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Hello everyone, welcome to another episode of I Soon. I'm Andy Gilber and there's d Concost told you let's save you having to introduce yourself. Thank you more importantly than either of us. We have a guest today, doctor Joyce Karan, who is seen in news editor at Al Monitor, which is saying, a major Middle East news agency outlet, and
she also teaches at George Washington University. Choice is great to have you on today, and so topic bajour is the Middle East and I think We can all begin by saying, this is a very uncertain time, as we have every single episode for the last ten months. So what are your thoughts? What are prospects of the peace in the Middle East. I never thought I'd be actually able to ask that question, but there you go.
Now, Andy, great to be with you. I've been reporting on that region for over two decades and I have to tell you we've seen nothing like the last ten months. The level of fragility instability in the region is different this time. The Gaza war, the conflict on both sides is real, and UH and Hamas is UH is more charged. UH has a global echo to it than other conflicts and wars we've covered UH in that region. Unfortunately, I wish I had good news for you on where the
conflict is. It's nowhere good. We were a little bit more hopeful about a ceasefire maybe three months ago in June. Right now it looks less likely. It seems both sides are dug in in UH zero sum game. That Israelly Prime Minister is determined on a mission to defeat Hamas. It's unclear what that means on the ground, because ten months in Hamas is still there they're still calling the shots h in Gaza. You've seen what happened with the six hostages that were killed by Hamas. We still have
ninety six ninety seven hostages held in Gaza. But the prospects of a ceasefire are dim. US officials are finally coming to that conclusion. So it's a matter, you know, and this in this time that each side is trying to buy between now and the US elections, how each party can can can operate and achieve minimum minimal goals until.
What are the That's a very interesting point. So arguably Netna who stands to gain by waiting until the elections, hoping at the very least the United States will be distracted and at the best that whoever comes in will be a little more conciliatory towards what he wants. But what you know, we we we know that obviously, I mean, we talked about Netna. Who's motivation for that? But what are they? What are these sticking points? What are the what kind of sense you getting from the dynamics of
the negotiations from from both sides? What are the sticking points and who who is really blocking them?
Very good question. So over time since these talks have been ongoing to try to get to seis fire agreements. There has been three major sticking points. One, who controls North Gaza can Hamas militants move back to the north. That's something that the Israelis have given a hard know on that this is this is non negotiable. So that's one. The second that's more important now is who controls the
eight kilometer strip on the border with Egypt. It's known as the Philadelphia Corridor the Israeli side, I mean, it depends who on the Israeli side, but they're saying, the Prime Minister is saying this has to continue to be ours because that route, they say, is used to move arms and weapons to Hamas. That's a hard no for the Egyptian side because according to the Camp David agreement in nineteen seventy eight that established peace between Egypt and Israel,
this route, Israel has to be away from it. So that's the second point. The third one, and that's been consistent throughout the negotiations, is the swap between which Palestinian prisoners get released and which hostages get released. So the US had put up a plan, you know, phase one, you have this number and Palestinian prisoners that would be agreed upon that would be released. What we're hearing from the Israeli government now, what we're hearing from Nataiello is
some of the names on the Palestinian side. He doesn't want to budge on them. So these are the three main sticking points. Of course, there are other questions who control Gaza with the Palestinian authority be able to come back in what happens to the Israeli troops in Gaza, But these are seen to be in phase two and three of any agreement. The three points I talked about, these are in phase one and there's no agreement about it.
Wow. So again it's the it's who among who's released in return for the hostages and the Philadelphia corradal itself, the two, you know, the two main sticking points and I'm sorry the first three.
Yeah, and the Philadelphia corridor that becomes a bigger issue because you have Egypt involved. Is Israel going to risk the peace agreement, the first ever peace agreement it had with an Arab country to control the Philadelphia Here we're seeing divisions among Israeli officials. The Defense Minister Off Galant, He's saying, you know, hold on one second, why we don't need to control that trout to block Hamas's weaponry.
We can coordinate with other parties. But you have some say that Benjamin Nataiello is actually using the Philadelphia corridor to block an agreement.
