Germany's WW2 Atomic Weapons Program w/ Thomas777 - Complete

about nuclear weapons generally. They uh, people like Thomas Schilling and like Herman Khan. They made the point that nuclear weapons are like any other weapons, they're just far far more muscle bound. The uh, the ability to impose you know, devastating attrition in an instant the system, you know, marks them apart, as does you know, very like strategic variables

relating to their destructive power and creates peculiar paradigms. I mean, oh that is true, okay, but they don't have they don't have great utility in any kind of like general applied sense, and there's there's actually very few paradigms where they really are are a game changer or that they really advance, you know, the the themiliar rangers of the state, you know, instantaneously, you know, like it there's this kind of like there's this kind of like mythical belief and

super weapons just I mean, it's like an ongoing thing that it just seems to have people assign a kind of mystique, you know, to wartech and I guess like nuclear weapons could be viewed it's kind of like the zenus of that. So I mean there's just that, But beyond that, there's deliberately cultivated narratives around around the issue. Historically, like the development of the first atomic bomb. A lot of this has to do with anti fascism, you know,

like ideologically anti fascism. A lot of this has to do with rationalizations for you know, America's development of the bomb and attempt to defend its monopoly on such capabilities, you know, the there so there's this idea that was presented by the War Department in the aftermath of you know, the the nuclear assault in Japan that well, we developed this thing because you know, the Third Reich was was feverously developing an atomic capability, and you know that would

have that would have that would have changed everything, you know, and and this this evil tyrannical regime set benting world domination. Could I hold hold the planet hostage with atomic weapons? That's and that's preprocess for a lot of reasons, but it does beg the question as to was was the

German Reich developing an atomic bomb actively? Uh? That's a complicated question for a lot of reasons, not the least of which not not uh not, the least of which not for reasons, not the least of which is the fact that Oppenheimer was not the quote father of the atomic bomb. Now there was Einstein. A man named Otto Hahn was and this didn't used to be controversial. Okay, Who is Ato Haanohan was born in eighteen seventy nine. He died when he was quite elderly, in July nineteen

sixty eight. Han is the father of nuclear chemistry and specifically nuclear fission. Okay, Hahn and his assistant, a lady named let's say Miitner, they discovered the radioactive isotopes of radium, thorium, protecting them, and most importantly, uranium. In the second episode, I'm no physics guy, but I do know something as much as a layman can kind of understand these things. We'll get into why uranium is so important and like what uranium actually is. I'm gonna like bore everybody to death,

but it's important to understand and applied capacities. You know, how atomic research developed into a a a discreetly military endeavor. Okay, but Han also through his experience, through his experiments, which were myriad, he discovered the phenomena what's called atomic recoil in nuclear nuclear isomerism and UH he pioneered UH a lot of the techniques that ultimately gave rise to carbon dating. Okay, So the guy was a The guy was a was

was was an intellectual giant. But quite literally everybody subsequent, every every researcher engaged in nuclear science and specifically UH weapons based nuclear research. There they were literally they were literally borrowing from Han's research Okay, that's indisputable. And like I said, at in the epoch he was credited as such, it's this idea that you know, like, oh, that the Germans were just like these crazy fools and they didn't understand physics or something or I mean, that's as nine

to be unbelief. Also like this idea that like, oh, like you know, because of anti Semitism, you know, the Germans didn't have a coterie of of top signific minds like that, that's preposterous. Like not only is that preposterous, but quite literally, you know, the technology that facilitated the development of nuclear weapons was literally invented by the Germans. Okay, now for background too, Han he received in ninety forty

four the Nobel Prize for Chemistry. And and just we'll get into this again in a second and third episodes. I think we I think it should probably be a three part series. But the but but just nuclear fission was that wasn't is the basis for nuclear reactors as well as nuclear weapons. Okay, it makes all those things

pot not just possible, but concealable. Okay. Interestingly, interestingly, during World War One, because uh Hans a little bit older, he served with love Landvan Regiment, which you know in the Kaisers in the kaiser Reich was like a reserve regiment, generally consistent, like it was kind of like the Home Guard or like what the British is called the Territorial Army.

But uh, he actually was mobilized and deployed and uh he was Uh he was attached to a chemical weapons unit, chemical warfare unit headed by Fritz Hobert on the Western Front, Eastern Front, and Italian Front. He was in heavy action and yet he was awarded the Iron Crossed second Class. So I mean, he why do I raise this specifically? It's not just because it's it's not just because it's interesting trivia, but it to I am, I'm trying to

demonstrate the aspect of Hans' character. Hans was not averse to the you know, applying science in in in military endeavors, okay, in including the somewhat horrible endeavor of chemical warfare. All right, This becomes an issue later on as to what Hans's view was of, you know, applying nuclear fission to to

weapons development. Okay. And plus it's just interesting background and there's I I I believe this is very much I believe there's very much a natural progression conceptually, okay, from chemical warfare to nuclear warfare, and I that it's arguable, but I think it's important. And I think people people understand people who understand institutional thinking and the men who populated was institutions and the way they kind of paradigms that they play with, as it were. I think that

it's somewhat inarguable. But this kind of thing was very much on on on the minds of of uh of European physicists. Okay, the concrete engineering of what became the atomic bomb wasn't and we'll get into why that was. But uh, it's like I said, there's this like mythology, there's this punative mythology that it's that both somehow simultaneously. The Germans were idiots who had no idea how to apply uh, what was called the new physics to war

fighting and the engineering of weapons. But in the other hand, they were like these maniacs hell bent on and developing an atomic bomb, and you know, only the only only these, like only the only these, like you know, genius askenasm like you know, we're able to save the day. And of course, like Einstein is the father of nuclear physics, and and Oppenheimer is the fire of the atomic bomb.

That's total nonsense, okay, And that's not a partisan take and arguable for those I'm sure are gonna send me hate messages about it. That's just not true. It's like, well, I can you know, I can source all of these claims. The let's jump to the end of the war, because I think Irving's book The Virus House as well as which is a source I rely on tremendously. It's the

best book in the German talkic bomb. There's also a book by not By It's about It's about Edmund Teller, And the narrative kind of begins on the date that the of the Hiroshima attack, because that's really people don't realizing the degree to or some Mahatant project truly was secret and at uh the attack that shocked the world. It's rather amazing the degree to which the Manhattan Project

was able to maintain operational security. But I say let's start there for a few reasons, as will become evident. It's the point at which the world was quite literally introduced to the atomic bomb, including a coterie of German scientists who had been taken prisoner by six and squirrelled off to the United Kingdom. So August sixth ninety forty five, the BBC Home Service they broadcast the first news that

an atomic bomb had been dropped in Hiroshima. The boat announced that the bomb in question contained as much explosive power as two thousand of the rif ten Ton bombs. President Truman had declared that the Germans had worked feverishly to find a way to use atomic energy but had failed. Now at a premise it's called farm Hall. This is a country house near Huntington in UH. The in in England, a coterie of German physicists were being held prisoner there

incident what was called Operation Epsilon. Operating Epsilon was the code name for this endeavor that took place in May one in June thirtieth, nineteen forty five, whereby the Allies identified ten German scientists who were believed of worked on the German atomic bomb program. And UH these men were they were captured, and they were again they were squirrelled away to UH to England and detained. And this in

this kind of mansion house near Cambridge called farm Hall. Okay, the proximity to the university is not an accident either, because it was it was a weird kind of incarceration that these guys endured, because on the one hand, it

was very punitive. On the other hand, you know, if they if you wanted these men to speak, you know, London wanted these men to speak to the you know, their own academics about the you know, about the bomb and things and if you're and if you're just you know, kind of like treating people like for for them to live, you know, like like you know, like abject and squalor or whatever, or you know, or abject prisoners in the

traditional sense that wouldn't have happened. So, I mean, it's it kind of reminds me of the early days of like spears attention Okay, although obviously he ultimately endured true horrors, as we got into in an earlier series. But the uh, the goal nominally, and I think this is basically true. What what m I six and the US War Department both claimed independently was that the goal was to determine how close the German roy had come of the development

of a viable atomic bomb. First among the detainees with Ata Han okay it uh. And this was attested to not just by not not just by his fellow attainees, but but by his interrogators and and and the you know, in the m I six men who were guarding him and debriefing him. There there was concern that Han would commit suicide because he was so beside himself that this bomb had been created, and he blamed himself. You know, it's not uh like you know that this was this

is very poignant, okay, and I don't. This is on my mind, like as I watched the open Hiram movie the other day, Like this idea that like Oppenheimer's single like single humanly created the atomic bomb and lived with this terrible guilt, that's ridiculous, Like that's not you know, it's it's it's as if they like extrapolated like Hans's life and mind and memories and you know, transposed it out to this kind of character of Oppenheimer, who has

has some relation to the historical man was become kind of like this, you know, it's almost like mythical figure. But the uh A major thh Writtener. He was the British officer in charge at farm Hall. He he he, he asked for Han, and he brought to his office immediately to make sure that his he was stable of mind, and also just wanted to speak to him about, you know,

what had just happened. According to Rittner, Han was horrified and again he felt personally responsible for the that's one hundred thousands of people, he told written er Han, Han told Writtener, And apparently according to in the and witnesses not just written her himself, Rittner developed something of a rapport okay during his time there, and uh Han had told Writtener, you know, on on multiple occasions that he he'd had forebodings about the potentialities of of his discovery

of of nuclear fission, but he never thought that, you know, a weapon would be rapidly engineered and deployed with that kind of destructive power, like not because it was impossible. But we'll get into what what you know, he thought would give a wo would would give the scientific community pause and other things. Now, who are the other detainees

of farm Hall. There were doctor Eric Baggi or Bog, doctor Kurt Diener, a professor named Walter Garreluck, odo Han, of course, Paul Hartek, the famous Werner Heisenberg, a man named Horst Coursing, a professor named Max von Lau, another professor named Carl Frederick von Weisker, and the doctor Carl Wurtz. Now the the the premises at Farmer Hall were bugged. Okay, everywhere was from you know, the kind of common recreation area to the private court of the men. And this

wasn't just this wasn't just incidental. One of the key purposes of detaining the German atomic scientists was the eavesdrop on the conversations between that, you know, the men themselves. Now as the what the myrophones picked up as the as the news was was h relaid, was that Heisenberg. Heisenberg disputed the possibility that the Americans even had a bomb and dropped it, Like he didn't dispute that Hiroshimos destroyed.

