Get ready.
It looks like it's the twenty eighth day of August twenty twenty four, allegedly, according to that thing we call a calendar, this the o'celli effect. You probably hearing us via the podcast, but we do this live, and it does happen to be a Wednesday, right, Wednesday, Yeah, that's.
The correct day.
I got to turn my head and look at the calendar to tell me what day it is, because some days blend into others.
Anyway, enough of my problems.
It is Wednesday, it's the middle of the week, and we've had an interesting broadcast week so far. But we're going to resume a conversation that I should have resumed last week, but you know, some of us weren't feeling good and it was not the week to do it. This week is the week to do it. Who do we have with us? Well, returning once again Larry Hancock, who I'm more than happy to break down a discussion over guess what a familiar topic.
Lee rv. Oswald.
We've been doing this because the Oswald puzzle Pieces. That is the title now, right, Larry Oswald puzzle.
Pieces, now, just the Oswald puzzle.
I do that every time. The Oswald puzzle. That's what it is.
And I know I do it every time and I realize it after I say it. But anyway, the Oswald puzzle, and it is a puzzle. That is the name of the book that should be out pretty soon. Not exactly clear on a release date at least, I'm not. Do you have a release date yet, Larry.
No, we don't. The book.
The manuscript is going to the publisher officially in two days at the end of this month, so really, you know, it begins the publishers schedule, right and so very clean. It's been intensely edited. That ought to speed things up. One of the interesting things though, is David's been working
on this, Rex has been working on it. The publisher has given us the is allowing us to have a pretty large photo section, and as you can understand, Chuck, it takes a good bit of time to come up with to address the use privileges for photos to get a generation of copy that's suitable, so we also have a deadline.
For that, but we're close to all of that.
So the publisher will begin working on it next month, and it just spends on when it fits into their schedule. It's hard for me to see it other than a twenty twenty five release because of the process they have to go through, but I think it'll be relatively early in twenty twenty five.
Well, there you go, and I'm definitely looking forward to this because, as we've talked about pretty much throughout this entire year, this is a re examination, another examination, because it's not like you haven't looked into the character the
historical character of Leo rvey Oswald before. You certainly have, but it was time for a reevaluation, a clean look again, and you march back into this knowing that you know there's a lot more to be known now because of a documentation that's been released, other people's work that might have furthered this that or the third thing, a few
mysteries might have been cleared up, et cetera. And in fact, we're going to talk about one of those specific mysteries tonight with another gentleman who will also be involved with the Lancer Conference in November, that's November twenty second to the twenty fourth of this year, and he'll be in person there, so he's got to put up with me.
David Boylan Okay, and I know he'll be presenting there and he's joining us to actually help us through something here, because we talked about a lot lot of the process here, a lot of the things that go on when it comes to oh, let's just say people getting involved with Well, there used to be less intelligence agencies, but still, whether it's today or it's sixty years ago, there was always a vetting process, a clearing process that people went through,
and we wind up talking about a lot of characters who were useful to or were sources, or maybe they were sources and methods themselves. Okay, depending on who we're talking about, for various operations, especially at the height of the Cold War, we're going to talk a lot about the vetting process, the clearing process.
The examination. How is it that we know who it is we're dealing with.
Is a legitimate source, is somebody that can be trusted, can't be trusted?
How useful are they? A lot of ways to go about it.
I mean, as I mentioned to you guys just before going to air, I even applied and I know this always sounds strange, but I applied for a job with the NSA and well, let's see, in two thousand and one, and well, you know, they had a whole thing where they wanted to talk to family members and neighbors, and they were going to investigate me to give me a
low level nothing job. You know, if they were going to hand me something sensitive, if they were going to involve me in you know, some stuff that really the public is not supposed to know, or something that might be counterintelligence, something that might be you know, various types of intelligence operations. They would have to know exactly who they were dealing with, what my entire background was, all
that stuff. Meanwhile, I was going for a low level job, and I swear they wanted to talk to my second grade teacher.
You know. It was weird.
And I knew other people who went through the process, and they told me stories about them going beyond that and investigating them and so on and so forth.
Again.
In some cases, I mean, one guy was pretty much like a tour guide at an NSA facility, and you know, he was exposed to next to nothing except you know, showing people the building, the facility and all that. And meanwhile they dug into his background so deep it was it was kind of disturbing. But anyway, sounds like somebody trying to do their job, and maybe we should know exactly who we're dealing with when they're close to something sensitive.
That almost sounds like responsible behavior anyway, Is that always the case? I don't know, But this is what we're going to talk about him. Why because well, Lee Harvey Oswald touches upon is involved in He's around people like
this at various times. And also, by the way, you go to Larry Dashancock dot com and whether that book comes out in twenty twenty five or somehow makes it at the end of the year or whatever, you can definitely get Larry's existing works that are already out there or this brand new one which I know I'm already going to recommend, as I do recommend all of Larry's stuff, as I say all the time, he takes up a large portion of the bookshelf I keep behind me here
and definitely well worth the price of admission any of Larry's work, whether it's about the Kennedy assassination or gee,
let's just pick a couple of other topics. Unidentified creating chaos, if you want to look at shadow warfare, the various behaviors of intelligence communities assets, how they react to things, etc. Well, Larry's written volumes and volumes on it, plus a couple things about the Kennedy assassination, just saying like tipping point, and of course someone would have talked all of that.
And I recommend all of Larry's work. But if you go to Larry.
Danishancock dot com you can check out his work, his blog, etc. And I advise you to do so. Oh and by the way, Larry will be involved with the Lancer conference as well as he has been for many years. And although you'll be there remotely, I understand, Larry, glad that you're involved and really happy always that you've been involved with the Lancer conferences that I've.
Been involved with.
So anyways, now that I've said all of that and a bunch of mouthfuls, I need to shut up and kind of turn it over to you.
Larry. What is it that we need to understand here?
And we have David here specifically to help us through a couple of things. And I'm glad also David that you're here. You're you're a rare guy on the show, and I appreciate you taking.
The time to do this.
