Is the U.S. Starting Another Illegal War? | EYES ON GEOPOLITICS

Those links are in the description, or if you're listening, it's in the show notes down below, so you can click it real quick and easy, and it helps us keep the lights on. So we appreciate it, and we appreciate you guys listening. Thanks a bunch. Hey everybody, welcome to another episode of Eyes on Geopolitics. I'm here with Mick Moulroy, Mark poly Moreopolis, and Jonathan Hackett. I think

Andy Milburn will be joining us soon soon. A lot happening. Us. Just beat Canada and the gold medal game and the Olympics and overtime incredible game.

and Jared Kushner. I don't know if that's like for a new hotel or anything, or actually this Iran deal, but yeah, that's pretty much what's happening. Obviously everything else in the world is exploding as well, but that's what's, you know, dominating the headlines. So guys welcome, and you guys can mudd wrestle for who wants to go first.

airpower and a considered amount of naval force. Right, So this looks like it's headed either to force or on into an agreement, although it seems unlikely if we maintain the maximum position of having to zero enrichment, including significant restrictions on the ballistic missile program, maybe even proxy for support if they do not accept that. And they haven't accept that, and according to some they haven't even acknowledged the red lines that we have, even though as Mark

just pointed out, the meeting is on Thursday. That might be to hear if they have come along to our side and want to avoid what looks like to be a fairly significant military confrontation between the US and Iran. If they do not, I do not see the US just simply turning tail and going home. I just don't see that happening. So unless they agree with it has to be way better than the JCPOA politically President Trump

to accept it. It's going to be significant. Now the question is going to be is it going to be focused just on the nuclear sites. There's some indication that they've started rebuilding and reinforcing those sites and the ballistic missile launch sites and manufacturing centers, or is it also going to include direct targeting of the regime. And there's a lot I don't know. It's hard to keep up

with the stuff that's accurate not accurate, but there's a lot of information. I should say that they have started basically continuity of regime planning, meaning that they've started dispersing their leadership. They've started having every key leader pick four successive leaders. So it's clear that Iran that indicates to me that they think it's going to happen, which means they know they're not going to go on Thursday and agree to what the United States is so I will

stop they're thinking that. Potentially I'd like to see, as I hope everybody would, a diplomatic resolution of this, but it doesn't look like it.

And but that does kind of reflect back to how does the US kind of grapple with the notion of if the Supreme Leader, if the Irani leadership actually has made the calculation that that, you know, a military a strike on them is actually worth it for regime survival, how can there actually be an agreement.

of this right now? Or is this is a conflict just inevitable if the Iranians really say, like, hey, we're not going to back down a pressure, this is two weeks too much pride for us, and the US kind of holds that maximalist line. You know, where do we go from here now other than in a week or so ago, when you know, in the future when these things are kind of go round and around again, we have this enormous force package ready to go. What are your thoughts, John.

happening right now. The first is nineteen eighty eight when the Iran Iraq war was negotiated to end, and the previous iatolas said that this is a poison chalice that they have to drink from to end the war after a million people had just died on both sides. But they that meant that they had to get to the point where a million people had died on both sides

before drinking from that poison chalice, according to them. And then of course the other was the twenty fifteen JCPOA, which was an imperfect agreement, but to them was a necessary agreement to get what they wanted after a very long time of pressure to reach that point, including the Stuxnet attack on their nuclear facilities and other things that really cripple the regime, not as publicly as people have seen,

but did have effects on the regime. The point there is that they don't get there until it seems like everything else has been exhausted and there's no other choice for survival. And right now they may not be calculating that they're at that point. True, they see all these

forces arrayed against them, but there has been restraint. I guess you could call it shown against Venezuela for example, and also back in June last year, where the US didn't push beyond a certain strategic endpoint, similar to nineteen ninety one when George Bush Senior decided not to push into Baghdad, Desert Storm, Desert Shield, there was a decision made to stop. I think the regime may be looking at those historic precedents and hoping within their own worldview

that there's more to be squeezed out of this. And if we look at the JCPOA, you know it was imperfect for one reason. That was because proxies were not included in that agreement to the West. And perhaps the West would like that now, but I feel like proxies are so weakened and so destroyed that it's almost a throwaway that could be added to it that wouldn't really have a true effect in reality, because Hesbela is so crippled, Kaiv, hesbulas crippled, the Iraqi, other PMF groups are so crippled.

