The Gulf War 1990–91 w/ Thomas777 - Complete

constituted in nineteen fifty. And this this dude who follows to say it lea. He's like, did yack you have a did he render like a similar diagnosis to the United States, like, you know, colloquially speaking, And I told him no, because generally the kind of thing is a fool's errand you know he's like, no, I understand that that's not like a dumb question at all, Like it's in short form, don't like it as it's impossible, can they tone, I wasn't being flipping about that at all.

It's a good question. But the reason why, I mean, Yaqui definitely in absolute terms would not have viewed and did not view the American system as long for this earth.

But there's something peculiar about communism. I mean, there's all kinds of peculiar things about it, but it was more contrivance than other ideological experiments, like obviously arguably it was the only true sort of top down is sociopolitical experiment at scale that uh there really is, I think not not uh pressing for it, the Soviet Union, not just because the peculiarities of you know, the epoch you know, the the nineteenth century into the into the twentieth century,

it but also just the process that the process of of of of dialectic itself, you know conceptually and philosophically as well as in you know, concrete material developmental terms. There's processes that must be left to develop spontaneously in order in order for any in any in order for any political structure at scale to to stand itself. Okay, Like what do I mean by that? What really killed the Soviet Union in terms of its internal constitution was

the information age. Okay. If you abolish the price mechanism as a sort of the signaling variable as it were for for uh, you know, developed for for for for innovation and development, you're you're essentially always reverse engineering whatever your whatever your adversaries are able to construct and innovate

and develop. You know, Like why is that? Well? I mean, think about it like this, if I if we corralled, if we created some think tank of say like you know, Elon Musk and uh and you know a handful of uh you know, like uh like top finance, some players you know, like Goldman Sachs types, you know, and then and then you threw some uh you know, you know, you throw some like applying engineering uh prodigies or applied engineering prodigies into that you a hypothetical group from like

m I T. You know, would uh and you just told them okay, like think of dynamic ideas, you know, would they eventually where they eventually innovate kind of like the next big like telecom breakthrough or like the next or the next kind of generation, uh, you know, like electric car. I mean, I that's not the way things work.

Some variant of that was done vis a vis the Apollo program, and in military matters that is the way things are done, because you're the data set you're operating from is the capabilities of the other side, the probable exigencies, you know, things relating to the theater that you're likely to fight in, and you know what capability is going to lend themselves to, you know, waging. We're in that theater.

But I mean basically you're you're, you're you know, your your your data set is actual is actual combat, which generally in some capacities underway and low intensity you know, kind of on every continent, you know, perpetually. But in terms of like major wars, you know, basically once you're at war, I mean, that's kind of your laboratory, okay, as it were, And that can't be over emphasized as

the fundamental weakness of the planned economy. You know, in the Soviet Union, did innovate a computer in the Eisenhower Cruise I eff era that was advanced as anything in the UK and America. But you know, thirty years later there was a grand total of less than five thousand computers in the Soviet Union. Like why they didn't know how, they didn't know what function it was best suited. Do you know? They had some sense in basic terms that

this is fundamental to command and control. But you know, you can't just you can't just predict like some kind of augur you know, what role like new revolutionary new technology is going to be best applied to in in in absolute terms, you know, for whatever purpose you know it uh now extrapolate that kind of stagnant tendency, that literally stagnant tendency, you know, kind of every conceptual endeavor, and you have Marxist Leninism, you know, and related to that,

but not you know, solely approximately caused by that, is that the whole concept of you know, this this this uh this intrinsically hostile labor and and and capital paradigm, you know, and the kind of the strange sociology of cities literally being you know, barracks for you know, hundreds

of thousands of of uh of of factory workers. You know that sustain you know that this kind of terrestrial like national manufacturing economy of of value added exports like that that belongs long at a discreete moment in time, and building a kind of entire socio cultural structure around that. You're you're doing yourself to being kind of frozen in in in that in that moment. You know, that's that's the reason why. And I mean there's also in my opinion,

like spiritual matters. I mean that quite literally, you know,

that make it not sustainable number one. But also I identify glaring frailties within the system as it existed, even to people who are basically secular, this was a parent That's why even people who were not Catholic and not even religious, you know, very much behind John Paul the second and you know his efforts to to you know, weaken the the the grip of the party states, specifically on Poland, but and all the captive nations as they were called. You know that had with a communist party

had a soul claim the power. But that's that's why even even thinkers far more kind of orthodox and they're thinking than YACKI understood this. George Kennan, who have a whole lot of respect for as I think people know, he made that point again and again, and he was criticized for it roundly by you know what was then the equivalent of deep state types and you know, Zionus types who just hated the Soviet Union for their own

kind of ethno sectarian reasons. You know, same people who who've got this kind of sanguinary hated to Russia today, but also just guys who you know, they're they're whole kind of raised on detro and the way they made a living was by discussing the Soviet Union as this you know, perennial and immutable and and just insurmountable feature,

this rateging landscape. You know, if you're if you're a second rate academic, but you've uh, you know, but you've you've found every profitable niche for yourself as this kind of public intellectual who's you know, protecting the country from this insidious threat. I mean, think of it. It's kind of like this the geostrategic equivalent, like at doctor Fauci. You know that's a sovietologists were okay, like are they

were they gonna? I mean, I think a lot of these people didn't have any meaningful understanding of of of the situation or of communism. But even those they did, they had no interest in in, you know, raising the possibility that this system has an expiration date. You know, not to be flippant about it, but the book Cybernetics by by Winer Uh it was published in nineteen forty eight, and that term is uh something that centered in people's

vocabulary from you know, science fiction and stuff. But it's an actual it's a meaningful term in in uh, in neuroscience and and applied logic and you know, AI and and all kinds of interdisciplinary fields that relate to decision making, particularly that which you know involves the interface of a human decision maker in a machine and various capacities. Okay,

I raised that. I raised that text because again it the first the first edition was published in nineteen forty eight from a really uh really really to Die was cast in terms of the Soviet Union's fate immediately after the cessation about civilies in World War Two. It's not to say it was it was inevitable the Soviet Union was going to lose the Cold War, not at all.

I made the point and the first one to make the point again and again that the Soviets very were very well situated in the strategic terms to win the Cold War, and arguably they taught the raison detra for that was in part you know that fact, and it was the Washington establishment coming to terms with the reality that you know, Warsaw Pact was winning on the battlefield.

So I'm not suggesting the contrary, but my point is again to kind of bring it back that that there were basic frailties and peculiarities in the Soviet system and you will not find, uh, you will not find another example of of a literally like planned society in that way. And this is this is the point from where Yaqui was speaking, moving ahead in large measure, with some exceptions that uh, I think are kind of obvious to everybody, and that don't really need to be fleshed out discreetly.