But where should we begin explaining this? You know nexus of people. Again, I like that that title. That word another one of Larry's book titles. Anyways, So back to it,
How do we begin to explain this? What is a way to introduce use somebody who is completely uninitiated, or even somebody who has a vague understanding of what it is they might encounter when trying to study Lee Harvey Oswald and the well, the people that surrounded him, the people that you know, brought him to whose attention at what time, and all of that outside of the defection, et cetera, et cetera.
Where should we begin with this?
Larry, I think.
Really the place to begin, Chuck is well, in my part is partially an apology, but it's something that's been symptomatic in the community, as it were, is that we've tossed around words.
We've tossed around words.
Like asset or source or informant or even spy without defining them and kind of taking it for granted that.
We knew what we were talking about.
And actually, when we're talking about an organization like the Central Intelligence Agency, that's the wrong way to approach it. The Central organize, the CIA is very professional organization, very structured, very bureaucratic. Oftentimes even for its it's UH staff frustrating because of its degree of security that that it oversaw the degree of the approvals process.
Uh.
Lots of people that were in field operations were routinely frustrated by how slowly it moved.
UH.
And I think what we have.
Neglected to do is really understand the process for that went along with these various words that we have just thrown around casually.
You and I have talked before.
It's like when you paint with a broad brush, you miss things and you make mistake.
Uh. When you talk about the mob.
Or the mafia or the CIA, just in broad terms, UH, you're always making a mistake. So I think one of the things we'd like to do, and in the course of working on the OSLO puzzle, both David and I have gone through a much deeper exploration of these sorts of things than certainly I had done before. And one of the reasons that we've been able to do it
is that David has had access. We have had access to so many CIA documents where you literally can trace the path of individuals through their spotting by the CIA, by their identification, you know, just entering in the system as an individual that's known.
Then okay, perhaps they might be some use. How would they be a some use?
And all the way through to the point of which takes a long time to get them what's called provisional operational approval, and then, for heaven's sakes, to actually get them to assigned to an operation, and to understand that some people carried operational approvals, were never used, weren't used for a period of two or three months, and then put on the shelf. This is not the kind of simplistic world that we've often written.
About in the JFK community.
And so what we would like to do is to walk through the process, give some examples, and explain how it works, how that the CIA worked in identifying people and clearing them for certain levels of activity as well as actually using them. But one of the things, and this is a this is something I was actually quite surprised for. Obviously, the CIA doesn't just call somebody in and decide they're going to use them for something if they don't have the right background.
I mean, that's.
Almost a couple of examples that we're going to talk about here, David. We'll talk about the right background means be related to somebody, a business relationship, a family relationship, a trusted relationship, an established pattern of communications where people are talking with each other that makes someone interesting. Okay, but if that doesn't exist, you just don't call someone and say, oh, okay, we need to get close to.
Somebody we know, you don't know them.
Go do it.
Yeah, that's that would not be a professional approach to things. So a lot of this starts with actually just building hundreds and hundreds and thousands.
Of files of people that might be of interest.
They're doing something, they live somewhere, they're associated with some one, and you open a two oh one file and I can remember when I first got into this and people were going, well, Oswall had a two to oh one file, so.
It must be he was a spy. No, No, that's not what it means.
You don't understand. But early on it's like, well, that's that seems reasonable. Let's see I he's got a file on him, right, Okay, why would they have a file on him? Well, you know, like you might ask when was that file created and where was it created?
And then when you find out that.
It was created when he went to Russia and it resided in the counterintelligence group. You go, oh, well, geez, if they were doing their job, they better. He's in the newspapers, for lord's sake, He's in the newspapers. He's in State Department memos. If if the CEI did not have a file on him, someone is grossly incompetent, you know.
So now that's not all that suspicious.
But so what I'd like to do is just kind of have asked David to walk through the process. You know, Okay, there's a two oh one file. What are the steps that happen between there being a two to oh one file and the CIA actually using someone in an operation? And he's he's done enough work on these people that we actually have links to documents and can illustrate how.
This process goes on.
So I just like to turn it over to him and have him go through the process and give some examples.
Right now, as a parallel to this, we have to be careful again not to paint with the sloppy brush, because you have specific terms, specific definitions, specific classifications for people for operations, et cetera. And these are not inconsequential. Like you said, and like we've said many times, you know, people use these very generalized, sort of odd terminologies, broad
ideas about what things mean, et cetera. You know, simply because someone was in somebody's proximity doesn't necessarily mean that they were operationally connected. Although if that was a useful thing, that's another issue. Right, But you know, again, as we go, right, people used to have used the word handler quite often in order to explain, well, here's somebody who had, you know, a background already, we can establish they were involved in certain things.
They get involved with someone who's sort of new to the.
What shall we call it the landscape at the time, and they automatically assume in a lot of people's writings and statements that that person's a handler for this person. That's not necessarily true. Whether they interacted with them or not is one thing, But what their specific purpose for interacting with them is that needs to be defined as we go. So everything needs to be carefully established as you go. You need to understand the terms, and you
need to be able to read these documents. That's another thing. These things are not in the plainest of language, you know, where it's like, well, operationally, this person controls what this person gets to know and they give the orders. These documents don't read like that. They read in a much different way. Plus you have cryptonyms. All kinds of stuff goes into this interpretation, and it is very specific. It's not written to be broad like you know, you and
I talked about. Well, they just say organized crime and they move on. That is a really bad definition. For somebody who has a criminal background, it may or may not be organized crime, you know, simply because they have a criminal background. Again, that's a different you know, sub section, if you will. But when it comes to this sort of thing, you've got to be very specific because people
serve specific purposes. One part of the agency might see somebody in one way, they might see them in another way.
The two on one file is a great example.
You know, two on one file just means effectively, you're an interesting person to the agency.
That's all that that means.
Back then, as far as I understand, it doesn't necessarily infer that you are working for them, that you're their agent. You're just a person of interest. Now I might have that wrong, and you guys, might you know, help me clear this up. But I'm pretty certain that's the way that goes. And there's a lot more to this as we go, Larry, Yeah.
