Discussing Sorel's 'Reflections on Violence' with Thomas777 - Complete

I think that this can go in a lot of different directions.

He was like, oh I knew about Cerrell before. But in the stuff in the National Alliance would put out and then Situde for Historical Review, that stuff is pretty weighty man, you know, like William Pierce whatever, whatever anybody thinks of him or things of that whole scene. You know, he was, he was in He was a serious intellectual. You know, he read tons of stuff, some some of

which I I didn't really connect with. You know, he was a big will William Gelly Simpson guy, and he was a big kind of you know, you spent a lot of time with you know a lot of this kind of like social Darwinist stuff that I don't put

a lot of stock in. But uh, he'd reference George Sorell okay like on some of his adv broadcast us and more than a passing capacity, and the I HR and guys like Hke Thompson and Teth Stimley and and and the like like, they they'd raised Currel all the time and they considered him to be like a serious thinker. And one of the reasons why is because part of their whole part of their whole mandate is the IHR. I mean, they're just still putting out great content that's

very very relevant. They made the transition to to the information age very seamlessly. But during the Cold War, you know, during the early Reagan era was kind of when when

they launched and became really active. So obviously, like they were constantly kind of defending the revisionist perspective against allegations like, oh, well, you know, the Second World War among the things that you know, it was a fight against these like socialist uh conceits and and and the brutalities that derived there in and you know, the Third Reich it was just another socialist government and we all socialism as godless thing that you know, it doesn't have any likes to stand on.

And why would anybody on the right, you know, paid any mind? And Sorell the the answer to that is because of the thinkers like Sorell. And even if you've gott no interest in kind of the different iterations of socialism and the revolutionary imperatives that you know kind of became the the the animating mythologies of these of these inner were of the of these early twentieth century and

then later interwar ideologies. If you even you don't put a lot of stock in that, you get if you want to understand, if you want to understand European politics after nine, after seventeen eighty nine, you've got to be in dialogue with socialism and you've got to understand, you know, what, how, how how the right, how the revolutionary right was dealing with those realities, you know, and Sorell was kind of

first among those thinkers. And if I basically accept Ernest Nolty's paradigm that uh the uh that that that that Italian fascism and things that the Flange Party in Spain, they were reacting. They were reaction against, you know, kind of the monarchist right and like the reactionary right as much as they were a reaction against Marxist Leninism, and then national socialism was u was a reaction to that. And in dialectical terms, like you know, some premises that

were hostile and some that were not. But that's why I understand George Sorel. And in America and people think of the right, you know, they think of uh, they think of uh that they think of Jeffersonians who you know, like like John C. Calhoun or they think of like America first guys in the twenty overth century, you know, and like that the Taft Republicans who were you know, who are anti New Deal and anti interventionists, and both of those guys, I mean, even the latter obviously they

were kind of traditional Hamiltonian nationalists. But you know, their whole idea is you know, like get the government off your back, you know, uh, you know, and uh and and and decentralized authority and you know, the kind of ha on the on their own terms to the kind of class identities that most kind of European paradigms suggest are are what informs political reality. But Sorell wasn't a class warrior.

And like we'll get into that, you know, like his Sorel's his his kind of he was, you know, like Nietzsche did before he viewed. Crell viewed culture is like peaking early, you know, like the pre Soprietic area era, you know, like the pre Peloponnesian War era of Dori Gathens. That's what Sorel, That's what thought was like the zenith of like human culture and political organization Like it wasn't some guy he was saying like, oh, we just got

to give. And he wasn't even he wasn't even like he wasn't even like the the Stefan George circle or like Earns the Younger. He wasn't even saying like, oh, we just we just got to inundate you know, the working class with some kind of like patriotic or like

racial life identity. He wasn't saying that at all. He was saying that, you know, there's a way, there's a way to insinuate into revolutionary consciousness among the workers, like something that's like culturally elevated, you know, and that that will change things, and you know, educate people in a way that you know is progressive, if not progressive with a capital key, but you know is progressive in terms of you know, allowing them to can septualize themselves and

conceptualize you know, political action, and in ways outside of this like narrow like paradigm of like you know, hostility to capital and you know, control of one's labor and you know, like material justice in terms of you know, getting paid for one's labor. Like if you that's kind of banal you know, not like that's not important. Obviously it's important, but they can't be the end all purpose of your political activity, and it certainly doesn't rationalize you know,

like like murdering your own countryman wholesale. I mean, if that's what it comes down to, because that's you know what the proverbial gods ordain. Okay, I mean you've got to deal with that in a manly and serious way and a stoic way. But that's not something you phind for just because uh, you know, it's it's like, well, you know, God is dead, so we were just gonna find some kind of catalysts, you know, for violence that they can be rationalized in the language of the day.

Like it wasn't saying that at all. But yeah, so.

we're just taking that term for ourselves. And I think what they would say is the difference between the left and the right is egalitarianism. The left is egalitarian. So was the socialist right egalitarian not in.

they all kind of strange things out of it. But Marx, I've got nothing nice to say about Marx and Lenin.

When Marx was talking about quote equality, he was talking about a kind of equal dignity across the class divide and across you know, kind of the like the you know, and and and eliminating and eliminating these kinds of contrived distinctions between people based on rank, you know, and uh you know this and and and and from there, you know, like affording that kind of elevated dignity to the workers, whom, you know, in his estimation, were were the we're the

ones responsible for generating the wealth of the nation. Okay, he wasn't saying like, oh, men, women are exactly the same, or like there's no differences in intelligence between men, Like that's a weird kind of cope that that that that like post ninety forty five cope that you know, people who wanted to kind of maintain people who were not

going to attack the capitalist system on structural terms. You know, that was kind of like what they'd invoke in order to say like no, actually, like we're we're more morally sound than than, you know, than than the Marxists and in in the Soviet Union and their satellite states. That's important to keep in mind. But the uh, the idea of socialism, you know, it didn't originate with Marx and

that was that was one of Spangler's important points. Like even if you don't accept Spangler's view of history and you think it's like, you know, just kind of needlessly esoteric and mystical, his uh, his essay, his essay Prussian Prussianism and Socialism, and then later well, let's a degree

is a book. I mean, it's yeah, it's like a longer I say that it's been turned, it's been beefed up with like secondary analyzes, but the hour of decision like basically the modern state as we know it in structural terms like owes to the Prussian state okay, everything from the military draft you know, to public education you know, to having like pensions for for retired people like that

that came from the Prussians. Okay, and I mean even that that's literally well in America too, like early education is kindergarten okay, like it's not an accident. Okay. I mean so that's some and this is something that you could be openly acknowledged, like it's not so much anymore. I mean some that's political something that's just because people are kind of ignorant. But you know, it's not like it's not like when Marx and Engels put their proverbial

ink to paper. It's not like they it's it's not like it's not like Europe was, you know, like this feudal society or some or something of Jeffers in Yalemen society like the Confederate States, and they were like, you know what, we need to like beef up a government that and you know, provide equity, you know, to people based on their labor and can like look after like

old folks. What they were doing was they were taking something that already existed in places like Prussia and to a lesser degree, you know, in places like France and the Habsburg Empire and saying like, okay, we've got to like improve upon this and make it into a progressive instrumentality to advance history. So this that's important your mind too.

Like if you're a European writing, you know, in the in the in the nineteen hundreds, like Sorell, like you were looking backwards at you know, your political heritage going back about three centuries. We're just looking at Mars and saying, oh, I see Marx's idea. I can improve upon that and make it acceptable to the right. So that's important to

keep in mind. And you know, kind of the kind of the first truly socialist institution is the modern military, Like it is okay, Like it's not the military's a lot of things. What it's not is it's not some robustly capitalist thing, Okay, I mean it's and the Prussians, arguably this was their strength and their weakness Prussia really is a wasteland. There's like nothing there, Okay. I mean you can like farm dirt and rocks and uh you've got you've got port access, but I mean other than that,

it's and you're surrounded by hostiles, okay. And I mean and obviously like Prussia was, Prussia was. The Germans weren't the original occupants of Prussia, Okay, there was, there was, There was There was a barbarian element there, like a truely like pagan barbarian element of indigenous Slavs that the ethnically cleansed, notcause the Germans are bad guys, I mean at the cleansing is it was just wasn't It's just the way it thinks, especially that part of the world.

But the kind of key institution of the Prussian state was the Prussian Army. That's what made it possible. It was literally like this garrison state, okay. And so from that that's what they extrapolated kind of like their model of what of what of what society should look like and how it should be organized. Like there's very much an odds like the Anglo American sensibility, but that's a

lot of things you can say that that's authoritarian. You can say that doesn't respect people's freedom or individual liberty. You can say that in some way it stunts like creativity, and maybe it does. I don't see it that way, but I also want to hold it out. It's like the zene of the human political development. But one thing it's not is it all like left wing or or liberal.

I mean, it's it's the opposite and extreme terms, you know, I mean because yeah, like a military type structure, a venture model, like, yeah, there's some kind of basic there there, there's there's some kind of basic cohesion and respect for like the various ranks. But it's it's singularly obsessed with rank, you know. It's it's the elm of hierarchy. It has no conceit that like, oh world equals here, you know at uh, it's very in fact that it very much

repudiates that. So that's another part of keep in mind and that that's basically what Sorel was getting in that, you know, it is uh like what he was calling for is you know, uh, a socialism that you know, makes meaningful cultural activity possible and that reflects you know, basic human nature in some way that's not totally at

odds and reality. But again too, he was like he looked at dance like as a means of because again like his model, he's not saying like, oh, the kaiser Reich is so great, or you know, Frederick, the seconds Prussia is so great. Like what he was saying was that, you know, things went wrong when uh, things went wrong when men like Socrates became powerful in ancient Athens. You know, like his his ideal was the the pre Socratic uh, you know pelopon Uses, So.

There's a couple of things going on in the Bimar years. You had UH, you had organizations like the Stalhelm you know, that were basically you know, kaiser wright veterans who wanted to turn things back to the way they were. But they and you know, and they they they were fighting the case. They were the guys who constituted the early

Free Corps. But then you had guys, you had guys like Ernest Rahm and Joseph Gerbels who basically saw the Communists as essentially correct in their methods that they were just you know, wrong in their in their ideological conceits. You know. Gurbels would go as far as he he'd organized street protests with the KPD, you know, to bring to bring down the UH, the unions that were like friendly to the Social Democrats, you know, and UH. And

this made a lot of people upset. And Gebels was the one kind of stress or infection national socialist dinner party man who survived the night at June h of June nineteen thirty four. You know. So that's something keep

in mind. I think what really like I think national socialism like ossified into what it truly was when when Hindenburg told the Hitler that Ernst Rahm and all of his fellows and Stress had to die, and then Hitler gave the order, and then Himmler and Seb Dietrich and the rest of them not just carried it out, but they also murdered guys like Kurt Schliker. I mean that that was that's kind of like what turn national socialism

into like a a pretty conventional right wing tendency. Honestly, like I uh, not not in the sense of you know, not not not not right wing in terms of like Donald Trump, or not even right wing in terms of like Robert Taft, but by European standards, the Third Right was more conventionally right wing than people will acknowledge. I mean they because there's there's moronic stuff like like Joan Goldberg saying like, oh, Fishers or a bunch of like

Hillary Clinton liberals or something like. But but there's serious people too who aren't prone to that kind of moronic stuff, who don't like really understand because they you know, they read these like dispatches from uh, from from Dietrich Eckert then and from Ernst ron like saying that yeah, God is dead. You know, like the hell with the capital

listen to Jews like burn everything down. You know, we're gonna we're gonna march on everything and we're gonna kill everybody, and we're gonna build those like new Society of the Birss like that. I mean, those don't get me wrong. Those guys are serious about that. That wasn't That wasn't just like so much talk. And a lot of them are frankly cyple bands. Well they they that that that that came to an end in June nineteen thirty four.