Every state, every modern state, you know that that that emerged as at least a nominally independent sovereignty after the Second World War, UH was created by by the Cold

by by the dialectic of the Cold War. Okay, even UH, even if even even those states that adopted a third position his orientation, they were doing so in dialogue with the Cold War contra the ideological paradigm they're in which they viewed as O they're existentially menacing due to them being forced to pick a side and what could very easily become, you know, a general nuclear war, you know, or owing to you know, fear of a kind of

cultural contamination that pretty much everybody formally aligned with out of the you know, the NATO or the socialist camp ran the risk of is they availed themselves to you know, the kind of kind of openness to the you know, to to the one superpower or the other. Iraq was no exception. To understand why America went to war with Annam's Iraq, It's that what I just describe needs to be accounted for in basic terms beyond the superficial. And

to understand why America was sort of so focused on Iraq. Oh, it's this too. The Iran Raic War was the progenitor of what became the Gulf War of nineteen ninety one. If I could bring it up on my screen, I bring up the notes from Saddam's meeting with his war cabinet on the eve of war in nineteen eighty before giving the order to go to war with uh The

Islamic Republic of Iran. Basically, uh, everybody from uh you know, these these Arabists like Saddam was, these these Pan Arab you know, nationalists to uh you know, you know, to the to these these radically pious uh you know Salafi types, you know, like bin Laden, you know, to uh, you know, to Zionists in Israel, to uh, to these American on

Cold War functionaries like Rumsfeld, Nick Cheney. The thing they all agreed on, in gewostrategic terms was that the sort of natural power arrangement in the Near East, it's a struggle between Turkey and Iran for regional supremacy. That that's what's precedented, you know for a millennia, going back to when you know it was the it was the Ottomans who who defeated the Mongols in the Near East and in person for all time. You know, Thus the the

Caliphate being a Turkish caliphate, an Arab one. Iran despite being a basically kind of like inward looking civilization, and it is in some ways of civilization into itself. It is a huge country with a very powerful heritage and culture. Doesn't matter. Anybody who's gonna tuned in to our you know, partisan community. I shouldn't need to elaborately make that case, but just uh, in raw strategic terms at least, you know,

accounting for limitations of power rejection capability. There's this great potential in Iran. Okay, and Saddam again being very much uh the creature of the Cold War conceptually, he was trying to accomplish what NASCAR had failed to do, and and create a genuinely Arabist block, you know, with the Bath Party as the as the catalyst. But he had to tread very carefully with you know, adopting any appearance

of sectarian prejudice or motivation. The Iraqi Bath Party it had Christians and key places, Tarika z one of them. It had Shia in in high roles, particularly some in the military, but at base it was a Sunny party. It was a party of the Sunni minority. Okay, Saddam Uh. Saddam's agrievances that Iran went way back the Algiers agreement that had been signed with the shop Uh was considered

this kind of a victory. M see you of of types, interestingly, and it had allowed both Iran and begged they had to save face with these territorial swaps that seemed to be the kind of remaining conflict diads potentially between the two countries. The Iranian Revolution changed everything. You know, we talked before about how nobody really foresaw Islam becoming this power plant will force this animating principle, you know, particularly, uh, the late Cold War was still very much the Cold War.

Arguably there's a more kind of earnest ideological bent in you know, seventy nine eighty than there had been any time prior to you know, the Eisenhower Arab you know, and and but this was not something anybody was really

thinking about. And the seizure of the Grand Mosque also in nineteen seventy nine, we're in these radical Salafis, you know, occupied uh, the Grand Mosque of Mecca for weeks, you know, demand demanded the advocation of the House Assad for you know, being at odds with being at odds with with Allah and a false Maslem the uh. They went as far the Grand Mosque occupiers, they went as far as the claim that their leader, I can't remember his name at

the top of my head, I'd a written down. They went as far as the claim that he was the Madi you know, the messianic uh historical figure would emerge, you know, as as prophesied by Muhammad. I mean, so this was this was profound stuff underway. Okay, people who have a kind of cynical view as well as others who just I think I'm kind of an incomplete understanding going to their own probable conceptual biases as regards will disbelief.

Just generally, Uh, they had to look at this as no big deal, or they look at it as Saddam just being terrified of some kind of general uprising, and Iraq not even so much against the Bath Party, but just this this kind of radicalized this a lot of consciousness, you know, sweeping him and his comrades aside. I don't really think that was it. I think there was great fear, the kind of the fear that you know, sectarian minorities have of the program wherever they uh where wherever they're

situated where you know, that's a realistic possibility. I think, uh, some had a more nuanced view of it than simply this is something needs to be quashed less you know. Uh, it kind of become the defining ideological currency of of of the Arab speaking world on some level, I believe like all Sunnis, and Sam was a Sunni Maslim UH.

There they felt even more gravely affronted UH at the concept of h An Iranian Shia caliphates than you know, they had been centuries prior to you know, the inception of the Turkish Califate, and so all these things conspired to kind of korem Iran Iraq towards war, and the United States and NATO, particularly the Buddhas Republic were very much behind this. I made the point again and again,

you know, and again. I can't cite precise numbers because I can't call it my notes, but the it was around fifty thousand people who UH who died owing to uh Iraqi chemical weapons assaults on Iran. Most of them are soldiers. Despite what, despite the impression people have oing to you know this, you know, the kind of endlessly repeated narratives about the Kurds, and those people did die. I mean they there was plenty of civilian attrition, but

it was primarily military attrition. About twenty thousand of that number died outright in the field. You know, these were Iranian troops who were hit with chemical munitions. A lot of nerve agent and then modern nerve agent. Nobody's really sure like what it would do. A fair amount of this nerve Asian was procured from NATO countries. Ireneians soldiers were treated in Europe, in Scandinavia, some in Germany, some of the Benelux countries. I mean, part of that was

genuine doctor without borders, like doing their thing. Part of it was a hot war in Europe. Definitely, chemical weapons, they're not obsolescent. They're actually quite utile, depending on the depending on the battle space and a general a general war between uh NATO and Warsaw Pact in nineteen eighty it's almost, I mean, it's a very on conclusion that

chemical weapons would have been used. So the world is watching the Iran Iraq war, okay, for all kinds of reasons, some of which, uh you know, some which owing to very concrete for kind of purely military matters, others relating to the political ones. And this idea that saidam this deranged maniac and he only enjoyed the large guests of of the United States and the bundest Republic and in

London because the Iranians were even worse deranged mediacs. I mean that that's that's that's garbage for all kinds of reasons, and only literates think that way. But also, sadamza Raak, it was a brutal state, it was a gangsterish regime. But I mean a lot of regimes were like that, A lot of regimes are like that. That America backed the ultimate megaciityl gangster regime in World War two and

stalin Soviet Union. So I mean it's not really sam Za rag was remarkable in the sense of how we're where and when it was historically situated, and you know, the kind of the global power plays that became involved in in a very direct and catastrophic capacity. But there's not something like weirder extreme excuse me, in any sense that Sadam Sane enjoyed the backing of them, of the US and and and certain key uh needle players. And

it's uh. The minutes from the meeting between Saddam and the Bath War Council, what amounts to the Bath War Council, he's talking about restraints like not in uh not not in like a Ronald Reagan kind of way or something, but he's saying like, we don't want a wider war than what we need in order to you know, situate ourself, uh in the position we want to be contra Iran. You know, we don't want this to turn into a

prolonged war. We don't want it to become a wider war where among the thanks God forbid Iran, could you know, potentially shore up sympathy of of of of other Moslim states, you know, like these are not there's not like the ramblings of some idiot or it's not it's not it's not some belieguer dictator who's suing for war in lieu of the status quo, because that's its only path of survival, you know, and that's key, you know. And it's also

Iran fought a lot better than anybody thought. And obviously they hung on for almost a decade, you know, getting pounded by the Iraqi army that was throwing everything it had at them, quite literally. They you know, America was saying in the epoch, uh, you know, State Department and CIA and I think Defense Intelligence probably had a more realistic grasp on things. But it's the same, it's the

same nonsense they always say about states and regimes. They don't like that this regime is about the fall aparts. Everybody is starving there. You know, it had the revolutionary government has no popular support. You know the moment, you know, the moment hostilities commenced. You know they're all going to surrender and the regime is going to collapse. I mean, this was you know this, this is always the alibi.

But it's incredibly it's it's remarkably foolish because if Iran, you know, like I, this is probably the only time you'll hear me cite fu Co in appraising capacity. But he he wrote this dispatch one of if you're kinda purely like journalistic, at least in structure, you know, dispatches he ever released for at least for wide publication. It was about the Rnian Revolution and it was frankly insightful. And he said, this is a genuine third way. This

is a genuine pop popular revolution. But it's not something that's just going to burn itself out, so to speak, once the immediate catalyst revolution fervor is gone. You know, he's like, for better or worse, these people have, these people have a very highly developed a vision for what they are trying to do. It is in fact precedented it's uh, you know, it appeals to a wide swath of people, you know, demographically. This is something that needs

to be taken seriously, you know. And he was speaking obviously in the context of you know, the Asdyton was ending, okay, but he was kind of a lone voice in the wilderness.

