Episode 1290: How the Soviet Union Started World War 2 - Part 2 - w/ Thomas777

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amount of material that I do. I can do what I'm doing with doctor Johnson on two hundred Years Together and everything else, the things that Thomas and I are doing together on kindinal philosophy, it's all because of you. And yeah, I mean, I'll never be able to thank you enough. So thank you. The pekan Yonashow dot com. Everything's there. I want to welcome everyone back to the Peaking Yona's show. This is going to be part two of Thomas talking about Victor Suveroff and Huckin Hoffman's work.

So Thomas, I hand it over to you.

against Poland and Finland. Obviously, Stalin's plan and this was confirmed by Khrushchev, was, you know, in the immediate aftermath of the assault and the Japanese at Chalkin Goal, which in the opinion of Hoffman and I agree with this, that's what started World War two and suvar ofw of

without saying it abides that perspective. The Molotov Ribbentrop packed which Stalin confided to the Pullet Burrow as well as the Kruz chief, was that that would embolden the Hitler to sue for war with Poland, which he wouldn't have done had there been the risk of a two front war, yet Germany's position was precarious, overextended. Stalin didn't think that, you know, Germany could truly stand up to the UK

and France. He grossly underestimated the Wehrmacht's offensive power. But even in the event of a German victory, his reasoning was that, you know, the French army would have its back broken, Germany would be on this footing a permanent hostility caught for the United Kingdom and Europe would be the Communists for the taking. You know that this was, in Stalin's words, to cruise chieft. Hitler was now wrapped

around our little finger. And one of the reasons for this confidence or over confidence, you know, and I think I mentioned before as of Barbarossa, Stalin had increased expanded the territory of the Soviet Union by four hundred and

twenty six thousand square kilometers. Does a quill went to the service area of the German right because it stood in nineteen nineteen and especially a petular significance the aggressive war of the Soviets waged against Poland and Finland and what amounted to the extortionate annexation of the Baltics, you know,

with waiting Estonia pressuring Romania into further territorial concessions. You know, the Soviet Union really on September third, nineteen thirty nine, it was in the strongest position out of all major powers, and the Soviet Union became a combatant, you know, on September seventeenth, when the Soviets also assaulted Poland, and of course there was a deafening silence eminent from emanating from London in the way of that deployment, which is telling

in and of itself. But you know, this myth that Stalin was somehow afraid of Hitler's posterous for the reasons just enumerated, and it's essential to understand, I mean demonster of this is the posture of the Soviet Union diplomatically and militarily towards the German Reich. And secondly the pattern of military deployment. And I'll get into that in a moment, But in terms of the former November twelfth and thirteenth, nineteen forty, you know, the view from Moscow was that

the war was going very badly for Germany. Italy was not performing well in the relevant battle theaters, which was compromising Germany's position in the Mediterranean, which Hitler had counted on as a hedge, you know, against the British Empire. There was no indication of a resolution of the war with the United Kingdom. You know, Jeremy's fear of influence was totally static. You know, Operations Sea Lion was a strategic ruse and even were it not, it would have

been a bloodbath. You know. So November twelfth and thirteenth, Stalin directed Molotov in Berlin to transmit to Hitler through ribentraup a demand for the expansion of the Soviets fear of influence. Basically, Stalin said that he demanded freedom to deploy in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Greece, as well as Finland. And he also said that, you know, the Soviet Union had a right to deploy on the Swedish frontier.

This is incredibly belligerent. Essentially all of southeastern Europe plus Finland and a piece of Scandinavia proper. Stalin just declared that this is now my sphere of influence. And if you meet this challenge with the hostile deployment, its war. I mean that sound like a man who's afraid of Eadolf Hitler and the German Reich. You know, in Stalin's mind, there was absolutely no possibility of the Wehrmacht assaulting the Soviet Union, even in terms of parody, let alone from

a position of strategic superiority. Which is somewhat fascinating because this idea that oh, the Germans underestimated the Soviet Union, they didn't at all, and stowfully gets into that Holder's report on the eve of Barbarossa. And Holder had actually written he'd written an assessment in nineteen thirty seven of Soviet forces and being and capabilities. It was remarkably accurate, and von Mannstein and good Darien their assessments quite literally

