The counterfactual theory of causation

OK. Last week, we did Hume's regularity theory. I can try this again. There we are. And I'm just there are a few people who are looking a bit bemused at the end of it. So I thought that what I'd do is I'd go through the arguments again, just briefly. So the question that we're asking is, what is causation? And if you remember, I said causation is important because without its prediction, an explanation and manipulation of our environment would be difficult, if not impossible.

It's our causal beliefs on which we rest of predictions, explanations and manipulations. So the question that we're trying to ask is, what is causation? And according to Hume, David Hume, the Scottish philosopher. It's regularity now. That's that's shorthand a bit because it's more than just regularity. It's also temporal priority and spatial contiguity. But the key for the human theory of causation is its regularity or constant conjunction.

And his reason for that is because that could be our only evidence for causation. So we see one billiard ball hitting another. We do not don't see causation in the individual case, says Hume. But we see another billiard ball hitting another and that rolling off and another billiard ball hitting another and it's rolling off. And the experience of that correlation causes us to think that it's the first billiard ball hitting the other that causes the other to roll off.

So causation is constant conjunction. And an obvious objection to that is, hang on, surely causation is the necessary connexion between the two events. That explains the regularity. It's not the regularity itself. It's the necessary connexion behind it. That explains the regularity. That's causation. And Hume, based on his theory of ideas and you remember we talked about the difference between impressions and ideas.

That habit of expectation, that observations of regularity and stillness makes us think that there's a necessary connexion. But actually, you cannot experience necessary connexion. You can experience a connexion, but not any necessity of that connexion and signals. We can't experience it. We can't either form a coherent idea of it. So we're answering the question, what is the causation? According to Hume, it's regularity.

An immediate knee jerk objection is. But causation is the necessary connexion that explains the regularity. It's not the regularity itself. Hume says no, it is only the regularity. The only reason that we think it's the necessary connexion is that we think it's necessary connexion. And we spread that habit on the world. We project that belief onto the world and unthink that causation is itself necessary connexion.

Okay, so that's what we did last week. Now, are there any quick questions of clarification? I don't want any questions of substance at this point because we haven't got time. But any quick questions of clarification about the human regularity theory? Nope. Jolly good. Okay. This week we're going to look at HEWs. Two definitions, of course. We looked at it last week, but we didn't divide it into the two.

So we'll have a look at each one separately. And then we're going to look at the nature of counterfactuals and counterfactual dependence. Then we're going to look at counterfactual theories of causation. And just as I called the Regularity Theory of Causation RTC. I'm calling this one CTT Counterfactual Theory of Causation. I'm going to look at some problems for the counterfactual theory.

And I'm going to end by looking at the nature, the relationship between the counterfactual theory of causation and the regularity theory of causation. They were always seen as rivals by the people who developed the counterfactual theory of causation. But as we'll see, it looks as if the counterfactual theory of causation is actually a version of the regularity theory of causation, and that rather puts the cat amongst the pigeons for various reasons. And I'll explain why as we look at that. OK.

Right. So let's have a look at humans. There's Hume's first definition of causation. We may define a cause to be an object followed by another. Where are all the objects? Similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second. So the object is the first billiard ball hitting the second beli ball. That's the first object. And the second object is the second billiard ball rolling off.

Okay. So when we get an object that's similar to a first billiard ball hitting the other, we get an object similar to the second billiard ball rolling off. That's the regularity theory of causation. But then Hume continues in the same sentence or in other words, hey, where if the first object had not been the second, never had existed. Now, that's interesting. I mean, is that equivalent to that? He does make it sound as if it is when he says or in other words.

But actually, this is surely a statement of necessary connexion, isn't it? If the first had not been, the seconds never had existed. In other words, if the first billiard ball hadn't hit the second billiard ball, the second billiard ball would not have rolled off. That's the counterfactual theory of causation. And it's interesting that Hume seems to take them as equivalent. The counterfactual theory of causation as equivalent to the regularity theory of causation.

But in about the 1970s, people stopped thinking that. And before I could describe the counterfactual theory of causation, I've got to look at the way I meant to change that. I meant to change that because grammar is horrible. It should be. If Lee Harvey Oswald didn't shoot Kennedy, somebody else did. So pretend that's what it says. I changed it on my machine and forgot I'd sent this in already. So if Lee Harvey Oswald didn't shoot Kennedy, somebody else did.

Is that true or not? Put up your hand if you think it's true. If Lee Harvey Oswald didn't shoot Kennedy, somebody else did. It's got to be true, hasn't it? Okay, that's just a conditional. That's a conditional sentence which divides into two the antecedent. If Lee Harvey Oswald didn't shoot Kennedy, then there's an implicit then in there. Somebody else did. That's the consequence. Somebody else did.

So you've got an antecedent clause. If Lee Harvey Oswald didn't shoot Kennedy and a consequent clause, somebody else did. And we're quite good at determining the truth value of such statements. But what about this? If Lee Harvey Oswald hadn't shot Kennedy, someone else would have. Is that true? Not necessarily. It might be. But you'd have to tell a story about it, wouldn't you?

So where is that one, at least if you can see what happened? I just you know, I put that one there and forgot to change the antecedent clause. We can look at the first one and see immediately that it's true. Has to be true. I mean, Kennedy is dead and he died of a gunshot wound. So if Lee Harvey Oswald didn't do it, somebody else must have done it. But if Lee Harvey Oswald hadn't shot Kennedy, somebody else would have done. Now, maybe that is true or maybe it's false.

The difficulty with that one is as a subjunctive, conditional on a counterfactual conditional. And traditionally, counterfactuals have been thought of as conditionals where the antecedent is false. But actually not all counterfactuals as such that the antecedent clause is false in this one. Indeed. Arguably it is true. So instead we should think of them as subjunctive conditionals. Okay, so what are the truth conditions of that? And let's have a look at the next one.

OK. If the Germans had won the war, we would be speaking German. Is that true or not? Put up your hands if you think that one's true. If the Germans had won the war, we would be speaking German. Put up your hand if you think that's true. Okay, put up your hand if you think it's false and put up your hand if you haven't got the foggiest idea. Yes, quite reasonable. Okay. That's the difficulty with counterfactual conditionals.

Actually, we do use them all the time and we talk about them as if they have perfectly straightforward truth conditions. But actually, they don't. Not straightforward truth conditions in the way ordinary count the conditional statements have. And with that one, it looks as if it can't be any state of affairs in this world that makes that statement true because the Germans didn't win the war after all.

So how how can what can make that true or false? There can't be any state of affairs in this world that makes that true or false. That's that's the thought. And so people thought about giving a counterfactual theory of causation for quite a few years in between Hume's regularity theory and the counterfactual theories when they were developed in the 70s. But they didn't because it was explaining causation, something mysterious in terms of counterfactuals, which are even more mysterious.