And it's weird. I mean, aside from the fact that you know, he was kind of a later date desad and a lot of what he produced in addition to just being you know, kind of grossly morally offensive and up to so it was just plaining, like not insightful, and it was wrong, particularly on matters of you know, power, politics and kind of human affairs and of a political nature.

But whatever reason, he was absolutely right about that. Okay that perhaps wren't some speculation at some point the dedicated capacity, but he was absolutely right. So they ran Iraq war became just like a disaster. You know, neither I ran or Iraq ever recovered from it, because you know, you don't recover from eight years of total war, okay, and

if you do, eventually, you're not the same. Particularly, I mean, when you're when you're talking about the when you're talking about when I ran in Iraq on the late twentieth century, I got scale, Like though it's it some it's like what I just stated as a constant pretty much regardless, you know, but particularly particularly for states of that of that size, I ran was a lot bigger than I racked. My point is, neither was a superpower or anything. Yeah,

I'll see what can be done. Yeah, I'm sorry about that. I was like, I'm trying to think of, like exactly where I was when I left off.

the recording picked up or not. I made the point that although he was very careful not to characterize the conflict in sectarian terms, owing to the reality that you know, his party was a Sunni majority party and the sea of of Shia Muslims, but also that would have compromised, uh, you know, his entire raizo and deetro and political life, you know, which was the created genuine Arabism rit large

as a mobilizing catalyst. And whether people whether they you know, and and and the Iraqi bath tried to carry whether whether it was Saddam himself, whether it was the Ministry of Information, or whether it was the Warp Cabinet. They tried to characterize it as a as as a racial conflict,

especially as things went bad after nineteen eighty three. You know, where the Arab people like fighting like the Persian other or like the Aziri you know uh of alien whether like Iraqi people like bought into that anyway or not. I don't really think they it didn't matter. They definitely were afraid of Iranians. They definitely they definitely viewed h revolutionary Iran. Again, you know the history of the neress domination by the Turks, by the Iranians, Persians or both.

And even people who would have been basically had no issue in in ethno or racial terms with Iran. You know, the this emergent Islamic tendency as a catalyst for for political uh action and as a truly you know, significant power political catalyst on the world stage. Any Arab would have felt affronted by that, like this, you know, this should not like the Persians should not be leading this

this this charge you know, and that or that. No, you know, the first true Islamic state, you know, should you know, should it should be the it should be the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, you know, like it can't it can't be this like this, this Shia, you know, this Persian Shia state. You know of of Ayatolas and and you know Uh and Malah allers and things like. You know, so there was very much that too. And neither I react nor I ran ever recovered, because you

don't recover from a conflict like that. And you know that's why I set the stage for this, because it's so important going into August second, nineteen ninety. People pretend like Saddam USI was like this idiot or like some deranged madman. He was neither of those things. And because I think I finally got my notes back so I can check this document I want to do, I'm the minutes of Saddam H talking to is Uh to the bad War cabinet on on the eve of war, you know,

just before twenty second September nineteen eighty. He's Uh talking about how the Algiers, the Treaty of Algiers. You know, that basically allowed Iraq to preserve their honor. And you know that the Shah was a man we could work with, you know, but all bets are off as revolutionary regime. However, Sadam continued to he could. He kept emphasizing over and over again, this has to be a limited war. We've got to We've got to limit our objectives military and political.

This cannot be allowed to turn into a quagmire and nor we We've got to make it clear that this is, you know, an effort to create you know, a lib a livable strategic balance for Arab people. There's not some open ended war of conquest against Iran, you know. And and again he he had the full support of in in in military terms, you know, of uh, the United States, the Bundest Republic, you know, and basically the key players in NATO for a reason. You know, it's I don't

know if it recorded me or not. I mean, I don't know if it was recording me when when I talked about that season the Grand Mosque, Did I record that? Okay? Saddam, like everybody else in the world, his eyes were on Saudi Arabia on Mecca in nineteen seventy nine, as well as uh the Islamic Republic of Iran, the season the Grand Mosque. By this, the besieging militia they called themselves the Equan I'll equan, which is a reference to the the to the basic that Bedouins under her arms, who

played a part of establishing Saudi Arabia. They seized the Grand Mosque from November twentieth to December fourth. They declared that their leader, Al Katani was the Madhi literally the Madi, you know, like the Messianic figure and in Islamic theology, who you know, who ushers in Islamic victory. You know,

they this was something nobody saw coming. I mean not if you looked at It's like, okay, if you could look at if people were disposed to look at the Iranian revolution as this kind of outlier phenomenon and look at Shia Islam as kind of a strange thing, or look at the Shah's regime as this kind of brutal police state that you know, people were looking for something to grasp onto as a catalyst to bring it down.

You couldn't you couldn't suggest that about the season, the Grand Mass, the fact that you know, this was happening in the sunny world as well, this kind of burgaining Islamic consciousness that was translating to you know, real direct action in war in peace terms. This changed everything, you know. And this also this is again why Saddam he was cautious and uh not characterizing the conflict with Iran as as a sectarian conflict, you know, And basically, I mean

that was pragmatic. I mean obviously because uh the Iraqi Bath was a minority party of and and although they had she they had Christians, Utrikasas was a Christian in their ranks. They couldn't well afford to be viewed as as uh as as as sectarian bigots. But you know there's those who wellcome that kind of thing, even against odds that would appear in surmounted belowing the blood loss

or whatever else it. Uh So again, I mean, this idea that that Saunam was just this like maniac or or this buffoon does not the historical record does not bear that out. And that's what I got into, I think right before I cut out a couple of things, you know about the only time, the only This is probably the only time I'll ever say anything praising about fu Co. But fu Co he wrote this, uh dispatch on the Iranian Revolution because he was in Iran when

it was underway, and it was incredibly insightful. And again I I, I know, it's hard to believe that fu copenn anything, particularly something that was like, you know, then contemporaneous to the to the kind of strategic situation and and and the burgening kind of you know, political culture of of rite Islam. But uh, you know, he said, look, this isn't a flash in the pan sort of phenomenon.

You know, it's not It's not just a typical you know, revolutionary tendency dressed up in the language she is loam for cosmetic reasons or or because they you know, they want to keep the Soviet Union out as much as they do, you know, as much as they want to evict the Americans. You know from from pulling the strings

in Tehran. You know, it was very authentic, It was authentically felt, and it represented something different that you know, theretofore was not part of the part of people's conceptual horizon. As Detant came to an end, you know, there's profound things underway. And all of this coupled again with the fact that every Arab with UH you know, a political consciousness and with a concern and you know, historical terms the fortune of his own people. A revolutionary Iran or

just like uh an irridentist and and militarized Turkey. These are very ominous things, you know. The the UH Turkey and Iran a sort of the natural UH hedgemonds regionally. That's one of the reasons why, like people are obsessed

about Turkey and Iran. You know, whether it's these whether it's these kind of cynical Cold War fossils who stuck around like Rumsfeld and Cheney, whether it's you know, Zionist types, uh, these kind of like rabid Zionist that gets like Menahu or I mean like the the like the Arabist UH you know bath Uh revolutionary types like Sadamwa's. You know, there's the reason why the Israeli fixation and Iran like it. It deteriorates on certain points of policy vision and into

just like naked irrationality. Okay, but generally it's not it's uh, it's not without precedent to view again, the UH, the real like power players in the region as ah as, Turkey and Iran. But going into August second the uh AS, things started to go really poorly on the battlefield for Iraq. August ninety eighty three is not Iraq deployed chemical weapons for the first time in a battlefield capacity. All told,

throughout the war. In nineteen ninety one uh the CIA released its documents and so so did Defense and Defense Intelligence on the Iran Iraq war. It's pretty much agreed we all parties of about fifty thousand I ran to

talk about fifty thousand casualties only to chemical weapons. About twenty thousand of those casualties weere Iranian soldiers killed outright, you know, just like when they were hit or like mass Afterwards, the Iranqi's made liberal use in nerve gas nerve agent, mostly taboon and seren And make no mistakes by what people say, chemical weapons remain very utile depending on the nature of the engagement in the battle space.