in the month before Barbarossa. The Soviet forces and being were exactly what they estimated them to be. In reality, it was Stalin who was looking west and saying that, you know, Germany has no meaningful offensive capability and the mighty Soviet Union has nothing to fear, and this is the key to why the Soviets took such horrific attrition during barbaross Further relevant to context here, I can't remember

if I got into this or not. There was a discrete mobilization phase throughout the Soviet Union between November nineteen forty, when this demand that I just enumerated was issued to Ribbon traup to deliver to Hitler by way of Molotov on order of Stalin. Between November ninety forty and the day of Barbarosa, a massive and unprecedented arms build up

took place in the Soviet Union. This included, as of the onset of hostilities, the rhetoric of possess no less than twenty four thousand tanks, including close to two thousand T thirty fours, which were technically a medium tank, but they were the all around best tank of the Second World War. I don't think that's arguable. You know, the air forces of the Red Army had over twenty three thousand aircraft, or thirty seven hundred of which were considered

to be cutting edge fighters. The Red Army had close to one hundred and fifty thousand artillery pieces. The Red Navy, including a substantial fleet of surface ships of varying types. They had close to three hundred submarines, and submarines are expressly offensive. There are no defensive submarines, and this man as Hoffman raises in his book, the Soviets not only a larger fleet of submarines than any other country in the world, but they outnumbered the Royal Navy more than

fourfold in terms of their number of subs. I mean, this is the most powerful offensive military element the world has ever seen, you know. So Stalin was essentially fearless and viewed himself as the imminent master of this planet in geostrategic terms, as of barbaros as well as an ideological ones. And we're going to get into that too. Something essential to understand about the Soviet culture. Stalin was

keenly aware of what had befallen the Jacobin Revolution. He was also keenly aware of the changing dynamics of of ideological cultures within great powers. You know. He realized that, for example, Japan was on the ascendency. He realized that the German Raich had intense energies that it was drawing from, even though he viewed them as geostrategically weak and compromised.

He understood that the United Kingdom was undergoing a terrible existential crisis and that their empire is structured was essentially obsolescent. And this is one of the reasons why there's been a series of revolts you know, nascent as well as well developed and realized, you know, in the years before the Great War and then in the Inner War years up to the then president, you know, and socialism in one country that that was something of that was something

of a propaganda cliche. Donan invoked the sort of give a branding to you know, the kind of punctuated disturbances of this mass and megacital restructuring of Russian society and the Soviet state which was becoming a superpower, as well as to you know, assuage the Western Powers which were very much doing his bidding at that moment. Stalin was very much engaged with the Common tern that had not changed and in the planning for what was to be

the assault on Europe. In the aftermath of the Icebreaker conflict, Stalin he called back the Russian delegation to the Common Turn and he called the common Terns representatives to Moscow to advise them of what was imminently going to happen.

You know, the Soviet Union needed to realize the World Revolution, to survive as well as to consolidate its superpower status, which was not just burgaining, but was being actively realized also, And I realized I've probably got a bias for testimonial evidence, especially they're not exclusively in discerning the motives of men

in command roles. But there's not there's not. The direct testimony is more reliable than circumstantial evidence unless it contradicts the manifest weight of extrinsic material facts outside the parameters those declarations and what Stalin said his biographer, Colonel General Bokaganov, he word for word by Lakov reproduced the speech that Stalin issued fourth on May fifth, nineteen forty one, and according to Bolkoganov, the Leader made it quote. The Leader

made it unmistakably clear. War is inevitable in the future. We must be ready for the unconditional destruction of German fascism. The world be fought on enemy terror ratory, and victory will be achieved with a few casualties. And as we got into last week, and as I think we've raised before in discussion of World War Two, it was a matter of formal doctrine that the Red Army was an offensive purposed element. Its primary mission orientation was as the

standard bearer of the revolution. And it never struck a defensive posture as a matter of doctrine by choice, you know, And I've made the point before. I believe Stalin is probably the single most powerful man who ever lived. And the momentum that the Communist International had at this moment was ed Zenith. I'd argue Stalin had to abide that role or he would have been replaced by a man

who would have you know. It was a convergence of ideological imperatives and geostrategic realities in a way that is very rare but was sort of inextricably and splendidly bound up at this juncture. And I think we talked before about the secret real I'm jumping around a bit, but

