the amount that Europe is actually providing to Ukraine. Now, I mean, the fact that they're not at the negotiating table is preposterous, and why the US is even leading doesn't even make any sense since we're not giving them any We're selling weapons to NATO under the Pearl Program to get to Ukraine. We're not giving Ukraine as anything. But let Nick just start with

you quickly on the Intel side. How much independence can Europe actually seek to get? Which would and because in some ways I think maybe the solution to all of this is actually the Trump gets bored, the US goes home, and then Europe actually does fully take over, because then you'd have a much more kind of equitable idea of uh, your support for Ukraine as being critical to Europe.

shot across the bow that you know. I mean, if you put yourself any of us in their shoes, would you ever want to be in that position again?

they're talking about acquiring nuclear weapons. And now that we've jumped out of the New Start treaty essentially didn't renew it or extend it, that sends a message, right. It doesn't mean that every European country can end up with a nuclear weapon, but it certainly says that we are not, you know, entirely interested in stemming the potential for a nuclear arms base, right. And I don't know that we're even negotiating on a new one, although that was the issue,

you know, including China and such. So I know that I viewed these a lot together. So intel is an issue for the Europeans, all of their security is, and I think they're going to relook at it again. If we did this right, we come up with we come out with stronger partners, like we would be going to our you know, fellow chiefs of UH you know, the Intel services and getting inform more information from them, right.

But you know, one of the big issues, of course you just said, and that is a lot of our intel is up there, right so, and that is expensive. So they have to be ready to, uh, you know, start spending a lot more on their national security and defense, which might mean less you know, available for their own social programs. But that's the decision they have to make. But it seems like they're being forced to make it right now.

our folks. But talk a little bit about the Special operations capability of European governments, because I think that's that's something that we don't hear a lot about.

squadron to Ukraine since late twenty twenty two. What exactly those guys are doing, of course isn't is an open source information, but you know, there's a good deal of training, but there's also assistance with tactical intelligence collection drones, you know, precisions strike at the tactical level, as well as a conduit of intelligence collection from ground up, which is intelligence dissemination,

rapid dissemination. Collection dissemination has been a problem in Ukraine, and so the SAS are probably remember I'm speculating here enabling that to your wider question. You know, we always pride ourselves on having the most capable special operations forces in the world, and of course.

of special operations. So what they cause special operations or rather special forces and let's not get into this whole greenberry bullshit about what special forces are, because they have a different In the UK special forces special operations are used interchangeably, and so you've got a very you know, you've got essentially you've got the what's it called the s R. It's going to get carved up for a forgetting the acronym here, but there are you know, they

they're the unit that they turned one parent into.

But that's again that's quite a small force. But what the Brits do well as far as the conventional forces US are they they have institutionalized the ability to work by with and through other forces. So foreign internal defense is considered one of the mission of central tasks of any of any battalion. And the Brits also have formed a Ranger Regiment whose specific purpose is focusing on military assistance,

which is training foreign militaries. So in their aggregate right, still fewer numbers than so Calm even when you add you know, all of these assets together, far fewer, but a significant capability. Uh and and they are heavily embedded in Ukraine. I would say the Brits are foremost, you know, I think that's that's indisputable in Europe as far as wielding that capability, and they understand they also have a

couple of advantages on their side. They're not quite they're not they there was no Church Commission in the UK, right, so they don't always have to declare what the SAS is doing. And the chain of command goes very directly from the Director of Special Forces up to cabinet level. So you've you've got a a not just a really exquisite tool, but when that can be used without a lot of deliberation and frankly not a huge amount of accountability, which you know is the pros and.

significant experience, regional experience. They know how to operate effectively in in Russian territory itself. They've proven that and and that's something that we in the US don't have either. So you know, round off, I answer to your question. And the French two are very capable. You know, it's all tier one, but they have very capable of special

aberation force too. Their their use in border the Ukraine conflict unknown, but bottom line, yeah, your europe field say a really capable special operations capability.

