The Work of Ernst Nolte Complete - w/ Thomas777

But you know it, I remain impressed by the fact that you guys managed to be able to bang out the content you do with the value you do, and it's always high quality. But yeah, I'm gonna drop the st rep on my sub stack. But yeah, since since I've been back from Arkansas, like I haven't, I haven't done ship, like I haven't answered people's texts or emails. This is supposed to be my big week to catch up on some long form stuff like like none that

I was getting done like, I'm sorry for that. I have not been feeling well but today and I and I and I agree a series, or at least i'd like to over three episodes, but at least two on the subject of Earns Noblety, not just his thought and kind of his particular school of revisionism, but what he represents. You know, he was a student of Heidiger, and he became very close to the Heidiger family, and that's important.

It's important not just put Heidiger in context. And I generally agree with people including Leo Strauss interestingly, who I don't have nice things to say about in terms of his ethics, but he did have insight into like the Western intellectual tradition. Heidiger was kind of the last continental philosopher, I think, and Nolty was very much the error to that tradition. You know, that began with people like meister Eckert and continued with iv Zy Hegel and Chopenhauer and Nietzsche.

And that that alone renders him a significant personage. But it's also people don't really understand what revisionism is. It's not just a matter of taking narratives that have been mythologized by ideologically committed peoples and institutions that have been able to utilize a bully pulpit, you know, to kind of force those perspectives on you know, on I kind of the historical canvas generally. But it's also why these controversies came about, oh to a certain crisis in in uh,

in the Western concept itself. No, I don't just mean ontologically, you know, in terms of you know, questions people pose themselves severally and collectively, you know, like who are we? Like what what what is our culture? You know, like what do we do we believe in God? I mean, those things are away important, but I mean the the collision with modernity and made no mistake, it was a collision of Western man and the catastrophes that ensued from

this that can't be overstated. Okay, and Nolty his brand of revisionism is very much grounded in there describing that process and identifying the twentieth century and you know, the kind of the intellectual paradigms that were emerging in the twentieth century and the kind of great ideologies that gave rise to the the Second World War and beyond. Those are those are derivative of this process. And the reason why people develop a sort of blindness about this is

twofold in my opinion. Part of it is, obviously there's a there's a there's a dominant narrative about the Second World War that the current regime is a very it has got it's got a very strong interest in sustaining, not just because it it derives its moral legitimacy from this narrative, but in in ontological terms, the way the world is structured morally, politically, in just an absolute conceptual terms,

you know, derives from this narrative. But beyond that, there's an inability, particularly in I think Anglophone intellectual traditions, to really understand condone philosophy, like even when the even when the variable is being described within that tradition, you know, touching concern Anglophone cultures as much as they do you know, Germanic or Francophone ones, there's a there's an inability to really sort of approach those things on on the correct terms.

Like even if even if I'm not even talking about accepting the postulists they're in, I'm saying that there's this there's there's an entirely different conceptual vocabulary for approaching these things. And it's not just because you know, oh the you know, the English and the Scots are are pragmatic. That's not That's not what it is. I mean that that's like a shorthand for you know, kind of university type to

teach history of philosophy, your history of science courses. That's we're talking about something both more opigue and more kind

of deliberate, deliberately maintained. You know. But really, when Nolding dots to out revisionism, he's talking about what exactly happened in the twentieth century, okay, And he's talking about what exactly national socialism and fascism represented contra capitalism and communism, you know, and this was not I mean, anybody who's educating on the subject, you know, knows that national socialism

had nothing to do with nationalism. Whatever that means that that got the thinking was dead anyway by you know,

by by the turn of the twentieth century. You know, it wasn't just it, It wasn't it wasn't a matter of you know, quote unquote scapegoating people, because that doesn't make any sense, you know, I mean, even if even if one accepts kind of court history claims that for no particular reason this Habsburg, Austria and the format, Hitler just decided he didn't like Jewish people for for some

social reason. You know, that wouldn't be people would people wouldn't respond to some some man's like petty like personal biases, like why would they? That's not that's not the way

things work. Okay, and uh, finally understanding how they kind of dehumanization, the process of dehumanization at scale whereby human lives, the horror of of human lives to the you know, at at the level of millions, because ceremonies extinguished, like cease to cease to be impactful, you know, like why that happened, and why that was inevitable and how there was a mirror of what preceded it in the case of the Third Reich, and as the war situation deteriorated,

the onset of the categorical extermination of people who were identified as standard bearers of the enemy idea. Okay, these are the concerns that are already has so when we talk about revisionism, we're not but we're not talking about arguing over like gas chambers whether they existed, and things like that because you already lost. You've already lost a proverbial plot if you're doing that, Like, yes, there's a lot of there's a lot of perjured testimony relating to

the instrumentalities of execution and things. Yes, there's a lot of hyperbole that stands in for you know, actual documented events, and that kind of thing should be rebutted. But that's not what we're talking about, okay, and you're not in the game of your own notion is basically, you know, I accept court history, but you know this is wrong because this many people couldn't have been killed. Like that's

now we're talking about. And if you're counting, if you're counting casualty lists, or you're or you're aggregating estimates of counter value attrition as as some sort of like atrocity contest, you know that, I mean that, that's that's incredibly perverse.

But it's also not you're you're missing the point, you know, So I know people will be like probably to them, they're like, well, how's an oldie revision is he doesn't do what earned his undilted or does and just claim none of this happened, So it's not a real revisionist. He was some kind of troll. It was some sort of pre internet troll. And don't get me wrong, like I there's a place for that, like Tom Metzker was was in some ways one of those two. But that's

not that's not real history. And I realized I'm digressing, But Fred Leuchter is a guy you should look into if you're concerned with instrumentalities and and kind of a direct, evidential rebuttal of some of the claims we're talking about.

I mean, Laker's got something with a tragic background owing to uh, the fact that kind of like Alex Jones today, Laker was very much singled out for destruction by the regime when when his when he when he when he when he developed a high profile which he did not cultivate at all. But some that's kind of upset the scope for we're talking about. Robert Fwerson is another one.

If then I guarantee in the comments section or whatever, people are gonna say that like I'm not I'm not giving a fair shake or whatever the to what they did.

The people that considered to be kind of like you know, the the authors and and writers who constant divisionist Cannon but getting into what are are subject for the day, A lot is made of of Heidegger's purported affinity for national socialism, and even people who are something like the Heidiger they seems understand that the claim is, well, Heideger was attracted to Nazism, you know, because he was a German patriot, and then when he realized that these were

horrible people, he retreated from that. And or they or they claim that, you know, he he coveted directorship of Freiburg University and this is a simply a career decision or something like. None of that even comes close to the truth of the of the situation. Heideger was concerned, first, last, and always with the crisis of Western civilization. Okay, and this and his opinion had been under way at least since the Third Years War, and probably why well before.

In terms of the kind of cultural mind. My your notion is that the function of culture, what culture is? The culture relates directly to the question of being. This translating exactly what he means by being is difficult. It's one part logos, it's one part qualia, it's one part consciousness, it's one part sentience. But the way to understand and the kind of short hot.

consciousness has distinguished even from the most intelligent animals. Okay, it's a neuroscience term. I believe that's its original kind of provenance. But you know, in fundamental senses, being is always kind of this question that that that's that, that's that's that's ever present. Okay, You're thrust into the world, you know, as a baby, and based the process of your mind developing is the process by which you know,

you come to understand being. You know, and even like even the most dullwitted human being, there's times at which you know he's he's metaphorically speaking, startled by the strangeness of his existence in the world. Okay, that's eye. The most primitive societies have some notion of God. Okay, even if it's just some idolatrous mock up of a bull or something, because you know, we we slaughter the bulls and from there, you know, we can eat and then

we can survive. So that is God. Okay. So being to Heidegger and to traditionally Aryan Man or Indo European, if you prefer, the kind of neologism was always an open ended question. You know, it always uh, it always it's it's the vantage point of it is uh always involves man kind of steering into a conceptual abyss. Okay, even that's not That doesn't mean it's intrinsically sinister, but

it's existentially disturbing because it's unknown. Okay. Now, in Heideger's view, man comes to live historically because this is how the question of being is answered, or at least this is the way that it's reconciled with human existence. Moment to

moment man experiences time. You know, time is time basically governs in both prozacon profound terms like everything man does in an individual capacity as well as UH in a in a an in a collective one okay, and moment to moment man is forced to make decisions, and what braggets all those decisions is time and thus death. Man's always confronting his own is just oblivion generally as well

as his own death. Okay. Now, what mitigates the terror of that, but what also allows man to kind of conceptualize what being is in both his day to day existence as well as in transcendental terms, is that looking at one's existence backwards from this very moment. Now, there's an infinite number of aggregate decisions that led to this point, okay, rendered by my forebears, rendered by people who I've literally inherited, you know, everything from the way I speak to my

folk ways. You know, it's like my biological aspects. There's this chain of existence literally stretching backwards to the very

moment I wish my insistors became human. That is essentially, again an aggregate of endless decisions rendered that constitute decisions within that temporal bracketing and the process by which you know, questions are posed second to second, moment to moment, hour to hour, year to year, decade to decade, epoch to epoch, and as we come to understand these things in aggregate and as an aggregate process, a dialectical phenomenon comes into

conceptual view, okay, and that's what it is really to be. Okay. It doesn't resolve obviously what it is, but it places it in a context that is at least rational within and it's bout it temporal terms, and that mitigates the terror of just you know, living in a in a world of the absolutely unknown, in which all beings and objects and phenomenon are are just mysterious and threatening and you know, totally unknowable according to the senses and in

the human mind. Now, that's a basically Aristotylian view. Okay. I don't want to go off on a how how exactly that is, because then we'll be here for weeks, But that that understanding of of a dialectical process and the temporal bracketing of that process is basically Aristotelian. Contra was essentially a Platonist view, and ultimately what became the Christian view, which is that being is this kind of presence,

this transcendental presence, okay. And you come to know that presence through a combination of you know, pious commitment to knowing it and through divide grace, both of which are totally outside of temporal consideration. Okay. Now, it's not for me to argue in order to in order to hideger suggest that there's not preestlye type men or or or literal prophets who can apprehend this and you know, come to know God in this way that I there's no

reason to believe that that is not possible. Okay, But in the terms and context, we're talking about the way in which cultures develop around the principles that I described. Specifically, the way the West developed it basically repudiated. It was basically itself frompudiating postulate, you know, like as as the scientific perspective and as the as scientism as what thing Smith called it, and as you know, the kind of conceptual biases of rationalism crowded out all other ways of knowing.

You know, It's like, okay, well we we we came to understand the world is just you know, being populated by various beings that we can empirically interpret and identify. And like within that paradigm, where where is God? You know, you can't identify God in those terms, not because there's not you know, indicators of God within the you know, the the physical world or anything like that. But you're it's a totally conceptually, it's it's a totally different vocabulary. Okay.

So when you remove man from historical time and then you remove him out of these practices that at one time allowed him, you know, to apprehend being as a divine presence, you're you're basically throwing him into chaos. Okay. That that creates conditions whereby every decision he's rendering precedes x niolo. Okay. This leads all kinds of pathologies. You know, it leads to people, you know, it leads to social pathologies, you know, in banal terms, you know, because social capital

breaks down. It leads to the deterioration of authority because why why would people conceptualize authority as deriving from anything other than convenience or you know, or power. Power. But most most importantly, what it does is it forces people to organize themselves according to what is noble and what can allow them to recapture temporal boundaries. And that's basically

that that which is technological. Okay. And this leads to uniquely insidious outcomes, okay, one of which was communism, which, aside from yes within marsis within Marxism, there's absolutely athno sectarian prejudices. They're in like you know, all throughout it, but in absolute terms like whether the rubber meets the road. As practice, what marcis Lennon isn't dictated was basically that,

you know, being is simply labor. You know, it's it's this process of work and of working, you know, by which man can shield himself from the elements and feed himself and you know, avoid avoid pain as much as you know, is can be reasonably as much as within the realm of reasonable expectation, you know, until like a actually he dies and that's it, you know, and there's an internal object to that that is pretty remarkably consistent.

I advise people read dust Capital because I made the point of people like Marxism, Marxism is nonsense, but it's actually very well thought out nonsense. Uh, they're a bundle of that as well. You know, it's completely self referencing. But I mean that that's the shortcoming of every of every modern ideology like capital eye, like theology, you know, in the proper sense because by by categorically by definition it's reference points are are beings, are are quantifiable objects

so there's really there. It's it's you're talking about the complete ebolition of metaphysics. Okay, the kind of the kind of mirror of commun was capitalism. Now there's there's a problematic term. I know people will say, well, capitalism is just occur a coin, a term coined you know, by Marxists themselves, and it appeared to stuff like Comy's manifesto. That's true, but there is it's shorthand for the technological perspective. Okay.

That perspective is basically that material progress is basically potentially infinite you know, the world. It's it's it's kind of a perversion of the anthropic principle. It's that, oh well, you know, man can perceive how to exploit all these objects in the world around him, and even his own body to maximum plenty, you know, the maximum pleasure, to basically infinite wealth. And that's that's basically the key to being Okay is this.

like that movie, you know, the movie District nine. Have you ever seen it? Yeah, definitely, Okay, Well, you know how like the alien technology, it's basically this fluid, but uh, it's like a smart nanotech fluid. So if like you add it to a human body, it's gonna try and like reak constitute according to what it knows about biolo

what has been problem to a biology. So it turns guind to an alien if you like apply it to like a fuel source or like it's sinuated into a fuel source, you know, it's going to try and like purge the impurities, you know, to make it like most like combustible or whatever. That's I've noticed in transhumanism when people say like, oh, but what about sustainability or what

about this? Without that, they basically always fall back and like, well this is just going to be resolved you know, bye bye, you know, by something by by something that can just sort of like replicate whatever is needed, you know. And uh, because that's the short that's the shortcoming of the of the of the technological perspective like rid large like at some point you like run out of stuff to be like like kind of like it kind of oversimplify it, you know, like there's not there's not more

things to exploit. I mean, I mean that's in like a value neutral term, like just if they materials not there, like what do you You're You're done? You know.

if your your your fuel source does burn out. But that's but but it's it's exponentially it's got an exponentially longer life than any other it's evil fuel source. That's why. That's where you're gonna see colliding more and more too. It is that these transhumanist types who think that they who think that that's like what they're u toldia is. But at the same time they're like terrified of of things like nuclear power. It's like you you can't have

it full ways. But no, that's the Yeah, that's why. Yeah, that's that's in every that's one of the reason why Dune is smart science fiction every different kind of thing.