I'm trying to corral the evidence in categorical capacities. The secret meeting with the polic Bureau, and this is when the Common Turn delegation was also present in August nineteenth, nineteen thirty nine, you know, in the concominant with the assault on the Japanese Imperial Army at calcm Goal. This meeting that Stalin called the polit Burow and the Russian section of the Common Tern. Stalin declared that the time had come to quote apply the torch of war to

the European powder keg. This is when Stalin declared, if we accept the German proposal for the non aggression picked, you know, Hitler will naturally attack Poland the intervention of

France and England will be inevitable. The resulting, in Shalin's words, serious and arrest and disorder would lead to a punctuated destabilization of Western Europe, yet without the Soviet Union being drawn into the conflict until they permissively opted do and Stalin referred to what he declared in nineteen twenty five

with respect to the international strategy. You know, the moment is nigh that we we can pursue the bultimization of Europe by way of an advantageous entry into the war through a broad spectrum field of activity which had now the potential of which had now opened up for their

realization of the world Revolution. And of course, when minutes from this meeting and the speech were smuggled out and were obtained by the French news agency Havas by way of Geneva, you know, and it went, it was, it was published, and then the Moscow immediately when in damage control and stalin apologists and propagandas, particularly in London but also in the United States. You know, they they started immediately claiming that this is fascist propaganda and this, this

isn't this isn't true, you know. So, I mean this is important also like when you read books by guys Chris Bellamy comes to mind. But they're legion these historians who claim, oh Stuvarov is a liar, there's no evidence for these things. They're redacting a huge amount of evidence, or they're just not including it and would question they say, oh, that that's just propaganda. They're just not addressing it. And

that's incredible, you know. I mean, it'd be like, like imagine somewhat more approximately, like let's say I was writing a history of of the American War in Iraq from two thousand and three eleven, and it'd be like if I was categorically redacting things that President Bush and Rumsfeld said in conversations they had and just declaring that, well, it's not important, or that that's just something liberals say or allege. I mean, people would laugh at me or

they'd say that's ridiculous. But in the case of you know, Barbarossa and you know, the icebreaker hypothesis. That's exactly what they do, you know, and you're just supposed to accept it. This is this is very abnormal, even accounting for the fact that research standards and things are often compromised for ideological and political reasons. But this seems tangential, but it's

essential to understanding Suvarov's and Hoffmann's points. We've got to ask why Barbara was soutanctically successful for the Rmont and what that means, because this is sort of the key in my opinion. The Soviets were planning an assault on Romania in the autumn of nineteen forty one, and if you know how to interpret military deployments, this should be clear. But also if you're going to assault Germany from then extant frontiers, you're gonna do so from the Baltic and

you're gonna do so through Romania. And of course Germany was totally dependent on Romanian petroleum. That's one of the reasons Hitler cultivated the French shup events in so closely Antonescu held the Knight's Cross. There was very good offices between him and Germany. Anyway, for cultural reasons, for ideological

reasons and other things. But he and Hitler, despite the linguistic barrier, they were very close friends too, and Antonescu was Hitler's strongest allah, I believe, you know, and a close to a quarter million Romanians fought, you know, for the Axis cause in the east, which for a country the size of Romania, that's remarkable. But army groups South deployed from Romania, and this, if this was a very delicate issue because Soviet intelligence, which was actually very good,

this the deployment to Romania. The way Hitler, the ruse Hitler was able to pull off was that the unstable situation in yugoslav was what was drawing German forces at scale to be deployed there. But also obviously, through Ledgered Maine and other things, OKW was effectively able to hide the scale at which forces were being a mass there. But you know, not only was it a staging ground for Barbarosa, but Hitler was react with anxiety that the Soviets were in with salt Romania because they were so

these forces down there at a dual role. They were purposed for an offensive mission, but they were also there to as a bulwark against a army assault, you know, at least so that they, you know, that there'd be enough time to reinforce and and not just you know, endure a collapse of a critical front, which on top of the geostrategic menace that also of deprived Germany really of it, it's only source of petroleum and represent quantities

to feel the war machine. But what this led to was there was massive Soviet deployments in the Baltic and in Ukraine through the Romanian frontier. So when the Wehrmacht assaulted, the road to Moscow was basically undefended. Okay, that's one of the reasons why Holder and Manstein they were beside themselves because they were telling Hitler, we need to move

on Moscow now. We can't wait, you know, we can't wait for the weather to turn, and we can't wait for the Soviets to reconstitute and affect a deployment in depth on the path to Moscow, you know. And as the deployment schema in Ukraine, the Army Group South was exponentially outnumbered, but the Red Army elements there they were

