The Rupture in the Gulf, and its Fallout

Hi and welcome to the Horn, a podcast from the International Crisis Group. I'm Alan Boswell. In December, the two Gulf powers, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates Had a major rupture in relations over the situation in Yemen after years of escalating tensions over the war in Sudan and elsewhere, including in the Horn of Africa region. To discuss this and the fallout, we have three of my crisis group colleagues.

First, I'll speak with Yasmin Farouk, Crisis Group's golf director. Then I will speak with Omar Mahmoud and Shoit Walda Mikhail, whom listeners will know are our Somalia and Sudan analysts respectively. Yasmin, welcome to the show. Thanks for having me, Alan. We have seen a major rupture between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Two Gulf powers. These were longtime allies, but in recent years they've ended up on the opposite sides of the war in Sudan and other regional rifts in this part of the world. What happened in December? That led to this major escalation between the two. So the rift became public with a Saudi statement on december thirtieth, on the background of a december second offensive by the Southern Transitional Council in Yemen.

that is supported by the UAE, during which the STC, as we call it, started marching militarily. Almost without resistance into bordering regions inside Yemen, Hadramaut and Al Mahra. And those are two regions that border Saudi Arabia and Oman respectively. Between december second and december thirtieth there was a lot of diplomatic uh negotiations that involved Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni parties themselves. But also Saudi Arabia and the UAE to try to convince the S T C to withdraw.

A Hadramaut is of national security importance to Saudi Arabia. It is um a red line and the same goes for Al Mahra when it comes to Oman. Obviously the diplomatic negotiation did not work. And on December thirtieth, we woke up to a statement by which Saudi Arabia is calling on the UAE to refrain from actions that threaten Saudi Arabia's national security.

and to adopt actions that would preserve the bilateral relationship. There are two narratives on why this STC offensive happened. The first narrative is that it came as UAE instigated action. Targeting Saudi Arabia. because of Saudi Arabia's request of uh US sanctions on the UAE due to the UAE involvement in Sudan. There was a visit by the Crown Prince around November uh eighteenth and nineteenth to the US

after which President Trump made public statements that he's going to work to solve the conflict in Sudan. This narrative goes that the UAE believes actually that the Crown Prince had asked for sanctions on the UAE. Saudi Arabia denies this. And the UAE doesn't really mention this link with Sudan in the narrative on what triggered the STC offensive in Yemen. The second narrative says that the STC offensive was actually motivated by Yemeni-Yemeni status quo. That the STC was promised.

certain promises regarding the status of the South by the Saudi backed government and by Saudi Arabia that were never materialized. And to add to this Saudi Arabia was already in talks with the Houthis in Oman and with Oman in mediation and with some kind of Iranian support. to advance on the political roadmap between the Houthis and the Saudi backed government and also with Saudi Arabia, and that these stocks were completely marginalizing the STC.

Which prompted the STC to act in order to put pressure and preserve itself a place on the table. The end result was then the december thirtieth statement that came after a Saudi strike. On UAE arms shipments in Yemen, in the port of Al-Mukalla, Saudi Arabia's statement says that the shipment proved that the UAE was supporting the STC.

offensive that threatened the national security of Saudi Arabia. The UAE says that the shipment was for counterterrorism a mission that was in Yemen with Saudi and a Yemeni government agreement. Yeah, make this move. It couldn't have made this move without informing the UAE and without asking for the UAE support and between December second.

and december thirtieth. The STC not only refused to withdraw but kept advancing and Saudi Arabia resorted to using airstrikes on both UAE shipment but also on the STC and push pushed the Saudi backed factions in Yemen to fight against the STC and to kick it out of all the regions and including from Aden itself.

One of the motivations of the STC, but also probably of the UAE, is that over the past five years the Say response to any kind of threat or any kind of destabilization whether inside Yemen or the Red Sea or even in Sudan was to try to contain the problem. Saudi Arabia had completely excluded the use of military force or even of course of diplomacy, and especially against its Gulf neighbors.

And I think this gave the impression to both the STC but also the Yemeni backed government and to other regional powers that no matter what happened, Saudi Arabia will not resort to the same coercive means that it used between twenty fifteen and twenty twenty. And this contributed to the perception that an offensive in Yemen might actually work in fulfilling its political objective.

