How the Soviet Union Started World War 2 - Complete - w/ Thomas777

heard in the past talking about it. It's quite controversial and maybe I'll ask you some questions about that at the end, Thomas even controversial amongst our guys, and I have a reason why I think it is. But why don't you tell us what we're going to talk about today?

most people in addressing Suverov, they've got to discrete narrow focus. Essentially, when they begin their analysis is on the eve of Operation Barbarossa, and they get bogged down in the minutia of what were Soviet deployments, how are they arrayed? Were they offensively arrayed? What were the comparative force levels and

capabilities of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army. Now these things are relevant, and I'll address those things, but that's not an adequate analysis, and Suvarov didn't begin as analysis there either. Suvarov's claim is that the Soviet Union literally started World War Two, and I accept that, and it's not strictly military analysis. Everything about the Second World War was a dialogue with Soviet power and the Soviet Union.

The entire twentieth century was in dialogue with the Soviet Union and its existence and the ideology that animated its structure, activity, decision making, and you know, every imperative related to power, political activity, they're in so other people there's a subset of people just don't really understand the issues presented, and

they essentially accept what court historians claim. But then they diverge or they think that the question is should there you know, should there be a deeper analysis at this key juncture in the summer of nineteen forty one, they're looking at it the wrong way, you know, either out of ignorance or because they're powed by what they do as a political consensus among academ and they don't want

to be availed a kind of punitive scrutiny. And I'll get into what I mean by that, you know, I if you if you accept the if you accept Suvarov's perspective, which was also shared by Jakam Hoffman. Jackham Hoffman was a military historian. He was when he was alive. He died in middle age in the nineteen nineties early two thousands. But he wrote this exhaustive book called Stalin's War of Extermination,

and he was essentially uh bundesevel archivist. And he wrote this exhaustive book about the origins of the Second World War. And you know, about half of it is dedicated to the political conditions that gave rise the conflict, and about half of it deals with kind of hard and fast

military subject matter. But I think that's the best book written on the topic, and he agreed very much with with Suvras analysis, but also myself, especially being somebody who favors direct evidence and the testimony of parties to the events in question. You know, if you look at what Stalin said, and if you examine the sort of ontological aspects the pedigonology of Marxist Leninism, there should be something

of a no brainer. You know, this idea that the Soviet Union didn't have ambitions of an imperialistic nature, that it had no interest in exporting its ideology to the rest of the developed world, that it wasn't possessed of an expansionist sensibility, that's laughable. I mean, it's laughable because the only thing that sustains the revolutionary political cultures such as that that was characteristic of the Soviet Union is this kind of dynamic revolutionary violence that's got to be

exported once the revolution is consolidated within. But also, you know, the Soviet Union between nineteen twenty two in nineteen thirty nine, it conquered a land mass of that was equivalent to the size of the German Reich in nineteen nineteen something like four hundred thousand square kilometers. This was a massively aggressive, expansionist,

burgaining superpower. You know, that's indisputable. And this idea that the world where you're talking about the United Kingdom, which had conquered twenty three percent of the planet and lorded over five hundred million people. You got the Soviet Union, which constitutes one sixth of this planet, and it's animated by this revolutionary imperative that it calls for the the bolshivization of the entire developed world. You have the United States, which is in control as a nineteen thirty nine of

fully half of this planet remaining resources. The idea that the world was terrified of this comparatively tiny country in Germany, that's a laughful you know, I mean, that's that's ridiculous. I don't know how else to characterize it. And the fact that you know, people suggest that is you know, is is insane. I'd say it's comical, but there's nothing funny about it, because this kind of garbage inform's decision making, and it you know, it's constantly it was a kind

of mass delusion of in the public mind. But you know, first and foremost it often makes his point really at the beginning of his study, you know, the the imperialistic I don't imperialist in the sense Latin has talked about it. I mean, the Soviet Union was an empire in the ideological sense make a mistake, and this sort of violent imperialistic power, political sensibility. It was. It was. It was

this kind of relatory practice. It was baked into every aspect of the Soviet political system, even even the heraldic standard of the Soviet Union, which endured until the final days in nineteen ninety one. It was literally the globe with the overlaid on the planet Earth is this giant hammer and sickle, you know. That was That was the

Soviet coat of arms. The symbolism is obvious, you know, Communism will encircle the whole world, you know, and the motto of the Soviet Union similarly until the end translates to proletarians of all countries unite. Yeah, it can't really

be more on the nose than that, you know. But again intrinsic to in termsic to the Marxist Leninist ethos as a globalist perspective, that's one of the reasons why the twentieth century belong so much to the communists because it was uniquely it was an ideology that was uniquely suited to the then present, and it was fundamentally ford looking. They can't be denied, you know, it's it's obsolescence. Oh do you know the fact that it became a staid the form of of organization, and it was it was,

it became an obsolescent psychological artifact. But at Zena that it was very much astride the Zeit guys, and they can't be denied. And even it was animated by a uniquely expansionist sensibility. But even hit it not then everybody was. It was everybody who was, you know, participating in velt politique at scale had a global perspective. I mean, that was the reality. The twentieth century was decided what configuration

globalism would take. Okay, it's just this idea of a kind of insular communism that was narrowly status that in inward looking, I mean, that's that's ridiculous. And beyond that Stalin Stalin himself came to characterize the ideological culture of Marsis Leninism for an entire generation it's not accidentally. You know, he reigned for over thirty years, and I believe he was the single most powerful man on earth, and that

is incredible for all kinds of reasons. But you know, he very much set the tenor of, you know, the revolutionary culture characteristic of the socialist community and nations as it was called. And he he was a confidant of Lenin, and Lenin said repeatedly and often, but most notably Lenin's famous December sixth, nineteen twenty speech, which was dedicated to communist practice and the vision for a velt Politique, a

Soviet Velt's politique. He said that to incite the capitalist states against each other is the main stratagem of communism. In his words, he said, quote of using the knives of scoundrels like the capitalist thieves against each other, on grounds that when quote when two thieves fall out and fight, the honest man laughs. As soon as we are strong enough to overthrow capitalism completely, we will grab him by

the throat. Victory of the communist revolution in all countries is inevitable, and that encapsulates Marxist learness of els polity, and that defined it until the very end. This was Uh, this was still the ambition when even amiss the strategic

nuclear stalemate. You know, in the late eighties, they were still challenging in Latin America to try and rectify the strategic imbalance, owing the you know, the advantage conferred the United States and they're uh and its allies, you know, by the inner German border.

But what Stalin declared at this speech was quote, should the war begin, we will not stand by inactively. We will enter the war, but we will enter as the last belligerent. We will throw a weight on the scales that should be decisive. The historian named Alexander Neckridge, he's he he characterized this as the Stalin doctrine, you know, and he insisted that this was never abandoned. And that's true.

And subsequent events and Stalin's decision making in the command role as well as his you know, in Warren peace terms, as well as in his role as General secretary, bear that out. You know, Stalin's last parapolitical act was you know, giving a MAO and Kimmel Sung a green light to assault on the Korean peninsula, okay, and this this led to a crisis on order of the Cuba crisis, you know,

less than a decade later. It's a tangent, but I about every decade subsequent nineteen fifty, nineteen sixty two, nineteen seventy three, nineteen eighty three, there was a general crisis wrought by the traversing of a conflict diad in what was UH a peripheral theater, but that you know, nonetheless had the potential for escalation to it's a general nuclear war.

And but my point being that it's it's not as if, you know, Stalin literally at the end of his life was still making decisions pursuant to this sort of doctrinaire

you know program the UH. And it's that just became a fixation of Stalin's as the uh as a situation in Europe became characterized by punctually crises, you know, for the next decade and a half, subsequent climbating obviously, in nineteen thirty nine and throughout the nineteen thirties, Stalin undertook a massive armaments program that was unprecedented, you know, and based on his rhetoric not just too you know, the poet Borrow and to the assembled nomenclature of the All

Communist Party, but also these public speeches that he made for the consumption not just of the Soviet people, but you know, as a way of signaling to the rest

of the world. It was clear that he was convinced that a general crisis of had had arrived, you know, in global capitalism, was was on its way out, you know, And it was in nineteen thirty nine, early one thirty nine the British ambassador to the Soviet Union, Stafford Cripps, and the American ambassador, Lawrence F. Steinhardt, they both were adamant that Stalin intended to bring about a war not only in Europe but in East Asia, and that this was a great threat facing the British Empire in the

United States of America. And this is important, especially the fact of Stalin's attention to the developing situation in the Far East. I'd argue that this was an essential aspect of what became his strategic vision. And we'll get into what I mean by that in a moment. When around between about nineteen ninety one and nineteen ninety five, a lot of documents briefly became available from the Soviet archives. That's how David Irving got Gebels the microfilm the Gerbels diaries.

That wouldn't be possible anymore obviously today and now if you even even if they're watching, government viewed you as basically friendly your view to as a dissident from the United States, they're not going to give you access to anything the FSB has, and I mean even something of exclusively historical interest, you know, from the warriors. They're they're not gonna let anybody see that, you know from without it.

There's this brief period of openness in the nineteen nineties, and during that period a bunch of documents that have been corralled by the People's Commissariate for Foreign Affairs, you know, that in the form of internal memorandum as well as

literally directives from you know, the desk of Stalin. You know, obviously it's it's not indicated as such, but reading between the lines, you know, these are obviously these are obviously statements from the General Secretary, most notably the People's Commissaria delegation to Japan, the telegram from Moscow that suggests that the Soviet diplomatic mission in Japan should agree to any treaty that tends to bring about hostility between Japan and

the United States. You know, it's very undisguised, all of these communications are you know, throughout the nineteen thirties that anything that brings about a Japanese American war should be cultivated. And this is this is imperative to Soviet ambitions, you know, the way it was described by one of the archivists who was involved in this NNGO, which I think still exists.