And so nobody bothered because it didn't seem worthwhile. But then we started to understand the logic or the semantics of counterfactuals. Okay, so in 1940, Stefan Rudolf Carnap printed his meaning, a necessity. And in that, he introduced the idea. He used the possible worlds talk that was introduced by Liben. It's to explain the truth conditions of counterfactuals.

And just to tell you how important truth conditions are, if you're trying to explain the meaning of the word cat to your child, you show it. Lots of cats. And you don't hear it. Lots of black cats, do you? Or lots of fat cats. You show it. Lots of tortoiseshell cats, some ginger cats and black cats and lots of different cats. Until the child is able, you point to a cat and you say, is that a pussy cat? And the child says, yes. And you point to a dog and you say, is that a pussy cat?

And the charge you hope says no, because it's understood the conditions under which that's a cat are true. And the conditions under which that's a cat are false. In other words, it's got the meaning of cat. It's got the meaning of it's a cat. So the conditions of truth and falsity are very important. And Rudolf Carnap suggested that we can use all possible worlds to understand counterfactual conditionals and just to.

That's him. It's nice to know who you're talking about. So that's Rudolf Carnap. And after Carnap in 1968. So you can see it took quite a long time for the logic of counterfactuals to be understood. Robert Stalnaker published a theory of conditionals. And again, with a hand out, you've got all the references that I'm using here. And that's Stalnaker just again, so you know who you're talking about.

And then after Stalnaker, this came along. And this is probably the most famous book on counterfactuals, 1973. David Lewis, a book called Simply Counterfactuals. And in this was Lewis who gave a counterfactual theory of causation. And this is Lewis always looks nice, cheery chap. And he looks like Bill Radcliffe, doesn't he? Or rather Bill Radcliffe looks like him to those of you who know Bill Radcliffe.

Okay, so it took quite a long time for an account of the semantics of counterfactuals come about. But this is what it is. If the Germans had won the war, we would be speaking German. OK, how do you determine the truth value of that? Well, there are two possible worlds. And what we've got to do is decide which one of them is closer. So is it the world in which the Germans won the war? And we are speaking German, or is it the world in which the Germans won the war?

And we're not speaking German in which. In other words, which takes us further from reality. So we know we're taken away from this world. Was we looking at the possible world in which the Germans won the war? Well, there are two of them. One of them, we're speaking German. And in the other one, we're not speaking German. Which of those is closer to the actual world? In other words, which of them is closer to actuality than the other?

So that's that's the semantics of possible. Now, if you're thinking what possible worlds? You're thinking quite reasonable view, there's not a logical explosion here. And if that bothers you, you're quite right. I mean, it is we've if we're going to accept possible worlds semantics, if we're going to introduce an ontology of possible worlds in order to explain the truth, conditions of counterfactuals. And you might think I really am very uncomfortable with this.

It's like introducing possible objects as well as actual objects and things like that. Now, we haven't got time to talk about that here, so we're not going to talk about it. But again, I've put it on the notes and on the reading. There are plenty of things you can follow up on if you want to read a little bit more about that.

But you're quite right. If you're worried about possible worlds, the only thing I can say in defence of it is, is that it looks as if what physicists seem to think that they need possible worlds and logicians seem to think that they need possible worlds. And they're not the same thing because physicists, of course, the possible worlds they introduce are empirically possible. In other words, they they think that they can conduct empirical experiments to show that there are such worlds,

whereas logicians conduct any thought experiments. But it's interesting that both physicists and philosophers think that possible worlds are needed. I say philosophers. I mean logicians, of course, because it's mathematicians, too. But that's all we're going to say about possible worlds. We can talk about it later, if you like. Okay. So the possible worlds theories of the semantics of counterfactual semantics is to do with truth conditions.

Semantics is to do with truth and falsity. And I explained why. Truth conditions are important. So the semantics of counterfactuals appeals to possible worlds, and that enables us to think that counterfactuals are no longer mysterious. And so we can use them to explain causation. As long as there aren't other problems, we've taken away the mystery of counterfactuals. You might not think so, but. But those in the know think so.

Okay, so now we'll look at counterfactual dependence, because that's the thing on which all counterfactual theories of causation depend. So here's a definition. So event e counter factually depends on events. See if and only if that I double F again. Not a misprint. If and only if. If C were not to occur, E would not occur. Okay. So if the first billiard ball hadn't second hit the second billiard ball, the second billiard ball would not have rolled off.

So if, if C hadn't occurred E wouldn't have occurred either. That's counterfactual dependence. Any questions about that. Because that's pretty crucial. Is that a question about to arrive, Sean? Or were you just an intake of breath only? Good thing. Perfectly reasonable. No, you need oxygen. In what way? We're trying to establish that he has always said, but if we in advance assume that. Si, si. You see, I can sort of see why you think that.

But I think the mistake has already been made and it's been made by you. I think you're assuming that necessary connexion comes and causation. What we've got here is is an account of which is we'll see in a minute that this isn't an account of causation. It's a counterfactual depending on which an account of causation depends. But the idea is that C is what makes a difference. And the difference it makes is if it failed to occur, the other wouldn't have occurred.

So there's no we're not assuming causation there, we're explaining it is the thought. Not happy yet. OK. Let's continue. If you're still not happy at the end, we can talk about it again. OK. So this is a definition of counterfactual dependence. E counterfactual. Depends on see if and only if if C were not to occur. E would not occur either. If the first billiard ball hadn't hit the second, the second wouldn't have rolled off.

Okay. So all a counterfactual theories of causation depend on counterfactual dependence at some level. But there's a problem with thinking that counterfactual dependence is a causation, a theory of causation. And that's because although counterfactual dependence is sufficient for causation, it is not necessary for causation. And if counterfactual dependence were the same thing as causation, obviously it would have to be sufficient and necessary.

But it's sufficient but not necessary. So two events can be causally related without one counterfactual depending on the other. And let me give you an example of that. Here's Lucy. Lucy, you see, she's got a name written underneath her. So, you know, it's Lucy. This is Lucy who's throwing a rock, as you can tell. And in throwing the rock. She shatters the window. Okay. There's a shattered window there.

But Lucy's rock breaks the window. But the window shattering isn't counterfactuals dependent on Lucy's rock throwing. And the reason for that is because if Lucy hadn't broken the window, Brian would have done Bruns a much better shot than Lucy. He's much more practised at throwing rocks. Even those rock is a lot smaller. And he was waiting there beside Lucy and he threw just after she did. But her rock shattered the window in his didn't.

But it's not true that if Lucy hadn't thrown her rock, the window would not have shattered because yes, it would, because Brian's rock would have shattered the window. Are you with me? So the counterfactual dependence is just not there. So there's causation and no counterfactual dependence. They cannot be the same thing. Now, do you all see that? I'm very happy to explain it again. If you'd like me to. Yes. That's all right.