Yeah, it's quite quite interesting, just for the benefit of the So the Philadelphia Kerdle, as Joyce mentioned, is is it's really on, you know, almost on their border with Egypt. It's the kind of the southern boundary of Gaza. And the question, of course, long running kind of question between Egypt and Israel has been on the tunnels. And so there was a school of thought within the Israeli military that you had to control the Philadelphia Curdle in order
to control the tunnels. However, a couple of things, and I think this explains the shift within the military and why Gallant is saying other things, The Israelis realize that there are other ways that they can control those tunnels. In fact, possibly a third of the tunnels are not even you know, they're they're not even under Israeli control now.
And yet there are other ways, you know, you find out where the entrances are et cetera, et cetera, number one and sitting on the Fidelphi Cradle Mikes number target that was kleave. You know, the chiefest staffs come to say, look, we're sitting here on ground, but the problem is underground. We have expertise technology to pursue the problem underground. Let's not sit here on ground and we're offending you know, the Egyptians. At the same time, there's all kinds of
reasons not to. But thirdly, perhaps the strongest argument, this isn't coming from outside, it's coming from within the Israeli military. And that is almost one hundred percent of the munitions that they are finding now, have been finding in the
last two months were manufactured in Gaza. They were not brought in from outside to include components, you know, components from So the point is that there are those within the US, within the Israelis right in military, who are claiming that Netnia, who is making the Philadelphia codle a blocking point when it should not be. So it is something, yeah.
And that's something Bibe N'atanielle is very good at. I mean, this is a guy who is an expert at maneuvering US politics. He did it under Bill Clinton. He did it again under Barack Obama, under Trump even and now with the Biden administration. He understands how to pull the levers. He goes to Congress when when he's upset with the White House. He plays to the US public when he's
when there's a message he wants to send out. We saw, you know, he gave an interview to Fox just recently, gave a press conference just to US media just in the last few days. So he's a very shrewd operator when it comes to addressing a Western audience and his ultimate game, and he's been successful at it.
So stay as a as a reminder to pass some of the listeners and realize that Netna, who kind of cut his teeth in debate in the US telet on the TV circuit, you know, in the in the eighties, writing became quite a popular figure. I mean, he's articulate, he's uh, you know, he appears to be very bright and uh and and he appeared and obviously to have a grasp of the topic way beyond the American public.
And so it appeared that he was explaining things that they didn't know while kind of presenting his view of the world.
Absolutely. And I mean this is a guy, he's an a MIT graduate. You know, he spent time in Pennsylvania. And you don't have anybody from the other side. No, you don't have any not even Palestinian, any Arab official.
That means, and that's what I was going to ask you about, Joyce. It's got to be supremely you know, I'm not talking about Hamas. I'm just talking about the Palestinian cause. Do you see anyone on the horizon at all? You know, a boss is uh, A boss has has lost. I think it's fair to say all credibility. You know, his people and Hermas has let them down this path. But there is no one who can who has the charisma and the smarts except for and you're can remind
me of his name. He's in Israeli prison right now.
Totally agreed, a boss. He's eighty seven years old. He's viewed as corrupt, He's viewed as just somebody who's who's not championing the Palestinian cause. Mind you, this is a guy that came to power after the Second Antifada saying we have to pursue peaceful resistance.
We have to people wanted to be here at the time, but.
Not for sure. So he's he he came with you know, us backing, he's close to Russia, and there were high hopes for him. But when it came to governance, when it came to establishing agreements, past agreements, implementing them with Israel was miserable failure for the Palestinian authority. That's now from all poles, seen as very unpopular, not just in
Gaza but also in the West Bank. Marjuan Barruti, the the guy you mentioned, he's he's the most popular among the Palestinians, but there is very little chance that Israel would release him. He's charged with terrorism and is serving a jail sentence. You've had, of course, you know the former Hamas leader smile and he he was a little bit more popular than Yeah, yes, and we're the current leader. But he was killed, as we know in tron.