deployed in an offensive pattern. And if you know anything about the way the Soviet Union fought and the way the Armforce of the Russian Federation fights, and they very much scaled down way to they obviously and with very different localized combined arms platforms. Deep battle is it's it's it's dependent upon a fixed deployment schema for it to work, okay, And the way the Red Army deployed offensively, and this is what they did when the tide turned and after Kursk,

this is how they assaulted Berlin. The offensive deployment schema is by heavy use of shock armies, a Soviet shock army. They were larded with firepower and totally front loaded. Okay. So when Army Group South engaged the Red Army through the ky Of Corridor, they were engaging this forward element that was loaded down with firepower that was supposed to break through the mainline of resistance, but that had a

limited operational capacity, often of only a few days. Then they were to be rapidly reinforced by fresh elements who would continually assault in waves, and then when that shock element was was re equipped and refitted, they would smash

through again. But obviously, if the Wehrmacht assaults with mass armored columns, when you're deployed offensively, with your floaded shock army as the sharp punk They're gonna smash that shock army, and then they're gonna cut through your reinforcement elements like butter, you know. And as they break through wave after wave, that frontloaded element is gonna be fighting on reversed fronts and they're gonna get cut to pieces, which is exactly

what happened. Okay, So the Soviet for taking catastrophic casualties in the North and in the South. Meanwhile, Army Group Center was racing to Moscow quite literally, and Hitler didn't know quite what to make of this because there were sort of two Hitlers, and slowly makes this point. When Hitler felt confident politically and when he had had a what he believed was a firm conceptual grasp of the

battle space, Hitler was hyper aggressive. When fog of war questions or political uncertainty clouded that perspective, Hitler developed a siege mentality, and that's exactly what happened. And Hitler viewed

Stalin as incredibly dangerous as he should have. So Hitler essentially halted Army Group Center well Army Group South surrounded this massive element plus the reserves that the Kremlin had ordered like rushed to the front immediately, and Hitler was afraid to push the attack for a decisive victory at Moscow until this element was neutralized. And it was neutralized. The ont of casualties the Soviets endured is utterly catastrophic

and unprecedented. And the Germans took something like three three quarters of a million prisoners alone. Okay, but by the time, by the time the fear order the attack to be pushed on Moscow was too late. Okay, that's what happened. People misunderstand that. It says, you know, oh, the Germans were plotting to attack all along because the Soviets were weak in some ways. But then Stalin got it together, and you know, because the Germans underestimated Soviet capabilities. You know,

Hitler lost the war. That's not true at all. That doesn't make any sense. And you know, if Stalin was like, look at it like this. Okay, the Germans were halted at Moscow, but they reached the Gate of Moscow, they reached Leningrad and laid it to siege. They reached Stalingrad. The German the very mug reached all of its objectives in months. How long did it take the Red Army to march on Berlin. It took them almost four years.

So why was there this plotting, grinding blood bath if the Soviets were this grossly underestimated force, you know, and the Germans didn't know what they were doing like this, the Germans killed the Red Army, you know, Obviously the Russians still had enough to hold Moscow and they did and that was incredibly valiant. And Russians are incredibly tough, and there's a simplicity to the way the Ivans fight,

but it's a simplicity that works, you know. I think it's as guided when people suggest otherwise, and especially today because people are you know, they've adopted prejudices and stuff in this regard. There's really really stupid things that come out of the Pentagon in terms of their assessment of Russian capabilities and things. And incidentally, Eric von Mannstein's the book it's called Lost Victories. It's for I think it's fascinating, but it's kind of for military hounds only. It's you know,

not like late Sunday reading. But what that book was the US War Department, back when there was a war department. There's not anymore, no matter what like special needs, Higgs Seth says. But in the last months of the Department of War, they debriefed Manstein on basically on you know, his experience over four years of fighting the Soviet Union and a general officers role, and the War Department soon to be the Defense Department, they took this very seriously.

An early NATO force structure wasn't a substantial on the infantry side, ground on the imagery and armor side. It was substantially based around what von Manstein had. It's said, Okay, so this book was sometime in the fifties, the first edition, it was edited to make them more readable, and it's it's literally Managelin is debriefing with some added stuff, you know.

So and that that was one of his core premises is that fighting the Russians on Russian territory, they're they're they're they're unbelievably and savagely tough, you know, and that that's a force multiplier and also makes up for some of their shortcomings. And the Russians also they they know what they know the limits of their capabilities, you know.