So you have to wonder is it just two tracks, is it nuclear and ICBM or MRBM missile limitations that are gonna built into this agreement, or is it not

even an agreement at all? That the regime was looking for perhaps they're looking for a safe exit out of Iran into maybe Moscow or some country where they could be safe, and this is a facade where they're just looking like they're negotiating these things that are familiar to everyone, but instead it could be actually they're trying to negotiate for their own survival, whatever that survival might look like.

of exodus of really smart folks. Do you think there are people around, you know, Kushner and Wikoff and the administration, you know, what they're doing on this. I don't know the answer to that. I'm curious if you have confidence that they are being given this kind of analysis and advice that you just kind of put forward.

seventy nine new members of the Future regime as college students in the United States. They had these relationships that had been built over decades and that just doesn't organically exist in the current group of folks who are in Switzerland doing these negotiations.

You know, we talked about the fact that this is you know, we hate to use the term unprecedented. In fact, we try and avoid using that term on this show. But this is, this is a build up in the Middle East that I think I'm I think I'm correct in saying hasn't occurred since the earliest part of you know, the century, right, I mean not the early part of the century, around the round the beginning of the Iraq War.

So to back down now or to find a compromise and then have to reposition all of these assets could could definitely be seen as a as a credibility blow, you know, whether whether it's painted that way or not. We you know, you and I and are probably I think a lot of people who listen to the show know how things work in the Middle East, and regardless

how it is painted, it does appear. You know, we've been saying, banging the drun, we're going to do this, We're going to do this, We're going to strike, yeah, and then we don't what are the repercussions from that?

to a New Jersey diner. You know, you want to go to you know, order some some you know Friday eggs or burger and one of them has to do with we're going to assassinate the leadership and you know, and and to me that first of all, there's a little humility there involved. I don't know if the United States has that level of granularity in terms of intelligence collection to do so. We're not the Israelis. But number two and Mick, this goes to things you and I

did in the past. You know, there are there is international law on this. I don't know. You know, we are not at armed conflict with Iran. Under Low Act, We're not supposed to be able to do this until we are at conflict with them. And then there's the Executive Order one two three three three, which bans the

assassination of foreign leaders. And I see nothing in the press about this, but for you and I, uh and Andy, I'll throw you in there too, for you know, for practicition, and Jonathan, I mean, everybody, d We're gonna throw you in as well. You're coming on the COVID action like this kind of stuff is what how we don't go to jail like there is I mean, you you know, so it's not like a bunch of CIA and Marines are like, hey, let's go wax and people like there

actually are rules behind this. There are lawyers attached to your hip everywhere. And so Mick, your your thoughts that there's no debate on this, I mean to me, I mean you've sat in that job as the as the daste, I believe you know. I mean, you don't just go assassin. And you know, you remember when when Trump said, hey, I want to go kill prischar Alasade, who was written about in Bob Woodwards book, and I think the national

security world was like, yeah, we really can't do that. Anyway, your thoughts on that menu option with the lack of any kind of legal underpinning, and of course I will throw out the Mick also went to law school, so this matters to you.

at a base somewhere. It could be clandestine ops against you know, soft target targets and diplomats. Right, it could be all the above. And you know, Jonathan should talk about all the capabilities that they have that he lays out in this book. So there should be a discussion

before we even have I think a direct confrontation. And folks that watch the show know that I supported the strikes against the nuclear facilities, so I'm not dubbish on this, but there needs to be buying because this might not go as smoothly as Venezuela. Right, this could go sideways. We could have you know, in addition to everything iditioned reference, we could have pilot shot down.

as despotic as it is, is another step. Right, So we have no authority we you know, the executive branch and the DoD to go to war with Oran, and we're taking that one step further, at least in the press, with debating whether we're going to take out the leadership. So there's a legal issue with it, but there's also a practical like, Okay, so say we do take out the leadership, who's going to take over? Is it going to be more amenable to joining an agreement with the

United States? Potentially not. The GC has historically been even more hawkish when it comes to acquiring nuclear weapon than the Supreme Leader. So there is the legality, and then there's the actual practical effect of taking out the leadership, which might not be putting the United States in a better position, and if certainly, it could destabilize the entire region, which is why I think so many countries are really concerned about what happens next. I would only add one

more thing and then toss it to you, guys. President Trump keeps saying limited. The way I'm reading that, and

it could be wrong, is normally, as everybody in the military knows, you present a low, medium, and high threshold. Same thing in the agency. Right, If you're saying limited, at least it indicates to me he's talking on the low end. And I don't think taking out the Supreme