Go ahead, Yeah, I checked to elaborate on that.
And again we often forget that the agency, like every company, is for a task oriented. A person might be in ato a one file and just setting there and somebody might come across it and go, oh, I've been assigned to this project and I need a resource. Okay, we're going to take this person, and we're not going to necessarily put this into two to oh one file because that's a general reference file within my functional area. Let's
say it's the director of operations. I create an entirely new file for this person because now I'm thinking about using them for something specific. And there's going to be a project that this is related to, you know, because we get project, we have to fund it. We've going to you know, there's a case offer, this case officer that's going to be assigned to this group or to this and they have tasks and this is all again.
Very organizationally structured.
So there might there may very well be a two to oh one file that is entirely compartmentalized from a group within the agent's that actually decides to investigate this person, and may ultimately use him. So that's very important to keep in mind. Compartmentalization. Why compartmentalization. Were they worried about us, No, they weren't worried about us getting into their files. They were worried about the bad guys, the Soviets, the you know,
Eastern European intelligence agencies. You know, we compartmentalized information for that, for that level. But I guess the one other thing that I would like to throw out is that.
Even when someone.
Gets approval operational approval and is used on a mission or for a task, they can then be put back on the shelf if there's nothing useful for them at the moment, if there's nothing pending. Yeah, they were cleared, but they were taken off operational aproof because we don't have a project for them at the moment. And the fascinating thing about that is they could still be assigned to a case officer. They're no longer operational. They might
even be paid, but they're not. They're not operational, and at that point in time, they can go off and do whatever they want to do. Uh.
They're They're fascinating.
They We have examples of them actually telling anecdotal stories about Oh, my case officer had no idea I was going and breaking into Watergate. Oh okay, my case officer had no idea that I was going to Libya and making explosives trigadav Oh nope.
Uh, you know, but we thought you were.
Yeah, I was, but I wasn't working for them at the moment. And so that's something you often we often timing is very important. It's kind of like where they cleared, were they operational? Were they not at a given point in time. The timelines are always critical.
Right, and when objectives change and things like that, you're you're revolving carousels of Cubans, right. They might be useful one month, the next month, the objective changes, regime change, somebody that they were trying to get at is no longer important, et cetera, et cetera. Maybe they're trying to deal with another foreign nation that could be involved with Cuba. Now they don't need to because that whole situation has
been taken care of in some other way. And these things are all subject to change as they go on. And like you said, they could still be on the payroll, on the books, or maybe just sitting on the shelf waiting, and.
These guys have lives.
I mean, you know, not to be too snarky about it, but you know some of them go on to do other things.
Because they're not going to make it.
There you go, you know, and some of them just go around talking themselves up and confusing us even more. Frank Sturgis comes to mind. Anyways. So with all that in mind, David, now that you've had all this dumped onto your lap, yeah, go ahead.
I'll be back later, David.
Have fun there you go.
Fascinating conversations, guys. You know, I was just listening and you guys hit right on the head. So I could probably be covering six terms here. Now you do a lot of reading and write from the docs just to make sure I get it right. How they explained it, how the CIA explained it. Beck the House Fleck Committee on Assassinations interviewed William Larson. Here's the chief of the
Information Management staff. Really interesting guy, answered all the questions, gave a lot of good information and it was classified secret of course because no. He explained how the filing system for a lot of these documents and where they went and.
Who started them.
So going through that is just a mine, I can send you guys the link or if Chuck puts it up afterwards, so here we can do the wrong reading on it. So one of the first files I want to subjects I want to cover is a two on one file. What is a two on one file? How he describes it, William Larson, the chief goes, it's a folder or a dacia and which information about individual is collated. There could be an interest, it could be a target, could actually be a staff officer of the CIA would
also have a two on one file, he said. If there is a counter intelligence interest, a file would be opened in the course of running a trace. If so you get a trace, you get a case officer saying, I want to run a trace on this guy. Let's open a two on one file. Whether he's a target or a potential agent as they call him. They're going to open a two on one file, and they should open one automatically. If they're five or more files that a two on one file shoul to be open. So
I run a trace on a guy. When I come back with five hits, I said, WHOA, all right, we're gonna open a too on one file. You know, that's how they're supposed to do it as the bureaucrats. They're saying, So Oswald had a too one file. She had a first request came in in October of fifty nine, like saying, all right, who is this guy? And it took the CIA of a little over a full year. It was December of nineteen sixty that they actually opened the too one file on that we know about. That would be
from Anne Editor from the Counterintelligence SIG Office. She's the one that actually started the file on Oswald. And that's what where we get there. She opened it up, so you actually call them Lee Henry Oswald. That's where that came from. So you get a tool one file. Now, if you're going to use this person or whether there what they call witting or unwitting, unwitting, you know we're using you.
You have no idea we're using you.
Winning is said, Yep, I'm gonna I'm gonna do what you tell me to do. I know I'm working for the CIA, you know, So you become a witting.
Participant there to do that.
There's a couple of uh forms, believe it or not, you know, in the pureaucracy he had they have to fill out. It's a pr Q one and two part one, Part two. S Larry mentioned there's a lot it's a bureaucracy. A PRQ is a personal record questionnaire.
A pr Q. I'm gonna read rate here from one.
Yeah, just so you know, I am going to include notes including, uh, the stuff on Larson, what he said, exactly what you just said. I'm putting it in the live chatroom at o'celli dot com, so you can always roll that back or it'll be in with the show notes to this podcast. Uh, just so you can follow along with some of this up and uh yeah, now we're onto uh the the green list in pr Q part one, all right, which is the next link I have here to uh to share after the one that's in the chat.
So go go right ahead, David, Yeah, sure, stop me anytime I tend to ramble here.
You're doing great.
A pr Q part one.
It's really just basic information and it's the guy's name, is he married with, is he lived? So it's just a small small piece of information. And they add the pr Q Part one to the two one file so you can see how a two O one file is the you know, your master file. This is where everything accumulates. Pr Q two usually filled out, got a lot more information. It's when it's almost like a personality file. Who are they, they're working for us, what's the job?
A little bit more information there.