And you better believe that it was clear to everybody on both sides of the wall, you know, Natal and Morris up Peck war players alake that if and when war came to Europe there would be liberal use of poison gas. Okay, So the strong attention was paid in both you know and in both the Eastern Bloc and and made always the what the impact was a chemical weapon is on uh on on modern infantry it I mean again, I guess I dropped that because it uh and and much and much, if not all, of these

chemical munitions were were supplied by NATO countries. Okay. At uh this was not some like rogue state action or something on that sort. But it this is uh this this, this was where Tandam was uh. This was the mindset. Okay. This was a conceptual situatedness of Sadam. The Iranqi bath kind of like the Arab street generally in the several Arab speaking Maslim majority countries going into August second, nineteen ninety. Also what had to have been on soams on Sadam's mind.

The Soviet Union still existed in August nineteen ninety, but the Berlin Wall was no more, the Cold War was over. There was still a huge potential for crisis. Arguably the world was you know, there was tremended danger afoot owing to instability and the fact that not any kind of meaningful disarmament had been accomplished, particularly in regards to nuclear forces,

unless you count the Intermediate Forces Treaty itself. But the Carter Doctrine, you know, which the Carter Doctrine, which you know, stated in no uncertain terms that any Soviet attack on any state in the Middle East, basically any hostile deployment, the United States would would treat that as an attack on his vital interests, you know. And it would, it would, and it would meet the attack with proportionate force. Okay, But the Carter doctor and absent the Soviet Union doesn't

really make any sense, you know. And it's not like there was some precedent for America just intervening in the Middle East just on just on basic terms, you know, or on its own terms. So from the perspective of Saddam, there was that too, you know. And finally, you know, America only ended UH the military draft in nineteen seventy three. The last time America deployed forces into an open ended coomic situation was Vietnam. The Democratic Party, their platform consistently

was hostile to UH military industrial interests. As a matter of course, the revolution and military affairs for as of all people like like the common man or woman are kind of are kind of ignorant military affairs anyway. But they had no concept of rima. They had no concept of what was different about, you know, uh, waging a counterinsurgency war with conventional elements like in South East Asia in a Cold war context, which axiomatically limited the operational environment.

They had no concept of why that is radically different than waging a conventional war in the desert against the country like Iraq. But there Americans were basically not enthusiastic about, uh about about military deployments and this idea of you know, just Congress signing off on some open ended deployment to wage a general war with Iraq, you know, to liberate a to liberate a country that was you know, this

kind of oil sheik kingdom like that. It was not for our include that that America was willing to go to war, and in fact, most people viewed it as unlikely that America would deploy, you know, at scale to accomplish as that.

And finally, what was essential even if the political will was there in America, even if you know, public opinion was one hundred percent behind it, even if there was a consensus on the Beltway even before a shot was fired, and anger you still want whoever that you know was in the old office would literally have to finesse UH. A coalition that quite literally had UH, you know, the Arab world one hundred percent behind America as well as

also them in the Soviet Union, agreed to stand down. Okay. Now, I'm not gonna sit here and pretend like Bush forty one was a good guy or that we should like him, or that you know, he was a man worthy of your my esteem or anything like that. Okay, but Bush was UH an incredible political operator, and he was an

incredible and chief executive within the bound of rationality of command. Okay, what he accomplished, I I can see Nixon point off, Okay, within a different context, but that's nothing sort of remarkable, and that uh, that is something that I believe will very much guarantee Bush forty one's legacy as at least a students like serious students of a political theory and of UH and of government as well as Warren Peace.

And that's one that's that's why I speak of Bush and what I know people at hag ME sometimes essentily just good natured ribbing for what appears to be, you know, some kind of like praise of like Bush, and I mean understandably, like why why would Ione say nice thing about the Bush family? But you know, I it doesn't matter what his politics were in this context. We're talking about the essence of executive decisionism and all of that. Let's let's take out the Gulf or proper in another episode.

If you're okay with that, I'm sorry if it's on my end. I mean, I'm sorry on my end, Like the Zoom we got food bar, I'll hop on my dad's machine.

by that. I'm not endorsing Bush's character or saying that I share what was his policy vision for the world, which in a lot of ways was a more restrained iteration of of of what the New Dealers saw, as you know, kind of the ideal configuration of world order. I think Bush forty one has something in common with Harry Truman. Frankly, he was a better warlord and they just like a more capable guy, you know. But he That's kind of the way to understand his policy vision

in great basic terms. Okay, his view for complex and independence and globalism was different. I mean, part of that ode to the different ep box in which they you know, were ascendant in terms of their own role. But part of it was just you know, Bush had a unique uh he he hit a unique concept that what globalism would look like that that And again I'm not I want to qualify this because people misunderstand, you know, I'm

talking about the about irrationality. I'm doing these things in the bout irrationality the goals of these actors themselves, Okay, and I'm juxtaposing that with the total kind of insanity and nonsensical like non policy that is, you know, characteristic

today of their regime. You know, it's not even it's not even so much today that you know, I'm out of the point in clintonon where like there was there was no foreign policy, you know, there was there was just this bizarre, uh destructive kind of scatter shot you know, collection of of of constellation of like military adventurism, you know, against the enemies of Israel and against other just kind of random states that you know, oh, owing to some

discreete interest group and their ability to bring pressure or to you know, localized economic interests you know, was targeted for destruction. But beyond that, there literally is no like meaningful foreign policy. I make the point again and again to people that people like Mike Pompeio or like Nicky Haley, like these people really are fucking morons, Like they're not they're not acting, you know, they're not dumbing down their language conceptually to trying appeel to like the common man

or woman. Like they really are like fucking idiots, Like they have no they have no concept at all of of of the world and power political or anything like that. So Bush, Baker, Scowcroft, even Cheney, and Cheney is a terrible person. But again, you know, we're not talking about the character of these people. You know, they they stand out and the kind of like the the the contrasting is a high relief of verbally speaking, but it's also

to the Gulf War other than Korea. Other than Korean War, it's really the only case of the United Nations functioning as it was inten function. Okay, so from one, Amazon two, and of course, like in the Korean War, the Soviet Union was boycotting the United Nations. So I mean, that's why the Security Council was able to bypass what would have been, you know, an inevitable Soviet veto or the

resolution to defend the Republic of Korea. The fact that Bush was able to get I mean, you gotta look at it like this, okay, from nineteen seven to facto, from nineteen seventy three onward, the Middle East became a conflict diad, the traversing of which, by hostile deployment by their you know, the United States to Warsaw Pact, led

to World War three. It was, it was declared the fact though a vital us deer of interest in nineteen seventy three, you know, when when uh it appeared as if, uh, the Soviet Union was going to deploy to relieve the Egyptian Army and prevent their destruction, you know, the United States UH then elevated the Defcon three. The Soviet Union, in turn, deployed nuclear warheads to the port of Alexandria.

They weren't married to their launch vehicles. They never came ashore, and UH, Gramco and USANOV undoubtedly, but Grimgo was certain advised, advised, uh, version of the you know, to to prepare for war basically you know, the deploy what with warsaw packs version of their rapid reaction for which which which technically was like a paratrooper elemental and nobody was like using parachutes

by then, you know, but they were they did. The Soviet Union did have an equivalent of a rapid reaction for US that deployed basically like uh, you know, the eighty second Airborne and that element attached to it did for the the Bright Star exercise bi annually. But I digress.