Leader would be considered the low end. So I don't know if it's legitimate that they're talking about this as one of the courses of backtion they're considering or not, because you know, I just wouldn't see that as a limit did course of action?

was for nowhere in there doesn't mention Iaron. You know, there's lots of obviously debate about and discussion about how that was like patently unlawful according to international law and according to our own law because of who that person was and what he represented as far as a political figure and a military figure from a sovereign country. But

does that matter in terms of US decision making? Because like the Million dialogue from Thucydides, you know, the strong do what they can and the week do what they must. And if the US is the major power, what relevance does the law have to that power? And that's like a moral ethical question. But when you have a National security Council who is making decisions based on a single individual's direction, sometimes moral and ethical decision making is not

put into there. And so thinking about the attorneys they have making these things, I don't remember John, you put out the torture memo back in the early two thousands for Rumsfeld, I mean, the attorneys that are there are making opinions that have been kind of predetermined by the

policy setter. So they say, we want a legal opinion that justifies this action, and that legal opinion will justify that action, even if it's a very flimsy or tenuous connection to the moral, ethical and legal things behind it. And I wouldn't be surprised if a memo was being drafted in the past few weeks or memos very similar in structure, where they basically just say, here are A, B, and C reasons why this is lawful, and now side observer analyzes that, they would say that's clearly not right.

But the president's not interested in that analysis. He's looking for a legal justification because that's how international law works. There isn't, you know, a common law of international law. There's this thing that we agree to and that we uphold, and that's why we respond to the pressures of the international outcry and hide behind our memos regardless of how lawful they look. With Venezuela, you know, we used we had a thin justification for that We've had thin justifications

for invading Iraq. Remember holding up the photograph of the UN Security Council showing the refrigerator trucks of chemical weapons and all that, despite those things not being true. And I think that's what the US will produce in this case. No matter what the option is, whether it's just striking nuclear facilities again or if it's decapitating the regime, there will again be some small, thin justification made to hide behind in the international community despite the US doing it.

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of asymmetric or any kind of Iranian response. Again, I think we've gotten so enamored with the power in the might of the US military, particularly with successful operations and the Maduro op being won, you know it always I think in essence we've gotten lucky in some points that it hasn't ended in US casualties. But I don't think we're talking enough about in the cost benefit of this

is what the potential Iranian response. So Andy, and we'll go to Jonathan in a sect because I think he's you know, he's written a book and as an expert

on this. But Andy, I want to get your your sense on this as well as someone who's a veteran of you know, decades of being in the Middle East and frankly going up against the Iranians and their proxies, and so I think those of us who have done that do have a you know, there's no hubris, there's no you know, there's a sense of humility that this is not an adversary that might just fold and we might you know, take some hits on this. And let me just let me close this by a conversation, Jonathan

mentioned Mira de Gan when I work with the Israelies in the past, particularly in the early two thousands, when when they would be considering operations like this, they would do a cost benefit analysis and say, and I remember to Goan saying this to us personally, saying, you know, if we take this course of action, we might lose an embassy. Okay, got it, And everyone's kind of shocked. And they said, but we're willing to take that risk. And that certainly to me, is not being done in

the United States now. So Andy, what are your thoughts on that in terms of potential Iranian response and are we are we not talking about this enough in terms of what the American people might you know, be seeing in the next couple of days or weeks.

of positive things. It offered access. It offered some level of transparency. I said, some level, not total transparency, but it offered a better level than we have now. Right, we went from scrapping a jig poet to a painis. But the big, the big problem with the jig poa

was that it didn't even address proxies. And I think what we're going to look at again, I said, I wouldn't predict, but I think what we're going to look at again is a default to the easy button, which is a focus on nuclear enrichment and kind of a handwave towards proxies. And I think one of the problems here that we've all wrestled with is the problem of monitoring. So if Iran said, okay, hey, we're out of proxy business. Okay, we would know, hey that Rand's lying because just like

ballistic missiles, they're not going to deinvest. But secondly, how is that monitored?

be monitored? That is I think that from from purely from my point of view, that's the big one of the biggest problems with the discussions.

the strikes? You know what sort of strikes they will be, and of course we begin with, well what are they intended to accomplish? I would say one or two things. One is a mowing the grass type return to nuclear facilities that perhaps sets the program back six months to a year. And the other is retribution. Right, I said I was going to do this, so I'm going to

do it. At least seven thousand people have died, you know, at least, probably many many more in the in the Iranian latest Iranian revolution, the president did say that if

the killing went on, he was going to intervene. The killing did go on after he said that, So we may be facing a hey, I've got to do this, and that if we're following that rationale, that leads me to say, only under those conditions, I think would we go after leaders of the besiege or the IGC and say, hey, this was justice for what they did in terms of

meeting out punishment to the protesters. Very last thing I'll say is I don't think anyone I would hope no one harbors any real thought that by taking leaders out of any organization within Iran, we are really enabling a democratic takeover by any opposition group, because we're not. That's a that's a huge gap, as we all know.