So me describing the the two oh one file as you know, look, you're a person of interest. Now we get into the specifics and you actually give us a good example of what is the es Minosa green list in p r Q part one, and then we have a good example of Emilio Rodriguez for the p r Q part two as as references here, right, yes.
Yeah, well we probably get into a little bit about Melia Rodriguez.
She became to do.
A whole show on him. But yeah, go yeah.
Basically an agent that became a staff officer. He's just kind of progressed. He went from just an agent that was being very helpful to being a contract officer for the CIA becoming a staff agent where he's actually getting paid and gets retirement.
So that's how he started.
So, but he had the classic two o one file, Part one, Part two green list and in the part this is a key when we start to look at the pr Q part two, this is where they list whether you are an unwitting or witting asset or agent, which is key. Oswald had a too Part two. They would say whether he was a witting or unwitting agent, so that would be clear.
But we don't have a part two that we know about.
You see that or it's been cleaned from the file, Larry, have you ever seen anything like that?
Now, as a matter of fact, you might think that was suspicious, but it's only suspicious if you I mean, if he's unwitting, you don't really need it because anybody can add access to his tuoh one file and use it. The fact that the fact that there is not one there suggests.
Either they hit it and forgot to idde the two oh one.
Right, you know, it's like, okay, yeah, we're gonna admit that we had a file on this guy, which is going to sound suspicious, but we're just going to hide the fact that he was witting by you know, doing away with these the green lists and the you know, the polygraph tests and the background check, so you'll you won't know for sure.
We'll destroy all that.
But no, as far as I'm as far as I'm aware of, nobody has ever found any paperwork beyond the basic TUO one.
File right exactly, and looking at the green list. We've looked at the two one pr Q POT one Part two. How green list is can we find anything detrimental on this person? Again, it's in a form they fill out goes in your tool one file and they usually have the results there. They send an inquiry to the FBI saying, hey, is this guy clean? Anything you can find the old
JM wave wave. They'd also send it to the Miami Police Department, you see, if these guys been arrested FBI, they'd also send it to what they call staffty internal.
Is this guy okay?
You know?
Can we use this person for whatever project we want to use? So if you get a clean now pr Q one and two get your greenlist started, they will give you a provisional operational approval. That means, yep, this looks good. We're gonna use this person for infiltration into Cuba, you know.
So, you know, David not tonsert too much, but I would say.
If they followed procedure certainly in greenlisting Oswald to in pursuing him as an you know, as an asset, they should have greenlisted with an investigation that there should be an inquiry to the Navy, an inquiry to the Marines. Uh, there should there should be inquiries at various places where they were.
Doing a background check. So just just keep in.
Mind if they are doing this sort of thing, even at the most minimum level for vetting, they should be doing background checks. If they're not, it's strange because nobody takes anything for granted. Uh, you know, and and Oswald certainly had a history in the Marines.
That would have raised some security issues.
I can think of many people that I've seen bounced by CIA security for less less problems than Oswald heading the Marines, not to mention his his you know, any background beyond that, but in any event, so they don't do this in isolation.
I think this is.
The picture of the you know that CI is all so secret that we could never know because they never reach out and touch anybody.
But that's not the way this works.
They might have also gone deeper. I mean, he's not an old guy at this point, you know, Like I always point out, he only lived to be twenty four years of age, so still plenty of access to his early life. They could have done like I was talking about, with the NSA investigation, you know, just checking background, looked into his family life, his known associates. Was he around people that maybe you know, would have made him an undesirable asset in one way or another for certain operations.
You would need to know these things.
Considering that he was still a young man, you know, so he might still be quite quite in touch with some of the people that he knew as a teenager, et cetera.
What what does his.
Immediate family do, uh, you know, siblings, parents, these kind of things might have been looked into as well.
David right, Yes, there would have been reports of actually, you know, people being interviewed, you know, so the first things that would have happened. The green list, you know, would have triggered a bunch of inquiries. So if he passed the green list, you know, he was good enough, then he would have given given an operational approval. Chances I would have get paid to once he passed the
operational approval. See yep, he's an asset. Agent can be used for this particular project for six months a year, two years, and we could paid one hundred and fifty dollars a month. That's used to be the going rate. You see a lot of people getting that amount.
Well, and I was, I don't like to go too deep theoretically, David. But fact is, people point out all the time, you know, this situation where he's defecting to the Soviet Union in quotes I'll put it because you know, did he properly defect? No, but you know his whole episode there, that in and of itself is something that could have triggered a whole bunch of stuff here. And is that, you know, not something that would have also come up because a lot of people say, well, he
was part of the false defector program. Well, if indeed he was, there should be some other paperwork here in this two a one file, right, if it's all being retained in the same spot, if it's all actually kept together, there should be some other existing documentation here Or am I wrong about that?
Oh, you're right, there's also you know, looking at Larsons again recommended you read that, he said throws, so go shadow files and soft files. The case officer may keep at his desk, not necessarily or her a desk like annd eager not sending the information to the tool one the central repository. They may keep that close to the vest, so that's also an interesting thing to look at. They also keep a lot of handwritten notes the case officer that may not make it.
Into the tool one file.
So there's always that, you know, but again there's the bureaucracy, and there should be a lot more files. If he was being a witting asset, maybe they just took.
Him out of his tool on one file, similar to what the FBI might do with informants of all types. Right you have confidential informants, and you have you know, sort of a secret informants and so on and so forth, and the FBI in some cases would have that stuff, maybe only at a certain level. It doesn't necessarily go all throughout the agency because it's only useful to the guys in you know, pick a city, Chicago or New Orleans or wherever.
It's only useful to them, So they might have notes on it.
They might have a binder sitting there that isn't necessarily collected right away with that person's general file, but it's useful to people that are in control of operations, you know, in a very direct sense, and they might use informants that they never you know, they that they identify later under a code or whatever, but that doesn't necessarily attach directly to somebody's named personnel file right away, right or at least that that's my understanding.