And if if you're if you're killing people because a man like Hindenburg is telling you that, like you know, these men are these met are red revolutionary rebel. We have to be stopped. Like you're a lot of things, but you're not left wing, okay when you're executing that order. So, I mean, that's my opinion. I know some people disagree with I. I've been studying the topic for a lot of years. I think I had some insight.

did the European culture make it a different interpretation? Even when you read Yaki, you know Yaki when he's talking about when he's talking about Europe, it's a different language than the language that we're used to reading in the books that you know, we're basically written by the victors.

zenith in the twentieth century. We were trying to repair the social fabriak in some ethical way that had been smashed after them after the Middle Ages. Okay. In the Middle Ages, there's this basic interdependence between everybody, you know, Uh, the lords were dependent upon the serfs. Both were dependent upon the king, and the intermediary between the two of them was the clergy. You know, these people couldn't survive

without each other. Like that cannot be overstated. You know this idea that if you were like a lord of the manor you know, you could just act like the character in that silly mad Max movie who's like, you know, for widering people to worship him from border or something like. That's not That's not the way things were. Like I'm not saying if you were a medieval serf, I'm not saying to have some great life, and I'm not saying you had some I'm not saying you had adequate remedies.

If if you had a cruel master, but he needed you. You know, he could not defend the land without you, He could not chill the land without you. He had nothing if if if you were not willing to work. But in contrast, like you had, you had no access to justice, and you had you had no nobody to navigate for you with with with royal authority, like if he did not exist. I mean, you had the church too, but that was that the church weren't men who worked.

They did very important things, but they they operate in a totally different world. I mean, so it's you didn't have a direct line to authority unless you know, you had to rapport with the lord of the manner. So that's fundamentally important. Would changed in the modern age and reach kind of its critical and in every sense you know, and it like in existential terms and consideral terms reached.

It's kind of critical state. In the twentieth century, you know, people were ripped off the land, they were thrown into factories that literally employed ten to thousands of people in these dangerous conditions where you were insinuated into some machine, you know, for hours and hours a day. I mean, if you died on the job, nobody really cared, or if they did, it's say, well it's so much. It's a mark in a Ledger book. You know, like you

don't have any rights. And it's not even even if somebody wanted to confer upon you some kind of voice or wanted to you know, kind of make you a lot like better, just like the velocity of production and the trajet three of things, like there was you didn't you didn't matter, you know, you were you became totally dehumanized, you know, and that's what the socialists were trying to do.

They're like we on the right and the left, they're like, you know, we we've got to repair this kind of social fabric and this iner dependence and there's basical basic ethical unity of classes and functions, you know, so that people aren't being treated like a commodity and so that like when they die in the job, you know, they're just not like shoveled away like so much garbage, like literally, you know, I mean, that's that's the way to keep

in mind. That's the thing to keep in mind. Like in America, there there wasn't some medieval order from which things originated, like even in the South, like people, I know, the Southerners themselves kind of looked at themselves as uh as uh as. It's kind of like lords and knights, which wasn't totally inaccurate, but it was more like but again, it was more like Athens than it was like uh then then it was like you know, a thirteenth century England, you know, like you had like the South is made

up of like kulak twype. You know, there were white surfs and there were black slaves, but they weren't the majority. The majority was not like rich plantation owners and like poor serfs and like slaves who work property. Like. The majority was like small freehold farmers who were doing their own thing. And that's that's supposedly the American ideal. Okay, like now it's like a small businessman. I'm not saying that the actually the way things are, but that's like

what's idealized. But you know, the in America, if you're on the right, your idea isn't like, well, you know, we gotta we gotta bring things back to you know, the throne and altar and like reverence for God and God's emissaries on earth, and you know, we got to create some kind of codependent between the classes that's not dysfunctional.

Like the ideal is like, you know, I need I need to be given the opportunity to like till the land and get what's mine, and you know, had the government stay off my bed, not take the fruit of my labor. I mean, the totally different sensibility, but one

is not superior to the other. I mean, obviously I'm more sympathetic to the American model because that's my heritage, and I you know, and then plus that's just like what's realistic, Like you can't, well there is that did GOPHI when I mean realized some of those polemical, but some of these idiots actually believe this. Like when when like when like regime loyal people are when these like mother Jones types claimed that like Donald Trump's this big

fascist or something. I mean that's like retarded from as a reason. But like some radical right wing guy like if George Wallas become president or he would want to become president, it would not look anything like Germany in nineteen thirty three. You're like Italy in nineteen twenty two, Like that's ridiculous. That's not the way we do things here.

Like that's like that's like saying that that says retarded as saying like, oh, if Donald Trump paid his way, you know he would he would he you know, he would be like the holy Roman Emperor. Like it doesn't it doesn't make any sense. But I you know, like I made the point before that the entire like civic religion of America is like is anti fascism, which which is particularly kind of asidine in this country. But yeah, well.

but it is. It has been authenticated. I mean it was it was Taylor's actual manuscript, but it wasn't published and available at public until after the war. But you know, people, there's not like there's not like you can extrap away from mine cop that's why it's idiotic. But people, oh, it's a boring book. It's like, well, yeah, it's it's it's it's an electioneer screed from the nineteen twenties, Like

why why would it be interesting today? But what is interesting like when he talks about when he when when Hiller talks about his his ideas on conflict between human populations, like that's that's instructive. And also, you know, I made the point of people before Hitler was he was just Catholic Habsburg, Austrian who uh basically identified his movements as the legacy of the Prussian state. And you know, the the December eleventh speech the Reichstag, which is really Hitler's

last public address of the Reichstag. You know, that's like when he issued the declaration of war against America, he talks about, uh, he talks about we like the royal we like in a reference to the Prussians and the Napoleonic Wars. Okay, so I mean he's saying like and then then that's notable because like, you know, Prussia was at odds with the rest of the German kingdoms. I mean that's a little bit off topic, but he has

it may like Adalf Hitler himself. If Adolf Hitler is like the standard bearer of like right wing socialism in Bymar, which I mean, I think I think we can say that he was, because he's the man who became king. Proverbially, his view was what I just said. It was that you know, the the proper like German, the proper German model of a national life is is Prussia, and and the Prussian model was based on was based on the army, and you know the the cynegepe baratus that that were

vote around that. So I mean, that's the way, that's what you can think of German socialism. Of course, to your point, guys like Strasser, guys like ram Uh Kurt von Schleich or I think was a lesser aristocrat who was basically cynical and he didn't really care, but he was obviously through his lot with with Strasser and ram because he wanted to destroy Hitler. But all these guys, at least what they were advocating in public was they were saying, like, you know, Hitler is a tool of

the bourgeoisie. He's not really a revolutionary, he's just a reactionary and he's a petty bougeois buffoon. So I mean, the no true Scotsman stuff about socialism, A lot of that was interesting rivalry between national socialists. It's not like the German street was. We're like nineteen seventies era, like you know Berkeley types, you know, talking about like who's a real socialist. It was a lot more. It was a lot less existential and like a lot more like

polemical and kind of cynical than that. I mean, that's my view, and I think I'm something. It's not an expert. I think I have some I think I have some expertise on the topic. At least.

ethos is, you know, the the racial community. So if you take that Prussian model, when you utilize it as kind of a way of of the rant and people and saying, Okay, you're not like a Mexican, you're not like a white man. You're not you're not black. You know, you're not you're not Asian, You're you're just you're just American. You just have the civic identity where you're not gonna speak your own language anymore. You know, you're not gonna

go to your own church anymore. You're not gonna you know, you're not gonna abide these habits anymore of your forebears, you know, like that's like that's what's really asitious about like the New Dealer or like American model. It's not it's not so much that it declares that like every man is gonna have some kind of like income in common, or that it's going to like reduce you know, like the proverbial disparity you know between the ownership cast and

what was then the working cast. Like what was insidious about is that it was tailed to essentially like strict people of any ability to live historically and any like meaningful you know, actual cultural identity. You know, it's gonna like alienate Mann from his heritage and from history in absolute terms. Like that's the big difference. And that's also

why I object a lot. There's something to it when people talk about quote cultural Marxism, if they're talking about Gramsey and Adorno like contra marx and angles, but they don't understand that like a lot of this, a lot of this doesn't have to do with Orthodox and Marxism or Frankward School stuff at all. A lot of it's like New Dealer bullshit, you know, like raceline, Like God is dead. You know, we we we know now that like everything is reducible to you know, data derived from

the scientific method. You know, the man's basically just like an animal who can talk, and you know, there's no more history and there's no more culture. All that matters is making man more suitable to governance and eminating these you know, these problems like you know, like like like conflict between the races, or like men and women not getting along, like that's.

the East Block or their enemy. I mean, this was long in coming, but they were looking around or some kind of or some ideological cannon and they settled down like the Frankward school. But this is also what had been turned loose on on on on divided Germany, you know, I mean, so there's a lot of things. Yeah, this definitely became part of like the American conceptual arise, like in policy terms as well as academic and electual terms.

But there was a lot of stuff that also like preceded it, you know, like these fools like were uh who built like that part of education and all that kind of stuff, and and these and these, uh and even even even a lot of guys who proceeded in their dealers like Colonel House, who was uh, you know, Wills kind of the Wilson's uh kind of Machiavelli, you know, administered without portfolio like uh, even he was like prone

to a lot of that kind of nonsense. Like House wrote that he wrote this really bad science fiction novel where there was like this benevolent dictator who was obviously supposed to be himself, and uh he basically like you know, finds a way to like strip man of any like historical identity, and he like forces everybody to speak this like esperantial language. So now there's like no more war, and this great man becomes like god on earth because there's no more war. And it's like why why would

that be remotely desirable? It sounds like a nightmare, Like like idiots like Colonel House, like there's some like great utopia that like you know that quits government of any criticism because you know, the the greatest thing ever is somehow like if black kids had high test scores and like everyone he was going to be prison were war is impossible? Like Nova explain like why these things are so awesome, but like that's their conceit.

everyone has to be one. And obviously some are going to rebel against that and not and the ones that don't rebel against it are going to basically lose what kind of social cohesion they have within their own community.

make a lot of sense. Like I what Lindbergh said and what Houston Stewart Chamberlain said, they I mean, yeah, those guys obviously had political and aesthetic preferences for Germany, but in ragio strategic terms, it doesn't really make sense for America in the UK to decide they're going to

annihilate Germany an alliance with Russia. Like what makes sense is for you know, Europe, led by Germany, the UK and the United States, you know, to house do this kind of ramparts against the East, you know, whether it's China, whether it's Russia, you know, whatever it is. Okay, that's there's there's a basic iologic to uh to what developed. And one of the reasons why that happened was uh

ideological necessity. And the United say from the Soviet Union when about irrationality of their objectives domestically, uh, there they had similar problems, you know, Stealin's big problem with the nationalities problem, you know, like how do I strip everybody their ethnic identity and make them into new Soviet Man? And the New Dealers were like they had the same problem, you know, like how do you like destroy like the nationalities in America? You know, And and I mean that

this still goes on in the day. Like that's why in typical fashion, when the regime talks about quote multiculturalism, they're talking about the opposite. They don't about like the eradication of all cultures, you know. But that's there's very few I mean that is now there's not a hell of a lot of states or organized like the United States or like the Soviet Union was, Like it's not it's not a natural political mode of organization. So you

can do one or two things there. You know, you can either you can either you can either rule by way like kind of evolve federalism, you know, and and basically leave people alone to manage their own affairs within their own culture spaces. Or but I mean government never is wanting to do that, I mean, at least here, so they're always gonna opt for this idea of of this, you know, eradicating culture and ripping people out of out

of a historical existence. And both are I mean, that's one of the things that brought down to Soey Union and that's all. That's also one of the reasons why post World War like America does not have moral legitimacy. But that was definitely what they wanted to do. And the but there's well it's gonna sound like a goofy example, but I'm using it because it pops up again and again. In the sixties, I read a lot of science fiction from the era, and science fiction from that era wasn't

just entertainment. There's a lot of think tank guys. I mean even to the until eighties. And Jerry Pornell, who was you know, kind of the Drivings my sdi like he wrote science fiction and he was when he you know, incident to his like think tank and policy work and stuff.