avoid escalation between the US and Iran. But the asymmetric capabilities and what Iran could do in terms of damage to US interest, US facilities overseas, just to Americans, what are your thoughts on that, because again I don't think that's really been discussed enough, particularly in the US national security media, from Congress or the American people. Everyone thinks this is so antiseptic, but it might not be. So what are your thoughts on Iranian capabilities to inflict some harm on us?

about what they've done. Like when COSTM. Solomoney was assassinated, that was like huge groundbreaking moment where this guy was untouchable and like the thought was if he dies, the whole thing is going to like the massive war going to happen, and there wasn't. And the Iatola himself said that they're exercising heroic restraint, Like what does that mean? Right?

And if you look at what their actual military doctrine is, it's called the Mosaic doctrine, where they have this very high emphasis on dispersal of not just forces, but also decision making, which is part of the reason why the airline was shot down in January after Solomani was killed, because decision making was so decentralized that people that should have been looking at these missile systems were not looking at them because of their way that they're doing their

command of control. It's designed so that if leaders get taken out, the war still happens, right, And that's actually from the German military World War two called offstrog tactic, which is mission command, which the US also uses. But Iran has really pushed it down to the ground force level. And why I'm saying that when we think about the negotiations and including proxies into those negotiations, to remove Iran's connection to proxies, this is an unrealistic request that I

hope that negotiators understand. Why when we look at, for example, the Marine Corps, we have the Marine Air Ground Task Force concept where the air and the ground component work together and they're both necessary components of the success of those operating forces. The proxies are also like this within the mosaic doctrine. If you remove the proxies, that doctrine falls apart because part of that rapidly decentralized command of control is the fact that the proxies can operate on

their own without regime coordination in the moment. And this is a huge difference between Arab militaries and Iranians military, not just the RTESH, which is their regular conventional forces, but also the IERGC. They're designed to operate independently if they must, They're designed to operate without any connection back

to some C two node somewhere else. And I think that when we're thinking about how do they actually respond without heroic restraint, this is the real scenario we should be looking at, rather than looking at the past twenty five years and saying, well, how do they react when we did X, Y and Z, Because that's likely not what they're going to do this time. Because I think they understand this is an existential threat for real, and you can see that not in their rhetoric but in

their actions. For example, on January thirty first, the IERGC dispersed a bunch of ground force units to all of their intercontinental ballistic missile sites and then medium range ballistic missile sites, which they've never done before. And they did this to protect those sites from ground force incursions, which means they expect there could be boots in the ground that might attack those facilities. They've never done that before

since nineteen eighty eight. Right. Another example is sending out no tams for live fire over the Persian Gulf. Warning mariners to stay away and actually firing live munitions across

the water, which they haven't done in a long time. Additionally, they have Russia there with them doing those maritime exercises, which is obviously a deterrent effect, which changes the US decision calculus about what type of attacks they might take because they don't want to hit Russian forces, or maybe if they do, they have to change how they think about that. Eighty percent of their oil goes to China. That means China has to be part of this decision

making calculus as well, and Iran knows that. So they're probably thinking about how do we use those assets we have, which are foreign assets, Chinese and Russian assets, and how do we disperse decision making as far down as possible that even if the US does strike us, we'll be able to do things to not just them, but to Israel, to UAE, to Bahrain, to Saudi Arabia. I mean, these these are the things that are in their minds as

they're thinking about what they do. And I would imagine that these decisions have already been made long ago, right, So it's not like they're they're deciding it now and they're disseminating the information now about what to do instead. This is part of their doctrine, has been built in since two thousand and two when the mosaic doctrine was made part of their military doctrine at their basically equivalent

of their War College. All of the officers who have been trained in the IRGC since two thousand and two have been trained in this doctrine, just like the Marine eric around task force concept we have in the Marine Corps very similar. You know, every echelon of rank, they're exposed to a higher level of this concept. And that is their doctrine that we've just never seen it before used, And that's what I would be concerned.

through this cost benefit calculation. But do you think anyone's actually you know, in an oval office meeting with the president saying hey, this is what could happen, and this is why exactly the scenario you laid out. And then of course it affects the negotiators because if we're putting proxies on the table, but you're saying this is non negotiable, then you know, what are we doing?