Historically, Eventually two tiers their check at least one is if this person has been pulled for assigned to a project. Let's just say there's a false effective project somebody is running that it's going to involve multiple people. There's going to be record keeping on this project to even ascertain if it's working. You know, again corporate level approach, Is it working, how many people that we send in, how much information are we going to back?
Should we keep funding it? It's high risks.
So there's going to be a project file that rolls up some of this information. But then there will also be a case officers file, as David said, and that will be a soft file. That will be a soft file that will be in somebody's desk, well, when we had a desk, it'll be in a lot filing cabinet that's going to be giving the details of the communication with that person, the instructions that have been given to
that person. And one of the things that we that we have to acknowledge is soft files never go to headquarters unless there's some special reason to go to headquarters. In fact, one of the HSCA one of the things that they've noted is that there were individuals where they actually found a record that there had been a soft file on a certain on a certain individual, something special was going on operationally with that individual. For example, they found a soft file listing it's just a list of
you know, we're maintaining these out in the world. One of them was for Roy Hargrave's which is kind of fascinating, but you're never going to get that file unless somebody collects it in real time. And the Warrant Commission didn't know about those things, didn't even though to.
Ask for it.
They just went to the CIA central filing systems. And not to jump too much over what David is doing now, but I was always amused when I.
Was writing about.
CI operations in uh counter terrorist activities that the CIA got very upset. Headquarters got very upset because the field was training in Afghanistan.
Feel us, we're training.
Afghani volunteers to go fight the Russians and build IEDs and use sniper rifles, and Headquarters thought that was kind of dangerous because these were real radical Islamist and what else might they do with that training? So they wrote to project, they wrote to the field and said, you know, stop that. Well, actually, years later a soft file turned up, and all this all file reflects was that the senior agent in charge said, Okay, we've got orders not to
do this. My order to you is not to report it. So just we don't we confuse ourselves when we think that the the central files CIA files, or the solutions of the world's problems.
It's kind of like the FBI office files.
If you don't have the FBI office files, you really don't know what was going on. And do you think they told Hoover everything? No, they did not, and CIA field operations didn't tail headquarters everything either. Right, And it's right, David, I tromped all over your process.
Gives me a chance to breathe them up. Yeah.
Yeah, But but David, maybe a quick explanation. Okay, so a soft file, I mean we should get from the inferences what that actually is and what we mean by that. You know, it's it's one of these things that doesn't necessarily go through the whole system, but is a notation somewhere, and again, like Larry points out, you know, in some cases, okay, well you know what, they don't they don't want us to do that. If we don't report it, they don't
know we're doing it anymore. These kind of things occur, right, and again, this is a bit of a confusing world that you get into here, because it's not as simple as okay, this person is just an agent now, or they are an agent. There's financial files also. Somebody's got to keep track of the money, and in various cases we found that there might be financial traces here that reveal that obviously there was more going on than say,
was preserved in a file regarding an operation. Because you're spending money in eight different places here, you're describing two operations. Obviously there's more stuff going on here. Either that or we're just paying people for nothing. Something's going on there. And sometimes you get things like that right where you have a financial record emerges. My favorite example of that, of course, is the mk Ultra stuff, you know, where we wouldn't even know about that if it wasn't for
the fact that the financial files had not been destroyed. Right, So, you know, how do we tackle that whole issue of just because you know there's an absence of evidence here or there, doesn't mean that it couldn't exist somewhere else. And what about these soft files? I mean, what are the the the possibilities here regarding you know, somebody being a witting or unwitting asset at certain points and big
difference between asset and an agent as well. So how do you break that down, you know, and explain the soft files sort of to somebody who's like going, what does that mean?
Yeah?
Kind of like it's like, you know, I I have a yellow pad paper, I get a phone call of writing down things on here. I may or may not type this up and send it to headquarters for distribution, right just you know, so lots of explains a lot of guys they just get backed up.
And they don't want to go through the paperwork. You know, they're busy.
You know, some of these guys have a lot of case officers, have a lot of agents.
They work, and they're very busy.
A lot of them are traveling, a lot of them going down to sites and things like that, and so a lot of it's phone call which they may or may not write down.
A lot of it's pat a lot of it's handwritten.
If you look at a lot of the documents too, there's a lot of handwritten notes on documents, and some of them actually put the tool one number at the top of the document for a particular assets, so they can file that in the tool one file a copy of it the too on one file. But sometimes a lot of times they don't, so you're not that's not going to hit the tool one file and may get distributed to a small subset of people, or just may
not get distributed at all. That's essentially what a soft file turns into is like I'm not sure what I'm going to do with this. It's not official enough to actually send it to headquarters, documented and putting the Information Management staff system. So that's essentially soft file is same thing with the shadow violence similar to a soft file, very similar.
Okay, there must be again, there must be a project that this doesn't occur at random. The case officer had to be assigned to a project in which this person is being used.
Uh, you know, and this is for a witting person.
Now, that doesn't mean there can't be a project that's handling unwitting people. Okay, but assuming that they've been cleared, you know, and assuming they're going to be paid paid through you know, deniable mechanisms. They're all paid through covers and with deniability. I think one of the funniest examples we run across is in the Garrison investigation. Garrison was investigating this one Cuban exile that had been working on infiltration missions as a guide because he actually had a
history as a smuggler. Okay, Garrison turns up an application, a credit application for a car, and the guy has written down employer, Central Intelligence Agency.
You gotta love this. You got whoever the guy's case officer was.
It's just that's this sort of thing that would drive you nuts. Did I not get the message across to you people that you were not really working for us? But it doesn't exist in a fact, none of this occurs in a vacuum. It doesn't occur unless the process that David has gone through, the two to one, the two levels of.
P r Q one and two, the green listing.
In many cases, if these guys are going to be operational in the field, uh, we didn't discuss it, but something called fluttering is required. They're going to have to be polygraphed. That's just routine practice to vet their backstory. So none of this happens to anybody who's going to have a WIT. I mean, this all goes with somebody who's going to be witting and operation operationally used in.
A specific product project.
You could hold somebody in that file as unwitting forever and just monitor what they're doing until you turn this process on. Then you may turn the process on and cut it at some point before you even approach them. But it's you know, there is a processed flutter.