But you know, there's that cornyal Star Trek episode where like Captain Kirk and Spock they go down to this planet and it's like the Third Reich and they know how this is possible, like you know what I'm talking about, Yeah, and then they and then ultimately it's unrabbled, like, oh well, this guy in like the twenty second century, he created like from the craft lands on this planet, the primitive humanoids. But there are always a war and he's like, Okay,

well I know I know how to resolve this. So we created this like third rich style regime. And then Kirk like addresses gay audience, like you know, this was the most efficient government of all time. But you know they they were they were brutal, racist, so you know,

that's why it didn't work. But the idea was sent in some way noble and that's that's interesting, And that coup that comes up again and again, not just in like corny science fiction, but in like policy papers, like we admire the Prussian state because the Germans are great people, but they're these brutal races. So that's why it didn't work. But we've got to strapolate that here in some way, but strip it up of the chauvinistic and like racialized

views and things. People don't think that way directly anymore. It's spent finats in different ways, but that's like what underlies it, especially in a place like Chicago, but nationwide, like a great which these institutions people like, for granted, are like things taken from the Prussian state. It's crazy, you know, it really is. You know, the degree that's not just me, that that that's not just me you know,

being ah, like a teutonal file or something. I mean, I'm sure like in part of that too, but it's just like can't be denied. Like I'm not even saying it's like a good or bad thing. It's just reality, you know. And uh that people one time people were way more kind of like directly cognit into that or at least willing to acknowledge it. Something that's important to consider. All right, Why did it get back to the book? Shut everybody?

is the sanctifying process. And you go on to say, a partisan unwilling to die or commit homicide is no more a political soldier or agent of history than would be a lawgiver who is incapable for reasons of moral or physical frailty of executing a death warrant issued by order of the King's bench as an agent of exclusive sovereign authority. Sorel viewed the modern bourgeoisie as particularly decadent and harmful, but he did not think the conditions of

his epoch to be otherwise unique. All ruling regimes political and social develop over time a kind of moral and intellectual apathy that precludes its worthiness, or at least revokes its mandate to act in a role of guardianship or standard bearer over the subject matter of its dominion. This is not to suggest a Currell shared a secularized eschatological vision of utopian salvation common to Marxists and progressives, which posited that the condition of man or the state or

national community was capable of perfection by way of revolutionary processes. Rather, he and I underline this, he viewed the fervor of violence as a hygienic mechanism entirely congruent at Congress with his own rejection of the linear view of history.

But some of this again is found in in the kind of pre Socratic hero epics, like like so I saw the the Socratic uh what what he used, like

the decadence of the Socratic uh era in Athens. He said, what you were left with was, you know, instead of this, instead of this mono class of Yalemen farmers, you know, uh, the best of whom you know rose to leadership rank whose use education and system mythology and hero epics, what you had was they developed this class of professional politicians who relied upon intellectuals like Socrates to rationalize their rule, but neither of whom were capable of real action, and

both resented each other, and both were afraid of an hostile to the ya women warriors. So you're love of this kind of like parallel paralysis where the men who should be the ones like most capable of direct the action and violence are declared that you know, this kind of thing is illegal, linear moral because they're terrified of their own position being swept aside, and they're on like

you know, lives being threatened by such a process. So there's this kind of like ongoing paralysis where this just kind of like meaningless discourse takes the place of action. And yeah, like I said in the intro that you've just reiterated, it's not a swelfout. Violence was so great or like the sexy thing that we all got to get into. He was saying that, you know, in political terms, you're not serious unless you know you're willing to implement

your will through violence. And in fact, he took human life and they're taking out very seriously. And that's one of the reasons why there's something Sago saying about the revolutionary process. If you're literally willing to kill people, even if they're your enemies, maybe especially if you're enemies, like, that's a very serious thing. You know, it's not something you do flippantly, and that's certainly not something you deal

with pettigouse agreements. And if you're willing to do that, uh, there's a sacred aspect to that that commands a certain reverential observance. I mean, it's it's all of those things.

But that's also why that's also and until things reach that state, whether it's because you know, the like the extens system is feeling structurally at such a point that people find themselves in these just dire circumstances where there's survivals and jeopardy, or when you're talking about, you know, a revolutionary circumstance incident to you know, uh, a wire

kind of strategic pairing of warfare. You know what what necessitates these things is is is a convergence of extreme conditions and and the human will and the hardening of the human heart within that will. So like when people in America, like at present, I mean like likes talk about it like, oh, Donald Trump is an extremist or oh, you know, we're we're under siege by by by quote Marxist, you'll know. You'll know when that's underway, man, because the

bodies being dropped. And thankfully that's not happening because in the Americans condition and the under present conditions, I don't I don't think I would lead anything positive, frankly, Okay, I just don't. That may change, but for now, we would it would, it would, it would mean a lot of suffering and a lot of a lot of dead

people being stacked up for no real purpose. But yeah, that's that's also and also like I don't want to get too far afield, but this is intrinsic to anything that European political theorists wrote about really fill the twentieth century, this idea, this kind of rollsy and live capital liberal idea that people have in America kind of like on all sides of the political are both sides of the political spectrum of like, oh, politics are just this rational

process that people decided to create and implement. Like no Europeans thought that way. Politics is mysterious and like the zene of the political occurrences is warfare, and you know, politics, like warfare itself is its origin is mysterious. We don't really know why things are ordered this way. You know, even if you don't believe in God, there's there's some kind of they're they're there, there's some kind of design.

Even even even if it just man acting out, you know, is is programming like as in as in an ant colony would that's very mysterious and strange. We don't know why that happens, you know, So all you can really do is you're truly, like in quite liberal terms, like writing the peribial Tiger to try and manage, you know, political occurrences and in violence, they're in chooses us. We

don't really choose it. So there's an inherent uh kind of providential uh, there's not an identificasion of providential things and phenomenon within the European mind. Conceptually said that that's important to keep in mind. Like this really jumps out at me, I think, because I mean, I'm very much like a God centric person. I'm a Bible Protestant, but I'm like an old stock American, so like I'm inundated with uh with uh with with kind of like American

viewpoints and things, you know. And I always was even guys like Russell Kirk, you know, who was a Catholic, but he was kind of the quintessential like American like twentieth century political historian. Like even he like falls into this kind of trap of of kind of like Ralls in and and and Hobbisian ontology about man kind of like rationally choosing to like organize politics this way in that nonsense. And then maybe as a topic for another episode, but Yeah.

it stay this esoteric? And then that's when you realize it's like, well, politics isn't one thing we've been we've been convinced, we've been taught in this country that politics is just one thing, or it's it's it's this side against this side, and no, politics has a very spiritual side to it. That's why I think a lot of people, especially people who are Biblical, when they read Imperium and they read part one, they're completely blown away because they've never read politics like that before.

this was like in nineteen ninety seven or so. Like I I I had this. I just I just used bookstore in Emiston like order meal like an old hard copy of Imperium, and then I like took it home and read it, and uh, I was like, wow, this is really intense stuff and it's really insightful. So I mean I came to Yacky by reading his book and realizing like this is this isn't this is incredibly you know, highly developed and serious stuff. And yeah, I said, it's

just really well written. Some of Yacki's language at the time seems overwrought because uh, you know, he was a little he was he was he was he was a he was a litigation attorney, and I mean that kind

of comes out, but uh, that's all. That's also as part of like the time though, like in the early like really until like the nineteen fifties, that's just kind of like the way people wrote, even kind of square people just like you know, writing on behalf of some kind of like even somebody like writing like a like an op ed on behalf of like eyes and how we're in like the early fifties, like what it would seem kind of like overwrought to us properly, like but

at the language I need. But but yeah, that's some you know, it's a it's a it's a serious book like whether you know, even if you even if you're basically kind of hostle to fishism or you know, postfishes ideas, and even if you're not you know, any kind of any kind of Germanic phile. I mean, you can't like like the people claim like imperiums like mystical garbage, like none of them I've actually read the book. I know. It's like I've engaged them, like, well, what do you

object to specifically? Like they can't tell you. There's like repeating, there's like repeating some nonsense they like read online or they're just you know, it's just like some conceit they have that I guarantee you they have not actually read it.

I'm so great. Maybe them like a bookworm, I've actually read, like I I've read Martian Angles for twenty years, Like when I I don't only sound off about a body of political theory that I haven't read, and you'll notice like when you're raising them and read it till you're right off, Like I haven't read that, but I don't most people. Most people don't sit around like you know, reading dos Capital. Most people don't sit down and read like all six hundred pages of Imperial They just don't.

Owing to the fact that everybody's got to live their life doing what they gotta do. I'm lucky to have the time to like read this kind of shit. But it's also I mean people that I don't think people with the attention span anymore, like even smart guys like I. One of the things I learned to do in law school. If if I drive anything of value, that experience is like I can sit down for like nine hours and like power through like pays and pays and pays a

dense text. There's things that what's rather do than that? But I can do it and like it doesn't you know, it doesn't like it's not like torture to me. So yeah.

the Yeoman Homestead as a school of command. A man must role his wife and children firmly, but also caringly and justly. He must also demonstrate his worthiness to wield his authority. A man's wife and children are obliged to obey his commands, but only insofar as his command's command role is tempered by correct virtues and practical reason. Do you think that is why the founding of this country actually worked in the beginning, In the beginning.