But uh he he. He believed it was some kind of conventional like some kind of muscle bound conventional weapon or series of firebomb raids like had been conducted over Tokyo. Over one hundred thousand people died in twenty four hours. Like he thought this was He thought this was propaganda, Okay, not because it would be impossible to create a bomb, but he you know, the scientific community was it was

a peculiar thing. And the even even you know, even on the EVA hostilities, the number of men who truly understood, you know, the new physics and were insinuated into, you know, the applied research of these things, it was incredibly small fraternity, Okay, And men like that then kind of looked at themselves, with the exception of a certain coterie they ended up in America, they looked at themselves as being part of

a community that kind of transcended politics. Okay. Heisenberg he was personally, uh friendly with a doctor Goudsmith, who was the head of the American Intelligence Mission, which had debriefed when he was initially taken prisoner, and gout Schmidt, uh was a fellow physicist, and they Heisenberg Gousmit knew of each other, and uh, Heisenberger developed like a pretty good rapport with him, and uh he'd asked gods Goutschmidt whether, uh,

whether atomic weapons research was something that the Allies were endeavoring to uh, you know, take on or if I or if there was any you know, background of such apply experiments, you know, the end goal of uh of weaponizing atomic energy. And Goutsman assured him that was not the case. And I Goutsmant I guarantee had no idea

about the mainhadan project. He was speaking totally honestly. Okay, so maybe it was naivete some people might say in the part of Heisenberg thinking like that, you know, the kind of the kind of the kind of fraternity of pure science would mean that you know, no one would know, no colleague would a lie to another, and such an important and like literally earthshaking matter. But that again it

was different times, it was different. You know, it was uh, these guys weren't ordinary academics or scientists, you know, they they were like the elite of the elite of the elite. And also again like Goutsmith I believe was telling the truth, like he didn't know about the Manhaddan project, you know. And plus two, I mean, like the it shocked everybody, was like the war in Europe was done, Like Japan

was utterly destroyed and couldn't even defend itself. You know, that's why was like that, like there's there's this lame like defense, like oh, Japan had to be invaded because they were just crazy and like a million Americans would have died like that, that's ridiculous. The bomb was deployed. These things developed their own momentum. The bomb was gonna be deployed somewhere. It had been developed to destroy Europe, which is totally insane if you think about that, you know,

like genociding your own race with with nuclear weapons. But it but aside from that, it's I don't think the Soviets would have stopped, you know, and they you know, they they were, they were, they were actively the Soviets had had gone to war against Japan in the final days, you know, like who's to say, who's to say they would have abided, you know, Truman's demands had UH had

the bombs plural not been deployed. But in any event, that's the rapidity to which too, that's something they keep in mind, like the kind of the core concepts of UH weaponizing nuclear energy. This is really only six years old, okay, So I believe there was something of this idea that America could just rapidly, you know, kind of develop a competency in the new physics, you know, and and within basically half a decade, you know, develop a weaponized capability

like it seemed unlikely. You know, it's it was extraordinary and putting oneself in the shoes of Heisenberg, I mean, think about the disorientation of of what he had just endured and and kind of like what of the German like experience generally like in you know, ninety six. And finally too, the uh, the Americans in the British came who you know, in operational terms, they worked fairly closely in the immediate aftermath of the German defeat for for

practical reason that those are political ones. The UH. The last German uranium pile laboratory to be seized, that was the library staffed by Issacar and verts. It was actually located in the French occupation zone. And UH, the US Army, with the sentence of the British at all costs, aimed to prevent radio active material and the research data from this pile laborate uranian pile laboratory from falling into French hands.

Like they they were singularly fixated on this, okay, and the Germans knew this, and that's and that's how UH and that's why Wicker and Verts ended up in the

hands of of the British and not the first. But the reasoning too, in Heisenberg's mind was like, okay, like if you, if you guys have the bomb, like why why why you fixated on you know, grabbing all the uranium you can and preventing it from falling into you know, rival hands or whatever like it just but again too nobody, nobody knew about the Manhattan Project other than those involved, and you know, the uh, the the the five stars

around Truman himself, but uh. Overall the feelings of the Germans, Irving characterized it as a sense of recrimination. They were shocked by the fanaticism of people who are not under direct like physical threat, who just developed, like rapidly develop an atomic bomb at uh. Like in their mind, it's like the kind of fanaticism that had been like a sterically attreated to them in the Japanese by the New Dealers.

You know, it's like you guys, haven't you guys have you guys have an ocean between the people you claim your enemy and you're like feverishly developing atomic bombs like that's there's something frankly insane about that. It.

You know, it's some people were people were somewhat flabberg acid that America was literally talking about making total war on Europe for frankly ambiguous reasons, you know what I mean. Then people didn't even there's a question as to whether you know, an atomic bomb would even work as intended.

You know, there's a fact, there's a fact that we addressed at the beginning of you know what, military utility doesn't really have outside of very narrow kind of strategic paradigms, other than the fact that you can like kill a whole lot of people immediately, you know, and America had, Germany was in ruins, the Red Army was in Berlin. The Japanese, uh, Japan's literally a pile of rubble that

was getting bombed the Stone Age every day. Like deploying uh like, like launching a nuclear attack on like a ruined country under those conditions, that's somewhat shocking, you know. I mean, even even if one understands the character of the men in control of the enterprise. So yeah, I don't think I don't I don't think he was like feigning, putting on errors or something. And uh, like I said, too,

these are the guys who actually made this possible. It wasn't Oppenheimer, it wasn't Einstein, you know, it wasn't in Rico Fermi. You know, it was these guys, you know, And it's I mean, there's something you know. Yeah, it's a trope that scientists are naive, but it's also kind of true. It was certainly true here. I mean, like I said, who are these guys faking it to? Like they you know, they had, they weren't. Uh and like none of these none of these guys were national socialist.

It's not like they were going out like it's not like they were playing a gearing and saying like I got to protect the historical record and you know, wrong foot my enemies like that didn't even feature in the equation,

you know, like Heisenberg was a national socialist. Hahn actually like was at odds at the regime not to do something liberal, but he just he just didn't like national socialism and he didn't you know, he was he wasn't a guy who was willing to unlike von Braun and it was, you know, willing to go along and be pragmatic. You know, these guys were, you know, but von Braun was a was a was basically like a you know, a mechanical engineer and like an aviation prodigy, you know,

like he wasn't. That's a different Like the theoretical physics is a weird thing, and it's like it's it's it's it's very it's it's like both concrete and abstract, and it tends to it tends to with it tends to with a track kind of you know, dreamy hyper intellectual personalities and stuff. So no, I don't I don't think

there's anything fake about it. But the uh Han Hanna described and people and and independent witnesses a tested to this, like people had been with him when he was first uh, when he had his first breakthroughs in his you know, fish and research. When Han first learned the potentiality or the implications. Rather, it wasn't clear what the concrete potential

was of uranum uranium fishing discovery. He said that, considering that war was obviously imminent, he contemplated uh, seizing as much uranium as possible, the majority of which in Europe was in Belgium, and literally throwing it into throwing it into the sea, or otherwise hiding it to ward off some kind of catastrophe, you know, resulting from a one

of the combat and states attempting to weaponize it. And then he realized that's not practicable, and also, uh, you know, I get, but I mean, I you know, that's that's that's that's that's the core, because the core of your question, like Han had those kinds of thoughts because that in his mind, that's what any remotely kind of like morally, anybody was remotely normal, normal like moral constitution would have those kinds of thoughts like he wouldn't just like, you know,

there's something wrong here with the Americans and British. It's like putting up huge factories and like feverishly like you know, producing pure uranium like without without question because like you know, and it's like why like was was was the Red Army storming across America? Was like no, I mean was with a JIP and he's threatening America Like no, I mean, like there's something there's something unseemly about it, you know, and like it's not I I I totally understand what

he's getting at or what's getting at. And I'm not at all some peacenick. In fact, like it's scale on these questions. I think I'm pretty callous, Okay, at least That's what I'm told. The interestingly coursing what he stated in the course of this conversation with his fellow detainees after the broadcast that you know, Hiroshima had been destroyed.

What he said and what he what he and what he reiterated later was that the level of cooperation, you know, under military auspices obviously that facilitated the Manhattan Project, that would have been impossible in Germany. You know, he made the point. He's like, he's like, you know, if the men in the room, he's like, some of us didn't

wouldn't have wanted to do it on principle. But uh he's like, even if we had, you know, there would have there would have been different ideas on how to proceed with this, and there would have been different ideas on you know, managing outcomes potentially you know, and like and trying to like build in you know, safeguards into the into the structure itself, or you know, there would have been there would have been resentments from you know,

taking orders from party men, you know. And that's your point. Yeah, that's the subtext of what he said. Of what Coursing said is that these men who worked on that man Handing project they were they were like absolute fanatics, like they were you know, they they were they were frankly crazy. And that uh yeah, that that goes without saying, especially if you consider the confessional background and motives and things

of these men in America. I mean, but it the uh, now, what what was the background here of just gonna introduce the background of what if any understanding of the weapons potential of Hans experiments existed. On April twenty ninth, nineteen thirty nine, this was, uh, this was kind of when the world became aware of the potential of some kind of potential potentially you know, game changing of the new physics. Hans experiments and widely publicized obviously throughout Europe. And there's

a French professor named Frederick jeelo or Jeloit. He was the son in law of Madame Curry. He reproduced Hans experiments meticulously and he and his team they were confirmed, uh like like it it was confirmed that like Han was you know what what what he what he had stated to have proven as regards, among other things, the existence in neutrons during the press of uranium fision and their situation like that that it was it was signed

off on is yes, this is legitimate. Not a letter to Nature magazine, which in those days was was like a leading kind of like it was a combination that kind of like pop science stuff but also like major scientific discoveries that's where they would be featured in which it metally sounds weird today about it. I mean, that's the way things work. You know. It's this French team

led by Joeloid. Their letter was titled quote Liberation of Neutrons and the nuclear explosion of uranium and uh essentially that was sort of like the first kind of like public declaration of uh, you know, nuclear fish and having like tremendous weapons potential. But I emphasized potential. You know,

there was nothing there. There's nothing demonishably proven here. But uh, the uh what this led to was in the next few days and UH Gottingen, which is a renowned university town, or at least it was then in Germany at uh the Physics Colloquium. Uh, a guy named wil Helm hanld Hanley, who was Ah, he didn't know Han, but he was like a protege of him, because, like, you know, he was an up and coming physicist, you know, everybody you know, he was kind of the he was kind of like

the grand old man everybody looked to. He read a short paper on, uh, what do you call the uranium burning engine? I mean we was talking about a nuclear reactor, okay, and that like little paper by this guy. The trajectory of German atomic research was basically going towards nuclear reactors.

You know, the idea of like or like a uranium burning engine, okay, you know, like an endless energy source, and that frankly that would have solved what became Germany's quagmire militarily in part more so than an atomic bomb would.

And that's a really interesting counterfactual. But that and amidst all of this kind of excitement, you know, it's got to be said, despite the impression people have, I mean not just court historians, even people who you know are are more kind of critical and they're thinking about historical topics. There's this idea that the so that that that the German Reich was some kind was almost some kind of like rightest mirror of the Soviet Union. It's not true

at all. You know, like the National Socialist Party it was, it was it was literally elected Hitler himself by the Enabling Act and by various referendums. He had tremendous power. But even that wasn't really unprecedented, you know, like the Reich president had had literally like extra constitutional authority as

he saw fit. But you know, the German state and the National Socialist Party were discreete entities and it it there were there were, there was tension there, like structurally, you know, and there was even beyond that, even uh,

it wasn't it wasn't. It wasn't simply because there's plenty of professors who weren't National Socialists, even the guys who were basically sympathetic, like they didn't want the government messing in their affairs, you know, like these were not just guys who you know owed their oh their careers and prestige, you know, something the Berlin government had done for them,

you know. And they also they didn't want to be ordered to work with other people, you know, like they that they didn't feel comfortable with or didn't you know, respect or whatever. It was like very provincial, kind of like very ego driven, but also just very you know.

I mean that that's the nature of academ you know, and that's that's especially you know, especially the especially the hard sciences and especially what was then called the New physics, which was literally like the cutting edge of of a scientific endeavor, you know. So I mean it's some it

was like trying to herd cats, you know. This this idea that you know, this is this idea that the Reich was like just some party state is nonsense, has this idea that like Germans like you know, some Prussian some Prussian officer types just like snapped his fingers and then like the crowd saw like, you know, do what they're told. Like that's that's nonsense too. Like it was uh, you know, it's it's uh, it's it was. It was, uh, it was. It was highly chaotic, you know this Uh.

The subsequent conference that was a that that was arranged based on all these based on all these you know kind of findings, and confirmed them, confirmed them, and and

confirmed the research. It ultimately was uh held in secrecy at uh at in in Berlin at a building on uh Winter then Linden the U, and this was when the War Department U got very interested in what was going on the UH the War Office as well as Reich ministries attached to it actually or or just kind of like practically because they were in the same orbit or had overlapping series of authority. In a very short space of time. In nineteen thirty nine, had begun their

own uranium research program. It was low key. It was basically uh, you know, corralling data that had already been produced, you know, in France and in the German Reich, you know, and kind of running a comparative analysis and trying and again like duplicating some of these experiments to make sure that you know, this was in fact the results were what they purported to be. And this led to UH.

This led to a Hamburg professor, Hamburg professor named Paul Hartzek and his assistant, a guy named doctor Wilhelm Groth. They'd written a letter to the War Office just before UH, just before the Berlin conference and about ten days after the publication of the of the of the Paris of the French physicist letter Nature magazine. And this letter was cited again and again and again by American new dealer media as well as like oss types all in Sundry.