Si, si. I said different. It is said if this window is within that event then finally then. Because I see where you're going. And I think your intuitions are very sound. Let me try and explain this again. And I think you'll see where I'm going. But you're not wrong in saying what you've said. They are two different events. There's Lucie's rock throwing and bronze rock throwing, and they are two different. But what we want to say is that it's Lucie's rock throwing cause the window to shatter.

That's true, isn't it? But what we're trying to postulate is that that's because the shattering of the window is counter factually dependent on Lucy's throwing the rock. But it's not because it's not true. That had Lucy not thrown the rock, the window would not have shattered. But what we're saying is that it's Lucy's role within that dance. But then that depends. Okay. I tell you what. Let me carry on for a few slides. And I think that we might explain your intuition.

And if not, well, we'll look at it again. But I don't think that your intuition is wrong. I think you need to get the logic absolutely straight and that you happen to the moment, which isn't at all surprising. Therefore, I'm assuming that it was necessary for Ryan to throw a rock once, Lucy, because it was necessary. He didn't have to throw the rock there, therefore. Lucy and the road. No. There was no I've no idea what you're talking about.

She shouldn't. This says the windows shatter is not dependent on comfort. And this is what if Lucy did not throw out the window broken? Well, the window wouldn't be broken then, but it would have broken only because Brun threw it. Yeah. Well, I think that's exactly the same. Is that the same problem? I was thinking after listening to two gentlemen here, I was thinking it works. If you knew the window breaking, rather let me you.

I mean, I think I like the way that you're both thinking. Let me see if I can explain it. Where's the board rubber? Because a bit of tissue doesn't do it, frankly. Um. A causes B is equivalent to a B counter factually depends on A. Okay, that's what we're postulating. That's the hypothesis we're putting. So A cause is B is equivalent to B counterfactuals. Depends on A or had A not have occurred, B would not have occurred. Okay. Now an objection to that is go.

I'll get out of the way as soon as I finish writing it because I realise I'm blocking it. Lucie's rock throwing are high. Fante's rock throwing caused the window to shatter but the window shattering. Did not counter factually depend on Lucie's through. That's the way the argument is going. So this is the claim. This is the hypothesis that we're considering is A causes B the same as be counter factually. Depends on A or had A not occurred, B would not have occurred.

OK. So that's the hypothesis. And the counter example is. Well, no, that can't be right because Lucy's rock throwing cause the window to break. We accept that. OK. That that's given by the counterexample. But the window shattering isn't counterfactuals dependent on Lucy's rock throwing? Because had the window not shattered as a result of Lucy's rock throwing, it would have shattered as a result of Brian's rock throwing.

OK. Let me let me continue, because I think we'll we might solve your problem in just a second. Let's try it. But first of all. OK. So this is the problem. Again, counterfactual dependence is sufficient for causation, but not necessary. That's what we're saying. Two events can be causally related. So Lucy's rock throwing and the window shattering can be causally related. Without the window shattering cause, lead counts factually depending on Lucy's rock throwing.

I think your in your mind, you're accusing me of a lot of logical subterfuge here, aren't you? I can see that you think there's a logical sleight of hand going on. Okay, let's carry on. Lewis's first counterfactual theory of causation solves this problem by defining causation in terms of chains of counterfactual dependence. Now, somebody last week I can't remember who it was.

Was it you actually who who came to me afterwards and said, surely what's important about causation is chains of causation. It was you. Primary was first. Right? Well, and I said to that this week, I would be giving exactly that. So Lewis solves the problem of counterfactual dependence not being necessary for causation by defining causation in terms of the ancestral it's called. That's the proper term, the ancestral of counterfactual dependence.

In other words, chains of counterfactual dependence. So C is the cause of E. I'm very annoyingly I used lowercase letters before and I'm now using uppercase letters. That's very bad. But anyway, we'll ignore it. C is of course, of a if and only if there's a causal chain of counterfactual dependence leading from C to E. Or actually should be leading back from E to C. But anyway, in a month.

So there is a chain from the shattered window to Lucy's rock throwing and there isn't such a chain from the shattered window to Brian's rock throwing, is the thought. So although you can say the window shattered, the window would not have shattered if Lucy's rock had not been there at T minus one. And if it hadn't been there at T minus one and so on. But there isn't such a chain back to Brian's rock throwing.

So the first ever counterfactual theory of causation, which was the result of this possible world. Semantics of counterfactuals was C causes e if and only if there's a chain of counterfactual dependencies leading back from E to see that C. So if. See, had not occurred, you would not have occurred if the sea had not occurred, D would not have occurred. If he had not occur, E would not have occurred and so on. So it shows it suggests counterfactual, sorry.

Causation is transitive, doesn't it? So if C causes E and E causes D, then C causes T as well, that will become problematic later on. Okay. Before I look at the objections, does anyone want to ask a question of clarification at that point? Is there the unofficial publication introduced by the fact that the window shattering does not have any time associated with it, that there would be much simpler to look at if it specified the window, shut it down?

At which point you would need to specify that the ropes heated at the same time? Well, I think this is going to be the same problem that's going to be, I hope, solved in just a minute. I mean, it isn't the problem. So what isn't the problem then? The problem disappears. If you specify the of. Oh, I see. Okay. So if you say the window shattering happened at T. Okay.

Will you give me another few slides. And I hope that will will solve that one because I'm going to talk about exactly that problem here. Okay. Any other questions of clarification before I move on to look at the problems? Bob, speak up. Isn't it the case that every time somebody claims counterfactual dependency, it's always possible to say that if Lucy shattered the window, somebody else might? Nobody is there. Somebody else might. Is there any cause at all?

Something else? Well, I mean, you're all you all I can say to that is, is that that just shows us that that's counterfactual. Dependence isn't necessary for causation. Is isn't necessary or sufficient. Necessary, isn't it. Yeah. The bureau might even be irrelevant. Yes. Because we all we've got at the moment is a hypothesis and we're testing the hypothesis. And we've seen one reason to reject it. Maybe there are other reasons to reject it. Okay, so two objections were first brought to the CTC.

So we've got the hypothesis. We've got an objection. We've got a possible solution, which is that we add chains of causation, but we're now looking to see if the change of causation will do it. And there are two reasons to think it won't. And the first problem is the problem of trumping. Now, are there any ex military men or indeed women in this audience? I'm rather inclined to ask you to leave. If I've got the wrong strong number of stripes, etc. It's a relevant right.

Good. Thank you. I realise it's irritating if you're in the know. But um. Yes, okay. Chumping. This is why trumping is important. You can see why I'm a bit nervous about this. Okay. Let's say we've got the troops and we've got a sergeant and we've got a major there. Now it's true that these this may not be a sergeants or a major, but nevertheless, we're going to continue. So there's a sergeant and major.

And if, like me, you know nothing about these things, you ought to know that a major trumps a sergeant every time if you're a military man. And so if both the major and the sergeants yell advance at the same moment, the troops will advance. And whose order? Are they obeying the majors? Exactly. Because the sergeants order is neither here nor there. If the if the major sites advance, the troops advance. And it's his order that they're being.