There's this NGO that was corralled or incorporated rather in January nineteen eighty nine, you know, this month before the enduring Border fell like low, less than a year that was dedicated to documenting human rights abuses as they called it,

and other things. During the Stalin era, and there's interesting data relating to the power political situation, you know, in the years prior to nineteen thirty nine that they corralled as well, and of particular significance, there's this transcribed memo from years subsequent by a man who served in the the Chinese or Japanese diplomatic mis Soviet diplomatic mission in the nineteen thirties, and he said, quote the Soviet Union, for its part, was interested in distracting British and American

attention from European problems and in Japanese neutrality during the period of the destruction of Germany and the liberation of Europe from capitalism. And then, of course it became clear that Japan was not going to remain neutral or America was not going to allow it to strike a position

in neutrality. You know, it became imperative to do everything possible to bring the United States and Japan into collision, which once it became clear what the you know, the New Dealer's ambitions were, that sort of resolved itself from the Soviet perspective. But nevertheless, Japan was at the top of Stalin's mind, and we're gonna know what I mean by that in a minute. Now, this is really what's critical to sub hypothesis and mine own as well as

what Suvarov posited. And again I echo this sentiment. I the Soviet Union started World War Two in August nineteen thirty nine when they launched a massive surprise attack at calcin Gole and knocked out the Japanese Imperial Army okay, and that changed everything, and that also was literally the

start of World War two. If you look at hostilities with nineteen thirty nine in nineteen forty five is a singular conflict, which I think, in broad conceptual terms is is useful, you know, especially because that's court history claims that War two began, you know, in September of nineteen thirty nine, and bizarrely they claim that, you know, Polish borders were somehow inviolable and any any any traversing of

them was an act of global war. But if we examined the ambitions and strategic orientatings and objectives of why the Soviet Union assaulted Japan, it becomes clear that this was the start of the Second World War, and what this the reasons why they did that, what this set in motion it was truly and respect of a global

campaign of revolutionary conquest. But in the days before that, and this is important too, because, like the nineteen twenty five speech, the Soviet Union later claimed this never happened, and it's interesting how the Allies dealt with it in subsequent years. But on August nineteenth, nineteen thirty nine, Stalin called a surprise secret meeting of the Central Committee of the Poet Buro. During the meeting, Stalin announced that the time had now come to quote apply the torch of

war to European powder kid. Now, of course, this was also as the non Aggression Pact was being, you know, negotiated with the German Reich. What Stalin said to the assembled Central Committee, quote, if we accept the German proposal, if the conclusion of a non aggression pact with them, they would naturally attack Poland, and the intervention of France

and England in this war would be inevitable. The resulting unrest and disorder will lead to a destabilization of Western Europe without US, us being the Soviet Union being initially

drawn into the conflict. And again, you know, since nineteen twenty five, this had been what the Soviet Union was waiting for, according to the Stalin doctrine, as a catalyst for you know, exporting the revolution to Western Europe, you know, and Stalin continued saying, quote, we can hope for an advantageous entry into the war, and a typical Stalin euphimistic language, you said, quote a broad field of activity, A broad field of activity was now opening for the development of

the World Revolution, in other words, for the accomplishments which had never you know, been abandoned, for the sovietization of Europe and Communist domination. He concluded this speech by saying, comrades, in the interest of the Soviet Union, the homeland of the worlds get busy and work so warm me break out between the Reich and the capitalistic Anglo French bloc.

Now this was the first stage of the plan for Bolshevik domination, and you know it then the non aggression pack the chorus was finalized four days subsequent, and it becomes clear, you know, I don't want to take us down another tangent. But it was really Gearing who pushed really hard for a firm alliance with the Japanese. I mean,

Hitler was already sort of disposed that way. Anyway, Garing respected the Japanese a lot, and Geary was something of a terrible snob, and he thought that Japan was like a high culture, I mean, which is true, but beyond the aesthetical attraction, you know, the understanding was that Japan was a great power in its own right, and they'd smashed the Imperial Russian Navy in nineteen oh five, and you know, Japan was just you know, the ideal hedge

they have against the Soviet Union the East. So when the Red Army launched this blitz assault of the Japanese Army in the Far East and utterly annihilated them, this terrified people. And it also it really meant that, you know, the Reich had no choice but sue for temporary peace with the Soviet Union because then they had no hedge, you know. And it was clear that and he moved westward, you know, and uh Hitler was confident that the war,

a war with France, wouldn't be a quagmire. But just the same, you know, he knew there weren't the forces in being to fight off as Soviet assault through Poland, as uh the Reich was you know, fighting Uh in France. So this was a. This was very much a conspiratorial master stroke of Stalin. I mean, I'm gonna be wrong.

Stalin wanted to conquer the Far East anyway, but that timing was ideal, you know, and uh, there's the forces in being arrayed such that it was a sort of a perfect opportunity not just to humiliate the Japanese Imperial Army, but to telegraph a message of the world about Soviet military might, you know. And it was highly effective in that regard. Now, the speech that Stalin made where he outlined his plan for the conquest of Europe in the

midst of you know, a Western European civil war. The French national news agency HAVAS, they obtained a copy of this by way of Geneva, presumably from you know, their own spies are from a friendly intelligence service, and it was published in early nineteen five thirty nine throughout France and uh Moscow claimed it was fake and it was a forgery, and right up to the present day, incredibly you'll find these dummy court historians and they're apologists claiming

that this this this was somehow a forgery by the French Havas agency and French intelligence by by by anti communists. I mean, it's ridiculous. In the official party paper UH Pravda November thirty, ninety thirty nine, Stalin himself finally came out and officially denied UH that the speech was UH was made and and and reiterated this preposterous claim that it was some forgery by ant by by fascists. You know,

this was demonstrated. It was confirmed to have been a real speech by Stalin's official biographer, who died only around nineteen ninety five. Even in nineteen ninety three he gave an interview where he confirmed for all time that this speech happened. The language of it was in fact transcribed perfectly in the you know, a document that was rendered by French of us, and that should have settled it

for all time. But like I said, regime historians, UH will will simply argue by assertion and repeat lies over and over and over and over again, and they'll simply deny the evidence in rebuttal. But that's UH. This is important because it became a major This is there was a major stumbling block for the New Dealers obviously as well as UH the War Party in the UK. You know, it was beyond an embarrassment that it stood. The represent

a real crisis with regards to their mandate. But it goes to show you what kind of bully pulpit had been devised and erected in uh, you know, the US and the UK. I mean, part of it was because it was the it was it was a French news release. But even so it the ability to lock out and discredit conflicting information and facts that had a tended to impeach official narratives is pretty remarkable. And in the case of the in the case of the focus in the

UK and the new Deal in America. But you know, uh, and super Off, to his credit, took up the issue of the August nineteenth speech. But it was a Vokoganov. Vokoganov was the biographer in question who attested at the end of his life to the voracity of the speech. But you know, the it was on January sixteenth, nineteen

ninety three. And again this this was that period of approximately summer fall nineteen ninety one until probably very early nineteen ninety six where there was open access to Stalin era archives in data in the Soviet Union.

about this so that he could capture clouts. Like what, there's there's this kind of stock in trade of simpletons and idiots to just go around saying things are fake. You know, Hitler's second book is fake. General Patten's personal diaries are fake, Gerbel's diaries are fake. Everything is fake, Okay. I mean, I it's like me saying Donald Trump is

actually of Jewish parentage. I can't prove that. There's no evidence to that, there's no reason to believe that, but I'm just gonna keep saying that over and over again. See Donald Donald Trump is Jewish. Oh you don't think so, Yeah, well you don't know anything he's Jewish, I say so. I mean I can do that too. Okay, you know, the onus is on the declarant you know. And again I so the Soviets are in the business of just pretending that Durbles wrote these diaries. I you know, I

don't accept that because it's stupid. But look, Kalganov, he was Stalin's official biographer. He confirmed in is Vest, which was an organ of that constellation of NGOs as I indicated a moment ago dedicated to, you know, kind of truth and reconciliation about the Stalin era. He went public in Russian and European media, and he was adamant that the minutes of the August nineteen, nineteen thirty nine speech that have been published in France were legitimate, that speech happened,

you know. And again, I'm sure, I'm sure these same defectors are gonna claim, well that's fake. Okay, fine, everything is fake. I'm an adult and I'm a white person. I'm not. I'm not I'm not I'm not a white in murder like developmently disabled. So I don't entertain that kind of stuff. But you know, the uh, And there's a historian, this lady historian, Russian historian ts Busueva. She undertook this broad scholarly evaluation of Suvarov's books, not just Icebreaker,

kind of his entire body of work. And her account of his work product was mixed. She was somewhat critical in acutive way. She praised other stuff, but she was adamant that the August nineteenth, ninety thirty nine speech was legitimate, and she claimed that copies of the speech were known to exist in the special archives of the Central Committee and the USSR, and she made excerpts of it available to the public in December nineteen ninety four. And there

was this big deal. The publication was a big deal, and it was unveiled at this conference of the Quote Memorial Society. That's the need, that's the umbrella name of that constellation of NGOs I was talking about. And this was on August sixteenth, nineteen ninety five. That was this kind of grand unveiling, you know. But they they and this might seem silly to make such a big deal

about the release of historical documents. But if you know about the Soviet system, I mean that it's it was this is a special case, you know, it's it wasn't an ordinary political system. And this this document changed everything, or it should have in the public mind, you know, because it's essentially uh a standing rebuttal to the entire court narrative of the war and its origins, you know.

So there's that too. So I mean again, I where where where's where's the evidence that all this is being faked? Like I guarantee you the Russian government wasn't happy about this, you know, I mean and that they still aren't any anybody who is fluent in Russian and I they're they're welcome to proper evidence that this is all lected me and and it's fake. But obviously that won't be forthcoming,

you know. And though it's getting to the kind of meat of the honset of hostilities, you know, again, suber Os the core of his theory, you know. Again, it's it's not just a matter of a discreet revisionist analysis of Operation Barbarossa and which party combatant their combatants were, you know, the aggressor. It's far more of a broad spectrum analysis and that and yak and Hoffman agreed with

this perspective, and I agree with it. Two, Not only was Stalin the progenitor of World War two, but World War two began on August nineteenth, nineteen thirty nine, because that's the date when Stalin ordered the assault on Chalcan Goal. Japanese sixth Army was deployed there. Stalin ordered a massive assault.

The Japanese were soundly defeated and routed. Marshall Zukoff stated on August twenty third, nineteen thirty nine, you know, in a reference to the Chalcan Gol assault as well as the non aggression packed with the Reich which had just been you know, signed Zukov said. Quote Stalin was convinced that the non aggression pack would enable him to rap Hitler around his little finger. Quote we have tricked Hitler

for the moment end quote with Stalin's opinion. According to Nikita Krushchev, Suvarov's take, which should be obvious to those familiar with the historical record, the non aggression packed on the heels of Japan being crushed on land in the Far East. Hitler believed then that he had to attack at Poland to protect the frontier of the German Reich. He would not have acted without a guarantee of non aggression because Germany wasn't in a position to go to

war with the Soviet Union at that moment. People were terrified of the Soviet Union after it had just crushed the mighty Japanese Army. So again, I mean, this is laughable, this idea that this idea that Stalin, who had just crushed the Japanese Army, who was sitting on the throne of a burgening superpower that concuted one six of this planet. The idea that Stalin was terrified of Hitler in comparatively

tiny Germany, that's preposterous. You know. Molotov, you know, obviously was you know, chief diplomat uh his official title was Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. Molotov spoke for the Supreme Soviet on October thirty first, nineteen thirty nine.