Is that information making it to the Oval Office? Probably not. And I remember even during my time when I was in the Middle East, most recently at the embassy over there, we had the President's Daily Brief getting put together all

the time, and it wasn't getting read. So even if if the President's Daily Brief is not getting read, and that is the most important piece of material that we produce as an intelligence community that's not getting read and that other report's definitely not getting read right, and that means it's not just not getting read by the president, it's not being absorbed by the decision makers that are there that could go tell the President that this is perhaps,

you know, Option A might be preferable to Option B because of this granularity that we have, and I don't think that that exists right now.

And you know, sailors, you know, aramin pilots or whatever getting cranky. There's problems with the toilet. I mean, it sounds, you know, it sounds a little bit kind of into the weeds. But do you think any of that matters? And it's not necessarily for morale, but also, you know, shit starts breaking you, and you and Jonathan certainly know that. But Andy, what are your thoughts on on kind of this extended deployment and does that cause you any concern?

You see a lot on social media people are saying, suck it up. I'm not sure that's really the right response. Of course, the commander chief calls you to do something, you do it. But you know, should we be concerned about this extended deployment? And then you know, and what really an immense amount of firepower with that carry battle group,

what they can bring yees, So a couple of things. I think that's a really good point.

people can can communicate better with their families. Well they can to a point, but it also heightens that sense of proximity and the proximity of all their concerns at home where I'm heading on this says, yeah, I think you're definitely seeing cracks. The Navy is notoriously closed mouthed. I think John will agree with that. When it comes to releasing information about morale or about leadership, and when they relieve people, it's always you know, loss of trust

and confidence and racourse not much better. But my point is there's always kind of this opaque thing. But if you look between the lines, you've got, you know, you've got a lot of churn and social media about reduced readiness of these carrier groups. That's that's a pragmatic reason. It's not that you you know, giving in too to

feeling overly compassionate to whatever generation this is. You've got a record of mishaps on the it is on the Roosevelt right recently, I forget how many aircraft they lost overboard. They shot one of their own aircraft down. Some of these mistakes were when you when you watch them on video, it's just incomprehensible. How does a trained crew do those things? I don't know what the investigations have revealed. The Navy haven't released those investigations, but I would maybe fatigue as

part of it. Right, either way, something's going wrong, and we saw this in the in the Pacific and the Seventh Fleet, remember back in you know, about ten fifteen years ago, culminating in a couple of fatal collisions.

thing to extend their life and mentioning social media. Actually, I've seen posts on Facebook and other places where spouses are complaining about how much time their husbands are out there, which is a problem from an OPSEC perspective, because we're

not the only ones looking at that, you know. And when morale gets affected like that, there are leaks like this that can then be used to exploit the not just the information environment, but also the actual combat effectiveness of those individuals because it helps the other side understand things. And I also mention, actually, the regime is taking advantage

of exactly what you're talking about right now. I just saw I'm at Yale Law School right now, and we have a veterans community, and there was a veterans community message put out requesting a petition to be signed by combat veterans to protests against the US going to war

against Iran. I looked into where that thing came from, and it came from the Quincy Institute, which is a regime connected think tank, because they want veterans to basically stay this statement, and then the regime can say, look, American veterans don't support this war, so we cannot forget that information environment that is attached to an integral to these combat deployments of actual ships sitting out there at

sea at the same time. Because it's the same world, right, we can't just think about the naval dimension or the

air dimension. They're all connected together. And I'll also mention too that the UK just disallowed the US from using Diego Garcia, which is a massive difference from the past, and it's extremely important because last year and a when we were also doing a lot of determent build up with our Lancers, we use Diego Garcia to preposition those lancers because we need a certain area in distance to put those aircraft for them to be effective, not just to be used once, but to use over and over

in combat, and Diego Garcia is kind of that special place to do that where we have access basing and overflight. Well, the UK just disallowed us from doing that, not only in Diego Garcia but also in mainland UK. So that changes the calculus, and that pushes a lot of pressure onto the Navy because that means the Navy is now the go to place to launch from sea rather than

launching from land. And of course there are a couple of places we can use like Jordan for example, and Qatar to launch air assets, but those are so close and inside the engagement zone that kind of puts them at risk in a way where we still need further

out rings of aircraft. And the only way to do that now because the UK is prohibiting us from using those locations is aircraft carriers, which again puts further pressure on those forces that are going to be deployed there, because if we launch a strike and it lasts for more than a day, those aircraft carriers have to remain even longer than they have remained now, right, And what does that mean? I mean do we bring another aircraft

carrier from another fleet? And if we do that, we lose our force projection in those areas where we remove those carriers. So these are all things I'm thinking about when I'm seeing what's going on, especially with the Mediterranean deployment and then the Fifth Fleet deployment's ramping up.