And the problem we've got here is that there's no chain of counterfactual dependency that leads back from the major's order that isn't matched by a chain of counterfactual dependencies that leads back to the sergeants order. And there we really it does show that you're not wrong when you say aren't we just assuming something in here? Because all we've done is given to cause. And naturally, that second one is going to show it even more because earlier we looked at early pre-emption.

So Lucy's rock throwing pre-empted, Brian's rock throwing, they happened at different times. But actually, if we look at late pre-emption, here's Lucy and her rock and her Broch rock breaks the window. But a split second later, Brian's rock sails through the window, too. Okay. And because it's a split second later, this is where you're bit about the time is absolutely right, because it's a split second later.

There's no chain of counterfactual dependencies that leads back from Lucy's throw that isn't matched by a chain of counterfactual dependencies that leads back to Brian's throw. Now we know that it's Lucy's throw that breaks the bloody window. And we're trying to say that causation is counterfactual dependent. But it clearly isn't. Is it because counterfactual dependence? So let's sort of keep the argument flow going here so that we in fact. Let me move it a little bit. Where's the pen?

So we've got the hypothesis. Causation is counterfactual dependence. And we've got an objection. No, there's counterfactual dependence. Sorry. There's causation and no counterfactual dependence. OK. That was early pre-emption. We've got an attempted solution to the objection, which is causation is a chain of counterfactual dependencies. And we've got objections. No, there's causation and sorry. Hold on. Yes, that's right, causation. Hang on. There's counterfactual dependence and no causation.

That's right. So there's counterfeit. The window seems to counterfactuals depend upon Bryans throw, but brons throw doesn't cause the window to shatter. So how can causation be counterfactual dependent's? It can't. Do you see where we are in the argument as it goes through? So we're postulating a hypothesis. And each time we're putting up objection's, which question the hypothesis, we're putting up a new theory in the hope that this will do the trick.

And in each case, so far it hasn't. So Lewis deals with this problem in a way that's going to so suit you and possibly you. And he introduces the notion of an alteration. So here's the definition of an alteration and event E that's identical to another event. ETR Except it occurs at a slightly different time, slightly different place, in a slightly different manner, etc. In other words, it's it's an event very like another event, but not the same one, not the identical event.

And I mean, since the notion of an alteration. He talks of one event influencing another. So if an alteration of Lucy's rock throwing occurred, an alteration of windows shattering would occur. So if her rock had been thrown just two seconds later, the window would have shattered. Two seconds later. But an alteration of Brauns rock throwing would have no effect on the window shattering.

Not on that window shattering. There might have been a different window shattering, which was the one that's caused by Bryans throw. Now, at this point, you might be getting a little bit bloody philosophers, you know. What are they talking about here? Okay, so this is the second counterfactual theory of causation.

C causes E if and only if there's a chain of stepwise influence leading from E to C. So we've got a chain of stepwise influence that leads from Lucy's rock throwing to the window shattering because an alteration of Lucy's rock throwing would have led to an alteration of windows shattering. But there's no chain of stepwise influence leading from Brian's rock throwing to the shattering of the window. But as you might expect, objections were soon brought brought to this CTC.

So the solution here. So, again, we've got a hypothesis. We've got objections to that. Early pre-emption is an objection. So the chains of counterfactual dependence were the solution. We've got two objections to that. Can't be because of trumping and late pre-emption. We've got a solution to that, which is stepwise influence. So we've moved away from counterfactual dependence itself. And we've moved away to counter factual influence. Of course, all this took some years.

I mean, isn't it nice that you can all understand it and take it on board in five minutes? But it took quite a lot of time for this to actually happen. But as you can imagine, there are objections to this. So let's have a look at what these objections are. So let's have a look at choice of cause. OK, here's courtesy of Steve Photography. A camper lighting a fire. Now, you can imagine what happened. The lighting of the fire led to the conflagration that destroyed the forest.

That's what happened. So the campers lighting the fire caused the forest to burn down. Okay, straightforward. And there's a woops. So I'm giving it away there. The trouble with that is that although there's a chain of stepwise influence that leads back from the fire, the forest burning down to the campus, lighting the fire. There's also a chain of stepwise influence that leads from the fire burning down to the birth of the camper, isn't there? It's true, isn't it?

That had the camper not been born, the forest would not have burnt down, or at least that would have been an alteration of the forests burning down. It would have been a different type of burning down, wouldn't it? And so there's a chain of stepwise influence from the forest fire to the campers birth. Doesn't that mean that the campers birth was the cause of the forest burning down? Huh? No, course it wasn't. I mean, none of us would say that, would we? Or would we? Maybe Chris would.

He's got his own slightly devious son. I mean, you can take your father and say big man. Well, that's that's just taking the objection even further. But it is exactly to force the what loses the force is the idea. It's a hypothesis that we're testing. So if counterfactual dependence is is basically the relation that that is causation. Well, then, Hans, the big bang not occurred. The forest would not have burnt down.

So the big bang is the cause of the forest burning down. Well, if there's something wrong with that, surely. So we change nation. What's up? How is that different from a chain of causation? Which isn't that. Oh, I see. Well, we wouldn't normally wouldn't say that the camp has birth had caused the forest fire. No, I would say that without it, etc, etc., there wouldn't be a campfire to cause the forest fire. Therefore, we would change causation. No, there's a chain of counterfactual dependence.

Yes. And this is what makes it look as if it's not a chain of counterfactual dependence that is causation. OK, let's. Sorry. Go on. Just things I think that if you take this long history that's also deterministic. And no, it needn't be deterministic. I think I said last week that that we often want to say that there's something probabilistic in causation. And you're absolutely right. We do. We're saying we can just add the word probably here.

Had the well had the big bang not occurred, the forest fire probably wouldn't have occurred. Well, all we have to is, is the word probability. We've got it. But had the campers birth not occurred, the forest fire probably wouldn't have occurred. Allows for probabilistic causation. Let's bring this back to Brian. Brian. And then Brian Simons inspired that encourage about throwing you. Right. Does it go back to her?

No. It would then go back to no. It would then be Brian's rock that shattered the window. And see, that doesn't change. You would say it was a chain that leads back to Brian's rock. So it's Brian's rock that caused it. He wouldn't have thrown it if he wouldn't get through it. So you could say that it was Lucy's getting ready to throw the rock that caused. Yes, you could say that. And actually, that takes me nicely onto the second objection here, which is the lack of transitivity.

Objection. Okay. We were talking about bombs. These aren't bombs on my back here, but that's a bomb. And the story behind this, if I can get it right, is enemy who hasn't got another name is just called enemy like a bomb and puts it outside Lucy's door in the courtroom. Whether it is Lucy, maybe it's somebody else, but it doesn't really matter. Lucy's door, Brian comes along, sees the bomb about to go off and pinches out the fuse. And so Lucy survives. OK, no problem.

