This is The Red Line, where we interview three geopolitical experts on one big issue shaping the news both here and overseas. And I'm your host, Michael Hilliard. 130 meters. About 400 feet for the Americans listening. What kind of a difference do you think 130 meters could really make? In one place in the world, that 130 meters...
is the difference between doubling your wage and living 10 years longer on average. The 130 meters I'm describing here is a bridge along the Narva River in Northern Europe. On the west bank of the river lies the Estonian city of Narva. and on the east bank of the river was the Russian city of Ivankorod. And as recent as 40 years ago, citizens living on either side of the river lived relatively similar lives, then a few years later in 1991, in the collapse of the USSR.
And the Soviet Union's 15 constituent republics were all simultaneously given this once in a lifetime opportunity to completely restructure their nation's core beliefs and institutions. Rather than decades of slow political movements, this was a unique opportunity to completely restructure everything all at once. And of the 15 republics of the Soviet Union, some states like Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan decided to stick with their same Soviet-era leaders.
and implement very little inclusive reform within the economy, and to many, it largely just felt like they'd changed the flag that was flying on the roof. In its dark contrast, the three Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, went all out. removing almost all remnants of their USSR structures and even ditching Russian weapons at a time when they had very little money to buy anything else. And the results of these reforms were absolutely stark.
with the three Baltic states very quickly experiencing massive levels of growth and investment, and a sharp rise in the citizens' standard of living, whereas others underwent decades of wide stagnation. And nowhere was this economic transformation between Russia... and Estonia more present than across our aforementioned bridge. The Narva Bridge, crossing the Narva River, has Narva on one side and Ivangeror on the other. Whilst Ivangeror on the Russian side is mostly populated with Russians,
Narva on the Estonian side is also mostly populated by Russians. In fact, it's almost entirely ethnically Russian. 95% of Estonia's third biggest city speaks Russian. with the population being 85% ethnically Russian, and 35% of them even being Russian citizens. Between the two sides, same geography, same people, mostly same language, and yet...
Even when you adjust the cost of living or the relative strength of their currencies, on the Estonian side of the river, life is by almost every measure far better. In Narva, crime is lower, education is higher, and wages are almost double that of the average wage in the Russian Piscoff Oblast just across the border from Estonia.
And when comparing Narva, an Estonian city full of Russians, to the average in the Piscoff Oblast, life expectancy in Narva is nearly 10 years higher, or from just walking 130 metres over the bridge into Estonia.
It seemed that Estonia pulled off the miracle that most of their old USSR compatriots simply couldn't. And with it, investments came pouring in, the EU and NATO came knocking at their door offering membership, and the country achieved the highest GDP per capita of any former Soviet state.
But as much as Estonia feels like it should be taking a victory lap after nearly 30 years of success, now onto the surface, things are growing increasingly complicated. The government in Tallinn, the capital of Estonia, has taken a hard anti-Russia position in the war in Ukraine. with Estonia even becoming the highest per capita donor of any state toward the war effort. But by pushing away Russia, Estonia has seen Swedish and Finnish banks gain larger influence throughout the country.
And forever anti-Russia forces within Estonian politics have used the opportunity to carry out new language laws against Russian populations within the country. And while some people see merit in this, Russian propagandists see merit in it as well. So what lies ahead of Estonia? a continuation of this starbound trajectory, or will we see fundamental problems when the country finally bubbling to the surface, placing NATO's northern flank in a precarious, undefined limbo?
Those are just some of the questions we're going to be tackling here today. And to help us understand the history of the country as well as the fault lines present within, we turn to our first guest. $6,000, 10 years and 130 meters. Estonia is an energetic, successful... An extremely modern country whose history goes back for much longer than most people realise.
It has had unfortunate experiences throughout its history, most especially with the decades of Soviet occupation. But we shouldn't define... Estonia as being a post-Soviet country. It existed before the Soviet Union and it will continue to exist for many years.
is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where she specializes on Northern and Eastern European strategic affairs, as well as defenses against emerging national security challenges. And on top of that, she's also a columnist for Foreign Policy Magazine, as well as Political Europe.
where she writes on national security and globalized economic issues. She has also been published in numerous prestigious organizations such as the Wall Street Journal, and currently serves as a member of the National Preparedness Commission for the United Kingdom, and we're thrilled to have on the program today.
It's a small country of just about one million people who are very proud to be Estonians. And in the past 30 years, the country has defined itself not just by its commitment to its own security. but also through its incredible technological innovation that has made the country fantastic for startups. Over the last 30 years, Estonia has gained a well-earned reputation for producing financial unicorn startups.
with this tiny nation of just 1.3 million being the catalyst for companies like Skype, Bolt, and Gazaa, all of which were either founded largely by Estonians or within Estonia. When it comes to finance or tech, Estonia punches well above their own weight.
And this could be seen even back during the USSR, when many of the USSR's most cutting-edge directors and musicians often came from the tiny Soviet Republic of Estonia. Estonia, for lack of a better word, was probably one of the most westernized Soviet republics. possibly due to the fact that Estonia, being right there on Europe's doorstep, was one of the only places that was in range of Finnish and Swedish TV and radio signals.
often giving Estonian citizens a far better understanding of the outside world compared to Soviet citizens in places like Kazakhstan or Georgia. But up until independence, there wasn't a huge divergence between the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic when it comes to things like living standard, wages, or even life expectancy. But today, there are some pretty stark differences between the border states in modern-day Estonia and modern-day Russia.
with Estonian citizens in cities like Narva having a life expectancy that is almost 10 years longer than the average Russian citizen in the nearby Peskov Oblast. But how did Estonia manage to actually pull this off?
How do they manage to change their economic reality so drastically as compared to those living just over the river in Russia or even in Belarus, just 200k southward? After... re-independence, Estonia essentially put itself on a crash course and along with Latvia and Lithuania really led the independence movement within the Soviet Union and the people who...
joined the course for independence, decided that if you're going to have independence, you have to do it properly. And so they completely redid what the Soviets had done, not just in their thinking about the economy, they went for a complete... complete crash course in the economy, did away with everything that had been a part of the Soviet-style economy was run, and set up a total free market economy, which was painful in the beginning, but turned out to be very successful.
So what they did was a complete crash course in terms of personnel. I remember a friend telling me years later he worked in the Pentagon right at the beginning of the 90s. One day he was sitting in his office in the Pentagon and a young man wondered and saying, I'm from the Estonian Ministry of Defence, I have an appointment. And my friend said, oh, that's great. It's nice to meet you. Did the minister send you? And the young man said, I am the minister.