The letter stated, quote, and this is the letter of the War Office, okay, by these by this Hamburg professor. It said, quote, we take the liberty of calling your attention to the newest development in nuclear physics, which, in our opinion, will probably make it pass to produce an explosive many orders of magnitude more powerful than the conventional ones.

That wasn't really a groundbreaking statement. I mean, yeah, people speculated that that was true, and UH, Obviously, what was right into this statement was that, uh, this is some sort of a this is some sort of like uh you know, low key almost kind of hidden communication between German Scientific academ and the War Office saying like, look like this is not only possible, this is you know, essential. We've got to beat the allies the punch and you know,

pursue this course of research. Essentially, like take this letter of the Fear and the Arments Ministry and like let's make it happen. There's no evidence that that's what this letter indicated, Okay, And frankly, like if that's what it was, like, why wouldn't open a letter be written, you know, like

it's not really other things are done. But you know so I think some of what is argued around these these these surviving kind of statements my sort of say surviving I mean, you know, like a literal letter forum. I think some of is in bad faith. The uh you know, and again the uh something uh. The letter concluded with quote the country that makes first use of unsurpassable advantage over the others. I believe what he meant

by it is just nuclear fission generally. And again, the trajectory of this kind of research was towards nuclear reactors, okay, or a uranium burning engine. I believe that's what they were getting at, and which is true, okay. I mean, any anybody who found a way to you know, utilize atomic energy for uh an inductil military purpose like yeah,

obviously like first use compares confers a massive advantage. But I don't read it as being like again, some kind of secret agreement, you know, to pursue atomic weapons research in concert. And I don't read that final sentences a statement to the effect of, you know, we have got to develop and deploy atomic bombs as soon as possible. That's not in context, That's not what it means. And I'm not playing lawyer ball at all. And frankly too,

it's a bit outside the scope. But the course of German scientific research, not just relating to the new physics, but even in conventional engineering and other things, it makes sense that a nuclear reactor would kind of be the would kind of be the holy grail of German research, if that makes any sense, you know, And again that would have alleviated not just emergent exigencies in the Second World War, but you know, problems that had compromised Germany's

operational effectiveness and its ability to survive protracted wars as generally, Okay, I mean in the preceding you know, millennia or what have you, But that the reaction in London was especially kind of severe to the French physicist letter, you know,

the Nature magazine letter. The British press when they you know, just like as they did subsequently when in sei wating mister Churchill into office, they undertook us like full court press full of lowered accounts of a new quote superbomb based on uranium fishing and that was being developed in Germany. You know, like they just presented this as a foremon conclusion, as a fact. You know. The four days after the letter appeared, both the British Treasury and the Foreign Office

were approached uh by Sir Henry Tizzard. He was chairman of this commit chairman of the Committee on the Scientific Survey of Air Defense, which had outsized power, as did pretty much every everything related to the Air Ministry. I think we talked about that in our tertial series. He said that in uncertain terms Britain should take preemptive action

to deny large sources of uranium to the Germans. And as I stated, the largest stockpile of uranium in Europe was in Belgium, and the the sizeable industry for extracting urate for extracting radium from uranium from uranium oars imported from the Belgian congo as well. So like get in Belgium, you didn't just have you know, like the raw stores of uranium. It was like the infrastruct sure to you know,

process it in basic ways to make it utah. So essentially with Tizzard was suggesting or demanding perhaps was uh, you know that Britain find a way to you know, wage war on the continent and capture whatever uranium Belgium had, you know, with hostility, which operationally obviously there was that was not going to happen. But the fact that this was well within their contemplation, and I don't think this was just propaganda. In the case of the UK, I

think they probably actually believed this. I mean, obviously their conceptual horizon was totally corrupted by this kind of hysterical idea of you know, Germany as our enemy, but within the bound irrationality of that that paradigm, I think they actually did believe that, uh, a fishion bomb was was was at that moment possible. And that's kind of a fascinating uh that that's kind of a there's a that's that's that's like it's like Frederic foresight stuff but in

real life. And I think that's kind of fascinating. And there's many many intrigues, uh really you know, like espionage and stuff and and what have you that like around that.

But I uh, I'm a I'm gonna stop here and uh, second episode, Uh, I think we'll have to go a little bit longer, and I want to get into the uh I want to get into with the actual Virus House, which is the title of the book, which was the dedicated research facility for the German atomic bomb, such that it could be said to have existed as a dedicated, dedicated program. And then in the third episode we'll deal with uh kind of like the aftermath and uh things of that nature. That sounds good.

It was that if you know, if they'd been ordered in it in a formal capacity, or if the or if the or if the atomic program had been like the rocket program and underdirect military authority, you know that they would have resisted that because you know, the unpredictability of outcomes and just kind of like the in their mind, like the naked immorality of of just unleashing that much power U when not you know, necessary for you know, in a matter of existential survival. I think that's uh,

I mean, that's the way to understand it. But people want people want to rehabilitate Heisenberg, and I mean they should, like, no German needs to be rehabilitated, but in their mind they want to think of Heisenberg and and Hans, you know, good guys. So they like exaggerate the degree to which you know, these men had some kind of ideological objection to finishism. But yeah, we'll get into that. We'll start with just like a brief understanding of what uranium is

very much a layman. Okay, So I mean, like I, I'm not suggesting, I'm not being panantic like I when I started reading about this topic, like I had to

read up on uranium. So I will take like ten million minutes next episode and like learn about our friend uranium, and then we'll get into you know, uh, we'll get into the uh the views of the of the warm and is re you know, contra the New Dealer War Department, you know, and and the kind of lack of a convergence respectively of uh of a common understanding of uh

the military potential of atomic weapons. And you know, like I said, I I want to get into like the motivations of why America developed a bomb and uh, you know that's a complicated topic. But yeah, we'll try to wrap it up in three episodes.

number seven H seven seven seven dot com. I'm a I'm preparing season two of the Mind Phaser podcast and as well as uh I'm going to Utah in a couple of weeks to film the first dedicated episode of Thomas TV on the channel. My YouTube channel is Thomas TV number seven him as TV. So exciting things are afoot. In addition, h to like this, you know, Pete and Keith Woods and other fellows are nice enough to host me and you know, like be looking out for that stuff too. But yeah, that's all I got.

was not a good film at all. I mean, well, we can get into that maybe when it's more apropos. But there's this narrative that there was this kind of mad race. There's two one or two narratives. It's either that there was this race by all major powers to weaponize atomic energy and feverishly you know, at Cambridge versus of Chicago, versus Berlin, you know, presumably somewhere in the

Soviet Union. You know, this was all going on, and you know this, this desperate race was proverbially speaking, was one you know, by the Manhattan Project team. That's not

true at all, Nothing like that was afoot. The other, the other, the other kind of narrative is that, you know, the Einstein Memo was born of some kind of secret knowledge Einstein presumably had, or that he had gleaned, you know, from the kind of German fraternity, as it were, of of you know, researchers in the new physics that you know, Heisenberg presumably was, you know, had come to in the knowledge presumably, you know, borrowing from Fermi's concrete experiments, that

you know, uranium could be weaponized into a into a super bomb. So Einstein desperately, you know, contacted you know, people he knew and and then close to the New Deal regime. You know they you know, including people he talked about in another series, you know, on the Board of Jewish Deputies, the American Jewish Committee. They put him

in touch with Sacks. You know, Uh Einstein, I said Rolys wall street Man, who then said, oh my god, you know this is you know, there's like like some corny movie plot, like you know that this evil Nazi regime is you know, months away from from this super weapon. You know, we've we've got to alert mister Roosevelt immediately.

Like that. That's ridiculous. I mean, aside from the aside many like value judgments they were in about the combatant regimes, like this was not underway at all, like we talked about last time, literally on the Evil War in ninety

thirty nine, the best minds in Germany. First of all, there was no there was no organization here, like the War Office, which itself was kind of a hodgepodge of of academics, you know, like bureaucratic administrators, you know, like party men, like guys, you know, like military men, at least in a liaison capacity, you know, who had some idea that you know, what's there that you know that there's a you know that there's some kind of applied

potential you know, to atomic physics. But the direction they were going was what we consider to be, you know, conceptualizing what am I to a crude nuclear reactor. Okay, that did change somewhat as time went on, but there was never not only was there never uh a Third Reich version of the Manhattan Project underway, but that wasn't even within anybody's contemplation, and nor nor was the kind

of organization in place to do that, you know. I mean, anybody will tell you when you're talking about academics, especially men a top of their field and in some kind of experimental science, trying to organize these people in a dedicated capacity is like hurrying cats number one number two. You know. The Third Reich was really, uh, the Third Reich unlike the Soviet Union and frankly unlike the New

Dealer United States. It was uh, it was just kind of like competing off in hostile like fiefdoms of authority, and these factions who really didn't like each other, who were kind of only bound by like faith in the fure. You know, like it's just kind of like messianic personage. I don't mean that in crude terms. They're on overly

praising terms. It's just the reality. Okay. So like people have this kind of mistaken idea, you know, like we talked about before the Third Reich is kind of like this like fascistoid like version of the Soviet Union, where like from the top down just everything was you know, corralled into the service of the state and its military needs. Like that wasn't the case at all, and that that's one of the things that you know, the catalyst for Gerbal was total wascond be known as the as the

Total warst speech. The catalyst for that was he was making the case like basically like begging a lot of some of the patrons of the party, like, look like, put us out your differences, that we have to mobilize completely, you know, if we're going to survive. And by that point, I mean the die was cast, you know, so it

but be that as it may. I'll also say, finally, and then we'll get into the meat of this there's this idea in America, and I think, I mean even among historians with a critical eye, and even with some people who have military knowledge, I think the direct experience or based on their theoretical you know, endeavors, there's this idea that nuclear weapons there's kind of like this trump card, you know, or that you know, like Thomas Schelling said, and in the conducts he said it was correct that

they're just like any other weapons, except owing to command and control nuances, you know, in the computerization and decision making a key junctures, and the destructive power of them. You know, they they're just capable of implementing far far more attrition, far far quicker than you know, conventional weapons.

And that is the correct way to think about them in conditions of bipolarity as regards to the political map in general, parody in terms of strategic forces, and being in a military situation such as the world of nineteen thirty nine or even of nineteen forty three forty four, it's not clear how an atomic bomb would have helped Germany. I mean, Germany could have annihilated the UK, and I mean, yeah,

that would have helped. I mean in terms of obviously it could no longer be utilized as you know, US Army Air Corps and Royal Air Forces on singable aircraft carrier from which to you know, strategically bomb Germany with and conventional loads. But you know, the path of victory in World War Two for Germany is the conquest of the Soviet Union. You know, Moscow has to fall in ninety forty one, and thereby, you know, Germany becomes a superpower.