Essentially, it's a line detect to test.
They gave these to a lot of their early recruits for the Bay of Pigs, what they what they call the Cadre back then first forty fifty people that can a detective test and they would send the results to headquarters and this would be put into you two on one file. And we have quite a few examples of that now even you know where they were a little bit off in there, you know, light detective test. So that's you know, in their two on one files also, HM okay.
And that that's especially true, I think David Will. These were guys that they expected infiltrate into Cuba, and you have to worry, you know, you're worrying about whether they're sincere or not. Right, we're taking these folks that are supposed to be virulently anti Castro, well are they really?
And in all honesty, you would probably I can't swear, I've not seen a file, but I would suspect that they did that for routinely, for anybody that was doing that kind of infiltration, because you've run a real risk of, oh, you're anti this or that. We recruit you, we train you, you send we send you in, and immediately we see you on the news talking about these evil Americans. You know, you really want to avoid that. You want to know that they're sincere.
Right, right, Yeah, So that's for the people that actually made it to the United States. A lot of the agent's assets in Cuba couldn't get a you know, light detective test because there's nobody there to give them a light detective test.
So had to do what they could with who's living there.
You know, all right, and now when Oswald bumps up against a whole lot of people that clearly would have had to have gone through a lot of these processes because they're activists, Uh, they're involved in the anti Cuban or excuse me, the anti Castro Cuban stuff, and so on and so forth. Uh, you know, when he bumps up against Berengear, et cetera. I mean, he's got to get mentioned in some of these other places. They have to note this guy. They ran into him. They got
it to a one file on them. So you've got somebody who was a person of interest running up against another person of interest. Whether it happened to organically or somebody orchestrated it, this should be noted somewhere, you know, and and so on and so forth. So, I mean, there's a lot of things here, and I'm wondering, how is it that we tie.
This to this historical figure.
You know, this discussion we've had so far, we've been pretty general and open about it and given people a lot of ideas about possibilities. But what is it that that you see in these files now.
That maybe was not.
So readily obvious not so long ago, David, I mean, what what is new here and what is confirmed from old ideas, et cetera, et cetera. What do we know about Oswald based on being able to track these things?
This way.
Actually it's with the old negative template that Peter Dale Scott said.
It's a lack of that should be there.
Some of the people in New Orleans he had contact with, sorry cough, we're actually CIS assets that we talked about. Then they were winning CIS assets. The perfect example is Sylvio Odio's Sylvia Odio's uncle Augustine Guitot. He was actually well when he was at Oswald's quarter a parents and he was also at this time a cutout working for.
Kyle Trenton, who.
Works for the Desmond Fitzgerald's Special Affairs Staff CIA in headquarters. So I mean, there should be something in his two O one file, which we have, but there's a lot of us things that are still redacted in Guitot's TO one file. So I find that amazing. Frank Martes was also at Oswald's court apparents, and he actually confronted Oswald outside the court, you know, said you know you're a you're a danger, and things like that. A month later he's denying he ever met him, even know who he was.
So that's when Larry and I suspect, like, was Oswald in play at that time?
You know?
So there's some Again there's no gaps and Martes's file he ended up being a CIS asset and going into the Congo as a pilot, you know, to fight the the Cubans there as an anti Castro Cuban. So there's still be gaps in some of these two oh one files, you know.
So I think an example we've seen over and over again, if a case officer has these Cubans as assets, one of the things that you constantly see showing up in reports.
I mean, one of.
Their major jobs is to report anyone who's suspected of being a Castro supporter, right, we see over and over again, just rumors and gossip because that's what they're out there to do, circulating the community and pass on information about you know, they don't know what anybody may do with it, but their job is to pass on to their case officers any information of that nature where the person is overtly a supporter of Castro clandestinely a supporters perspectives, that's
what they're supposed to be doing, so there should be reports. As David said, these guys are verifiable assets and they're reporting on everything else. It's like, wait a minute, you're reporting on everything else, and this is the one thing that you didn't report on the guy that's on TV and radio and you were to court his parents and you didn't say anything to anybody about it.
Clearly they did.
It's it's virtually impossible to think that there weren't reports at the case officer level, because that's what they're there to do. And quite frankly, uh, their credibility depends on their being in place, and they're seeing those sorts of things. We see them and we've written about this. We see them writing on Cubans coming into town that they suspect or you know, they're they're they're very vocal. And the funny thing is several of them report both of.
The CIA and of the FBI, you know, So.
It's not that they that there's a whole gap of missing information for that period of time.
Now there isn't.
There is only a missing gap pertaining to Oswal's activity. But that's kind of mirrored, Chuck by the fact that we won't get into the home Mexico City mess here. But the thing is that clearly information on Oswell is being compartmentalized, because when Oswell shows up in Mexico City. Nobody tells Mexico City Station anything about this sort of stuff, like, oh, wait a minute, Okay, yes, he's back in the United
States and here's what he's doing. Nope, And I'm not going to talk about this now because we spend way too much of my life in the book talking about Mexico.
City, right, David.
But it's like, clearly this is intentional, and Morley and Newman dug this all out of testimony, and clearly there's clearly there is compartmental as a compartmentalization of information, which is why I brought up early on the fact that we would expect there would be things that are not in his consolidated too oh one file because somebody somewhere else in the agency decided to make use of him in some fashion winning unwitting that's another question. But you
compartmentalize that information because that's operational. A two to oh one file is not operational. These other files, saw files, project files, shadow file, all those are operational.
Those you got to keep secret.
And you wonder about the domestic contact UH division files. New Orleans had their own domestic office. Theres Hunter Leak was running it, and we just mentioned Frank Bartees, who's at Oswald's Court of Parents.
He was an off is a contact of hunter Leaks.
You know that at least five reports that who's talking about, but there's probably others that we can't get our hands on. Wellians get to miss the contact office, So you wonder where they go. You know they soft files. Did they hang on to those? I don't know, Larry, what do you think would they hang on to those?
My guess is those would be so would be just field level files again, because you're if you're not talking about something.
