This is Kristen O'Brien, Managing Editor at NFX, and this is the founder list. Audible versions of essays from technology's most important leaders selected by the founder community. In December 2017, the white paper introducing maker and the original decentralized dye stablecoin system was published. It describes the exact design and features of the die launch as well as a road map for the future of die.
The die stable coin is a collateral backed cryptocurrency whose value is stable relative to the US dollar. You can also listen to the Bitcoin and Ethereum white papers on the founder's Flint, at founderslist.nfx.comredbynfx.introduction Beginning in 2015, the Maker Dow project operated with developers around the globe working together on the first iterations of code, architecture, and documentation.
In December of 2017, the first maker Dow formal white paper was published, introducing the original die now Cy stablecoin system. The white paper described how anyone could generate die using that system by leveraging Ethereum as collateral through unique smart contracts known as collateralized debt positions or CDPs.
Given that Ethereum was the only collateral asset accepted by the system, the dye generator was called single collateral die, SCD, or Cy, That white paper also included a plan to upgrade the system to support multiple collateral asset types in addition to Ethereum. What was then Flint intention became a reality in November 2019.
The die stablecoin system today called the maker protocol now accepts as collateral any Ethereum based asset that has been approved by MKR holders, who also vote on corresponding risk parameters for each collateral asset. Voting is a critical component of the maker decentralized governance process. Welcome to Multicollateral die, MCD.
In MCD, we trust Blockchain Technology provides an unprecedented opportunity to ease the public's growing frustration with and distrust of dysfunctional centralized financial systems. By distributing data across a network of computers, the technology allows any group of individuals to embrace transparency rather than central entity control.
The result is an unbiased, transparent, and highly efficient permissionless system, one that can improve current global financial and monetary structures and better serve the public good. Bitcoin was created with this goal in mind. But while Bitcoin succeeds as a cryptocurrency on a number of levels, it is not ideal as a medium of exchange because its fixed supply and speculative nature results in volatility, which prevents it from proliferating as mainstream money.
The dice stable coin on the other hand succeeds where Bitcoin fails precisely because Dye is designed to minimize price volatility. A decentralized unbiased collateral backed cryptocurrency that is soft Flint the US Beller, dies value is in its stability. Since the release of single collateral die in 2017, user adoption of the stable coin has risen dramatically, and it has become a building block for decentralized applications that help expand the DeFi movement.
Dye's success is part of a wider industry movement for stablecoins, which are cryptocurrencies designed to maintain price value and function with money. For example, in February 2019, JP Morgan became the 1st bank in the United States to create and test a digital coin that represents 1 US Beller. As the cryptocurrency industry grows, other banks, financial services companies, and even governments will create stable digital Currier, as Beller large organizations outside of the finance sector.
Facebook, for example, announced its plans for Libra, a stable digital cryptocurrency that'll be fully back by a reserve of real assets in June of 2019. However, such proposals forfeit the core value proposition of blockchain technology global adoption of a common infrastructure without a central authority or administrator that may abuse its influence. An overview of the maker protocol and its features. The maker protocol.
The maker protocol is one of the largest daps on the Ethereum blockchain designed by a disparate group of contributors including developers within the maker foundation, it's outside partners and other persons and entities, it is the 1st decentralized finance or DeFi application to see significant adoption. The maker protocol is managed by people around the world who hold its governance token, MKR.
Through a system of scientific governance involving executive voting and governance polling, MKR holders govern the protocol and the financial risks of Dye to ensure its stability transparency, and efficiency. 1 MKR token locked in a voting contract equals 1 vote. The die stable coin The dice stable coin is a decentralized unbiased, unbiased, collateral backed cryptocurrency soft Pete to the US Beller.
Dye is held in cryptocurrency wallets or within platforms and is supported on Ethereum and other popular blockchains. Dye is easy to generate access and use. Users generate dye by depositing collateral assets into maker vaults within the maker protocol. This is how die is entered into circulation and how users gain access to liquidity. Others obtained die by buying it from brokers or exchanges or simply by receiving it as a means of payment.
Once generated, bought, or received, dye can be used in the same manner as any other cryptocurrency. It can be sent to others, used as payments for goods and services, and even held as savings through a feature of the maker protocol called the Dye Savings Pete, DSR. Every Dye in circulation is directly backed by excess collateral. Meaning that the value of the collateral is higher than the value of the die debt, and all die transactions are publicly viewable on the Ethereum blockchain.