He said, quote a single blow against Poland, first by the Germans and then by the Red Army, and nothing will remain of this misbegotten little child of the Versailles Treaty, which owed its existence to the repression of non Polish nationalities. You know. So again to the Soviet nomencladur and especially Stalin, they wanted to they wanted to crush Poland. You know, among other things the polls were at the Polish Munta was ethically cleansing Russians, you know, the Russians hated the polls.

this uh isolationist. Oh. And of course meanwhile too, uh, you know, they the Soviet Union was funding, equipping, arming, and facilitating the Communist revolution in Spain, which obviously had profound, you,

strategic significance. You know, in the same period the Soviets had assaulted and conquered Poland, you know, Uh, They'd assaulted Finland and conquered uh Archangel you know, and through the UH, the the waging of these aggressive wars against Poland and Finland, and then essentially the extortionate annexation of the Baltic you know, and threatening to assault Romania, which all of which gained

territorial concessions out of shopping fire. Because again, every the Soviet Union's neighbors were in capable of standing up to its might, you know. So by this time, by uh the eve of Barbarossa, the Soviet Union had expanded its territory by four hundred and twenty six thousand square kilometers. That was equivalent to the service of the entire German War in nineteen nineteen. And in so doing, as the Alcaholfen points out, Stalin had ripped away and you know,

buffer states on Germany's frontier. So I mean Europe was defenseless, you know, in the east, you know, and obviously the time was nigh for a for an assault on Europe and where Germany was as of nineteen forty. Despite Germany's initial military successes, you know, there wasn't anything Germany had done that Moscow considered particularly impressive or critical, you know, that would have changed or altered Stalin's ambition. And it's

quite the contrary. There was no longer a chance a decisive victory against the UK because you know, Sea Lion was a strategic ruse, the purpose of which was to deceive Stalin, by the way, not not that, not Churchill, which I mean, that's that's interesting in its own right, but the uh, you know, and as Stalin, who was already by that time had hundreds of spies in the rows of elements strations, and he knew exactly what America was thinking, and he knew that the United States was

going to stand behind the UK. German forces were scattered piece meal all over Europe. The German army was uh still dependent on uh, you know, on horse drawn transportation. Germany wasn't even close to being able to realize a full mobilization on the order of you know, nineteen fourteen, nineteen fifteen, even if there'd been the political will to

do so. You know, the minute Germany was cut off from Romania, they their army would stop in his tracks because that was, you know, their only source of vital petroleum. I mean, what would would even a layman, looking at all relevant criteria and variables as of you know, nineteen forty nineteen forty one, sees Germany and his position a catastrophic vulnerability. So I mean the idea that the idea that you know again, the idea that Stalin was afraid

of Germany and afraid of its armed forces. I mean, that's that's preposterous, beyond belief, you know, and just for just for comparative purposes. Between November nineteen forty, in the day of Barbarossa June twenty second, nineteen forty one, there've been a massive arms build up underway since nineteen twenty five, but this year and a half or this half the year, I mean, between you know, the winner in nineteen forty and summer forty one, this was an unprecedented military build

up in terms of scale, scope and rapidity. On June twenty second, nineteen forty one, the Soviet Army possessed twenty four thousand tanks, almost two thousand of which were T thirty four's, which were technically classed as a medium tank, but they were probably the best overall tank of the entire war. The Air force of the Red Army since nineteen thirty eight had acquired twenty three thousand, two hundred and forty five military aircraft, including three thousand, seven hundred

that were of the most recent design. The Red Army had one hundred and forty eight thousand artillery pieces and mortars the inventory of the Royal Navy. In addition to its surface fleet, it had two hundred and ninety one submarines, which were an exclusively offensive platform. This meant that the Soviet Union had more submarines than any other country on this planet, had more than four times the number of submarines that the Royal Navy did, which was the world's

leading maritime state. I mean, this is utterly insane, you know, and it's unprecedent on it like that, nothing approaching this sort of scope, scale and character of mobilization had ever been contemplated, let alone implemented. So, you know, again Germany, which is over committed, overstretched, outnumbered, engaged in a quagmire,

not mobilized for war. Like the idea that the Soviet Union, which again had just succeeded in stripping away Germany's buffer states in the East, and that successfully conquered Poland, and you know, the territory had covetated in the Arctic after you know, an unprovoked assault on Finland. This idea that the Soviet Union was afraid of Hitler, I mean, like it, it's so stupid it almost doesn't warn't rebuttal because it you know, it's it's it's an exclusively bad faith argument.

But what a time we got. Yeah, I'm gonna wrap up there because I was about to get into the some of the testimony you send the commiss ours about the ideological culture of the Red Army. It's but yeah, I hope this was instructive to people.

I don't even think they actually believe that there's insulting the intelligence of everybody else, like you know, the Oh those weren't the communists. There was these imaginary other guys in Spain who like, what are you talking about? There was this there was this unusual coalition of syndicolas, fascists, Filangis, Carloss, Uh, you know, reactionary monarchist types. I'm kind of secular nationalists, you know that wash who are you know, referred to

with the nationalist side. I mean in anchor as that may be. This is kind of the umbrella term that's favored. And uh, there was the common Turn and and and the Soviet Union and and their proxies. Like there wasn't this other element there that were uh like gay feminist liberals or like Ernest Hemingway's buddies who just love freedom

or whatever whatever delusion normis have. You know, it was a bunch of it was a bunch of communists like Eric Milke who were busy shooting priests and nuns in the face and torturing fascists to death, and you know, preparing to categorically exterminate anybody who wasn't editable, just like they'd done in the Soviet Union, and just like Bellacoon's brief tyranny did in Hungary, and and just like the Communists did everywhere that you know, they were victorious in theater.

Key was the waging of aggressive war against Poland and Finland. Obviously, Stalin's plan and this was confirmed by Khrushcheff, was, you know, in the immediate aftermath of the assault and the Japanese at Chalcan goal, which, in the opinion of Hoffman and I agree with this, that's what started World War two,

and the Suvarov without saying it abides that perspective. The Molotov Ribbentrop packed, which Stalin confided to the polit Burrow as well as the Kruz Jeff, was that that would embolden the Hitler to sue for war with pol which he wouldn't have done had there been the risk of a two front war. Yet Germany's position was precarious, overextended. Stalin didn't think that you know Germany could truly stand up to the UK and France. He grossly underestimated the

Wehrmacht's offensive power. But even in the event of a German victory, his reasoning was that, you know, the French army would have its back broken. Germany would be on this footing a permanent hostility capture, the United Kingdom and Europe would be the Communists for the taking. You know, this was, in Stalin's words, to cruise Jeff Hitler was

now wrapped around our little finger. And one of the reasons for this confidence or overconfidence, you know, and I think I mentioned before as a barbarossa Stone had increased expanded the territory of the Soviet Union by four hundred

and twenty six thousand square kilometers. That's equivalent to the service area of the German right because it stood in nineteen nineteen, and especially a petular significance the aggressive war the Soviets waged against Poland and Finland and what amounted to the extortionate annexation of the Baltics, you know, with

waiting Estonia pressuring Romania into further territorial concessions. You know, the Soviet Union really on September third, nineteen thirty nine, it was in the strongest position out of all major powers, and the Soviet Union became a combatant, you know, on September seventeenth, when the Soviets also assaulted Poland, and of course there was a deafening silence eminent from emanating from London in the wake of that deployment, which is telling in and of itself. But you know, this myth that

Stalin was somehow afraid of Hitler's preposterous. For the reasons just enumerated, and it's essential to understand, I mean, demonster of this is the posture of the Soviet Union diplomatically and militarily towards the German Reich. And secondly, the pattern of military deployment. And I'll get into that in a moment, But in terms of the former November twelfth and thirteenth, nineteen forty, you know, the view from Moscow was that

the war was going very badly for Germany. Italy was not performing well in the relevant battle theaters, which was compromising Germany's position in the Mediterranean, which Hitler had counted on as a hedge, you know, against the British Empire. There was no indication of a resolution of the war with the United Kingdom. You know, Germany's fear of influence was totally static. You know, Operation Sea Lion was a strategic ruse, and even were it not, it would have

been a bloodbath. You know. So November twelfth and thirteenth, Stalin directed Molotov in Berlin to transmit to Hitler through ribentraup a demand for the expansion of the Soviets fear of influence. Basically, Stalin said that he demanded freedom to deploy in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Greece, as well as Finland. And he also said that, you know, the Soviet Union had a right to deploy on the Swedish frontier.

This is incredibly belligerent. Essentially all of southeastern Europe plus Finland and a piece of scanning Avia proper. Stalin just declared that this is now my sphere of influence. And if you meet this challenge with the hostile deployment, its war. I mean, does that sound like a man who's afraid

of Eatolf Hitler and the German Reich. You know, in Stalin's mind, there was absolutely no possibility of the Wehrmacht assaulting the Soviet Union even on terms of parody, let alone from a position of strategic superiority, which is somewhat fascinating because this idea that oh, the Germans underestimated the Soviet Union, they didn't at all, and stowfully gets into that Holder's report on the eve of Barbarossa, and Holder had actually written he'd written an assessment in nineteen thirty

seven of Soviet forces and being and capabilities. It was remarkably accurate, and von Mannstein and good Darien their assessments quite literally in the month before Barbarossa. The Soviet forces and being were exactly what they estimated them to be.

In reality, it was Stalin who was looking west and saying that, you know, Germany has no meaningful offensive capability in the mighty Soviet Union, has nothing to fear, and this is the key to why the Soviets took such horrific attrition during barbaros Further relevant to context here, I

can't remember if I got into this or not. There was a discreete mobilization phase throughout the Soviet Union Befe November nineteen forty when this demand that I just the numeraid was issued to Ribbon traup to deliver to Hitler by way of Malotov on order of Stalin. Between November ninety forty and the day of Barbaros, a massive and unprecedented arms build up took place in the Soviet Union.