allies like shit. It was in the UK when the kind of explosion of anger about President Trump's statements about NATO forces and their performance in Afghanistan, the whole Green Line issue, and the anger in the UK this is not just the general public, but also with current and former at least intelligence officials that I know was something I'd never seen before. And so this is the result.

I mean, kure Starmer, the prime minister, who would never, I mean no British prime minister would do this except if he had the support of the public, and he does. There's no the political controversy in the UK is not It has a lot to do with you know, with the Epstein files. It has very little to do with uh Starmer's move here because I think it's popular because of we've treated our allies like like crap, let me just flip something. D I'm gonna put you on the

spot here. I was. I was joking before about your your love of AOC and I'm totally kidding on this. You you know, this is a a political podcast usually, but I think but but AOC did make the news because she started, you know, sending out on social media, you know, no war and her on and I guess the question I would have for you, is, you know, what is a smart strategy from the Democrats presumably they're the ones or select Republicans as well, who are not in favor

of military action. And would it be just kind of a statement like that, which which in some ways I think is not helpful, or would it be better to say, hey, you know what we do need is congressional authorization. We need we need another AUMF authorized use of military force. We need at least a president to address the American people, congressional hearings. I mean, these are things that are supposed

to happen. So if you're coming from the Democrats side, you know, is it effective just with these little slogans know where and Iran? Or would it be smarter to actually be a little more nuanced, Hey make it, hey, President Trump, make the case, Let Congress vote if you go through the War Powers Resolution and things like that, or even just tell us what the end state, what the goals are.

But do they want to use their authority? Also, the other problem is most Democrats are kind of for this, right They we've hated around Iran for a long time. We even Democrats. It's not just a republic thing cozy up with Israel and Apak. I mean, if you want to talk but nuts and bolts. I think that's why AOC goes that way where it's like put it on a fucking poster or a T shirt, because it's like easy for people to understand, like the majority of American

public doesn't give a fuck about Iran. Well, doesn't want us spending more and more money on a foreign war, even if it's three week engagement where we're just blowing the shit out of them, and frankly, there is no plan, right, Like I saw a couple of people tweet who are like experts or national security analysts saying that the move is, oh, it's good because we don't have a huge ground force there. It's just a build up of a navy and air force assets. We'll have a Q three week four week

aerial bombardment and will negotia with the remnants. It's like, that's the fucking plan here. Like to me as the layman, that makes absolutely no fucking sense whatsoever. Because we've talked about it before that more than likely Uron's not gonna come out of this and bring the show in on a fucking white horse driving, you know, heading down Main Street to take control, or they're not going to become some liberal democracy that's ready for AI and and modernization

and being part of the global economy. Like an IRGC faction is going to take over and probably be even more brutal than the Ayatola is, and that's who we're going to negotiate with. Like, I think it's just wishful thinking, frankly, and I always heard from other CIA folks that like,

wishful thinking is the worst thing to have. And I just and I'm just still reeling from the fact that more than likely there isn't somebody with a granular kind of look at what's going on in the Oval office advising the President and his advisors of the Cabinet or Pete haiksth or whatever. To me, that'sake a complete dereliction of duty. You don't have some smart guy in there. I got one on a fucking podcast today on Sunday. What are we talking about? You can't get one in

the fucking Oval Office. Like, to me, that's a fucking joke. I'm done, Thank you, Mark.

have friends who've been killed by by the Iranians. In essence, the EFPs in Rock, the running support that SHIA groups there. I mean, in my entire adult life of twenty six years at CIA, you know, a lot of it was folks on Iran or her proxies, and none of it was just a struggle for ends. It was kinetic, it was down and dirty. I do not like this regime

and I would love to see regime change. We also seem to forget that the Iranians were trying to kill you know, President Trump and John Bolton and Mike Pompeio and others. And so there's a side of me on the just the personal side is yeah, you know, I could, if we could, you know, get this regime out of there. I'm all for it. Sometimes though I struggle just with the mechanics of it. And what I think is a is an administration that doesn't have the competence to do

this right. So with that all in mind, I think it just from a personal standpoint. You are both former Marines who both have been, you know, actively in the fight against the Iranians. What does your gut tell you on this? I mean, is there something that naws on you? So right now we're doing we're saying a lot of

things the administration is not doing right on this. But again, I sometimes i'd sit back and I say, you know what, but I'm actually for the notion of regime change, and in particular I am absolutely for supporting the Iranian people who rose up. Either it's ten thousand or thirty thousand killed it. It was a debacle. And so Jonathan, let's start with you from your guest, so you're hones your personal you know your personal experiences, you.