And on the back of this, Saudi Arabia has taken this very muscular approach and has even demanded that the UAE fully withdraw from Yemen. Has the UAE complied with this? Yes. So the UAE issued responses from its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also from its Ministry of Defense. Saying that it is voluntarily withdrawing its counterterrorism mission that was left out.

in Yemen. The UAE withdrew, as you know, officially militarily from Yemen but kept a counter terrorism mission in agreement with both Saudi Arabia and the Saudi backed Yemeni government, and of course Western international partners that have an interest in counterterrorism in Yemen.

The rough number that is usually given about this counterterrorism mission is ten people. And so the UAE announced that it is withdrawing them. The Saudi statement, but also the Yemeni government, asked the UAE to stop all kinds of financial but also military support to any faction in Yemen, basically to completely go out of Yemen. For now, the UAE official position is that it will comply.

Sending the message that from now on Yemen has become a unilateral responsibility of Saudi Arabia on all levels. It is difficult to see the UAE completely disengaging after a decade of investment in Yemen. The UAE has Invested not only in the STC but in other factions in the south of Yemen. And again, the UAU officials stressed that this was done in agreement with. Uh Saudi Arabia. Some of the families of the southern leaders live in the UAE.

Many of them have UAE citizenship and it's often very difficult to track Alan the financial support that goes between countries. But at least for now, the official position of the UAE is that were out. And did the UAE pull out of islands like Socotra? Yes. The official position and uh the official announcement is that yes and the Saudi demand is that yes.

out from all the bases that were uh established, out from all the islands, including Socotra but the other islands a like Mayun that are in the Babel Mande Our listeners I think most will remember the previous Gulf crisis several years ago, which pitted Saudi Arabia and the Emiratis together and other Gulf countries against Qatar. Is this the start of a new Gulf crisis? No one wants another Gulf crisis. The blockade of Qatar and the crisis had

military and political and economic repercussions on everyone in the Gulf. And up until this crisis, this rift between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, all officials in the Gulf, including in both countries, We're saying we learned our lessons from this rift and we don't want to see it happen again. But I wouldn't exclude it. Up until now, so many countries in the region have been involved in this rift trying to send messages, if not mediate, between the two sides.

And to convey their own messages that they don't want to see a gulf rift between such two heavyweights. But it is true that on the different files, whether Sudan, the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea Security, the relationship with Israel or the position in the Israeli Palestinian conflict or in Yemen, both countries started on the same side. And now are ending on opposite sides.

Saudi Arabia has really clear cut demands. They consider that the UAE policy on their borders and they consider their borders being the Red Sea that includes the Horn of Africa and the other

shore of the Red Sea and Yemen, they consider this as a zone of national security. It is not a zone of competition with the UAE. And they consider that the UAE policies over uh the past ten years have resulted in threatening Saudi national security and they are clear cut about wanting to see those UAE policies change and wanting to see the UAE not being a player in areas such as supporting non state actors or providing military equipment.

to any movement that would be considered as a s a threat to Saudi Arabia. It really now depends on one the UAE reaction and two not only the Saudi assessment of UAE actions, but the Saudi perception of UAE actions, whether they mean real de escalation.

And whether they result in a satisfying answer to Saudi national security concerns. From your perch watching the Gulf, to what degree do you think? The war in Sudan especially was a major wedge that drove Saudi Arabia and the UAE to this place. Right before the offensive in Yemen happened.

Sudan was the conflict where tensions were getting really acute between the two countries. And I think that The Saudi decision in Yemen to resort to military action came because tensions were already brewing too high in Sudan.

and Saudi Arabia was um in Sudan questioning whether the UE really understood its national security concerns. And when the offensive happened in Yemen, the Saudi authorities The UE perception is that It by no means had any intention to threaten the national security of Saudi Arabia.

And that its role in Yemen but also in Sudan is about solving the problems once and for all. Saudi Arabia has been very frustrated with a very aggressive UAE approach around the Red Sea, I'm including in the Horn of Africa.

But from the perspective of the UAE, how do they see what they've been doing over the past two decades, but especially in recent years? So the UAE believes that other countries in the region have been addressing the region's problems in the same way over decades and those same ways did not fix

The region's problems, whether sub Saharan Africa, the Horn, the Middle East, and that there needs to be a a trial with new means that are mainly geoeconomically motivated. The UAE can afford to use unconventional ways. to invest tremendous resources in order to do from its own point of view what has not been done, which is to solve the problems of those regions once and for all. to solve the problem of instability, of um governance, of violence.