What properties of die functions similar to money? Generally, money has 4 functions, a store of value, a medium of exchange, a unit of account, and a standard of deferred payment. Dye has properties and use cases designed to serve these functions. Die as a store of value. A store of value is an asset that keeps its value without significant depreciation over time. Because dye is a stable coin, it is designed to function as a store of value even in a volatile market. Die as a medium of exchange.
A medium of exchange is anything that represents a standard of value and is used to facilitate the sale, purchase, or exchange trade of goods or services. The DY stablecoin is used around the world for all types of transactional purposes. DY as a unit of account. A unit of account is a standardized measurement of value used to price goods and services. For example, US Beller, euro, yen, Currently, DI has a target price of 1 US Beller. 1 die equals $1.
While DI is not used as a standard measurement of value in the off chain world, It functions as a unit of account within the maker protocol and some blockchain debts, whereby maker protocol accounting or pricing of DAP services is in dye, rather than a fiat currency like US Beller. Die as a standard of deferred payment. Die is used to settle debts within the maker protocol, Example, using dye to pay the stability fee and close their vaults, this benefit separates dye from other stable coins.
Collateral assets, Dye is generated, backed, and kept stable through collateral assets that are deposited in a maker vaults on the maker protocol. A collateral asset is a digital asset that MKR holders have voted to accept into the protocol. To generate dye, the maker protocol steps as collateral any Ethereum based asset that has been approved by MKR holders. MKR holders must also approve specific corresponding risk parameters for each accepted collateral.
Example, more stable assets might get more lenient risk parameters, while more risky assets could get stricter risk parameters. These and other decisions of MKR holders are made through the maker decentralized governance process.
Maker vaults, All accepted collateral assets can be leveraged to generate dye in the maker protocol through smart contracts called maker vaults, Users can access the maker protocol and create vaults through a number of different user interfaces, including Oasis, borrow, and various interfaces built by the community.
Creating a vault is not complicated, but generating die does create an obligation to repay the die along with the stability fee in order to withdraw the collateral leveraged and locked inside of Vault. Vaults are inherently non custodial. Users interact with Vaults and the maker protocol directly. And each user has complete an independent control over their deposit collateral as long as the value of that collateral doesn't fall below the required minimum level, the liquidation ratio.
Interacting with a maker vault. Step 1, create and collateralize a vault. A user creates a vault via the Oasis Borrow Morgan or a community created interface such as Instadap, Zirion, or my ether wallet, by funding it with a specific type and amount of collateral that would be used to generate dye. Once funded, a vault is considered collateralized. Step 2, generate dye from the collateralized vault.
The vault owner initiates a transaction and that confirms it in their unhosted cryptocurrency wallet order to generate a specific amount of die in exchange for keeping their collateral locked in the vault. Step 3, pay down the debt and the stability fee. To retrieve a portion of all the collateral, a vault owner must pay down or completely pay back the die they generated, plus the stability fee that continuously accrues on the die outstanding. The stability fee can only be paid in die.
Step 4, withdraw collateral. With the die returned and the stability fee paid the vault owner can withdraw all or some of their collateral back to their wallet. Once all dies completely returned and all collaterals retrieved, the vault remains empty until the owner chooses to make another deposit. Importantly, each collateral asset deposit requires its own vault.
So some users will own multiple vaults with different types of collateral and levels of collateralization liquidation of risky maker vaults To ensure there is always enough collateral in the maker protocol to cover the value of all outstanding debt, the amount of die outstanding valued at the target price Any maker Vault deemed too risky according to parameters established by maker governance is liquidated through automated maker protocol auctions.
The protocol makes the determination after comparing the liquidation ratio to the current collateral to debt ratio of a vault. Each vault has its own liquidation ratio, and each ratio is determined by MKR voters based on the risk profile of the particular collateral asset type. Make her protocol Auctions. The auction mechanisms of the maker protocol enable the system to liquidate vaults even when price information for the collateral is unavailable.
At the point of liquidation, the maker protocol takes the liquidated vault collateral and subsequently sells it using an internal market based auction mechanism. This is a collateral auction. The die received from the collateral auction is used to cover the vault's outstanding obligations, including payment of the liquidation penalty Pete set by M care voters for that specific Vault collateral type.