But you know, like Dune deals in at planetary level like shortage economies, which eventually everything becomes a shortage economy, you know, over on a long enough timeline, matter how conservationist you are, you know, it's you know, like the the ar Conans, the hardcons have become incredibly wealthy, but the cost was basically like annihilating photosynthetic potential on their planet. So they're like a dying society. You know, I got to react as itself. You know, there's there's no water.

So I mean, like everything from the way people greet one another to you know, the way like the way military doctrine is organized, you know, is accounts for you know, the shortage of water. You know, like the entire U the galagic imperium runs on this narcotic that's also you know,

like a light enhancing like geriatric. But that also as you know, the basic this like practical necessity of allowing navigators to to perceive like what pathways could be navigated through space without you know, losing without like fifty percent

attrition or something for their for their highlighters. But but that's to bring it back, uh, like with Heidiggers, what Heidiger saw in the Third Reich, it wasn't so much that he's like what It wasn't almost like he thought Hitler himself was a heroic figure, although he may have. I mean, frankly, I made the point before Germans didn't particularly like the NSDAP. They love to eat off Hitler. It wasn't so much that he thought the National and

Socialist Program was this incredible revolutionary program. It's that this was the first time in the modern age and almost at the critical juncture owing to the revolutionary situation underway globally, that there was some kind of political cadre talking about what we just discussed. You know, Hitler was saying there is a crisis in Western civilization. You know, nobody else was saying that. You know, whether he was wrong or right,

or good or evil or neither. You know, it wasn't Huey Long Wasn't wasn't saying that, you know, there's a spiritual crisis in the West, and that's why, like our system is breaking down and we can no longer, we can no longer sustain you know, like a moral or social consensus. You know, nobody in the Soviet Union, I mean the parts they were all dead, was saying, you know, well, this is this is a confrontation basically with God and transcendence. You know, nobody on this planet was saying that. I

think the Japanese were. But that's the whole other subject. And that's a fascinating topic as to why, you know, why there was that affinity and Italian fascism had something of a different source, and uh, we'll get into that as we get into Nulty proper. That was related to the kind of intellectual nexus that the national socism was, but it was different. It was far more radical, it was it was far more of It was far more of of of a of a revolutionary response to conditions

immediately press easons. But so basically a Heidiger's understanding was it the form this is going to take and in ideological terms isn't really important. You know, the fact that this is conceptually front and center is what is important. And if this movement is allowed to be destroyed, there's

gonna be no more Europe, you know. And again not not because he saw that there was something intrinsically sacred about the National Solist movement or something like there in Heidiger's mind, like that kind of thing wasn't even possible through political activity. But this was the spark of that awakening, Okay, And that's that's that's what that's what's important. I mean, that's uh the uh so, no, after Nolty. Nolty was he was a student of Heidegger and he became very

close to the family. Uh. He downplayed this and a lot was a like there was something sinister or something like I Nulty absolutely was not, you know, like running from some sinister association. I mean, that's preposterous is that he he didn't want to mind cloud from a man

who was, you know, really like an intellectual giant. And I think anybody who's serious in their study of chedrophilosophy, whether they accept all the height of his postulates or not, acknowledges that, you know what really Uh, The book that first put Nulty on the map was The Fascist Missing

Sign on it hook Fascism in its epoch. It was transmitting to English as Three Faces of Fascism, okay, and this was probably the first serious treatment of fascism of national socialism from a critical perspective through the lens of

you know, continental philosophy and political theory. Something that became something that had become popular in the fifties was this idea of totalitarianism and that part of this was just typical kind of code war vernacular extrapolated to the Academy and passed off as as some sort of meaningful analysis in lieu of you know, just kind of cheap polemic,

which in my opinion it was cheap polemic. But this there's this idea, there's just kind of like pop sociological under like understanding in the Academy that oh, well, What really distinguishes, what really distinguishes modern states one another, is that places like the Third Roike and the Soviet Union were totalitarian, you know, presumably in America and in the UK. You know, we value personal liberty and things, and so we don't have to suffer the total state because our

people wouldn't tolerated. That's fucking stupid for all kinds of reasons. And it also obviously doesn't account for the fact that these these these states that supposedly share like a common like a common value system, these totalitarian states like waged these like utterly devastating like Ross and Creek conflicts against one another. But you know, novelty basically is objective. Was the kind of like robut that coition is as well as you as well as a tackle some of them

more serious critiques and treatments of the third Right. But that nevertheless kind of like missed the mark. Basically, what he laid down is that the action France, say, which who's kind of got leading intellectual was Charles and Morass. He said, look, you know France, which had uh, France was kind of the comperial canary in the coal mine as regards revolutionary processes, obviously, you know it was uh,

it was at the turn of the nineteenth century. You know that France was utterly devastated by a revolutionary historical impulse. So he said that Noldy suggested that a kind of a kind of deep seated reactionary tendency developed in France, okay, and then which endures. So the opposition in France is always going to be like radically conservative, okay, and people like the Maestra, you know, the counter Enlightenment philosophers. There was very much like a Francophone like stamp on this, okay.

So he says that emerging in the twentieth century kind of like the first truly like modern like like in twentieth century terms, like reactionary movement was like the action frant state, okay. He said, the response to that reaction where the Italian fascists okay, who were it was basically a radical probletarian movement, you know that it was a it was a form of both resistance too and reaction against modernity, but it also embraced like certain aspects of

hyper modernity, you know, which seemed which seemed incoherent. The people who don't really understand was underway, but there was a I think that one of the reason that ampathized George Sorel so much is because thinkers like him are kind of the tie that binds what seems like opposing tendencies.

But and most significant Noldies suggested national socialism was a synthesis of these two tendencies, you know, which themselves were a reaction against, you know, the tendency towards Bolshevism as the new kind of as the new uh iteration of of you know what had was first emergent with the Jacobin Revolution. You know, Thus, national socialism it's both it's both radical in reactionary, it's both revolutionary and conservative. You know.

His point was, uh, this is this was actually a very coherent, very cohesive, remarkably integral ideological program, and that's one of the reasons people responded to it like they did. Like this idea was just some I mean, politicians are constantly trying to conventional politicians, they're constantly promising all these old people, they're constantly preaching, especially in those days, some kind of reconciliation between the classes, and they're getting absolutely nowhere,

you know whatsoever. But you're supposed to believe the National Socialists they could just somehow like remedy these things like good propaganda, even though there was no coherence to it, I guess ridiculous, you know, like one of the reasons why they were able to capture the mand that they were was because they were uniquely astride the dialectical process

as it was either resolving or coming to pieces. Everyone perceives it, you know, as of you know, like nineteen twenty nine, nineteen thirty altoming the point that even people who are partisans and standard bearers of the spirit of the age in which they live, and even men are willing to literally kill or die for their ideological commitments, they may not even be fully aware of of what of what of what phenomenon they are serving, or what

or what they're participating in and what's underway. And in apocal terms, know, the's opinion was basically that, look, philosophy lives on in political terms. You know, whatever you can say about you know, philosophy is having been you know,

divorced from what's becomes scientific practice. Whatever you can say about you know, anything related to him to uh, the conventional sociology he politics, if anything, UH has become like more remote from UH, the common man's ability to two to apprehend it, you know, the meta political dimension of politics as he was observing it. You know, in the

the early Cold War. Nolty's opinion was one of the reasons these particularly dangerous times is not just because the state of technics and obviously you know, like the the development of the bomb and things like this, but you've got people who absolutely have no no ability to perceive what's under way, and and they're they're they're at the helm of of of of great power states and they've they've they're either conflating you know, rhetoric with reality or

they perceive the fact that they've been able to capture you know, they've been able to they've been able to rise the the front office or the or there the or the the titular head of a state organ that that at least can you know, manufacturing and sent to the degree that you know they're they're they're not gonna be removed by by force. You know, they take that as some sort of like providential indicator that you know, they're they're somehow fit to render decisions when they absolutely

are not. And this is important. The UH and this was in fact, uh, this was in fact an aspect to that I believe Heidegger I felt was present in in fascism that uh mind you, there was plenty of National gall Lighters who weren't particularly intelligent. Even those who were didn't view themselves as as some kind of like as some kind of like high priesthood and the political or something. But these guys did view themselves is almost

an exception as initiates in two historical processes. You know that they came to perceive either through their baptism by fire at the front as young men, or you know, by some sort of epiphany that a lot of people suggested that they had, you know, in the company of Hitler. I mean, whether you accept that or not, there was an understanding among among National socialists, among fascists. Stuff like

the Iron Guard hasn't been different. I looked back at the stuff as like adjacent, but not really the same phenomenon. It was far more kind of conventionally theological and related to to what we think of is a crusader impulse, like literally, but just the very fact that these men looked at themselves in the terms that I described it says that they were conceptualizing politics in a way that their enemies were not. Okay, like the cope of of

anti fascists. Well, that's because they were crazy, Okay, But that's not that's that's not that's a non answer, that's

a non perspective. The way these people, like the true national Socialist partisans, in these estimation they viewed the process that we talked about a moment ago at the outset of not just you know, the removal of man from history by the and by and the removal of man from historical time by the combination of the technological perspective and the deterretoryation of you know, the ability to approach

God and uh, either pious or or conceptual terms. Nulty believed that this would never like man would never recover, Okay, if the kind of practical transcendence what he called it, of the Soviet Union in the United States, of Sovietism and Americanism reached full realization. What do you mean by

practical transcendence? Okay, When man is able to master things that once were believed only to be the domain of God, that's when that's when God is truly dead in the in in in the collective like cultural mind Okay, like whether you're talking about, you know, the conquest of space, when you're talking about the humors of like a culture that claims like we can turn like a male into a female and vice versa, like or you're talking about people who claim like, you know, we can, we can

we can create humans like outside of a woman's womb, you know, just by the manipulation of the game meets and things. Yes, okay, that kind of thing is born

of a humorous which is not remotely godly. But we're talking about we're talking about cultural mindset, and you know, we're talking about the way these things are, The way these things are are are devised according to you know, man generally, man's ability to perceive generally, And again, where are we talking about conditions whereby man's ability to know

God has been reparably compromised. Okay, this is a basic vulnerability here, you know, the uh, the irony being of course that as this kind of practical transcendence is accomplished, you know, the absence of culture and the ripping out a man from these tem pro boundaries that facilitate culture, that makes it more brutish, like more ignorant, like more impoverished. You know, it breeds literal backwardness because people no longer understand you know, race and class anymore. You know, people

no longer pursue meaningful education. You know, at best, you know, like an educated man's a technician, you know, like it becomes it. Uh, the like like the fruit of this transcendence and this ability to create you know, god like technics and presumably generate wealth out of nothing is uh, ironically a kind of like a kind of total degradation of the human being you know, at scale, and the

absolutely like annihilation of culture. With a few generations of this presumably the result is what Hitler said about the destruction of man's ability to bear culture is as being the end result of an intention of a bolshevized planet, whereby people won't really be people anymore, Like regardless of the mentioned material in question, they'll have no memory of culture. They'll be they'll be unable to bear it even if

they did. You know, you'll you'll people basically who live on the level of the animals, just they all of an ability to you know, speak and you know, think abstractly in so far as you know, being able to kind of cond ofent the next day, whether they want to fill their belly with or satisfy whatever glandiar impulse by accomplishing. But you know they the only thing that

really makes makes man man is culture. There not there's not there's that's an anatomical thing or what have you, or or some special structure in his brain that that that makes this impossible, you know. And this is a this is what was a fundamental concern to Nouldy, and this is I believe why he began writing when he did, as as the Cold War being heating up. Yeah, I want to want to wrap this up in a minute.

I'm not feeling great. And also I I realized this is like a long introduction man, but I think it's important because, like I, assuming you're okay with this, this is your show. Next episode, I want to get into the historians debate or the historical striketh as it was called the historians controversy. There's not putting aalty on the map, kind of on the academic map. I mean people who people in who had an interest in in kind of philosophy and in serious scholarship of the third Reich New Obem.

But it was not late nineteen eighties kind of as as philosophical would poplicarly philosophical discussion of the Third Reich and the Soviet Union, you know, kind of as the Cold War was winding down, this kind of thing was

at its most intense interestingly. But next episode will get into like how that was emergent and how exactly Nolty became affiliated or identified not affiliated, you know, with like Holocaust revisionism, which, like I said, there's nothing all wrong with Holocaus's revisionism, but Nolty is adjacent but a different represents a different tendency, and we'll get into what I mean by that. I hope that this was not too scatter shout, I didn't bore people. Also, I'm not feeling great,

so forgiving man. If like my ideas, we're not terribly fluid, No no problem at all. Do some plugs and we'll end it. Yeah, man, you can always find me at the substick. It's real Thomas seven seven seven at substick dot com. We gotta chat there too. In addition to like my In addition to my podcasts and like videos and other cool stuff, you can always find me on Twitter, at least at the time being uh, they like monetize me Eastie. They're getting nukre but you never fucking know.

It's uh at Capital R E A L underscore number seven h O A S seven seven seven. You always find me on my website. It's real Thomas seven seven seven dot com, Real Aria, or it's just Tomas seven seven dot com. Sorry, as you can tell them with fevers, it's just number seven hm A S seven seven seven dot com. I'm on Telegram. I'll probably get more active as I have less time on social media to fuck around. You can find me on YouTube. It's Thomas TV. Do a search of Thomas seven and seven on YouTube and

you will find me. Yeah man, that's what I got, all.

the whole costs and historical historiographical terms. That conversation was started, at least between public intellectuals, and in the Buddhist Republic there was an active community of public intellectuals, not just because of the peculiar and rather tragic conditions that characterize that state, you know, sociologically and politically, but the Cold War meant that these people had to say in policy

discussions that they wouldn't otherwise. I mean that was in any in any combatant state to the Cold War, and when one considers the ongoing status of mobilization and everything else, I don't think it's hyperblele to refer to NATO and the warsaw packed ops has combat in the States and every country thus situated, you had a coterie of of intellectuals who were not just permitted to speak on policy matters,

but we're expected to do so. But in Germany this was particularly this was particularly visible at tendency, an act of a kind of at discourse. What kicked off the historical strike was, I mean, the immedia catalyst was Reagan's Bittberg speech. For people who are too young to know or don't remember, the D Day anniversary, the fortyth anniversary. In eighty four, Reagan was Reagan was in Europe anyway

for NATO related summit type at diplomatic activities. He spoke at Bittberg, and he went out of his way to say that the Waffen SS and Rmacht ward had buried there victims of the war just as much as the Allied word and they should be respected. It's basically parodying what Conrad ad Nower said and now are much as people on the right dislike him. I don't have many nice things to say about ad Hour, but he's a complicated figure. And ad Nower said he and now insisted

that Wehrmacht veterans gont get full pension rights. The BOB and SS was not so fortunate. But that's that's why they established their own, you know, networks to facilitated that kind of thing. But this sparked this kind of whole.