So far, so there's a chain of stepwise influence from Billie's pinching out the fuse to Lucy's of Susie's survival. Thought it was someone else. Susan's survival. Except that OK. Had Billy not pulled out, the few pinched out the fuse. Lucy would not have survived. But it's also true that by the transitivity of stepwise influence had enemy not placed the bomb. Billy would not have pinched out the flute fuse. And Lucy Susie would not have survived.

So the placing of the bomb that caused the survival of Lucy. Oh, no. That is really bad. We don't want that at all. There's something badly wrong with this account of causation. Do you see where I'm going? So the objections here are that there's too many causes. In other words, the camp has birth as well as the camper lighting the fire and it makes enemies placing the bomb a cause cause of Susie's survival. And again, we might. We think. No, no, no, no, no.

That will not do. This can't be the right theory of causation. Would anyone like to to think of the next step? How are we going to get over this? There is a way of getting over this. Can anyone think that it might be. You might think it's blindingly obvious that this is a lousy theory of causation. But believe me, it took quite a long time. Something that's obvious when you explain it like this in its outlines is much less obvious as you're actually working through it.

No one can see the solution to this one. Go and have a go. I assume that handwaving was. I have a hypothesis. It was my brain. It's funny, my brain works through my feet. I walk in if you have to stop. Stop saying the word. Well, funnily enough, you're going in the right direction. It's not stopping the chains so much. Should I go on? Can anyone be negative in this subway stop? I'm inclined to say that's always true. Branching or stopping.

Otherwise, you're going to market. You don't want to go. The transitivity does that for us. I mean, lots of this is cause this problem has caused lots of people to say that causation isn't transitive, but Lewis has a completely different way of solving it. Okay, let's have a look at his way of solving it. And Lewis says he wants no truck with these principles of invidious selection.

I just like that sentence. So I thought I'd quoted and he thinks that we've got to distinguish causation and explanation. Now, that's a really important distinction. And if this were a flip chart, I'd turn the page and write something down. But as it's not a flip chart, this is very irritating, isn't it? Do you think there's one behind her? No. There's a table. Right.

Okay. Causation. An explanation. I said right at the beginning of these lectures that when we explain things, we tend to appeal to causal chain. So why did so-and-so get cancer? Lung cancer? Answer because he smoked. Well, hang on a second. So-and-so got lung cancer and she doesn't smoke. OK. There must be more to it than smoking. But you see that when we explain something, we appeal to some event in the causal history of what it whatever it is that we're trying to explain.

And what Lewis says is that the causation and it's not just Lewis in Stanley and I'm the philosopher. It's important for or hugely important for making the distinction between causation and explanation is actually a philosopher called Donald Davidson. And it is a very important explanation because causation is, we think, a relation that exists in the world quite independently of us. If we weren't here. Causation would still exist. So the world would go on.

It's just that we wouldn't be here to look at it if we weren't here. And let's take away animals as well for anyone else who? Anyone who thinks that animals go in for explanation. There wouldn't be any explanation, would there? They'd be causation, but nobody would be making use of all of their observations of causation in explanation of anything. So explanation is very much an epistemological relation. It's a relation that makes things intelligible to us. Causation is a metaphysical relation.

It's a relation between events quite independently of us. OK. So there might be causation, but no explanation. But it looks as if there couldn't be explanation and no causation, because explanation depends upon identifying a causal chain or in some event, in the causal history of the events that you're trying to explain. Do you see the difference between causation and explanation? Absolutely vital difference. And Lewis would say we look at the campus birth.

And of course, it is an event in the causal history of the forest fire. When we look at the and again, if I had a flip chart so I would draw lots of little circles in a tree like shape with the one at the top being a forest far and somewhere down here at the bottom, there would be the birth of the camper and somewhere even further down would be the big bang. And this is the causal history. All these events combined to produce the forest fire.

Now, all those are events in the causal history, but we'd be off to pick out the campers birth in explanation. Of the forest fire. We use our principles of invidious selection as hers to choose the campus, lighting the fire light, lighting his campfire. That's what explains to us the the forest fire. But the forest burning down, not the birth of the camper. So whereas the campers lighting the fire makes the forest far intelligible to us.

The campers birth doesn't. If you say how did this forest fire happens? And I say, because Fred was born on 21st of June, 1957. You were in, say, a. That's no explanation. But if I say that Fred lit a fire half an hour before the forest fire started. That makes the forest far intelligible to you. Do you see the difference between explanation and causation? So Lewis thinks that both those objections to his second counterfactual theory of causation.

So the choice, of course, one. So, again, look at the bomb example. And it's quite true. The enemy is placing the bomb was an event in the causal history of Susie's survival. Because had it not happened, Billy couldn't have pinched out the bomb. And if Billy's punching out, the bomb caused Susie's survival, which would all agree to.

Then so did an enemy's placing the bomb. But in explanation of Susie's survival, we're not going to cite the placing of the bomb, Alwi, because that wouldn't make Lucy's survival intelligible to us at all. Whereas Billy's pulling out, the fuse does make her survival intelligible. David? Well, the terms were explanation for what will stop intelligibility. What the term is intended, as well as purely practical.

Yeah, well, there are certain things make other things intelligible to us and certain things don't. And so it might be that my the the firing of mine. Okay, so I. What's your name. Mike. Mike. I shoot Mike. Okay. What caused the death of Mike. Answer. Marianne's pulling the trigger. But it might be that my pulling the trigger is identical to neurone n firing in my brain. But if you say well what caused Mike's death and I say Marion's neurone then firing.

It's not an explanation, is it not Nesser. You have a lot of other knowledge. Seems to be very much a matter of the judgement. Yes, but intelligibility is intelligibility is to do with us. And what we can understand, what might not be what might be intelligible. A smart. Ah well. Neurone ends. Firing Marianne's heads to a neurophysiologists might be a perfectly good explanation of Michael's death.

Given that Michael was standing where he was standing and so on and so forth, whereas it's not at all an explanation to ask. So yes, indeed, explanation is is relative to who is doing. But let me use a simple example. You and your five year old granddaughter and your one hundred and five year old mother. Forgive me if I am insulting you with the ages I've chosen. Oh, jolly good.

You're all watching television together. But I think you'll agree that each of you is getting very different things from what you're watching. And that's because something's intelligible to you. Only in the context of your picture of the world. So something you can understand is not something your five year old granddaughter is going to be able to understand and possibly even your hundred and five year old mother has things she can teach you yet.

Maybe she understands more than what? Because she's got a even bigger experience. Maybe if she started to get a little violent, she uses slow slowness, which we'd separate causation and explanation. He looks right. Be aware of this all three. It is almost infinite yet. And it does go right back to the Big Bang. And before that, if there was anything before, there is no causal structure. Remember? There are only certain bits of it that are intelligible to us as the cause.