This included, as of the onset of hostilities, the Rhetorican possess no less than twenty four thousand tanks, including close to two thousand T thirty fours, which were technically a medium tank, but they were the all around best tank in the Second World War. I don't think that's arguable, you know, the the air forces of the Red Army had over twenty three thousand aircraft, or thirty seven hundred

of which were considered to be cutting edge fighters. The Red Army had close to one hundred and fifty thousand artillery pieces. The Red Navy, including a substantial fleet of surface ships of varying types. They had close to three hundred submarines, and submarines are expressly offensive. There are no defensive submarines and this man as Hoffman raises in his book, the Soviets not only a larger fleet of submarines than

any other country in the world. But they outnumbered the Royal Navy more than fourfold in terms of their number of subs. I mean, this is the most powerful offensive military element the world has ever seen, you know. So Stalin was essentially fearless and viewed himself as the imminent master of this planet in geostrategic terms, as of barbaros as well as of ideological ones. And we're going to get into that too. Something essential to understand about the

Soviet culture. Stalin was keenly aware of what had befallen the Jacobin Revolution. He was also keenly aware of the changing dynamics of of ideological cultures within great powers. You know. He realized that, for example, Japan was on the ascendency. He realized that the German Reich had intense energies that it was drawing from, even though he viewed them as

geostrategically weak and compromised. He understood that the United Kingdom was undergoing a terrible existential crisis and that their empire is structured was essentially obsolescent. And this is one of the reasons why there've been a series of revolts, you know, nascent as well as well developed and realized. You know, in the years before the Great War and then in the Inner War years up to the then president, you know, and socialism in one country that that was something of

that was something of a propaganda cliche. Down invoked the sort of give a branding to you know, the kind of punctuated disturbances of this mass and megacytal restructuring of Russian society and the Soviet state which was becoming a superpower, as well as to you know, assuage the Western powers which were very much doing his bidding at that moment. Stalin was very much engaged with the common tern that had not changed and in the planning for what was

to be the assault on Europe. In the aftermath of the Icebreaker conflict, Stalin he called back the Russian delegation to the Common Turn and he called the common Terns representatives to Moscow to advise them of what was imminently going to happen. You know, the Soviet Union needed to realize the World Revolution, to survive, as well as to consolidate its superpower status which was not just burgaining but

was being actively realized also. And I realized I've probably got a bias for testimonial evidence, especially they're not exclusively in discerning the motives of men in command roles. But

there's not, there's not. The direct testimony is more reliable than circumstantial evidence unless it contradicts the manifest weight of extrinsic material facts outside the parameters those declarations and what Stalin said his biographer, Colonel General Wolcagano of he word for word by Lakouv reproduced the speech that Stalin issued fourth on May fifth, nineteen forty one, And according to Volkoganov, the leader made it quote. The Leader made it unmistakably clear.

War is inevitable in the future. We must be ready for the unconditional destruction of German fascism. The worl will be fought on enemy territory, and victory will be achieved with a few casualties. And as we got into last week, and as I think we've raised before in discussion of World War Two, it was a matter of formal doctrine that the Red Army was an offensive, perurpsed element. Its primary mission orientation was as the standard bearer of the revolution,

and it never struck a defensive posture. As a matter of doctrine, by choice, you know, and I've made the point before. I believe Stalin is probably the single most powerful man who ever lived, and the momentum that the Communist International had at this moment was at zenith. I'd argue Stalin had to abide that role or he would have been replaced by a man who would have you know, it was a convergence of ideological, imperative and geostrategic realities in a way that is very rare, but was sort

of inextricably and splendidly bound up at this juncture. And I think we talked before about the secret real I'm jumping around a bit, but I'm trying to corral the evidence in categorical capacities. The secret meeting with the polic Bureau, and this is when the common Tern delegation was also present in August nineteenth, nineteen thirty nine, you know, in the concominant with the assault on the Japanese Imperial Army

at calcum Goal. This meeting that Shtalin called the Poet Borough and the Russian section of the common Tern, Stalin declared that the time had come to quote apply the torch of war to the European powder keg. This is when Stalin declared, if we accept the German proposal for the non aggression picked, you know, Hitler will naturally attack Poland.

The intervention of France and England will be inevitable. The resulting, in Shalin's words, serious and arrest and disorder would lead to a punctuate a destabilization of Western Europe, yet without the Soviet Union being drawn into the conflict until they permissively opted do and Stalin referred to what he declared in nineteen twenty five with respect to the international strategy.

You know, the moment is nigh that we we we can pursue the bultimization of Europe by way of an advantageous entry into the war, through a broad spectrum field of activity which had now the potential of which had now opened up for their realization of the World Revolution.

And of course, when uh minutes from this meeting and the speech were smuggled out and were obtained by the French news agency Havas by way of Geneva, you know, and it went, it was, it was, it was published, and then the Moscow immediately wanted to damage control and Stalin apologists and propagandas, particularly in London, but also in the United States, you know, they they started immediately claiming that this, this is fascist propaganda, and this, this isn't

this isn't true, you know, So I mean this is important. Also, like when you read books by guys Chris Bellamy comes to mind. But they're legion these historians who claim, oh Stuvarov is a liar, there's no evidence for these things. They're redacting a huge amount of evidence, or they're just not including it and would question they say, oh that that's just propaganda. They're just not addressing it. And that's incredible,

you know. I mean, it'd be like, like imagine somewhat more approximately, like let's say I was writing a history of the American War in Iraq from two thousand and three eleven, and it'd be like if I was categorically redacting things that President Bush and Rumsfeld said in conversations they had and just declaring that, well, it's not important, or that that's just something liberals say or allege. I mean,

people would laugh at me, they'd say that's ridiculous. But in the case of you know, Barbarossa and you know, the Icebreaker hypothesis, that's exactly what they do you know, and you're just supposed to accept it. This is this is very abnormal, even accounting for the fact that research standards and things are often compromised for ideological and political reasons. But this seems tangential, but it's essential to understanding Suberov's

and Hoffmann's points. We've got to ask why Barbarossa was so tactically successful for the Wehrmacht and what that means, because this is sort of the key, in my opinion, the Soviet It's we're planning an assault on Romania in the autumn nineteen forty one, and if you know how to interpret military deployments, this should be clear. But also, if you're going to assault Germany from then extant frontiers, you're gonna do so from the Baltic and you're gonna

do so through Romania. And of course Germany was totally dependent on Romanian petroleum. That's one of the reasons Hitler cultivated the friendship of Antoniscu so closely. Antonescu held the Knights Cross. There was very good offices between him and Germany anyway, for cultural reasons, for ideological reasons, other things.

But he and Hitler, despite the linguistic barrier. They were very close friends too, and Antonescu was Hitler's strongest alla, I believe, you know, and close to a quarter million Romanians fought, you know, for the Axis cause in the East, which for a country the size of Romania, that's remarkable. But army groups South deployed from Romania. And this, if this was a very delicate issue because Soviet intelligence, which

was actually very good, this the deployment to Romania. The way Hitler, the ruse Hitler was able to pull off was that the unstable situation in Yugoslavia was what was drawing German forces at scale to be deployed there. But also obviously, through Ledgered Maine and other things, OKW was effectively able to hide the scale at which forces were

being a mass there. But you know, not only was it a staging ground for Barbarosa, but Hitler was reacted with anxiety that the Soviets were in with salt Romania because they were so these forces down there at a

dual role. They were purposed for an offensive mission, but they were also there to as a bulwark against amy assault, you know, at least so that they you know, there'd be enough time to reinforce and and not just you know, endure collapse of a critical front, which on top of the geostrategic menace that also to deprive Germany really of it, it's only a source of petroleum and represente quantities to

feel the war machine. But what this led to was there was massive Soviet deployments in the Baltic and in Ukraine through the Romanian frontier. So when the Wehrmacht assaulted, the road to Moscow was basically undefended. Okay, that's one of the reasons why Holder and uh Manstein they were beside themselves because they were telling Hitler, we need to

move on Moscow now. We can't wait, you know, we can't wait for the weather to turn, and we can't wait for the Soviets to reconstitute and affect a deployment in depth on the path to Moscow, you know. And as the deployment schema in Ukraine, the jur Oury Group South was exponentially outnumbered, but the so the Red Army

elements there they were deployed in an offensive pattern. And if you know anything about the way the Soviet Union fought and the way the armforce in the Russian Federation fights and they very much scaled down way to they obviously and with very different localized combined arms platforms. Deep battle is its it's dependent upon a fixed deployment schema

for it to work, okay. And the way the Red Army deployed offensively, and this is what they did when the tide turned and after Kursk, this is how they assaulted Berlin. The offensive deployment schema is by heavy use of shock armies, a Soviet shock army. They were larded

with firepower and totally front loaded. Okay. So when Army Group South engaged the Red Army through the ky Of Corridor, they were engaging this forward element that was loaded down with firepower that was supposed to break through the mainline of resistance, but that had a limited operational capacity, often of only a few days. Then they were to be rapidly reinforced by fresh elements who would continually assault in waves, and then when that shock element was was re equipped

and refitted, they would smash through again. But obviously, if the Wehrmacht assaults with mass armored columns, when you're deployed offensively with your front loaded shock army, as the sharp punk they're gonna smash that shock army, and then they're gonna cut through your reinforcement elements like butter, you know. And as they break through wave after wave, that frontload of element is going to be fighting on reversed fronts and they're going to get cut to pieces, which is

exactly what happened. Okay, So the Soviets were taking catastrophic casualties in the North and in the South. Meanwhile, Army Group Center was racing to Moscow quite literally, and Hitler didn't know quite what to make of this because there were sort of two Hitlers. And Stofally makes this point. When Hitler felt confident politically and when he had a what he believed was a firm conceptual grasp of the battlespace,

Hitler was hyper aggressive. When fog of war questions or political uncertainty clouded that perspective, Hitler developed a siege mentality, and that's exactly what happened. And Hitler viewed Stalin as

incredibly dangerous as he should have. So Hitler essentially halted Army Groups Center well Army Group South, surrounded this massive element plus the reserves that the Kremlin had ordered, like rushed to the front immediately, and Hitler was afraid to push the attack for a decisive victory at Moscow until this element was neutralized. And it was neutralized. The only

casualties the Soviets endured is utterly castrophic and unprecedented. And the Germans took something like three quarters of a million prisoners alone. Okay, but by the time, by the time the FU ordered the attack to be pushed on Moscow was too late. Okay, that's what happened. People misunderstand that. It says, you know, oh, the Germans were plotting to attack all along because the Soviets were weak in some ways. But then Stalin got it together, and you know, because

the Germans underestimated Soviet capabilities. You know, Hitler lost the war. That's not true at all. That doesn't make any sense. And you know, if Stalin was like, look at it like this. Okay, the Germans were halted at Moscow, but they reached the gates of Moscow, they reached Leningrad and lated it to siege, they reached Stalingrad. The German the very much reached all of its objectives in months. How long did it take the Red Army to march on Berlin.

It took them almost four years. So while was there this plotting, grinding blood bath. If the Soviets were this grossly underestimated force, you know, and the Germans didn't know what they were doing like this, the Germans killed the Red Army, you know. Obviously the Russians still had enough to hold Moscow and they did, and that was incredibly valiant. And Russians are incredibly tough. And there's a simplicity to the way the Ivans fight, but it's a simplicity that works,

you know. I think it's misguided when people suggest otherwise, and especially today because people are you know, they've adopted prejudices and stuff in this regard. There's really really stupid things that come out of the Pentagon in terms of their assessment of Russian capabilities and things. And incidentally, Eric VA. Einstein's the book it's called Loss of Victories. It's for I think it's fascinating, but it's kind of for military hounds only. It's you know, not like light Sunday reading.

But what that book was the US War Department back when there was a war department. There's not anymore, no matter what, like special needs Hegseth says, but in the last months of the Department of War they debriefed Manstein on basically on you know, his experience over four years of fighting the Soviet Union in the general officer's role. And the War Department is soon to be the Defense Department.