It has the resources to do this. It is a risk taking country. It is more ambitious than traditional regional powers. It is more agile. It is more flexible. And this is how the vision is presented. There is some truth to the fact that we cannot continue doing the same things and expect different results. But the issue here is that the fallout of it What Saudi Arabia and Egypt and Turkey, for example, see as the disintegration of states.

or the violations of international law are issues that need to be tampered with when the UAE chooses its means and its ways to solve the region's problem. What should we expect from Saudi Arabia with this new approach? What could be on the table and what could the fallout ultimately be? So right now what we're seeing very clearly is Saudi push

in its borders, particularly in Sudan, Somalia and Yemen. We have seen intensive diplomatic calls and visits and coordinations with the countries around the Red Sea. So I would expect To see new announcements regarding the Red Sea governance, but also we have seen in Somalia the Saudi ambassador was visiting the north of the country. We have seen close coordination with Egypt that shares

um Saudi Arabia's positions regarding the Red Sea governance but also Sudan, Somalia and Yemen. We have seen closer coordination with Turkey. So I expect that we should uh be watching closely what happens in the Horn and the Red Sea. This is where it's going to uh play out. It is also playing out in Washington D C being the main partner of both countries.

Uh both countries place a great deal of importance on the position of the United States and particularly of President Trump himself from their foreign policies and in this rift. We have seen the Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs visit DC. It is playing out in the US uh public space in articles but also statements and on social media.

and I expect it to continue playing out there. There is already a narrative placing the UAE and Israel on the side of wanting to um solve the region's conflicts once and for all. uh and putting Saudi Arabia on the sides of more um Islamist actors but also anti Israel and anti UAE uh front and that link between the UAE and Israel is very much used in this rift.

Uh there is a sense in uh Saudi Arabia that there is very close coordination between the UAE and Israel, that they support each other's policies. uh in the region, uh sometimes in ways that threaten Saudi national security. The UAE advisor to the president put out a tweet in a subtle way say that you know what the UAE is doing is UAE policy. So the rift is already playing out in D C as well. So these are the spaces I would watch and in which I would expect

to be movement. Thank you, Yasmin, very much for coming on.

Thank you for having me out. That was Yasmin Farouk, Crisis Group's Gulf and Arabian Peninsula director. We will now turn to Omar Mahmoud, our Somali expert, and Shuit Walda Mikhail, our Sudan expert. To discuss how this could play out there. Omar, let's start with you. The fallout in Somalia from this rift in the Gulf has been pretty swift. First of all, Israel became the first country to recognize Somaliland. That happened near the end of December, with Somaliland also recognizing Israel.

Whether or not this is directly tied to the Gulf Rift, this is being perceived as part of this whole affair, right, Omar? Yeah. There's a lot of suspicion that the United Arab Emirates helped facilitate contact between Israel Somaliland. The UAE has a very significant presence in in Somaliland. They've invested in the port of Berbera. there for, you know, nearly a decade now. Suspicions, especially in Mogadishu, have always been that the UA's been pushing

Somaliland's uh bid for recognition as well. Do we know what the quid pro quo is between Somalia and Israel regarding the mutual recognition? Well not a lot of details have come out and and more has been denied versus

what's actually been revealed in terms of some of the things the Somaliland government has said will not happen is relocations of Palestinians from Gaza. That's one oft rumored thing and and You know, even President Trump had given some legs to that when Somaliland was being floated as as one of these destinations, but the Somaliland government said that's not part of the deal.

position, which is attractive. Near the Red Sea, you know, in the Gulf of Aden, uh very close to Yemen and Houthis as well, which has been an adversary of of Israel. So I think it's that strategic position that probably can give Israel some sort of advantage vis a vis the Houthis, whether this is just purely monitoring, whether this is something even more active. I mean the other thing Somalians

Sorta denied, but there's still a lot of talk of is this idea of uh Israeli military base. Now a military base might be going too far, but that doesn't mean there can't be security cooperation at at some level below that. And I'm sure that's a big part of it. And and for Somaliland, of course, you know, the quid brocrow is the recognition side of this.