But the point is Middle East policy as regards warren peace became formalized by the Carter doctrine, you know, and uh Carter declared to know uncertain terms, you know, when when the Red Army assaulted Afghanistan that you know, any any Soviet ingress into the Middle East would would be treas an active war, you know, against the United States

and its allies. And so the fact that Bush was able to the fact that the fact that he was able to get the Soviets to sign on to a massive US deployment to the Arabian Peninsula and the fact that he was able to do so able not just to facilitate that, but to get the Soviets to agree to that deployment for the purpose of of engaging what had been a Soviet client state. That's incredible, Okay, And

it's uh, this is a very delicate minuet. And something we covered earlier in the series is that you know, Garbachew, whatever people can say about him, and I know a lot of patriotic Russian guys like like hate him, and I'm sure if I was Russian and I I had have strong feelings abound him. Two. Like, I'm not saying that's misguided. It's not for me to say that it's

their country and it's their culture. But what I will say is this, and what I do think I'm entirely qualified to say, a Gorchov wasn't just this kind of He wasn't just a cipher. He wasn't a stooge. You know, he wasn't just he wasn't some myrionette just kinda you know, stumbling into poor policy decision after poor policy decision and being like a letter around by by the Bush White House.

That's not true at all. And that's one of the reasons why he was you know, basically sandbag and removed from office you know, by in part by by Washington. So there's no it was not what again is there was not some guarantee that that that Grushoff would have equiesced to this. But also even if Grozov had been you know, a cipher in the order of what I described, there was still, ah, there was still the remainder of the party apparatus. There was you know, a hardline element

that you know, had to be placated. You know, there's the people who became uh, you know, the the Yelts infection that you know, which is complicated because Yelson in a lot of ways was that he was he was exactly that he was a cipher, but he but he too was accountable to people within the Soviet apparatus, particularly you know, decision makers within the national security apparatus, which is which, as we've established in concrete policy terms, had

outside cloud and power, you know, even even more so than than in the United States. That that kind of the peak of the kind of the peak of uh of Cold War hostilities, you know, So it's that that's got to be acknowledged both. You know, it's an indicator of Horss effectiveness again within within the bounds of you know, the policy decision, the policy challenges on the table, and the hospital decisions rendered they're in but also of Bush forty one, his ability to finesse uh this UH stuff.

And I know, I know again I can't. I apologize very sincerely for with the fact that it was my machine that you know, has screwed up connection or whatever last time. And so forgive me again if I'm repeating this myself. But another thing that I think has to be acknowledged is is that I'm saying was a more

complicated figure than is often acknowledged too. He really was, and some of the things he did that at the time spun as being you know, just just fool's errors, or you know, him being cast as is simply nothing more than a tinpot dictator who is more prone to who's who was less risk averse than than most of them. That's really that's really not the case either. There's a reason why Soviet relationship with Iraq was always troubled for

a time. UH. The UH this the Iraqi the Iraqi diplomatic UH mission was uh was was was banned from East Berlin because uh they taken it upon themselves, uh to uh one opportunity presented itself to murder people that they they wanted dead, like other Iraqi's. I mean like there's this one Iraqi Communist party functionary and uh Iraqi intelligence under light aotgomatic cover literally threw him off a

roof in East Berlin. There was some there's some student that dissident type who uh was was cozy with uh, you know, uh the communists, but who was uh, you know, an anti Saddam Zelat and uh some Iraqi's uh pulled up next to him when he was, you know, on foot around Pearl Marx's alley. He pulled him into a car. He disappeared, and then he washed up on a river bank, you know, with evidence of extreme torture and all kinds of horror mutilation, you know, having having been dead for

weeks and and in your stores somewhere. So finally, like finally, you know, finally like you're not you're not doing this anymore, you know, you're you're gone. And just the fact that the bath Thats were you know, actively actively at war with the Communists in some basic way. I mean I'm talking about like within Iraq, as they were consolidating their monopoly on power. I mean, that's that that that that's that axiomatically caused tension. But nevertheless, Iraq was a The

Soviet Union never had a true Arab client state. The only communist Arab state was South Yemen, the short lived South Yeman East State, and it was short lived, not because it didn't have legitimacy. Something that's fascinating to me now in in Uh, in the Yemen War, there is a faction down there that is uh Is uh I identify as it as like the South, so that they identify as like the legacy of the South Yemen Armed Forces.

You know, when they're they're very much like it's kind of like post Marxists, but but but but radically left wing militia, you know. And I mean I find that fascinating. But my point is that, uh, the Soviets could not pick and choose. You know, the Middle East was not Africa, the Middle East was not Asia. They certainly wasn't Latin America. You know, they couldn't pick and choose, you know, like

what Arabs Arab state they want to do them. You know, they want to do a give privilege, a position, and in terms of UH material support and and UH informal client diage. You know, they like communism just was not taking rude in the Near East, you know, just wasn't even when it had real currency in in other theaters at comparable stages and development and everything else. So you know, Saddam also we talked about the situation of Iraq going

into the Iran Iraq War of nineteen eighty. The Iraqi said signed the Lgers Agreement with the Shah in nineteen seventy five. This had to do with you know, territorial disputes and other things, you know, typical kind of uh the typical kinds of things that you know, provoke interstate rivalry or more. It's kind of acted as like a catalyst or like a superficial and immediate rationalization where within paradise times that you know, there's already like a mutable

hostility between state actors. I Ran in Iraq have always kind of been desperately at odds, okay, in in political terms, you know, uh, I Ran its rarely at war like open war, but I mean they're constantly at at at war and a and and you know a uh in a subtle and and and sort of hidden capacity, you know, unconventional capacity, but nonetheless uh, you know, they've always been at odds with Iraq in the modern UH era, post

Ottoman era after World War One. But the the and and as you know that that's not entirely without objective uh rationale. Like we talked about the reason why uh the Israelis, like the the American States depart meant you know, Zionist all and sundry as well as uh you know, formerly Arab nationalist types like the Bathists, you know, like Arabist types and what remains that element today, but also

you know, UH radical you know, Salafi types. They they the two kind of poles of of of of of hard power, and the Near East has always been Turkey and Iran, you know, and the Arabs kind of find themselves between these these uh, the the the these alien elements, you know, and when the UH as Islam became this kind of animating catalyst most remarkably, UH one you know, for for for Sunies obviously was uh, you know, the for uh the jihad against uh, the Soviet Union and

communism in the midst of the assault in Afghanistan. But the truth the first true Islamic state was Iran, and the fact that the fact that it was a non Era but non Sunni culture that uh produced the first truly Islamic revolution. That was remarkable, but it was also it was it was also it was also alarming. You know, it meant that, it meant that, it meant that power bases within Islam, within the faith itself, and particularly like you know, revolutionary practice they're in. You know, it had

had shifted. You know, there was a seize of the Grand Mosque in nineteen seventy nine in uh In, in Saudi Arabia, and that was impactful too. But again much of that mighty animated the kinds of guys who you know, went to join the Holy War against the Soviet Union. You know that that wasn't the House of Saud wasn't about to collapse, you know, like it wasn't. It didn't. It didn't spark this kind of this like kind of

wildfire tendency, you know that to provoke. Soon he's under arms, to duplicate what happened in Iran, you know, like nothing like that. It and not without not without because you know, Iraq as a as a majority Shia state, and you know the Shia minority globally within is Lam, but they're they're extraordinarily potent minority. And that's that. That's there. The sha heartland is is really Iraq in the Arab world,

you know, I mean in terms of raw population. Okay, you know the uh, the the Aqi Bath Party, they were they were ecumenical in a real sense. You know, Tarika's Ease himself was a Christian under the Bath Party was a Christian, a core of of a of Arab Bathism in Iraq and Syria. It's a totally et thing, you know. It was. Uh, it was. It was a

Sunium political culture, all of these things. Uh, there was an internal logic strategically, I mean to uh Iraq UH preemptively assaulting Iran and uh Saiddam H. If you read the notes from a Saddam speaking to his war council or what would have been like the Bath uh national security Council, it's equivalent. You can tell that it's not a decision that's being made flippantly. And UH. The immediate catalyst, you know, as we said, like the the Algiers agreement

was signed with the Shah. Tehran immediately declared at the revolution that you know, we're we're not we're not bound by any any treaties that you know, we're signed by the by the imperialist government. You know, that's that's over with.