But I mean really the way the southerns thought of themselves, it was like that, you know, and and that's why, like you know, in terms of like place names and everything else, you know, like Athenian references you know, were ubiquitous and the anti belle themself and to some degree that still are in themself. And yeah, that's the way they viewed it because again, the South was not the

South was not the Habsburg Empire. It was it was it was, it was it was a ye woman reed who viewed themselves as kind of like a monocast, you know, like that's why. And I mean part of that was possible because like, uh, slave was racialized, you know like that. But so I mean you dated somebody's like a monocast, like even even like a poor even like a poor like white like tenant farmer and like a lord in the manor like they had some kind of political interest

in common, like cont for the slaves. Now I know that, Like I know, people like Howard Vinn would be like, oh, that's because they were just educated and you know, racial prejudice, like that's not the case, like they're at people do obviously identify in communitarian terms, like along racial and cultural lines, and that's only possible. Then that's really only possible if there is like an US and them like paradigm. That's not good or bad, it's just the way it is.

And yeah, that's if you and then North it was a little bit different. But at the same time too, like I said, even you know, the uh, the the old right what was called old right in the twentieth century, you know America first and Robert Taft and stuff that those guys were. Those guys were Hamiltonian Republic. They were like northern city slickers. But at the same time, you know, they they viewed, uh, they viewed got the American ideal.

You know, it's like the small businessman, like our version of the Kulak, you know, like they so that I'm maintaining this not just a Confederate conceit that is truly like the old American ethos. And yeah it's got no, it's got nothing. Uh you know, there is no Caesar in that equation. Okay, so it's you know, it's not there's no Caesar and there's not even a King Arthur, you know, there's a the the ideal like like the

American hero, he's an archetype. He's not he's not a king or he's not like a man in a certain in a certain official role. So yeah, I think I think that's fundamentally important. And I mean that's the way I think, like not even consciously, like I you know, that's why I think some of these like trad guys in the internet are wro. It's like I'm not talking

about like like actual like Russian guys. I'm not talking about you know some of these, uh, some of these Moslim guys who who are by that world I thought, I know, like guys from Terry Hood, Indiana, but like decide that they're like trade Catholics or something. It's like, bro,

like what you want you want to? Like you know, you wanna you want to you want to you want to want to pretend it's you know, we got a king here or something, or you want to pretend you're in the court of Caesar, Like why the fun would you want to do that? And plus I mean it's not like our heritage anyway, you know, Like that doesn't that doesn't work.

that's ridiculous, like that, that's that's not Catholicism. Then you know, you're just like some guy like like go with the math occasionally and you know, uh, Christmas Eve at midnight, you know, goes like a local perish. But that Catholic is a man's actual implications for politics and authority, and like the pope is either that the pope's either the Emperor of Europe in absolute terms or he's not. You know, I mean he's not he's not Billy Graham, He's not this,

he's not this deacon. In a weird hat who like we all kind of listen to when we want to, you know, like he he has either God's emissary on earth or he's not. You know, eat my fight. I'm not a Catholic, but if you are, you can't. You can't be a Catholic and then decide to like you're going to like pretend Joe Biden as the president, you know, like.

own gain. This tendency, in the Cirellian view, and this is the part I underlined, is only overcome by submission to sovereign authority customary as well as formal in ordinary conditions, and when necessary, by immersion in collectively dynamic and violent efforts,

often themselves both revolutionary and restorative in character. Sorel's commitment to socialism must be understood within this context that socialism, for better or worse, was considered a historic inevitability in structural terms, and if nothing else, it was at least grudgingly stipulated, even by many of its staunchest critics on the European right, that at least some concessions to the popular demands of socialist parties would need to be made

for any future government to enjoy the legitimacy it required to effectively rules.

National Socialists. But you know, again, it was the Stalhelm wasn't going anywhere for that for that reason that uh Currell outlined and that I just kind of like explicated in plain English, the uh you know this, there's I realized that you know, in from the twentieth century onward, especially with the advident visual media as well as you know, the concentration of power in in key loci and the ability of of consolidated governments to you know, to kind

of dictate policy. You know, there's there's a power to kind of create a conceptual horizon, you know, like the media like in the in the Oliver Stone movie Natural learn Killers. You know, like what he Harrelton says. He says, the reporter like media is like whether but it's man made whether like that that's actually really poignant, Okay, And

like I stipulate that that's very true. At the same time, you can't just generate some kind of like revolutionary tendency out of the air or and he can't just quash one that's emergent. So this idea that you know, I mean, I think Annolf Hiller believed everything he said, for better or worse, whether you think Hitler was great or what anything. He was evil, Like he wasn't a liar, and he wasn't he wasn't a politician in the conventional sense, Like

he believed everything he said. He didn't take on like a socialist program like like Thaloman claimed and the KVD claim, you know, just for cynical reasons, like he believed in it, Like even if you didn't, like, yeah, it was the reality was that.

you just wouldn't add, you know. And and like I said, that wasn't just that was that wasn't just like the fervor of like you know, the kind of red wave

after nineteen twenty one twenty two. It was that was like deeply insinuated into like the German consciousns you know, like the uh this idea you know, like like we talked about that at the at the top of the hour, like the the you know, uh, socialism as we know it especially you know, came from it came from Prussia and and came from uh that that state of organization with yourself was derived from this desire and this fundamental imperative to kind of repair the social fabric that it

ceased to exist after you know, the medieval era disappeared into into historical time. I gotta raise up in a minute, though, So let's we can we can go part two on this if you want. But yeah, yeah, there's anything else you want to hit, just real quick though, in terms of key points, So let's take those up now.

but they were highly racially conscious and highly anti government. Uh. But if you're talking about the actual partisans, you know, like the kind of like kind of the true like rebels in the South and uh, and you were talking about the fire years in the North, you like, and and the the like the radical abolitionists, like there was there was something of a precursor to like right left divide in America. It's an imperfect analogy, but there's that later.

I agree with basically when Patty Cannon wrote in the eighties and nineties about the old right being you know, the the Hamiltonian uh, Robert Taft right, the America first right, that was that that was the emergent American right in modern terms, okay. And uh, you know in the in the in the you know, in the in the twentieth century, the words win the state wasn't ancient history. It was less than one hundred years in the past. Okay. So I mean the like America is like a consolidated uh

national union was was a pretty new thing. So there's that too. The I believe, Uh, I'm always making the point that you know, the Nuremberg system replacing the Westphalian system that had not just profound implications for international order and more in peace and and and and the conceptual

horizon of of of of heads of state. But it also uh, it made it made the political right quite literally illeal because that that that was part that was that was half of the reason for holding the Nuremberg proceedings in the first place, is to say that you know, okay, like you know, the Allies were on the side of of providence and history and opposition to that which is

the right wing. You know, this is a criminal conspiracy of racist murders, you know, and and and obviously you know, no no rational actors such as you know, the Marxist Leninists in Moscow and the New Dealers in Washington whatever started war. So wars were only started, you know, by the trigus and and conspiracies of of breakings and criminals and races. And that's what the right wing is, you know. So where it's it's it's illegal to hold these views

because they result in genocide and warfare. That's why after that's why there was no like Hewing Long or Robert Taft after nineteen forty nine or forty eight forty nine, okay, like, uh, you the closest thing was a guy like Joe McCarthy. But obviously you know, there were there were the uh, the deep State closed ranks to wipe him out. And I'm that said McCarthy was like a great guy. I mean, I'm not saying morally. I mean, I don't think he was.

I think it was kind of a bumpkin. I don't think he was a great figure hit And I've got my own issues with him. But certainly the name was Roy Cohne didn't do any favors, but the for all

kinds of reasons, but that are called wars series. But the but that was that was basically the American right as it was as it was Acipha and you know, hewing long Robert Taft Wallace was a resurgence of that, you know, And and of course Nixon took on the Wallace Coalition, which became the Reagan Coalition, which became MEGA. That's right wing in the American sense. I mean, I

I think it's somewhat of a protest movement. But at the if those people had better leadership, and if they had UH and if they had a stronger intellectual foundation, I think they'd very much like identify with Taffian principles, like actual America First principles. So yeah, I mean I

think I think that's basically genuine. I I think there's a lot of silly stuff like within I mean, if we can still consider like MEGA to be a movement like the you know, the I was on the ground in January sixth, And I'm not saying that to sound like I mean like figure that one killer and not trying to come off like Rodoni Junior's characters that you know, like I was there when the ship went down at Gretade.

I was there. I'm not trying to come off like that, but like I raised that a lot because like people say all kinds of crazy stuff about January sixth, and like when I tell them like they're wrong, and it well, how do you know? It's like, well because I was there, fucker like that's how But and and those people were gutsy. I think a lot of them for like turning out in depth, you know, to exhibit their discontent, which was

entirely well placed. But there's also just like a lot of like fucking real goofs man and like guys doing dumb shit, you know, like like that freaking weirdo like OU painting himself up like brave heart, like running around like like an idiot, like I saw a lot of like that kind of shit and there's like goofy stuff like that that you know, like on the MAGA, right, So I mean there's like more than like a seed of potential and they are in some real way like

the airrors to like you know, the Taff Hamiltonian and later like the you know, the Wallace Nixon Reagan uh coalition. But it's problematic because like America is problematic in terms of how colitics break down. I mean, that's my view of it. I'm not I'm not saying bad I'm not trashing mega people like I mean most of my friends are are constitute or people like that. You know, I'm not. I'm not some snob. I mean how can I be. So I don't want people to think I'm like saying

new things about them but them. But yeah, uh that's my view at a glance.

dead people, like really awful stuff. I don't sounds like some fucking shrinking violet, but I mean I find that kind of stuff upset it, you know, and like I but so that's okay, but like you trash like Lensky, like you get like moved. So I mean, hey, it's it's neither here or there. We don't need t gramm anymore because the centenship regime is is has been broken in some way, like enough at least that we can get our message out. But so I'm not on t

gram anymore. But in my substack it's real Thomas seven seven seven dot substack dot com. There's a chat in there, and if you're a subscriber, like you don't need to pay, but you do need to subscribe to access to chat. And like that's like where we've been congregating. And you can always like hit me up on email if you want to talk to me direct. It might take me a week or two to reply, just because I get a lot of email It's zartex z E r t

A X seven seven seven at ProtonMail dot com. And yeah, that's that's all I got.

is great. It's essential to understanding the twentieth century and the trajectory of the political right and and how European the political culture developed in fundamental ways, and you know, more and more of what we do. I mean, it's important to educate our people in our faction, as it were anyway, But you know, mein Shamagademia just is not

taking these things up. The exception is guys like Paul Gotfried, but I mean he's really on his own, you know, I mean, I mean, I was Godfrey, you know, one of us uh Rick Large but he is a serious political theorist. But he's you know, he's he's found anitche audience, kind of like Michael Jones says. But you know that My point being that what what we're doing is really kind of filled uh uh phi satisfying a demand, you know, and the fact that demand exists in the first place.