That's you know, that's kind of ironic, isn't it. That we've talked about this that the path of targeted assassinations sometimes leads you to a worse often leads you to We've seen that in the United States, and so now we're left with nothing but extremists except for Marwan Barghuti, who is in jail. What is the Israeli's I get it, he's accused of terrorism, but so are they all. And in fact, the Israelis have released Palestinians with Israeli blood
on their hands, so there is a precedent here. You know, I'm going back to the release of our prisoners. It seems now that this that this is maybe an arbitrary opposition to you see what I'm saying. Israelis have already been have They've already waived that concern about releasing Palestinians who killed Israelis. So now they have a chance to release someone at least who can provide more moderate leadership than Yaya Sema they have.
But in this case particularly, I don't think they actually have a plan on what to do later. Their immediate plan is, you know, we're gonna drive full force in Gaza. It's been ten months. Hamas has not been completely defeated. So the only plan on the table is to just prolong the war. There is no day after plan. And who takes control. Will it be the Palaestinian authority, will it be a different offshoot of Hamas, will it be
an Arab force that comes to Gaza. So, particularly because they don't have uh these plans in place, and they don't have they have not made these decisions, it's hard to see them making the political decision of releasing Marjuan Berruti because they would be just endermining the Palestinian authority's he's more popular than a bas and then they's just he would also be undermining hamas in in Gaza. So it's a little bit complicated at the moment in terms
of seeing Berruti out. I think the more immediate projection is, you know, they're going to continue with this war until something happens within Israel or with the US election on November five.
In the meantime, what is what are some of the things that are happening some of the train things that you're observing that you know causing you concern. You mentioned activity in the West Bank, but on both sides violence, you know, flaring violence on the on the West Bank that's kind of been I'm going to use a cliche, simmering powder cake since seven October. And now that that doesn't seem to be any prospect for a ceasefire, or if there is no prospect, do you see things getting worse there.
They are getting worse. I mean, we've seen three US citizens, at least three US citizens have been killed in the West Bank since October seven by Israeli forces. We are seeing Israel launched in operation recently in the West Bank in the Genine Camp to uh just confront militants there. At the same time we're seeing hundreds of Palestinians have been killed. Another another issue that's a powder keg in
the West Bank is settlers violence. Settlements, you know, for the who don't know, are illegal housing projects and units that Israel has established in the West Bank since nineteen sixty seven. It's illegal because it's an occupied territory. Just between and in between October seven and now, we've seen these settlers attacks go over twelve hundred by the numbers. I saw actually just a few days ago, twelve hundred
attacks by settlers against the Palestinians. So you're seeing even between the settlers and the Palestinian population a higher degree of animosity. And within the West Bank there are more militant groups. There are people that are very upset what's happening in Gaza, so they're protesting. But you're seeing also like a group, for example, its name is the Lions. Then, uh, that's a fairly new group and they've they're expanding Hamas
is gaining popularity in the West Bank as well. So can Israel handle a war in Gaza and an eruption in the West Bank. It's getting much more complicated to Israel to the status agreements that were signed in Oslo and later on in the West Bank. So it's an important issue to monitor and to see how the Palestinian authority as well can navigate this one.
Are we seeing Israeli's move into so in two areas that formerly were not administered by them within the West Bank? You know, I mean categories of areas in other ways.
I'm sorry, Yes, So you're seeing more rates happening at night in Ablos and Janine, as I mentioned, And these are areas that we've seen more Palestinian autonomy around them after Oslo. But because of the situation, because where the Palestinian authority is today, you're seeing Israel just move more
aggressively within the West Bank. For you know, for me sitting here in Washington, I can tell you the Administration, the State Department, the White House, they're worried if the Palestinian authority can actually handle the situation in the West Bank. They're worried that a collapse of the Palestinian authority could also mean a collapse of the security situation from the Palestinian side in the West Bank.
Yeah, just so very quickly, so after Oslow, all of the territory that had been captured by Israel in nineteen sixty seven became subject two kind of the three categories. It's either security and administration provided by the Israelis. I think that's kind of whatever. It's like ABC, right, So either by security administration or B the Israelis provides security, the Palestinians provide administration, or see the Palestinians provide security administration.