and probably an expectation that it's not just Israel, but that Israel can lobby other countries, can bring some others on board. And so there was talk of Somalian joining the Abraham Accords. Clearly that would open the Somali land recognition up to a number of other countries. And honestly, I think all eyes are really point to the US on this. And and so Somaliland, remember, a couple of years ago engaged Taiwan to have a diplomatic relationship. You know, Taiwan's been lobbying.

in Washington D C and and so now they get another partner with substantial lobbying effort in Washington DC and Israel to also lobby on on their behalf. Have we seen any sign yet that the US might have been involved in this? Not really to date. The public comments from Trump has been there's no change in the US position. This has been reinforced at the UN Security Council and other areas.

from the US government. The US is undertaking, you know, a review of its Somalia policy, engaging Somaliland more might be part of that. The US military is of course interested in the Berbera But to the point of recognition, we haven't really seen uh any n indications of that just yet. As we heard from Yasmeen earlier, we are seeing Saudi demands for the UAE to withdraw from its bases in Yemen and surrounding islands.

I would imagine that that would make the UAE's presence in Somalia there on the Gulf of Aden even more important. Omar, can you just remind our listeners what are the UAE assets in Greater Somalia? There's two areas on that coastline. So one is Berbera. which is the main port in Somaliland, around 2016, uh UAE company DP World.

took over management of the port of Berbera and has invested a a significant amount in terms of refurbishing and and modernizing that port. There's also the airport there where the UAE has a a military presence. Um now the other side of this is the port town of Bosasso, which is in Puntland. Um

further to to the east there, almost on the actual horn part of the Horn. There used to be P and O ports. The D P world now is running the port of Bosasso there. And then also around the airport there the UAE has a military presence. We've already seen a major ripple

of this Gulf hit Somalia, the federal government made a cabinet decision to end cooperation with the UAE. It's the sort of step that reminds us of the earlier Gulf crisis from twenty seventeen to twenty twenty. When countries in this region saw incentives to two sides in that rift. Or felt pressured to do so. So tell us more about that decision. What does it mean in practice?

Since Mogadishu does not fully control the country. Certainly, I think there's some shades of the Gulf Cooperation Council crisis from uh twenty seventeen to twenty twenty, which badly affected the region, but I would argue Somalia in particular quite a bit. And we should remember Somalia actually cut ties with the UAE at that time as well, or suspended cooperation as as well in twenty eighteen.

So this decision, I mean, that's what the Somali government saying that every agreement Within Somalia and and they include Somaliland within that as as they view that as part of their territory. is no longer valid. So this would also include the the agreements in Jubaland. Uh this would be the agreements that the UAE had in Mogadishu as well. The UAE had undertaken some training of the Somali National Army troops and was continuing to repay some of their salaries.

Uh but then also in in Jubaland, uh further in the south, the UA has some cooperative uh agreements as well. And so that's what Mogadishu is saying. All of this is is null and void now. Tied to this, Mogadishu said also uh federal member states. Uh, you know, these are the subnational units within the Somali Federation. They can't be making outside deals without the government's knowledge as well.

So that's on paper. Now the practical implementation of this is a bit more difficult because as we know, you know, the Somali government doesn't really have the rich or the capacity in these areas. And and if you look back again at that twenty eighteen decision, the Somali Parliament again declared the agreement in Berbera null and void. But for all practical purposes, you know, the UAI uh company DP World continued to to operate in Berbera and there wasn't really an an interruption there.

This is overlaid on top of internal divisions within Somalia right now as Somalia is heading into an election cycle as well. So Punland and Jubalan have been the two member states. They've already suspended their cooperation with Somalia for domestic reasons. Uh you know, Mogadishu's been um changing the constitution, has been pushing an electoral model that they don't agree with.

So you already have that backdrop and now you add this sort of foreign policy difference as well. So I think these differences are only getting accentuated within the Somali context. But the question about how Mogadishu implements this Mogadishu does have some tools at its disposal because it is still, you know, the international sovereign that that everyone recognizes.

So that gives it some some tools like airspace control and this is something they they've wielded before. So shutting down flights to certain areas if airlines don't comply with their directives. But of course, you know, they don't have the the ground capacity there as well. So we'll have to see how much they want to try to squeeze some of these member states into compliance. I imagine the expectation in Mogadishu is that

Uh the Saudis will step up support for them after they've made this move to curtail the cooperation with the UAE, is that right? Certainly. I don't think Somalia would have made this step without the expectation of other support. In part because relations with the UAE haven't been great for the last two years. When when Ethiopia had the MOU arrangement with Somaliland in in early twenty twenty four.