They took this very seriously, and early NATO force structure wasn't a substantial on the infantry side, ground on the imagery on our side. It was substantially based around what von Mannstein had. It's said, Okay, so this book was sometime in the fifties, the first edition, it was edited and make it more readable, and it's it's literally Managelin

is debriefing with some added stuff, you know. So and that that was one of his core premises is that fighting the Russians on Russian territory, they're they're they're they're unbelievably and savagely tough, you know, and that that's a force multiplier, and it also makes up for some of their shortcomings. And the Russians also they they know what they know

the limits of their capabilities, you know. And on the one hand, and super off of his book Inside the Red Army, which is very much worth reading too, especially if you got an interest in the late Cold War stuff, because it's very much a breakdown of you know, the the Brison of era the Soviet Army. You know, he makes the point, uh, And Harold Coyle made this point too that Doctoran in the Soviet Army was almost like regulation.

There was there were no mission oriented tactics, and the whole ethos of the Soviet Army's general staff was to eliminate uncertainty wherever and whenever and however possible, so they didn't tolerate deviation from the battle plan as emerged from you know, superior orders. But nevertheless, the Russian, the Soviets and the Russians do very well with what they're good at, you know, and deep battle is what they were good at. Heavy reliance on on combined arms in a shock element

capacity went on the offensive. That tended towards the kind of inflexibility which I think they later remedied somewhat during the Cold War. But the ability to rapidly shift from an offensive posture to defending the Behrmacht was very very good at that, and the British are pretty good at that too. The Soviets were catastrophically bad at it, and

the French were bad at it. But part of it too, though, is that Stalin had every reason to believe that the Behmont wasn't capable of what it was capable of as of June nineteen forty one. I mean, that was a blind spot. But at the same time, you know, the Germans tend to surprise people on matters of military affairs. But that's key because it's not as internet guys and armchair goofballs who claimed, well, Suber was an idiot who's a liar like looking out bad the Soviets got mall.

That's the whole, the whole point, Like that makes his point not the opposite. So that's that's key. You know, I'm not I'm not just dwelling on minutia to play cake the the you know, the the military hounds among us or something. But you know it's also you know, it was you know the point too that I think a lot of lay people don't understand these days. You know, modern war resolves rapidly. You know, you don't you know, you don't plan for quagmires because then you're planning to

lose a war. So you know, within ideally in about ten weeks in the outer temporal limits six months, you know, Moscow had to fall to the Hrmont and Stalin was over confident, absolutely, But it stands the reason his kind of poor view of the Wehrmacht, not in terms of its quality of men or firepower, but the geo strategic situation and what he viewed as it's over extended commitments

and things. You know, he reasoned that, you know, even in the very unlikely event of an assault, you know, we can hold him at bay long enough to reinforce and by then, you know, victory conditions will no longer be realizable. You know, this all kind of falls into place, is the totality of circumstances. You've got to look at this the ssoudieological culture. You gotta take Stalin's own statements, you gotta look at the statements of his underlings, including Khrushchev.

You've got to look at the pattern of deployment. You've got to take in if you know what to look for. But even I mean it's even more persuasive, or are more obvious or other, But you know, taking in totality, I mean, it's clear that Suvarov was telling the truth, you know, but also mean, well it's not it's not

clear what what the alternative was. I mean it this unprecedented military build up coupled with the transformative, globally transformative aspects of the Bolshrirek Revolution, the heart and lungs of which paverbially were in the Soviet Union. I mean, what what's the alternative Stalin was? He ordered this build up for purely defensive purposes, to which would inevitably at some point provoke the West into attacking him. I mean, it

doesn't that that doesn't make any sense. And generally, when you're talking about conditions of approximate parody with conventional combined arms at scale, or when you're talking about near peer strategic planning, you don't wait to be attacked. You always push the assault, you know. Then that's I mean, this, this this is very basic stuff.

this really great exhaustive biography of Francis Yackey. But he wrote a book on Stalin called Stalin the Enduring Legacy, and people who haven't read the book, they they they panted as some sort of oh he's some Eurasianist. That's like, that's not what he's saying at all. He's saying Stalin's legacy was complicated. He basically abides the same viewpoint that Paul Godfrey does, although for some of different reasons about a substantial aspect of the Cold War deriving from the

Stalin versus Trotsky paradigm. You know, but that doesn't mean that Stalin was somehow not an internationalist. And even you know, the Soviet Union can name dozens of ethnicities, you know, a huge Moslim population, you know, a huge Asiatic population, you know, a huge number of Near Eastern people. You know, it spanned one fifth or one six of this planets, like the Soviet Union was the ultimate international superpower, you know,

and the only way the Soviet Union survives. And one of the reasons why the later Cold War was so dangerous as human you know, for technological reasons in historical ones and the sidelining of human decision makers and misconditions of strategic nucleator parody and things. But the reason why

I drop of who was a fascinating guy. And I mean, like I've said, I believe I'm not a sovietologist and I'm not a Russia expert at all, but I do know something and it's clear to me that post Khrush chief there was a shadow trifecta of and drop of

Ustanov and Gramigo with a real Soviet executive. Brezhnev was a frontman, which made sense because before he became kind of do we compromised people liked Breshnev, and he resonated with with the people even today, like he's fondly remembered, you know, like uh as as as you know, uh, it's like a man who was like a like a

great steward of other Russian people and the nationalities. But you know, and drop of I mean Bridsenev was very much a Stalinist, you know, and as was in drop of but and drop off seminal speech right in eighty two, right after he became a general secretary. You know, he this is when uh project Rion, which a lot of people attribute as contributing substantially to the war Scare of eighty three in the able Archer era. I think people

still misunderstand that aspect of it. But because it may there isn't one of the subject of the speech to the Presidium he said, we're going to lose the Cold War if we don't take drastic measures to countermeasures against Rima, you know, the revolution of military affairs. He was being specifically of computing power and command and control aspects, which was true. There's there's something, there's something insane. There's only like five thousand computers in the entire Soviet Union in

ninety too. It was something that it was some insanely primitive state of affairs or regards high tech, you know, and you know, it's oh point was basically the risk of war based on the strategic paradigm as it's evolving, is well as these command and control aspects and and the sideline of human decision makers, that the risk of war is probably greater than it's ever been since you know,

the forties. But also so we're going to lose that war if we don't find a way to develop meaningful countermeasures that you know, are our technologies of parody, or unless we find a way out of the Cold War, you know. And that was Gorbachev's whole notion, because Gorbachev wasn'tna drop off protege. He wasn't some big liberal chevid narsee I think was subverting things. But point being, you know, Gorbachev was very much the anti Yeltsin quite literally, and

Yelson was the neocons guy. You know. Gorbachev's notion was, you know, to reform the command economy with certain qualifications, you know, and and and basically do it with gods plan and favor of something else that could abide innovation in the high tech sector and to bring about peace with the United States. But surrendering to the United States or dismantling the Soviet Union that was not at all within the cars and one of the reasons why Gorbachev

was head rapport with Bush and Baker. Bush and Baker assured him, we're not gonna try and dismantle the Soviet Union, and they weren't for a very specific reason. Bush said, where you know, until there's full nuclear disarmament, we're not even gonna talk about, you know, a post Soviet future,

you know. And obviously the Neo count perspective and their shoehorning of Yeltsen was, you know, break the Soviet Union to piece is now their notion was, and one of the reasons for the why this crusading aast Moscow's proceeding from Ukraine. Their notion was to break the Soviet Union into essentially three discrete like client regimes, you know, like

the former Soviet Far East. And in those days especially too, because the Pentagon was still looking at China as essentially friendly and obviously like you know, seed some of that territory to the to Pig King, but you know, base

they'll be like a Ukraine like commissariat. They'll be like, you know, the Moscow kind of central Commissariat, and then they'll be this like former like Russian Far East that can you know, just that's just kind of like, uh, this sort of like hyper exploited you know, hinterland for the United States and and and the adjacent finance capital and stuff.

And you know, uh, Bush and Baker realize like, no, we're not We're not gonna grind these people's faces into the concrete, and we're not going to destabilize the whole region. And you know, we're certainly not gonna do anything until there's full nuclear disarmament. You know that that was a

tangential discussion. Should give me. But Baker was a great man, and I've got a lot of respect for him and Bush forty one, it was not a particularly likable guy, leaven It dead, but he had a very serious and sophisticated view of geopolitics and political affairs. So that administration looks better and better in my opinion. And I mean I felt that way at the time. As a teenager, I realized his country, I realized something really, really really

bad was underway. When when when when Clinton was elected. I mean, it would have been one thing if it was like a twenty twenty steel but the body politically excited about this pig, and that was insane, you know. And it's not just because he was crushing our people. I mean I knew guys who got indicted and with the prison under Clinton reno for when they hadn't done anything. You know, I'm not just speaking, I mean as a matter of law as well as a matter of fact

or ethics or whatever. But as it may the to bring it back a bit, you know, there there's a brief moment really from about ninety two to ninety six, and that's when that's when these these historians, first another David Irving, you know, he got access to the FSB archives and there was all this incredible stuff that came to like that, you know, the old Soviet system had

suppressed and kept from probably eyes. But then, I mean very quickly the things became even more opaque than in some much than they had during the Soviet e because the regime will never tell the truth about what's going on with Russia, I mean, or with Europe. But this is an issue with peculiar sensitivity for reasons that I don't think need to be elaborately explicated. But I realized I talk more about Hoffman as well as the knowledge

of Barbara Rose, and I did specifically suber Of. If you going to a part three, I'll remedy that and i'll speak specifically to suber Off, and I'll include some aspects of inside the Red Army. I've got a paperback of that. I'm going to take it on the road with me.

You know, I mean, I get it. That's not that's not a fun right, Like the defector actually sucks.

got right. He's like nothing, absolutely nothing. And I'm like, I see these defectors come out of like North Korea, and like immediately they get debrief by the State Department, and then they get boob jobs and they're driving brand new cars and they're in frigging condos. And I'm like, yeah, I think I think defectors were a lot different back then than they are.

it pete cold War, you know. Uh, life wasn't that different than the Soviet Union or in America. It really wasn't. So. I mean, it's not like you're some GRU big shot. It's not like you're gonna get great stuff in America. You can't back home. I mean, yeah you can. You might be able to get like blue jeans for your mistress and like good scotch, but there's not some like there was some like huge difference in quality of life

or something. Guys like Stuber defected because they they had ethical reasons for it, and they developed a moral contempt for the system. I really liked the book, The Hunt for at October. It's just like an awesome book, and I reread it lately because I I I've forgotten how good it was. But you know, the uh, the Captain of the Red October, the whole deal. I mean it's

in parts of character. I mean it's not. It's a brilliant meditation on on late Cold War strategic nuclear platforms and the deep parodies they're in, but it's under a character study. Like the Soviet naval officer, you know, he's uh, he's this guy from the He's this Lithuanian guy. He doesn't really relate to the Russian culture. His wife needed an operation and uh, the doctor who operated on or was drunk when he poured in the surgery, so he boxed it and she died. But the doctor was the

sun of some polit baro big shots. They're like, you know, you can't stop demanding like vengeance against this man. So so this navel off series just like what the hell am I doing? You know, like I and also too in it he's like deeply religious. He's like, so there's like this atheist, uh chauvinistic Russian government that killed my wife, and I am I'm supposed to I'm supposed to kill fifty million people and event a wharl like on behalf

of it. Like, no, I'm not doing that. I mean there there's there's a deeper moral quag mari too, because the Red October it's a Typhoon class sub but it's got what's called a caterpillar drive, so it's invisible to SOSIS and passive sonar. So basically it's a splendid first strike weapon. So he realizes, like the Soviet Union can all this strategic balance and basically, uh bring America to terms through the threat of through the threat of nuclear assault,

and like, I mean he've used that as morally fucked. Also, you know, like if we're gonna win, like let's win the Cold War clean, you know, not not do it basically by like holding America hostage with the nuclear trigger.