And the concern from the US perspective is that you were seeing more of the Israeli you know, of the Israelis going into B and C areas on on these rates. The areas A are those areas about the facto, you know, it's where settlements have sprung up and it's only Israelis. But but you know, as as Joyce has said, even settlement, you know, the area as are technically illegal, but they're just the fat of complee. So the Oslo Accords, I mean.
We're we're now three decades after Arsenal. Oh, it's it's hard to see what's left from that agreement that that stands today. It's you know, the areas you've mentioned, the A, B and C are very much just that that status is no longer there, in part because militants have emerged, new militants organizations have emerged in the West Bank. Israel has moved in more aggressively, and the area A that you mentioned where the settlers are, we're seeing more clashes.
These are coming sometimes into Palestinian areas, and there has been a push since October seven to get the Palaestinian population out of areas that are close to settlements. So we've seen some Palestinian you know, locals leave because of the they're worried about settlers, settlers, violence and tach and this very much undercovered. I think few outlets did report THEMSNBC, CNN did reports about that. So it's really untenable when you're talking about the Palestinian is really status quol and
andy here. I think it's really important because we forget sometimes that we haven't seen negotiations between Israelis and the Palestinians since twenty thirteen. And that's a major reason that we cannot overlook and how we got here. The Trump administration was the first administration in a long time that did not have the Israelis and the Palestinians talk and negotiate around the same table. The Biden administration tried to reverse some of the Trump administration decisions, but we still
didn't see negotiations and the failure of diplomacy. That's why we are where we are to It's not just because you know, Hamas controls Gaza, of course that's another reason, but but yeah, failure.
There was no negotiation outlet, and arguably the US kind of lost its way in negotiation stance. So it had always been the US stance for a two state solution, and that, you know, and to begin with that and then to sort out the more tangled problems. The settlements is one, the right of return for Palestinian refugees potentially is another. But now it appears that the two state solution is just hard. It's hard to imagine getting that from here, two states living side by side.
You know, it looks like amy Raj I mean, honestly, if you look at that map, how do you even connect those banks to Gazana, let alone, how do you even connect the West Bank within itself. And then we have Jerusalem is another issue. We have the Jordan River. This Israel wants control there. So it's it's we are in a really bad place in this in this conflict. And I don't say, uh, this lightly and there is
I hope we can get to reassess. But the uh, the assumption that you could you know, overlook the Palestinian is really conflict and just focus on outside agreements that has that has you know, fell flat on on October seven. Of course you can get an agreement with bahin with the United Arab Emirates normalization, but unless you address the elephant in the room that has been for a years now, the Palestinian is really conflict. There is no stability, long
term stability in the in the Middle East. You're seeing the Pentagon overstretched, sending aircraft, aircraft carriers, you know, reinforcing its presence in the Middle East.
At the expense of the Pacific It's expenses.
Then that's that's unsustainable. I mean, this is just not a good situation. The alternative would have been a more aggressive diplomatic push from the Obama administration going to the Trump administration and maybe, you know, we can dream that it would have been concluded in an agreement during the the Biden administration. That didn't happen. Instead, we saw these elements of conflict spiral out of control. And that's why we are here today and in.
Fantas defendants to the US too. Although you know, we normally we don't shy away from criticism. Arguably with the death of Jitzapara being the kind of the anchor point for the piece, you know, for the conciliatory movement disappeared within Israel. You know, it took a while to become evident, and it was a process that began, you know, back then and what was it nineteen ninety five or not, Yes, and arguably just and seven October kind of completed that process of absolute polarization.
That's one way to look at it. And the closest we've come to a deal was perhaps Camp David too in nineteen nineteen nine, two thousand with Bill Clinton at the time. Here he actually ran out of time. He couldn't conclude the agreement the Palestinians were divided among themsel else within within Fata, and Adapat said at the time, you know, he couldn't get the concessions he wanted on Jerusalem and the right of return. But after the two thousand Talks, it's just been Andy just Downhill.