And that's the way it was like. You had all these young people in their early 30s and some even younger who became ministers without any experience, but with a great deal of zeal and a great deal of ideas. And yes, things could have gone terribly wrong. Because having a government run by people who have no experience in the business of governance is a risky proposition. But the Estonians took the position that you have to make a clean sweep. And they have done rather well.
But as much as Estonia can completely overhaul economic systems, there are still numerous leftovers from their Soviet past, one of which being the large Russian diaspora here in the country, with around 23% of Estonia's population being ethnically Russian rather than Estonian.
And this becomes even more apparent when you look at cities like Narva, Estonia's third largest city, where over 90% of the city's population speaks Russian, and over 85% of the population are ethnically Russian. Now, I'm not saying this is a bad thing.
Cities like Cabramatta in Australia are a majority Vietnamese, and it's a fantastically integrated part of the city with some of the best food available anywhere in Sydney. But Australia isn't in heightened geopolitical tensions with Vietnam anymore. And noting these recent escalating tensions between Russia and Estonia, how does Tallinn get around the fact that they are in direct geopolitical competition against a country with ties to nearly a quarter of their population?
A large presence of ethnic Russians across the Soviet Union is one of the legacies that the Russians left. What they were trying to do throughout the decades of the Soviet Union was to create an empire of different republics. that were ethnically integrated. And you can say that was a noble thought, or you can say it was an imperialist thought, but that's what they did. To make that happen, they incentivized.
Russians to relocate to other parts of the Soviet empire and the Baltic states in particular were attractive. for Russians to live in. So the Soviets didn't really need to incentivize Russian relocation to those republics because it was really a very attractive place to live. We should remember that the Baltic states, even during Soviet times, were seen as more Western. and more even liberal within the...
realms of the possibilities of the Soviet Union. So they were attractive places to live in. And many Russians moved there, which is why when Estonia and Latvia and Lithuania declared independence or re-independence, there were very significant Russian communities. their countries. And it was not organic migration of the kind that we think of when we talk about diaspora in other countries. It was really this incentivized relocation within the Soviet Union.
This is one of Estonia's tough calls, who, in the opinion of many policymakers in Estonia, may or may not have Estonia's national interests at heart. But to be fair, a lot of these ethnic Russians have been living here in Estonia for as long as these Estonian families have.
either moving into the area during the Russian Empire's takeover of the Baltic states in the early 1700s, or may have come in during the Russian annexation in 1939, or may have even been forcibly moved by authorities in the USSR and have lived in the area for decades since.
Many of these Russians residing here in Estonia may know no other home other than the one they have in Estonia, but at the same time, may still refuse to integrate into the Estonian society and culturally identify themselves as Russian.
watching Russian television, speaking Russian, and often having opinions that would more closely align with the Kremlin rather than Tallinn, the capital of Estonia. Now, Estonia can't just kick these Russians out, as that would be against international law and a... pretty awful thing to do. But they also can't just wait for them to integrate, as many of these concentrated Russian pockets throughout the country have existed throughout the entirety of modern-day Estonia.
And as Nava shows us, even 30 years later, still refuse to integrate and maintain a massive cultural difference in the city compared to other places in the country. So how does Tallinn work around this? Now, I remember vividly in the early 90s, it was a massive issue for Estonia what to do about these Russians for one quarter of that population to be Russian.
But there they were, these Russians, and they weren't arming any sort of rebellion, but they were in many cases hostile to what Estonians were trying to do because it was obviously very much an Estonian undertaking, but they couldn't. kick them off because they weren't violating any laws for the most part. They were just there. So there's been this uncomfortable coexistence for many years, really, since Estonia re-independence. This uncomfortable coexistence that the Russians know it.
that they are not particularly welcome in Estonia, but nevertheless being allowed to stay. There was a lot of concern around the time of the Russia's annexation of Crimea that Russia might want to. pulled a similar trick on Estonia. And the question was, how would ethnic Russians in Estonia behave in such a situation? Fortunately, it hasn't come to Russian annexation or any other military aggression against Estonians.
So what about these new language laws, with the government trying to consolidate some of the language differences and encourage Estonian to be spoken across country? Because as it stands, only around 70% of Estonia can actually speak Estonian.
with around 56% of the country being able to speak Russian, mostly in the older populations, and about 51% of the country being able to speak English, mostly in the younger populations. So many Russians who would be encouraged to learn Estonian are simply opting to learn English. as it's better job prospects outside of Estonia itself. So how is the Estonian government trying to work around this?
The Russians in Estonia in many cases don't speak Estonian. They speak Russian because you could, during Soviet times, you could speak Russian anywhere in the Soviet Union. And in the case of Russians in Estonia, as is the case with Russians. Everywhere in the former Soviet Union, they, in many cases, watch Russian TV, which, as everybody knows, is often not very truthful and doesn't exactly instill loyalty to Estonia. The interesting thing, though, of the past...
17 months or so has been that Russians and Estonia haven't really... voiced particular support of Russia, Russia's war against Ukraine, they have remained quiet on the subject. And I think many of them have realized that actually they have it. really good in Estonia. They are lucky to live there as opposed to the juxtaposition of where Russia is today and the effect of the sanctions on the wider Russian population. It is a difficult situation. if you're a small country
And specifically, if you're a small country with its own language, then you don't have the luxury of saying, oh, English is the global language. They will just go with English. We have just seen, for example, the Netherlands decide that. their university's instruction in English has gone too far. And now the new policy is that the language of instruction at Dutch universities is English, not Dutch.
And Dutch is a larger language than Estonian. It is a challenge for any country, smaller country with its own language that, yes, it is much easier to speak English. If you want to attract people to your country, you do so by... facilitating the use of English, but Estonian is a unique language spoken by 1.3 million. It's a tiny language and I'm not surprised that the Estonian government, Estonian authorities are working very hard to make sure that
the Estonian, keeps being used. So what is the general relationship like between the Russians and the Estonians? Obviously, it's a history that's seen occupation, but it's also a history that's seen liberation as well, particularly in the case of World War II. a subject that's become increasingly contentious throughout Estonia at the moment. Can you take us through what the cultural relationship is like between these two countries?