But isn't this just about the convention? Well, no, it isn't convention. What it's a matter of is wait for it regularity. I mean, we can see a regularity between the lighting of a fire and the fires getting out of hand. That's the sort of thing we understand. We've seen that correlation before, but there's no correlation that we've observed between the birth of people and the forest fire.

No, there could be something else. Like what? Well, the fire being caused by the camera, maybe because he was particularly angry. Oh. And turn the gas up too high. Yes. Yes. I mean. Well, do you remember I said last week that the striking causes the fire, the match to light, but actually it wouldn't if there wasn't also oxygen, etc., but that would be a married convention if we were lucky. Well, that's not a matter of convention. It's definitely not a matter of convention.

It's a matter of empirical observation, isn't it? We know that if you were to strike a match in a vacuum with the camera, if he really was angry, if if the law case was deciding whether he was negligent or not cause the fire. Oh, I see what your argument is about. Well, when we start looking at the law and start apportioning causation according to the law, we do have to start looking at convention.

That's true. But it but the thing that's important is causation is completely independent of us, whereas explanation is never independent of us. And the law takes it just one bit further. His explanation has to do with intelligibility. Law has to do with convention as well. The legend, whatever the legislation is, and case studies and not case studies case. What's the word? Precedence and things like that as well. Did I say another hand? Yes. Can you speak up then?

In court is a vast, almost infinite, or probably infinite number of things found in the course or the course of history. And you say pulsations independent. Of course, no causation is independent of us. Causation is independent. But the thing we pick out as the cause when we're explaining something is dependent on us. Causation is independent of the causes. No, the cause is also in. Is it also independent of our or. There's no such thing as the cause except when you're talking about explanation.

Because there are many, many. And again, I wish I had a flip chart because this is drawable. I can't even turn it round. This is very frustrating. And I don't want to rub that off because I. Well, actually, let me rub it off because I think I'm doing this at the end anyway, so. So here's the forest fire. We're calling that E now that's got a string of different events in the causal chain. Each of them has a string of events in the causal chain leading to it.

And there's no reason why there are three on each, except that I'm afraid of running out of room. Each of those is going to be caused by a string of events. Now, if we take this event here, if that had not occurred, that would not have occurred. But that doesn't mean we can cite that as the cause of that, because the cause tends to they can't be the cause, because it's only the cause in the context of every other cause that's come. But we could say it's the cause if it explains it to us.

It probably doesn't if it's that far back. We'll pick something here as the cause. Are you with me? Yes, it seems inconsistent to have the same. Well, okay. I mean, just when we say something is the cause, that's usually part of an explanation because there's no such thing in the world as a verb cause it's there. There are always multiple causes. I mean, there is is a definite article. It picks out one and only one event. And there's no event that has one and only one cause.

So the cause only has meaning within the context of an explanation. And the minute you have an explanation, you have principles of invidious selection. In other words, it depends on what's intelligible to us. Okay. There's nothing inconsistent about that. I think it's fairly straightforward. Did I. Woman at the back. Did I see your hand up? No. Okay, Bob, I'm not happy with this thing.

There's a causation explanation. I'm happy that you can say that the birth of the camera or the big bang is part of the cause of the cause. It's not a very important one. It's quite I'm not happy with the idea that the enemy planting the bomb is part of the cause in any sense at all of the of Luce's survival. That seems to be just. Yes. No, I. I have some sympathy with that. But this is the argument that we'd make for that child. Well, that's the argument. Hard enemy not planted the bomb.

Billy would not have pinched out. Sorry, I should have put up here. Susy's survive, Billie's pinching out the fuse caused Susie's survival. I mean, that would accept, wouldn't you just took that. Okay. Would you also accept how the enemy not planted the bomb? Billy would not have pinched out the fuse. Yes. Well, then by the transitivity of causation, it's got to be the enemies planting the bomb. That is the cause of Susie's survival, as we know. That's not the case.

Well, hang on a sec. Well, no, we don't. No, it's not the case. I mean, it's just what we know is that we would never cites the planting of the bomb as an explanation of Susie's survival or of the cause. But I would say yes. This is bomb planting season. No, no, no. Right. Okay. If C causes E and E causes. D does. C cause. D? No. Of course not. Of course, means factually counter, factually defending the conclusion. I would say, you see, it is so easy to use counterfactuals on it.

It does not follow. But what do you use counterfactual dependent on. See. This is what I would say. Okay. But I'm not asking that moment. I'm asking you whether you think causation is transitive. I mean, is that true? If it was if by by causes woman sufficient causes. Probably, yes. What we do think of causation is sufficient. So a cause is sufficient for its effect. We do things like that. And if that's true, then that's.

And if that's true, then how is that not true? Because that's isn't that isn't counterfactual preparedness necessarily cause. Well, we're not. Don't forget, we're no longer talking about counterfactual dependence. We're talking about chains of stepwise influence. I'm not. We might have to engage in this by email or something like that. But you're absolutely right that this has caused the lot of people to think that that must be false.

That causation is not transitive. After all, the trouble is, it seems a little hard to deny that. And if you think that's hard to deny, then you think the causation is transitive. And if you think causation is transitive, then it's difficult to deny that you just it is Sufi's survival death because. Well, you can, but that is what we mean. I don't think that helps much. Does it just not what it seems to me. Certainly we apply. We will all be over most of the all of this.

No, you. You're absolutely wrong about that because all the network comes in because it had the big bang not happened. The forest fire would not have happened had the camper not been born, then the forest fire would not have happened. So we've still got in every event. That's part of the causal chain. What I'm saying is as soon as you think about this specific kind of like.

Well, that's to do with explanation, not with causation, because the minute we've identified the cause and we've made it intelligible to ourselves, we tend not to worry about the rest. Of course, we will have to if if we want to start manipulating things, if we're scientists, we want to produce an effect. We'll have to make sure that the whole cause is no, then not just the cause, not just the part of the cause. To say the cause is nonsense. There is no such thing as the cause.

The cause is always shorthand for an explanation. I mean, that's what I was saying a minute ago. The cause is complete nonsense. This was never an event that is caused by only one other event. Can you speak up? But you see, why do you need to say no need? Yeah. I mean, lots of people would have sympathy with with that claim. One way of solving this would be to say, I can't remember exactly how it goes. But you can't count as the cause. Something that would not have happened had.

Sorry, I can't remember. But but you're absolutely right that there's a sort of. Yeah, absolutely. And there's a name for it. And I can't remember what that name is. I'll look it up next week if you want to e-mail me and remind me and I'll put you onto a paper that will explain that. But Louis' distinction between causation and explanation is his response.

You would never cite the bomb being planted, enemies planting the bomb in explanation of Susie's survival because there's no correlation between the planting bombs and the survival of the target. So that's just not on. OK. Let's just. I'm worried about the time here. So another objection. So we've dealt with or Lewis thinks that we've dealt with the first objections to his second TTC, but we won't say, well, how can the causal history of an event be constituted of interrelated events?