It is a very positive tendency because that was not the case twenty years ago. But yeah, we we can dive in. We can dive in immediately. Man.

pretensions Marsian angles both an equal measures. They had these pretensions to science, you know, or this idea that you know they were they were you know, they were they were positing theories of economics and nothing of the sort was underway. That's not my own conceptual bias, Like there

is no Marxist economics. There's a Marxist sociology. And yeah, it posits uh, you know, values and and and uh and observations about you know, the human condition and how and obviously, I mean that's selling a fundamentally concerned with

particularly man and his relationship is on labor. But that's that's not a theory of economics, you know, it's a it's kind of it's kind of political sociology that it places a premium on on Man as an economic actor, uh, both severally and collectively, as it is kind of like his primary is his primary kind of function as historically as well as Andrew pot But that's not that's that's not economic science, okay. And but Sorell I Mesuela is very clear that he was he was dealing in pure

political theory, Okay. He was talking about value creation. He's talking about animates people, you know, to to to create political cultures, and you know, and and and and to live historically, you know, and uh, you know fundamentally conserned the questions of identity with esthetic with value judgments kind of rendered by aesthetical tendencies, you know, uh, the things uh you know kind of the kind of kind of distilled down, uh as into human values, you know, things

like heroism and like what is heroism and in the political realm and things like that. You know. That's why the seminal text of Sorell, if you want to understand this point I'm trying to make, and forgive me if

I'm being up the skater shot. As you know, with Sorell's essay on the Trial of Socrates and why Socrates deserve not only deserve to be executed, and in absolute moral terms, but he was imperative and political terms because people at Socrates had brought horrible damage to Athens, you know, and and and really kind of destroyed the legacy of Paraples as it were. And that's why that's why Sorell's favorite, Uh,

Sorell's favorite the pre Socratic thinker is Xenophon. I'm not that's a really complicated issue, and I'm not a guy who was an expert in the classics, but that you know that that's fundamentally important. I'm just for our purposes we're talking about here, it's it's premium, it's prem efficient evidence that Currell did not pretend that he was you know, that he was that that he was presenting some like

new science of economics. And he was not pretending that, you know, he he was like the air to some kind of rationalist socialism that uh was an improvement upon Merks or something like. He He was a very he was in a very real sense philosophizing with a hammer. Uh. And frankly, he was concerned with a lot of the same with a lot of the same phenomenon that Nietzsche was.

But he was far more of a practical, uh political theorist about it, and he was driving different conclusions that had superficially sort of similar uh the futures, if that makes sense. But I draw the distinction, or I make the comparison not accidentally or or or not because I'm trying to be funny. But like the other day online, like I was a bar of people who were mad at me because they thought that I was putting shade on and they're kind of nichean sensibilities and that's not

really what I was doing. But people like us, I feel, can read wherever they want, okay, And I'm not I'm not like the grand like Bury and of philosophy or something, just kind of authority. They like tell people like like, hey man, you should like read this, but not that.

But you know when people do approach me and say they're interest didn't understanding you know, the twentieth century, and they tell me that their interest didn't understanding you know, uh, developing kind of like a practical paradigm of political action. You know, you should be reading stuff like cREL a lot more than you should be you know, sitting around reading. You know, there's Arthustru and you know, genealogy and worlds and things like that, but they you know, I and

I try and steer people. I mean, even even if people are just kind of like died in the wool intellectuals. I mean, it's great, okay. I mean, there's nothing at all wrong with it, as long as tempered by a kind of pragmatic grounding in the world. And it's not some kind of you know, it's not some kind of

psychological coping mechanism of retreat. But the uh if if one of the things that people that caused people that gravitated towards thinkers like Nietzsche, and there's some degree Heidegger, although they were very different, is uh you know, there was there was there was a real historical crisis that that reached the zenith you know in in uh in in in elite modernity, you know, the mid really really the mid nineteenth century, just when they started to impact

like regular people's individual lives, you know, and obviously it reached a horrible zenith in the twentieth century. I mean, I don't I don't see that for the reasons what court of storians do. Obviously, as I mean, I drew, I drived that observation for radically different reasons. But you know, this can't be denied. And I try and expand people's conceptual horizons and make them see that, like what Mitra was not the only uh andoth very powerful language that

really resonates with with people, especially especially younger guys. Which is fine, young guys have great energy that we need. But I try and help steer people the fact that you know, he was not the only thinker concerned with these things. There was many others who were, and there's many on the right who were, And there was many who whose ideas and and philosophies held a far more kind of relevant pray to go relevance to you know, the the current dilemma. And so that's kind where Sorell

comes in. But I he was. I look at sir as a pure political theorist and a uh and and a political sociologist were at large, and he was fundamentally concerned with the economic But you know, that's everybody was. You know, like the Zeit guys do exist in is

like the Zeit guys do exist in. You know, you've got to you've got to, like a whether you want to or not, you've got to abide the the epoch in which you're situated and the kind of conceptual realities that are paramount, you know, and his guys is a real thing. You know. You don't have to be a gaily End or you don't have to believe in God if, but you can't deny that, like, the Zeitgeist is a

real thing. I mean maybe you maybe you come at it as like, well, you know, it's just kind of a you know, it's just like a functional mass psychology or whatever, or you know people or or like you're like epigenetic memory come, uh, basic structures of mind. It's like, okay, it doesn't matter for our purpose. It is like what causes the Zeitgeist to emerge, but it is a real thing, you know, and like what's possible politically is very much

bounded like pen by those parameters. You know. That's why lately, uh, I mean, my big project right now is uh is is uh, you know, making progress on the Nermer with transcript and that that's preceding at taste, But I want to write about the d d R and uh the radical German left post nineteen forty five and things like the botder mindhoff Gang. You know more globally onto the Red Army faction. You know, like a lot of these people. And I realized this is a tangent, but I'll bring

it back. I'm going to start with this. This is topable. A lot of the people who are involved with it, they weren't first of all, like versusing. None of them were relacure minorities like they They were very much like German boys and girls, okay, And they were attracted to this really because that's what was possible within with you know, within the conceptual parameters of the Cold War, you know.

And interestingly Horsemahler, who was uh, you know, a self identified you know, stalotist radical who who became a lawyer and he defended a lot of the boder Minehoff people in court. You know. He after the after the Berlin Wall came down, he joined he joined the NPD and he was actually arrested in prison for quote Holocaust and Island things. I mean, so he basically and and some people were like, oh, what is synic this man is? I say no, I think there was always what his

sympathies were. But you know, he was a German guy from the East who was you know, born in nineteen forties, Like what was he like, what was he gonna do like march around like horse or vessel? Was he gonna you know, was he gonna try to organize like a march on Rome in nineteen sixty? I mean, it's not that that's not the way the world was, you know, and it uh, and it's not just it's not just a matter of of practical potentialities. It's also I mean

just what what what speaks to people? Like what guys uh, potentialities within the political realm emerged, you know, so I I want to more about this, you know. And there's also and that's one of the reasons too, I'm interested in guys like Johann von Leirds. I mean, I'm interested in Islam for and it's impact on the political for

all kinds of reasons. But guys like him and guys like I'm at Hubert, it was like the same kind of thing, okay, Like they were kind of unusual people and you know, kind of like orientalist adventurer types, but they they very much. I mean, I'm not gonna claim to know like what I mean, I've never leave the Christian faith, okay, but I I can't I can only speculate and like, what motivates people to convert to like

what a very alien religions? I mean, for all I know this was very genuine and some kind of spiritual uh calling. But I also there's a negatively political aspect in the case of people like von Leers and Mahler and that oh what I just said. The Zeit guy said the questions of you know what what what is? Uh? What? What was possible you know, within within the conceptual parameters of of the e F. I'm that much was situated. I know that was long winded, but it's it's it's

frankly a big question. But yeah, that's that's that's that's not That's how I characterized Sorel. That's why I believe he's there's an enduring relevance there. It's SAE for Werner Sombart. Uh. And well, if you want to, we'll do a episode

on Werner Sombart. You know, he was he was kind of like the other like socialist of the right, and he was German obviously, and he wrote Specific America and why socialism is not resonant in America, which is fascinating and timely, but that's that's that's my not so brief answer to the question as to how I characterized Sorel or categorize him.

I just want to read this chapter. It says the army is the clearest and most tangible of all possible manifestations of the state, and the one which is most firmly connected with its origins and traditions. Syndicalists do not propose to reform the state as the men of the eighteenth century did. They want to destroy it because they wish to realize the idea of marxis that the socialist revolution ought not to culminate in the replacement of one

governing monarch already by another minority. The syndicalists outline their doctrines, still more clearly when they give it a more ideological aspect and declare themselves anti patriotic. Following the example of the Communist Manifesto, he actually goes on to say, it is impossible that there should be the slightest understanding between syndicalists and official socialists on this question. The latter, of course, talking about official socialists speak of breaking up everything, but

they attack men in power rather than power itself. They hope to possess the state forces, and they are aware that on the day when they control the government they will have need of an army, they will carry on foreign politics, and consequently they, in their turn, will have to praise the feeling of devotion to the fatherland. The reason I brought I chose that passage is because it's very easy. I know a lot of the people in my orbit are anarchists. A lot of them call themselves

right wing anarchists. And it seems to me that the reason that anarchy can seem very appealing to a lot of people is because they don't see an answer in

the zeitgeist for their morality, what they believe. And another thing something that I wrote is it seems that moral superiority when you have no solution to present dilemmas, leads you to become somebody who politics becomes all about morality, because it's very easy to win a political argument if you just say, well, all war is immoral, all taxation is immoral, everything is immoral when you have no when there is no vision that you can see of overthrowing

what is in power now where it seems like these anarchists, and I'm including my former self are no different than these syndicalists who just want to destroy everything and will even resort to anti patriotism and saying that power it is possible to destroy power when you're basically moralizing against the site geist you know that exists.

problem here too. The reason why you know, the anarchists who did crazy stuff like attacking the UH the Chicago Federal Building and it's like literally blowing it up, and these these guys like Sacho and many like is Italian anarchists suit your point, we're very much like in in bed with cyndical is, you know, like like erceptually in Europe that had that was kind of like anarchism like had within conceptual vocabulary of European socialism, like anarchism made sense,

you know that, even if it was not a good idea in America, I think there are like anarchists in America who actually like I think that. I think I think they're to your point in doublging and flights of fantasy, but they do have a pretty deep understanding of h of H of the source material. But I think most people in America grantate towards it, Like when they think of anarchism, they're not really thinking of anarchism per se.