If your experience with a country is under its occupation, then you won't have a lot of affection for it. And yes, Estonians will acknowledge that the Soviet Union helped defeat the Nazis, but... In the process of World War II, the Soviets committed a lot of aggressive acts themselves, including occupying the Baltic states. And they have... somewhat reluctantly kept the various Soviet memorials that the Soviets put up during the time of the occupation of Estonia. But we saw...
after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, that the Estonian authorities decided some of those monuments had to go. You can't have memorials in honor. of an occupying power when that occupying power has not learned from history and has not given up occupying other countries. We should remember that Estonia has a much longer history of links to Sweden and Germany, for example, and is proud to be part of that group of countries. It has close ties to Finland, but especially harmonious ties to Sweden.
Estonia has been incredibly gutsy since the invasion of Ukraine. We have seen the Estonian government position itself extremely clearly, and especially Prime Minister Kayakalas has been... incredibly vocal on the need for the West to support Ukraine. And Estonia has indeed emerged as the largest donor as a percentage of GDP per capita to Ukraine in terms of military assistance.
I think it reflects a genuine desire among Estonians to help Ukrainians because Estonians know what it's like to be occupied. And we have seen that within NATO, we have seen it within the European Union, and we have seen it exemplified. most strongly by this young generation of leaders. So Estonia managed to do the impossible, something almost all of the other post-Soviet states could not do.
rebuild their economy, and develop themselves to become the beating heart of the new tech startup sector within Europe, something that would be almost unthinkable just 40 years ago. But all of the successes are sitting in a precarious position, as much like the other former Soviet states, the question of Russia is still one that is largely unanswered. And for Estonia, with its large Russian diaspora within the country, things are increasingly complicated. As in Estonian politics,
you'll have some groups calling to crack down on the Russians and punish anyone who refuses to accept the cultural norms like learning the Estonian language. But others will point out that these Russians often speak English now, and the sort of language being used in these attacks is exactly the kind of rhetoric that is likely to radicalize the Russians that were already here, even if they weren't radicalized in the first place.
Fortunately though, this is Estonia, and the country has been able to thread every challenge thrown at them so far, whether it's been solving the defense problems by joining organizations like NATO, or solving its economic problems by joining trading blocs like the EU or...
But there's still a large question as to whether Estonia can solve this one. What can Estonia do to solve the problems around cohesion within the Estonian state? And how has the conflict in Ukraine complicated or sped up this problem? Well, to take us through that, we turn to our second guest. Part two, the one that got away.
No, I tell you, as a historian, we have a very, very long history of mostly negative experience with our eastern neighbor, Russia. And the most sort of quiet time in our history, we had more than... or nearly a thousand years ago and for that also a good understanding how to survive as a small nation in this kind of geostrategically
turbulent location as as we are and taking into account to current russian aggression marco michelson is the current chair of the national foreign affairs committee for the nation of estonia as well as a serving member of the estonian ricky koglu
the National Parliament. He's also served as the Estonian Chair to the EU Affairs Committee and Chair of the National Defence Committee. Before his time in government, he previously worked as the Director of the Baltic Centre for Russian Studies and was Editor-in-Chief for the biggest national daily newspaper, Bostimierz.
having taken the role after serving as Posteme's chief correspondent assigned to Moscow, and we're thrilled to have him on the program today. We foresaw this, of course, for many years, and myself. As a journalist in the 90s, I was a Moscow correspondent for Estonian National News Daily. I covered also the first Chechen war between 94 to 96 and already that time.
In Estonia, we understood that Russia never left the idea of recreating empire back again. That was a sort of first major... conventional warfare they launched nearly 30 years ago now to reconquer territories of former empire. This is why what happened last year on our National Independence Day, 24th of February, that day was turning point in many ways, but turning point.
for us only, to make sure that our allies and our partners also are awake against this existential threat that Russia is posing and has posed already for many years. You've been covering Estonian defence for a long time now, and we're very supportive of Estonia's decision to join NATO back in 2004. So, having now been in the organisation for nearly 20 years, what do you see as Estonia's role within NATO?
This is a very important question. As I said earlier, one of our mantras is never alone again. While just prior to World War II, then we were an independent nation. Our, at that time, diplomacy or kind of priorities were linked to neutrality. We hope that as a small nation we can stay afloat and survive in a turbulent world.
Neutrality next to Russia is welcoming to conquer you and unfortunately we lost our independence for nearly half a century after we regained independence after the collapse of the Soviet Empire. Empire in 1991, political forces in Estonia have been very much united behind the idea that we have to as soon as possible integrate back into the western world to become members of the european union and nato and this is why for estonia as a small nation obviously it is so important to keep first
and foremost, NATO as our main pillar of our defense. Estonia is giving clear understanding what we should do as our allies, investing into our own defense. Currently, Estonia... is investing roughly 3% of GDP into our defence expenditures politically strongly. You know, we are united behind this decision and for at least for next 10 years.
Our expenditures in defense are going to be a minimum of 3% of GDP. We have to build strong deterrence on the eastern flank of NATO because only... and real existential threat to our alliance is russia so how is estonia preparing the defenses here what sectors is estonia prioritizing with this investment when it comes to building a credible defensive force within their military
We built our defense forces from zero or scratch from early 90s. We didn't have any weaponry left behind from Soviet occupational forces. Then they left finally Estonia in 1994. So we have procured, we have bought the equipment ourselves, we have built very solid conscript reserve army. We can call in short notice up to 35,000 men and women to be ready and to be operational in a very short time. We are one of the fewest countries in Europe.
today who have conscript service and this has served very well for us so in terms of Our investments today, we are investing heavily into the stocks of ammunition and modern weaponry from HIMARS to the Coast Guard rocket systems and so and so forth. So it's the latest. procurement what we did together with our southern partners and neighbors Latvian to buy modern mid-range air defense systems but saying that obviously
Estonia as a small nation and other Baltic nations as well. We need very strong help and presence of allied forces in Estonia.
So I'd love to put to you one of the main questions often put forward by Baltic defence planners, and it's around one of Estonia's largest cities, Narva, which straddles the border between Estonia and Russia. With Narva having such a large ethnic Russian population, how does it factor into Estonian defence planning in the event of escalating tensions or even conflict with Russia?