I mean, obviously the Reds, like the actual Reds were still like very powerful then that their their narrative was well, you see that this just proves that, you know that NATO was just a fascist that like a reconstituted fascistic block that is trying to trying to halt the advance of history, you know, by by by military arm from the threat of nuclear war, and of course they find common cause with these dead fascists. You know, these guys

are the sort of military social democrats. They basically parroted that, but for a lot more dishonest and dishonorable reasons, you know. They Reagan was kind of Donald Trump before there wasn't Trump, you know, I mean his he was a lot more of a significant figure in terms of power, political phenomenon things. Obviously this was the world situation, but you know, the narrative people, Reagan was a man that people love to hate, you know, for the kind of permanently aggrieved opposition you know,

in America and as well as in the EU. There's a broader context of bitt Berg though that relates the

helmet Cole. And like we talked about Cole a lot in these series that we do, Cole was about the only like truly kind of nationalistic minded uh consler post war were, you know, and that like his his final act in that role, like we talked about, was the unconditional recognition of the infinited state of Croatia, which, like Monkey runched a lot of the designs of Bush and Baker and what they hoped to accomplish in Europe after

the Cold War. You know, but it wasn't just it wasn't just placating coal like people have to understand that there was this bizarre situation after Deyton fell apart and and and Deyton was dead was was was dead? Is as Dillinger really even before Reagan took the oath of office. Okay, and a few things owed to that, which you are kind of outside the scope of our media discussion here, but such said it was the Cold War was back on in earnest. The Buddhist Republic had a military draft.

They weren't just expect did to participate in the defense of Europe from warsaw pacts. They were they were the main line of resistance. Okay, So we were drafting these guys, you know, directly out of high school. We were putting them on what was to be the front line of

World War three. In nuclear command and control terms, the NATO Charter demanded and what operations Protocol was was that American nuclear weapons based in the Boonies Republic warheads would always be in the possession of of American forces, but their launch vehicles would be under control of the bundess Republic, and in order to be married to those vehicles there had to be an agreement on a legitimate launch order.

So basically we were relying on these people who essentially commit suicide to stop the Soviet Union when the Warsaw Pack ancelaught came. Now, if you're gonna do that, While at the same time saying Germany is basically a constitutionally evil country like race of people, and German militarism is the source of all all woes in the world. There's there's a there's a cognitive dissonance there that can't be sustained in policy terms, and that's been going more and

more clear, you know. And for context, the main the mainline of resistance. If Warsaw Packed had in fact assaulted, obviously the Battle of Berlin would have been a mailstrom. The Buddhist fair had to defend. They're respected to defend Berlin.

They're respected to reinforce the Benelux and the British and the North German plane, and they're expected to defend the folded gap at all calls to the last man with nuclear weapons if necessary, and to reinforce and reconstitute forces there it basically until they could no longer do so. So they're talking about a million dead Germans within a

few days. Okay, And again you can't if that's if that's standing policy and you're public about that policy, because that's the only way that you can maintain credibility contra Op four. You've got to be willing to back it up politically, and if you're Ronald Rigg, and that means you can't go to Bittberg and say that these men buried here who died resisting communism, I might add, you know, are the scum of the earth, and they're evil and we must never let them rise again. I mean, this

should be obvious to anybody. But you know, one of the perverse ATHLETs of the Cold War, I think, was that there was a there was an aspect of the laft who are truly like Warsaw Pact sympathizers. I mean, obviously, I mean though that that that element was always far stronger and more organically constituted in Europe than it was in America. But there was some of that in America

even after the sixty eight kind of schism. But like a lot of these people were just the I mean they were just they were just disengaged morons, like they had no like It's like it didn't compute that right there. Wrong with America was in the Cold War. It couldn't just be stopped, you know. And I mean unless unless America is gonna call it off or seed you know, uh,

the inner German border to the communists. I mean this the uh, not just the the mainline resistance in the share punk of NATO's military capability, but also the political will to resist Warsaw Pact in political terms, you know, came down to Germany's continued willingness to contribute, you know. So this is kind of what opened the door to what became known as you know, the historic or strife.

And I mean the point in the first episode. The reason why A Deep Dive so much in an Eli's background, It's not just because I've got my own interests in political theory and philosophical things. It's because the reason why Nolty's blunked in with you know, all revision is so they're talking about people like Fred Leikter or Ernes Zundel

or David Irving. Like basically ever just limped into the revisionists camp if they reject this claim at the German people are the atavistic population that is prone to homicidal racial hatred scale, that the Third Reich was the spontaneous, unprovoked criminal conspiracy to carry out those aforementioned tendencies against escapegoaded population again for no particular reason other than hostility,

like ambiguous hostility. And also that the reason why the twentieth century was characterized by these deep crises that culminated in you know, to global conflagrations and then a half century of nuclear brinksmanship is because of some sort of sunder vague within Germany cultural trajectory that makes them prone to militarism. Like none of that makes any sense, okay, I mean it should be clear to anybody who's at

all sophisticated on political or military matters. This is not how This is not how populations behave at scale and politically, that's just not how things work. And Multi's starting point was basically like long before eighty forty five eighty six, when the historic of strife really jumped off in earnest like Noulti made that point in his earlier books. He said, if you're gonna claim that national socialism was just this sort of was just sort of like the private prejudices

of Adolf Hitlers policy. He's like well pretty much every German executive, whether they're talking about you know, Carl Luger, the mayor of hal for post Hafs for Vienna, whether you're talking about Bismarck or you're talking about Heindenburg. Like, none of these people could have been said to have like have like liked Jews or like not dislike Jews. Categorically, the idea there's some weird thing in policy terms that people hadn't heard before but all deeply felt that doesn't

make any sense. And secondly, again that's just not because racism isn't isn't that's not, that's not that's not an explanation, and that's just that's just not how politics are conducted. And finally, as I've said before, some of this is deliberately misconstrued. It it's because people are remote enough from the epoch they don't really understand this. The Germans weren't obsessed with race in a way that other people weren't. Germans talking about Jews, is this race that's different than them.

That's the way everybody thought, like, not necessarily about Jews, but that's the way they thought about human behavior. You know, human behavior is biological, if you want to understand you know, political behavior, it's racial. You know, what makes it possible where people live among each other is this kind of like blood compatibility. You know. So, oh, obviously there's tension between Germans and Jews, or between Poles and Jews, or

Poles and Russians because they're different races. That's what they meant. They weren't saying Jews are this evil race that's different than us because we're obsessed with race and we figured this all out. That's the way everybody talked. That's the way everybody thought, and that doesn't make any sense. And that's weird. Like I'm not saying it's not racial difference between people. I'm saying in those terms, that's not the

way people think about politics anymore. That's the way everybody thought about politics in the nineteen twenties, thirties and forties. America was singly obsessed with this idea that you know, eugenics could had selective intervention, whether it's sterilizing people who are deemed to be criminal incorrigibles or whether it was you know, facilitating you know, large families among high IQ people. The people weren advanced that this is gonna usher into

some utopia. Okay, So that's not an explanation to say that like, oh, Germans had race on the brain and just decided they didn't like Jews because they were an impure race or something. That's totally the wrong way to look at it. Like you can say that that kind

of thinking is bullshit and it's and it's nonsense. But to characterize it as like evil German thought or some crazy thing German people thought, you know, that was exclusive to their cultural pathologies or something, that's complete nonsense.

what the fuck is Semitism? You know, Like that's like saying that's like saying like, yeah, you know the Koreans and the Chinese, are they they dislike each other because of epicantic follism, Like I mean that doesn't like, uh, it suggests that there's some immutable trait, like unrelated to politics, that that people just you know, somehow decided that it's a basis for animosity and like it's not. That's not the way things work, you know. That's why that's why

I discourage people from using that term. Like anti Semitism is even moremaningless than racism. I mean, at least like at least canna say like I mean, race obviously exists, and it's conceivable that, like you know, there's people who, for no regular reason, you know, just have certain preferences and prejudices, you know, and because race isn't is an essentially and characteristic and we're talking about humans, like that makes sense, Like you know, Pep Germans just opposed Semitism.

But the best is that Palestinians are anti Semitic, so like they're anti themselves. I mean, like like what it's it's it's literally retarded. But anyway, but Noulty Nolty was basically I mean I think he was. He was a remarkable guy. I mean that goes out saying and he had a far more he had a far greater aptitude for analysis of the historical process than than most people even even kind of who are of his class and caliber. But his view of Germany's sort of tragedy and heritage,

that's that's basically like a right, hey, alien view. It's not it's not this like aut landish thing. And one of the reasons why he was so sort of savagely excoriated by his enemies, you know, the degree to which legal reasoning becomes a self fulfilling prophecy. And I invoke Alan went to Holmes a lot who I think I'll

went to Homes Junior. I think a lot of people want to read because I like, maybe it's because I was a lawyer, and like a I spent a lot of time with legal theory and case law and things. People have this idea that home Junior is like this big liberal or something like. You know, Holmes point out legal realism is that it's no such thing, and that

the law is not a science. It's not this process by which you know, a kind of like science and ethics can be discovered or by which you know, outcomes can be guaranteed that on a long enough timeline or assuming good faith among actors potential actors to to the controversy at bar, you know, the best possible outcomes for all parties can be realized. His whole point was that all the law is as political preferences that are totally arbitrary.

And then he give an epoch, you know, dressed up as as some sort of some sort of logical like like, as some sort of imperative base on a science of logic, and that's complete horseship. And because world order was so much structured according to the letter of according to not just not just not just a letter of rhetoric, but to but like legitimacy was so much bound up with language, you know, laid down by supposedly by supposedly objective international tribunals.

First Forrest Nuremberger, this idea that oh, this, this, this is just an absolute truth. You know that well obviously you know, there was there was this, there's this massive conspiracy to murdered Jewish people for no reason, perhaps in

nineteen twenty three. By this, by this criminal cadre, I mean that the court said, so, you know, and if they're gonna base, if we're gonna base, what succeeded the moral consensus as regarded war in peace on what amounts to an ideological statement dressed up as a criminal court decision that kind of tortured logic and and and sort of like non reasoning is is going to take on

this outside significance. So that's part of it, you know, so pointing out obvious and not so obvious but troubling facts of history related to the reality of you know, kind of the anthropological and sociological origins of conflict at scale. This is like outraged people because you know, they like the like the simpletons kind of intellectual sanctuary is always legalism,

you know. And I made that point too that by by the time uh, strategic parody had set in, I mean even beforehand, probably by the time the Single Integrated Operation Plan, which is America's strategic war fighting doctrine, I mean, by the time like that just became openly accepted that the fighting win a nuclear war, We're gonna kill eighty

million people. I mean, like you know, you no longer can talk about, you know, you know what we're gonna invoke this kind of foam moral out age or anything that went on in World War two, and you you certainly can't declare that, you know that men who devise the technologies of mega death or who implement them at scale and executive capacities, or are somehow the end music humanity. I mean it like nobody, even even though that child

can see like why that's ridiculous. But but that's why that that that that was the context, and that's the inner thing today too, because people still try to tear down, know, these postulates, but they increasingly they can't do it. I mean, first of all, I mean there's just people an acting beam are just lacking and then they're not built for it.

But there also there's not like really a context anymore, you know, like they can't there's like without the without sort of the Cold War, you know, not just as an existential sort of reality around which things just orbit,

you know, politically and sociologically in existential terms. You know, there's not there's not the contextual focus in order to kind of provide people with ethical like like ontological sort of pull stars is where like the situate themselves are like what the starting point should be for for such

a discussion. But some thing I wanted to get into a little bit too, is uh, you know, the the historians who did who were basically viewed as as sympathetic to the Bundesa as ah like as an institution and it's it's political and military mission. These were guys, i'd say, a guy who kind of most exemplified that position with Jachham fest And it shows you how sort of like perverted discourse had become and remains. All thankully, it's not quite as bad around the issue with Germany and German

the German historical experience. Like Festu, his father was this was this anti government extremist in the Third Reich. Best actually he either served in the Vermont to the vass in the finalized of the war, which I think is quite heroic, but he hid this fact until the day he died. He was this big anti fascist. He was definitely a proponent of the sunder veg or a special

way or special path theory of German historical development. But he also acknowledged that the German people were facing oblivion, not just psychologically and culturally, but biologically. He was very anti Soviet. You know, when he cast he said Hitler basically was almost like a shamanistic sort of figure who reflected the will of the body politic. You know, he

wasn't simply leading people at stray or something. That's a pretty weak argument and a Milk Coast argument, but like that was considered to be this kind of like extreme apologia or like some sort of like a hard right dangerous idea I mean, which which is totally insane. A. J. P. Taylor, He's another guy who's and he's well worth reading. He's a typical kind of German hating Englishman of the epoch. He's got this irrational house stility to all to Germany,

all into German. But his take was that, you know, Churchill brought the war in the West out upon himself and upon his country. Why on earth did Germans want a war in the West, which obviously they didn't. I mean, the fact that that was used is some sort of

minority take is absurd too. But his uh, he had a unique kind of or he had him rather ye had him, and he hit his own kind of disgree understanding of Saunder vague and that it was there was a unique German trajectory in the modern era that became aggravated in earnest after eighteen forty eight and particularly after unification in eighteen seventy nine. But that you know, Hitler geostrategic terms, acted like any other German executive, would you know.