Saw the sorry Jerusalem is the other the right of return Jerusalem. We're two of these settlements. Settlements, yeah, security, and we haven't even got to there. It's like now for the Gaza piece, the real issue is what happens next within Gaza, and and that isn't even that isn't even up for discussion. Gosh So painted a extremely gloomy picture facts on the ground. So we haven't even talked about the North Joyce. What are your thoughts about that.
We talked about problems simmering on the West Bank in a way that perhaps they haven't previously. We've talked about the instn Right. It's a affiliated group.
They claim to be just their own Palestinian.
Military have tremendous support on the rest they seem to have.
They have support, they've been they've claimed responsibility for more attacks and and before October seven, even in the last year and a half and just uh. This situation just makes it for these groups to to get popularity because you have the Palestinian authority that's just incapable of delivering to its to its people, and you have the Israeli occupation that keeps feeding UH into their their ideology.
So what about up north?
Yes, that's a number area that we haven't talked about yet. I was just in Lebanon and in July, and at the time it was the specter of war was high between Israel and Hasbola. What we're seeing at the Lebanon Israel border is something is an escalation that we haven't seen since two thousand. So that year Israel left, we drew flam Lebanon. You need latterly there was no agreement. They they they withdrew the Can I just mute my computer?
Okay, yeatas two thousand and six, it's muted for some reason, but it's okay.
Hopefully one bus again. I apologize, right, we didn't hear it. Yeah, it wasn't good. So two thousand and six we had the big war. Yeah, and the Israeli is assumed then that Husbola will be contained. It was this they call it mowing the lawn strategy that they can come in every few years, or they can hit Hasbola and they can just contain and deter the Iran backed party in Lebanon. The problem is, you know, eighteen years since two thousand
and six, Husbola is much larger than it was. It has now presence in Syria, it has presence in Iraq, it has presence in Yemen. It re armed and is very confident within Lebanon two because it has a friendly government. There is no president in the country, so the situation is fragile, but we were able to avoid an all out war a couple weeks ago when Hasbola retaliated against Israel. Having said that this situation is also unsustainable because you
have the Israeli population in the north. They had to leave their towns, they had to leave their homes. You have a situation too in South Lebanon where displacement has happened. Schools are reopening in September. So can the US arrange a deal between Hasbola and Israel, between Lebanon and Israel that includes Hasbola without Gaza ceasefire. We're hearing more about this lately. Hopefully if this happens, that problem will be at least contained until we see what happens in Gaza.
The issue, of course has Bolah has maintained that they will not stop their attacks until they see it guys, as he's fired. So it depends what you as negotiators can deliver on on this issue.
Is there any what are your thoughts about what's going through in Nazuela's mind? Uh, you know, I mean there's it's there's speculation about whether he is waiting for the go from Iran, whether he's an independent guy. But he's concerned about you know, I'm using it. I'll use a crude American expression. He's concerned about shitting in his own nest at this point in time, right, always a concern for him, always, you know. But he doesn't love Lebanon.
He's not a Lebanese patriot. It's it's purely utilitarian relationship. Right. He needs a haven and Lebanon is his haven. So what what do you think? What do you We'll pay you extra if you get this right, I mean, we'll pay you I mean, you know, but if you get that's right, that's quite A.
Is a very interesting guy. He is by far the most formidable leader of the group. And that's why it's bustained.
It's you tell us a little bit about him, you know, we use his name a lot. But yes, so in a sense a different I'm not I'm not talking about ethically. I'm talking about his just his his pension, his charisma, his quality as a leader.