Observational, they're they're just reporting it.
And if domestic domestic contacts is normally more outbound than inbound, we see that in Dallas, where a domestics contact guy is actually told to investigate OSLO after he returns to Dallas. He uses a deniable cutout in the form of de Moorinshield to do that and obviously collects information and it goes somewhere we've never seen because we have not seen domestic contacts out of Dallas. But in New Orleans it's a little different in that you know, there's no sign
that anybody activated domestic contacts to look at Oswald. We don't see the flip side of the coin, so I really don't know. I would assume that they were mention it to him. But if he didn't have a tasking to investigate Oswald, you know, he might not have done anything with it except you know, just setting in a
SAFT file and those are destroyed after a period. We shouldn't we shouldn't make it all mysterious because in all honesty, you know, paperwork does accumulate and after a period of time that stuff just gets threaded.
Well.
And the other thing is I mean, when you got two guys that are assets showing up at you know, a misdemeanor court appearance for this Lee Harvey Oswald, you would think that there could potentially be some sort of contact there previous to that, where somebody says, why don't you guys go down there and show your face? Maybe somebody directed them to do that. That would end up in a soft file somewhere right there would be.
A case officer file.
And we absolutely know that that occurred because we know that that had been reported back to Miami. It had been reported to case officers by DR and the DR people told morally that they had done that.
So by the time that courtting occurred.
He was absolutely Oswell had been had been spotted by dre reported by DR, and there should have been an exchange of Actually what the DR guys told Morley was that this was one of the best opportunities for propaganda that they had ever had, and Oswell was the kind of guy that they were being paid to use in propaganda. There's clearly no doubt about it. And clearly again as Jeff found out, you know those files are withheld.
Yeah, as Jeff was speaking of, you know, Sylvia Audio's uncle, Augustin Greek Todd, his case officer called Trenton. Jeff Walley actually interviewed him twice and Trenton knew wall about, he new bringier An, he knew Oswald and he he said, I can't remember the exact quote, but said he couldn't diego near Oswald, you know, wouldn't touch him with a ten foot poll which means somebody else had a relationship with him.
That's I might take it.
M M, well, there's that.
Plus, you know I've seen the I don't know if I want to call it speculation or maybe beyond speculation. This idea that there was an operation to discredit the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. And Oswald's out there pretending to be the treasurer for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New Orleans, right with a with another guy who's supposedly the head of it, his pseudonym. Right, you know, that old thing is going on there, and you know,
was that part of a greater operation? Was that something that he just dreamed up on his own?
I mean, do we have any definitive.
Proof here among the files that are attached to this character Lee Rby Oswald?
Dave, Well, you're gonna have to wait for the book for that, Chuck.
But okay, it's not that we don't explore that in detail. But the real honest answer to that twofold answers A the FPCC had already been destroyed. It was so thoroughly penetrated, it had lost so many chapter members. It's kind of like the FBI that the number of people involved with the FBCC, there were more intelligence people involved in seeing what they were doing than there were members. I mean, it was coming apart at the seams. But the here's how bad it was and now and that it changed.
Here's for timing is a year before that that would not have been a true statement.
But things things were such a nature that when then the FBI investigated Otiswell's relationship with them, you know how, they actually wrote it off the books and closed it down.
They wrote the FPCC.
This is the Federal Bureau of Investigations writing the FPCC saying, oh, it's this. This guy told us that you had this really big chapter in New Orleans and you know, we're just we're just curious about that. And the fb FPCC writes back and go, no, no, we don't have and they close the file. Like clearly the f PC is FPCC is not being treated seriously as a threatening clandestine
our entity at that point in time. But the other thing you have to get to is, as David just brought up, somebody can have an operational interest in Oswald without his being witting. What we do not find and not to say they can be. There is no paperwork trail that shows witting. There is absolutely a paperwork trail that shows operational interest.
If you want to be strictly.
Factual, Absolutely the paperwork trail, what information is being shared, indicates an operational interest.
Just as Jane Roman.
Said, it did, but his paperwork does not show that. So that's where you get into a real fascinating discussion of witting versus unwitting.
Right, So there's one way to look at all this. And I've already had you guys on for about an hour going.
Through this just so you know.
But David, but what key points have we not struck upon here that you think would be best to fill out this explanation.
I think we hit them all pretty much. I think you guys also did a good job. Flynn, you know what was going on at that time, So no, I think we hit them.
Okay, So Larry, is there anything else we should add here? Because again, it's an interesting study. It gives you an idea of you know, look, can we prove it was something that was happening or wasn't happening. I like that we can at least finally say that all those you know, blanket denials of there being absolutely no interest in this Oswald character. I mean, he was a screwball. You know, he was no good, He was not useful to anybody.
We know now that that's wholly ridiculous. And by the way, it's not like the agencies are not willing to use screwballs anyway, just saying, you know, some of the people that we've discovered over time, Okay, you know, I find the one guy that we got after World War Two. It was totally paranoid, but was good with surveillance that got recruited.
I always love that story.
You know, that's what you want. But yeah, I think I would sum of them two things.
First of all, only because we understand it at the day at the level that David can work the files now, A lot of what he was just telling you, if you look at the links he sent, you only see by looking at a marginal note down in a little check box on a form a notation that shows green listing, you will only see by somebody who was copied or
somebody who signed off on a file. Until we could understand it at this level, or David can understand it at this level, I still don't that I asked David questions. We couldn't make conclusive statements about these people and what should be there and what should be there. Certainly, when I first started writing about this, we had no knowledge of that level of detail at all. Now we do have it, so it's a lot more comfortable to say what should be there and what shouldn't be there, and
how this process works. So understanding the process has helped us a lot.
And it's not easy.
David hasn't said anything about that, but even use it knowing the crypts with the crypt busting, what, David, we couldn't say the things that we said on this broadcast.
What maybe ten years of research.
Before we could talk at this level of detail, A lot of reading.
And thousands of documents.
So I would encourage readers again, I guess what this is is encourage readers, not listeners, not to you know, take for granted generalizations that are made about individuals or documents or process because a lot of stuff has been thrown against the wall that was pure supposition and pure speculation, and we can do a.