Would Estonia look to draw the front line along the Narva River, placing its troops into a city that is just under 90% ethnically Russian, and therefore possibly risking sabotage or having their positions given away? Or would they deploy behind Narva in areas of Estonia that are majority Estonian?
and risk it becoming a de facto city, much like Donetsk or Luhansk in the very early stages of 2014. If tensions between Estonia and Russia do grow, where does Estonia, and therefore NATO, intend on drawing the front line? Yeah, this is a very good question. Narva is as much NATO city as London, Washington, Paris. No difference. Yes, Nagorno is located right on the border with Russia, but this is, as President Biden and others have said and repeated, every inch of NATO's territory.
is defendable and must be defended but to not to reach that point where attack is imminent and we face reality of the war then we put a lot of efforts both political and military efforts today into deterrence. Our strategy and NATO's strategy is to create solid deterrence by denial. That means that we have a presence of Allied forces, a part of, or additional to our own defence forces, and also a very solid and clear strategy. of nuclear deterrence covered mainly by the United States.
and other efforts, what NATO's alliance is doing. And also the defense line on Narva River is going also through our own internal policies and what sort of decision we make here in Estonia. And if you visit Narva just across the border, across the river in Russia, there's enormous differences in the quality of life and the way how we handle also the problems of life.
local people living in Narva. And this is crucial, obviously, that Russia couldn't sort of play this interference game as they have played perhaps somewhere else. But we have to be... vigilant and we have to obviously be ready for surprises and this is why Estonia is also among our nations, NATO allies paying a lot of attention to early warning systems.
that our intelligence service is working perfectly well. So you were talking a bit earlier on about deterrences. And for a lot of people, when they hear the word deterrences, they often think of nuclear weapons. And with your highlighting of the importance of deterrences, I'll ask the question, is Estonia planning at any point?
to forward deploy nuclear weapons onto its territory, to increase its deterrence, but also raise tensions along that border. Is that something that Tallinn or NATO is looking at at the moment, or frankly, a forward deployment of nuclear weapons here may not be any use, as it just raises tensions?
And the NATO nuclear arsenal based in Belgium, Turkey, Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands is more than capable of doing the job from there. Are there discussions about raising your deterrence by forward deploying some of NATO's nuclear weapons upon Estonian soil? Yeah, taking into account the modern technologies and capabilities, this is totally unnecessary. Russians have deployed tactical nuclear weapons into the very close vicinity of our borders.
They have tactical nukes in the Kalining region, which is sandwiched between Lithuania and Poland. But as you know, NATO allies, particularly the United States, have tactical nuclear weapons also present in Europe. and the means how you can, at the end of the day, use them. You don't need to have them on the borders. And first and foremost, obviously, in our interest is that nuclear weapons will never be used again.
in warfare. This is why the existence of those weapons should stay as it has been during Cold War time, as well as a most important deterrence measure. But both sides will understand that if nuclear weapons are going to be used, then this is going to lead to mutual assured destruction. And this must be the clear understanding today as well, what is important for Estonia.
is that we have a solid presence of Allied troops here in Estonia. We have three nations or troops from three nuclear states, actually, who are present in Estonia. the UK, the leading force in the local NATO battalion and also French troops and also the Americans are in Estonia as well. so obviously we'd like to see even bigger presence but if you go back into the near history then in 2014 then russia actually started the war against ukraine occupying and annexing crimea we didn't
have at that time a single Allied soldier on Estonian soil. So it's through the last nine years we have seen a huge change in terms of both defence planning of NATO. and also allied presence in Estonia and in our region, what is extremely important to keep Russia at bay. Relations between Thailand and Moscow have been tense for a long time now. But prior to 2022,
Estonia still received lots of electricity, gas, and goods coming in from Russia through trade. After all, Russia's shopping capital, St. Petersburg, is only a four and a half hour drive from the Estonian capital, Tallinn.
But now that previous trading relationship between Russia and Estonia has been almost completely severed with Russia being under sanctions. But in the future event that the war in Ukraine does come to some kind of an end, Do you anticipate a return to the pre-2022 relationship that Estonian Russia once had, that culturally was a bit frosty, but trade could still be done?
Or is this new decoupling from Russia and shiftable complete reliance on the Nordic and EU states, the new unbendable path forward for Estonia? We build heavily our independence in terms of energy consumption and resources as well. And this is what has happened in basically every European nation as well. Most dramatic change has happened in Germany.
which just prior to 2022 was heavily dependent from natural gas export or import from Russia. First, I don't see that in the near future there is any possibility that Ukrainians will give up. That means that unfortunately this war most likely will last a little bit longer than we expect today. The second point is that I don't see any opportunity that we go back to the relations with Russia.
what we had before February last year. We have to make sure that first and foremost Russia will be strategically defeated in this war of aggression in the middle of Europe. because the aim of Russia is not only to destroy Ukrainian statehood, but also to destroy Western security alliance in the Euro-Atlantic area, namely NATO.
so who do you see then is estonia's main trading partners going forward then naturally every country trades first and foremost with its neighbors but you must take into account to the estonia as a member of european union we have a common market Free and common market, like we're both into northern direction, to western direction, to southern direction. Our main trading partners are in Scandinavia, like Finland, Sweden and others.
And actually, regionally, we have very close cooperation in different spheres. And we are very like-minded nations. We have a Nordic and Baltic nations, a special format. We have NBA in eight countries.
All together, five Nordic countries, three Baltic nations, so we work very closely. And I must say that after Finland and Sweden becoming members of NATO... we have even more good opportunities to enhance not only in the sphere of security issues, but also in terms of economic affairs, trade, innovation and so on. Estonia is also known about as a unicorn harbor as well in the world. We have the highest number of unicorns per capita and that tells you that the young generation
is very hungry to invent, to be innovative, to be internationally sort of recognized in many ways and also internationally connected. This is the future, this is present and this is also the future of Estonia. It really is amazing what just a few years can do. Just two years ago, the defensive landscape of Europe looked very, very different.
and many Eastern European analysts looked at the defense of the Baltics through a completely different lens. Whether it was the DOD study, or the RAND study, or any of the countless others, the wide assumption being made was that in the event of a Russian invasion of the Baltics, that the Russian armoured columns would reach Riga and Tallinn within just 60 hours, and that the Baltics falling to the Russians was a foredrawn conclusion.