And again he had a computative view of the Germans as a people. But he completely rejected this idea that you know, Hitler was this evil mad man and and just some kind of some kind of outlier. And interestingly, one of the one of the one of the contributors was then pretty I think it was. I think it was.

among them. He uh, he had a a functionalist viewpoint of things, and this was in vogue based with like neorealism, you know, like traditional realism, real politique, and besides anthropological and organic you know, causes of conflict and of state behavior in human behavior at scale, you know, really from the sixties onward, it became in vogue, uh, you know, talking about institutional behavior, you know how you know, structural

phenomenon and alternatively and sometimes concominantly functionalist explanations you know, are you know, reveal revealed data, meaningful data about you know, war and peace, but also you know political behavior scale, you know, and and of course too that.

was some interesting opinions being bandied back and forth. But what the reason it became this censorious controversy was for all the wrong and most predictable reasons, you know it and obviously any any any any German truly right wing, you know, not even particularly pro nacial socialists, but remotely patriotic or unwilling to kind of take a knee before you know, proverbialated before you know, NATO and Zionist and interest in the things they're going to view the sounder

of a conception as well as you know, the the functionalist explanations as it's basically you know, left wing and nature and and and intrinsically cunative, which they were, you know, but it's also again, you know, by the by the mid nineteen eighties, you know, you're talking about four decades

having passed. Even if even if the Third Reich had been this totally brutish regime, and even if even if it's fewer had been you know, the second Coming of Dracula or something, it's like, well again you know, if you're expecting us, us being us being the German people, you know, to take a million dead in seventy two hours, you know, fighting off the Ivans, and you expect our land, which you know, for the record, has been occupied now

for forty years. It's the designated nuclear battlefield of World War three. You know, see what you want, you want it's basically be you know, like kind of the holy

warriors of of what you considered civilization is communism. But then you're gonna turn on and say that, you know, we're evil pieces of shit like that doesn't that that doesn't treat you know, But it's also I think uh and Nola himself made this point, you know, as I get a lot of hate mail for a lot of reasons, and a lot of which surprisingly relates to the Vietnam War. I think American issupposedly an older American is they feel they got they got strong emotions bound up with this.

And I understand that I invote the Vietnam War for comparative purposes, not not not for some cynical reason, but for the reason Nolty did. If you want to understand, in the ethical terms set out by the victors in World War Two and by their their ethical metrics and by what was considered until the end of the Westphalian era to be you know, the moral consensus relating the laws and customs of war. The Vietnam War made us, it made hash with that all those things as much

as the Second World War did. And the entire internal logic of a free fire zone is not any different than that of the mandate of of an mindset's group and formation saying that, you know, designating an area a free fire zone, and saying that there are no civilians here, and regardless of age, sex, overall health, everybody is a

fair target. Because anybody who remains here after this, you know, they've been put on notice and give an opportunity to be evacuated, is obviously, you know, an act in communist or a sympathizer with the enemy idea. And because you know, as the mentioned material that is literally the what you know, the bearer of that idea, it's got to be annihilated. It being human beings. Welcome to the Welcome to warfare of the twentieth century, where all wars are a total wars,

and all total wars are ideological wars. You know, so when you've got every week America dropping you know, the body count as their victory metric, like literally measuring measuring whether we're winning the Cold War where it's gone hot and mountains of corpses we're counting, you know, when the victory metric and nuclear war is can we kill an enemy society, you know, by annihilating eighty million of its people, when you've got the Chinese, who after sixty eight, according

to a lot of these same academics, we're doing things like breaking nolity of the cols. This was you know, kind of the true progressive regime that was, you know, realizing communism. They were deliberately killing off tens of millions of their own people as useless eaters. Okay, you can't. It's as laughable to turn around and and start and started and start spitting like number lies or trying to declare that, you know, yes, the world is a wicked

place and and war is terrible. But you know those Germans, you know, they're they're they're just you know, they're they're they're just in league with Lucifer, and you know we we can never forgive them for this. So I mean,

I think it was all of those things. You know, now that doesn't that's that's not to say that, I mean, obviously, that's not to say that what sort of political biases, you know, gain momentum and and and become like consensus, consensus reality and in conceptual terms as has any kind of bearing on unreasonable things or or reasonable ass itself

or anything like that. But you know, we're not. We weren't talking about you know, some sort of are between the hoy ploye or we weren't talking about some policy initiative that like the official trying to convince people of through television media or something. We're talking. We were talking.

This was a very that this was an argument between and this was like a controversy between you know, like a very narrow quartery coterie of academics who, you know, all of whom knew better than what they were alleging those contract multi I mean, so that's important. That's important to keep in mind. And I'll also say, and I actually wrote them. I wrote about this, and I I wasn't jumping around a bit, but uh, just I mean

for clarity too. Here's here's what these are. The four questions are the four like, how is according to according to Nolty himself as well as Harber Moss, and according to according to the people who populated most of these forums, were these these debates are being had between you know, eighty four, eighty five and like eighty nine, it was were the were the crimes of the Third Reich uniquely evil or were they comparable, you know, to the scaled

violence of the Soviet Union other communist countries. Secondly, what is sounder vague a meaningful concept at all?

cultural and national life. And that really I mean regardless, like even if one accepts the kind of however preposterous. The yeah, the aforementioned postules this idea, that this this idea that conflicts that are global in scale, can just be caused by you know, some national group of bad actors. I mean, that's that's the way a child would think, you know. I mean, that's just it's on his face,

that's just that's just incredibly stupid, you know. And I emphasize that again and again, like it's not even you know, just not that. That's not a serious people or irrational adults talk about historical cause and effect or or or discuss political concepts, you know, whether you know with practice or or you know, matters of pure theory such as pure theory can exist in uh in in in discussion of politics. But you know, Nolty, one of the reason I respected him, is he or one of the reasons

I he got my attention initially. I mean it was like pre internet talking, even before I became a lawyer. I put a lot of stock in direct testimony and discrete psychological aspects of within, you know, the mind of the key decision makers. And you know, Nulty cited Hitler's table talk, you know, where Hitler would talk about repeatedly the rat cage torture, you know, and saying in the context of you know, this is what the communists do to people, and you know, also talking about his own fate.

You know, I'm not I'm not gonna the communists capture me and and subject me to the rat cage torture. Now, people like Harrimas said, oh, this is absurd, This was this is just Hitler suggesting that you know that you dave a bullsheit again to me that apparently, you know, going to be like Harvard must existed only in Hitler's imagination. We're prone to these barbaric acts. But the Soviets actually did that. You know people, or well I assume college

kids will still read. That's quite literally a plot, like a major plot point of nineteen eighty four. You know, Smith sells out Julia and and his comrades, and what breaks his mind is that O'Brien threatens to ratcage him. You know, it's this idea that is this something that Hitler made up or it was you know, the sort of fever dreams of a madman. I mean, that's the entire point of doing things like the rad cage torture. You do you do something like that for one of

two reasons. Either you're a disgusting status who likes to torture people, or you're devising things that are so terrifying to the human being kind of universally regardless of you know, sex, or background or national or like ethnic psychology. Like you divide things that are so horrible to human beings that you know people instinctively will will kind of bend to your will. And obviously you publicize those things to terrify people at scale, Like that was the whole point, you know.

And it's this idea that you know, and Robert Conquest, who I'm relying a lot upon for my own writing on this topic. You know, the Soviet Union had death camps decades before a shot was fired in World War Two. You know, they they annihilated ten million of their own people as of September third, nineteen thirty nine. I mean, like what you can't get away from this and the idea that, oh, well Hitler couldn't have known about that,

that's nonsense. You know. On my own sub stack, I wrote about max On shooting or Richter he fell at at the Munich Pooch like he he'd actually when the National Soldialist charged the police court On He'd locked arms with a Hitler and uh he got shot and he died instantly, like his his heart got pierced. And when Richter f well, he had actually dislocated Hitler's shoulder. And Hitler later said he said Richter was the He's like, he's the only man we couldn't afford to lose at

at Munich. You know, he's like our party, the party like never recovered.

by Hitler, you know, Doc. Finally he was a free Corps veteran who you know, been fighting, you've been fighting the communists and in the Baltic but he also he was a aristocrat of somewhere known he was in uh Turkey. When you're meetings, when you're meeting genicide jumped off and the way the world came to know of it was Richter was issuing these dispatches back to Berlin from the German diplomatic mission, and the Kaiser's representative finally said, you

got to stop doing this. You know, we need we need to try and get these people, these people being the terms like back in the war and whatever whatever government succeeds assault in it, we've got to have good offices with them. But so Richter went to the Red Cross and he started publicizing what he was seeing to

anybody who would listen. And he was directly responsible for him to rescue a lot of vulnerable persons among this population, the targeted people, you know, like women, elderly, little children. So the Nanstolls, this party, supposedly the only reason it convened, the only reason to constituted itself, The only reason to guys like Richter clicked up with Hitler was because they were racists who wanted to devise a criminal conspiracy to murder Jews. But Richter, like he spent his spare time

like worrying about ethnic cleansing. I mean, like what was you there just for show? Like they just really really like Turkish people, Like I don't, I mean, it doesn't track, like none of the tracks, you know, and that's what's important, okay, is that's what the big lie is. You know, the

big lie is about stuff like Sunderbag. It's about stuff like you know, making Adolf Hitler some sort of stand in for Lucifer and this like secular religion, is this idea that the Germans, unlike every you know, exclusive to themselves and like everybody else on this planet, where's obsessed with race and originally decided Jews or a bad race. Like that's what matters. Instrumentalities of homicide don't matter, Like arguing about like did four million people die? You're eight

million people die? That's I mean that that's that's literally demented. It's also retarded, you know, I mean decides even if that is, even if that is something that people I mean, people can reacharch anything want, but I mean, if that is kind of like your your emphasis. You should be reading people like conquests. You should be reading about the logic of the free fire zone in the Vietnam conflict. You should be reading about, you know, the Soviet death

camp system. You know, and like Nolty himself said, if you accept, if you accept everything alleged by court history in total including this idea of you know, homicidal gas chambers. The Soviet Union literally did everything that the Third Reich allegedly did, you know, a decade beforehand, with the possible exception of utilizing nerve gases scale, which I hardly think matters. If I'm not saying doesn't matter if people die. I'm saying, you know that what we're talking about, you know, the

preferred instrumentality of of of murderers scale. You know, we're not talking about something of grand like substance of import you know. So a lot of people are a lot of people are just kind of like tripping over themselves, not just by allowing the opposition to defind the parameters at discourse, but also define like what is important. You know.

So it's like you don't court historians and people sympathetic to Zionism or whatever, or people that have some kind of like peculiar fixation with this idea that Third Reich is the epitome of you. They don't get to decide, you know, what is what what the terms of discourse are. They don't get to decide what the parameters are of

of research. They don't get to decide, you know, what needs to be proved or rebutted, you know, as if they're you know, they're like like a judge in a in a in a case at bar or something, you know, dictating the what against you know, what the what their respective burdens are and things like that. That the uh. And it's also I mean what at the end of the day at uh, you know, and ultimate at this point too, at the end of the day, like the past becomes the past at some point, you know. I mean,

I this is all I do. Is is study playable theory and you know, the historical process and things and is you know, it's and so I mean, I'm the last person obviously would say like, oh, you know, it's studying the struggle pross doesn't matter. But it's idea that even if, even if truly horrible things occur, that they can't be justified by any exigency or by any appeal to anything other than you know, the kind of universal

depravity of man. I mean, it's kind of a so what I mean, we we don't we don't spend we don't spend decades of centuries wring our hands because we inherited some guilt because people are bad. You know or or our ancestors are bad. That's just not, that's not the way we do things in the West, among other things, you know. I mean, yeah, obviously an underpentent sinner is there's a few things kind of more obtuse and ugly than that. But you know, one sin isn't greater than

another sin or less than another. You know, it's just not that's a bizarre way to look at the world, as if you know, some sins are worse than others, some historical events or criminal offenses. Others are just you know, spontaneous occurrences, and certain ones you inherit a kind of liability for them that you have to atone for symbolically or ritually. Like that's that's that's really really really strange conceptually,

you know, And I put it. I put that to people too, like even if even if even if these people I have rams or are these people like kind of poor little unfortunate w Lipstott, He's he's incredibly stupid. I mean, having ussel isn't stupid, but I mean she is, yea, even if other things she said was true, I mean, it'd be kind of a big so what you know, I mean, am I so jump off a building because my answers just did bad things. I should I should I wear a hair shirt, might go to sleep or something?

Or should I should I get like half of my money is a teeth like the local synagogue. Like I don't what executive people want, you know, But I'm not. I'm not just being up to so I can actually put this to people and they will get me like I'm an Elien. But I mean maybe I am pretty weird, but I don't.

and stuff. It's like even if you're you know, if you're someone like in passion Zionists or or some somebody with the slave mentality is like not Jewish, but just as decided like take on those prejudices for some unconstable reason. I mean, it's like, okay, like you know, the the Palestinians, his your ops, aren't They're not all gonna like put down their clashing the costs and be like, you know what, you're right, you know, specialficums of the history. I'm a

terrible person. I'm gonna stop. Now. You can convince like a billion rooms and you know, the rest of the world that you're right. That's great, that being right doesn't win wars.

me record what they got to say. But there's like all these weirdos of semi hate mail, and even if there's some who aren't so much haters, but they're just like, you know, how do those people possibly let you in their house? I'm like, well, would they care what I'm into? Like, that's not the way normal people think. It's like you think that wakes you're a weirdo. It's like if you like, if you'd like if you think that, like black people like look at some guy, like, oh, that guy's got

a nutsy shirt on. I can't let him in my house. Like no one thinks the way with total weirdos, you know, or like bitch made like like suburbanit people who lived through their television or something like, I don't even know what it's like. No one thinks that way man, like in the real world, you know. And I guess that's like my point, you know, it's so you can the uh what the and in mind, that's the point always

made to people too, like partic eaments and noualty. It's that what It's not what the way you judge these things, the way you judge kind of like what's shaping the conceptual horizon. It's not what. It's not what Ben Shapiro is saying or tweeting out. It's not what MSNBC is saying. It's not it's not like how things being presented in

Hollywood movies. You know, it's like a matter of zeitgeist, and once and once things like lose their kind of evocative power and like lose their like monumental power, like

like that they're done. They can't be like recaptured, you know, and like nobody, like no serious historian would take something like Shindler's List like seriously today, you know, like and that and that that that then that's not going to change, that's not coming back, you know, and nobody's people like people basically unless you're a and like's in one of these kinds of like weird zip codes where where people attend some some crazy like like non denom church that

like worships Israel or unless you're you know, like in Scoche, Illinois, like like basically like nobody likes Israel, and like that's not going to change. That's not going back to the way it was, you know, twenty years ago. You know, like this can't the like zeitgeist when when they preceding this is a conceptual structure, like psychological constitution is gone, like it's gone, you know, and everything is different now.

I mean, that's that's why I was emphasized that people who say that things are so terrible today that it's it's practically like mainstreaming to be somewhat right wing, you know, like that that's a sea change from thirty years ago. That was like one thing thirty years ago, you know, and and things can things are never going to go back to the way they were, you know. And that's

the way to look at it. It's not it's not it's not what people who have access to remains of the bully pulp that are like shouting out kind of into the into the abyss or whatever, just to hear their own echoes. I don't know.