So I can tell you as an Arabic speaker, as somebody who listens to his speeches, his Arabic is formidable as an orator, as somebody from that region. When you look at other leaders, when you look even a hamas militant or officials, there is nobody that excels in delivery of the Arabic language like Hassan Nasralla does today. Of course, that doesn't negate the fact that his calculus is just
independent of what happens to Lebanon. He dragged the country to a war that destroyed much of the Lebanese infrastructure. After it was rebuilt after the civil war there, he admittedly says, we get our money, we get our food, he said in his speech, we get our water from Iran. So you want to come at us with the Iran thing, we welcome it, he says. He does his decision independently. I'm not so sure because it seems since October seventh, Iran has been reluctant to wage a full front war
against Israel. And we've seen Hasbelah stage attacks against Israel, but those have been contained. Even when Hasbalalah law no A lost close friend of his for at Sugar, the head of the the head of the missile production in the in the party, the response was was was you know, I mean, sure, israeled down many of the drones, but it could have been more. There was no border infiltration,
no redline crossed exactly. So a very calculated guy. And I think at this point in time, his priority is maintaining the power he has in Lebanon, that's the their base, and he seems to be enjoying, you know, having larger influence Kepta, gone trade in Syria, having presence in Hirakiam and as we as we mentioned so very interesting.
So so that they've got a they've got disrupting their revenue stream would be another consequence possible, the consequence of going to war again. Zuela points to Nuzuela as being a pragmatist and the fact that he is adhering to the rules of the game that both his Bolla and the Israelis talk about right without talking about to each other, they both understand the rules of the game. It's you know, you start off by hitting in the vicinity of what
said area called Shabba Farms. You know what happens in Shabba Farms doesn't And then as long as it doesn't go south. And then you know, the next step is as long as it doesn't go north of the Latani River for the Israeli strikes, for the and and for Hisbolla. Interestingly enough, the red line they've worked out Israeli red lines don't go after Tel Aviv, right, you know, if you go off to Tel Aviv like that, now you now you're in that face now.
But don't kill too many people.
Yeah, focus on mostly military targets, et cetera, et cetera, and you keep the pots simmering and you keep the support coming without escalating into regional conflict.
And that's that's more of a Biby Natagne who also calculus here. Because ahead of the Hasbola retaliation for the for the assassination of Sugar, some in the Israeli military advised to hit Beirut, to hit Hasbola headquarters as a preemptive move, and from the reporting that we've done that others have done. It was Biby Natagniello that said, no,
I'm gonna wait, I'm gonna see what they do. We have very interesting carriers, we have US intelligence helping us, and then we would fend off that retaliation instead of doing a preemptive strike. So, in a way, a full blown war is not in the interest of Hezbollah nor Israel at the moment. Could this change, Could there be a miscalculation, of course, but Andy, at this point, I
think it's not in their in their interest. What about Iran, Yes, so we're still waiting for that Iranian response to Hani is killing right as we wait, it seems the Iranians also don't want to UH to go in a full front war. There is a lot happening in Iran internally as we know. You know, their their president was killed in a in a plane crash. The foreign minister was
in the same plane as well. UH. Their economy is not doing well, so there is so much change within Iran for a new lead ship to establish UH itself and then they will see what comes with their foreign policy. They seem also to be more focused on their nuclear program.
They're advancing that they're enriching more so if you ask me, and that's pure opinion, their their biggest retaliation would be, you know, coming closer to a uh break yeah, exactly than anything they would do in you know, like firing missiles or other sort of attack against Israel.
And by the way, Western you know, the nuclear watchdog agencies and the gosh, what's it called, the u N It doesn't matter that, you know, the new u N nuclear mon aah yeah, and and other experts. So together they estimate worst case scenario that Iran is six months from breakout. By that, I mean developing enough and rich uranium to manufacture a weapon. Now you still have to weaponize it. It could take two years beyond that, you know, to put it on it or longer to actually weaponize that.
But that that's the worst case scenario. Other estimates have it, you know, a couple of years from breakout and then you know, you add a few years onto them. But the the problem is that there is not no one can see an obstacle to prevent the uraniums from doing this.
Is that correct? I mean short of all out war, no one can think of any diplomatic tools or any other means to prevent them from having enough and rich uranium if that's what they want to do now, They at the same time are aware that once they do decide to break out, the West will find out. And that is that that you know. And they've crossed the red line too, So there's this delicate balance. Is that a fair way to put it?