Right at the strategic level, no one has the same long range strike and air superiorities as the US or the Europe's trying to get there with the eurofighter, you know, in the Grippin air defense and sad, although the Norwegians and Germans have pretty advanced system they still lean on US technologies and architectures in NATO. Now, whether whether they need to do that for much longer, I doubt. And then you have joint command and control, right if NATO

goes to war. Europe has so many multiple collaboration communication frameworks, but lacks and fully integrated kind of battle management C two joint CE DO comparable to US. So that's that's

where they're going to rely on us. The last thing I'll say though, in some areas like industrial defense capacity for things that are really required in the Ukraine war, Europe is ahead of us, you know, creating a manufacturing of drones, expendable drones one five to five munitions because they don't have such laborious acquisition process and because their industry is already tuned to turning out these these things.

he makes nice a softer tone. All of this can be blown up in one truth post X post whatever it is by Trump if he wants to, you know, invade Greenland or say something insulting to NATO partners. So the other part has to do with the reliability issues. So everyone's gonna kind of maybe be a little happier right now leaving Munich, but I'm certainly not sure if it's sustainable. Mick, let me just turn to you with the kind of this this second subject for today's podcast,

which is the Tuesday talks in Geneva. Hey, by the way, maybe we can have some peace talks in Whitefish one day. If you crush this security conference you're gonna hold in the summer, we can have a Whitefish summit. But right now it's the Geneva summit. And so so it's a ron on the table Jared Kushner and Steve Whitcoff, the US envoys for everything under the sun, including when the next Super Bowl is going to be played. Are it's

my own stupid quip are going to be there? And kind of the big question I think, and perhaps Mick, you're in a perfect position to ask is not in the sense of, you know, what is going to happen a month from now, We don't really know. But what do you think the Iranian negotiating position is going to be, because all eyes are really, you know, in my view, at least to see if the Iranians are going to give even just a little bit, just enough to have

these negotiations continue. There's some indications that the US has kind of softened some of the positions on the zero enrichment of uranium. It's caused a bit of a stink in the national security world because you know, Trump at one point said no, no enrichment's allowed. But I think that might be on the table. Do you think the Iranians are going to come with anything that would be

required to actually have negotiations continue? And then we'll get onto the last the next piece, which is actually critical in terms of the US military build up, but first and foremost the Iranian position in your view, Mick, I mean, this is what you did in the past at DD not only at the agency, but you know, Iran was front and center, and your portfolio is when you're kind of running the middle as shop, you're.

appear the US has softened a bit. Remember Secretary Rubio was like, has to include no enrichment, nuclear, proxy for support, ballistic missile capacity, and human rights is where he started before the negotiation started. I think we're now at least pretty close on at least we're focusing more on nuclear and I think that's one of the issues why Prime Minister nand yeah, who gotten a plane and came early, right, came early and stood right next to the Oval Office

door until you know he was let in. Israel of course, doesn't want to see an agreement between the United States and in Iran that that is anything less than very very stringent to the addresses. I think all of the above, I think the US is more inclined to compromise and to be frank, that's what negotiations are If you can't compromise in chances of a successful negotiation are very slim. So I think both the US and obviously Iran should be willing to do that and the and we'll get

into the significant force build up. But all this is happening as you know, another aircraft carrier strike group, the USS gerald Ford is on route to the region, right, huge capacity added to another huge capacity. And then we'll get into the details of just how much they have looking down the barrel, so to speak, literally at them. When it comes to these negotiations, the I think politically the issue is going to be it has to be

more stringent than the original JC. Right, if he gets back into the same agreement, he will he'd be in the president of the United States. We'll be like, well, what was that all about? Right, you know, and that's a fair criticism if that's the case. So he has to get it more stringent. I imagine there's going to be more of a you know, testing and validation program that we know exactly what they're doing and not doing.

I think the US is still going to go in with a zero enrichment potentially throw on the table, bring in enriched uranium for civilian purposes done somewhere else. Right, If it's truly about, you know, using enriched uranium for medical purposes, then it's about the actual medical purpose, not necessarily your ability to produce it yourself. So there's I

think there's a lot of room there. And of course they're going to want to see the uranium that's been enriched to sixty percent not needed at all for civilian purposes, removed from the country and maybe brought to Russia or Turkey. That's been on the table in the past. But I do think lots writing on it. I don't think we

have a date yet, but it's this week in Geneva. Hopefully, you know, mister Widcoff and mister Kushner bring in some of these real experts, potentially going back to the original discussions.