But it's it's actually a really interesting book. And yeah, that Muller Miller was a he he wasn't a leading light like Nolty, but he's a guy who during the historical strike he was. He was a younger academic and interesting things to say. Oh a book RHS. Stoffley who wrote that book, the Biography of Hitler, that I think is so great. Hitler beyond evil and tyranny. He wrote this book with this retired Wehrmacht general officer called NATO

Under Attack. It was published in nineteen eighty four and it got a lot of attention from war college types. Like the sub the subtitle was, uh, how NATO can

win in Europe without nuclear weapons? And if you're if you're a late Cold War geek like I am, who I find it re emergence of conventional force structures as as a major this positive variable to be fascinating just because it's cool, But uh, this relates very much on what we're talking about and how as the tent ended in the final phase of the Cold War really heated up, you know, this sort of punitive view of the Wehrmacht the and of the Germans as a people who just

could no longer be abided. That's I mean, it's just like a fascinating kind of like period piece about what war planner types were thinking and stophe a was a really freaking smart guy and who grasped political and historical like he grasped the philosophy of history and and political theory in a way most like military types don't. But he also was a very brilliant, like you know, military writer. But yeah, that's uh, I'm gonna ask to wrap it.

always find me on Twitter or not always. I mean, I think I think they've gotten tired of like nuking me there. It's a real capital R E L underscore number seven hm me S seven seven seven. My substack has been popping a lot lately. I really appreciate that people are very generous and in signing up and throwing me a lot of love, not just in the form of like subscriptions and don'ts, but you know, sending me encouraging emails and stuff. And I actually really do appreciate that.

I mean, I'm not trying to sound like some sentimental slob, but you know I I I feel a very moved to get that kind of love from people. You can always find my continent at my website. It's number seven h on as seven seven seven dot com. I'm on t gram, I'm on Instagram. You know I'm I'm here there see can you shall find all?

to comprehend it. It's just that, frankly, not like you know, deep diving into into political philosophy and sort of the history of ideas and in a very abstract capacity, that's that's not something that you know, a great number of people are taken in by and I totally understand that, but it's essential to understanding the development of of of

concrete political realities in the twentieth century. And if you want to understand the are present and it's it's it's nuances therein you've you've got to you've got to understand these things as legacy structures and legacy phenomenon of the twentieth century. Not just because as we talk about there's been a basic stagnation in America and you know, the

former West. Even if that were not the case, even if there was an authentic dynamism to American government, and even if there had been you know, truly forward looking and in far reaching and workable sort of path forward in policy terms after the classing or German border. You know, I'm thinking in terms of what you know, mister Nixon wrote about in his final years and as well as

you know, kind of the Bush Baker model. Like I'm not suggesting people should look at that as you know, some ideal model or something, but there was like a dynas to it, and it was relevant to you know,

Postcold War realities. You know, even if there was even if there was something like that extent, you know, in terms of intellectual occurrence as well as political will and conceptual ambition, this would still be informed almost entirely by you know, twentieth century structures phenomenon relationships like different as things are today. As much as I agree with people including mister Musk, who say that historical time is speeding up along the technology, that is one hundred percent true.

So today I want to get into some of these things and what's key to understanding about novelty and German idealism generally. You know, people, especially Anglophone types who have are marinated with a certain disdain for continal philosophy. Okay, man, it's just a fact. There's a tendency to dismiss these

things as well. That's so much sophistry, you know, That's that that's just uh, you know, a not particularly lucid interpretation of political realities, you know, that extrapolates the musings of of closer intellectuals to populations at scale. That's the wrong way to look at it. Even if you don't accept the postuitz ontological and otherwise of Pagel of of

nulty of Heidegger. Even if this is nothing more than a conceptual horizon that became a kind of self fulfilling prophecy in terms of how it shaped the European political mind, that's nonetheless a causal variable that isn't arguably just positive of how con is. Okay, I take it a step further, obviously, I mean, I think it's clear to everybody that you know, I'm very much a Hegelian. I think Urson Old was the most profound historical thinker and a writer of the

twentieth century. But the way I understand German idealism is it's people who deal in and studies the consciousness and things will be familiar with the anthropic principle. This is extraordinarily complicated, Okay, on like its own terms. But we can't talk about political realities without talking about the events within within the human mind. Okay, It's not like there's some it's not like some actual political reality remote from

human psychology that is existing outside of our purview or something. Okay, we're not We're not talking about astronomical phenomenon, talking about you know, events of of of of a natural scientific you know nature. Obviously, you know, so that renders that that that that renders the study of of of political philosophy unique, Okay, because you can't you can't. You can't do away with with mind as a prime move on. Okay, even if you reject the postulates of somebody like Noldy

and it come bat this again and again. All right, But it's also to understand the entirety of the war.

or so. There's economic realities that you know, affected and impacted the ability to manage populations at scale that in turn, you know, we're decisive and as regards you know, the capacity to mobilize those aforementioned populations, which in turn, you know, had a tremendous impact on the perception of states engaged

in a hard power competition. That goes without saying, but all of these things it key points the decision as well as in terms of broad conceptual horizon of what the end game of these political ambitions were you can only understood in terms of the Zeitgeist and the way that practical transcendence was changing the way humans live their lives and identify themselves and quite literally how they lived and died. Nobody was more insinuated into that Modelitia thought

and Hadolf Hiller. Okay, I'm going to begin a series on this book in the next week. This is an incredibly ballsy book and it was kind of underneath the radar. It's basically a breakdown of Hitler's second book, The Secret Book, And what Sims emphasizes is that Hitler very well understood the situation geostrategically as well as historically. And I've always made the point before that Hitler's primary op was Franklin Roosevelt,

not Stalin. Sims hammers that point home absolutely, okay. And in terms of Germany's mobilization paradigm, in terms of the technologies Hitler emphasized in terms of his entire timetable, tactical and strategic from September ninety thirty nine until December nineteen forty one, was oriented towards facilitating Germany's ability to defend it against a massive assault by the United States. That can't be that can't be overemphasized. Anybody who denies it

is not in the game. However, what was happening to European peoples and what was threatening to render the culture extinct was uh, what was? What was? What was was uh was purely conceptual, okay, and it's uh, it's the uh sphare punkd of that devastating idea or psychological tendency. Was was Bolshevism. You know, Bolshevism wasn't just a way of ordering labor. You know, it wasn't just uh, a matter of depriving people of of certain freedoms you know

that they become habituated to do. It wasn't just a question of breaking down traditional modalities of order, you know, whether we're talking about you know, within the family unit, or you know, in terms of how you know, the races or ethnic populations relate to one another, or the way you know, the sex is you know, kind of relate to one another in as regards you know, duties and responsibilities and things, and in ontological terms, it was it was sharing the bases of of of of identity,

and when you remove people from any identitarian pole stars when you literally rip them out of history, they're no longer living as human beings in basic terms. Okay. And despite what people claim, and SEMs emphasizes this too, Hitler did not claim that Europeans or some master race. Quite the contrary. Hitler said Germany's rachel stock has precipitously declined since the Thirty Years War. He looked at that as the sharing event, okay, that Germany never really recovered from.

He said that the best European stock was in England, and their leadership cast basically was able to dominate a good portion of the planet as well as preside over a divided society that had no kind of like organic

like national underpinning, you know. And they managed to do this with like a combination of of tremendous foresight, you know, on unrestrained ruthlessness, and you know, an ability to sort of manipulate subjugated cultures in a way that incentivized you know, cooperation, but also quite literally you know, rendering like the best that those cultures could provide to this you know, imperial whole. Okay.

Hitler further said that the best European stock had emigrated to America, you know, so Hitler's like, we're basically left like this kind of like shattered remnant of what's what was potentially you know, like a like like a master race. Okay, and thus it was all the more critical. Germany would like literally die from this onslaught of of of suicidal for lack of a better way to characterize it. Okay.

Now this wasn't just like Hitler actually believed this. Okay, this wasn't I mean, this wasn't just you know, stuff fit for the bully pulpit, or you know, before the national social has had anything approaching a bully pulpit. This wasn't just you know, these weren't just like scare concepts or or something a nightmare scenario to to bring ignorant people the polls out of fear or something like that. The degree in which communism in practice, like literally the

practice of communism marsis Leninism. It can only it can only exist, let aloning door and perpetuate itself if it annihilates all competing conceptual horizons. You've got to deprive people of the ability to conceptualize some alternative ontology. Okay, there's no other ideology like that. As long as it's miss laced. When we talked about an earlier episode, this kind of a Simpleton's paradigm that's fromoted during the Cold War, of Oh,

there's totalitarianism and then there's democracy. Something like Franco Spain had nothing in common with the Soviet Union, a revolutionary communsm generally, nor did you know some some tinpot dictatorship in the Third World regimes like that forcing compliance or enforcing supervisial compliance, you know, by by use of the penal apparatus or or some or or some kind of you know, use of military force as an extra judicial

means of punishing people. And you know, as a spectacle that communism is not interested in that for its own terms. One of the things I think in some ways is the very overrated writer but or Well captured the true essence of Marsus Leninism in nineteen eighty four. And that's exactly what the book's about. It's not about totalitarianism or fascism or government generally. It is about Marcus Leninism. What O'Brien says, I need you to love a big brother.

I don't you know. I'm not interested in super visual compliance. I'm not interested in forcing you to do things. You know, in fact, quite the contrary, you know, I need you to not be able to conceive of anything other than prostrating yourself in kind of like odd and terrified reverence of this megalithic state. You know, And not only do you not, you know, the reason why you don't resist it isn't out of terror. It's because you can't even

conceptualize resisting it. It's like resisting God. Okay, and iably the best example of this was in Romania immediately after the war. There's I can't remember his name now, but there was a Romanian Orthodox priest who when somebody has made a saint, are they beatified? Is that the term? Okay, I believe it was beatified? Yeah, for his resistance the communists. But uh, there was this what came even known is uh the poteste e butchering that pronunciation again, forgive me

the Potetsi prison experiments. Okay, Ptetsi prison Now. Romania is a fascinating example because it's usc was was was he was viewed kind of in the west of this bizarre eccentric obviously, you know, him and his wife were were nearly executed on on live television and that was shocking. I think we've talked about before, you know, as a teenager seeing then on this. This was long before a live league and anything like three guys one hammer or any of this horrible stuff that you can anybody can

see on the internet. And but I mean, obviously it's the only violent overthrow of of of an East Block regime. But you know, for all pradical purposes, Romania had seceded from Warsaw Pact. You know, Chusysku himself, he negotiated with Kennedy to remove Romania from the SIOP target list and a nuclear war. But in terms of that, despite kind of like seceding entirely from Veldt politique, were Mania kind

of perfected Mars's Leninism as regardless internal situation. I mean, purists will say, well, it was a personality cult, but that's not what I'm talking about. Most of the detainees at the Poteste prison were men wud served in the Iron Guard, you know, they were they were you know uh os front veterans who you know, we're company level officers, are higher. They were priests who hadn't done anything wrong. I mean, even of a you know, political nature and

they were psychologically tortured. According to this phase paradigm, the first phase would involved this kind of like endless interrogation over days and weeks, with torture liberally applied under the auspices of revealing intimate details. This was called external unmasking. But the interrogators, I mean, they obviously that any any kind of anything relating to somebody's intimate, moral, or or sexual behavior, they'd find that valuable to exploit against them.

But this wasn't this wasn't the purpose of external unmasking.

They'd forced people to do things like, you know, they'd say, you know, it's come to our attention that you know, like your father was actually like it like a trader, you know, and or like you know, it's it's you you were actually born at Bastard, you know, and then we we've we've discovered this, or like you know, your your sister was a prostitute, you know, and and she had many men, you know, and we we we we've talked to men who who you know, who visited her

and and in relations with her for money, and they'd insist on it over and over and over and over again, and you know, they torture people into signing confessions and stuff that seems apparently meaningless from a political perspective, but victims subsequently attested that you start losing touch of reality in these conditions and you start wondering, you know, like is that actually true? You know what I mean, I'm sure people will say, like, well that that would never

happen to me. Very very strange things happen when people are incarcerated, and add to that, literal court.

lenient with the subject. So basically this was you know and say like, you know, basically like you know, I now in this perverse way, you know, it's it's a way of trying to trying to literally create like Stockholm syndrome, or to generate those sorts of misplaced sympathies in the

mind of the victim, you know. Uh, So it came to the uh, you know, the victim in some cases begin to look at his torture is truly benevolent, you know, because even if it was totally a charade, you know, the fact that he would disclose, you know, persons who'd shown him leniency, and then he'd be rewarded with you know, maybe if he'd been subjected to a starvation diet, he'd be rewarded with food or something or even just you know,

the appearance of of of affection like perversa. It sounds you know, people do need affection or or approval in some basic sense, and somebody who's somebody who's been utterly destroyed, whose internal constitution has been destroyed by a deliberate and purposeful, you know, regime of torture, even even even the approval of of their torture, you know, who's cast himself in in some kind of fatherly roll. You know. You see you see the police do this too, and it's been

sued to the police interrogation. Obviously they it's not nearly this extreme, okay, but that's that's basically what good cop, bad cop is, and some very dumb down and obviously much less insidious and and and literally figuraibly violent the sense it's the uh, the third stage was h in the third phase, it was this. It was just it

was this kind of public humiliation ritual. If the person was uh, you know, if they were if they were a priest or a or a a lay person in the other US church, you know, the interrogator would do something like you know, laying out a crucifix and like

demanding the urinate on it. You know, if it was a political partisan or like a former like Hrmacht officer or Iron Guard revolutionary, you know, they might like force him to like like drink urine or like literally like lick the boots of his interrogator or something, or like you know, claim to have engaged in in like disgusting sexual acts or something, you know, in this like Michael Joanes not specifically about this in this context, but you know,

he's talked about how part of the subtext of the kind of like normalization of pornography is uh, the kind of like assault the intimate world core of the person, you know, and and and and and rip away any any kind of private and any kind of truly like private boundaries they have, you know, and that that's a real thing too, you know, but this was you know, these uh people were people were permanently and profoundly damaged

by this. I mean beyond the obvious. I mean, like he said, you don't the things people think they take for granted, they they they no longer can like they're not they'y're not capable of it. I'm not talking about and I'm not talking about like trust in in authority and in some basic way, I mean like they're not fully human anymore. There's no photo on their own obviously, but it this guy, Ned Robert Graves is you know, an english Man of letters type of you know, like

a great war veteran. His memoir was called Goodbye to All that. Robert Conquest cited him and for comparative purposes in his in his book on a Communist Megaside, Graves was talking about the experience at the front, okay, during World War One, and he said that, he said, Graves said that like the squalor and danger of the front lines, being under constant bombardment, you know, like living in filth.