You know, it captures the Central Asian world island. If you want to use mckinder's language, okay, just you know, atomic bombing Moscow and killing you know, ten million Russians. Well, I mean the third right killed ten million Russians. I mean that did that win the war? You know, like I I think it was uh Ac mcdeinahjadd It was an interesting guy at least more I mean, he was at least the most interesting Iranian ahead of state since Komani. You know, he made the point when kind of Ntnya,

who was at his most kind of historyonic. You know, it is freaking that everybody's developing a bomb. You know, all Israel's enemies are developing the bomb. You know, it's like, did the did nuclear weapons helped the Soviet Union? You know, like when the Soviet Union went down not with a bang,

with a whimper. I think it had uh. I think it had something like twelve thousand warheads you know that could be married uh launch vehicles and deployed you know, as like strategically you know, like intercontinentally you know, or at least like within theater, you know, over intermediate distance. I mean it's that there's like this idea like nuclear weapons just you know, you like own you own your enemy, like in and for verbial or actual terms, you just

own the battle space like that. That that that doesn't make any sense, you know, in the case of America obviously, I mean America just had to devastate Germany and Japan, you know, and it could and then and then America gets the planet, you know, but I mean no nobody else was in that situation, you know, ironically, in a totally counterfactual scenario there like a nuclear armed Japan like that actually, like Japan could have extorted a lot of

concessions if they had nuclear atomic bombs or something comparable. I've thought about that and not I think not incidentally, that's why they were so fixated on a biological weapons program, you know, and like the father of modern bio warfare is shiro Ishi. And he got poached immediately by US occupation forces and delivered the the War Department, soon to

be the Defense Department. They ended up actually teaching at Berkeley of all places, you know, as as like in this kind of role of civilian roles like this in old age is like this unassuming like biologists. But he he was a he was a he was he was a war master of bioweapons. Okay, that's something of a tangent. But another event. All these things are important. They're not They're not just speculative, you know, uh, sort of counterfactuals

that are fun to play with as we uh. I think we finished last time with the letter the letter by the French physicists to Nature magazine, you know, was discussed the potential of of of you know, some kind some kind of military application of of uranium, you know, and reactions from uranium if you know, the the isotope needed could be you know, cultivated. Okay, and this this really this caused it say it caused a stir in

the scientific community would be a gross understatement. But the response essentially by the Germans was, uh, a guy named Abraham Isau. He was chairman of the quote Reich Bureau of Standards. What translates the right grous the right grou of standards in education, specifically the physical sciences. Was it's, you know, a domain of authority and kind of keeping you know, such that the universities could be corralled into

a directly military role. It was, you know this this was this was kind of like this, this is kind of like the party's way of uh of, uh of not just keeping tabs on these things, but trying but you know, if we're trying to direct such potential as it he emerged in a constructive capacity. But of course, again we're talking about you know, literally cutting edge theoretical physics here. Like you can't pick and choose like who you want to stay aff these things. You need people

actually understand the damn thing in question. You need and beyond the people are competent. It's like he wasn't any kind of like national socialist or party man, but he was basically patriotic. He uh, he'd been, uh, he've been a leading a already on high frequency electronics. He'd been an academic physicist for most of his career, but he

was politically active. Again, he wasn't he wasn't any kind of like party loyalist, but he had followed kind of the sentence of nationalism in Germany and he was like definitely behind it, you at least in like a but but frankly, I mean like patriarch Germany's generally were you know, but he uh, he was excited at you know, kind of nuclear physics being brought within his you know, kind of a number of authority tron lay that way, and

he convened a conference I think we mentioned the GENA conference, which was directly convened in response, you know, to the UH announcement by the by the French researchers UH on their applied UH experiments on a short lasted course was you know, ada Han Hahn was unable to attend because

he was engaged otherwise in Sweden. Professor a guy named Professor Joseph Mattok from Vienna UH was uh was was deputized in favor of his you know, regular assistant Lisa Meitner, who is also in Sweden, you know, with the man himself to like to speak for him, mber like sit in for him. The conference took place in you know, relative se Recey April twenty ninth, nineteen thirty nine, at

the Ministry of Education building. As we talked about the UH doctor uh doctor doms who's the head of the Ministry's research department, he vocally attagged Hahn in absentia for publishing, you know, his vital discovery. What he perceived is like his vital discovery, you know, to the scientific to the wider sign offic community. And that's not the way science works, okay, unless you're I mean, if head had just been two years later, you know, and had Germany been UH actively

at war, I think that case could be made. But even then, again, this was not the main Hadant project. Nobody, nobody had, nobody among this coterie of new physicists in UH, in Germany or Austria, you know, had an idea that

you know, this is a military technology. I mean beyond the fact that excuse me, I'm sorry, beyond the fact that you know any kind of any kind of apply technology where you're talking about a truly renewable energy source that theoretically, at least you know is is essentially inexhaustible. I mean, yeah, obviously the military implications of that, just say,

the military implications and everything else. But that's but that was that that that would have been like saying you know that you know that would that would have been like saying that, you know, aviation something should have been kept secret, you know, as it was under as you know, as as trials underway in America to you know, perfect the truly viable aircraft, but American elsewhere. But the uh but uh, Matt talk took up. Uh he went to bed very much on Hans's behalf, and he uh he

basically cowed the committee into silence. You know things, we're not We're not a military, this is not a military. This is not neither a party nor a military you know conference, you know, we're not We're not under your authority or anybody else's. You know, basically like, how dare you insult the man who's you know, basically changed the

world by his research and discoveries. And that honestly set the tenor man like not not just in the Genda conference, but moving onward again like it something like it described never could have happened in the Soviet Union, Like no matter what no matter what the technology under discussion was, even if it was a purely speculative technology at that at that juncture, you know, so it's there is there is more of a you know, I say this is important,

not just because I've got you know, peculiar fixations as a as a researcher, but you know, it's it's it's important to you know, developing a a properly characteristic view of the German Reich and and its internal situation. You know, this is not a place where scientists or cowed by the party or by the regime. You know, there certainly were as always representative official doom. We try to throw their weight around, but they were not in the driver's

se here at all for a lot of reasons. The uh basically the long story short, in addition to a lot of theoretical postulates unrelated directly, you know, to the subject at hand, which I'm no understanding of because I'm not physicists at all. I'm not even like an educated leaman in physics. Okay, and first admit that, but to uh, they kind of highlight of the event if you want to look at those terms. To Gottingen professors, uh, got injuiced,

and it got even Honley. They they they outlined once again, I mean not them once again, but they'd outlined again as was on the mind of every man present, you know, ah, the practicability of of of a quote uranium burner. Okay, I mean this was again, this was such that there could be said to be uh a sort of priority afforded any conceptual model. I mean this, this was it okay,

And again that that obviously has tremendous military application. But it but not in the way that was being bandied by you know, uh people, uh, people like Einstein later on, and and also by some uh some uh some people, particularly in m I six and uh later on oss in the case the former I it's interesting and we'll get into that the uh, the I don't want to jump people ahead. We'll get into the kind of the take from London or the view from London and the

potentiality of an atomic bomb. But and in the event, the h there's been a general band placed uh on the export of uranium compounds from Germany, and uh the right Ministry of Economics was uh they were adjusting, uh well, they they were They're trying to determine like there was a recently capture minds in Czechoslovakia. I cannot pronounce uh yakima jakumal if anybody on deck, like in the comments, I'm sorry if I'm butchering that, I first admit I

I'm terrible with these pronunciations. But Central Europe is uh is rich in in uh in uranium war, okay, like natural uranium war. The uh this this hadn't been mined yet, but it, you know, had been accessed in some basic capacity. But you know, uh who basically who is going to get get it first? Like hadn't been decided? You know, was it just gonna be spirreled away and given to the you know, given to the O k W to basically sit on so nobody else could have it? You know?

Was it was it gonna be given to you know this uh to what what? What would was basically gonna be given it? Like you know the the Burgening kind of committee, that uh Burgning kind of quorum that attended the conference at Jenna, Like what what would become of it? But it uh what they had allowed was a uranium sample had had been dispatched to Gotha gen for special analysis and the special analyst, uh who was uh dispatched you know to essentially to to report his findings. Was

was was a guy from the War Office? Okay, and what was not known to the attendees of the GENA conference and was not probably known to really anybody the right chancery. I'm sure that there was some line of communication there and Hitler himself, I speculate, and again this is pure speculation, probably knew just because he was so hands on in terms of UH weapons development and things like that. The War Office had begun its own uranium

research program. But again, you know, it's if they were developing a bomb, and if this was like the Raizon deetra Avid, you know, like why why why why why why were they appealing to civilians at all? You know, I mean it because that would presume the knowledge that that would presume not just the the conceptual basis for such a program, but the knowledge in order to implement it, as well as the political will. And it's just not

you know, it depics. What develops here is I think an dis futal picture of you know, basically everybody, uh, everybody within the party administration who had understanding, you know, who's realistic about you know, the fact that you know, inevitably like a war is going to emerge between you know,

the Third Reich and the Soviet Union. Anybody in the scientemic community you know, who was at all engaged you know with the reality in national politics at the time, and anybody who uh you know had uh had been paying attention, you know to to the new physics with any with any sort of understanding of it beyond that of a layman, like understood that there was some kind of like great applied potential for this, but that might not be emergent for twenty years. You know, it might

you know, it might never be fully realized. But again too like it wasn't clear what that was, and such that there was any kind of like agreement in these like very kind of crude conceptual terms. In Germany it was as you know, it was basically as like this is an energy source. That's one who changed the world, you know, it was not like this is this is how we built super bombs, you know. And interestingly, but uh, such that the United Kingdom had a view of this.

After the chairman of a Belgian mining concern he uh he got wind of the situation in Czechoslovakia with respect to uranium. A a guy named m Edgar c Ga. He was president of the Belgian Mining consider and a union miniere. Okay, I think that's how you pronounced it. He contacted, uh, a guy named Tizard who was chairman of the Committee and the Scientific Survey of Air Defense

in London, Okay. And when he did, uh, the outcome of their meeting was basically, Tizard he was unwilling to he was willing to provide the funds or the authority for Sindiire or Cindiata to to purchase all available uranium stocks, which there were several thousand tons in Belgium and far more available in the open market that it had been extricated from Czechoslovakia or extracted you know, before the before the before the country fell apart and uh, you know

what have you when and became came under the dominion of the Reich. But you know it, Uh, the fact was, I mean it this was not it was the UK was very much by this point, this was May of nineteen thirty nine, you know, they were shifting to a war footing, you know, I mean, it can't be argued that this was you know, oh, you know, the climate of appeasement was ruling and nobody you know realized you know,

the danger that lay ahead. If you want to take that kind of court historian's view, I mean that that they can't be argued. Okay, the the uh what Tizard did say is that, uh, if some kind of mass of UH uranium reserves or at least that which was then available in the open market, if the bulk of that ED should fall into enemy hands, he said that maybe something that you know, that that could be catastrophic and strategic terms. But I mean it wasn't it wasn't

clear what they was. You know. It's like it was basically that, you know, we hear that, you know, the crowds want it, so we don't want you know, because they wanted We want them to not have it, you know, but we don't want it either because it may be nothing. You know. The uh, the Admiral basically just are like took this to the annualty which you know in in

the UK. Then as I assume now even I always said always had outsized clout in terms of like war and peace questions, they said that, you know, they said that, uh, you know, not only to went out of the funds they gamble with on this like literally but they said the possibility of developing a quote explosive of unprecedented power from uranium was so remote as to be negligible. So

again this was like science fiction. Okay, it kind of reminds me of if you keep up with I don't know if anybody does, but I and maybe they've moved

on from this kind of fixation. But like some years back, you know, if you picked up parameters, you know, like the USM ME War College magazine or read these uh speaking of the bridge, right, some of these like Royal Navy publications they was talking about like rail guns and these kind of like super guns that we're gonna that were were primarily gonna be based on you know, Uh, there's basically gonna be like there's some kind of new like quasi surface warfare platform that's just going to like

change everything. You know. It was a lot of uh, I mean that is now like I mean now it's more you know, guys kind of trying to rationalize already bloated budgets and stuff. But there's there's always there's always there's always uh, there's always generals and admirables, as well as civilian analysts and intelligence men, you know, like like sounding alarm bells about about some future you know, like

super weapon. You know, this was not like this was not something new, Okay, yeah, I mean they the twentieth century is remarkable in terms of the punctuated the punctuated equilibrium as so to speak of you know, scientific advancement

by by leaps and bounds. But this this idea that you know, there was there was a firm understanding of the potential of uranium that and that you know this somehow would you know as we make you know, Germany it's strategic situation as it was in thirty nine, you know, the master of the world. Like that's that's ridiculous. G. P. Thompson had an interesting take. Uh he was, he was.