They're thinking of kind of like a Habizian ontology of oh, well, naturally, there's no there's no course of authority, you know, and all we need to do is, you know, kind of overcome this tendency to exploit others and you know that the state of nature has no government, which is nonsense and also too if people kind of associate all authority with like this, you know, new dealer uh bureaucracy committed to social engineering and all kinds of and all kinds

of in all kinds of tyrannies like prosaic and profound, like screw with people vibes you know, individually as well as collectively, culturally, socially and everything else. Like it's not some people develop this binary tendency. They don't realize that there's various iterations of government and like government quad government doesn't just like equate to you know what this like obsolete like cold world of Iathan that we're kind of

stuck with in America. You know, I governments neither good or bad like on its face, you know, I mean it's I'm always making the point of people that you know, because uh like a lot of people know that I you know, I identify a lot with you know, Confederate here and stuff, you know, for for cultural and theological and like racial reasons, but as well as you know, historical ones. And they're like, well, how can you also

like admire the Prussian state? It's like because there's a commonality there and that you know, the regime that came into existence was appropriate for the people within its dominion as well as you know, the political challenges that were extants. You know it, uh like the Prussian regime was appropriate for Prussia, like you know, the Confederate Yaloemen re you know it truly we're kind of like self governing and

in a classical sense. So it's as much as that was possible you know in the in the nineteenth century. I mean that was appropriate for them. You know. It's not like there's like one like it. It's not it's not just like one modality a government that is appropriate. There's categorically wrong. I mean obviously there's something there. There's some there, there's some configurations of government that are just absolutely like terrible, okay, Like I mean there's something like

weird Internet guy. Like no nobody was say that, like you know, democratic Campucchia, like like a great regime, you know, like something, but you know, the yeah, people can just make it like categorically sweeping judgments like the The problem with regimes like that in America and like that which has been imposed on Western Europe is that it's it's I compare it to like you know, you know, like the old Ray Bradbury story Faaraaneck for fifty one, like

when I was in high school, Like people still like read that, like he to sign it, and you know have like the fire department and fairne forty one. Their guys actually go out and start fires like the US government is like a fire department that starts fires because like governmental dres its legitimacy from the degree to which it guarantees the posterity like the people in their culture and and the government is quite literally working to annihilate

those things. And that that's that's it's beyond like a dysfunctional government. That's it's abjectly perverse. You know, it's a it's a cross purposes with the raison detrovan government. I mean that that's that's really what brought down the Soviet system, you know, I mean, yeah, there was the planned economy doesn't work. You know, you can't. You can't. You can't abolish the incentive for creativity. We're large, and they just say like, well, we're gonna you know, we're just gonna

plan all like economic activity and all. And you can't like plan spontaneous innovation. Okay, that's ridiculous, you know, and obviously like it didn't. It didn't. It didn't deliver anything of of of real value to people. And then some kind of basic security of material nature, you know, I

mean in every like their bone sense. But that's not like why if that collapsed, there's there's ysfunctional governments that just like lurch on for centuries, you know, like the out of an empire, Okay, like the Soviet regime fell because it was it was literally like this perverse iteration of of of of a regime that was literally across purposes with with you know what what what should be

like the t los of government. Then if you if you're literally like one of things I agree with the Michael Jones on is if you're literally proceeding like if you're literally proceeding against a reason, like that's kind of like your course set. You know, you're like anti reason, like that can't really sustain itself. And eventually people are

gonna revolt against that. I mean, even if they don't understand really like what's wrong with the regime they're under and like philosophical or ethical or or any kind of you know it like you know, intellectual terms, just because it's it's it's gonna like start, it's gonna star like from any obstacles their ability to lead a normal life, you know, and like do anything constructive, you know, And that's that's kind of where we're at now. But yeah, I forgive me if that was a long one.

basically can have a history of providing for themselves. So the you know, what is the answer that's you know, it's like a lot of the people I know, their answer is, well, we just have to get rid of the state. As we get rid of the state, then you know, the we can institute good economics quote economics. Of course that has never been tried. They just assume that it's going to be better. You know, people will

be able to defend themselves. Well, if we just get rid of gun laws, any gun law, then you know, violence can take care of itself, because you can if somebody comes at you, now you're you can have a bigger gun than them. I mean not not taking into account that people just with people are large families just put together their own armies, you know, and so when you try to devise an answer to what we have now, I don't think that going backwards in time is what's

going to solve it. We're going to it's going to be something new, but it's going to be something that involves a government of some sort, and I think it's going to I would assume it's going to be something that would be more of a right classic right wing government if we're going to hold any of this together, unless, of course it just breaks up and balkanizes.

at odds with the reason. I mean, there's there's a few things wrong with the government, Okay, one of which is structural. You know, like we've talked about like regardless how you felt feel about like Roosevelt in a history or the New Deal or whatever. Like the regimes that exist today, it's an anachronism. It's as much of them as as the Soviet Union was and like a turangle, okay, because it's it's it's structured to do something that that

is uh that there's no longer extant. Okay, I mean it's it's it's structured to wage the Cold War, Okay, and then that's about it, and literally everything else that's subservient to that, because even even regimes are totally just functional, even even those that are populated by people we don't have any meaningful understanding of of high politics conceptually, they're they're like bound by basic realities, okay, like going to the fact that you know, their ability to act like

hemmed in by uh by by by critical disincentives to you know, to push up against that. Okay. So everything was every everything is subserve me at the high politics, okay, when particularly when you have uh a situation, strategic landscape like that of the Cold War. So, I mean, the regimes just it's it's it's it's you know, it's a it's a quote solution like in constant search of a problem to you know, to the rationalize its continued existence.

So there's that. There's also uh, there's this radical uh faction that's you know, really really I mean, the New Deal was when it was when it was able to assert itself politically and truly kind of concrete, organized capacities. So I mean frout a century, we've we've just kind of like lampre wrapped around the the structure of government.

Verbially speaking, that's uh that, that's uh that that's actively trying to destroy the culture and uh the ability of the people, uh who are the you know within that culture live historically or to or to harbor any identities of a historical nature. Okay, if and that must that have to be excised. How it's going to excise that

depends on what develops. But the structural problem I was talking about about the obsolescence of uh, the regime that's gonna take care of itself, and not in some punctuated way. It's not gonna be some like Mad Max scenario where everything blows up one day. It might take two hundred and fifty years or something, Okay, but gradually it's just

not gonna be able to assert itself anymore. And you're gonna see localities, you know, whether you know, whether it's some what you know, whether it's like some some mid size city in New Mexico, Arizona that you know, can't rely on the federal government, you know, to provide it with, uh, with the water it needs and things like that, and

the infrastructural uh, the things it needs. So you know, it's just gonna it's just gonna have to find ways to you know, to resort to self help, you know, in Congress with you know, like the other states and municipalities that are similarly situated, or whether it's you know, some place like Chicago where you know, you take this you know, you take like the West Side that's like increasingly just like kind of going to hell in a handbasket, you know, like the police increasingly you just kind of

like just don't patrol anymore. You know, you're gonna see more and more situations like that where uh, you know, people in true like ghettos like like live like Perl, not intersecting lives with like bourgeois people, and they don't even like really interfere with each other anymore, Okay, like uh, and then that that's happening as we speak like I see it. I'm not just like it's not some science

fiction thing I came up with. So like things like that are kind of gonna kind of gonna conspire to you know, just kind of like deprive the regime of credibility in uh in hard power terms, and uh that will uh that that'll like the the uh the radical culture distortion element within that regime. Like on account of these kinds of structural frailties that are increasingly emergent, it won't be able to impose its will on people anymore. You know, it's not gonna be able to insinuate crazy

ideas to the part of education. You know, it's not going to be able to you know, transform like what we're you know, basically functional with kind of poor communities into like ghettos where like you know, race wars are going on. It's not gonna be able to you know, uh, it's not it's not gonna be able to mobilize uh people, uh, you know, to go and annihilate you know, other societies overseas that decide you don't have to be destroyed, and

that that's already happening too. You know. That's why increasingly this reliance on mercenaries and and things like that. So what what will emerge from those proverbial ashes. I believe once you strip away what I just talk about and the core of America, you know, kind of like the white Christian core and those people who are you know, who perhaps aren't you know, like us ethnically or or or or don't like a bid you know, the same

sex that we do. But where my fellow travelers in terms there are billy you to you know, create and sustained culture that kind of core. I think that kind of like the core setting of America is like hamiled vers of Jefferson. And a lot of people object to that, and that can be like oversimplified, but basically it's the

federalist versus an anti federalist perspective, okay. And you can see some states that uh tend towards the former and some towards the ladder, and that's gonna cause tensions, but generally it's not in anybody's interests, you know, to wage bloody civil wars. And I think by necessity, particularly in America, it becomes poor, you know, kind of uh, pragmatism is gonna carry the day, you know, but just in practical terms, you know, you're not gonna you know, like twitter years

from now. You know, if you do have you know, the geographic division is gonna isn't gonna be between you know, like the old North and the Old South. But there's gonna be some of the same kind of tendencies that you know, cause like a political and and and sociological

class between them. But you're not You're not gonna You're not gonna have this regime that's kind of got like endless that that's got kind of like a that's got bottomless pockets, you know, uh, and the ability to just kind of like you know, martial unprecedented productive capabilities to like wage war and dominate you know, anybody you wants. Some of the that's not going to exist anymore. You know.

That'side the fact that that's really kind of self defeating as a as as a as a course to you know, to unite the country in some sort of in some sort of a unitary political culture under a single sovereign. I mean that was possible in the War between the States for kind of complicated reasons, but it's also you know, the the war win the States shouldn't happen in the

first place. I mean, I don't know, I don't know if there's anyo a civil war discussion, but it my point is, like I'm not it's there's not some looking evident ability that you know, absent these kinds of a because of the alien elements that I just talked about. You know, we're literally attacking the body politic and absent this kind of obsolescent and very corrupt regime. You know, morally materially that's kind of desperately trying to cling to power.

I don't see Americans just kind of like going to the rifle to kill each other as a matter of first recourse. You know, generally these things can be resolved. You know. It's and I may be wrong, but I I don't think I'm overly optimistic. I mean, I am like a basically a gloomy Angle six And Calvin is kind of dude. I don't think anybody accuse me of being some like optimist Pollyanna who says everything's gonna be

all right all the time. But I don't. I don't agree with guys like Thomas Chitthham and who he he. He is a fascinating guy, and he wrote some great stuff in the nineties and it's like Civil War two paradigm, Like he literally wrote a book called Civil War two. It was I'm sure some of the fellows are familiar with. I mean, like I'm an old guy, so I'm familiar with that. I read it when I was like sixteen. But the kind of ethnic confleet he talks about, yeah,

I don't doubt that that that's pretty possible. And it's unfortunately in some places that's underway, right.

You know, basically something like gangster world words like on the cops, like you're not the law here, like we're the law here, and like what we say goes and you know, where the Lord King is sovereign and them being kind of like a periodic war with like Blackwater Tights who, owing to some interest for another you know, are being hired by uh, you know, either wealthy private agents or by what remains of you know, the the seate of sovereign government in the state and and like

and going to war with these people in the localized ways or something where I can see like militia type guys, you know, pulling like what the Arian nations did and saying like, look like we're seceding because you know, we're like you know, we're like the Arian Community of Christ And if you're not white, you're not right. And if

you're a fed, you're fucking dead. So like you're not gonna you know, you're not gonna fuck with our like municipality and the government just being like, well, we're not gonna like we're not gonna fight some like endless war with these people. We're not gonna kill them all, so it's like leave them alone like stuff like that. I

definitely see happening. I don't see, like you know, I don't I don't see you know, like years from now some kind of uprising some kind of simultaneous uprising and kind of like the white underclass against you know, the regime, and like blacks against the man, and like immigrants who like you know, want to create like you know, Oslon and like the Southwest. I just don't see that happening.