Analysts pointed out that if NATO even wanted to defend the Baltics, they would either have to rush troops into the area, that it would likely take too long and require too risky a route. NATO troops were assumed that they'd either have to travel up the Svoelki Gap,
between Kaliningrad and Belarus, knowing that Russian troops stationed within Kaliningrad and Belarus would likely travel just the 60 kilometers needed to close the Svalky Gap and cut off any troops that had just entered or were still deployed within the Baltic states.
leaving the only other option of supply across the Baltic Sea, a route that would require Baltic Sea ships running a dangerous gamut past Kaliningrad and its nest of anti-ship and anti-air missiles. Minimal risk-averse analysts simply assume that if the Baltics were invaded,
We would let them fall to the Russians and come back and liberate them later, hoping the NATO alliance would stick together long enough for us to liberate them. But that was two years ago, and Russia is now significantly weaker. NATO is far more unified. and we have Finland and likely soon to be Sweden entering NATO, converting the Baltic Sea from a narrow Kaliningrad death run to becoming in all reality a NATO lake.
But how will these new changes in Russian strength and NATO's borders impact the defensibility of the Baltic states? With these new changes, are we still likely to contemplate abandoning the Baltics until later? Or will the entry of Sweden and Finland completely rewrite our playbook on Baltic defense? What's the new defence measure? Will Sweden get its entry into NATO? And what will Estonia's role be within the new northern flank of NATO? Well, to answer all that, we're doing our final guest.
the tripwire. Stephen Pfeiffer. is an affiliate of the Center for International Security and Cooperation, as well as a non-resident senior fellow with the Brookings Institute, specializing in nuclear arms control, Ukraine, Russia, and European security.
Previous to this role, he was also formerly the US ambassador to Ukraine, as well as special assistant to the president and senior director for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia on the National Security Council. In addition to Ukraine, he also served in the US embassies in Warsaw, Moscow, and London. as well as the US delegation to negotiation of intermediate range nuclear forces in Geneva. More importantly though, he's a great friend of the show and we're thrilled to have him back on today.
The Baltic States applications were accepted by NATO back in 2002. They started the process and they formally came in in 2004. And that was a different time. You did not have today's Russia. Russia that today clearly is aggressive and is prepared to use military force against at least one of its neighbors. So some of the questions that might have been asked by the Baltic states in today's situation weren't asked by then.
But once the Baltic states were in and the drive there, I believe, still in the sense of the enlargements by NATO in the 1990s and the 2000s, the first drive was there was to underpin the democratic market transitions that countries moving from the wreckage of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union were undergoing. It was not at the time, I think, seen as a necessary
defense commitment in the sense that Russia in 2002 was not seen as the threat it is today. Of course, Vladimir Putin really over the last 10 years has very much changed the threat that Russia poses to Europe and has changed that perception within NATO. I think a good foundation to build this upon is to ask how you would categorize the relationship between the Baltics and Russia both pre-2022 as well as post-2022.
How has Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine impacted the relationship between these guys? The Baltic states clearly were among those parts of the Soviet Union. that were pushing for independence and pushing for the breakup of the Soviet Union. And in fact, they gained their independence from Moscow back in September of 1991. That's when Moscow formally acknowledged it, of course.
The United States and other countries in the West had never officially recognized the Baltic states' incorporation into the Soviet Union. So you have a very troubled history between the Baltic States and the Soviet Union. It goes back 1939 and 1940 when the Soviet Union occupied the Baltic States, deported tens of thousands of people. And then when the Soviet army pushed the Germans.
out of the Baltic states in 1944, another round of deportations. So there's a history there that has led these countries to be very interested in regaining their independence. And what I think you've seen over the... The last 30 years, really beginning fairly early on in the 90s, was a determination in all three Baltic states to join institutions such as the European Union and NATO that would really lock them into Europe.
And they saw that as part of the separation process from Russia. So prior to 2022, the defensive landscape of the region looked very, very different, with many analysts assuming that if the Russians were to enter the Baltic states in force, they would reach Riga and Tiling within 60 hours, and there would be very little NATO could do to stop it without taking on excessive risks toward their forces.
The depressing conventional wisdom was that the Baltic states would be acting more as a tripwire for NATO forces rather than an impenetrable steel wall like they often portray themselves. But now that we're seeing Finland's entry and very likely soon Sweden's entry to NATO, How are those defense calculations around the defensibility of the Baltics changing for people like yourself?
The Baltic states until probably 2006 or 2007, NATO did not have a contingency plan for defending the Baltic states. And up until 2014, there were no NATO... military presence on the ground in the baltic states that with one exception that from i think 2002 on native countries had alternated in deploying squadrons of maybe four to eight aircraft to the baltic states to provide
a Baltic air policing force because none of the Baltic states had their own air force. But the only ground troops that you had in the Baltic states prior to 2014 were those that came in for exercises, but then they left. That changed in 2014 after the Russian invasion and the Russian seizure of Crimea, and then Russian involvement in the conflict in Donbas in eastern Ukraine.
And you then had NATO deploying battle groups of maybe 1,000 to 1,500 troops in each of the Baltic states in Poland. These were multinational groups headed by individual allies. And they were largely seen as a tripwire force that were there to send a political signal to Russia that any military action against Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania would be met by NATO as an alliance.
Now, I think in the aftermath of what we've seen the Russians do in the last 16 months in Ukraine, one, there are questions probably in some reassessment of just how much of a threat the Russian military poses, while it was probably a mistake.
Two years ago to think that the Russian military was 10 feet tall, I would think it would be an equal mistake to think that the Russian military is two feet tall. So I do expect that you're going to see NATO looking at an enhanced military presence in the Baltic states, something more that they've had. in the past. And then, of course, working on more rapid reinforcement capabilities because you don't want to create a situation where the Russians think that it would be a walkover.
And of course, the entry by Finland and I expect soon by Sweden to NATO probably makes that reinforcement and that defense issue for the Baltic states a much easier challenge for NATO to meet. And when do you expect Sweden to be able to join NATO officially? Obviously Finland already had the nod, but Turkey is stating at the moment that they'll block the vote.
Many assume that Erdogan, the main holdout preventing Sweden from official entry, was withholding his vote to simply punish Sweden as political red meat for his voting base living outside of Turkey, mostly in places like Germany, as it makes Erdogan look powerful.
whilst at the same time appealing to some of the more religious voters. With it often being the case that this very large voting base living outside of Turkey often vote on more nationalist issues rather than economic ones, as economic decisions made by the government affect them far less not living in Turkey. But now that the election's over and Odoğan's won his re-election, do you assume that he will now be coming back to the table looking for a deal?
There's a big push to have it happen by Vilnius and I very much hope it will. But if it doesn't happen by Vilnius, I don't think it will be too much longer down the road. It seems to me that particularly with his election campaign behind him, Turkish President Erdogan, who is at this point the big obstacle to Sweden, he's looking for a deal. And I think a deal can be had. There probably has to be a little bit more work bilaterally between Stockholm and Ankara.