If enough dye is bid in the collateral auction to fully cover the Vault obligations plus the liquidation penalty, that auction converts to a reverse collateral auction in an attempt to sell as little collateral as possible. Any leftover collateral is returned to the original vault owner. If the collateral auction does not raise enough dye to cover the vaults out standing obligation, the deficit is converted into protocol debt. Protocol debt is covered by the dye in the maker buffer.
If there is not enough dye in the Beller, the protocol triggers a debt auction. During a debt auction, MKR is minted by the system, increasing the amount of MKR in circulation, and then sold to bidders for dye. Die proceeds from the collateral auction go into the maker buffer which serves as a buffer against an increase of apply that could result from future uncovered collateral auctions and the accrual of the die savings rate.
If die proceeds from the auctions and stability fee payments see the maker buffer limit, a number set by maker governance, they are sold through a surplus auction. During a surplus auction, bidders compete by bidding decreasing amounts MKR to receive a fixed amount of dye. Once the surplus auction has ended, the maker protocol autonomously destroys the MKR collected, thereby reducing the total MKR supply. Example collateral auction process.
A large vault becomes un collateralized due to market conditions. An auction keeper then detects the under collateralized vault opportunity and initiates liquidation of the vault, which kicks off a collateral auction for say 50 Ethereum. Each auction keeper has a bidding model to assist in winning auctions.
A bidding model includes a price at which to bid for the collateral, Ethereum in this example, The auction keeper uses the token price from its bidding model as the basis for its bids in the 1st phase of the collateral auction. Where increasing die bids are placed for the set amount of collateral. This amount represents the price of the total die wanted from the collateral auction. Now let's say the auctionkeeper bids 5000 die for the 50 Ethereum to meet this amount.
The die bid is transferred from the vault engine to the collateral auction contract, With enough dye in the collateral auction contract to cover the system's debt plus the liquidation penalty, the 1st phase of the collateral auction is over. In order to reach the price defined in its bidding model, the auction keeper submits a bid in the 2nd phase of the collateral auction. In this phase, The objective is to return as much of the collateral to the vault owner as the market will allow.
The bids that the auction keepers place are for fixed die amounts and decreasing amounts of Ethereum. For instance, the bidding model of the keeper in this example seeks a bid price of a 125 die per Ethereum. So it offers 5000 die for 40 Ethereum. Additional die for this bid is transferred from the vault engine to the collateral auction contract.
After the bid duration limit is reached and the bid expires, the auction keeper claims the winning bid and settles the completed collateral auction by collecting the 1 collateral. Key external actors In addition to its smart contract infrastructure, the maker protocol involves groups of external actors to maintain operations. Keepers, oracles, and global Beller, otherwise known as emergency oracles, and maker community members.
Keepers take advantage of the economic incentives presented by the protocol, Oracle's and global settlers are external actors with special permissions in the system assigned to them by MKR voters and maker community members are individuals and organizations that provide services. Keepers. A keeper is an independent usually automated actor that is incentivized by arbitrage opportunities to provide liquidity in various aspects of a decentralized system.
In the maker protocol, keepers are market participants that help die maintain its target price, 1 US dollar. They sell die when the market price is above the target price, and buy dye when the market price is below the target price. Keepers participate in surplus auctions, debt auctions, and collateral auctions when maker vaults are liquidated. Price oracles.
The maker protocol requires real time information about the market price of the collateral assets and maker vaults in order to know when to trigger liquidations. Protocol derives its internal collateral prices from a decentralized oracle infrastructure that consists of a broad set of individual nodes called oracle feeds. MKR voters choose a set of trusted feeds to deliver price information to the system through Ethereum transactions. They also control how many feeds are in the Pete.
To protect the system from an attacker attempting to gain control of a majority of the oracles, the maker protocol receives price inputs through the oracle security module, OSM, not from the oracles directly. The OSM, which is a layer of defense between the oracles and the protocol, delays a price for 1 hour. Allowing emergency oracles or a maker governance vote to freeze an oracle if it is compromised. Decisions regarding emergency oracles and the price delayed duration are made by MKR holders.
Emergency oracles. Emergency oracles are selected by MKR of voters and act as a last line of defense against an attack on the governance processor on other oracles. Emergency oracles are able to freeze individual oracles to mitigate the risk of a large number of customers try to withdraw their assets from the maker protocol in a short period of time as they have the authority to unilaterally trigger an emergency shutdown. Dow James.