So it was, uh, it's not as if a conciliatory posture was being struck with, you know, with with Bagdad it and uh, really the tenor of of Saddam's appeal to the War Council is, you know, if we let this go now, we're essentially allowing ourselves to be extorted, and if we're gonna set, if the president being set you know, of of at first impression with the revolutionary regime in Tehran is that, you know, we are available to be extorted. You know, He's like, how how would

that look? And how would that look to the Arab people, you know, not just in Iraq but theater wide, you know, and it's also well how would that look to the Soviet Union too? Frankly, again, despite the despite the their kind of troubled friendship, it wasn't genuine concord of necessity, and you know, the uh, the Iraq, Iraq needed Soviet material support or to remain a viable military power. And if confidence was lost, uh In Moscow's confidence was lost,

you know, they simply would have looked elsewhere. Admittedly it was a shallow pool of potential clients, but nevertheless, uh, you know, there was precedent for that. The s IS didn't just desperately continue to sustain regimes that weren't viable or that or that would not be able when when when critical circumstances emerged, uh, you know, be able to mobilize and and be able to be able to wage war, you know, and in uh In at least a nominally

effective capacity. So this had you know, I raised that because again, like it's the people people claim, because you know, they kind of selectively choose to cite like late Iran like war like propaganda of you know, out of Bagdad, where you know, they're they're emphasizing that, you know, the

the Iranians or a different race. You know, they're they're there, they're Persians and their series and they're not like us, and saying like Saddam was just like this madman who just invaded Iran for no reason, or or he did some out of you know, out of out of uh, you know, kind of quasi racialists, like you know, tendency is a bigot tree or uh or because of like tech fury, hostility to the Shia. I mean, I that's

really not true. And I mean whatever, everybody is an armchair general, you know, so it and nobody, nobody chooses to treat these things, you know, as they as as decisions would have been rendered, like in the epoch and at the critical moment of decision where uh, you know, the the the awareness of the situation, you know, would have been restricted to what was then a parent and emergent. And then I'm not saying much to I was like a good executive or something, but I'm saying that he was.

He was, he was more confident than his acknowledged and he was in a very unenviable, unenviable position. I think at some point it was inevitable Iraq would find itself at or. But that's more kind of a it's kind of a more complicated and wider topic. It's like getting back to the getting back to our topic. I means it ran back were a lot because it's it's important

for for all kinds of reasons of context. Really not not really not just to the politics than your East, but relating to the Cold War, relating to uh, you know, uh the sectarian hatred and darl Islam, you know, relating to uh, the revolution and revolution in military affairs, the reemergence of chemical weapons being utilized and applied, you know, like the tactical capacity on the bail field. It's really uh,

it's really fascinating. But m h getting back to mister Bushford. One, what bush did immediately after after the Iraqi invasion at Kuwait in August nineteen ninety On August twentieth, he issued US National Security Directive Number forty five. Okay, the relevant parts stated and I'm quoting here unless indicated otherwise, US interests in the Persian go for a vital to national security. These interests include access to oil and the security instability

a key friendly states in the region. The United States will defenditive fight interest in the area throughout through the use of the US military force, if necessary and appropriate, against any power with interests in nimical to our own. Going off the record, this is important to me at least because you know how, like the Michael moritypes, they're constantly talking about how our politicam at least is driven his exclus say, we quote bite oil, which doesn't make

any sense. But it's also like they act like it's some kind of secret or something that you know, American executives have pretended, like you know, energy policy and domination of of key oil reserves in the Near East by hostile powers, they've always always been really above board that you know, these things play into strategic decision making, you know, so I've always like wondered about that, like why that I've tryed like idiots. And it's not like I had

nothing nice to say about Bush forty three. You're about the Iraq War. You know. It's not like I was sitting here like cheerleading medling in the Middle East, but like they actually was in Trump card, it's about oil man. It's like, what does that even mean? Like if you wanted to, if you had to say, it's what's gonna act like some like nineteenth century uh like empire and just go around grabbing you know, rubber plantations and petroleum fields.

You know, why not invade Venezuela, you know, like why why you know, you don't need to go the way to Iraq like steal oil or whatever. But I digress the UH. But what's significant about National Lecurity Drug to forty five is that even as the as the Cold War was ending, it was based Bush was reiterating that the Carter doctrine, you know, like you' saying, the Carter

doctrine is still operative. He was signaling to the Soviet Union too, because obviously it wasn't clear like what like how they were gonna how Moscow was gonna respond, you know, moving forward, and it wasn't clear at all. You know.

It's and in a roundabout way, had UH, you know, had the Supreme Soviet or had the UH or had UH you know, kind of the Inner Party specifically that which was tethered to the Ministry of Defense, had they kind of gone into a revolt against UH Peristroica, they they could have utilized, you know, with America's UH looming UH mass intervention in the Middle East as as their catalysts to kind of bring down the Gorbachev regime. Circle the wagons that were and that that's a fascinating counterfactual.

But the fact that it didn't happen again is a is a credit to Bush what he wont his ability to finesse in in a in a bona fide way. And again the fact that like that that Gorbachev was able to pull that off on the other side, in in concord with Bush is I mean, it's a testament to the garbage shows frankly, like genius is a politician. You know, if the man was a fool or a cipher, that he would never have been able to accomplish that. The Uh, I'm not I'm not gonna quote verbatim because

that's it's it's redundant that borybody to tears. But what's fascinating is like the remainder of a of the declaration Bush sites United Nations Security Council Resolute six sixty is sixty sixty two as a as an authority for intervention, you know, which UH was like at the court according the letter of the law, like such that it can even be said that, you know, war and peace decisions are bound by the law and in the way that you know could be said stated to be, you know,

within the borders of of UH of a sovereign dominion. But uh, you know Bush Bush had all the authority he needed from Article two, you know, from the President of the Carter doctrine, and so long as Congress was willing to you know, was was willing to float the bill and not otherwise you know, revoke uh, his ability to see the policy through. I mean that that's that's the only authority Bush needed. But he was big. He was very much proceeding as a diplomat in in in

in prosecuting this war. And I say that in the most positive terms there are you know, it's just, uh, it's it's noteworthy because most executives would not have done that, even ones who were really kind of uh, even some of Bush's successors and Clinton liberal types, they wouldn't have

characterized it that way. You know, even if even if they wanted to, even if even if they wanted to kind of finess, what they were doing is as in the interest of you know, this burgening global community or whatever. So this is very interesting with within the for the time and the moment within that epoch, and for what Bush aimed to accomplish, that was absolutely correct strategy. I just find it really interesting. I mean, this this may like bore some people to death, but it's it's it's

fundamentally important to the topic. And it's also it's it's important just in more global terms, I figuratively and literally again what the Bush forty one people wanted to see through they wanted to Uh, you got to look at the Cold War as as among other things, you know, in structural terms, not just parwa political ones. You know, the uh, there never was a there never was a

formal peace treaty signed with Germany. You know, that's one of the reasons why you know, like the two Germanys were able to exist in perpetuity, in apparent perpetuity after the war. What Bush was aiming to do, he was

aiming to create configure. Uh, this this globalized, truly globalized polity as an envisioned by you know, the New Dealers and to a lesser degree, people like Truman, you know, and see that through to fruition, like actual fruition wherein you know, military action would essentially other than you know, things that truly are you know, kind of like postichomatized manners of like civil unrest within the you know, at at at the local and and and and downscaled level,

you know, other than other than those obvious exceptions, you know, any military action would would be carried out through the United Nations Security Council, you know, where the permanent uh UN Security Council you know, would be kind of like the higher House, you know, or the or the cabinet

of a world government. You know, the General Assembly would be kind of like you know, the the World Congress, the World House of Representatives, the World House of Commons, you know, and you have you have a rotating executive, you know, who's more sort of like a global prime minister than a than a president, because real power lies in the Security Council. But this is what Bush was aiming to do, you know. And however, however we feel

about that. The degree to which this was just like utterly pissed on and sabotaged, you know, from the Clinton administration onwards in favor of the like anarchy is insane. It's completely insane. And what's what's more insane is that nobody talks about it. It's it's as if it's never happened, but that the current situations, uh, the current strategic situation is just some kind of accident of fate or like it's something just like some immutable development because other states

that aren't reasonable or something. It's this is incredible that that people that people feel this way. I do want to cite a couple more points of the memo. Those are and I quote push stated incident, you know, to explicating why intervention UH to eject Iraqi and quoit constantly to vital interest quote. Much of the world is is even more dependent on Iraqi oil. Much of the RULD is depending on Iraqi oil and is highly vulnerable to