You've put it much better than I would do. I'm not a nuclear expert, but even within estimates that you hear from regional countries, sometimes you hear from Israeli. Is that period is shorter than six months?
Yeah, I've heard yes, Israeli. So I'm trying to err on the side of conservative estimates, right.
And we had, you know, in until twenty eighteen, you had an agreement that was not perfect, but that capped that program, the JCPOA. The US withdrew from that agreement under Trump, and now most of the clauses in the agreement are about to expire anyway, so you can return to that. The conversation will have to again come to November. Who wins the White House? What kind of a new
nuclear deal you can reach with the Iranians. Can you tempt them into you know, accepting a deal that would give them sanctioned relief, would give them more financial incentives than going for a nuclear weapon perhaps, But that has to wait for the you know, for the new administration to come into office. There is no time and there
is no room at the moment for negotiations. The Europeans have been trying to you know, be a back channel in sending messages the Swiss particularly that our money is to at least contain the nuclear program, but it's not in a in a good place. The bigger question, as well, Andy, is would Israel go unilatterally for a strike. Do they have the weaponry to do it, the sort of bombers that you know more about than me to do that. Would they inform the US? Would they not? That's that's a big one.
Yeah, yeah, yeah, And we yeah, we we in the US military have lived with that prospect, as you know, and a lot of what I did personally in the military was to try and avert that happening, you know, to to offer other alternatives, or to bring military pressure on Iran below the level of armed conflict or bring pressure on Iran below the level of armed conflict too to alter course, but at the same time persuading the Israelis that there that this would be a disastrous move
and that the US would guarantee Israel's security. But the implicit return on that is that Israel would not attack Iran. You know, my my policy viewpoint of that is, I think is that it's remained the same. You know, that is the policy is the US is at all costs, Well, we're trying to prevent that happening. At the same time, US does not went around to have a nuclear weapon. So walking that line has been a very is what
it continues to happen. I have tremendous you know, you are You're there at the independagon far more often than
I am. Right now, What is what is your kind of feeling about, you know, the political part aside about handling Iran, Is there is there a do you get to feel that there is a there are lines of communication for negotiation or or has Iran kind of turned off the phone and said, Okay, we're going to get a head down and in our own business for a while and let you worry about what we're doing.
So good news. They haven't turned off the phone, they haven't turned off communications. Despite the escalation around the Gaza War, We've seen at least two meetings, not direct indirect between US officials that went to Oman, the small country in the Gulf, and Iranian officials Geme and the Omanis were mediating. That was purely about the nuclear the nuclear issue. The Pentagon and I mean and rightly so, they're very concerned that the aftermath of the Gaza War is dragging the
US deeper into the Middle East. It's diverting resources and it's a big burden on the strategy. I mean, this is not I mean, Secretary Austin didn't come to office wanting to spend more of his resources in in the Middle East. As you mentioned, there is the Asia Pacific. There are other challenges between you know, Russia, Ukraine that the US would rather spend more of its assets. Uh there. So in that in that sense, the priority is now to contain the situation, to still act as a deterrence.
But we need a ceasefire in Gaza because absent of that, it's hard to contain the other side. It's hard to get to a situation off at least cold peace between Iran and its proxies, especially the Houthi Is. I mean, these group that's very helpful for Iran and in the.
As disrupting the global yes economy right now, all things mitigate well, you know, absolute US interests are for there to be a ceasefire. I would say, you know, there's the US interests absolutely. It's very it's very interesting to hear also what Netna Who is saying, because I've heard this among some you know, number of right wing Israeli's. A couple of things. One is, you know, two state
solution is off the table. You know, this is the concerning thing about this though, Joyce is it's not just right wing Israeli's that's like most Israeli since seven October, and Netna Who's kind of embodying that fear and emphasizing it. But but the other piece is that there is this kind of attempt to continuously deconstruct what's happening in Gaza
from the threat up north on on Netna Who's side. Hey, these are two separate issues, you know, the Palestinian issues separate from Haboala has Bolla is a existential way you shouldn't tie them together, whereas Israel's adversaries are making a clear no, we see these as very much tied and and that is that's presenting a negotiation a problem for the United States, right because yeah, I know you're now there's a clear possible divergence between US interests regional stability
and Israeli interests or net Hu's interest in particular and full interest. But a fact, a fact for the.