He said that, like young officers, he said, they said, after after several weeks, they begin to deteriorate a little. He's like, after six months, he's like most men, we're basically all right. But they were starting to show cracks, okay, said after a nine or ten months, these guys became a drag on fellow officers and NCOs. You know, like they were no longer thinking clearly, you know, they they

they'd become desocialized owing to constant anxiety. You know, he'd say, after a year or fifteen months to continuous service, he said, even like the most robust and healthy junior officer would basically be useless. You know, he was no longer fit for command, you know, at best, you know, oh it was experience and whatnot. You know, if he still had the nerve and the gumption for direct action, you know, he might be able to utilize and like the equivalent

of stormtrooper role, but in a command role. Not not even close, he said. The real tragedy, though, he said, guys over the age about thirty or thirty five, and especially over forty. He said that these guys had less resistance, you know, and in his estimation, it's because they had, you know, decades of normal life to compare their current situation, dude, he said. Officers over forty, he said that the six

months more almost unfamily became you know, obvious alcoholics. You know, they'd only be able to you know, assuming they've survived multiple assault operations. They could only they could only function if they were totally drunk. He said that they started seeming you know, complete like he said, they started seeming literally, you know, like in a state of shock at all times. You know. He said, some of them lost their ability to communicate in basic terms, like their ability to their

command of language had left them, you know. And Conquest says that something that developed in Soviet society, especially after about nineteen thirty six to thirty eight, about ninety thirty six,

ninety thirty eight onwards until about nineteen fifty seven. He said it was something he said, it was something completely comparable, particularly guys who were in roles that were somewhat coveted where they were in contact with commissars at all times and responsible for their people, but they weren't protected by you know, the lar guests or the patronage of party men.

Like a good example would be, you know, like a doctor at a hospital, you know who like like a surgeon who was responsible for you know, more junior doctors and nurses obviously, or like a professor of geology, you know, or like a guy who worked at one of the design bureaus, you know, like over seeing other engineers. You know. He'd be under constant pressure of the commissars. You know he is, and so it is, his whole family would

constantly be under surveillance. He'd be subjected to things like you know, when people he worked closely with or taken away and either executed summarily or sentenced to sentenced to the death camp system. He'd be ordered he'd be directed to sign a statement saying that he fully approved of these measures. Against people who were engaged in countervolutionary activities,

regardless of his personal feelings about them. And like, over time, this just broke people down, you know, and the workers and pet the workers and peasants who supposed that the Soviet state was directly was was was oriented towards, you know, like elevating you know, these people, a huge amount of them, and we'll get in some of these figures in a minute, had cycled through the forced labor system and they and they begin acting, They just they began behaving like convicts,

you know, in all in all the pathological ways that you know people who are in and out of the prison system do you know, And even if they didn't have you know, pathologies going in despite being branded as criminals, they certainly had them when they were released. And that's what I mean, that's what's unique about Sovietism, and that's what's unique about communism, you know. And the people who I mean, it'd be easy for it it's either people

to say like, oh, well, that's their own fault. You know, why weren't their cadres of people who who were who were cultivating resistance to this, to this this regime, they were all dead. They were slaughtered. The Soviets slaughtered ten million people by the time by by, you know, before a shot was fired in the World War, you know, And that's nobody's all point. That people who were capable of of harboring a conceptual vista of some alternative system.

They they they were, they were They were killed categorically regardless of age, sex, overall health, national origin, because they were the they were the standard. Even if they weren't the standard bearers of the enemy idea, you know, they they they weren't malleable in the way that they needed to be. You know, the Khmarra rouge actually perfected this. I think year zero is you know, left revisionists who

like Saratra, who actually understood Marci's Leninism. You know, they were constantly trying to extricate the commute riage experience from revolutionary communism as like a postulant to itself. This is some bizarre outlier. This is an example of oriental barbarism. You know, this has nothing to do with with with with rational state behavior. You know, there's nothing being extra

away from that. He knew that that was not true, Okay, aside from the kind of atavistic mythologies that you know, the Khmer Rouge threw in to kind of woo the the peasantry towards their perspective and you know, and whatever, like racial mythologies that were emphasized when they were fighting

the Vietnamese like that. Notwithstanding, Paul Pott was actually a very learned man and what he aside from the fact that you know, Cambodia Democratic Campuccia, as it was so dubbed, it was a was a backwater that was devoid of the prayer, was an industry to facilitate, you know, the

realization of true communism. And in political terms, he was absolutely a pure communist and that's what's required in order to facilitate its realization that it's not an outlier in the least, and people who are honest, like orthodox Marxists who remained in you know, Moscow adjacent after the after

you know, the ninety sixty schism. They it's subtle, but it's there, like they acknowledge that I find this fascinating, but not for the reason something like the think, no, not merely sucking wave it around as some you know, gotcha like I obviously it's like grotesque people think that way, but it's it's entirely consistent with uh, the overall paradig I mean, it would be dishonest for anyone who describes

that perspective to claim otherwise. But you know, the end result as all these points too, when you're talking about these monumental ideas, you know, there you can just look

at them as historical contingencies. You know, you've got to look at them as not just as as as as causal as ultimate causal variables in and of themselves, but as phenomena that uh, it's that, but phenomena that endure until their full realization or until they are annihilated because the the because the bearers of the idea are annihilated. I mentioned material of it. The purpose of communism is

to realize communism. It's not just to alleviate tensions inherent to you know, opposing classes amidst historically he wal, It's not just a way to you know, kind of placate a radicalized proletariat, you know, in the short term and until you know, some sort of new structure that has more equitable outcomes can be realized. Like the point of it quite literally is it's it's self contained realization. And the end result of the Communist center prizes is the

eradication of culture. And that was the great horror in the minds of all who opposed it. And you know, like I said, one of the only meaningful things in absolute terms you can take from my comf is when Hitler says that a Bolshevis planet is a plan without culture, where all men you know, live basically as basically as

animals with the power of speech. You know, and the or the earth is uh the the the earth is basically this, you know, this ball of mud like spinning through the void, with no with no with no higher life. You know, everything you associate with culture, the from the comparatively prosaic is the most profound no longer exists. You know, it's it's it's the world as labor. You know, there is no past, there's no future, there's only the present.

And you know the realization of work quotas or you know, the homogenization of life such that it's rendered indistinguishable. But for you know geographic location, which anymore has no meaning other than you know, the signature on a map. And that much much as people might have misanthropic fantasies about Earth without people. I think those are actually like some

corny show. Like decades ago, it was like it was like Earth without people or like the world without man, and it was I think it was not discovery or something. I forget the tangent, and it was you know, there was these like cgi rendered landscapes where uh, you know, like skyscrapers are all over grown and and just like animals or have free reign and there's no more man to you know, corrupt like the pure sanity in nature

or something. But that you know, people have this idea that somehow like without like the without without the human mind to perceive things, that these things might may well

as not not exist. You know, I'm a sure go without saying, but it's I think it's like the way people like can imagine like what their own funeral would look like because if they have some kind of some kind of vantage point or something, you know, and and and in the terms you would you know, as in you know, and and as a as a living human with you know, optic nerves and things.

as book that I think needs to be emphasized. Hitler was incredibly and he he knew exactly what was underway in terms of the strategic historical situation. And the second book makes the point that America contains about fully fifty percent of the world's like actual like capital and resources. You know, he says that once fully mobilized America will be unstoppable. He said, it will be unlike any hedgemond

in the world's ever seen. And he said that, you know, unless unless some sort of total regeneration occurs in Europe. He wasn't talking in some kind of strasserist notion of you know, like the United States of Europe like literally like a palogenetic revival of the race, you know, and he had Hitler had no use for petted nationalism, but his idea of a European superpower is very different. And

what people like Distress were suggested, is my point. But he said that, you know, unless this happens, assuming that assuming Germany could fend off a Soviet assault, which at present then present being you know, nineteen thirty three, it could not. But he said, even if it could, he said that Europe would basically become, you know, the battleground between the United States and the Soviet Union for world

of gemity, which is exactly what happened. And he said that, you know, the danger of the Soviet Union is the danger that's always when presented by Europe, which is essentially an indefensible peninsula, you know, populated by a world minority of peoples facing uh without without any without any you know, there's no Sahara desert in Europe. There's no sort of

like natural rampart. You know. They're the you know, the the immediate physical threat the European civilization is the billion strong hordes of the of the Barbarian East, you know.

But he said that this is you know, the uh, the the graver like absolute like literally global threat is is America, you know, because it's it's a complete because it's completely it completely like neutralizes everything people had there to be taken for granted about hard power and the capacity to marshall capital and the service of hard power.

How he viewed the American people is nuanced and fascinatingly and Sims gets into this too, despite this kind of like like this liberal fixation with like, oh, Hitler was a Confederate and he loved slavery and hated black people. There said almost nothing about black people other than that. He said that transplanting you know, one hundreds of thousands of African slaves to the New World, he said, was he said, was something that reminiscent of an artifact of

a barbaric civilization. And he said it was beneath America to do that and totally unnecessary, you know. He admired the kind of northern industrial might of the Union. He said that, you know, the cream of German racial stock, the tune of five point nine million people over a few centuries, had emirrated to America. He's like these people in the backbone of American power, you know. And he said that, uh, you know, some of the best of of a of the anglophone leadership cast has sort of

like assimilated them into their own ranks. Like he's basically saying like this is this is a recipe for utterly like unstoppable power and like full spectrum dominance like economic, military, cultural, and every can seeable way, you know. But he said that there's like an underlying rootlessness there that's ring which been co opted, you know, by a Jewish modernist perspective.

This is different than the threat. It's different but related in terms of a constellation of of of of Zeitgeist related factors, like writ large, it's different than you know, the Soviet threat, but it's it's derived from the same it's derived from the same historical crisis. Okay. And he makes the point in the second book that it's not accidental that, you know, Americanism and Sovietism will like find common cost for limited purposes because they're not actually manikey

in opposites. There's a there's irreconcilele differences between them, you know, he said, giving conditions to parody, they destroy each other. But but they're they're not like moratal enemies or something, you know, in absolute terms. And but that's I didn't mean to go so far like a field, but it's the uh what I did want to get a little bit into. When if I'm jumping around a bit, a lot of people over uh over email and whatnot, they've been asking in comparative terms about like to what degree

like the Soviet Union had like a camp system. And I make the point and I'm we're lying on Robert Conquest for this. The Soviets had a death camp system rit large. Its purpose was to categorically exterminate people. There were there were hundreds of these camps purpose towards that end in the frozen you know, tundra of h what was the Soviet Far East. This is the territory I mean for people came to like geology and you know

that like or a science and stuff. I mean, this is uh, this is literally you know, like the ice age, you know, like World Island. You know, this is where the this is the this is where the polar bear develops. This is the this is where mammoths stalked the land, you know, until fifty thousand years ago or whatever. You know, Conquest called it an empire of camps that existed from

nineteen thirty one until approximately nineteen fifty seven. And I mean the scale of this, uh in nineteen thirty mid nineteen thirty, as this as the security apparatus was sort of consolidating and leaving behind the revolutionary phase and developing into a like a true kind of penal system, an extermination system to categorically manipulate population outcomes in mortal mortal terms. By that point, the OGPU was the precurs of the

NKVS with the precursor to the KGB. It was constantly reconstituting itself in these days, is which I believe it was very purposeful to make it difficult to identify what series of responsibility were in the the The communists were singularly obsessed with manipulating the historical record for reasons that

are obvious. I mean we've before, we've been talking about this past hour, but you know this was uh, I mean Stalin famously literally you know, like would redact people from the record, you know, only photographic evidence of them. But one of the reasons why, I mean any rigorous historian really like it's if I understand that, if anything, the the death soul presented even by rigorous revisionists like

Conquest is understated. But superficially, this kind of contant manipulation of vernacular and nomenclature provided provided the Soviets with an alibi. And there and there are stortbell apologies today and in some sense despite the abiquity of information that it has the same function. But what's an arguable is that by mid nineteen thirty there's approximately one hundred and forty thousand

prisoners already in these camps run by the GPU. Initially these sort of huge labor projects, the first of which was digging a canal from connecting the White seat of the Baltic which, for perspective this alone required well over

one hundred thousand lavers. Okay, and what better way to avail a labor pool, and you know, to to to capture tens of thousandans of of of able bodied men you know who either are categorized as you know, putical unreliables or members of ethnic groups that have been you know, determined to be you know, unassimilable or or resistant to you know, the uh, the kind of a de ethnic ethnicfication of people's you know, you you can brand these many criminals and then you know, you can essentially work

them to death on these on these massive public work projects, you know, as as slaves literally even worse. I mean, they're spendables. You know, you don't you don't work your slaves to death, you know, if I under you know, under ordinary conditions of a channel slavery. But from nineteen thirty onward, the number of peoples even some kind of custodial sentence just astronomically rose. In nineteen twenty nine there was summerly fifty and sixty thousand people who were sentenced

by the OGPU. A year later this was there was over two hundred thousand, But in nineteen thirty one it was one million, two hundred and thirty thousand. I mean, this is this is astronomical, okay. And we're talking about you know, we're not talking about a matter of decades.

We're talking about the span of a year. You know, the camp the population in these camps, you know, labor camps and death camps, you know, increasing fivefold over you know, a million people there was within this far eastern camp system. There's between one hundred and one hundred and sixty camps at any given time. This absolutely dwarfs the camp system that the Third Reich, I mean, absolutely dwarfs it. Even if you accept at face value everything alleged a numberg.

You know, it's it's it's it's comparing an ant to an elephant. The o GPU further in nineteen thirty two, absorbed seven hundred small penal colonies and and uh jails and prisons you know, where the people have been serving

sentences from anything from petty theft to homicide. These camps and prisons have formerly been run by what it's called the People's Commissariat of Justice, and OGPU declared that, you know, these were being inefficiently administered, so they absorbed you know, what amounted to the conventional you know, prison population and began working these people to death, you know, on these

public works projects. On January first, in New Year's Day, nineteen thirty five, this newly unified system, according to Soviet records, there was nine one thousand prisoners in it. Over seven hundred thousand are in work camps and two hundred and forty thousand are in work colonies. Now, mind you, and reading between the lines and kind of was made this point. There was these discrete, smaller units, and there's no explanation for why they were so organized. Presumably that's where actual

dangerous criminals were housed. But everybody else, the oldly majority, had done nothing at all wrong. But everything in the Soviet Union under what was called Article fifty eight will just catch all penal law. Absenteeism from work was a crime. Destroying Soviet property was a crime. Poganism, which translates approximately to like disorderly conduct, that was a crime. You know.