This is a incredibly complex, incredibly technically detailed set of negotiations, and if you don't have that expertise and listen to him, of course you might not end up with the agreement you think you're getting kidding, right, So being on Team USA, I think it's important that that happens and then we get the smartest people at least maybe not at the table,

but behind the people at the table. Either way, it's good and see if we can't solve this diplomatically, because this is, in my opinion, headache toward a military confrontation if it's not decided that way. I just don't think the US would send this level of military power to the region, lose at the negotiations and the just turn them around and send them home. I don't see that happening. So this is either going to go the diplomatic path or probably the military path that we can get.

and I were up with the Kurds. I remember having discussions with our Kurtish partners, and of course, at one point one of them, and you know who it is, I won't say his name, but he reminded me that, you know, the Kurds have been lied to and betrayed me just about everybody and they fully expected us to do it again, and we did same thing with the Syrian opposition with Obama's red line. You know, we can Afghan or Afghan partners in Afghanistan. We can go on

and on. And I raised this because of President Trump's several weeks ago saying, quote, help was on the way, Iranian protesters stay out on the streets, and so one of the things, and this is not saying I advocate for a military option or operation, but if there was a diplomatic solution, which would include even if you could call it a good deal, the regime stays in place, and not understand that we've then betrayed the Iranian protesters who are out in the streets. That rubs me wrong.

Is it enough to go to war with Iran? I don't know, but there's just a part of that. I just want to kind of throw that out there, and both of you in a second when I turned back to both you can comment on that kind of ethics and morality of it. But but Andy, do do kind of jump in in terms of the force structure, you know, because I think when Trump made those statements several weeks ago, we didn't have the right forces in place. But I guess the question is do we have the right forces

in place now? And comment on the notion that was that, of course, an anonymous US official said the other day is that the military campaign might take weeks. You know, I guess is that sustainable? Do the American people support this? I mean it seems like, you know, we're so obsessed, but rightfully so with things like the Epstein files and Minnesota and I we're heading down to put potentially a major war in the Middle East like that we haven't seen for some time.

linked to sanctions relief, some kind of progressive plan for sanctions relief that lifts sanctions once uh, you know, actions are verified on the Ranian side. I mean, this is that itself is very complex. I think all of us here, if I can speak for you guys, would like to see, you know, the big problem with the juke poer. One of the problems was that it did not address proxies

at all. And it looks as though maybe we're going down that path now, right, but all of us know that that as far as direct threat to US interests, it is Duran's use of proxies in the region that's even greater, arguably than possession in a nuclear weapon. I know will be challenged on that, but the proxies have given us a headache for you know, since the eighties, and so you know, most people would say, why would

we walk away? We've got everything in the region, And to your point about are we ready to go to war, we are absolutely ready.

are cyber options lined up too. And most importantly, we've sent air defense batteries and we've almost emptied when you look at our inventory and you look what our commitments are elsewhere, places like Korea, we have pretty much emptied our inventory of air defense batteries and sent them all to them, the least which has been a double ed sword. Because that, in particular, I think is what has caused

the Israelis to change their mind. You remember in early January when the President was saying, hey, We're coming to your rescue. Remember Netania who actually said, hey, revolutions are best carried out internally, right, the Israelis were cautious, they were concerned about the prospect of regional war. Now when they've seen that, I'm only guessing that the number of assets that are stacked up in the region, especially air defense, which they care about very much, that tune has changed,

you know. The so yes and answer your question, and we are absolutely prepared, and and there is ah, there is two. I mean, no one can no one can really answer you quit everyone's question about we are we going to go to war? But even our allies in the region to point it out that, yeah, there's kind

of a credibility factor too. In other words, we need to raise the bar on these talks and and and include things other than nuclear agreement, if you know, aside from proxies, we need to talk about ballistic missile threats, right we always care about the most In fact, yeah, absolutely, and and so that needs to be on the table. We have the force to back it. I don't want

to mean to sound like a hawk. I think you know there are many downsides to it to a regional conflict, but there is a point of hear about credibility rhetoric matching what we intend to do and what we intend to do can be quite rational and reasonable if we want it to be. But we do have to address those two additional threats other than nuclear. Potentially, you play a capability, you.

the way. So the second part of you know, promoting being the leader of the free world is be careful what you say, right, so you know, walks offly and carry a big stick. We obviously have the stick, but people really pay attention to what the US says. And because we have the you know, the most dominant military in the world, and we have traditionally historically been the leader of you know, individual liberties and democracy, and which is what I believe the protests are primarily about. I mean,

there's a lot of reasons for the protests and are on. Yes, I get it's economic, but there's a lot of groups that have been promoting you know, women's rights and the rights of you know, ethnic minorities and you know, go

down the list. Will the US be portraying that potentially, yes, But if we would have taken out the you know those comments, I still think we should support the protests, but we're not going to go in militarily and do a regime change that US has learned our lesson or on would be I don't know, ten twenty times more difficult than a rock for example, therefore twenty times more costs of prohibitive, and we'd lose thousands of people. So I just don't think the US is willing to do that.