I mean that's kind of moralistic. But at the same time, I mean, I I don't know, man, like if it's no being uh being the captain of a of a typhoon class sub that that there was a counter value like mega death machine, you know, it's it's it's it's role was to assault counter value targets and and kill millions of people if you don't believe in the system you serve. That's a pretty horrible role to be in. You know, you've got to be a true believer to

do that job. It's not like any other job in the military, and it it's not like any other role in any era, you know, I commanding it can be commanding a first strike platform that that can that can kill millions of people, you know. So I obviously that's like a fictional example, but what clans he was drawing upon was the real ethos of defectors in the Cold War. And on the other side, Yeah, guys like the Cambridge five, but I think we're pretty disturbed guys. But they were

true believers. That's totally different than these days. Like some I think Snowden is a is a sincere guy. Whatever problems he might have, you know, he's basically yeah, I mean, he could never leave Russia now, Like it's not a happy life, you know. I I think, uh, you can argue, I mean, Snowden, I don't want to get into a deep meditation on the ethics of what Snouding did, but I my point is, like I whatever is motives, I don't think if we can say he did that for clout.

But you know, these people who come the other way, like some of these Chinese or North Koreans, they're they're just not going to get paid, it's obvious, but they think they're not being respected like they should be in, you know, whatever role they're in. You know, but the Cold War was a Cold War is a different world, I mean literally, you know.

make progress. I gotta make substantial progress on this manuscript. By December, things have been very hectic, so in good ways, and then I injured myself like a fucking idiot. But it's uh, the mind Phaser pod. Uh, it's gonna be another couple of weeks before a fresh episode drops, so forgive me for day. But Jake burd and I will continue to drop fresh stuff on his platforms and on radio for Chicago. So just bear with me. I promise we'll be back to regular uploads when I get back from the road.

who's seriously engaged with the subject matter. There's a reason why court historians claim the opposite of hostilities was September third, nineteen thirty nine, because that represents a discreetly ideologically coded perspective. And obviously the intention is to present the global strategic and geopolitical situation as being one of relative peace until the German Reich violated that peace through make it aggression

against the Polish state. Okay, that's a problematic perspective for all kinds of reasons, you know, some of which are political, some of which are purely historical in nature and factual.

But what I think is irrebuttable. Even if one accepts, you know, the mainstream view of a the onset of hostility between the German Reich and Poland and the subsequent war declaration on the German Reich by France and the United Kingdom, the fact of the matter is that weeks prior, the Soviet Union assaulted the Japanese Imperial Army at Chalkan Goal. This was a massive engagement. This is a massive clash of forces, you know, and obviously it represented the onset

of a state of general hostility. Is between two great powers, the Soviet Union and the Empire of Japan. So I don't really see how anybody who looks like to be taken seriously it can claim that this was some sort of insignificant event or somehow not related to the broader nexus of causation that you know, also precipitated the agin hostilities in Europe. You know, either the Soviet Union going to war with Japan in a scale capacity represented the

onset of general hostilities on a planetary scale, or it didn't. Okay, So there's that related to that, but more discreetly political in terms of the significance of the subject matter vis a vis court history, narratives, and the way that official authorities in the United States and the United Kingdom and the Buddhist Republic continue to present, you know, and characterize the Second World War is the issue of Soviet intentions and what exactly the state of power political relations was

between Moscow and Berlin as of you know, June twenty second, nineteen forty one. And it's pretty clear to me, you know, and I I draw a lot in substantial measure on

the laate Yakam Hoffman's exhaustive study of Barbarossa. It's pretty clear to me that the Soviet Union was eminently going to assault Europe and the German Reich, not just the FURE but OKW as well as you know, various command elements within the party apparatus, the military and the secular state of apparatus recognized this reality, as did myriad heads of state who found themselves allied with the German Reich for various reasons. You know, this included Croatia, Slovakia, Italy

and you know France. You know, again there was no VSI France. There was the Government of France and it it was absolutely on the side of the Axis Powers. You know, there were volunteers from Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland throughout uh this Central Asian Islamic countries. You know, Romania. Romania contributed a quarter million men, which is a massive contribution for a country the size of Romania. You know, Hungary, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, you know, Belgium, Luxembourg. You know, the list

goes on and on and on. You know, and obviously the Spaniards that Leningrad fought incredibly valiantly. But you know, there's there's this This wasn't just a matter of zeitgeist, some sort of mass hysteria or some sort of desire to sacrifice one's life, or some sort of epemeral glory. The Soviet Union, UH had a time of the fact that it was animated by a revolutionary ideology that was truly global in character. It The Soviet Union had built a military juggernaut the likes of which the world had

never seen. It was almost unfathomable, and it was only growing larger and more powerful, you know, and the like I said to me, this is obvious. Hoffman and Victor Suvarov and a few other military historians, all right, Astofe is another one. They brought unique insight to the table. And Hoffman in particular, his data points were and are exhaustive. And Hoffman too he not that I mean, obviously, I

don't have any prejudice against independent scholars. I am one, but such that people are prone to dismissing historians who don't have what they view as adequate credential affiliation with reputable institutions. Well, Hoffman, when he was alive, he was in the employee of the official Historical Records division of the Bundespan, you know, and he was considered to be probably the seminal German historian on Barbarossa in terms of

the military aspects. Okay, you can't say that he was a crank or that he was some Greek the guy who was outside of the establishment of the bundes Republic. He was very much insinuated into it. Okay, not that that have to make a difference, but such that it does. You know, I don't see how people can impeach his credibility, you know. And one of the issues that Hoffman takes up, because again Hoffman was very focused on the quantitative military

aspects of Barbarossa. One of the things that he addressed was a lot of lay people as well as historians and military analysts who know better. But for cynical reasons, vand Wagon on this argument, they claim that, well, if the Soviet Union was so deeply mobilized and had to raise such a massively scaled war machine, why did they absorb catastrophic casualties. Well, that's exactly why they did, because

they were deployed offensively. And when you're talking about combined arms, even to this day, I mean, drones and localized autonomous firepower are definitely changing things most strategically and tactically and nowhere is that more on display than in than in various aspects of tactical deployment and depth. But even to this day, this remains constant. If we're talking about combined

arms modern warfare, we're not. You can't just call it a proverbial audible in the midst of hostilities, if your forces are a rayed to assault and switch to a defensive paradigm, so coming under assault when not prepared to defend in depth, it can lead to catastrophe, particularly when one's opponent is the Wehrmacht. And we're gonna get into how exactly that plays out. But not only again, does the attrition rate and specifically the skewed nature of that

attrition rate. Not only does that not tend to rebut the claim before us, it actually tends to substantiate it. Now I'll get into some of these data points, said, you know, to clarify what we're talking about here. I can't remember if I got into this or not in the first episode. And please tell me if I'm repeating myself and know what has need to correct me. I'm not gonna be offended. Quite the contrary, You'll be quite gracious.

Between November nineteen forty and literally the eve of Barbarossa in June nineteen forty one, the Soviets undertook a massive arms build up. It Now, don't get me wrong, By the autumn of nineteen forty the Soviets enjoyed numeric and arguably technological superiority pretty much across the entire spectrum of combined arms. But this punctuated build up of November nineteen forty to June nineteen forty one can really only be

interpreted as mobilization and anticipation of offensive operations. On the outbreak of hostilities in June twenty second, nineteen forty one, the Soviet Union had deployed no less than twenty four thousand tanks, close to two thousand of which were T thirty fours, which you know, in those days there weren't main battle tanks. There was light, medium, and heavy tanks then arguably super heavy tanks. But the T thirty four was I think of it as kind of like the

the zero of of of armored forces. You know, it was probably the most effective armored platform of the entire war. And and all are out in terms Okay, yeah, obviously, you know, the Tiger was a superior machine. That's not what we're talking about, you know, in the the the ability of T thirty four is to be rolled off the assembly line rapidly, you know, almost like model T Fords or something odin that that itself as a force multiplier,

you know it. Between ninety and thirty eight and June twenty second, nineteen forty one, the Red Air Force had acquired over twenty three thousand military aircraft, around thirty seven one hundred of which could be considered cutting edge. Probably about half of those had night fighting capability. The Red Army had close to one hundred and fifty thousand field

artillery pieces and heavy mortars. The Red Navy had over two hundred submarines, which I can't remember if I mentioned or not, but obviously the submarines are prest league offensive. There aren't defensive submarines, you know. And to be clear, this alone, I mean, the Soviet Union wasn't known as

any kind of maritime power. I mean, if anything, you know, the the Tsars Navy had been sank by the Japanese in nineteen oh five, and that it further compromised the prestige actual potential of you know, the Russian Navy is a real force. But by June twenty second, nineteen forty one, the Soviet Union by far had the largest submarine fleet in the world, more than four times that of the Royal Navy, you know, in the UK was viewed as the foremost naval power on this planet, you know. I mean,

these data points speak for themselves, you know. And on the political side, I know I've gotten into this in previous series that we've done. I put a lot of emphasis on direct testimony owing I'm sure in part to the fact that my background in part is at least

is that of a lawyer, you know. But also if we're talking about intent, particularly of wartime executives, there's a tendency to be able to rely upon the statements of a wartime executive or an executive who is preparing for war, there's a there's insteadive is at telling the truth when the chief executives so situated, is talking to his cabinet or as a general staff officers, Okay, because what incentive or there be to lie number one, and there's there's

there's active disincentives to lie because that compromises the ability of subordinate command elements to effectively execute orders and wage war towards victory conditions, you know. And so I put a lot of stock in what Stalin said, and a lot of this testimony from Stalin himself, you know, that which isn't independently documented by you know, the minutes of his speeches or by audio recording. You know, A lot of Stalin's intimates were the sources of these statements, including

Colonel Volkaganov, who was Stalin's official biographer, you know. And Stalin gave a series of speeches in this in the year preceding Barbarossa, but particularly the six to eight months immediately proceeding onset of hostilities, which approximately reflects the final phase of mobilization that we talked about just now, from