the Iranian people that are suffering under this regime. And that's ninety percent of the country, maybe more than that, that want this regime gone, and have wanted this regime gone more and more over the past forty seven years, right, and especially in the past two months January eighth and ninth, If you do the math on it, they were on the low end, they were killing five human beings per

minute every minute for forty eight hours. On the high end, you're talking in excess of twenty to thirty people per minute for forty eight hours. That's insane. And that's and

all the complaints we had about the war in Gaza that was over two years and Israel killed almost the same amount of people in two years that the regime killed in two to three days. Where is the outcry from the West against that. That's how I'm looking at that, And especially because you're talking about a country of almost ninety million people suffering not just violence and death and rape and destruction, which it's beyond what most people understand.

If you see the videos and what's going on there, it's utterly disgusting that there are these animals doing this to people who just want to be free. And with that in mind, regime change is not it's not great, But what if that could be freedom for people at some point and it won't be freedom tomorrow. And that's

the thing to think about. There's a cost if there is regime change, Just like the French Revolution and even the American Revolution, when there's regime change, there's a moment of absolute like violence and it doesn't matter if the shot comes in on a white horse, well he's got to get there first. And while he's getting there, there

is law lessness, there is violence. I mean, we remember in Baghdad when we came in there, there was absolute unrest because there's no government, there's no sovereignty, there's no police, there's no trash, there's no sewer like the things that keep society together. For a moment, it just evaporates. And that is going to be a really tragic moment. I've spoken to Iranians who are in Iran right now. They want that. Yeah, they're willing to pay that cost, and

they're even willing to die for that right now. And that's that's something to remember that when our interests align and the interests of those people aligned, that's the moment to act. And I think that moment is now.

might mean one year or five years. But I do think that what I come back to as well is again is I hope we do this right. But it's the Iranian people and the idea of a new future. And you know, everybody, I mean, I'm going to say this. I live in the DC area, so we have a zillion Iranian friends, so we're all mesmerized by this and certainly want to see change. Andy, what are your thoughts

on that? Again, as someone who is kind of up against the Iranians for some time, and you know, perhaps a critic as I am of you know, the mechanics of how the Trump administration is doing this, But does this not you as well, like, you know, hold on a second, Like the right side of history is going to be regime change.

long term goals. And so one of which, and it is kind of the messaging to the US domestic public that you know, there's been very little of that, right, I mean, this would be a good opportunity for the administration to give the case for intervention in Iran based on based on what the Iranian regime has done. You no, make absolutely open the cruelty, the scale of death on you know that has occurred, and all these other things, myriad things that they're doing, you know, blinding, using munitions

deliberately to blind people in the crowd. I mean, all of these things that that as far as do I in the long term, Do I think American popular opinion paid plays a big role in foreign policy? No, absolutely not, but it's but it's certainly something the administration. You know, if they're looking for reelection and building a case domestically,

they start on that. And then the second part, as everyone here knows, we wouldn't be reading about seeing about which are developing covert options, which I'm sure are happening. And it's again I mean those of us who work with resistance groups and motor for instance. No, it's easier said than done, but I'm sure there's two parts of

that right. There is the assessment piece upfront, which are the legitimate groups, which ones are likely to be able to bear a burden, and which ones do we want to bear a burden in an insurgency, whether it be long term or short term. How do we enable them? Should we enable them? You know, all these are complex questions that takes a while on the ground to be

able to understand. I would imagine that we're looking at those things as well as other non kinetic options focused as kind of foreign movement in consonance with our support for an insurgent group within Iran, in other words, planning a campaign that's focused on perhaps covert operations to parallel what is happening out in the open and the last piece, and you know, I would say, yeah, I think strikes

are going to happen. I think they're going to be a little bit of a mowing the grass option unless we start seeing domestically this case for intervention to support the insurgency, Unless we see that openly. I think that the follow on the strikes are going to are going to be going off the nuclear facilities, which, as we know,

is an imperfect short term solution. But that is all. Yeah, I would, I mean, I would absolutely think that there are COVID steps taking place now, as long as we don't undermine those covert steps by announcing, Hey, we have just taken these covert steps.