And I just regime changed from the air is almost an impossibility.

military action. So we've got two things. We've got the threat of military action trying to lead to a better agreement nuclear agreement, which to be fair, is in the regime's interests because it'll get the economic sanctions removed, which is the predominant purpose of the of the protests. Right.

So in a way, although I think we should be negotiating, we should try to get to a better nuclear agreement, it's going to be going to run counter to the actual protests, who are going to have left over reasonable revolt, and the regime is going to be stronger, and they're going to be allowed to sell their oil if they don't. There's secondary sanctions that the administration is looking at to

try to prevent China from buying. I mean, there's all sorts of things that will make the economic circumstances and are on even worse if these negotiations don't happen. But it's a fair point, you know, I think the United States, even if we get an agreement, should do everything we can to promote legally. Of course, freedom and democracy in Iran, but that's predominantly going to have to come from the Iranians.

Military confrontation is inevitable.

seem incapable of understanding that. They seem like they really believe that having a nuclear weapon will make the regime impervious to being overthrown without thinking that, like, there's no way that Israel alone, let alone the United States, is going to allow that to happen. They're just gonna and we've already seen that Israel has the capacity to go in there, eradicate their air missile defense, eradicate their air force,

and basically own the skies. So if I was looking at it from their point of view, I'd say, well, we're only giving We're not even giving up something that we can actually acquire because they're not going to let us acquire, so why not give it up? So we can you know, bolster the economy, bolster our position here. If I'm in the regime, i'd want to stay there. But I don't think they'll do it. I think they'll come up with yet another reason to scuttle this thing.

With this idea, they're staying almost half pregnant, right in the worst possible position. I don't have this good analogy, but they they don't have a new core weapon to use, but they look like they're trying to acquire one because it's way above the need for civilian use. So they're basically making themselves a target, and a legitimate target my opinion.

Yet they're you know, there's really no path forward other than an agreement that would believe the sanctions and basically acknowledge that they're never gonna get to a new co weapon. So that's a long way saying that I think this probably will fail, unfortunately, certainly an opponing for it, and then the US either will get tired of negotiations dragging out and start using the actual force to be an influencer,

or they'll just fall apart. And I do agree with that, and either setting up, I mean, we've got like eight destroyers, six cruisers, We're going to have two aircraft carriers strike multiple squadrons of fighter air jets. I imagine from what i'm aaron from media that you know, there's been a lot of pre patory warning orders given to our Strategic Bomber Command. I mean, this could be a very long, sustained, multi week campaign to not only degrade the nuclear programs,

to target ballistic missiles, particularly the launchers. Of course, you can have a lot of missiles, no launchers don't make any difference, and maybe even a regime target. So maybe he'll address the point you just asked me about, Mark and say, Okay, I'm going to target some of the regime because of what they've done, killing thousands of protesters and chailing tens of thousands.

kind of quick, easy, decisive wins. The Solomoni strike first administration Maduro couple hours the strike of the Runde nuclear program again, incredible strike, you know, one day at most, and I would imagine that, you know, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and others are telling Trump, Hey, this could be sustained over weeks. And I don't know if he has the appetite to do that, and certainly the I don't know if the American people do as well.

I think there is some domestic politics involved in this, if we've been kind of sleeping sleep walking in here. So I'm not so sure he has the stomach for this, But we'll see. But d I gotta throw it to you, what do you think?

the American people what in the heck we're doing. And by the way, if it's going to be a sustained campaign, and this is the horrible part of this, we're gonna lose people the idea that this is going to be kind of pain free, which so many of these I think Trump's gotten lucky with a couple of these military operations because nothing, you know, really bad has happened to US forces. But you know, if you take the country to war over sustain you multi week campaign, we're going

to lose some servicemen and women. So do you think that Trump has to then make this case to the American people?

it means that much to Congress either. I think the average representative does not understand his or her role in the process checks and balances. And I think, and you know, we saw this atrophy over twenty years Rock and Afghanistan. We've talked about this, the AUMF being continuously expanded without any real discussion or deliberation. I think we're at a point where no one has skin in the game. I mean, really, you know, the American public's focused on the economy and

focus on what's happening domestically. The average representative, as far as having people who are in the military within their constituents or families of those within them militiate, they're always going to be a minority. Uh And and so there's no real incentive to challenge what the executive is doing,

regardless of party. That's sadly where I am. And so to answer your question, I don't think that the administration will feel a compulsion to talk directly to the American people, and I don't think that by and large the American public cares either.

this effort should come from. When I say effort, I mean just simply to to do what the Senate's supposed to do constitutionally, which is act as a check and ask the right questions before we go to war.