And on the one hand, and super ofw of his book inside the Red Army, which is very much worth reading too, especially if you got an interest in the late Cold War stuff, because it's very much a breakdown of you know, the the brisn of era the Soviet Army. You know. He makes the point and Harold Coyle made this point too, that doctrine in the Soviet Army was

almost like regulation. There was there were no mission oriented tactics and the whole ethos of the Soviet Army's general staff was to eliminate uncertainty wherever and whatever however possible, so they didn't tolerate deviation from the battle plan as emerged from you know, superior orders. But nevertheless, the Russian, the Soviets and the Russians do very well with what they're good at, you know, and deep battle is what

they were good at. Heavy reliance on combined arms and a shock element capacity went on the offensive that tended towards the kind of inflexibility which I think they later remedied somewhat during the Cold War. But the ability to rapidly shift from an offensive posture to defending the Hrmont was very very good at that, and the British are pretty good at that too. The Soviets were catastrophically bad

at it and the French were bad at it. But part of it too, though, is that Stalin had every reason to believe that the Vermont wasn't capable of what it was capable of as of June nineteen four. Won I mean, that was a blind spot. But at the same time, you know, the Germans tend to surprise people

on uh matters of military affairs. But that's key because it's not it's not as internet guys and an armchair goofballs who claimed, well, Subra was an idiot who's a liar like looking out bad the Soviets got mald That's the whole, the whole point, Like that makes his point not the opposite. So that's that's key. You know, I I'm not I'm not just dwelling on Minutia to play cake the the you know, the the military hounds among

us or something. But you know it's also you know, it was you know the point too that I think a lot of lay people don't understand these days. You know,

modern war resolves rapidly. You know, you don't know, you don't plan for quagmires because then you're planning to lose a war, so you know, within ideally in about ten weeks in the outer temporal limits six months, you know, Moscow had to fall to the Hrmoncht and Stalin was over confident, absolutely, But it stands the reason his kind of poor view of the Wehrmacht, not in terms of its quality of men or firepower, but the geo strategic

situation and what he viewed as it's over extended commitments and things. You know, he reasoned that, you know, even in the very unlikely event of an assault, you know, we can hold him at bay long enough to reinforce and by then, you know, victory conditions will no longer be realizable. You know, this all kind of falls into place is the totality of circumstances. You've got to look

at the sudeological culture. You gotta take Stalin's own statements, you gotta look at the statements of his underlings, including Khrushchev. You've got to look at the pattern of deployment. You've got to taken if you know what to look for. But even I mean it's even more persuasive, or are more obvious or other, But you know, taking in totality, i mean, it's clear that super off was telling the truth, you know, but all of a Suddan, Well, it's not

it's not clear what what the alternative was. I mean it this unprecedented million he build up coupled with the transformative, globally transformative aspects of the Bolshek Revolution, the heart and lungs of which proverbially were in the Soviet Union. I mean, what's the alternative Stalin was he ordered this build up for purely defensive purposes, to which would inevitably at some point provoke the West into attacking him. I mean, that

doesn't that that doesn't make any sense. And generally, when you're talking about conditions of approximate parody with conventional combined arms at scale, or when you're talking about near peer strategic planning, you don't wait to be attacked. You always push the assault, you know. Then that's I mean, this, this this is very basic stuff.

But he wrote a book on Stalin called Stalin the Enduring Legacy, and people who haven't read the book, they they they panted at some sort of oh he's some Eurasianist. That's like, that's not what he's saying at all. He's saying Stalin's legacy was complicated. He basically abides the same viewpoint that Paul Godfrey does, although for some of different reasons about a substantial aspect of the Cold War deriving from the Stalin versus Trotsky paradigm. You know, but that

doesn't mean that Stalin was somehow not an internationalist. And even you know, the Soviet Union can name dozens of ethnicities. You know, a huge Moslim population, you know, a huge Asiatic population, you know, a huge number of Near Eastern people. You know, it spanned one fifth or one six of this planets, like the Soviet Union was the ultimate international superpower, you know, and the only way the Soviet Union survives.