Again, Somalia suspected that the UAE was a little bit behind that. There were some other reasons as well at the time. But, you know, relations kind of went on a downward spiral since then. But Somalia hadn't taken to the point of of suspending ties. Um and so I think it was the recent developments which had a trigger, but also that Somalia has some expectations of some wider support.

Um and even if you look at the playbook from the MOU response two years ago, that's essentially what what happened. You know, Somalia then signed agreements with Egypt. They signed agreements with Turkey, um, and that was sort of a response.

to the MOU and so I think we'll see another similar sort of response this time. We'll circle back to you, Omar, near the end of this segment. Show it over to you. Sudan is really where these tensions between the Saudis and Emirates First really started to spike over the war there with the Saudis irate really at the Emirati backing of the RSF. First of all, before we get to the immediate fallout from this, how have you seen the Saudi role shift over the course

of this war in Sudan, or especially vis a vis the UAE. After the Sudanese war started in April twenty twenty three, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE initially maintained a public neutral stance and they called on the war parties to end the conflict. and they work towards ending the conflict. So the apparent support to opposite sides of the war that emerged later reflects a combination of longstanding relationships and evolving and diverging strategic logic.

Abu Dhabi's ties with Hemeti and the RSF have been rooted in personal relationships forged during the conflicts in Yemen. against the Houthis and in Libya, which uh the RSF took part in on the side of the UAE and the UAE's ally General Haftar. And the RSF's emerging ideological stance against Islamist. also aligned with the UAE's position against the Muslim Brotherhood and against political Islam across the region.

So for the UAE, investing in the RSF which quickly took control of vast areas, including the capital Khartoum. and central areas like Al Jazeera and Sennar, as well as most of Darfur and Kordovan, just after the war started before the end of twenty twenty three, may have seemed like at the time the best actor, um uh to guarantee UAE's um geostrategic and economic interests in their region.

By early 2024, a UN Security Council panel of experts noted credible indications of arms shipments, which were linked to UAE channels. and investigations by different human rights organizations also documente RSF access to newly manufactured equipment also allegedly connected to Abu Dhabi. This narrative intensified in twenty twenty five. when the Sudanese army, SAF formally accused the UAE of backing the RSF and um they cut diplomatic ties.

though the UAE consistently of course denied uh providing military support, framing its involvement as humanitarian and diplomatic. So by late twenty twenty four, um the army officially cancelled the UAE's Abu Mama port deal, which was signed during the political transition following um Al Bashir's removal from power. Um they cited political and security concerns, while ongoing gold and agricultural deals were also ended. As for the Saudis, the

Over twenty twenty three and even the beginning of twenty twenty four the Saudis were believed to be neutral, even by the RSF. That Saudis' stance began to shift towards open support for SAF. Then in May twenty twenty five, the war heat even closer to home with a drone strike on Port Sudan, just across the Red Sea from Jeddah.

After that, the Saudi Arabia um support to SAF became even clearer, both diplomatically and militarily. Around this time reports emerged of a one point five billion Saudi brokered military deal with Pakistan. to supply staff with equipment including uh reconnaissance and strike drills and advanced air defence systems aimed at strengthening the army's capabilities against The soft. So what fallout are you seeing already in Sudan?

from this rupture that we saw centered in Yemen but will obviously include Sudan. Many Sudanese expect that this rupture will not only prolong the conflict but also cause it to spread into near areas, involving many more local and regional actors. Saudi Arabia may get directly involved in the conflict.

which so far has been limited to providing protocol recognition and diplomatic backing. Sudan may increasingly function as a proxy arena for Saudi UA rivalry, with each side seeking to advance its interests. and influence in the Red Sea through local actors. So this may also open the door for other states, broadly aligned with the Sudanese army, such as Egypt, Qatar and Turkey, to also shift towards a more explicit military support.

to SAF. Until now, these countries have largely avoided extensive or overtly military engagement, in part to prevent Sudan from becoming an open proxy battlefield with the UAE. If that restraint then erodes, Sudan risks turning into a theater for wider political struggle over the Red Sea, where regional actors compete for economic access.

uh maritime influence and strategic dominance in their region. Currently Saf and RSF are locked in intense battle on their road from Barra in North Kordofan, leading to Umdurman, which is a sister city of the capital Khartoum. SAF is finalising relocating its government to Khartoum from Port Sudan, which is done with a blessing from the Saudis who have pledged to support reconstruction of the capital city.