Iraqi threats. To minimize any impact that oil flow reductions from Iraq and what we'll have in the world's economy will be over policy as well. Producing nations do what they can to increased production offs at these losses. And that's important too because again, the the OPEC embargo with seventy three, like America coming to terms America in the UK coming to terms of the House of sod that UH, that that that created a a reliable kind of configuration

we're in. Like all the major petroleum UH producers, you know, they had invested interests in in in in proceeding peaceably, and they were afforded you know, limited ability to to you know, to carry out a price fixing regime, which they do to the day. But the fact wasn't that know, Iraqi oil is so important, or that you know anyone or that Iraqi oil like funds anyone critical you know,

state actor or you know, constellation of things. It's that it would where Iraq able to you know, attack another export, another, another OPEC state and dictate regionally. You know what political concessions would be required for continued access to Iraqi petroleum. Even if America could maintain good offices, would Iraq no problem? The other Arab states would not they've been able to and that would have been profoundly destabilizing, just not just structurally.

I mean Saddam would have recognized that. I don't think Saddam with some Marvel villain rubbing his hands together and saying, you know, now I can extort money for oil. But he recognized exactly what the structural implications of this were.

And I believe from like where the Iraqis were sitting, like their idea was like, well, this needs to be reconfigured anyway, you know why, and especially without the Soviet Union, you know, it's like what are we just gonna let is OPEC's gonna become kind of the this kind of like Cooley, uh, this kind of like Cooley enterprise like behold in the United States. You know, I don't think

I'm speculating too much here. You know again, I this this becomes apparent like as you as you deep dive into you know what the what the incentives were, and the motives were, and the viewpoints were of the respective actors, you know, like Era Ben and Western in the you know, the occidental perspective versus the error perspective. It's like writ

large here in a lot of ways. Okay, like corny as that might sound to people, but uh, moving on the Bush was very he uh, he was very emphatic, and not just for appearance sake, but in a real kind of concrete capacity of a declaring that you know, US forces and a sort of other elements. You know, whether they're whether they're uh you know, whether they're British, whether they're French, where they're Italian, whether it's whether we're whether they we're talking about you know, Syrian forces and

Assyrians as Fesisad came heavy to support Bush. And I mean that's another thing too, like after like like basically America's best ally in the Middle East should be serious, Like what's America been doing for twenty years like trying to annihilate Syria. But uh Bush made it clear that, you know, the coalition military element are guests in the

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia first and foremost. He included in Saudi general officers in the decision making process, even if it was just kind of like nominal in for appearance sake, because these guys frankly didn't have the experience, you know,

to really to really bring command presence to bear. But there were a lot of elements, including Osamov and Lauden himself, who uh approached uh the royal family and said like look like let me or let us you know, like uh like raise an army of of the righteous as we did to fight the communists, and like will and will like eject uh, you know, the Iraqi army. Ourselves.

We don't need, you know, we don't we don't need, we don't need, we don't we don't need infrails on our on our soil, you know, and not just on our soil, but on the soil we're like the profit tread, you know, and we don't need you know. You know, this is basically like a Jewish war and there you know, it's become that way because it's it's not it's not

to liberate, you know, Moslims from from Bathist tyranny. It's about you know, it's about monetary intrigues and power political uh ambitions of of of Nonmuslims, and that could have gotten traction. Not not with that, not with the House Asad, but you better believe with the Arab street, you know. So the a lot of the ridiculous kind of propaganda that you know, the the like literally these like man saanditing firms that were retained like you know, draft these

like atrocity stories and things. A lot of that that wasn't just you know, for the sake of UH, you know, kind of a stirring up war fever in America like that was really already kind of bourboning that I believe that was for that was that was for the court of world opinion and particularly for UH form you know, the UH the Arab streets, you know, and and and encouraging them to identify uh, you know, America and the

Coalition as as this of savior element. You know, that that was best suited to combat at this grave evil lid you know, had befallen the Kingdom potentially, and that you know, was it was already you know, it was already engaged in gross, gross acts of of of of of a terrifying nature in Kuwait. So I mean there was a lot here. You know, it wasn't just a matter of that. This wasn't beside the fact it was the first open, open ended military deployment since the Vietnam War.

It was the first, uh, it was the first real operational test of of of the of the post RIMA you know, r A M A relative military affairs army, it uh, all those things. It was. It was the first major uh, it was the first major con inflict of the you know, it's of the post Cold War era. I mean, the color was in the process of ending at that point. I mean, yeah, the wall would come down,

what you know, the Soviet Union still existed. Like this was this kind of arrived at like the worst possible time, you know, But that's you know, war arrives like the seasons, doesn't it. But that but a lot of what was going on, you know, on the on the propaganda side and the cultivation and narratives and things like that, A

lot of that was was Bush Baker. You know, in the American White House, in American State Department, like speaking to the Arab street or signaling to them, you know, and uh and and in ways that I I don't think even if even if the foreign policy establishment, even if they weren't conceptually illiterate these days, I don't I don't think they have the ability to do that, just like creatively or you know, in terms of their like psychologically app situte or anything like that. I just I

just couldn't. I can't see it happening even if there weren't abject the object morons at at the helm. How long we've been going, like, forgive me about forty Okay, yeah, I'll speed it up a little bit.

And something very strange happened UH at the onset of hostilities after you know, January seventeenth onward, the uh you know, the the the onset of Desert store was a massive air campaign, which the UH some there's some military types who say that it should have just been a fall on combined arms assault and that it was you know, the the weeks long you know air campaign was uh was was wasteful and lives, you know, civilian nutrition they're

talking about, and and in a waste of time. Frankly, I I'm not going to get into that, and I'm not super qualified to discuss that. But as as UH, by the last week in January, the coalition had had had UH had flown something crazy like twenty three thousand sorties over Iraq, and I like Kuwait, they'd uh they've been dropping these two thousand pound bombs on Iraqi airfields that were more accurate than their destructive power was greater than people had anticipated. So the Iraqi error element was

like taking a serious beating. And I think they they they lost twenty two planes and in tactical aerial combat you know, the UH and these were these these these were French, Italian then and Soviet aircraft. And they even had some make twenty nines like the Mad twenty nine folk from that was that was packaged for export. It was it was not the same as the as the Soviet Air Forces model. It was an inferior model or

stripped out in some way. But the point is it was in mid twenty nine, like this wasn't I raised that for clarity, you know, the iraqis they weren't. They weren't flying around. I went in nineteen fifties planes or something. Okay. It so as this on January twenty sixth, something very strange happened. Suddenly Iraqi planes they started appearing in Iranian airspace. Like at first it was just like a few of them, but then it became clear that they were going to