And one of the reasons why the later Cold War was so dangerous as human you know, for technological reasons in historical ones and the sidelining of human decision makers and misconditions of strategic nucleator parodying things. But the reason

why I drop off who was a fascinating guy. And I mean, like I've said, I believe I'm not a sovietologist and I'm not a Russia expert at all, but I do know something and it's clear to me that post Khrush Jeff, there was a shadow trifecta of and drop of Ustanov and Gramigo with a real Soviet executive.

Breshnev was a frontman, which made sense because before he became kind of elderly and compromised people liked Brezhnev, and he resonated with with the people even today, like he's fondly remembered, you know, like uh as as as you know, uh, it's like a man who was like a like a

great steward of other Russian people and the nationalities. But you know, and drop of I mean Brensnev was very much a Stalinist, you know, and as was in drop of but a drop of seminal speech right in eighty two, right after he became a general secretary, you know, he this is when uh project Rion, which a lot of people attribute as contributing substantially to the war Scare of

eighty three in the Able Archer era. I think people still misunderstand that aspect of it, but because it may the reason why the subject of the speech to the Presidium he said, we're going to lose the Cold War if we don't take drastic measures to countermeasures against Rima, you know, the revolution military affairs. I think it's being specifically of computing power and command and control aspects, which was true. There's there's something, there's something insane. There's only

like five thousand computers in the entire Soviet Union. In nine eighty two. It was something that it was some insanely primitive state of affairs or regards high tech, you know, And you know, it's whole point was basically the risk of war based on the strategic paradigm as it's evolving, is well as these command and control aspects and the sideline of human decision makers, that the risk of war is probably greater than it's ever been since you know,

the forties. But also we're going to lose that war if we don't find a way to develop meaningful countermeasures that you know, are our technologies of parody, or unless we find a way out of the Cold War, you know. And that was Gorbachev's whole notion, because Gorbachev wasn't a drop off protege. He wasn't some big liberal chevid Narsee I think was subverting things. But point being, you know, Gorbachev was very much the anti Yeltsin quite literally, and

Yelson was the neocon's guy. You know. Gorbachev's notion was, you know, to reform the command economy with certain qualifications, you know, and and and basically do ay with God's plan in favor of something else that could abide innovation in the high tech sector and to bring about peace with the United States. But surrendering to the United States or dismantling the Soviet Union that was not at all within the cards. And one of the reasons why Gorbachev

was had rapport with Bush and Baker. Bush and Baker assured him, we're not gonna try and dismantle the Soviet Union, and they weren't for a very specific reason. Bush said, where you know, until there's full nuclear disarmament, we're not even gonna talk about, you know, a post Soviet future, you know. And obviously the Neo con perspective and their shoehorning of Yelsen was, you know, break the Soviet Union

to pieces. Now. Their notion was, and one of the reasons for the why this crusading against Moscow is proceeding from Ukraine. Their notion was to break the Soviet Union into essentially three discrete like client regimes, you know, like the former Soviet Far East. And in those days especially too, because the Pentagon was still looking at China as essentially friendly and obviously like you know, seed some of that territory to the to pick king, but you know, base

they'll be like a Ukraine like commissariat. They'll be like, you know, the Moscow kind of central Commissariat, and then they'll be this like former like Russian Far East that can you know, just that's just kind of like, uh, this sort of like hyper exploited, you know, hinterland for the United States and and adjacent finance capital and stuff. And you know, butch and Baker realize like, no, we're not We're not gonna grind these people's faces into the concrete,

and we're not gonna destabilize the whole region. And you know, we're certainly not gonna do anything until there's full nuclear disarmament. You know that that was a tangential discussion. Should give me what. Baker was a great man, and I've got a lot of respect for him and push forty one. It was not a particularly likable guy, I leave it to Dad, but he had a very serious and sophisticated

view of geopolitics and political affairs. So that administration looks better and better in my opinion, And I mean I felt that way at the time. As a teenager, I realized this country. I realized something really, really really bad was underway. When when when when Clinton was elected I mean, it would have been one thing if it was like a twenty twenty steel but the body political was excited about this pig and that was insane, you know. And

it's not just because he was crushing our people. I mean, I knew guys who got indicted and with the prison under Clinton reno for when they hadn't done anything. You know, I'm not just speaking, I mean as a matter of law as well as a matter of fact or ethics

or whatever. But as it may the to bring it back a bit, you know, there there's a brief moment really from about ninety two to ninety six, and that's when that's when these these historians first mother David Irving, you know, he got access to the as B archives and there was all this incredible stuff that came to like that, you know, the old Soviet system had suppressed

and kept from probably eyes. But then, I mean very quickly things became even more opaque than in some ways than they had during the Soviet era because the regime will never tell the truth about what's going on with Russia, I mean, or with Europe. But this is an issue with peculiar sensitivity for reasons that I don't think need to be elaborately explicated. But I realized I talked more about Hoffmann as well as the nulange of barbaras that