He was a leading British physicist, perhaps perhaps the leading physicist who was close to uh you know, the like not just the War Party as it were, but to uh, you know, military circles and uh both intelligence and the admiralty. He said, uh, you know, it's highly he said, he said, the Germans are probably more afraid of US developing some uranian based technology. You know is is than than we

are of them. And uh he suggested, he suggested a dis info campaign indicating that the British had in fact tested uranium bombs of unprecedented force, you know, so potent that the authorities in you know stopped uh stopped testing of them for fear of of compromising the uh compromising the uh the program completely, you know it. Uh. Churchill himself he said that, and he talked of am I

do like church was like something of a technology. I mean, on the one hand, he's like pans a lighte, which he was and he and he he he he was a disaster as a as as a commander in chief, but he did have like a fetish for like wartech, you know, I albeit not in an informed way, but his view was the same. He said that, like any any German, talk of a quote superbomb is pure bluff, you know. Uh. He's like, you know this is ridiculous,

Like nothing like this. There's there's no indicators, there's no kind of reindicators that something like this is going to be deployed, you know. And he said, even if it was, you know, the the uh you know that both the Admiralty and the Air Ministry as well as the army. You know, their their view is that, you know, even if such an application have been cultivated, it would you know, anything that would lead to results on a large scale would not be emergent for years, you know. And this

was Churchill talking. You know, this is like arts Wormont or ChIL you know. So, I mean it's uh the uh he asked a question.

exactly what you said. It could have served as you know, an ongoing pretext as well, you know, like these kinds of things are being developed in and enemy hands. Oh my god, like basically became you know, kind of like the the Lbit. It was, it was, it was, it was top secret. But what became, you know, like the the New Dealer rationale for the Manhattan Project. But it's but again, I mean the reason it didn't is because it's seeming, it like, just so outlandish. And again, these weren't.

These weren't a bunch of you know, these weren't a bunch of World War One generals. I go, and I don't know about this. You know, this this this high fluting science like you know, these were like these were guys at the top of the field, you know in the UK, you know, in the nineteen thirties. I mean to say that like they they didn't you know, have an indigenous you know, uh, academic community that was very much on the cusp of new physics research. I mean

that it is preposterous. It just didn't seem it just it just wasn't. It wasn't what people were thinking. Okay, And I mean, yeah, okay, anytime you're talking about anytime you're talking about anytime you're talking about a rare element. Okay, obviously like explosives, whthing comes to mind, this is like the nature of it. But that wasn't This was not

something that was just a universe. Like the way it's presented is that there's just something that was like universally understood to be like you know, the potential of a you know, of a of uranium, and it was only a matter of time before you know, the the correct formula as it were, was calculated in order to like bring it into reality, you know, And that's uh, you know, all we can the closest we can get to literally peeking inside the minds of people in the epoch is

you know there you know, their their declarations, either their either you know there were there there's you know there either their private diaries and their correspondences or you know, their their public declarations or their statements. The presence of witnesses, and there's not any there's not any indication that you know, anybody within the scientific or military community in Europe as of nineteen thirty nine, you know, had this in within

their contemplation. And again part of this was part of this was uh, you know, part of this was a conceptual bias because again, like it if you're if you're if you're a Felt marshal in the Wehrmacht, or you know, if you're a British admiral of the Royal Navy, Like why what what's what's an atomic bomb gonna do for you? You know, like what like honestly, like how how is that gonna solve? You know, the the exigencies that you're charged with resolving?

You know, I mean it's Germany, Germany becomes a superpower and and and and resolves. Uh, it's uh and and resolves like the long emergency. It's it's faced with if it if it, if it can drop atomic bombs on people. I mean, it's not you know again it it's there's a very there's very there's a very peculiar strategic configuration where where nuclear weapons have real utility and that basically

never emerges. And you know it certainly it certainly wasn't emergent in the case of Germany in nineteen thirty nine, you know, And people can argue that point. I ate want, but I don't I get to come across a convincing case otherwise, even in even in uh, even in the abstract and more concrete terms relying on UH. Relying on the direct UH advice and claims of a professor F. A.

Lindemann and later Lord Cherwell. Churchill wrote to the Secretary of State for UH for Air Defense, for air and Air Defense saying that you know, any suggestion of of UH, of quoting Nazi super weapons were without foundation. He said, only UH, you know, as is expert, namely Lindham and had told him, UH, only a minor constituent of uranium was effective, which which which you know was took which

took quote many years to extract. You know, the chain process can take place only I've concentrated in a large mass. You know, the as soon as the energy develops, you know, uh, it's you know likely that you know, it would acquire a mild detonation instead of a chain reaction which presumably you know, would would would would incerate you know, like the uranium core that was needed in the first place.

And you know or you know, based on this based on the nature of these things and you know, unknown variables.

You know, if an adequate mass were cultivated, you know, the chain reaction could ensue that you know, it was just massively destructive, you know, and uh in ways we can't even conceptualize, you know, all the basic uh not that bassic in terms of uninformed because this was a new science, but all the kind of all all the kind of you know, usual objections of the time to you know, why you know we don't this is you know, we don't want to We don't want to tickle the

dragon's tail as it were, you know. And this was Churchill himself, like relying on his experts, you know. And it's again like what if anything he had he had an incentive to you know, confabulate you know, some kind of threat where there wasn't one, not not diminish a threat where you know where it was. I mean obviously it's but that uh and just uh for those who don't know a lot about this, and I mean I'm one of them, so I'm not being pedantic, Like what

is uranium and why uranium? Again, uranium is what was available central Europe is uh one of the uh natural you know deposits of uranium that can be uh harvested and or extracted mind and you know utilized in weapons development. Obviously, uranium is a chemical element. Uh, what is a chemical element. It's an irreducible substance that cannot be broken down into other substances. It's symbols you. It's atomic number is ninety two UH. In solid form, it's a silvery gray metal.

It UH. Uranium atoms ninety two protons and ninety two electrons, of which six are valanced electrons. UH. Uranium radioactively decays by emitting alpha radiation. And the halflight of this is it's between something like two hundred thousand and like four point five billion years sort of isotopes, so like uranium like this is this was like revolutionary medium like date the Earth like quite literally I did not know that until recently. But the most common isotopes in natural uranium

is uranium two thirty eight and uranium two thirty five. Okay, and uranium incidentally is the highest atomic weight of the primordially occurring element primordially occurring elements. Now why uranium two thirty five urinum two thirty five is uh, it's uh. It's in every in every every thousand parts about in every thousand parts of natural uranium, there's about seven parts called lighter isotope, which is the mass number two thirty five the chemical properties are the same obviously, but the

physical properties differ. Uranium thre thirty five. Essentially, it's gotta be the uh, the atomic structure of it's got to be manipulated in a way so that, in very crude terms, it does not absorb, uh, what it is being bombarded with, you know, like the the reaction has to actually be cultivated. Okay, and this can only be achieved with the uranium twe

thirty five isotope. Okay. The uh. Such that Professor Esau had any idea the urnium two thirty five was like something was like special that it, you know, it was distinguishable in terms of its potential for you know, applied

applied utility, you know, like military or otherwise. He if he knew, if he had a deeper understanding than his colleagues of why, he didn't disclose that, but he did say that at once, we should secure all of the able uranium stocks in Germany and we should cultivate uranium two thirty five where we find it. He said that it joints research group over his administration, but representing you know,

like all interested factions you know, party, state, military, you know. Uh, And this was you know, people kind of like shrug this off, like well, that's other asyl like trying to you know, insinuate himself into some kind of you know, hancho role, I mean, which within with under under the under the German Reich, especially you know in the pre war years that was not uncommon, but or they kind of viewed him as just you know, another scientists kind

of you know, being hysterical. And for most of the people present at the at the GENA conference and these subsequent sin of meetings of this coterie that had you know, that was involved in the uh you know, or that there that was know within this kind of core of people from the Department of Educational Standards as well as the War Office. You know that nobody had heard about uranium or uranium research until until the war broke out.

You know, as it happened. When the war did break out, there was ah, you know, there was the there was there was the there was the nominally civilian research team that we just mentioned that the War Office had kind of secretly you know organized and like I said, like I I believe there's a direct line from them to the chance for Adolf Hitler, although I can't prove that. But uh, there were actually two teams in total working on relatedly small scale uranium research like on the day

World War two broke out. Okay, at doctor Kurt Diebner, who's the who's the here the armies expert on nuclear physics of these uh? The uh the the the Deepners was sam honestly dismantled the very day after Brendan, France declared one in Germany PROSESL somehow to hear an interview with General Becker, who's the chief of Army Ordnance. He obtained a promise of full War Office support and full and exclusive support for his uh, for his you know,

for his team's research endeavors that the expensed that Deepeners. Now, some people will speculate it's kind of like the dog that didn't bark in evidentiary terms, like, well, how do you pull this off? Especially considering he was a civilian and Deepner was insinuated into the army establishment. He must have he must have promised some kind of results. I

don't think that. I don't I don't see that as possible because I mean, you know, Becker, among other things, you know, he get to that position without under having a basic understanding of of of of you know, of chemistry at least, you know, I mean it was You're not talking about some man in the street as relates to applied science, you know, even something that was then as kind of theoretically uh abstract or you know, unknown, as as as atomic physics. But I I don't, you know,

I don't. I don't see what Ese could have produced either in order to kind of like in consider or in consideration of that guarantee that supposedly would have been made that Deebner couldn't have. I speculated just comes down to Becker having more confidence in one man over the other. But again, who knows. I think all of this is kind of much ado about nothing, because the point I think the key takeaway is that this was not viewed as a priority, you know, not that it was uh

you know, I I think probably improved terms. Becker didn't really give a shit, you know. I mean he Germany was now at war with Britain and France, you know, and his priority was, you know, doing what he had to win that war. You know, like what one agghead is bringing to the table versus another one. Well, he makes the better argument. He gets the you know, he gets the he gets the shudder, you know. I mean

that's these things so often are. And like I said, I mean the speculation is basically people filling in the gaps with what they want to to substantiate a narrative that's you know, not this not uh substantiated by the record, you know. I mean, so that's species. Anyway, what Becker did agree to, what Esau did come away with, aside from like a promise of you know, kind of funding and support, uh was an official voucher certifying the military

importance of the project for the war efforts. But I mean, like all kinds of all kinds of things we're kind of given that proverbial stand, especially later on and kind of more liberally by the s s believe or not, I mean anything and against the sas basically whatever you've givens him or like any kind of signific merit, you know, whether it was you know, like uh, you know if id you know, transforming like you know, corny to jet fu wooler and I mean silly, but you know what

I mean, like it, I don't like the fact that the fact that I was able to the that he was able to get you know, like the Chief Army ordinance, you know, to to sign off on his research. I mean that basically means he was competent then like whatever he came up with, like probably would you know, be utile, and whether it was or not, you know, like whatever he came up with belong to the army, you know, not not to not to not to any you know,

private sector or university patron. So that's oh, that's that's kind of the foundation of uh, that's kind of the foundation of you know, like leading into the war, like what what the state of uh, you know, atomic research was. Of course, ultimately like during the war the title uh, mister Irvings book the Virus House, I mean that was the heavy water facility that was dedicated to you know, that was dedicated to you know, cultivating uranium two thirty five.

So I mean there's something there. Yeah, and uh, I hope not boring everybody to death. I'll try to wrap this up in the next episode, but it but yeah, that's I don't want to I don't want to get into that now because then we'd be talking for the next hour. But yeah, that's uh, that's uh, basically the the foundation and you know, like I said, I think it's the reason why I wanted to cover this now was I think it's timely gonna ground to the ab and Iron movie, which in a lot of ways is

not a bad film. I suppose you were Hollywood, and like some people, I believe chrits reh Nolan was kind of surreptigially signaling the political things. I mean, that's a subject for another stream. But I thought it was timely.