It's not likely. And Shilham was Sham was a dude born in the forties who who's sort of experienced, was in was in Vietnam, And I mean, I totally get that. And I got a lot of respect for dudes like that, you know. And then I mean that's my day's generation, you know, And I I got huge respect from my dad as in all of them, guys. I'm not saying like they got stupid ideas at all. What I'm saying is like their world views, like we was colored by that. And I don't have a crystal ball. I'm not some

kind of like augur. But I do think I'm pretty good and kind of discerning basic the basic trajectory of of political events, you know, like in every basic sense. Okay, I think that's probably people read my content. Frankly, you know, it's not It's not because I'm a comediant or because like I'm a a great knuckle. But you know, I and yeah and plus two. I'll turn it back to you in a minute. I'm sorry for rambling, but the

you know frankly too. And I mean, I recognize this because it's my culture, and I totally I've got a problem acknowledging it. The tendency to like apot not just escatological, but like apocalyptic thinking in America, you know, and there's an idea that there's gonna there's always gonna be a day Losi and there's gonna be there, there's gonna be uh, you know, there's always gonna be something like punctuated event that brings everything down. You know, there's gonna be you know,

some kind of like massic, some like extinction level event. Honestly, that's like when underlies the global warming bullshit. It's like the weird old basic kind of like uh, it's it's like a it's it's kind of like the loser, basic,

bougie version of it. But I mean that's that's why it's weird to hear like Europeans parodic, because it's not a European thing, that's like America thing, you know, And but on our sidety I mean even intelligent guys and some ladies you know, who don't ascribe to that kind of nonsense. And there's even kind of cogs and the tendency I talk about like anthropologically, they still like they've got this kind of like instinctive tendency to think in

terms of like punctuated equilibrium. I'm in in in historical events and like apocalyptic stuff like oh, you know, just one day, everything's gonna come down, or there's gonna be a race war, or like infrastructure is just gonna go belly up and we're not gonna clean water, Like it's not gonna happen. You know, It's it's gonna be a death by a thousand cuts, and it's gonna be like it's gonna be a couple hundred years, Like a Mary's gonna exist in some form or another for a couple

hundred years. Yet, you know, even even if it's just like in even if even if twitter years now, it's just like in name only kind of like the last day is the Holy Roman Empire or something, but it's it's going to exist in some sense, and there's gonna be a guy who's identified as President of the United States like, what kind of cloud he has, what kind of ability he as raised army? I mean, that's that's a different question, but I firmly believe that. But yeah,

go ahead. I'm sorry. I don't mean to monopolize the conversation.

or high deductibles. There are no surprises. You get peace of mind that no insurance company concerns itself with take charge of your healthcare today. With crowd health, open enrollment is the only time you can hit eject on the broken system without penalty, So don't wait, and for a limited time, just ninety nine dollars per month for the first six months when you use promo code pete Q at join crowdhealth dot com. Open enrollment ends January fifteenth,

So sign up today before it's too late. That's join crowdhealth dot com promo code peteq. Crowdhealth is not health insurance. It's a totally different way of paying for healthcare. Terms and conditions may apply. No, we can start. We can start an argument on when the when the Roman Empire started to fall. I mean, some people will say, you know what, you know what Caesar and with the first Caesar. But okay, well here's something I wanted to bring up.

So this book actually talks about violence. It has violence in the in the title, but he also he also talks about social change. He also talks about political change. And from everything you've just said, is the change that would happen in our culture where we were born, where we are, I don't think any of us are. Most

of us aren't planning on going anywhere else. Is going to be social and is going to be political, because that's where sure, if you go back to the War between the States, the War of Northern Aggression, then you can talk about violence, and you can talk about an invasion of a foreign land, but really what started to bring down what we have now was social and political and it was by you mentioned the term culture distortion, invoking Yaki and invoking Spangler. That's what has to be

won back. And I really think, and people are probably sick of hearing me say this over and over again, that that's going to have to start at the most local level, and probably the most local level is in the home and then spreading out to community and going forward like that like that.

That's that's how that that's where women learn, you know, how to like how to like relate to men and stuff and like hold down the household. And women do that. You know, believe that, you know, that's not some conceit,

That's very true. So I don't like people mean down at females, that's where kids like learn you know, how how how to grow up into adult men and women, you know, and uh and and you know and and and the nature of like what you know, what is just and the parameters of obedience like within within you know, within that kind of justice paradigm of command and obedience.

And that's why you know this in a concrete engagement with with what we consider the body politic I mean in Sir Alzheimer, now, I mean, uh as the body politic and anthem has consisted of of like every liked a household, you know, and uh, some of these men were rich and some of them were not so rich. But you know, they all went to war together. They all told the soil together. You know, they all they

all participated in the assembly together. Like this idea of you know, hyper specialization and dividing people into like you know, basically neglecy, dividing people's functions within the same kind of caste, that's that's a recipe that that's that's a recipe for

self destruction, among other things. Because that's Therrel's point is, like, well, then you have this basically parasitic cast of politicians who, even if they themselves aren't aren't wealthy by birth, you know, they they basically become like the clients of wealthy patrons and aside of everything else that's wrong with that, Like these guys don't work, they don't do anything, you know, they're like this, there's this weird leisured class that by

nature's kind of decadences, you know, that develops resentments of the Yalemen ry and vice versa. And uh. In turn, they're dependent upon these kinds of intellectuals and financers, who, in Sorel's view like have more are like in bed together like verbially, you know, and they and you know, these guys view themselves as they they you know, they've they've got their own kind of like resentment and fear of like the Yaleman re or the proletariat like in

Cerel's at Bach. You know, but they themselves are as parasitic as like the political caste, and just as uh and just as prone to intrigues, you know, because they're they're they're their situation is always tenuous, you know, because they're they're they're they're they're they're by definition they're parasitic, you know, they they they rely upon the willingness of uh, of the two other factions they just identified to not just tolerate them, but to sustain them and everything else aside.

Like even if you had a totally like homogenous population, even if at least nominally there was some kind of common culture and common religion like seal religion and like ethics in common, that that's still a create all kinds of weird pathologies, and it would institutionalize social divisions in ways that not that not just their counterproductive, you know, until like a virtual society, even just in practical terms, like what you don't institutionalize social divisions for its own

sake because some endless conversation and endless argument and endless contention is some marvelous thing from which we all benefits. That was that was called Schmid's point about parliamentarism. My wife's dysfunctional, Like on his face, it's there's there's something very ethological about it. I don't mean insinuate these kinds of psychological terms in the discussion, but I can't think of a better way to describe it, because it is it's it's it's uh, it's a maladaptive uh conceived of

of human mind. Is the pray these things. It's not like practical, it's not things that exist and like you know in kind of political reality that we just come upon and have to address. These things are very much cultivated and created and it's very artificial, you know what I mean you see this today, I mean even uh, there's you know these like even if you took away the culture distortion and aspect like look like this, look

like this infotainment garbage. It's job basically is the kind of like is a manufacture like Widge issues us like make people upset about you know, like this isn't stuff that's like emerging when people when people's actual lives or if this isn't stuff that you know, people would uh people would identify as as as being something that you know,

warning their attention and some like oncological capacity. It's like literally just like confabulated and you know, because people are like, uh, you know, even in the best of times, you know, like common people or you know, deal with a lot of certain and like anxiety uh derived therein you know that that's that's kind of formless, you know, something that's just this kind of human condition, you know, when they're plugged into figuratively and literally like plugged into some kind

of media organ twenty or seven. You know, one of the things that satisfies or one of like the needs of fulfills like psychologically and tell them cope with things is like giving form to these kinds of amorphous like negative feelings and anxieties and so it it's it's it's kind of like a these thing are kind of like permanently situated to be, you know, like manipulated by a sort of idol like parasite political cast whose only real role is to kind of is to kind of create

like you know, institutionalized grievance structures, if that makes any sense. And I mean, you know, obviously a high tech and like you know, media like changes all that. I mean, even like radioven for TV, like visual media is a

huge game changer. But even like radio, like the ability to just like literally brought broad being able to broadcast any capacity like coast to coast or like across the European continent, you know, from like Paris to like Prague, like that was that was a game changer, you know, for the reasons I just stated, and that uh that that's one of the reasons why people ask like why why why it's kind of like faux democracy or it's kind of like institutionalized uh, or it's kind of like

institutionalized grievance uh structure. I just identified, like why, why why it seems to like acciomatically coexist with, you know, like the modern like managerial state. Well, I mean the answer is media. I mean, I don't mean a time of reductionists, but I I think i've I think I've invoked the quote before from Natural Born Killers. I really

like National Born Killers. It's a really dope movie, and I I try and turn people onto it because it's not it's not just like gross Quentin Tarantino's stuff or like Oliver Stone like preachy stuff. It's really really insightful and it's really subversive in some ways. But the guy who's uh like the Stark Weather uh like Diliger character, you know, Woody Harrelson, when he's talking like the media guy, he's like, you know, he's like, he's like media is

like the weather, but it's man made. Weather is this thing you're immersed in and you don't even you don't even like notice it. I said, I find myself like not really noticing it. I mean, I discern like what what what's not people's minds and kind of like you like, what's something like the Floyd Craziness George Floyd Crasiness was jumping off. I would discern like this is what people

are thinking about. But it's like I don't even like I don't even always like detect Immediately they're like, well, that's that's the narrative that's being created by what, you know, the media they're immersed in, because they're just like take for granted, you know, and I uh and and speaking of zeitgeys the uh you know, like the day of day uh, like the day day fixations of people like within that like brought a paradigm like that that comes

one hundred percent from media. I mean it plays upon like things like intrinsic to mind, you know, like symbolically and and things really the impulse and appetite and stuff and symbols that are kind of universally resonant in like most basic terms, but in terms of the actual narrative, like the concrete particulars like of those narratives and of like those symbols and like what form they take those totems rare Like that's one hundred percent created by uh by,

by architects of media. And I mean that sounds conspiratorial to people. Whatever I mean, I'm main a sociological observation.

how they want to destroy anything that's anti patriotic. Well, in the process of destroying anything that's anti patriotic, you have to just destroy family, you have to destroy people's religion. And that's exactly what the culture disorders that we you know, that we've talked about, set out to do. And it's

not a conspiracy theory. They wrote, you know, Burnez wrote about about propaganda and that's why you have to have That's why the Internet is the blessing and curse it is because it puts out propaganda, but you can also destroy that propaganda within minutes in real time. But you're basically dealing with culture disorders who are like, Okay, if we are going to have the kind of power over the people that we want, if we are going to be the managers over these people, we have to do

everything we can to destroy this. And it seems like that is something clearly out of the syndicolas, the communist playbook, and even today, people that I know who are the you know, some of the great you know they believe there fighting for freedom and liberty for the individual, don't realize that they're basically on the same side as the syndicolas,

who want to destroy every bit of hierarchy. And as soon as you destroy hierarchy, you are word you're where we where we are now, you're in menagerialism.

that curs spontaneously. There's also the sendingolists who were on the right and some of these guys uh like a lot of these guys actually far really are in Spain on the right, I mean, you know, against the Reds. But they and you found this with with with the Rohm fiction two you know in in uh, in the in the Reich, Uh there's a there's a type of man who like really holds a communist and contempt not just for the kind of more obvious reasons, but because

communism really is just promises. It's kind of like telluric utopia and it doesn't just like rob kind of the you know, our living environment, in our our conceptual space of anything beautiful, edifying or cool, frankly for if you'll forgive the kind of colloquialism. But it also at the end of the day, it's not really heroic because it's just saying essentially, well, you know, technology is gonna usher in this kind of garden of eating of uh of

like productive surplus. You know, we're all gonna have like all the cargo we want, and you know we can we can like eat as much as we want and like sit around as most as we want, and it's gonna be great, you know. And uh, the cynical is you know, part of the reverence for violence and kind of like they're the sorel is. Like, no, the problem with communism is that it's just as decadent as that is, you know, the as the as the bourgeois worldview, you know.