Dow teams consist of individuals and service providers who may be contracted through maker governance to provide specific services to Maker Dow, Members of Dow teams are independent market actors and are not employed by the maker foundation. The flexibility of maker governance allows the maker community to adapt the Dow team framework to suit the services needed by the ecosystem based on real world performance and emerging challenges.
Examples of Dow team member roles are the governance facilitator who supports the communication infrastructure and processes of governance and risk team members who support maker governance with financial risk research and draft proposals for onboarding new collateral and regulating existing collateral.
While the maker foundation has bootstrapped maker governance to date, It is anticipated that the Dow will take full control, conduct MKR votes, and fill these very Dow team roles in the near future. The die savings rate. The die savings rate DSR allows any die holder to earn savings automatically and natively. By locking their die into the DSR contract in the maker protocol. It can be accessed via the Oasis save portal or through various gateways into the maker protocol.
Users are required to deposit a minimum amount to earn DSR, and they can withdraw any or all of their die from the DSR contract at any time. The DSL is a global system parameter that determines the amount die holders earn on their savings over time. When the market price of die deviates from the target price due to changing market dynamics, MKR holders can mitigate the price instability by voting to modify the DSR accordingly.
Initially, adjustment of the DSR will depend on a weekly process, whereby MKR holders first evaluate and discuss public market data and proprietary data provided by market participants and then vote on whether an adjustment is necessary or not. The long term plan includes implementation of the DSL adjustment module, an instant access module that directly controls both the DSL and the base rate.
This module allows for easy adjustment of the DSL by an MKR holder on behalf of the larger group of MKR holders. The motivation behind this plan is to enable nimble responses to rapidly changing market conditions, and to avoid overuse of the standard governance process of executive voting and governance polling. Governance of the maker protocol. Use of the MKR token in maker governance.
The MKR token, the governance token of the maker protocol, allows those who hold it to vote on changes to the maker protocol. Note that anyone not only MKR holders can submit protocols for an MKR vote. Any voter approved modifications to the governance variables of the protocol will likely not take effect immediately in the future. Rather, they could be delayed as much as 24 hours if voters choose to activate the governance security module, GSM.
The delay would give MKR holders the opportunity to protect the system if necessary against a malicious governance proposal by triggering a shutdown, polling and executive voting. In practice, the maker governance process includes proposal polling and executive voting.
Proposal polling is conducted to establish a rough consensus of community sentiment before any executive votes are cast, This helps to ensure that governance decisions are considered thoughtfully and reached by consensus prior to the voting process itself. Executive voting is held to approve or not changes to the state of the system. An example of an executive vote could be a vote to ratify risk parameters for newly accepted collateral type.
At a technical level, smart contracts manage each type of vote. A proposal contract is a smart contract with 1 or more valid governance actions programmed into it. It can only be executed once. When executed, it immediately applies its changes to the internal governance variables of the maker protocol. After execution, the proposal contract cannot be reused.
Any Ethereum address can deploy valid proposal contracts MKR token holders can then cast approval votes for the proposal they want to elect as the active proposal. The Ethereum address that has the highest number of approval votes is elected as the active proposal. The active proposal is empowered to gain administrative access to the internal governance variables of the maker protocol and then modify them. The MKR tokens role in recapitalization.
In addition to its role in maker governance, the MKR token has a complimentary role as the recapitalization resource of the maker protocol. If the system debt exceeds the surplus, The MKR token supply may increase through a debt auction to recapitalize the system. Will be governed the maker ecosystem to avoid excessive risk taking. MKR holder responsibilities. MKR holders can vote to do the following.
Add a new collateral asset type with a unique set of risk parameters, change or add new risk parameters of 1 or more existing collateral asset type, modify the die savings rate, choose the set of Oracle feeds, choose the set of emergency oracles, trigger emergency shutdown, and upgrade the system. MKR hold can also allocate funds from the maker buffer to pay for various infrastructure needs and services, including Oracle Infrastructure And collateral risk management research.
The funds in the maker buffer are revenues from stability fees, liquidation fees, and other income streams. The governance mechanism of the maker protocol is designed to be as flexible possible and upgradable. Should the system mature under the guidance of the community, more advanced forms of proposal contracts could in theory be used, including proposal contracts that are bundled. For example, one proposal contract may contain both an adjustment of a stability fee and an adjustment of the DSR.