But also you can see the press beginning to mount from other NATO allies. I thought it was interesting that the day after his phone call after the election with Erdogan, President Biden said, look, we're looking forward very much to seeing Turkish support for Sweden in NATO. And he also said, and we're looking forward to being able to meet the Turkish requests.
for advanced F-16 fighters. I believe there's a link that's between that. And so there's some subtle pressure, I think, being applied on the Turks. And my guess is there's a deal to be had. They're just working on the exact terms now. Hopefully that'll be done by Vilnius. The main issue with the defense of the Baltics was continuing supply, as yes, we could probably fly troops in, but keeping them fed and armed would be the main problem.
What most of the studies showed us is that the Sovolky Gap coming up from Poland into Lithuania would likely be cut off by the Russians and the Belarusians, and that any naval or air resupply traveling over or parallel to Kaliningrad would be a dangerous route to undertake.
But with Sweden and Finland's entry into NATO, the Baltics can now be supplied from Stockholm to Tallinn, which is just a 200-mile or 360-kilometer ride, and even shorter distances between Helsinki, the capital of Finland, and the ports in Tallinn. with boat rides between Helsinki and Thailand being less than three hours by ferry. With Sweden and Finland's entry to the organization, NATO now has multiple large ports on both sides of the Baltic Sea.
But for people listening, how does that change the defense dynamic and calculations around the region? With Finland and then Sweden now in NATO, I mean, the Baltic Sea in effect becomes a NATO lake. And so I think it makes that reinforcement effort to the Baltic states a much easier problem. It also makes it much more likely that the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet is going to be bottled up.
I think there's already discussions that were going on for some time between Finland and Estonia about procuring land-based anti-ship missiles. If they did that, that would give them the capability really to... shut down the Gulf of Finland and bottle up most of the Russian fleet that's home ported near St. Petersburg. And then you only have to worry about those ships that are present in Kaliningrad.
Looking at a map, the entry of Finland and Sweden into the alliance make challenges of defending the Baltics much easier for NATO to solve. So, we know Estonia and Latvia are getting more troops and equipment, and the Finnish ports are getting their own anti-ship missiles. The Swedish as well are building up naval facilities in Gotland and around the east coast of Sweden, and in general, the region is becoming a lot more defensible.
But what about if we go just north of here? You see, with Finland's entry to NATO, we now have a new 1,300-kilometer border of wilderness frontline running along the eastern border of Finland. with this border for the most part having nothing but lots and lots of trees on the Finnish side, and Russia's only railroad connecting Moscow to the crucial Russian Arctic bases in Mermansk and Severomorsk.
with that crucial artery railroad being at times just one track wide and only 40 kilometers from the finished border. A less than ideal situation for any Russian defense planners whose resources and troops are already stretched pretty thin. So what do you think will happen with this border?
For the sake of saving everyone the effort, will both sides leave this frontier largely unguarded, just doing the odd patrol, or are we likely to see a proper militarisation of the 1300km long border running down the spine of the Kola Peninsula? What does the finished border look like in a few years time?
It was rather fascinating to me to see last year Vladimir Putin's reaction to Finland and Sweden's announcement that they were going to seek NATO membership, where he basically suggested it was no big deal.
even though the entry of Finland into NATO more than doubles the line where you have a NATO-Russia border. And the interesting thing is that for whatever frustrations that the Russians may have about Finnish entry, in fact, The Russian military presence along the Finland border today is much less than it was 16 months ago because a lot of those ground forces have been moved south to be involved in the Russian war against Ukraine.
I'm not sure the Finns have to do too much more. I mean, the Finns have a relatively small standing force of I think about 23,000, 24,000 troops. But they have this incredible capability to mobilize. And I think fairly quickly, they believe they could have 200. 50,000 troops in the field, and ultimately 900,000. And they have some pretty impressive military capabilities. They have probably the third largest stockpile of artillery of any country in Europe.
They have modern main battle tanks. And they have, right now, the Air Force flies F-18s. But they've signed a contract to buy F-35s, which would make those fighters capable with the F-35s that are being purchased by Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium. So I think Finland can integrate fairly quickly into NATO, but it may not have to make too many adjustments to its current military status. What I think you'll see is basically the kind of planning on the focusing on.
How would reinforcements be moved into Finland? What kind of infrastructure would be necessary to reinforce the country with other NATO forces in a crisis? For all of the talk in Moscow about NATO as a hostile alliance and NATO as a threat, there's never been a serious thought in NATO about invading Russia.
So in one sense, I don't think the Russians have to worry about reinforcing their border. But it does seem to me that the reality in the near term is going to be that as long as Russian forces are tied down fighting or near Ukraine. They're going to have a reduced military presence around Finland as much as they might like to restore that military presence or even reinforce it. It's just the fact that they have only so many people that they can get into their military at the moment.
So, with the Russian Baltic fleet based just outside St. Petersburg, knowing that they would now have to run the gamut between Helsinki and Tallinn to get out of the Gulf of Finland, a gap that is as short as 80km across, and quickly filling up with Western-made anti-ship missiles.
And knowing this, the Russian Admiralty must be looking at the Baltic fleet as more of a liability than it once was, as the entry of Finland into NATO really does box them into position. In response to this, do you think we'll see the Russians redeploying more of their Baltic fleet down toward Kaliningrad?
or even redistributing parts of the Baltic fleet to more easily defendable fleets like the Northern Fleet based out of Severomorsk or the Pacific Fleet based out of Vladivostok. How do you think the Russian Admiralty is going to react to this vastly worse and defensive position? Kaliningrad has fairly limited port facilities, and Kaliningrad is also fairly vulnerable, given its location where it's sandwiched in between.
two NATO members, Lithuania and Poland, and just across the sea from Sweden, which I believe will be a NATO member in the near future. Quite frankly, if I was in Russian command, I would really think about the utility of the Baltic fleet and maybe some of those ships might serve a Russian interest if redeployed to other fleets not in the Baltic because it doesn't seem to me that the
Russian Baltic fleet in a conflict, and hopefully we never get to that point. But I don't think that the Russian Baltic fleet would be a military factor for very long into that conflict. So let's move back down to Estonia now, and there's an interesting hypothetical around Estonia that I've imposed a few times, so I'd love to get your opinion on it. As you know, the city of Narva, along the Russo-Estonian border, is a majority ethnic Russian city, and by a pretty wide margin.