So how can causation have the structure that I drew on the board a minute ago with lots of events being caused by lots of other events and all of them being part of a causal history. And when we allow omissions and absences to be causes. So it was the Queen's failure to water my tomato plants that led to my tomatoes, plants dying, or at the very least, it was my failing to water my tomato plants that caused the tomato plants dying.

And similarly, it was Bob's failure to put on the window locks that caused the burglary, etc. So we allow missions to be caused as well, unless you're going to allow negative events and some philosophers do. In other words, Billy's failing to put on the window locks is an event in itself. He's not doing it. And actually, that's difficult, isn't it? Because how many negative events are happening right now? There's you not having breakfast for a start.

There's you not being in the pub. There's you not et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. So it's so if you allow negative events again, you're exploding your ontology. Maybe that's all right because we've already allowed possible world. So there's there is a possible world. You'll be glad to hear where you are in the pub. So we do seem to allow omissions and absences to be causes. But again, if we distinguish causation and explanation, we can explain this.

Am I going to say no? Okay. So if we want to explain the burglary, we cite the failure of whoever it was to put the window locks on. If we want to explain your sobriety, we say it was your failure to be in the pub at the particular moment, et cetera. But again, it's explanation that matters here. So we the only reason that we can cite absences as causes is not because there are any such things as negative events, but because non events, non happenings.

Make intelligible to us certain events. And so, again, we can cite causation and explanation. OK. Let's have a look at the I'm going to we can talk about this in a minute, but I'd just like to do the final five minutes of this session and then we can go onto all the questions, get them all at once. Okay. So the counterfactual theory of causation was always taken as a rival to the regularity theory of causation.

When Lewis first postulated the counterfactuals area of causation, it was explicitly as a rival to the regularity theory. So he looked at the problems that we looked at last week for the regularity theory, said it cannot be the case that there's no more to causation than regularity. Instead, let's think of causation as as counterfactual dependence and the variations there in. Certainly Lewis saw it as a rival. Interesting, though.

Hume didn't. I mean, Hume put forward those two explanations as if, in other words, he says and then he offers the counterfactual theory. So he didn't see it as a rival. An interesting this person, this philosopher, Helen Beebee, doesn't think that the CTC is a rival to RTC either. She says that Lewis is counterfactual theories of causation rely on the mill Ramsey Lewis view of the laws of nature.

M. Ramsey Lewis, this is this is John Stuart Mill in his system of logic, Frank Ramsey and David Lewis himself. They come to this theory of the laws of nature. And if you remember, I spoke briefly about them last week, according to the Mill Ramsey Lewis view of the laws of nature. There is no more to a law of nature than the explanations generated by our best deductive systems. In other words, by the deductive systems that best explain our universe.

So we make observations or observations. Tell us about correlations, about constant conjunctions. We those are the constant conjunctions that seem to occur irrespective of context. So it happens in your lab in Australia just as easily as it happens in my lab in London, etc. Those are taken out as the laws of nature that the the. So the best deductive system is determined by strength and simplicity in that.

What we're looking for is the correlations, the the constant conjunctions that are as informative as possible. They tell us as much as possible about the world. And whilst using as little apparatus as possible, we have to introduce as little as possible. So you might laugh at the idea of possible worlds, but actually there are people who believe and there are a lot of people who believe that our best deductive systems rely on the notion of possible worlds.

So we know that even though we're trying to use a simpler theory as possible, we've got to introduce possible worlds or we can't explain the world that we're actually in. So the mill Ramsey Lewis view of the laws of nature actually says that. So you might think. Pen keeps me fit all this. OK. Three levels. This is the level of language. This is the level of thought. And this is the level of, let's say, the world.

I don't like saying that because, of course, thought and language are part of the world. But, yeah, this is the non-linguistic non thought. You see, these are all different. And you might think in exactly the same way that there's the laws of nature, which are the things that we use to explain and predict events. We we get our rockets to land on comets and things like that because we can do the mathematics and we can cite laws of nature and so on.

And then underpinning that, there are natural uniformity is in our laws of nature are correct. If they correctly describe the natural uniformity is OK. In the same way that when we say the cat sat on the mat. That's true. Or we think the cat sat on the mat. These are true if and only if the cat is on the mat. So in the same way, our laws of nature are true only if the natural uniformity is that govern all worlds are as they are.

But the mill Ramsey Lewis view of the laws of nature is doing away with that. All there is is our explanations of the world. So just as with the rank regularity theory of causation, you're saying that causation is the regularities themselves, not the necessary connexions that underpin the regularities in exactly the same way the laws of nature are the laws of nature, the laws of nature, the things that come out of our best deductive systems.

Those are the laws of nature. They're not directly describing uniformity is that govern our world independently of us. So you can see that actually the crucial point, according to Helen Beebee, is that the counterfactual theory of causation, just like the regularity theory of causation, is austere, as I called it last week, austere in that it doesn't appeal to necessary connexions. All there is in the world are regularities not necessary.

Connexions not not mind. Independent natural uniformity is. So the CTC, just like the RTC, sees causation as nothing more than lawful regularity. And so it cashes out those regularities in terms of chains of counterfactual dependency or influence. But it is in effect, just another version of the regularity theory of causation. And just to run through today, because I realise that it is quite difficult to take on board, we're answering the question, as we were last week.

What is causation? And we're saying, could it be counterfactual dependence? Well, no, it couldn't, because there's causation without counterfactual dependence. That was the early pre-emption. And so on. Could it consistent chains of counterfactual dependence? Well, no. Because trumping and late pre-emption showed that it can't be those either. Could it consist in chains of stepwise influence? And as you go back, you can remind yourself what all these things are.

And the answer to that is yes. So long as we distinguish causation and explanation. So we haven't found an objection to the final theory of counterfactual theory of causation, so long as we make that distinction between explanation and causation. But we have seen reason to think that the CTC is just another version of RTC. In other words, we've not really added more than a bit of sophistication to what we had last week. And next week I'm going to look at a rival to both these series.

So a completely different take on causation. And what I'm doing is bringing this more up to date, because so far, I mean, I told you the CTC is although they they are still very much in play. They did start in 1973. So we're still, in a way, looking at history. So we are going to come bit more up to date next week. So that's it for this week. And we've got five minutes still for questions. Sean? I've spent the last 30, 40 years of my life delivering outcomes from causal chains.

In effect, I'm your little dog and you put up with a single bottle at the top of it. Coming down the block. Exactly. Making a plan to achieve an outcome. And when you talked about the picking, pinching other ball and contributes to survival, I would attack a problem. Sorry. I would I would approach business or technical problem by questioning whether every action, every day contributed to the object.

And obviously, in that particular case, planting a bomb is not contributing to a guy named Susie Susie. I would be delivering something to Susie. Survive the pitching outfit. Yes, a survivor. And in my having a rough day is evil. Could be mitigated by an action reaching out to you. So I don't have a problem if there is a fishing boat in my causal chain, it's been introduced by a risk which is now mitigation.