And the function of violence is that, you know, it forces man to be engaged with mortality and and with you know, at least potentially heroic action and like a data day sense. You know, now that can go too far and you get like gangster as dudes as well as cycle passed, as well as some guys who are just kind of like angry and misguided for various reasons. You know they take that to mean like, well, there's just kind of like an endless mersh to like burn

things the fuck down and like fuck people up. And like the most kind of pure iteration of that right now is like isis or whatever isis is like morphing and do currently Okay, you know what you have then is you have like a bunch of mongols. Okay, I mean that and that's not. I mean's all kinds of reasons why that's not. I'm sure some guys are can saying the comments and being like a pussy or something.

It's like, okay, whatever, But I I don't think. I don't think some kind of like endless like you know, mongol rampage against things we don't like. Is is is the way forward? But that is like a real tendency man, And that's why violence does need to be tempered with reason. And I think and and Sorell does not like abandoned reason or something like. That's why he's not he's not. He's not not only is he not an Ichian, but he's not some he was. He was not something like

anti rationalist. Uh you know, uh like fu Cove the write or something at all, you know, I mean that's why, Uh, his issue with uh, you know, is issue with Sobeerrates is that, like Cyberate, he's like, wasn't serving reason, you know, rationalisms, logos, you know, it's it's something entirely different. And you know that's why I, like I said, I'm not an expert at all in the priests of pratics as sure as hell.

I can't read Greek or anything like that. But I do think I've got a pretty decent understanding of Cirel annoying to Cerell and oing a hiag girl like I read a you know, I read the fragments are Clitus

that I mean that do exist. You know, I spend a lot of time with Xeno fun and uh, there's nothing, uh, there's nothing anarchic about what Cerell posits in like a coloaquial sense, you know, I mean, yeah, there's he pertacts with some of the same uh, some of the same intellectual heritage as like actual capital at anarchist did like in his epoch. But he's not he was not at

all a guy like Ron. He was not all a guy who you know, he's not at all some like criminally minded strange person or some or some kind of a Faeries outlier who you know just uh it just just identified like a path to like revolutionary action. I mean that's the way people have to mischaracterize him. I mean, Sorell's probably uh, he's esoteric, like his whole body of

work is. But those that do actually have a deep understanding of a twentieth century European intellectual foundations, they will to very directly attack Cerell and and painted him as like what I just said, like, oh, this guy was like you know, he was he was, you know, he was he was he was something erst Rahm type psychopath, but without the without the medals and the war record and and uh and the body count. And it's not and that's a deliberate slander. I think it's not what

he was at all, you know it. Uh. So that's why there's an there's an enduring the value to uh Sorell, not just to the political soldier. I guess that's what I'm getting. Yet I even argue like kind of hyper modernists and worldly and like secularists as Cerell was. I say that guys like the Iron Guard and Kadriano, who probably had like more in common with Cerell and then what he identified as uh, I mean the kind of Eastern mysticism, uh that you know, the Romanian Orthodox guys

were into. Like obviously Cerell we have like no use for that, but in terms of like within their own kind of cultural paradigm, like what they were trying to accomplish like that, the Currell probably would have like looked approvingly on that more than more than any kind of you know, inner inner war, like you know, radical right movement at least I think so, you know, it's uh, and that's all about Thetic was in Spain, like didn't they didn't they didn't go anywhere like they I mean,

like I said, those guys said guts and they had heart and they fought really hard, and I think their sacrad lice should be honored. But I mean, is the reason why there is there's a reason why I kind of like the dullary Cudgillo Franco this this kind of like reactionary uh like Cruk like went out, you know, I mean, it's not It certainly wasn't because of like

his charisma or like his great mind or something. It was because cynicalism, even if it is tempered by a basic decency, like in moral terms it and isn't just kind of this like orgiastic you know, path like orgiastic cathartic violence or something. It does It does not like lea out Asian for sustainable structures or for like a new kind of like dialectic that's gonna you know, build something in instead. I guess that was a point we're coming up in the hour here, man, Yeah.

to a fanticide. Like there's this there's this mass homicide machine in the Pentagon that just constantly murders thousands of people for the most like ambiguous reasons, you know, like aus it's currently doing to Russia, and people people like cheer that on, like it's just like not only like there was tolerted, Like they get excited about it, but then they'll turn around and to say that, like, you know,

violence is the most horrible thing we can imagine. They you know, they but they don't don't really believe that

they've actually got no real respect for human life. But because they don't, it's it's it's a kind of a it's it's it's a kind of it's it's kind of milk toast aversion to uh, actual sovereign decisionism, like coupled with a kind of a couple of couple with the kind of like un manly like content for human life, where you know that that that kind of like that that kind of identifies uh, you know, living things is a commodities to be exploited, just like everything else. I

mean that's the way I read it. But it's also too like an ethical terms the way peot the way these like uh the way these uh like post war liberals like gen Rawls, they're they're only the eras like Jeremy Bentham and like Bentham, uh you know, the uh, the Enlightenment liberals and demisterra was always uh the people that Demister was always savaging correctly, I mean they they're they're whole there, you hope he is a pointless society, you know, like we talked about before, Like it's it's

it's the ideology the nursing home or like the luxurious prison. It's a place where nothing ever happens. You know, there's no value creation, there's no culture, there's no passion, there's no love, there's no hate. It's like when people like exist like fornicate or present masterbait more properly, you know, like defecate and like and and and and uh and

and eat and sleep and like that's it. But it's it's just wonderful utopia because like you know, nothing bad happen, Nothing quant unquote bad happens I think it's Uh, I think it's the intellectual poverty of the enlightenment project. You know. Couple with that basically kind of see like like agents sanility in terms of uh, in terms of the you know, the the dominant bourgeoisie cultural string like dominant in terms of its ability to like impose its view upon like

the culture as a whole. And yeah, it's obviously it's you know kind of like the culture distorders. Uh, it's it's a primary objective of there is the you know, the kind of like defang like there the people identify as like their mortal like enemies. You know. In one way to do that is the is the kind of you know, condition people against you know, quote unquote violence or like you know, conditionally a tolerance for like all

kinds of horrible stuff. But you know, uh to uh, you know, to condition them away from the ability to like apply violence constructively or in like you know, a political capacity. It's a complicated issue when it's all of those things, but it's uh without those conceits though, like rationalism, like rationalism can't bite anything that doesn't have some like utilitarian you know, like very basically explicable purpose like within its own kind of self referencing paradigm. So like why

would you care about anything enough to be violent? You know, like why why why would you care about redemptive action? Like why would you care about you know, like writing injustice? Like why why would you care about heroism? Like why would you care about like you know, uh, massulain honor? Like none of those things matter because they don't have some kind of utilitarian end that like helps us shit more efficiently or like eat more food or something.

a deranged act of aggression. I mean it's like there's it's one part like delusion and sinility on the part of uh, you know, on the part of uh these clowns in government uh since nineteen ninety two. But part of it is I mean people are, yeah, people are actually I think a lot of people like in these kinds of managerial caadres, they're really like they have twos some fucking stupid and like morally illiterate, like they really believe that like how there, you're not let me punch

you in the face over and over again. Like it's I I didn't realize that for a long time, and then I realized, like these people really are. They're they're crapists. They're like moral creaman's and they're just like a lot of we're just like fucking stupid, Like they're not acting like Joe Biden, like Biden.

kind of like a family business. I'm not like putting shade on Randon Paul. He's a by the only like he's not the only previous Paul. I. I I like it all these days. But but my point is, like I think Head he had like another kind of like path, the clout and money. I I don't think he'd be hanging around Washington. I just don't. I Mean, that's that's all. That's all other people talking on the sociology of the managerial state, like, uh, there's not there's some grand uh

historical project. They buried that project, notwithstanding you know, whether it's world, whether it's war, whether it's World War two or whether it's the Code War, like uh, you know, the point before like Elon Musk forty years ago, he'd be like Jerry Parnell. He would have been you know, heading up some pack and like working hand in glove with the d O d on like SDI and stuff like that. But like I guys like him, like they want anything to do with garment these days, why would they?

Like that's this repository of like losers and like weirdo's frankly you know what I mean that that doesn't matter.

So there's something like lose rich about people that just deciding they hate Elon Musk but he but yeah, I mean the role he's in not just his wealth, but because of like how that wealth is kind of insinuated into things that touch and concern you know, uh, like like you know, technology that at scale, you know, the regimes relying upon. I mean, he's gonna be like a political actor, okay with it. But the reason why, like

he doesn't comment like formal office. So the reason why he's not you know, engage in like think tank stuff is because, yeah, that the end of the Cold War brought an end to the ability of of of the regime to attract none such as he to uh their environs. Yeah. Well yeah, let's uh if you want to do a place,

well that'd be great. Man's up to you. And then we'll after that, well, we'll get back to the Cold War series and take up uh Vina Vietnam era, like what next episode will do whichever you want, like either of those.

But it changed things in all kinds of ways, and that that really was like the hot battle field of the Cold War and all kinds of like militarily put it leap, I mean, culturally it changed things. And we'll

get into all of that. But my point is, like it's not just some it's not just like a question a trivia or some or something something that's like interesting to talk about, like you know, it might be to talk about kind of like you know, the you know, some some kind of like long forgotten you know, war ways by the British Empire or something like it remains really important? Is my point?

is seven. If you search for Thomas seven seven seven, I think you'll find it. But uh, you'll find me on substack at real Thomas seven seven seven dot subsec dot com. I've been canceled from uh t gram, which is a ship uh company. In my opinion, I was a paid subscriber in a you know mind you They welcome garbage, like you know, hardcore pornography and like really

disgusting like boor stuff. But it's run by some Zionist crowd, like and apparently like the crime of like criticizing uh Somali of the Earls West known as Ukraine as like a chancellorable offense. So I've got no use for that. I wish people would. Uh. There's plenty of other chat options popping up, including a substack itself. Uh, you can join my substack chat for free. They it's it's a

lot more user friendly than t gram. They don't censor anybody, and we've got total control of it because it's incident to my t gran, my subject account and subjects.

where people abuse me. And I've gotten really disgusting and awful communications from from these like Ukrainian sickos and like other people. Man, like there's it just really grows stuff. I mean, like I I cannot, I don't know, you know, play murder or something. But this idea that like well t gram kind of sucks, but you know, it's good for other things. It's not a good platform, man, And it's it's a repositive Malbourne spy Wars spywear. It's always

fucked up like the user or it's bought. Hell yeah, man, it's a ship hole and people I don't know why people are like so attached to it. It's like what do you what are you getting out of this? But whatever, So yeah, that's no more. I will never return there. But yeah, forgive the rant, but that's definitely can find me. My My second novel, which is the second Steel Storm novel,

is gonna drop in January. I do hope you went asking what that, but you know that that's all I got for no And thank you very much everybody you throw all the kind feedback.

into the substick ship. It's basically like the core of guys and a few ladies, and we we appreciate them being among us. Stop. Uh. It's basically like the t Grand mob like basically migrated there. But there's still something holdouts. And I don't know if they're fucking massiveness or what. It's like quite the freaking t gram Man it's bad for you. Yeah, it's bad for you. But yeah, again, I can't thank you enough man, and I I'm really stoked that people have been so excited about this, this

this series. And yeah, well we'll get into we'll get into uh, we'll get into the Vietnam War next episode, and then we'll get back to Sorel and reflections on violence.