I did specifically suber of. If you want to a part three, I'll remedy that and i'll speak specifically to subro OFV and I'll include some aspects of inside the Red Army. I've got a paperback of that, and I take it on the road with me.

military people, you know, I mean, I get it. It's not that it's not a fun life, like the defector actually sucks.

got right. He's like nothing, absolutely nothing. And I'm like, yeah, I see these defectors come out of like North Korea, and like immediately they get debriefed by the State Department, and then they get boob job and they're driving brand new cars and they're in freaking condos, and I'm like, yeah, I think I think defectors were a lot different back then than they are.

people man like it it pete Cold War, you know. Uh, life wasn't that different than the Soviet Union or America. It really wasn't.

Hunt for at October. It's just like an awesome book, and I reread it lately because I I'd forgotten how good it was. But you know, the uh, the Captain of the Red October, the whole deal. I mean it's in parts of character. I mean it's not it's a brilliant meditation on on late Cold War strategic nucles your platforms and the deep parodies they're in, but it's under my character study. Like the Soviet naval officer, you know, he's, uh, he's this guy from the He's this Lithuanian guy. He

doesn't really relate to the Russian culture. His wife, uh need an operation and uh the doctor who operated on or was drunk when he put in the surgery, so he boxed it and she died. But the doctor was the son of some polit baro big shots. They're like, you know, you can't stop demanding like vengeance against this man. So the so the this naval officeries just like what the hell am I doing? You know, like I and

also too in it. He's like deeply religious. He's like, so there's like this atheist, uh chauvinistic Russian government that killed my wife and I am I'm supposed to. I was supposed to kill fifty million people and event a wharl like on behalf of it. Like, no, I'm not doing that. I mean there there's a there's a deeper moral quag mari too, because the Red October it's a Typhoon class sub but it's got what's called a caterpillar drive, so it's invisible to SOSIS and passive sonar. So basically

it's a splendid first strike weapon. So he realizes, like the Soviet Union can alter the strategic balance and basically, uh, bring America to terms through the thread of through the threat at nuclear assault, and like, I mean, he've used that as morally fucked. Also, you know, like if we're gonna win, like let's win the Cold War clean, you know, not not do it basically by like holding America hostage with the nuclear trigger. I mean that's kind of moralistic.

But at the same time, I mean, I I don't know, man, like if it's no being uh being the captain of a of a Typhoon class sub that that there was a counter value like mega death machine, you know, it's it's its role is to assault counter value targets. And kill millions of people if you don't believe in the system you serve. That's a pretty horrible role to be in. You know, You've got to be a true believer to

do that job. It's not like any other job in the military, and it's not like any other role in any other era. You know, I commanding a commanding a first strike platform that that can that can kill millions of people, you know. So I obviously that's like a fictional example, but what Clancy was drawing upon was the real ethos a defectors in the Cold War. And on the other side you had guys like the Cambridge five. But I think we're pretty disturbed guys, but they were

true believers. That's totally different than these days. Like some I think snout In is a is a sincere guy. Whatever problems he might have, you know, he's basically yeah, I mean, he could never leave Russia now, Like it's not a happy life, you know. I I think, uh, you can argue, I mean snowed and I don't want to get into a deep meditation on the ethics of what snowed and did. But I my point is, like I whatever his motives, I don't think if we can

say he did that for clout. But you know, these people who come the other way, like some of these Chinese or North Koreans, they're they're just not going to get paid, it's obvious, but they think they're not being respected like they should be in, you know, whatever role they're in. You know, but the Cold War was a Cold War is a different world, I mean literally, you know.

trying to make progress. I gotta make substantial progress on this manuscript. By December, things have been very hectic, so in good ways, and then I injured myself like a fucking idiot. But it's uh, the mind Phaser Pod. Uh, It's gonna be another couple of weeks before a fresh episode drops, so forgive me for this, but Jay Burden and I will continue to drop fresh stuff on his platforms and on radio for Chicago, So just bear with me.

I promise we'll be back to regular uploads when I get back from the road.