So I took it out. And you were showing me the outcome isn't going to make the difference. That's important here. This is the thing that might make the difference. Here is what you were talking about. And I wish I could remember the. There is a technical term for it, but if you agree that Biddy's pinching the fuse is an it's a determinate and we can allow probabilistic into term of Susie's survival.

And if you allow that Billies pinching the fuse depended counter fatuously on enemies placed in the bomb. Then you have a problem. I don't believe I have. Well, I will. Clearly, you can see that Lewis's own solution. He would say that, yes, we might cite that an explanation of Susie's survival, but we would never cite. That's an explanation, Susie. Survival. Why can't I just say to you.

You're looking at how to manipulate an outcome. Well, you would never place a bomb as a means of manipulating the outcome. Susie's survival. Course she wouldn't. But in a context where you have Susie a bit too near a bomb, then Binnie's pinching out the fuse is a necessary condition of her survival. But that is because I have as a longer term desire. So, you know, I know that Susie will. I want her to survive. Hmm. If I don't know that there is such thing as a Susie and such a thing as hers.

You know, perhaps it's a different thing. But I have a temporal overlay in this causal chain. You mentioned time. There's there's a flow of time. And this is something leads to something. Leads to something. There is a temporal flow. Now, interestingly enough, there are things, full anticipation functions in mathematics by atom bomb detector, which I can explain mathematically. I can anticipate in time something that will happen.

So there's a you can play around it. Of course, I don't mean that common sense at all. But I don't have a problem with saying that there is a causal chain. If I do want to put it in a logical sense. But if there is a enemies placing a bomb, then I want to do something about it to mature and show survival. If there's no bomb. But you would never cite that in explanation of no. And you might say you wouldn't say that it is a cause of Susie's survival despite transitivity.

But you would have to either say that causation itself isn't transitive. And they're all philosophers who insist on that because of problems like this. Two things. All you've got to find another way of saying that. OK, if Biddy's pinching the fuse cause Susie's survival and the enemy's placing the bomb cause Billy to pinch the fuse, then unfortunately, if causation is transitive, you've got to say that enemy's placing the bomb caused the disease the survival and not a cancer.

Well, that that's the point you're making. There is an argument to that. You can say that we can't call that a cause. Because it was only because of it's only because of that that that causes that and these cancel each other out. I will for next week look up what what that is. Cause I can't remember for now because doesn't this get around to the idea that humans have to have. Oh, hang on. It's just coming into my mind and it's gone again.

So I just say it just say flitted, you know, just so gone. OK. I think I still have it now. The problem is that we humans have to have explanations for things. And it all sounds fine that when you want to help Susie survive because the genes found. But when it gets into other areas where grandiosity of humans wants to manipulate, even even unconsciously, to make themselves feel good and explain something and bring logic to something.

So without you know, in due respect to his explanation, this is why I'm beginning to see the merit of understanding that cause happens without any explanation. The course is completely independent of not the cause. Sorry, causation exists independently of us. I mean, not this obviously is something in place, a bloody bomb. It doesn't happen independently of us, but causation exists in the world independently of us. Explanation is something we do right.

And in doing it, we cite cause it causes and because ah interesting causation is really only explanation. What we're interested in is those causes that make intelligible their effects. And there are lots of other causes of the effects that we want to explain, but we're not interested in them. If they don't make them intelligible when we're not interested in getting out of your sedergreen happiness, to think that explanations is led us to the worst for us.

How much explanation has been good as opposed to how much? Well, I mean, Vic Einstein said explanations must come to an end. But that was in a different context, gone. I was just thinking about what you say about it. No, I didn't say anything about universes with nobody in them would be causation. Oh, yes. I'm sorry. Yes, I did. Even if there were no human beings, there would still be causation contests where there would still be.

And there wouldn't be any action. But there would be causation. Causation is because we are to create these things. One session of time. No. This position of time just got events. Why do you call witnesses or no direction? Well, if there was a cosmic occurrence that were to wipe out all human beings. Now, does that mean that, for example, the London I would stop turning if it is turning over? No, I'm just saying it isn't isn't causation is the human concept. No explanation is.

But causation. I do. Well, causation is clearly a human concept in that it wouldn't be the process of causation wouldn't have a name if we hadn't given it one, but it would still exist. But isn't it just a way of seeing the world which is based on the fact that we live temporal movement, we see things is progressing through time and changing. Whereas if you have no individuals witnessing the changing things through time, then nothing would be changing.

Everything will just be as it is. We would have no thing leading to something else because this time you're actually witnessing. Well, the question of whether time is real is a very big philosophical question. And we might think the time isn't real. And if time isn't real, then then there can't be temporal successions that are causation. But I do think that's a different question. And I completely accept that without human beings, there'd be no explanation.

But I don't think I accept that without humans, there'd been a I mean, the big bang caused the universe. There were no humans around at the time. It's true that we couldn't know that the Big Bang caused the universe. Were it not for various theories and so on. But but I think that it existed without us. Seems to me to be. But then I'm an invert. This idea of causation is something that's very imposed on the universe.

Okay. I just want. We accept the statement that explanation is always going to be, yes, they probably can, because there can be legal explanations and there could be other types of explanation. But Ann Lewis would actually say that all explanation is causal because even legal explanations will cite causes. So it's your intention to kill that made it murder.

So it is the fact that you caused the death of somebody and intended to cause that death that makes it murder, etc. So Lewis would definitely say there are no explanations that are not causal or that are not. Such that we cite a cause in them. Well, if you look at sort of like visual perception, it's similar to white and it can be something like analogy. It could be a way of thinking that is not based on explanations would be something else outside of causality.

Okay. I mean, it certainly does look as if there could be. But Lewis would say no, there are no explanations that are not causal. And one more question then. I think we'd better finish the problem with the speaker between the explanation and causation. I mean, I decide to throw a brick and break a window. Then that's an explanation why we never wrote me in the sidebar. Doesn't that have to be a break in the chain of causation?

Because otherwise, I mean, my decision is simply a result of other causes, and I'm not really there at all. Well, actually, I mean, that that is exactly exactly the problem of free will. I mean, if if your decision is not itself a caused event, then it's it's not true that we can go back in the day and find events that cause other events, etc. But but I mean, the question of whether reasons are causes is something that I'll look at at some length.

It could be a decision during Wunderbar. It would actually have to be on course. Well, not. No, no, no. There are lots of philosophers who think that decisions are caused as well. They're just part of the causal chain. But you're right. There are other philosophers who think that if it's caused, it's not a decision at all. Yeah. Okay, let's finish there and we'll start again next week. Looking at the rival theory. So a completely different type of thing.

Or at least we'll look at the argument for the existence of a rival theory. Then the following week, we'll look at the rival theory.