Better job now.
So I think that would be my summary comment is the good news is, after all this gruntwork and all this slogging, we can do a better job now looking at the process, looking at the documents than we could have thought about earlier.
You know.
The only other thing to throw in here, I think is that it's also remarkable and useful to understand who handled these files. You know, you have that page that tells you who signed them out, who took possession of them. You know, it gives you an idea of who was actually handling these so who was interested in reading them at certain points in time, and the timing of their looking into these files is yet again another thing that opens up like a Rosetta stone to let you know
what was going on here. Why would somebody want to read this file if they're part.
Of you know, uh, the the uh, you know.
This part of the agency, if they're uh, you know, looking for operational uses at that time, it's fascinating that it's this guy who checks it out, you know, uh, so on and so forth, because it's yeah.
Excellent point, Jack.
I'm really glad I should have said, I'm glad you brought that up, because you know who's reading what file, who's even copied? Is your only clue you have to the operational significance. And and I think that's another area David can point out. You know, we didn't understand JM way before, we didn't understand Fitzgerald's special affairs staff before. Now we understand it, and and actually we understand how many case officers should have seen something about Oswald and
who were active in New Orleans. We didn't know that before and just knowing who's reading what document.
It's funny in two ways.
First of all, you know when they got questioned afterwards and said I know nothing, that it was a lie, right, And you know what, and we know what kind of projects they were engaged in, So if they were copied on something, it tells us something about project as well, right.
I mean when you combine it with knowing what these guys and this takes a while. You got to know what these guys' responsibilities were, what it is their particular you know, they're compartmentalizing things so it can be distributed to specific offices within the agency. Those offices have specific purposes and are involved with specific things at certain points of time. So it is all relevant as you examined this.
And you know, David, I really appreciate you taking the time to break this down and kind of you know, do this for us, you know, slow speed if you will. But it takes a while to build up this information. It does so that you know how to decipher what it is.
You're looking at.
You know, again, I always used to laugh when I would see these guys, you know, waving around a document and saying, oh, I know this because of what's in this document, you know, And people used to just take their word for it because they have a document.
But do they even know how to read that thing? Do they know what.
They're looking at? Do they understand who actually initialed this?
You know?
Do they understand who decided to read it in nineteen sixty as opposed to who decided to read it in nineteen sixty three. Is there a big difference, you know, between what is you know, supposed to be there and what ends up not being there.
Who got you.
Know, read into these things? Who needed to be aware of this guy? You know, who actually needs Oswald's to a one file right? I mean, all of it is relevant, and the timing of it is relevant.
So anyway, there's always a lot more to it.
And you're going to get into this in depth in the Oswald Puzzle, and I'm looking forward to it. I also am looking forward to David. Just before we go, would you mind giving me a hint about what it is you're going to do a presentation on it? Lancer, It's could be me and Larry, okay, and I'm guessing Oswald.
How about how about Oswald and the FBI and New Orleans?
Nice? Okay, And just to give.
A teaser, let's pose this question. If I went into the FBI office and told them a series of lies about working with a Clandestino organization that was covertly meeting in people's and then they found out that I, like totally lied to them, what do you think they would do to me?
Hmm today, I'm not sure, David. What were we saying?
I said nothing. They didn't do anything.
Interesting. And oh, by the way, they did have.
Some surveillance on this guy too at a certain point the FBI. It's going to be interesting to have you guys sort of peel back the layers on that. And I look forward to it and can't wait to see how this is going to come out.
At Lancer. There is always much more to.
Dig into here, and again, it's good to have a re examination because those broad, sloppy strokes of the brush, I think you know, in a lot of ways, it got people introduced to a lot of ideas, but it didn't do them any favors about getting to the specifics. And I'm not blaming you, Larry, I'm saying that in general, you know, there were people using too broad a terminology.
There were people throwing out ideas that, like you said, were almost purely supposition, based on very little evidence that they were just you know, let me see if I can fill in all these blanks. And that's what went on for many years. And we can now do a better job because there's more information out there, there's more literacy. You know, it's not just one guy among us all that knows how to read these documents. Now, you know, guys like David have learned.
You know, I don't know where you went to learn this, David, but.
You know I'm making a joke there, but I mean, you have to teach yourself how this stuff works, and you have to be as well informed as possible.
And it's a process.
And you know, sorry, it did take about a decade for us to understand certain things that might have been mysterious not so long ago.
And here we are.
So with all that in mind, again, both Larry and David will be involved with the Lancer Conference which is November twenty second to the twenty fourth in Dallas, Texas. In the show notes today, they'll be the you know, the the website to go ahead if you want to sign up. There's also a ten percent discount if you use the code Ocelli ten on the website. Whether you attended virtually or in person, that coupon code works and
all that good stuff. I'll be there in person, David will be there in person, Larry will be there virtually, and there is a long list of speakers actually that ought to be really fascinating. So and again, go to Larry hyphen or Larry dash Handcock dot com. Check out his blog. I recommend all of his books. If you don't have them, all, what are you doing?
Go get them.
You know, not just his books on this case, but a wide variety of topics that again would greatly inform you about to be behaviors, reactions, and history of what goes on in the intelligence business with major events, various assassinations, surprise attacks, and shadow warfare.
Whoops.
Those sound like book titles because they are. And again I highly recommend all of Larry's works. So I want to thank Larry Hancock and David Boylan for joining me tonight, and I want to thank you guys for listening again.
Read through the show notes, click.
The links check out the stuff and educate yourself as best you can, because there is always more to learn.
And keep digging.
We may eventually get at the clearest picture possible and who knows, maybe even what solved the case. Anyway, I'm merely o'celly. All of you are indeed the effect.
Goodnight, h go ahead, call.
It a shot in the truth about the day as fascination.
Right, Well, what do you want to know?
Baker's wild claim Oswald girlfriends you knew Ruby and Berry hans you weapons?
Really?
I imagine I could claim I have four wheels. It doesn't make me a wagon.
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