Nonetheless, those revisions will remain for MKR holders to decide. Risk parameters controlled by maker governance. Each maker vault type has its own unique set of risk parameters that enforce usage. The parameters are determined based on the risk profile of the collateral, and are directly controlled by MKR holders through voting. Risk and mitigation responsibilities of governance.
The successful operation of the maker protocol depends on maker governance taking necessary steps to mitigate risks. We identify some of those risks Pete, each followed by a mitigation plan. A malicious attack on the smart contract infrastructure by a bad actor. One of the greatest risks to the maker protocol is a malicious actor. A programmer, for example, who discovers a vulnerability in the deployed smart contracts and then uses it to break the protocol or steal from it.
In the worst case scenario, all decentralized digital assets held as collateral in the protocol are stolen. And recovery is impossible. Mitigation. The maker foundation's highest priority is the security of the maker protocol. And the strongest defense of the protocol is formal verification. The dye code base was the 1st code base of a decentralized application to be formally verified.
In addition to formal system verification, contracted security audits by the best security organizations in the blockchain industry, 3rd party audits and bug bounties are part of the foundation security road map. These security measures provide a strong defense system. However, they are not infallible. Beller with formal verification, the mathematical modeling of intended behaviors may be incorrect or the assumptions behind the intended behavior itself may be incorrect. A black swan event.
This is a rare and critical surprise attack on a system. For the maker protocol, examples of a black swan event include an attack on the collateral types that back die, a large unexpected price decrease of 1 or more collateral types a highly coordinated oracle attack Morgan malicious maker governance proposal. Please note that this list of potential black swans is not exhaustive and not intended to capture the extent of such possibilities. Mitigation.
While no one solution is fail safe, the careful design of the maker protocol, the liquidation ratio, debt ceilings, the government security module, the Oracle security module, emergency shutdowns, etcetera, in conjunction with good governance for example, swift reaction in a crisis, thoughtful risk parameters, etcetera, help prevent or mitigate potentially severe consequences of an attack. Unforeseen pricing errors and market irrationality.
Oracle price feed problems or rational market dynamics that cause variations in the price of die for an extended period of time can occur. If confidence in the system is lost, rate adjustments or even MKR dilution could reach stream levels and still not bring enough liquidity and stability to the market. Mitigation.
Maker governance incentivizes a sufficiently large capital pool to act as keepers of the market in order to maximize rationality and market efficiency and allow the dye supply to grow at a steady pace without major market shocks. As a last resort, emergency shutdown can be triggered to release collateral to die holders with their die claims valued at the target price. User abandonment for less complicated solutions. The maker protocol is a complex decentralized system.
As a result of its complexity, there is a risk that inexperienced cryptocurrency users will abandon the protocol in favor of systems that may be easier to use and understand. Mitigation. While dye is easy to generate and use for most crypto enthusiasts and the keepers that use it for margin trading, newcomers might find the pro called difficult to understand and navigate.
Although DI is designed in such a way that users need not comprehend the underlying mechanics of the maker protocol in order to benefit from The documentation and numerous resources consistently provided by the maker community and the maker foundation help to ensure onboarding is as uncomplicated as possible. Dissolution of the maker foundation. The maker foundation currently plays a role along with independent actors in maintaining the maker protocol and expanding its usage worldwide.
While facilitating governance. However, the maker foundation plans to dissolve once maker DAO can manage governance completely on its own. Should maker Dow fail to sufficiently take the reins upon the maker foundation's dissolution, the future health of the maker protocol could be at risk. Mitigation, MKR holders are incentivized to prepare for the foundation's dissolution after it completes gradual decentralization of the project.
Moreover, successful management of the system should result in sufficient funds for governance to allocate to the continued maintenance and improvement of the maker protocol. General issues with experimental technology. Users of the maker protocol, including but not limited to die and MKR holders, understand and accept that the software, technology, and technical concepts and theories applicable to the maker protocol are still unproven.
And there is no warranty that the technology will be uninterrupted or error free. There is an inherent risk that the technology could contain weaknesses, vulnerabilities, or bugs causing, among other things, the complete failure of the maker protocol and or its component parts mitigation, reference a malicious attack on the smart contract infrastructure by a bad actor previously mentioned.