November nineteen forty to June nineteen forty one. And Volkoganov makes the point that that Stalin was very taciturn, but he became quite candid and quite open within the cloisters of you know, these command element corridors in his discussion of you know, what was to be military doctrine in the next war, which he increasingly discussed as if it

was an imminent possibility. In Volkoganov's own words. In describing the speech Stalin made on May fifth, nineteen forty one, he says, quote, the Leader made it unmistakably, unmistakably clear. War is inevitable in the future. One must be ready for the quote unconditional destruction of German fascism. The world will be fought on enemy territory and victory will be

achieved with few casualties. And again, this wasn't something that Stalin merely devised as a polemical device to embolden forces under his command or to overcome any potential or actual crises and confidences among the general staff by appeal to revolutionary fervor. Lenin made clear in identifying the core doctrinal elements of the Red Army, you know, back in nineteen twenty, nineteen twenty one, nineteen twenty two, that the Red Army

was an instrumentality of revolutionary imperatives. It wasn't a defensive element, you know, and it was to be deployed offensively at all times, you know, because the only rational for its existence within the paradigm of Mercist historiography and Leninist revolutionary doctrine was to facilitate the advance of history and the

victory of the proletariat against the class enemy. So there's really no there's really no way to interpret Soviet battle doctrine as anything other than discreetly ideologically coded and axiomatically offensive, you know, And this is this is going on, or this is relying upon the strictures of Marxist Leninist ontology and the distinct Marxist view of military power and its

utility and its ethical functions. And the Marxist Leninism was in fact a total philosophical and political system, impoverished as it may have been intellectually in various capacities, and to be fair at what's sophisticated in others, what's irrebuttable or indisputable, is that it was a total theory of political and

social and thus historical antology. So the idea that the party state, which to be clear, by nineteen forty one, had categorically annihilated millions of people within the Soviet Union owing to what was identified as their ineducability, you know, the idea that Stalin or the Presidium or the Politburo Standing Committee or these surviving command elements in the Red army. The idea that they would somehow hesitate to see through

these doctrinal imperatives is somewhat laughable, you know. And we're not in the court of law, so it shouldn't be a problem to invoke subsequent as well as prior precedent to demonstrate persuasively what the doctrinal character was of Marxist Leninist revolutionary military elements. I invoked the case of Cambodia a lot, you know, from nineteen seventy five to ninety seventy nine. And I know for a fact, because I

got to hate me all it's affecting things. People suspect I only do that for the sake of polemical uh expediency, But that's not why. Paul Pott was not some simple minded brute. He was actually a very sophisticated political soldier. He had a very deep understanding of Marcis Leninism, far more than Mao and Democratic Tempuccia. As Paul Pott and his cadre branded the country during their brief tenure, was a very pure Marcis Leninist stayed in some ways, and

there was nothing there. There was nothing heterodox an idiot logical terms about the way they implemented class warfare adjusting for the discrete conditions on the ground in Southeast Asia as in nineteen seventy five. So what I'm getting at, and I'll move on here in a moment I don't quite understand. Are the same people who acknowledge that the Soviet Union was this outlier country and that that was unusual in every conceivable sense, you know, in terms of

practice and policy and theoretical foundations and everything else. Yet they insist that this this didn't somehow impact military decision making or that revolutionary ontology somehow, somehow stopped at the at the point of executive decisionism when it came to the decision to you know, spread the revolutionary cause to Europe and specifically to annihilate the dialectical enemy in the

German Reich. But you know, the Stalin had spoken again and again as well to the Central Committee, most notably on January eighth, nineteen forty one, and there was two high ranking Air Force officers in attendance, and Stalin apparently spoke directly of the ratio and algorithm that was necessary to defeat the German Reich. According to the General Staff, as well as his own calculations as had been explicated to him by authorities that he trusted. He spoke on

this particular day to quote twofold superiority. He said that, as had been explained to him, twofold superiority is a law of military science, meaning the two to one ratio contra the enemy and offensive operations. You know, whether you're talking about raw numbers or you know, force multipliers and variables tending to act as force multipliers that magnify the effectiveness of offensive elements, you know. And Stalin stated openly

that quote, this is not a game. The time is approaching for military operations, twofold superiority is essential, but greater supurity is even better. And he said that he spoke specifically of the difficulty of traversing the Carpathians and the need to designate at least five thousand attack aircraft in order to neutralize defensive positions that infantry and armor aren't

going to be able to reddle traverse going to the terrain. Now, this is hugely important for reasons I'm gonna get into in a moment, Okay, But from January of forty one, specifically January eighth, until May, you know, only weeks before Barbarossa. Stalin talks again and again about waging military operations in the Balkans, specifically across the Romanian frontier, and discrete exigencies that are presented by waging war in that theater. Okay.

In a lecture given in the spring, I believe in March of forty one, but somehow neglected to sign an exec date, he addressed the Soviet Planopotentiary representative in Belgrade, which at that time was under the rule briefly of a Chetnik junta, which in turn led to the German intervention and ultimately the you know, bifurcation of the Kingdom

of Croats, Serbs and Slovenes. But in addressing the Planopotentiary Representative in Belgrade and select members of the Pullet Buro, he said, quote, the USSOR will only react at the proper time. The powers are scattering their forces more and more. The USSR is therefore waiting to act unexpectedly against Germany, and doing so, the USSR will cross the Carpathias, which will lead to the signal for the revolution in Hungary.

Soviet troops will penetrate Yugoslavia from Hungary, advance the Adriatic Sea, and cut Germany off from the Balkans in the Middle East. Okay, so what does this mean in both immedia tactical terms and how this impacted the battlefield situation in Operation Barbarossa as well as in broader strategic terms. Well, I'll take it away better question first, the latter aspect. First, the

Soviet Union plan to assault Europe through Romania. By capturing Romania, it could deprive Germany of essential access to petroleum reserves.

And also that's commensurate with Soviet deep battle doctrine, which presuming forces and being ratios that Stalin described as being you know, at least a twofold advantage and preferably double or triple that Stalin basically was planning a deep battle like pincer flanking maneuver across the entirety of the continent in the north through Sweden and then down to assault Germany from the north and in the south. The main stap punks would be through Romania. And I'll get into

in a moment. This is why the Army Group Center, Army Group South faced savage resistance and Barbarossa Army Group Center was moving so fast it was basically like face with no more than token opposition on the road to Moscow, which doesn't make any sense unless you understand the deployment schema of the Red Army, which was totally offensive and concentrated in the south in a way that wouldn't be

rationally in a in a defensive oriented schema. It's uh most uh, most significant everyone, I'm jumping around a bit, but so please stop me if I'm not being clear.

Most significant the suber of hypothesis in terms of Stalin's declared intentions was probably what's going to be known as the secret meeting with the polit Burrow and the Soviet representatives of the Common Tern who had been called back presumably to be availed for the specific person being availed to this speech on August nineteenth, nineteen thirty nine, which obviously coincided with the assault on the Japanese a Kalkin goal.

But this was a surprise secret meeting, and it was unprecedented for the Russian delegation of the Common Turn to be called back. Among other things, Stalin didn't have a lot of he didn't have a lot of respect for the Common turn. I mean in part because the his UH rigid command doctrine. He didn't I mean, he wasn't comfortable with UH an ideologically coded cadre structure, whereby independent of Moscow, just going to the fact of distance and

you know, remoteness. You know, he didn't want some cadre making decisions even superficially on behalf of the Soviet Union without his direct oversight. Okay, but nonetheless, you know, the common tern still had tremendous clout in ninety thirty nine, and especially coming off of the defeat in Spain, there was a real danger of a fracturing of a you know, the broad international front red front. So this is highly significant.

You know, I guess what I'm getting at is that Stalin wouldn't have called the Russian delegation backed for you know, for the sake of putting on airs or to stand on ceremony or something. And this is when I think, I excuse me, I think I briefly addressed this last episode.

It was in this it was in this secret meeting or secret speech that Stalin declared that uh, you know, getting the Germans, to getting the right foreign ministry to agree to a non aggression pact, you know, that would embolden them to act against Poland, you know, because there too for the Berlin and specifically Hitler felt that his hands were tied in resolving the Polish issue because an assault on Poland, even in the wake of a gross

provocation or violation at Germany's territorial integrity on the frontier, you know, what, would lead to a Soviet counter strike that would be devastating. So Stalin's reasoning was, you know, we will, uh will lull Germany with this non aggression pact, which you know absolutely guarantees that they will assault Poland, which will then you know, lead to a war declaration

by the UK and France. Germany, you'll uh will probably be victorious on the Western front, but only at pure it cost, you know, and then uh you know and that this thus this is the icebreaker that uh will uh soften uh what would be Europe's defensive cordon and allow the Red Army to you know, just bowl over and annihilate resistance in the West and you know, thus reverse the reverse the defeat handed to them and Iberia and you know, conquer the continent in a rapid and

devastating operation. And I mean Stalin this is remarkably consistent as far back as nineteen twenty five, you know, when he was less than three years into his formal ascendancy as General Secretary, he spoke openly about the need to act militarily against Europe as soon as possible, but not until the political climate and the you know, the myriad it ever sort of changing alliance structure in the West was such that what Don called the quote broad field

of activity would be realizable in order to you know, pursue the imperative of world revolution. And to be clear, you know, not only was a Europe along with America and Japan, you know, the kind of productive core of this planet, but you know, the understanding was that Europe was still the inconceptual terms, you know, the political center

of human affairs. You know, conceptually, you know, every every every ideological schema you know, came from Europe, and even even things like the anti colonial movement were fully locked into dialectical uh engagement you know, with with with European thought. So Stalin's notion was that, you know, first last and always your Europe needs to be overrun and annihilated, and the revolution has to has to be implemented there. You know, it's a waste of time and it's self defeating them pursue. Uh,

there's such imperatives on the periphery. But make no mistake, you know where ever revolutionary activity jumped off that had historical momentum and forced it in being Stalin absolutely was in favor of supporting that and seeing that through. But the uh, but but the but the core orientation of the Soviet Union had to be you know, the the you know, the implementing the World Revolution in Europe, you know, first and foremost. And and that's also why the Spanish

War was so important. You know, it wasn't just uh. I've read some court historians claim that Shalin was somehow like reluctantly forced into the Spanish War just for the sake of appeasing the common term. I mean, that's that's that's laughable for all kinds of reasons. But it also you know, Shalin wasn't as heterodox of a of a Marxist Leninist as he's often portrayed. I mean, Stalin was complicated, you know, Like I said, I it's a lean value,

but it's a great book. Carry Bolton's book stalin the enduring legacy. You know, Shalin was a complicated figure, and there were heterodox aspects to his worldview and his his own Velt politique. But it wasn't a radical divergence or something, you know, And that's important, especially because these days even even some fairly heterodox political fearis and even some revisionists

seem to abide that fiction. But yeah, the you can't and in other words, this you can't you can't extricate the ambition of the Sovietization of Europe from the existence of the Soviet Union itself. You know, these these these ambitions were synonymous, and that's that's also why the Cold War developed the way they did in in raw geo strategic terms. But you know, and I think I can't remember I mentioned or not this speech and question. You know,

the August nineteen, nineteen thirty nine speech. It was obtained by the French news agency have us and uh, the French were kind of notorious for getting a hold of these kinds of documents and records, you know, And when when the Havas agency by way of Geneva, when when? When when they went public with it? It was published in ah, some international journal and then in many of

the major French language newspapers. But Moscow's propagandas immediately went into overdrive, you know, and claiming, you know, this is a this is a forgery. You know, this, this is confabulated by the the enemies of Russia and the Soviet Union.