So that's one of the reasons why I get really really irritated when people who some of them don't know any better, I guess even in our own circles like talk, they refer to people as criminals. I'm like, don't. I'm like, don't, don't start doing that. Okay. I mean, maybe I feel strong about this one background, but you've lost your kind of grounded this when you start calling people criminals or some categorical elements. Okay, but you know, for perspective, this

was that this this this this was well known. You know. One of the things people that attacked Nolty and his thesis claiming like, oh, nobody knew it was underway in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was a nascent superpower, and this was it was nothing like today, but film was ubiquitous. There was an international newswire. You know, It's not like Moscow was thousands of miles away from Europe.

This is well known, you know, people and people, uh, these cadres who had fought in Bavaria, you know, and in the Baltic against the Free Corps. I mean, these people would have been trained in the Soviet Union, you know. The for the more, you know, by nineteen thirty six there was a truly international proxy conflict in Spain. You know, this this idea that information somehow was was quarantined, you know,

and didn't cross national frontiers. I mean that, that's that, that's laughable, you know, it's this was this is common knowledge, you know. And plus I mean how exactly you know, one hundred thousands of people over the words of the decade,

millions of people were categorically disappearing. You think people weren't noticing that, you know, upon the Soviet assault on Poland, you know, a huge number about a quartering onlyion polls disappeared in once you know, not just because I mean that the Russians there were there was there was ethnic hostility between the Russians and Poles anyway, that was arguably as severe as that between you know that the Germans and the Polls, or the Poles and the Jews, or

the Germans and the Jews. But you know you think, uh, people, people weren't noticing that. You know, the tens of thousands of Poles were just disappearing. Their entire officer corps just disappeared, you know, the entire like Warsaw clergy just disappeared. I mean like, but it's I'm not trying to be up to so like mak it out like it's funny or something, you know, or every flippant rather about these kinds of human tragedies. But it's it's it's like a non argument.

It's not it's it's on its face, it's it's laughable. But the uh, you know, I I epaesize this too, And I mean again, I the first person make the point that it's not you know, like a like a his or historical revisionism is not some kind of numbers game, but because what is in contention is the degree of attrition in comparative terms. And this really was not just the subtext but kind of the part of the core

controversy of the historical striketh. I want people to contemplate again the degree with which the Soviet can't apparatus utterly dwarfed that of the German Reich, and like Nolty said, other than other than homicidal gas chambers, the degree to which they were employed is arguable. I don't want to get into that in this series, not because I'm afraid to or something reverse to. We can talk about Fred Leuchter and Robert Farreson and the entire controversy if people

want to. But that's but the point is, even if you accept all of that at face value, every single thing that the Third Reich did was precedented by the Soviet Union, with the exception of homicidal gas chambers employed against civilian populations. So the entire kind of notion of oh Saundervig led to this unique and intractable evil. Just look at you know, look look at the Third Reich. This this regime that existed for the sole purpose of

realizing a homicidal conspiracy. I mean, it's it's laughable. I mean, it's there's something funny about it, but it's it's preposterous. Rather, that's about this. I got some more stuff to say about this, but I don't want to. I would you be agreeable or amenable if we did a part four about we fielded questions from subscribers and I could just kind of tie up loose ends. Man, I don't want

to tell you your business with content. Okay, Yeah, I appreciate that, man, And I hope this wasn't too lake scattershot, but yeah, I prefer that, man.

YouTube it's at Thomas TV. Also excuse me. Also links from my website alwayso links from substack seeking you shall find I'm I I dropped a video sit rep today on my substack, not because I love hearing myself talk, but I felt I owed the subscribers an explanation for kind of where we're going with things, So I, if you are a subscriber, please check that out. I take this very seriously and very personally, and I do not take a granted the love and support I get from

all of your people's. It's it's tremendous, Okay, but that's that's all I got.

the continent. You know, people don't really pay attention to continal philosophy, and in the way that they do, you know, kind of anglophone treatments of ethics and things. You know, both in concrete terms is applied to the world situation in any given moment, but also in more abstract terms, you know, postulating, you know, what is a legitimate active state, you know, what is permissible under conditions of war, things

like that. Something I think was more at least more sweeping in terms of what was being asserted than what was postulated during the historical strike was an Oldie's nineteen

ninety one book. It was It was a history of the twentieth century, okay, from essentially a right Hegelian perspective, and specifically specifically he talked about how the common nucleus of acts and historical phenomenon gave rise to three totally abnormal political cultures, and that was the Soviet Union, the Third Reich in Israel and a lot of people in this country, not so much in Europe for reasons that should be obvious, but a lot to people must understand

what Israel is like. I'm not saying that I'm speaking in purely objective terms, not at all punatively. I think they few Israel like they do like the independent state of Croatia or something, or like they view you know, even Ukraine like some kind of they think, Oh, a bunch of a bunch of Jewish people lived in the Middle East and decided they wanted their own state. That's

not how it developed. And it's also why there's tensions between you know, the ruling Leekud regime contra you know who the people they call the ultra Orthodox, as well as others. Like Zionism. Isn't just this organic move of you know, like nationalists mighty Jewish people indigenous to the

Middle East. It was very much a European ideology that came out of, you know, born up sort of like the intellectual culture of of people whose origins were in this we're in the pale settlement, you know, and who found their way kind of you know, far and wide in European urban centers and and and and and intellectual corridors, you know, whether you're talking about you know, Mensk or Berlin or Warsaw or Zagreb or wherever. But the whole idea was that for the Jewish people to survive like

as a race. And again this is you know, very much grounded in the kind of twentieth century sensibility of people's heritage being you know, born of blood and material quantities. You know, the idea was, well, the Jewish people need to stop being this kind of you know, they need to stop being this kind of nation without a country. We need a national state, you know, we need that that that that guards you know, Jewish racial blood at

all costs. You know, it's got to, uh, it's got to be premised on this kind of like communitarian you know, like like like military socialism. You know, it's got to uh, it's it's got to basically inundate people in this kind of new way of thinking. You know that Jews aren't habituated do owing to owing to their kind of peculiar heritage, not like like politically, I mean, you know, in the

terends of modes of life. And that's why for example, you know, and again I'm not I'm not saying this cunatively like why why why is why do people speak Hebrew? What is real? They'd be like if people like me said suddenly decided we're gonna start like writing and Viking rooms, Like why don't they speak Aramaic, you know, like why why don't they speak like Yiddish or even or even you know, whatever dialectic German was common to. It was

common to the Jewish ghetto, like white Hebrew. You know, like it's very much this is very much that kind of mythologize. It's like a view of themselves. Okay, And I'm not even saying that, like like and Zion go ahead.

the Jewish form of life. You know, that's very much a boring again of the same, the same historical, historically driven, uh ideological phenomena that that gave rise the you know Marxist Leninism and national socialism, you know, and that's one of the reasons Israel is anachronistic. Okay, and I don't want to go too far afield, but I'm writing some long form stuff right now about what I call the

German Cold War. You know, the DVR, they pursued an independent course in a lot of ways, I mean, very different than that pursued by you know, Crusiski's Romania or like Heuzyugoslavia. Like they were one hundred and ten percent in the worst offpack camp. And but you know, they

they were, they were, they were. They were kind of like more of a vanguard of the Stalinist perspective than even the Soviet Union was, and kind of fascinatingly and ironically, you know, as Gorbachev started implementing pera Strika, like the Socialist Unity Party in the d DR started banning Soviet publications that they considered to be like revisionists and not adequately orthodox in terms of the ideological line they towed. But one of the big the DDR, like the Cubans,

they pursued this aggressive revolutionary foreign policy overseas. You know, in the modern Syria is very much, very much owes to East German assistance and development, like everything from like a military doctrine to their kind of like mixed economy to you know, their to the kind of nomenclature that the Syrian Bath Party, which was very different than the Iraqi Bath Party. I mean, that's one of the reasons why they went to war with Saddam's at Iraq in

ninety one. But they were very much in some ways in some critical power political ways, you know, the progeny of East Germany and UH, the East Germans really targeted Israel, Okay, Like that's indisputable now, of course, the UH if you read stuff from the era on even some of these academic articles about you know, Cold War anti Semitism, like there were people at like the bottom Minehoff faction like they praised UH, like the execution of the Israeli athletes

at Munich, you know, like the Japanese army faction like they assaulted UH. You know, they assaulted the Israeli airport and stuff, and UH, I can't remember his name, but one of the guys who he wasn't a direct action operator, but he was kind of the court intellectual of uh

of the bottom Minehoff crew. He would openly call he would openly call Israelis like Youudenschwein, like literally Jewish pigs and like that was that was like unthinkable, It would be unthinkable to talk about like any other like population

like in East Germany. You know. But uh so there's something I mean obviously, I mean I I basically accept one hundred percent like Yaqui's paradigm about what happened in the Cold War and and how Zionism was the was it was the final catalyst to put you know, the Eastern Block and and the Israelis and arguably the Jews

as a people, you know, like an enemy footing. But it's but you know, the uh one of the things I was keeping Israel alive in terms of it's raised on Detra, but also in practical terms it's sort of conceptual existence was the Cold War. One of the reasons why Israel's having the problems it is now. It's not wokeism or what people seem to think, you know, like

in like these kind of commentary ists circles. It's not because people suddenly have developed some like you know, quote unquote like liberal idea of a Palestine and racism or something. I mean it might, I mean that there might be some aspect of that, but you know that nothing's changed in that regard. It's not like suddenly people are aware of the racial dynamic and they weren't, you know, ten

twenty fifty years ago. What happened was as as the Soviet Union and especially the Third Right, you know, like like fade into memory and there's just you know, and it's just not something that figures into people's conceptual horizon,

even historically in terms of living memory. You know, like this kind of like this literally like Jewish racial state, you know, talking about invoking these kinds of the apocalyptic kind of scenarios to rationalize why it's got to sustain this kind of bizarre and anomaloust existence and the kind of globalized planet like that doesn't people can't conceptualize that anymore,

you know. And one of the things, you know, like we talked about one of the things that killed the Soviet Union, you know, it wasn't just the fact that it's because I mean, like like authoritarian and dysfunctional regimes like Shambalon indefinitely or they can. I mean, it happens

all the time. Like what killed the Soviet Union wasn't that people didn't have freedom, or that it had a basket case economy, or that you know, it lacked popular legitimacy in a way that you know, could be could only be remedied by you know, over reliance on punitive measures.

I mean, those things didn't help any But at the end of the day, the class struggled paradigm as like an ontological reality, like regardless of like the credibility of that explanation for for human political life and sociological existence, regardless of whether there's any merit to that or not. The punctuated disturbances of of modernity, like you know, really really disruptive people's lives, you know, And that's one of the things that gave Marcus Leninism it's momentum as well

as its credibility. And when those conditions abated and people couldn't even really conceptualize of them anymore, you know, because two thirds of the population had been born after those occurrences took place, and things, you know, there's no longer a context of Sovietism you know, it's it's just pictating incoherent and in large part that's where Israel is now,

you know. And that's one of the things that's one of the reasons why the Holocaust narrative was so essential, because when that had this like monumental power, like totemic power, you know, regardless even even with the Inner German border no longer existing, and even even with the Cold War no longer dividing the planet, it could be said like, well, you know, the jew as a people, like Jewish people, qua Jewish people, you know, they were they were availed

the most catastrophic evil that ever existed. And you know this could re emerge at any time, you know, owing to the basic moral frailties of of of everybody else and their unique enmity towards the Jews as a people. So you know, Zionism is essentially like the defensive ramparts that they need, you know, Like, I mean, that's nonsense, but this had a tremendous totemic power. Again, I mean,

only to a number of variables. I don't think something like that could be I don't think something like that could be constructed now, like such an ideological narrative that had that kind of staying power, another kind of total and and was kind of that like totally insinuated into political life and get sexual terms the way that particular narrative was. But you know, you look at the history of Israel, can.

sodom and gomorrah. That that doesn't seem like it's going to work.

it's uh, it feels a basket case. What's also too, it's kind of the point I was making is that the people who are kind of like perpetuating Jewish life, you know, they're these like hard line religious elements who really aren't Zionists, Like they're super hardcore like in their

identitarian commitments, but not because of the Zionism. I think Zionism is nonsense, you know, and at worst they think it's you know, like blasphemous and like a kind of idolatry, you know, the it's uh, and then that's a whole other that's a whole other paradigm that's rather complicated.

know what I mean. Like it's not not because like racism real or something, or that it's not an essential component of identity and everything else, but that they can't just be like the exclusive basis of you know, your communitarian mandate, you know, because yeah, it just it doesn't, it doesn't, it doesn't lead anything other than other than some kind of superficial how much in neity it's you know,

like a mile wide and half an inch deep. But the what's also what people have to understand is that, you know, kind of the and I'll get into briefly, I'll kind of break down what white white multis description is apropos. I think a lot of people don't truly understand what happened in the nineteen forty eight war. But you know, Israel, Israel is always had a problem with getting people who are willing to go live there, like Israel's kind of a shithole. Like I'm not again, I'm

not saying that like, oh fuck those people. I'm saying, do you want to go Do you want to go live in some uh? Do you want to go live in in some unstable uh? In geostrategic terms, you know, like densely massed, like like overpopulated, uh, you know, country in the desert where you know, the cost of living basically to to to afford the kinds of luxuries we're used to in America. And you know the e or Japan, you know, can be astronomical depending on the world situation.

You know, where you know it's your day to day activities are kind of limited by the security situation, which is which is one of like permanent emergency. And also again too, it's not we're not talking about We're not talking about like a guy who you know, was born in Japan or like born in Spain or something like going back to the old country. Like Israel is an

ideological state, you know, like it's not. Again, it's not it's not kind of like the Jewish way of law because it's been for you know, thousands of years in the EU eas just like fully realized or something. So there was always this problem with getting people to move to Israel, you know, and that was one of the reasons for the huge push of the jag and Vanic Amendment, you know, which was obviously premised done you know, the need to treat Jews as a refugee from Soviet anti Semitism.