The mitigation section there explains the technical auditing in place ensure the maker protocol functions as intended. Price stability mechanisms, the die target price, The die target price is used to determine the value of collateral assets die holders receive in the case of an emergency shutdown. The target price for die is 1 US Beller, translating to a 1 to 1 USD soft peg. Emergency shutdown. Emergency shutdown or simply shutdown serves 2 main purposes.
First, it's used during emergencies as a last resort mechanism to protect the maker protocol against attacks on its infrastructure and directly enforce the die target price. Emergencies could include malicious governance actions, hacking, security breaches, and long term market irrationality. 2nd, shutdown is used to facilitate a maker protocol system upgrade.
MKR voters are also able to instantly trigger an emergency shutdown by depositing MKR into the emergency shutdown module, ESM, if enough MKR voters believe it is necessary. This prevents the government security module if active from delaying shutdown proposals before they're executed. With emergency shutdown, the moment a quorum is reached, the shutdown takes effect with no delay. There are 3 main phases of emergency shutdown. 1, the maker protocol shuts down. Vault owners withdraw their assets.
When initiated, shutdown prevents further vault creation and manipulation of existing vaults and freezes the price feeds. The frozen feeds in sure that all users are able to withdraw the net value of assets to which they're entitled. Effectively, it allows maker vault owners to immediately withdraw the collateral in their vault that is not actively backing debt. 2, post emergency shutdown auction processing.
After shutdown is triggered, collateral auctions begin and must be completed within a specific amount of time. That time period is determined by maker governance to be slightly longer than the duration of the longest collateral auction, This guarantees that no auctions are outstanding at the end of the auction processing period.
And 3, die holders claim the remaining collateral, At the end of the auction processing period, die holders use their die to claim collateral directly at a fixed rate that corresponds to the calculated value of their assets based on the die target price.
For example, if Ethereum USD price ratio is 200 and a holder holds a 1000 die at the target price of 1 US dollar when emergency shutdown is activated, the user will be able to claim exactly 5 Ethereum from the maker protocol after the auction processing period. There is no time limit for when a final claim can be made.
Dye holders will get a proportional claim to each collateral type that exists in the collateral profile, Note that die holders could be at risk of a haircut, whereby they do not receive the full value of their die holdings at the target price of 1 USD per die. This is due to risks related to declines in collateral value and to vault owners having the right to Pete their excess collateral before die holders may claim the remaining collateral.
The future of the maker protocol increased adoption and full decentralization. Addressable market A cryptocurrency with price stability serves as an important medium of exchange for many decentralized applications. As such, the potential market for dye is at least as large as the entire decentralized blockchain industry, but the promise of dye extends well beyond that into other industries. The following is a non exhaustive list of current and immediate markets for the die stablecoin.
Working capital, hedging, and collateralized leverage. Maker Vaults allow for permissionless trading by users who can use the dye generated against Vault collateral for working capital. To date, there have been numerous instances where vault owners use their die to buy additional Ethereum, same asset as their collateral, thereby creating a leverage but fully collateralized position. Merchure receipts, cross border transactions, and remittances.
Foreign exchange volatility mitigation and a lack of intermediaries mean the transaction costs of international trade are significantly reduced when using die. Charities and NGOs when using transparent distributed ledger technology. Gaming. For blockchain game developers, Dye is the currency of choice. With Dye, game developers integrate not only a currency, but also Flint higher economy.
The composability of Dye allows games to create new player behavior schemes based around decentralized finance. Prediction markets. Using a volatile cryptocurrency when making an unrelated prediction only increases one's risk when placing the Pete. Long term bets become especially infeasible if the Beller must also gamble on the future price of the volatile asset used to place the bet. That said, the die stable coin would be a natural choice for use in prediction markets. Asset expansion.
Should MKR holders approve new assets as collateral, those assets will be subject to the same risk requirements, parameters, and safety measures as die. Conclusion. The maker protocol allows users to generate dye, a stable store of value that lives entirely on the blockchain, Dye is a decentralized stable coin that is not issued or administered by any centralized actor or trusted intermediary or counterparty. It is unbiased and borderless, available to anyone, anywhere.
All die is backed by a surplus of collateral that has been individually escrowed into audited and publicly viewable Ethereum smart contracts. With hundreds of partnerships and one of the strongest developer communities in the cryptocurrency space, Maker Dow has become the engine of the decentralized finance movement. Maker is unlocking the power of the blockchain to deliver on the promise of economic empowerment today.
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