You know, it's fascist propaganda. And uh it did not make as nearly as big of an impact as one might think, you know, which is really interesting because it goes to show you too, how you know, And a lot of that too had to do with, uh, this kind of deafening silence from American news agencies, you know, and other than all the major papers in America, I mean, other than those brands held by McCormick were basically uh,

mouthpieces for the New Deal regime, you know. But it's still I mean obviously too, I mean this there's a kind of nascent, low tech globalism emerging at least between America and Europe by way of you know, the UK, but even you know, I mean, it's it's, it's it's stormans remarkable that there is basically no impact in terms of global opinion. And uh I've looked too to see if this pops up in any America first literature, and

I haven't found anything this positive on that question. But that again goes to show you to the degree to which the psychological environment was being actively manipulated, you know, long before the onset of formal hostilities, which might seem like an obvious point to you or myself, but people are inundated in this country with this idea that you know, somehow the New Dealers had no interest in these goings on and the European War and the intries from the

Soviet Union, the German Reich, you know, until Pearl Harbor,

when America was attacked. Then that changed everything. I mean that that could not be more false, from the first h to the New Deal regime, which again coincided almost precisely with the National Socialist Revolution, which was a totally legal revolution again, you know, and Roosevelt from the first days of his administration was pursuing an an absolutely radical anti fascist imperative as the core mandate of an ambition of his administration, you know, And that can't they can't

be denied, you know, in the I don't want to spin this off to tangentially, and I know that a lot of people criticize me for my sources, well, yet they have yet to directly rebut any of these data points that have derived from these sources, namely Robert Conquests and Ernst Nolty, and as well as the Black Book

of Communism, which is a great resource. I'm gonna add, but it's indisputable if the Soviet Union exterminated millions of people between nineteen seventeen and nineteen forty one, and there was a massive series of death camps, actual death camps that were employed towards this incredibly gruesome task, and the degree to which there was an information blackout about this reality can't be overstated, you know. And people who raised this issue, you know, not just not just America Firsters,

but Joseph Schumpeter's wife. Interestingly, she spoke Japanese and and she was a big advocate for Japanese people. She was kind of a human rights type, but of a genuine sort, not like the twenty first century sort. And uh, she raised the issue of Soviet annihilation therapy as an ULTI called it, and she was she and Schumper were her

hassled by the FBI. Both were you know, sympathies for the Axis vis a vis her, you know, dealings with with these people and stuff, and particularly Japanese people are being persecuted by the New Dealers, but also you know, propagandizing against the Soviet Union, in their view, was this big subversive act, you know, which seems kind of an incredible I'd imagine that people today, but they don't. I mean, but I mean, it only seems incredible if one doesn't

accept the true nature of a of that regime. But that aside, it's remarkable that agree to which these things could in fact be could in fact be hidden, you know, But that also raised I mean, there's also and obliquely and conversely it it also begs the question, you know, if there was this mass murder conspiracy hatched in the German Reich at Vance in ninety forty two, like why

wasn't anybody you know, publicizing that? I mean that one would think that would be a godsend to the New Dealers and a perfect way to portray the Germans as these horrific villains, and especially became imperative you know by ninety forty four, as the UIs Army was quite literally near mutiny, you know, which we've talked about that was the real catalyst for the execution of Poort Eddie Slavic.

You know, it's people so uh, you know, the Walter Winschel and uh, the Office of War Information and all these myriad anglophone news agencies. They just decided not to report on the fact that the German Reich only existed to exterminate Jewish people just because they didn't think it was important, you know, they did, they didn't think it was a useful way to code propaganda. I mean, that's like a bit tangential. But moving on real quick, so I realize we're running out of time. I mentioned a

moment ago. Something that's often raised is okay, So why why was Barbarossa so tactically so tactically successful? And why was the Attrition eight so algorithmically skewed against the Soviet Union if in fact the Soviet Union was mobilized for war and planning to attack. But that that's exactly why

these things did develop that way. The Soviets were planning to assault Romania by autumn of forty one, and that's exactly why, like I said, army groups South encountered comparatively savage resistance and that's also why that's also why there was a there was powerful reserve elements in Ukraine because essentially they were there to rapidly reinforce the shock element

that was going to assault the Balkans. So there was this awkwardly unbalanced deployment scheme of Soviet field armies where Soviet forces blocking the corridor to the Moscow Leningrad deployment space they were exponentially weaker than those deployed to Ukraine, which doesn't make any sense unless you account for the fact that they were deployed in offensive posture, the fair punk of which was you know, in the south to

assault Romania through the Carpathians. Now, don't get me wrong, the Soviets were sensitive to the fact that Moscow was being left relatively undefended. But uh, you know, it doesn't like, it doesn't track any other way other than accept what I just acknowledged. And it's also you know, again this idea that's endlessly banned to this day, that that Stalin was afraid of Hitler, or that the Soviet Union was

afraid of the Vermach. That it's like, well, I mean, okay, that's preposterous anyway, But so Stalin was so afraid of the Vermach that he he there They're basically was a token deployment on the UH path to Moscow. You know, I mean, how how is amply does that work? Any uh? I mean, any interpretation is uh he can only result in a conclusion that the Soviets were poised for exclusively offensive operations. I mean, unless you can it's a tortured

kind of logic. I mean, I guess you could claim that the Soviets wanted to draw the Germans in and funnel the main line of the funnel under the to the main line of resistance at the gates of Moscow and stop them their tracks, but that Moscow practically felt you know, that doesn't make any sense. I've read people who try to make some variation of that argument, but it's it's so preposterous. I don't really think it warrants to kind of blow by blow rebuttal but that's really,

you know, an example of extent conditions. Speaking of herself and the resistance that IRA Group Center did encounter. To be clear, they weren't defensively deployed either. There wasn't any depth to their deployment schema and they in fact were forward deployed with a heavily armed shock element in the lead, you know, which is one reason why our group center

such as they didn't counter resistance. They got hit with a lot of firepower that was immediately exhausted, and then when counterattacking the Vermont immediately broke Soviet lines because there was again, there wasn't any there wasn't any depth to the deployment. You know, if you know anything, I'm not any I'm not at all like a military type person, but I do know something about the internal logic of

modern warfare, you know, in an abstract deployment. Since I mean, and if you know anything about this just not even really deep diving into the numerical data points and stuff, but it's literally looking at the map of the deployment scheme of this should jump right out at you. It's it's almost like you know those a you know, it's like illusion pictures. They used to see them a lot, like beer companies, and it's like you look at some picture and it looks like it's like a bunch of

old pictures, a Spudge Mackenzie or something. But then you see it and it's like a sexy girl or something. And then once you see that, like, you can't unsee it. What's like that? Okay? I mean you look at you look at a deployment map of the Moscow, Leningrad Gorky battlespace on June twenty second, ninety forty one, and you realize like what it is, and then and then you

can't undersee it, you know. So the fact anybody who makes an argument of the contrary, I got to assume they're being dishonest or they're just profoundly ignorant of the subject matter. Yeah, it looks like we've gone over an hour. I hope that wasn't to skater shot man.

of the German Reich. And once it was clear that Anglo American forces intended to take Berlin, Stalin would have immediately shifted to a footing of hostility cat for the United States and the UK. And even before that happened, it's conceivable that these elements that were driving for Berlin on the Soviet side, like first Ukrainian Shock Army, which I think was under Rock. I think that I think

first Ukrainian Shock Army was enter Timoshenko. But whoever whatever formation cone Of and Rakasovsky respectively were commanding, it's very conceivable that they would have ordered down the company level commanders to treat the US and the UK as enemies who were literally trying to race to Berlin, as to act as a blocking element, and the Soviet view, you know, for the Germans so America to found itself at war with the Soviet Union. You know, that's the only alternative.

But I mean, that's what that you like, I said, the thing was decided at Yelta. It's I mean, I don't you can uh. On the one hand, yeah, it was the new It was the New Dealers who kept

the Soviet Union in the war. But like von Manstein, I highly recommend von Manstein's it's marketed as his memoirs, it's called Lost Victories, but in reality it was just debriefing by the War Department, which obviously was very interested in learning as much as they could about fighting the Soviet Union with combined conventional combined arms, with an emphasis on armored columns. Obviously. But Mannstein, who really was like a kind of Prussian martinet and a very prejudiced guy.

He stipulated that the Soviet army was unbelievably tough. They could absorb catastrophic attrition and not fall apart, and much as in the Western world, as we might view their doctrinal orientation on the battlefield as exhibiting a kind of callous disregard for human life, it was and is highly effective. And those things are all true. You can't really take away from the gameness and just the raw toughness of

the Red Army. You know. So I'm not gonna sit here and say that, oh, Shtalin was just handed a gift by you know, the New Dealers and in general Eisenhower. You know, because uh, the Soviet Union fought for every single inch of ground that uh they won back, and uh, the the attrition THEA endured is almost unfathomable. Yet by the time they reached Berlin, their morale was great. They were acting like they were at a party. I'm not

being flippant. They were doing utterly horrible, horrible things. By my point being, the enronament that arrived in Berlin wasn't some broken ragtag for us. It was a very game, very aggressive, very high morale element, which is one of the reasons why they were so dangerous. Like it's realistic. And their Utergang where Troutle young, you know, Uh, she's trying to pass through Soviet lines and then like the kid runs up and grabs her hand.

took you know, like eighty percent casualties. You know, they're and they're they're like the surviving element, and they're they're acting like you're at a party. You know, they most most people would have fallen apart, you know, even when they had the kind of that kind of momentum in broad strategic terms, just because it was so it was so brutal and so catastrophic. So yeah, I'm not I'm not gonna take anything away from the Ivans in terms

of their toughness and gameness. But it you know, I a race to Berlin between Montgomery and Eisenhower and and uh the Soviets would have meant war. So that's the best answer I can give.

This was a great series. I thought this was a series that needed to get out there, especially after reading after reading sub Off and getting a little of the way through Hoffman and having to finish Hoffman. It's just vital information that people are you're not going to hear even if you exit court history. This is stuff that's hidden and there's a reason why both of those books. If you want original copies of both of those books, you're paying two three hundred dollars.