I mean it's like my background like educationally, but also it uh, you know, the Cold War was so I mean nuclear weapon Like the Cold War can only understood within the context of the nuclear paradigm, you know, like it was just it literally defined every aspect of it, like military, political, philosophical, Like people can't get their minds around really the idea that you know, in a different strategic paradigm, let alone one in the twentieth century that

you know, nuclear weapons could have not been you know, the kind of trump card the or like the key to victory that oviated you know, all like lesser killing technologies you know, and like I cannonize that enough. It's like again like even people, I'm not any people have got their own conceptual prejudices one or the other about the Third Reich, Like it's not put that out of

your mind totally. Think it's really strategic terms about irrationality of what Berlin had to accomplish in order to realize it's war aims. And win the war. Like again, how would an atomic bomb facilitate that? I mean, on the one hand, like, yeah, it's better always to have like potential firepower on hand. That's devastating, But it's not okay,

I mean, it's it's you know, it's not. Uh, it's it's not like like the utility of these weapons is not there's not a spectrum, a wide spectrum utility to them, you know it. And I think people forget that, you know, even people who are basically informed about things and you know, conceptually literate. But yeah, all right, I'm rambling. Man. I won't, I won't. I won't keep you any longer. But thanks so much for hosting me. Man, I owe you a lot with friends, and I appreciate being able to cover

these things. But I really really appreciate the chance to appear on your program. Like believe that.

me on the app formally known as Twitter. It's real R capital R E A L underscore number seven h O M A S seven seven seven. I'm on Telegram. It's at Thomas Graham number seven h O M A S seven seven seven Graham. Or no, it's Thomas. Yeah, no, it's that's right. That's right. I'm not going c isle. I'm just tired. And that's uh. The YouTube channel, there's nothing there yet except a couple one off things, you know, like an intro and you know, some stuff that I've

recorded with friends, like my dear friend Carrie. On my YouTube channel, it's Thomas t V. That's uh. When I go to Utah in a couple of weeks, it's to begin shooting dedicated content for Thomas TV. So I'm excited about that. You know, we're doing a lot more with the brand, not just like sexing up the production values, which I owe to my dear friend Rake and his team, like literally, like I could not do any of this

stuff without them. They're the guys who do all like the editing and stuff and make things like presentable, like legit I'd be if it was just me, Like i'd be like some like a hobo, like looking like he was on Public Access and like nineteen eighty or something like, I'd be like something from like yeah, it'd be like something from like Public Access and like some alternate dimension of shit. But uh, some keep that in mind that they're the guys who really are owed props for anything

I'd do in this regard. But yeah, that's about where we're at. I uh, I'm hoping to be able to drop steel Storm three my early spring Nuremberg by summer, and that's all I got for right.

some of these things. But I've gotten feedback. Like a friend of ours who's a German dude who also has a degree in physics, like told me that, like He's like, yeah, if I'm proud of you for like not totally fucking this up. That made me feel kind of good. Like our German friends as well as like our physicist friends generally don't pull any punches in that regard. So but today, I mean, there's just a lot here. Okay, I mean, but I think we'll maybe go one more episode just

as a you know, after this one. It's kind of a bookend, and maybe field questions. But I'll explain what I mean with the statement I'm about to issue forth as we get into the meat of today's episode. But you know, the German the German atomic bomb program such that it such that there could even be said to be one that existed. It was basically strangling Utero when when the Vermacht was like stopping his tracks at the gates of Moscow. Okay, I'll get into what I mean

by that as we move along. Okay, if nothing else, you know, military exigencies and and and the long emergency of of a of a long war, a prolonged war which Germany cannot afford to wage, may rendered any any kind of German version of Manhattan Project, you know, not feasible, even if it was strategically sound as regards you know, its impetus, you know what, it would it even resolve

Germany's military quagmire emergent military quagmire. But there's a lot in between, you know, nineteen thirty nine and December nineteen forty one. They still needs to be addressed. And the person at Heisenberg features very prominently here. Okay, for those who know, Heisenberg was not an experimental physicist. He was a very much a theoretical physicist and frankly something of

a philosopher with theological interests. You know, he was not he was not really the counterpart to Oppenheimer or something you know, and I say that like in the most praising terms. I think a guy like both Gang Smith is kind of very much a descendant, the spiritual descendant of Heisenberg. So the fact that Heisenberg came to be you know what kind of helm the virus house research and all attendant projects. I mean that tells you something too,

you know. I mean it's some and I'll expand upon that with discrete facts and testimony, but that's something you need to keep in mind. You know. It's just there's a lot of connecting the peribial dots and the absence of direct testimony or concrete evidence to point to in order to you know, paint a picture of what this of what this endeavor was, and you know what gave rise to it and how it was not what was claimed, but you know to what degree? To what? To what

degree it was? Uh, the people who claimed the German atomic bond program was was was well underway and a dedicated capacity. The degree to which that was propaganda deliberately cultivated by interested parties contra. You know, people actually believing this was the case owing to the not just the fog of war, but you know, the kind of opaque nature of of what was then you know, the new science, you know, and and everything else. It's hard to say.

I think it depends on who we were talking about, but we'll get into that too, particularly the views of people like Stimson versus you know, those in you know, I mean Stimpson was an outlier in the New Deal administration anyway, but you know, he the view of him versus you know people, uh who who people in the administration who are most receptive to Einstein and Sax's claim. I mean, there's a there was a there's a difference

in inconceptual horizon there. But I want to get into we left off last time with the April twenty ninth, I mean thirty nine conference, and as as we as we got into, uh the focus of that discussion really was the feasibility of a of a quote uranium engine, you know, like we said such that these such such that these discussions among this coterie that the War Office had corralled had had it had a focus, and later like such that there such that their experimental activities, you know,

had a discrete focus. It It was it was really towards well we conceptually what we'd consider a nuclear reactor and that becomes relevant, that becomes independently relevant as a as time went on. We really relating to the weaponization of of of of uranium two thirty five as we'll see, but a few days prior, a guy named Neils Borr, who was a Dane, but he was in some way he had like an outsized impact on German physics, okay, and he was very much like a mentor of Heisenberg

among other among other luminaries. He and uh a guy named J. E. Wheeler, they published the American Physical Review, which was read pretty much by everybody in the Western world who's it all involved in physics even throughout the war, you know, this endured it uh it uh it reiterated the idea that uranium two thirty five had weapons potential.

You know, so this was even independent of any New Deal propaganda, independent of any you know kind of anxieties uh well founded or not within the British intelligence establishment, like there were just like worldwide, there were people who were arguably you know, like explendidly disinterested in the political climate and the burgaining you know, battle lines who were playing with this idea. You know, it was at least

on their radar. Okay, So the climate, the intellectual climate into which everybody was sort of thrust who was taking on a role in experimental physics and in any combatant nation actual or potential you know, there was there was there was this kind of subtext of you know, military

potentially a direct military potential here. Okay, So I mean to be fair, like that's got to uh, that's got to be accounted for Ada Han, who you know, who was an experimental physicist and who did have trumendous clout, uh just just just across the board, like not just but it's particularly within the uh, within the committee in

uh Berlin. Uh. He said that any project essentially, you know, try and cultivate uranium two thirty five, it it'd be it'd be astronomically expensive anyway to present you know, just insoluble difficulties. Professor Bagey, who was uh a pre eminent researcher and he was kind of the top researcher who was attached to Heisenberg in a direct capacity, like he was literally his protege. He said, well, let's call it

Heisenberg himself. And you know, if if this is possible or if this is just you know, a pipe dream, not even the development of a bomb. Isn't that It's not that's not the question on the table, just you know, uh, the uh the you know, the but the the extraction of light uranium isotope in appreciable quantities, you know, like he if if this is possible and if it's feasible, you know, uh within you know our present means you know, he'd be the man who could uh who could you know,

sort of shed light on this. Now, heisenbergola universally respected. Like again, there was a basic element of disdain for theoretical physics among uh many of these experimental physicists, and that very much that that verific of a parent when Heisenberg kind of joined this, join this this this this quorum not a qual I mean, it was anything but

a quorum as a coterie, you know. In that Uh, there was a lot of there's there's a lot of there's a lot of contrarianism for his own sake, uh, kind of thrown up in these discussions, which I think David Irving in his book makes that point. And he had opportunity to you know, speak to some of the men who actually were in attendance at these meetings, at

least in like a more than oblique capacity. The UH, well was finally agreed upon, was basically that if there was any if there was if there's any slight the official statement what was decided, like the minutes of of these kinds of like the collected minutes of these these debates discussions was UH what Professor Geiger said, if there was any if there was even the slightest chance of liberating energy from the atomic nucleus, it was, you know, in any of these experiments, that it had to be

followed up. Okay, the UH it was recommended that General Becker, you know, the the Ornaments Department chief, UH, that that dedicated to quote Nuclear Physics Research Group. The organized under these auspices, and you know, like we talked about last time, like ESA had an amicable relationship already with Becker and UH so so it was it was it was. It was made so for security reasons, and this too, I think clouded perception of the Allies, at least in those

who were within military intelligence. For security reasons. The project UH the language employed UH in documents relating to it, it was all characterized as as research for the creation of potential fuel sources for rocket propulsion. Okay, Like the actual Reich rocket program was, it became, it came into the auspices of of the s S eventually, you know.

That's why von Braun like actually was in was in was in uniform in the s S, you know, like he was, you know, you like, it was formally incorporated into the organization and in a very top down way. You know, the rocket program is an example of how of everything that you know, the that that that the

virus house program wasn't you know. And I also believe owing to the intrinsically uh military language of uh you know, this kind of deliberate mischaracterization of the program as a rocket program, I think that may have convinced people who came across kind of scraps and and statements out of the ear, you know, who were spying on the Third Reich.

I I think they just made they they axiomatically determined, like, you know, well, this is this is a direct this is a this is a direct military endeavor, you know, and uh that that's not unreasonable, It's not unreasonable conclusion to draw, especially if one understood how the German General staff system work and kind of what the interplay was between you know, technological research within what was nominally the private sector, and you know, it's it's the ability of uh,

the military to capitalize on on these on these developments, you know. But it's I think that's uh, I think that's interesting. And it's also, uh it goes too like we're priorities were you know, like kind of the people, uh people in the Wehrmacht kind of like they viewed as like the zenith kind of of of of vartech, you know, was uh what was aerospace stuff. You know, it's like with with with with rocketry obviously kind of being the the absolute diseenth of of that. But the

uh it uh. What also happened was on a on on September sixteenth, for the the Kurt Diebner, who he talked about last time. He was appointed to lead at least nominally in the Nuclear Physics Research Group under Ordnance Department auspices. Doctor Bagge, who began keeping a diary for the first time in his life, because I mean, I think he realized, I'm sure he realized that whatever the outcome of these endeavors, it was something you know, he

was participating in scientific history. You know as he was being made. But on the UH he notes that on September sixteenth, nineteen thirty nine, Diebner summoned him personally UH to report the Army Ordnance Department. He writes, participating the quote conference about an important matter, then returned to Leipzig. This was the last from this point on the reason

why he uses that UH, that deliberately minimalist language. Any reference to the possibilities of uranium for any any of any application, reactors, UH, super bombs, anything was considered was classified as a state secret, okay, And all all references the possibilities of uranium and energy derived from uranium was

was actively suppressed, okay the first instance. And again this goes to show you the kind of frosty relationship between the private sector and the army in this regard, you know, kind of splendidly contrary the situation is existed between the aviation industry and UH, the military establishment, which was positively incestuous. A Semens research chemist, you know, a Semen research physicists.

You know. Semens was a huge conglomerate, you know, like they uh, they're basically insinuated everything on the cutting edge of of UH of applied sciences, you know, as related to industry and everything else. The UH he submitted in an article UH to the main like German news agency. It contained a detailed description of UH, you know, like a kind of like the atomic science of the day, you know, and it's it's supposed, you know, like marvelous

potential for purposes civilian and military. And it refers specifically of the power contained in the uranium nucleus. And it said, quote, it potentially contained enough to blast the ruins of a giant city up into the stratosphere. What terrific powers of annihilation and erfs were have It could fight an enemy with bombs like these end quote. And the writer called UH and knowing certain terms or increased experiments UH with masses of uranium, which again the Reich had access to

in Czechoslovakia. There were uranium reserves in Portugal too, and later on late late, very late in the war, even the British work convinced that this played into some of the kind of you know, the reasons why like in their view, UH, the fear sort of treated UH Franco with kid gloves. The majority of these the majority of these resources were in Portugal. But obviously you know it it uh that that the key to the uh to the peninsula was Ibran peninsula, Spain. But that's something of

a tangent. But the uh, the this this, this article was totally suppressed, and UH the author was warned like nothing of this nature can appear in print. When uh there was a papers on general atomic research were allowed, including uh directly related to you know, experience involving uranium and uh including the light isotope, but uh, no direct mention of their context was to be made, and certainly not any even speculative suggestion about you know, their employment

and weapons programs. Now we can look at that in a number of ways, you know, like it's like we talked about before, and I think you raised when you're looking ahead. I mean, the Germans were actively at war by this point. This was the you know, the two weeks prior the United Kingdom in France and declared law in Germany. But even at even at nominal peace, you know, in a strategic landscape such that Germany was situated. You know, the way, you've got to be careful with what you

introduced into the stream of information. You gotta be careful about the disinformation you insinuate, and probably it was in the minds of plenty of people that the last thing that the right and needed was uh, you know, the new dealers in the British being able to seize upon statements by top scientists that Germany is working on super weapons.