Iran and in dedicated flight patterns. This wasn't like a handful of defectors or something. You know. At first it was about twenty, then it was about sixty, and it was over one hundred, and the entire remainder of the Iraqi Air Force literally flew to Iran. And this one US Pentagon official at the time who asked not to be named, and you can still find the You can

still find the the article online. Google it. Right before we went live, he said, to what kind of frightened uh New York Times Journal, He said, I really hope that this is not Saddam Hussein's like Molotov ribbons trot packed moments, because we could have a real problem, and the Iranians had no intention of collaborating with Saddam. I don't even think they had any definite way of context

yet at that point. But I think Saddam absolutely wanted America to think that, and I think he absolutely wanted America to launch some like mass assault in Iran incident to thinking that. You know, I at the time, I remember some of these guys like we're saying that, well, Sadam's an idiot. He should have ruin his whole air force, a carrier battle group and tried to sink what he could you know, the people talking about as if it was like the Argentine Air Force. Uh, you know, like

like like knocking out British cruisers in the Falklands. It's like not at all comparable. And like it' said, I'm thrown those airplanes at UH at a carrier battle group, they just would have gotten like slaughtered. It just would have been like a fireworks show, and like that would be the end of it, like and he knew that. So that coupled with you know, yeah, the the ability of Bush and Baker to to stand down the uh

Israeli government. But also those are the days of like yees Socra being man and stuff like you didn't just like just like demento Zionist element. And it's not like the israel government was ever any great shakes, but it was a lot more rational than you know, and uh, there's far more of a concord in the occupied territories, you know, the uh it was it was kind of it was kind of a rare moment of relative calm, you know. So it was a constantly of all those things.

But yeah, I understanding either of those things in isolation, either the uh the launching that scuds at at Tel Aviv or UH, you know, the UH, the appearance of UH, the Iraqi Air Force or remain of it, and Iran. I think those things have to be understood together. And it's also you know, once some I I mean the point of people too, I mean especially about the Second

World War, but about all conflicts. You know what, once, once you're in a war, once you're in conditions approaching war, you can't just say, like, you know what, I'm gonna put the brakes on this and and like stop everything. Like so I was saying after he wrote the Dice in Kuwait, I don't think I don't think it's not thought that the America would do anything. I think he thought the British would. But I think I think he recognized it's like it wasn't nineteen eighty two anymore, even

if it were. UH. And don't get me wrong, like the fact that British could fight the Falklands War was incredible, Like I take my hat off to him. They could not have figured out that that campaign or similar campaign on the ground against the Iraqi army, you know, and logistically this would have been impossible. So Sonnam's notion was that, you know, this is basically this is basically a low risk Guenter prize and there was a wider war. Wasn't big game clear that was not the case at all.

It's like, well it was too late. Sonam could have gone all in assaulted Saudi Arabia and continued until he you know, hit the actually hit the gulf, and uh like seeing if he could hold it or he could have just I held fast and uh, you know, I hope that the coalition would fall apart before the onset of hostilities, or if it did not, hoping that you know, some kind of situation at theater y anarchy, you know, and and and a wider war, you know, uh what a forced uh America to kind of come to terms,

you know. But this idea that you know, this idea that you can just like Cinnam everybody else can just kind of like pull the plug on hostilities and just be like, hey, I give up now, or like no, it's not a thing's work. But yeah, I your your your lady friend. Uh, I'm sure, I'm sure that was an insane freaking experience she had or or friend's head or whatever. You know.

you kill, you kill Sadam Hussein. I mean that. I mean, first of all, like you lose the appearance of lawfulness because just going around like whacking people number one, number two, it's like, okay, so then you got some you got some Salafi government in the Sunni triangle, like fighting like an ir a Iranian and his blood back to like you know, shift element and basically had like the Iraqi Civil War, but like ten years earlier, you know, And it's like the I I don't I think it's moronic

when people are like, well, Sadam was like Arabs need like you know, some brutal dictator to hum in a line like that's just like fucked hard thinking and they don't even know like what they're talking about and they say that. But it's also I uh nor do I

think not? I think Saam is like was was like a great man, but he he wasn't any any worse than you know, a lot of other uh a lot of other kind of kind of kind of dictator strong man types who you know, who who America has founded perfectly okay to live with the the uh, I mean he Saddam Hussein thought that, but it's all too like again, Sadam was uh he Sadam's like recklessness the I mean during when the when the Cold War was ending, like everybody,

arguably he was being reckless, you know, in some way or another in terms of like second rate power and in terms of lesser powers like that. I mean, but it's not like what why Saddam Hussein kind of became this like this like there's this like bad guy stand in for everybody. He was kind of weird because like he just wasn't that important, you know, and he wasn't somebody uh if America too, like if they'd want to do.

Uh if America hadn't didn't totally of its head of its aass in the Middle East, even during the Cold War, where it's just like, you know, again I ran as uh I ran as going to be the dominant uh GEO strategic power in the region. Okay, just he is saying, like our policy do I ran since the Shah was deposed, as we're gonna shriek over and over again that you're evil in bead Like it's not it's not policy, you

know what I mean. Like it's something like an intelligent US regime would have done whatever it had to do, you know, to kind of uh finanse the Iranians into

doing what we wanted, you know. Well at the same time, uh, you know, building up Iraq is a meaningful bulwark, but also one that you know, people within the region and that you know wasn't too what wasn't too easily discredited in terms of its its optics and things, and that very easily could have been acco not very easily any terms, but in political terms, that definitely could have been accomplished.

But even aside from the politics of it, you know, killing killing snam Musan would not really have accomplished anything. And the Bath Party, despite what people say, it's very different in Syria. It's I mean they're literally like at odds with one another, you know. And uh and I mean at the Assad family, they're they're they're they're great people, they really are. And mashasas a hero and his father was a hero. Okay, I my dad. Aside, the uh

baphism is a real thing. It's not just like contrivance or something that would just fall apart if you removed uh you know kind of the the lynchpin dictator, you know who who's uh kind of ideological clothing is is the af mentioned contrivance. If uh Asnam was just kind of like simarily killed, I mean, I think there was.

The US lost a lot of credibility with when they finally did like availament of his cane report for seeding frankly, and then uh isis isis executed the judge who had him hanged and uh I and they they they made a tape of it. It was in one of their like ice music videos. You know, it's like an arrow and said, this is the judge and then like you know, you see a guy like blowing his head off, and that didn't make me happy and not happen anybody dies,

but I didn't feel sad that. I I mean, I think judges are kind of piece of shit anyway, but I uh that that guy didn't like feel bad for Okay, what point being, I don't uh, I don't understand why people think like, okay, like if they that's the thing.

It's like it's like some old movie or something like Sam Musin is is like he's like some hive mind and if like you shoot Saam Mussin, like all the Arab automatons just like drop dead or fall over like like Disneyland ortomatons, and you kill the power or something. I don't know, but that's uh. But that's why the the whole way that Operation I Rag You Freedom went about was very weird, just like the planning when it

finally did come to fruition. The planning was just very bad, you know, and it didn't really make a lot of sense. We could cover that, uh another time, yeah, I I I uh, thanks for accommoding me. I thought it was important to do a deep dive into some into this into the subject of the Gulf War before we moved on, So I hope, I hope everybody got something out of it worth well.

I'm sure people probably think it seems like this is taking forever, but it's just me and and my and my crime partner Rake, So I mean, it does take time and we want to do it right, but it is on It is on track to launch, you know, like this month. So other than that, I've been getting back to my long form writing. I've got some articles that are appearing, uh in print form. You know, you

can find me at UH. I'm still on Burber app Alough, I'm kind of looking at disengagement that the summer moves on. You can find me on substack subsects kind of my home. It's also where the podcast is. It's real Thomas seven seven seven dot substack dot com. You can also find me on t gram. You know, I'm all over the place, man, But that's uh, that's what I got going on. And uh, we're you and I are doing our thing, and that's that's huge, and people are responding to that very very well.

And uh, that's gives me a huge lift, man, Like I'm very honored by that, and I I owe that to you man for providing this format and you know, kind of thinking through this, like thinking through this kind of this, this kind of organizational structure that we do. So yeah, thank you man. This is very great, no problem.