But this hasn't really deterred RSF drone attacks on Khartoum and it clearly hasn't deterred them uh from marching on Omdurman as they're trying to do so now. So um unlike in Yemen where Saudi intervention led the UAE to pull back in Sudan the dynamics may unfold differently, whereby the Saudi pressure on the RSF may instead prompt Abu Dhabi to deepen its backing, further escalating the conflict rather than containing it. There's also a regional dimension to this.

Some neighbors were have already been accused of backing one side or the other. So what begins as a proxy confrontation between Saudi and the UAE in Sudan therefore risks escalating into a broader regional crisis. Whether these dynamics are intentionally leveraged to advance Gulf interests. Or inadvertently create conditions that spark cross-border clashes with Sudan at the center, but nonetheless may involve the broader regional countries, particularly Sudan's neighbors.

There are also many other uh rich. Another one is the potential to deepen Sudan's political and um geographic fragmentation. If Saudi Arabia uh concerned by UAE backing for the RSF seeks to limit RSF's role in any future government. while also containing them uh militarily in western Sudan. which is far from, you know, the armies controlled areas along the border with Saudi Arabia, the conflict could entrench divisions across the country. Such a scenario could leave Sudan

with at least two parallel centers of power, each backed by strong regional allies. Omar, we've heard Shiwit outline just how bad this could get in Sudan. How bad could this get in Somalia? Well I think my concern in Somalia is also that Internationalizing what is at its core a local dispute. So the issue between Somalia and Somaliland. I mean it's it's a local issue that has gone unresolved for three and a half decades. But internationalizing a local dispute

also risks basically making Somalia a a proxy ground. And I think what we've seen even before the moves of the last month or so, there was a latent

proxy battle I would argue already going on between Somalia and Somaliland. And and there was sort of a tit for tat that was constantly escalating. So if you look at even, you know, Somaliland's uh seeking of recognition from Israel, I think you could argue that Somalia main was already feeling squeezed by Somalia for some of the international measures I talked about by airspace control, but also in particular because of some local dynamics.

So there's a a region that's contested between Somalia and Somaliland, th this region of Seoul and Somaliland's lost control of Seoul over the last couple of years and Somalia is now incorporated as an official member state. President Hassan Sheikh made a a visit there this past weekend, which you know no Somali president's been there since the eighties. That

Somalia's tool to undermine Somaliland's recognition bid. So then Somaliland's counter reaction to that is to seek international recognition even more. And and so we have this constant series of tit for tap maneuvers. And my concern is that once things become internationalized, a local dispute, you have positions locally that are more uncompromising because actors have external supporters and they can continue to take more uh difficult positions and and not really look to compromise as much.

And then, you know, if you get to a a point of more uh actual conflict breaking out or whatnot, it seems harder to even resolve. Uh because then you have to bring in sort of that international element harder to disentangle. Aaron Powell There's a risk, right, that the Somaliland Somalia dispute becomes more polarized within the Horn of Africa region as well, as I think we started to see after the Ethiopia Somaliland MOU a couple years ago.

Certainly, this division of a region in terms of maybe those that line up on the Somaliland camp, those that line up on the Somali camp, and the tragedy of this would be you would have a Horn of Africa even more divided. I mean the whole

argument I I make about Somaliland is this issue needs to be resolved because it holds back the wider horn. You know, it's a very strategic coastline that's not being utilized to to the best of its uh abilities. Regional integration within the Horn of Africa, which is probably one route to greater economic prosperity is complicated by the fact that Somaliland's status is resolved one way or another.

So if you had greater polarization of of the region based on, you know, those who support Somaliland's independence, those who don't.

You're not actually doing much to overcome that issue in terms of dividing the region and not being able to take advantage fully from the regional economic integration element as well. So yeah, I think that is also a concern that these fault lines, it's locally it divides Um within Somalia it it divides the region and then it grafts onto these also external fault lines, these geopolitical fault lines in in a wider region that then just make this a a very difficult issue to disentangle.

Thanks Omar. Yeah. Alan. Thanks, Alan, for nothing else. Once again, I'm Alan Boswell, and the horn is produced by Mae Francis and Idaho.