You know, Hitler especially was very consent of this, like so is Gerbels and that uh that there's there's there's a very interesting give and take around both men's respective ideas on the role of you know, media at war and as a political apparatus. But my point is that it's not it's not just like prema fashion evidence that

oh Berlin demanded this be suppressed. They obviously were, you know, this was their goal was to you know, do exactly that what was suggested in the article by the Siemens physicists. You know, it's quite a bit more nuanced because I've run across we're a very basic treatments of that anecdote

that you know, profit precisely that sine conclusion the uh. Now, one of the problems faced whatever the state of applied research utilizing uranium two thirty five by the German scientists was you know, whether whether as a dedicated weapons program or just as you know, I'm trying to identify what potentiality existed utilizing these you know, these these this element specifically uranium thre thirty five is an energy source like whatever,

whatever the whatever the ultimate goal was, there was a there there's a problem with, uh, there's a problem with isolating uranium two thirty five and cultivating it. Okay, and uh, this is such was the you know they're from there from whence emerges the concern about you know, it just being a cost prohibitive affair, which makes it, you know, functionally useless, particularly as a a military a military endeavor. The UH September nine, the second Conference of the Nuclear

Physicists at the Ordnance Department was held. The subject of that conference was specifically means of extracting energy from the uranium nucleus, either in either controlled amounts you know, as would facilitate a reactor or uranium furnace, or or in

the uncontrolled chain reaction reactive violence of an explosion. Okay, the first, the first accounlisting the first would would involve mixing the uranium with some substance caple of literally slowing down the high energy fast neutron is admitted during the fission process without absorbing them. For technical reasons I don't quite understand. Neutrons of a certain energy band are particularly

prone to capture by uranium. So for them not to be lost, uh, they these these these fishing neutrons had to be had to be rapidly slowed down by some kind of breaking substance or in science scientific language like moderating elements or moderator. Okay, the uh The second uh them possibility was that if if, if, if, that's gonna be made to utilize this as an explosive, you know, if a super bomb was in fact possible. You know. The uh it was the rare I hope that was

needed to fish in with thermal neutrons. Okay, so how do you how do you how do you get the how do you get the uranium two three, five that you need? You know? In the case of the first question, a professor Harvik he discussed the design of the uranium reactor to solve both problems. Okay. He had a colleague named doctor Hans Seuss, not doctor Seuss, the guy who wrote like the cat in the head, Like this guy is like an actual like doctor named Seuss like take

from that way you will. I know, some dick is gonna mention starability, sneeches or something like. It's not about that, Sue said, proposed that heavy water was uh, it was was to be used in the in the UH as as as as as the moderating element. Okay, what is heavy water. It's a form of water. Obviously, we whose hydrogen atoms are all dueterium, also known as heavy hydrogen, rather than the common hydrogen isotope that makes it most

of the hydrogen and normal water. The presence of heavy of heavier hydrogen, the heavier hydrogen isotope, it gives the water different nuclear properties, and the increase in mass alters the uh the physical and chemical properties as relates to

normal water. Okay. Now, so as this research went on, in other words, you know, kind of like the challenges like stacked up and up and up, and as I'm sure you've gleaned, basically, uh, what became clear according to the path the course of German research, and America was able to avoid this entirely owing to plutonium. And we'll get into that briefly if there's time or if people

are interested. But basically, like when it came clear of the second conference, what was being floated is that, well, it's not a question of do we build a bomb or do we build a reactor or not not even

dew we but like what what's the potential here? Is that if you want, if you want to do anything like the latter, you you have to develop the former anyway, Okay, something this is just becoming like who's going to pay for all this when this may not even be possible and we may not even have access to the uranium uranium pile reserves that we need in order to accomplish it.

The Heisenberg Enter Heisenberg he was commissioned specifically to investigate theoretically whether a chain reaction in uranium was possible given the known UH properties of of of neutron fusion and uranium fission and the characteristics there. And over time, this is pre nineteen forty one. After ninety forty one, things changed. Reasons we'll get into that kind of became the focus of such that they're gonna be said to be like

a dedicated focus towards a uh A directly military application. Okay. I think this is when discussions corral discreetly around the potential of an atomic bomb, okay, within German physics quarters generally and specifically within this Ordnance department coterie of great physics minds. Okay. And partly yeah, obviously because partly like that's something that you know, the Wehrmacht needed to know about if this was possible, you know, owing to the

fact that Germany was now at war. But also I mean, if that's possible, if you know, basically like it's you know, if if there's potential for you know, energy release at all, you know, like the most kind of the most kind of concrete way you know, to understand that in experimental terms is to determine if you know, like an explosive

chain reaction can be cultivated. Okay. I think that must be accounted for and based upon Heisenberg's own notes, like I'm talking about like his personal like opinion work product that was you know, not for anybody else's eyes. This seems to be the case because he never once talks about you know, I mean, first of all, there was his reactions when he was in captivity to the you know, to the hero seem in Nagasaki texts, but also like in his own I say, opinion work products. It wasn't

a proper diary. You know, he never wants to write, you know, some of the effect of you know, like this we're we're working towards development of a bomb. I mean, he writes a lot and he and he raised issues, uh with with colleagues about you know, the reality of of of this research for various you know, in various capacities. But number once does want to get the idea that you know, he saw himself as insinuated into some sort

of like German Manhattan project. The uh around the same time, uh, the War Office somewhat abruptly, uh, they took over the they took over the building on the camps of the Kaiservillehelm Institute of Physics. Okay, because it had it had the best equipment for for for applied atomic research, probably

probably in Europe, definitely within Germany. All uh, all scientists participating in you know, the uh, the War Office project, uh were they they were they were asked to transfer this one central institute, you know, so that like they basically like all hands to be on deck under one roof. This is this is absolutely necessary, Okay, especially we're talking

about this kind of advanced research. The problem is these men all had uh you know, these weren't military men to a man, they were ah, you know, civilian researchers. They had egos. Uh. They they were all, you know, kind of the kingfish of the pond. They were situated at in their respective institutions. But it's also you know, some of these guys were young, but a lot of them weren't. You know, It's like they people become very attached their research, particularly men I'd have to imagine a

brilliant intellect. You know, they didn't want to They didn't want to be part of a team. I mean, who the hell does you know, like in that capacity. So uh most almost most of them, uh like almost all of them objected, and many of them just declined. They just declined, what amount of do a direct order? Okay? But it's like the cachet that these men had was, you know, you cannot you can't, you can't replace nuclear physicists, okay.

And like it's the uh who was corralled there uh at the Berlin Dalum Uh the kinds of Vellam institute like Weisiker, Vitz, Bob Borman, Fisher and Heisenberg was often present. So I mean there was like a core uh, there there was, there was there there was a core like working group that did exactly what was what was directed. But it indicated a real you know, it indicated a real lack of of concrete focus and kind of top down discipline towards a directed goal, you know. And that's uh,

that's I think that's more symptomatic than causitive. I mean it's not you know, it's it's not it's That's important to understand too, is that, you know, when we're not talking about you know, a true German atomic bomb project, but that was sabotaged by outside egos and eccentricities. It's uh.

And I want the second key takeaway too, is that there's this there's this idea that you know, there was some like brain drain in Germany because like you know, all the brilliant physicists were Jewish like and got chased out. That's not true at all. Heisenberg probably was like the leading physics mind like on this planet, you know, and uh, you know Weisigerwitz, Bob is Borman. I mean, all these guys like they were boggy dee neer like they they're at the top of their game. And frankly, you know,

they weren't. None of these guys were like party men and were dedicated national socialists, but they weren't about to reject their father land. Whige frankly had done tremendous things for them in terms of facilitating their research in all kinds of ways, and you know, providing them with you know, not just the material means, but the kind of social capital and and and structural resources to you know, to practice there there you know, there their uh, their experiments

and everything else. Or or in Heisenberger's case, you know, like there was really probably in uh probably in France and probably in in in like the Nordic countries. I mean, he would have been like a luminary, but it you know, he I mean Germany was Germany was uh what was was was was was the center man, it was the it was the actual pivot of h of scientific research

and endeavor in Europe. That can't be denied, you know, and like the that's also uh, there was a disadvantage here because uh Maut talk uh but his uh one one of the you know, one of the one of the researchers. He said I know in certain terms that you know, he was delighted to be assigned this project because you know, he could continue with atomic research and his young colleagues, who we thought had great potential. He said, we could protect them from getting called up to the draft.

You know, we could continue our scientific research in a matter which we were accustomed like whether other people had to tighten their belts, you know, other other young guys, you know, who had a bright future and whatever career field. You know, we're having to go fight, you know, for the fatherland. You know. He's like, we were basically unmolested, you know, So, I mean that's that's totally different, totally

of an idea or sensibility. That was the case with the Manhattan product scientists and in the UK man like there was uh the uh you know, there was like we talked about, you know, Churchill had very uh he in his in the and his sponsors. I mean they re effectively you know, kind of kind of drown out dissident voices as respect to the war effort, you know, and it had becomes something of a career killer, and especially in university life, which frankly, you know, was there

was a lot of Jewish influence there. You know, these these uh, these guys in the UK or the counterparts you know, to the UH to the Virus House UH team as well as the Manhattan Project team. You know, they they were very much, uh, they were very much working in a dedicated capacity after nineteen forty one to weaponize atomic energy to be turned against Germany. And they had no qualms with this at all, you know. I mean it wasn't even a question of qualms with the Germans.

This wasn't even on the radar, you know. I mean, I can't eemhacize that enough. And if this was in the military's mind, which I don't think it could have been, because I mean they that the men who could conceptualize these things, we're all you know in in academ i. You know, if you if you're if the men who can actually perform the experiments as required to facilitate the engineering of such devices as will be coveted by the arn't forces. I mean, if you can't, you can't make

them do that. I mean you're you're pissing into the wind. Uh. No, what changed in nineteen forty one the Germans. Everything changed in December, but before that, in July nineteen forty one. The Ministry of Aircraft Production, which has something of an

outsized role in the UH. In what we can think of is kind of like the Churchill Defense Establishment or like you know, arms establishment, I mean for obvious reasons, you know, I mean and UH, I mean the UK realized early on and it hit a transition to UH, a major make transition to a major air power. Otherwise, you know, like the Royal Navy would only be as dominant as a as A as the Royal Air Force

could be to defendant. So they so they so the air mindustry and all of its attendant kind of appendages UH developed a lot of clout. There was a special committee appointed UH to research UH the UH the potential of atomic energy. Okay, it can alluted that and effective uranium bomb and again uranium out until UH, until American research became kind of known to the world, like after

forty five in a complete capacity. Everybody's you know, uranium was what everybody thought of when they thought of weapons potential. The UH. This UH, the Aircraft Production Committee's report was that about twenty five pounds of uranium two thirty five the yield could be equivalent to about each inndred tons

of TNT and UH the committee. The committee's conclusion was that Germany, having a taken steps to cultivate heavy water, coupled with uh, you know, their uh, their increase in my ding of uranium war within uh you know, they newly that they newly gained access to in what was Czechoslovakia, that it's obvious that you know, uh, even you know they they're the state of Germany is and that they're not they're not looking to utilize this for peaceful purposes.