And with the growing tensions between the Estonian and Russian populations there, there is a worry there about fighting kicking off between the groups in the city. For a hypothetical here, let's say fighting and rioting breaks out in Narva, with Estonians and some police beating up local Russian populations.
and in response, the Russian police or very light military units stationed across the border in Ivangorod, who had been receiving calls for help from Russian citizens in Narva, now come across the bridge from Russian Ivangorod into Estonia Narva to attempt to quell the riots and prevent further violence.
Now this scenario is interesting because it is a moral grey area and nowhere near cut and dry on what the right option should be. But I'm curious, what do you think NATO's response would be? Would these troops crossing the river be seen as an act of invasion or just reasonable people looking to help?
Does NATO assume that these troops would go back over the border once the riot had calmed down, or do they worry that once in the city, they may refuse to leave, forcing NATO to either go on an offensive to kick them out, or openly admit that where the line is is somewhat blurry. It's an interesting hypothetical, and I'm very curious to know how you think Estonia and NATO would react to these Russian forces coming across the bridge in the name of riot control.
My guess is if the Russians were to sort of get involved in any kind of ethnic tensions and use Russian military force in Narva, there would be a strong reaction from the Estonians and NATO would be supportive. Narva is... Part of Estonia, it's part of NATO territory. You haven't seen anything that would suggest that the ethnic Russian population of Narva on its own want to seek independence. The question would then be, if there was that, how much were the Russians involved?
And so that would be seen as an external threat. And I think there would be a strong Estonian and a strong NATO response. Speaking of hybrid threats, Estonia in the past has come under frequent cyber attack from the Russians, with the Russians even testing a lot of their cyber capabilities in efforts to bring down the Estonian power grid on multiple occasions. Things that were tested here were often implemented in Ukraine later on.
but Estonia seems to punch way above their weight in cyber defense. So can you take us through why that is and if this is a trend that's likely to continue? I think one of the interesting things about Estonia is it's a very digital economy. it's interesting last year i was with a group we had a chance to talk to a former very senior estonian official and basically we kind of asked how did estonia reach this point and he said well
Estonia was looking in the early 2000s about where it should sort of focus its economy. He said in most areas of the world economy, Estonia would be playing catch up. Except he said in 2005, 2006, everybody was looking at the digital world. And so Estonia could actually be a leader there. So that actually positions Estonia fairly strongly to deal with the Russian cyber threat. Of course, NATO has located its cybersecurity excellence center in Estonia.
And so my guess is that Estonia is going to be subject to Russian cyber probes, but they're probably as prepared as most NATO allies to defend against those. And we can see this parrying of Russian attempts in the Estonian economy as well. with the Estonians rapidly decoupling much of their economic basis away from the Russians. But do you think this is a trend that's likely to continue even after the war on Ukraine?
You've seen a trend really since 1991 on the part of all three Baltic states, basically, and it was accelerated after their entry into the European Union. to basically reorient their trade westward. And that's only increased in the last 15 months. So since the new Russian invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022, Lithuania and Estonia both cut off natural gas imports from Russia.
Latvia was reducing its gas consumption in August of last year when Gazprom cut off its gas exports to Russia. So you now have those three states. They've severed their imports of pipeline natural gas, and they're basically moving to reduce other areas, for example. electricity imports from Russia so that the Russians do not have
major economic tools that they can exercise over the economies of the states. Even now, either Estonia or Latvia, I think they're laying an undersea or they have laid an undersea electricity gauge cable. to Sweden so they can patch it in part to the Swedish grid. I think there's a connector between Estonia and Finland.
So they're moving basically to make sure that they have energy supplies independent of Russia. And again, in the current environment, and given how we've seen the Russians cut gas off to much of Europe in 2022, that's probably a very smart move on their part.
On a per capita basis, Estonia is by far the biggest donor of funds to the war effort in Ukraine, with the state even taking out large loans so they can continue to fund equipment heading to the Ukrainian war effort. So I think it's pretty safe to say that they're pro-Ukraine. But how was the war viewed in the other two Baltic states, being Latvia and Lithuania? Are they just as enthusiastic as Estonia is about the war?
If you look at Latvia and Lithuania, they may not be doing quite as much for Ukraine, but they are doing a lot. All three countries see it important that Ukraine prevail and is successful in driving the Russians out or at least getting to a point. where there's a settlement on terms that Kyiv can accept.
And I go back to one former Baltic leader made a comment a year ago where he said, yes, in our country, we early on sent all of our Javelin anti-tank missiles to Ukraine. He said, we figure every Russian tank the Ukrainians kill is one less. tank we might have to worry about. So Estonia has certainly been the leader, but I think Latvia and Lithuania have also done a lot and been very supportive of Ukraine within NATO and in terms of what they can do bilaterally.
But for Lithuania, they only have a very, very small Russian diaspora. And the Russian diaspora in Latvia only makes up about 24% of the country. For Estonia, who out of the three has the largest Russian diaspora, the government has put forward some measures which have been criticized by groups like Amnesty International. One of the most controversial being the Estonian Grey Passport. Now, these passports are often given to Russians.
who have arrived in Estonia after 1940. The grey passport allows them to live in Estonia and even travel the EU, but does make working in the EU much harder. Grey passport holders also can't stand for election in the Rikigoglu. and they cannot vote in national elections. There are also some jobs in Estonia that will not hire you if you possess a grey passport. And because of this, holders of grey passports often have an unemployment rate as high as double that of the national average.
with the decision of whether you get a red Estonian passport or a grey Estonian passport, often coming down to the holder's ability to speak Estonian. a notoriously hard language with 14 separate cases. Now, digging both sides, I do understand that for Estonians, they want to prevent Russians having undue influence within their national elections.
as the Russian diaspora is quite a large voting bloc, and that governments often need both carrots and sticks in order to convince people to learn a new language, particularly a hard one like Estonian. But I also do worry that this may backfire on the Estonians.
Gray passport holders, Russians living in Estonia, often complain about feeling ostracized by the Estonian government, and there are worries that this underclass system may grow the resentment in the Russian community toward the Estonian state.
And on a larger geopolitical level, there are worries that policies like this allow Putin to go to Russian diasporas in states like Latvia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan and say, look how mean those Estonians are. We would never do that. We accept you for who you are. as the Russians often have finalist requirements for attaining a Russian passport. I know it's a complicated issue, but are you worried that Estonia may be ceding the moral high ground on this one?