You know, nobody actually believed that, you know, Brezhnev or and drop what was gonna subject these people to a program. The the underlying impetus was this is a way to literally get people to Israel, you know, like the Soviets, you know, basically like basically like bribing the Soviets to to the hand out visas for free you know, to

any to any ethnic Jew within Soviet borders. You know, but they're but but they're you know, they're they're they're only with the understanding that their destination was Israel, you know, I mean that. And on top of that too, you know, I've always maintained one of the reasons where a Bean was murdered, uh and Ehud Barak, who's a pretty sensible guy. He's he's he's kind of a man without allies, because I mean he was he was just like a hard line,

like IDF military guy. So people on the left, including you know, like Israeli labor types, don't like him. He's a hugely critical of Lekud. So these are cardcore designists

don't like him. But he all but admits that, you know, Barack was, Rabine was assassinated, and Raban was essentially going to end in the permanent emergency, you know, but they but Israel sees to to exist and that emergency ever goes away, you know, Like I'm not even saying this is consciously within the within the contemplation of of of the inner party of Leekud or something I think some people understand this very well, you know, and on a

very conscious level. But you know, Israel needs that. They need the they need the threat of existential siege. They need the threat or at least the the conceptual specter, realistic or not, so long as it's so long as it has credibility within the minds of you know, the national community. There this this idea that you know, they're facing oblivion unless uh, you know, they they remains, they sustain this constant vigilance that's uh facilitated by you know,

this this kind of like spartan socialism. You know, that's without that, Israel doesn't have anything, you know, without that. It's it's it uh, it's it's going to like evaporate into the pages of history, you know. And I think that's inevitable, but its and it's already happening. But that's that's what that's what Nolty was getting at about Israel.

And that's hugely important and I mean, just like briefly too, like for people who don't accept what accept that whole kind of the whole kind of paradigm, you know, the

the nineteen forty eight war. Well, first of all, as as any Zionists, so enthusiastically remind you the Arab forces and being and the men with real comet experience, they'd either been the ops to the British Empire or they've been fighting on the side of the Third Reich, you know, and including the move the al Husseini who was had been branded a war criminal and had fled Berlin at the eleventh hour, and you know, was was basically it was basically like living a living a vagrant life of

a wanted man or an tenorantal life or ether. So there's a unique vulnerability in terms of in terms of the Arab popular a Palestine and their ability to defend themselves, you know, at least contra their their's Zionists adversaries. What we think of as like the nineteen forty eight uh War or the you know, the Deliberation War or the War of Israeli Independence or whatever court history calls it, were essentially talking about Hagana's what they called Plane D,

which was the ethnic cleansing of Palestine. Even though it was clear they were going to get their way in some sense with the UN partition, Truman was not enthusiastic about it. And ironically, the only people who were were the Soviet Union, and that rapidly they were there were Soviets rapidly reversed course on that. But that's outside the

scoreboard is talking about right now. But the uh Hagana Ergun, this this stern gang, they all they all realized that even if they got even if they got like you know, fully half of uh the land in question, they still

had a demographic problem. You know, they still they still have their backs against the wall in terms of you know, as regards to the bounty rationaley of what they were trying to accomplish, and that was, you know, a Jewish racial state where in you know, the entirety of a Manic Palestine was in their hands, you know, demographically, militarily and otherwise. So in in March nine and forty eight, Plan D kicks off and Zionist paramilitary elements. This was

the first time they were under a unified command. Really, uh. All the Palestinian Arabs had was they had the al Kadar al Husseini and a man named Hassan Salom. They succeeded in cutting the road look can tell Aviv and Jerusalem, and had there been the forces in being to assault, they might have had the man power to seize Jerusalem, and that would have been a game changer in my opinion.

But because it may, Designers leadership realized they they had to act systematically, and they had to act now, not just because of the possible Palestinian offensive to preempt what they were planning, but they discerned that there might very well be a change in the in the international situation, in particular kind of like washing the DC's mood towards

the concept of a Jewish state. And you know, just as as kind of the Cold War hardened in terms of you know, the nation and alliance structure, they thought that their ambitions would probably be sacrificed. I mean, you can argue that either way. But again in terms of what in terms of in terms of Zionism as an idea, you know, and like we talked about in Noblty's view, which I think is correct, ideas of their own animating force. You know, this design Is project had to be seen

through or would die, especially at that juncture. So the the Clindic of pales Dye it really went into full operation in April and May of forty eight. It had

two and really only two like basic objectives. The first was to swiftly and systematically take any any installations at Vaca by the British civilian, military or infrastructural you know, to occupy them, repurposed them as the infrastructure for the NASA state and in the short term, you know, employ them and as needed and you know, the duration of the military operation at hand, which also gave them a

huge advantage. They also they were able to facilitate this because there was a minority of prosign as British officers on the ground and there's still this element you know in the British ruling establishment which and people could run entire valumes under. Why that is, you know, especially in this era, especially in the era in question, when British soldiers and civilians had died at the hands of Urgun and other Zionist elements. I mean this, this completely stupefies me.

But there was enough support on the ground for Zionists among the British garrison which was in the process of bugging out. You know that this this eased them the kind of tactical burden on accomplishing these things the Palestinians had no I had no such advantage, okay, and they're

also again you know, the palaest what was the Palestinian leadership. Uh, they were access adjacent, you know, so they were if they were wanted men and if they weren't formally wanted, you know, they they certainly would have become targeted if they re emerged. You know. So this idea that oh the Palestinians are just you know, just they're just fools. There's just you know, savages who couldn't mobilize. That complete bullshit, regardless of anybody feels about the Palestinian cause or anything,

that's just not that this is not true. The second and the most important obviously aspects or ambition of a plant d and of the war. Generally, it was to ethnically cleanse what was to be the future Jewish state of as many Palestinians as possible. The main direct action element of the Zionis was Hagana, which had several brigrides. They had several brigades. Each each brigade was assigned a village or a township to occupy, and almost all of

these villages were ordered to be destroyed. And you know, the people, the people expelled or or outright killed, and uh, some of these uh. This led to some difficult situations, especially in mixed areas where there wasn't great support for the Zionist cause. I think for obvious reasons, where you know, you had you had, Zion's paramilitary is literally extricating people's Arab neighbors. In some cases they're inner marriages and things,

you know, like very ugly stuff. There was the most uh, what really was kind of a game changer in terms of in terms of world opinion as well as in in terms of what we truly radicalized, not just the Palestinians that ground, but sympathetic Arab regimes, especially those populated by you know, by Sunnies, and you know, Palestine is

a Sunni majority. April twentieth, auspicious date, nineteen forty eight, the dry Yasin massacre and Haifa had Gana assaulted Haifa and everybody, everybody was everybody was killed, regardless of age, sex, overall health, you know, women and children, it didn't matter. And it was it was very it was very chaotic. There's some reports of trophy taking from the dead, mumulation of the dead, like people taking noses and ears. There were reports that were phileral substantiated of of of young

girls and women being raped. This was not This was not some well executed you know, like clean kind of like idef operation or something. Okay, it was. It was an ugly and brutal rasc and cree in all the

worst ways. And the response to that was as this kind of as world opinion kind of became outraged by this, you know, Desigonist leadership, they took to these kinds of they took to these sort of performative endeavors of you know, publicly encouraging Palestinians to remain in these mixed areas, you know, saying you know, you'll have come to any harm, and you know, everybody's rights are going to be honored in

the future Jewish state. I mean, which was I mean, even if that was sincere on the art of political cadres, I do not reason I think it was. But I mean, let's say it was. You know, the situation on the ground was what it was, and it had its own momentum and it couldn't be stopped at that point in my opinion, you know. But all told, all told, about three quarters of a million Palestinians were you know, expelled from the land. You know, probably about twenty thousand people

were killed outright. And again this was not excluding the military age males. Quite the contrary. It was, you know, categorically but that you know, the h and again the the British had an arms embargo on Mandate Palestine. Truman again was no friends of the Zionist regime. I mean, even after you know, victory was declared in May of forty eight, Truman issued it the fact of recognition that you know of the zign Oft state, you know, but

he refused a dejiree acknowledgment of their legitimacy. The Soviet Union was the first state to provide that. And the designist elements in the ground, you know, Haganah first among them. They'd gotten the small arms that they were able to procure real largely from the East Block, you know. And it goes to show you how the reason why Moscow envisioned Israel Zionist Israel, is being adjacent to them ideologically,

I mean part of it is. I mean it is because again I mean an old these points you know, Zionism wasn't is the progeny of the same nexis of causation as where the other you know, great European ideologies

of the twentieth century. I mean, I believe where Stalin was sitting, he probably viewed he probably viewed the treatment of the Palestinians and the way that he viewed his own treatment to the nationalities, and well, you know this, this is a way of creating a tabula rocess that you know, some kind of Israeli socialism can be built, you know. And the reason why, and again I mean the the reason why that was an idea that could be entertained, you know, and Stalin was the consummate realist

and it wasn't plumbing prone to flights of fantasy. It made sense why you would think that, you know, but ultimately developed you know again too, with the East Block being uh, you know, rapidly anti Zionists, and and the DDR carrying on and like literally an active war against the Jewish state, you know, I think that, I mean, that's that's demonstrative of Nolty's point two. I mean, all all this stuff, I don't see how people can reject the kind of the kind of Hegelian view of history.

I mean, with some qualifications, obviously, when they look at how these things actually developed, you know, I mean, we're not We're not just talking about arguments between historians and kind of academic I've retier cloisters, you know, we're talking about you know, war and peace phenomenon that actually developed and was just positive and in terms of the outcome of.

You know, it was because on some level everybody discerned that there was something unseemly about Zionism, you know that not not because like it's Jewish or not not because you know of anything intrinsic to the Jewish character. If people make that case that they want, I'm saying, that's not what that that's not why it was a kind

of natural target the Soviet propaganda. It's because the the first half of the twentieth century was it was was catastrophic that was left saying, okay, and even somebody who doesn't accept in an ethical or or conceptual terms, you know, the claims the International War Crimes Tribunal Nuremberg or the claims of you know, coreni historians who posit this, you know, thunder Big theory of Germany and in folcdof Hitler is as some kind of a it's some going to stand

in for Lucifer. Even somebody doesn't accept that at all, you know, saying you've got to accept this sort of exceptional state that's premised on this sort of like rabid racial nationalism, the structures of which, although superficially similar to familiar ones, are basically all oriented towards, you know, the maintenance of this totally abnormal, you know, sociological and military paradigm.

You just got to accept all this, you know, because it's essential going to you know, these uh, and the reasons presented are things that you know kind of like remind people the darkest kind of like the darkest times, the Inner War years, and and what was suggested is as being necessary for the survival of the race or

or the assent in working class or whatever else. I mean, it's not something that people wanted to think about, you know, and it's not something that people felt comfortable with, you know, kind of raising at the banner of legitimacy, regardless of they felt about or if they had any opinion about, you know, like Jewish people and Zionism. And that's some and that's also something Nolty said in one of his

last collection of essays. He said that ultimately, you know, Zionism has to either fulfill it's sort of internal mission, you know, as a monumental idea. It's not historically contingent, you know, because Nulty agreed with Carl Schmid in that regard and Heideger you know, I I I ideas of their own self attained revelation, you know, and that's either

realized or it's not. And in the case of Israel, that's only realized really by some kind of an end sigue and the end in in in in context, that would that would basically mean, you know, the the annihilation of the Palestinians as a people, you know, is that possible today? I mean physically, yeah, is there the political will there. I mean to your point about Israel being I mean not to sound like some sort of like Marxist or something, but is is it? Is it fatally

compromised by its own internal contradictions? Like yeah, I think actually maybe it is. But even were it not, you know, I think, uh, I don't think they could. Uh I don't think. I don't think the Israelis can start categorically exterminating the people at Gaza any more than in nineteen eighty resident could have assaulted Poland, you know, like the Soviets did Hungary in fifty six, Like this would have been like unthinkable considering the state of not even just

like world opinion. It's like conceptually like what people can tolerate, you know, morally, But.

to people. So yeah, exactly exactly, like why And that's the point it make of people too, you know, like when people like me or you know, some of our right wing Palestinian and Iranian and Lebanese friends, when they raise the issue is raelly race racialism, they're not saying like, oh,

Israel is they're real racialists. What they're saying is that the regime tells you that everything Israel does is utterly unacceptable in all cases, but Israel, Like that's the point, Like the point isn't on its own terms, like is racism bad? That that's totally that there's nothing to do with it. It's why this special pleading and you know, and and and even and and even notwithstanding that, like

why is this such an impat narrative? You know, like you can't make the claim like people did during the Cold War, that this is an absolute strategic necessity because for better or worse, you know, America was in the Cold War and its enemies were you know, the client

states of the Soviet Union, which were Israel's enemies. Now, how much that over to the fact of America provoking these circumstances and not practicing balanced diplomacy and regardless whether the Cold or Whipment fought or not, Like that's not important because like America was in the Cold War and take like nineteen sixty seven or seventy three, you know, like the die was cast. You know, it's not as if like the brakes could be put on the geo

strategic situation as it had developed. So yeah, there's you're absolutely right. Yeah, that's about There's some other stuff want to take up, but again it's it's it's I kind of want to conclude this like multi discussion, so I want to say that for next time I want to

do I haven't decided yet. I'm I'm I'm rereading the Sims Excuse me, I'm sorry biography of Hitler, which raises really important concepts, including you know, Hitler contract Roosevelt, and Hitler's understanding of America as not just you know, Germany's primary addressary, but also of you know, the like like the future of this planet hinging on you know, the ability of civilizations to constitute themselves as superpowers, and how like Europe is coming up short, you know, in every

in every category of criteria contra America. And this wasn't just a question of a practical of a military ambition or or a practical war planning and things that it had to do with the entirety of Europe's historical mission and which would, in Hitler's mind, would either succeed or Europe would simply perish. And to understand that is essential

understanding Hitler and the war. It's essential understanding Roosevelt. And that that the fact that Roseneld and Hitler and their radio addresses were always like in dialogue with each other, you know, not with Churchill, not with Stalin, not you know, with not with the world generally, so we could I was playing with.

underscore Thomas seven seven seven. That's substack dot com. Because we've launched season two of My Phaser, I'm gonna make the season one content free. I'm gonna I'm probably gonna do that on Monday, like like all season one, you'll be able to ask it for free. I may or may not upload it to YouTube or rumble, but for now you can, Like you don't need any special app for any thing you can just listen on. Just go go to substack dot com and anything that's that's that's

not by a paywall. I mean you can just click it and listen to it. But yeah, that's that's that's what I got.