You know. The only immediate benefit to the German Reich of finding ways to release the energy contained there in would be you know, in a weaponized capacity. I think by this point, I think the British probably believed this. I mean, who the hell knows. I mean, like we talked about these guys were zealous anyway, but considering that,

you know, uh, there was far less known. I mean, bring that some top signed is, but there's far less known there than it was known in America, you know, about what the kind of real world application of these

things would look like. I think that they probably believe, like you know, anything, that the Germans were willing to dedicate this kind of effort too, is UH is going to be explicitly military and probably you know, some kind of massive force multiplier that's misguided for a lot of reasons, not ethically, if actually, but in a fog of war kind of scenario with the state of science at the time, that was UH, you know, available even to an expert.

I I I think they probably believed what they conveyed the Churchill the UH. They further said that the material for an atomic weapon UH at the earliest, at the very earliest, could be available to Britain by the end of nineteen forty three, you know. But that also, you know, begs the question as to like, what would we do

with it and would it even work? But the UH this of course led the British to UH try and see if they could find out about the Uranian research program through their contexts in Norway, the UH the primary

German heavy water facility was at Razuken, Norway. If I'm butchering that, forgive me Juken, I think r j U k A N. The problem is, as I think the subscribers know, because we got into it in our Churchill episodes, the Norwegians are not a particularly warm feelings about the British, particularly when the British had intended to assault and invade

and occupy Norway preemptively. So throughout the summer nine forty one, as UH intelligence came in from UH Trondheim to London, you know from their intelligence operatives that uh, you know, heavy water production that Rajukan you know, was steadily increasing.

The uh. The UH, the priority of UH, the priority of the Prime Minister, you know, as well as everybody in the intelligence into military establishment was to uh you know, bring the Norwegian UH intelligence service on board and uh, you know, essentially get somebody to you know, kind of penetrate there was Jukan facility, or or at least uh, you know, develop a a way of conveying information back to London that might be usable in terms of how

you know, the facility could be could be compromised and uh derailed from its purpose. They UH Norwegian essentially told him to go to hell, you know, they they UH. The official response from UH there was a guy named Welsh. He was a lieutenant commander in UH British in u in in UH in the British Army went on to serve in the intelligence service. He'd married a Norwegian woman and he was chief the Norwegian section of UH the

intelligence service. He UH he contacted UH when he when he contacted his counterparts in Norwegian intelligence, apparently they literally said to him a telegram, blood is thicker than heavy water, you know, like basically go fund yourself, you know, like we're not. We're not. We do. We want to be thrilled that they that that, you know, the the bare amount is here and we don't know what the hell they're doing, you know, at this facility, but you know,

we're not. We're not gonna help you in Piggy Churchill will find other ways to attack our country, you know. And I think that's really interesting, especially considering how in UH, particularly in in in English history books and like Quizzling is held out it's just this like it's just this buffoon,

when in reality he was a great man. But also they it's pretended that like Norway was a either fully on board with the Allies with this like victim state, you know, like a lot like you know, there was a about five sweet five and ten thousand Norwegians like joining vafen SS and for a populationized in Norway. That's substantial. Like Nude Hampson, it was kind of like the National

Scribe in Norway. You know, he literally wrote a eulogy to add off Hitler like they I mean there Rwegians are great people, but I and it's just an interesting kind of wrinkle that you know, they refuse to participate in kind of these UH, these designs of of London, even at the height of the of the of the

early phase of the war. At the UH same time the UH, the British approached, at least as we know from the record, the British approached the senior British scientific representative and UH in the in in in the air Mistry Committee. He wrote, he wrote to the chairman of UH, Roosevelt's Scientific Advisory Committee, like when he was in Washington, I believe like if I read that right, you know, basically like you know, kind of feeling out, you know, the the Yanks about you know, what the state of

their research was. And of course like they nobody else had the Manhattan Project, you know, like knew anything. Like even if they had, I it's I mean, it's debatable if they would have just closed that or not. But you know, there was a it was a security was very very tight, to say the least. But he voted the question, you know, this is it proves possible to manufacture a uranium bomb, you know, should in fact be used?

You know, like should we should should it should? You know one of our respective general staffs are both like are they willing and should they sanction the total destruction of Berlin and the entire you know, or or like the entire country in Germany, you know, with with a weapons such as this, you know, And it's uh, that's really the only the kind of the kind of lame indirect reply was from Stimson, who in Stimpson, like I mentioned earlier tonight, but also like in the past I've

mentioned that Stimpson was a you know, an outlier in the new New Dealer regime. But you know, he said years after the fact that you know, in ninety three we believed, based on you know, intelligence derived that we consider reliable, that you know, the Germans were far ahead of us and weaponized atomic research. I think Stimpson probably

believed that. But it's interesting I raised the issue of the UK scientific representative like not only raising this moral quagmire, but you know, kind of putting it to paper literally in the documentary record. That's the only that's the only such moral qualm I've ever heard from a British source about about the about the atomic bomb from you know, from the era before it was it even you know,

had been devised into existence. Bomber Harris, uh spoke very candidly and intelligently and the morality of strategic bombing you know later on, but that not of the out of the nuclear question. But it's uh, I think the stuff's useful to kind of it paints a picture of what was in the minds of the relevant players, you know, like I said by them, I in reality, America was far ahead of everybody in terms of you know, applied

atomic weapons research. Plutonium was first synthesized, synthetically produced, and isolated in late nineteen forty by deuteron bombardment of uranium two thirty eight in a cyclotron at Unity of California, Berkeley, Okay, and the ultimately plutonium plutonium proved to be a game changer. The Nagasaki bomb was a was a plutonium bomb, okay. But even like, aside from that, just uh at separating uh plutonium from a chain you're acting uranium pile and

then using that as an atomic explosive. Just the fact that possibility had been recognized, that meant that you know, from you know, basically from inception of the Manhattan Project was like on the path like developing an atomic bomb, like in concrete terms, which is pretty remarkable. I mean in all kinds of ways, I mean, like good and bad.

But the the uh, yeah, I was gonna say, Oh, the UH summer of nineteen forty one in Germany, the UH, the Army of Research Department had formally contracted Norwegian Hydro for a supply of fifteen hundred kilograms of heavy water between October and the end of the year or but from October nineteen end of the year only three to sixty one kilgrams have been delivered. It was slow going.

In other words, like if if this was in a like even if even the process which was outlined at the second Berlin Conference, which essentially amount of, do you know, the creation of a reactor and subsequently you know, the utilization of that reactor and the heavy water cooling to uh, you know, to cultivate uranium two thirty five, Like even if that, even if that was the objective and it was on track. Arguably in terms of you know, both intent and capability. This seems far too slow a process

to make any kind of difference on the battlefeel. We'll get into exactly what I mean in a minute. But what's important is that once, once, this, once this heavy water cultivation got underway, Heisenberg attested. He said it was from September forty one. He's like, we saw an open a road ahead of us leading to an atomic bomb. Okay, It's like, this is when I became convinced it was at least possible. And that's when, uh, you know, just kind of a what was what was gleaned from you know,

just these processes that were actively underway. Things came into focus and a kind of conceptual capacity. Ethemics like, I'm not a scientist, so I take these guys words for it in their testimony when they suggest that this is this is a you know, a real process. Whatever the endeavor is, Neil's borr uh, and this is important. The end of October ninety forty one, heis Montreil the Denmark to seek out Neils Borr, who was one of the pre eminent physics minds on this planet, and heisen he

was something of a mentor tot Heisenberg. Heisenberg asked him in at Boor's home, he said, you know, and I was Heisenberg wasn't being loose lipped and telling him like what he was working on. He asked for just you know, basically like, you know, what, what do you think of the like is there a moral obligation and not cultivate, you know, a weapon from atomic energy? Like basically, like, what's the moral implications of working on an atomic bomb

in wartime if such a thing were possible? You know? Orr said that you know it, you know, well, you know the responsibility once fatherland versus you know, his duty to you know, the scientific community as well as you know, like human progress, all these things only need to be weighed.

Borr afterwards came away believing that this was like Heisenberg's kind of like it was either Heisenberg sort of like thinly veiled confession, or it was him trying to convey to him and sort of like a culted language that he was building an atomic bomb quite literally, and he he see He later said Bored that he was deeply shocked this. I believe Borr basically told all of his intimates within kind of the small fraternity of European physicists that you know, Heisenberg came to see me, and the

Reich is building a bomb, okay. And I think that's when the kind of myth of the German atomic bomb program really kind of took off in earnest, not in a propaganic capacity. I think people actually believe this, and

I think Bora actually believed this too. But even if that were true, and I'm gonna wrap up here in a moment, but as fall became winter in nineteen forty one, the Wehrmacht was stopped dead its tracks at the gates of Moscow, you know, and as we talked about many times in our series, you know, the right the Soviet Union had to fall in December, you know, the the entire German state, it's national economics, everything about it was configured towards quote short wars with long respites, you know.

Like That's why I always emphasized that the Third Reich was not some like mirror the Soviet Union. It was not mobilized for war from the top down. It did not even have a wartime mobilization scheme on play you know until Lany forty three. You know, this was uh the fact that, uh, the assault on Moscow failed. I mean, this was a disaster, like ultimately this cost the war.

But immediately, uh, in December forty one, Hitler issued the edicts that the need to the German national economy or to give way to the necessities the arment's economy, and that meant that, you know, uh, Fritz Toad on December third, and for those who don't know, Fritz Toad was the Albert Spear succeeded Fritz Toad as Armaments and Munitions Minister

after Toad was killed. Toads informed Hitler that the economy was literally at the breaking point, and from then on, any expansion in one sector to meet military necessities had to be balanced by you know, reduction in another. You know, Hitler drafted a decree essentially with like Toast's uh input as to a you know what what this would entail, you know, and essentially like shedding all like non essential projects from like any firms or institutions like engaged in

applied research of a non military nature. Like essentially like

that was over. You know, it's uh. Professor Schumann, one of the Genda conference attendees, he drafted an open letter to all institutes working in the arene In project and he said, he said to no one certain terms that the quote, the work and the project undertaken by the research group is making demands which can be justified in the current recruiting and raw materials crisis only if there's a certainty of getting some benefit from it in the

near few. Sure, you know, and that uh and that uh and that that was that man, it's we can there's more to the story of the virus house. As the war went on, and particularly as you know the tide truly turned, I mean and seek was no longer a possibility after December forty one, but after Stalingrad, you know, it can there's obviously like an opening a new questions like why did the Iranian project continue? But that oh

do uh? That oh do I that old kind of the nature of of modern modern bureaucracy, particularly in a state of total war, you know, like these things that are earmarked for funding of a way even an emergency was kind of continuing to go on, you know, were there were there's some people too, like within Dutch just the research group, but within the military establishment, who had who did understand the implications of this uranium research and did think that there was potential for a real viable

device to be cultivated from it, you know, in a way that could like help Germany. Yeah, I think there were. David Ermi certainly seemed to think there were. We get into some of that next episode, and I promise, I I'll wrap it up. But there's just a lot here, man, you know, and like, uh, I think, uh, I think the entire story needs to be told. But yeah, that's a I'm getting uncomfortable with form, like sitting for this hour rightly, and I don't want to bore people at death.

But yeah, well we'll take this up in for a part four and I'll I'll wrap it up then, I promise.

on bird app or x app or whatever. The whole of my podcast and some of my like longer form stuff is on substack. That's the prime primary place to hit me up. And it's a real Thomas seven seven seven dot substick dot com. You can find my website which is still under construction, but there's stuff there. It's uh, just Thomas seven seven seven dot com number seven H one E S seven seven seven dot com. My YouTube channel is Thomas TV. I'm leaving for Utah on a

few days. Issue dedicated content for it, which I'm excited about. As time goes on, we're gonna do more with that. But I got a lot going on right now. I'll be dropping more long form like books like in the spring. You know, Season two of the pod is coming up in September. Yeah, all kinds of stuff.