Well, again, this was really, I think, only an issue in two of the three Baltic states. In Lithuania, the ethnic Russian population, I believe, was like less than 10 percent, maybe only 7 percent. So Lithuania basically from the outset said, if you're in Lithuania, you're a Lithuanian citizen.
In Estonia and Latvia, where there was concern, the ethnic populations were, I think, 24 to 27 percent ethnic Russian. And there was a sense that a large part of that population had actually moved into Estonia and Latvia. after the russians had reoccupied the baltic states following uh at the end of world war ii and so there were certain requirements i think basic language requirements that made some people uneasy but i think in the end when the year
looked at this, they found that the standards that Estonia and Latvia had set were not unduly severe. But remember, we're now 30 years into that. And my guess is that while you may have in both Estonia and Latvia, you probably have An older ethnic Russian population, which probably still wants to speak Russian, hasn't learned Estonian and Latvian. For those under 30 who've really gone through Estonian and Latvian school systems.
they probably are fairly comfortable in Estonia and Latvia. So I think this is an issue which has been ameliorated with time. And so my last question for you is a question I assume a number of TV pundits would bring up pretty quickly. if tensions were to begin to spiral on the Russo-Estonian border. That question being, why should the US care about Estonia, or even defending the Baltic states? What do the US and Europe gain from our current deployments into the Baltic states?
It stems from the point that they're members of NATO. And again, NATO is based on the commitment of allies to consider an attack against one, an attack against all. If NATO, above and beyond the risks to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, but if NATO did not... move to defend one of those countries, I think it would promote very real questions within NATO.
What countries would NATO move to defend? And again, the Baltic states came in at a time, I think, which was fortunate for them because this real possibility of conflict with Russia back in 2004 was not foreseen. And that's, I think, a critical. factor. And the kind of debate that I think would take place in NATO capitals about bringing Ukraine right in now, which is, are you prepared to go to war against Russia to defend Ukraine? That's a hard question.
I'm not sure back in 2004, that question was asked in regards to the seven countries that joined NATO back then, and it probably made their entry easier. But now once they're in NATO, they're members of NATO, they should be defended as NATO members all should be defended. Estonia really is the wonder child of the former Soviet republics.
with the country going much further than almost anyone ever thought they would, transforming from a Soviet backwater to one that has the technological prowess to go toe-to-toe against Russia in cyber warfare. It's become the home of unicorns in Europe.
and an arsenal to democracy of Ukraine. Those clever Estonians in those first crucial moments of independence knew very well that every decision counted. They could have easily backslid into their old ways or just reformed parts of the government to make themselves rich, but they didn't.
and instead became the test case for the power of institutional reforms to the benefit of almost all of your citizens. But Estonia moving from an underperforming Soviet economy to a middle European one may not be the full story.
This growth could be seen by some economists as simply catching up to where they probably should have been all along, or that Estonia does get to be at the forefront of all these tech startups because of its place within the EU and its solid tech infrastructure. But personally, I would give Estonia a little more credit than that.
Even this sure stance Estonia is taking against Russia is a bold and impressive one, and to stamp out any ideas that borders can be changed by military force is one that, admittedly, Estonia does have a very heavy vested interest in.
If Ukraine fell today, who knows who comes up next. But admittedly, this moral stance has come with a high price tag with the Estonian people, with the country undergoing tough economic reforms and large borrowing to keep arms manufacturing up, to keep arms manufacturing up,
Russian investment down and continue the war effort, all of which has exacerbated the cost of living crisis already present within the country. And with all of this being in the name of hurting Russia, some worry that this is just further prodding the cultural sore spot between the ethnic Russians.
and the Estonians. Estonia underwent a series of crucial tests 30 years ago and came away as the A-student, and of the 15 Soviet republics, they came away as the A-student. Now, 30 years later, Estonia sits back down for a new round of tests, and every backer from the EU to NATO to the Nordics really hopes they pass it again.
Thank you so much for checking out the show this week. I not only think the Sonia has one of the top three flags in the world, but I also absolutely love the country's history and economics. It's a super interesting country, and I'm sure it won't be the last time we discuss it here on the show.
And if you want to keep up to date when we go even further into the Baltic States, as well as the rest of the world, you can find all of that out as soon as it drops by following us on social media, on Twitter, Reddit, Instagram, Facebook, Discord, and TikTok.
on the handle at TheRedLinePod. If you want to follow me on Twitter, I'm on the handle at MikeKaleedOz. Oz is in Australia. This show is completely funded by amazing Patreons, who donate a small amount of money each month to help us keep myself and the team going.
And speaking of our amazing Patreons, this week I want to thank Pai and Erik Rudolf, who are the latest Patreons to sign up as of time of recording. This show is only possible with the support of listeners like these guys, and we really cannot thank them enough. So this episode on Estonia is all thanks to you.
As usual, here are my three book recommendations. The first is Understanding the Baltic States by Charles Clark, for a great crash course on the developments on Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania since independence. The second is The Full Digital Nation by Vialanis Cappatieta Deribs for a look at the rapidly expanding Estonian tech startup scene. And the third is The Baltic Revolution by Leevin Anatole.
for details and stories recounting how Estonian singing brought down the Baltic SSRs. I want to thank this week's guests, Elizabeth Braw, Marco Michalson, and Steven Pfeiffer. Another absolutely fantastic lineup in this one.
I also want to thank my staff, starting with the primary researchers in this piece, Nate Oestiller and Sean Cotillem, who did an absolutely fantastic job on this one. And I'd also like to thank Wade McCarr, the producer, Perry Grace, Daniel Zavella, Genevieve Donnelly May, Nick McNally,
Isaac Gibbs, Ahmad Al-Ahmad, Andrew Garbery, and Robbie Sutton, the research assistants of writers here at the show. Jamie Tannow, our MIDI director. Raoul Devanarayanan, our ocean analyst. Francis Leach, our director of Breaking News. Mark Spencer, our second voiceover artist.
Jonah Gunn, our production assistant, Ross Crabtree, our media advisor, Joe Hawthorne, our audio cleaner, Marissa Rafter, our videographer, and Nick Mudge, our field correspondent. This team is the best of the best, and the reason we're nearing 100 episodes, and we can't wait to do another 100 with them. going forward. The Red Line will be back in another fortnight with another international episode. Until then, thank you for listening and goodnight.
The views and opinions expressed in this episode are solely those of Michael, our guests, and the Redline Podcast. They do not represent any government or organization and are solely our own. For more information,