Andy and Jonathan, you are perfect for this. One of the things that I found really interesting over the last couple of years as I kind of make the rounds and give some guest lectures at universities is teaching about ethics and morality in conflict. And you know, I've I've given this talk. I went down to the Citadel, I did it. I did at a Catholic university, and you know this this was this with groups that actually think

about this stuff. And so this is what's what I think is is gnawing at me a little bit and I want to get your your take on that. If there was to be an agreement, uh that that avoids war, it's going to be an agreement around the nuclear program. But in essence, what that does is it allows the

regime to survive. And then we go back to the ethics and morality of Presidents Trump several weeks ago that help was on the way, and again, what the conversation we just had was what appeals to me and maybe to us, is that you know, that's that's something that actually matters. You know that the Iranian people actually stayed out in the streets because they thought the US was coming, and so on that ethics piece of it, the morality

piece of it. Actually an agreement, a nuclear agreement that would avoid war has a unethical component to that, which means the regime survives. And that's what's it's actually keeping me. It's keeping me up at night, it's driving me crazy a little bit. So, Jonathan, what are your what are your thoughts on that? Because look, I mean the one thing and I you know, I know Mick certainly much better than Andy that I know you do you we've known each other for a couple of years. Jonathan we

just met. But you know Mick who you know US Military Marine Corps lawyer is one of the most ethical people I've ever met. And I think that's that's not based on his training at CIA, it's based on his training with the Marine Corps. And again, so Jonathan off to you on that ethics piece of this. An agreement to stave off war in some ways is unethical because of our promises made.

do it right. Even things like the lend lease program and all these other things in World War Two where we like huge risk to do and there was a lot of repercussions that could come from it, but we didn't negotiate with the others with the enemy to stay back and allow things to continue. And the status quo in Iran has not worked for anybody, not even for the regime, I mean for anybody, since nineteen seventy nine.

And if we continue to a lot to put it on life support, what are we accomplishing just to say that we had an agreement. There's really nothing that comes this because everybody knows that if the regime comes this agreement, they're going to get some concessions for themselves too that are positive for the regime beyond the agreement itself. Do we really want to be again keeping them on live

support just so that this will happen again? I mean even today and yesterday that this was forty days since the actual protest killings, the major Day eight and nine happened. People were out there protesting at sharif Is, the beating up bus egis, that's again a perfect opportunity to do something.

And coming to this agreement betrays those people who even today are out there protesting because they believe that this world power who said they're going to help will come to help, you know, And there's a we could have chosen to say nothing that's different, but we didn't say nothing. We said something, and now we need to do something.

on the streets. What do you think of that? Yeah, one hundred percent.

So I think there's a there's just a lack of understanding about this that the solid pragmatic reason that we all understand as form of soft or ic practitioners is that you can't you can't betray people and then expect other people to trust you. It's number one and number two. When we're just using the intelligence community and we're just using soft our record of using proxies is actually really

really good, you know. I mean, whether it be the SDF for looking back and things like Plant Columbia or in our Salvador, when we're not putting massive amounts of troops on the ground, when we're just using proxies, we have a pretty good success rate. So we don't want to violate that, right, We don't want.

It was because our country represented certain values that went beyond transactional negotiations, and those values were persistent, right, And those were things, regardless of administration, that we were willing to risk our lives fall. So that is important for all of us who wore in the.

enjoyed watching it, and I am happy. I am happy the US one.

thank you.

I'm not comparing that to the United States versus Canada.

down to the description. The keynote speaker is General Stanley McCrystal, so it should be a good one and Mix going to be there. Maybe ees On will be there. We're trying to figure that out. I have a phone call with the organizer later. We'll see if they meet our price.

gets them. Jonathan as always a pleasure. We got to have you on more and more because I feel like you're the smartest guy in the room. And I'm still freaking out about the fact that it's fifty to fifty that there is a person in not in the Oval office talking about these things while they're Uh, that's crazy. That freaks me the fuck out because if I can get a guy for a podcast, they could definitely get somebody in the Oval office to brief the President or the Essay or whoever they need to brief.

and whatever's topical or current on the high Side. So it's another way for us to get the information out to you as social media algorithms are pretty iffy and you never really know what you're gonna get. So this is a once a week email. It'll slide into your inbox and it will have you know the greatest hits of that week.