First time in this conflict, when you talk about non state actors in the Middle East, you're seeing a multi front war against Israel. These are separate fronts. So we've talked about Lebanon, We've talked about Gaza, of course, but you're also you know, a Yemen iraq I rock through Syria. So this is this is new in this conflict. I mean, of course, you had the the A in the pl all fighters back in the seventies and the eighties, but it was nothing like this. You've had state actors quite
Israel nineteen seventy three, nineteen sixty seven. Uh, this is different, and this is a challenge for Israel how it addresses different different threats. But under two state solution, yes, there's a lot of reasons to to to be skeptic about it. But the main argument for it still is what is the alternative? Yeah, I mean, are we going with John Bolton the three state solution. Let's say that's I mean, that's that's a joke. Yeah, that's got to Egypt and
was back to Jordan. That's just not one state. More so after October seventh, the Israeli Is would not want a one state. Do you pro long the occupation? The status quo? Uh, those don't end well, you know in in in history. So this is this is just there is no alternative. The two state solution is still the strongest argument of the under table. How do we get there?
Has because ignoring, ignoring the problem arguably has got us by us, I mean collectively in this in the position where we are now. Yes, no negotiations for nine years, and yet in the meantime, several operations that took place in Gaza and life continued and never thought that the problem had gone away.
And this is where US Congress is also liable for this one, because for the longest time they were they allowed, they allowed themselves to be to be used by Benjamin and Yahouh as a to exert pressure on any president who's who's in office, and that came at the expense of yours national interest, which is to achievete to state solution, which is to proceed with negotiations. This, I mean, this is not this is not sustainable.
Yeah, yeah, yeah, I mean I I if I was. We weren't hoping for a solution necessarily to this, but Joyce was very disappointed. You didn't get us.
I know, we'll have to do Yeah.
Is there anything this has been terrific? Is there anything else that we haven't talked about, Anything we've talked about that you'd like to mention.
I mean, just to lead to end it on a hopeful, hopeful note. You know, you talk to Palestinians and Israelis, and there are people on both sides who who want this UH to end. There are figures in Israeli and Palestinian politics. There was a paper by former Prime Minister it would All Mert and Palestinian negotiator Nasser Kudua just in the last few days proposing a solution. So there are voices that can still get us out of this UH,
this chaos that we're in. This this, yes, exactly, and you have to have the create the political climate that would get us, that would get us there, and I personally believe this this region is meant for coexistence. It's been the case in the past, it can be the case in the future. Is just we really need UH to do diplomacy better as as Americans, as US administration and I don't know, we can only hope for for better days ahead.
Andy well choice on that, on that, less that then, happy note, but absolutely honest, fascinating discussion. Thank you so much, and yes we will definitely, we will definitely get you back, hopefully hopefully to analyze things as they as they get better.
Let's hope. So thank you. Yeah.
In the meantime, please to everyone that you're going to appear on on eyes on, terribly impressed on on Monday, and I'm looking forward to it. This was a great episode. D oh yeah, and Choyce, so you can be found at George Washington University, UH and UH and also our monitor where you were the senior news editor. I'm not telling you that so you don't know it. I'm telling everyone else and d over to you for for closing comment.
Yeah. So all of Joyce's links will be in the description down below. In the show notes. So take a look. There. She's on Twitter at joyce Underscore. Great Twitter feed. She's very much plugged into the Middle East. It's a great follow and uh yeah for us, Andy's info is down in the description is Substack. Everything you need to know is amazing book. I have to say that every every episode day you'll read it. I did read it. Actually, it's one of the only books I've ever read.
And of course.
The best way to support the show is Patreon dot com, slash the teamhouse. All the information is down in the description.
Thank you, thank you so much.