U.S. and Israel Strike Iran

Good Saturday evening, everybody. Uh welcome to Dis Dispatch Live. Happy to be with you this evening uh to talk about the US and Israeli strike. On the Iranian regime, I have a terrific panel uh joining me tonight. Mike Warren, known probably to most of you, um, senior editor at the dispatch, Mike Nelson. Um How should I describe you, Mike? Former COO of the Institute for the Study of War, Special Forces badass, um, dispatch contributor.

Favorite uh contemporary journalists writes for the Atlantic. Very happy to have you all along. Let's jump in right away on the news. And Mike Nelson, I'll start with you. Um We saw a s series of strikes uh today. Um, and I'm wondering if you can give us any insight. We've been talking about this for a while. This has been anticipated for a long time. Um, wonder if you can give us any insight on sort of what happened today.

Why this happened now, um, and what, if anything, we can learn from the targets that uh were struck and the people who were. Well uh what happened I think in the last uh I guess thirty six hours since Since the the peace came out saying that that we needed to lay out a a case for war. Well, there was a a a myriad of reasons that we could strike Iran. that the president needed to make a compelling case.

And now we saw the president about midnight last night uh release his statement announcing the the beginning of Operation Epic Fury and the strikes on Iran and laying out a little bit of the the reasoning for it, although he was um There there's still some some vagueness to to some of the understanding. Now

In between Midnight Hammer last year, last summer, which were the strikes against the the physical infrastructure of the nuclear program, and now there seems to be some kind of reporting of some kind of threat. And the imminence thereof is is Not quite sure, at least not to the general public. It was briefed to the gang of eight. Obviously it's known to the IC and the president himself, but it is still somewhat nebulous in our understanding. Um that threat.

Uh the president laid out and some of his his uh uh interlocutors laid out today that there may have been uh an Iranian plot to use some of their short range ballistic missiles conventionally armed in the region.

Uh, we saw that in the first week of January in the aftermath or in the reaction to the popular protests that the Iranian regime cracked down on their people, killing even with the president's own numbers or those that he's disclosed, up to thirty two thousand Iranian citizens, uh, that he had threaten them not to to to seek retribution against or there would be consequences.

And then there was suggestions from Secretary Rubio and Vice President Vance that they had accelerated and restarted some of their research towards a nuclear weapon or or creating one. Um, we do know, and then Steve Witkoff obviously uh uh kind of kind of sparked that off as well, claiming that they were one week away from weaponization. Or some version thereof.

So I think there is something that happened and we saw second uh Senator Schumer seem to suggest with with sobriety that there was something that was. credible and known and and discovered by our intelligence community, uh, that suggests that there was either a rekindling or or an energy uh energy within their intent, their research, or potentially their moving of the existing fissile material, the 60% enrich uranium that was

unknown where it went after after Midnight Hammer, or there may have been this plan to do uh uh short or a large scale uh conventional ballistic missile strikes in the region. Regardless, uh what seems or what is is Potentially reported was the specific inciting event for last night was this meeting uh with the Supreme Leader, with Khameni and some of his senior leaders that uh by all reporting the Israelis.

struck, killing several of them. And by all reports, uh Kameni himself, that that was a opportunity that could but not be missed.

And they they took the opportunity. Um, the Israelis seem to have struck primarily counter-leadership targets, and the United States seems to have struck. uh uh some of their capabilities. So you saw that the Iranian response was a little bit more muted than we might have expected. They did launch some missiles throughout the region. Those were largely ineffective and in of lower volume than we might have expected.

So it seems that those initial round of strikes had pretty good success, both in striking leadership and uh degrading their ability to respond. Yeah, Graham, my former colleague Brett Baer at Fox News, used to cover the Pentagon for many years and now has been in the anchor chair uh for a long time, but still has good sources cited in Israeli senior Israeli government official uh saying that some forty, up to forty uh senior regime officials, including Ali Haman

uh were killed during this operation. Um in your really terrific piece, uh just out. Um you talked to um several people, including an uh an exile, an Iranian exile who spent time working for the regime, now believes the regime should be overthrown, um, saying that really you could effectively uh some kind of regime change or at least the first steps toward regime change by taking out the top ten. If these reports are accurate, um today it seems like

These strikes may have taken out even more of that. What's your reaction to to that? And you know, given your reporting, I mean you've done such great and extensive reporting on the regime, on Iran general, on the Iranian populace, and on the exile community. What's likely to be the the response from the Iranian people to the extent that we can we can know that?

Um, thanks for having me first of all. And um I just wanna note first of all that that if they got forty people, forty senior leaders at once who are in the same room. Then uh this is pretty remarkable. Uh remarkable, first of all, that they just put that many people who were important together in the same room. Um that uh that that speaks to some some real insanity or lack of other options. that they felt. Um the exile I spoke to is this guy named Jabbar Rajabi, very unusual guy.

And he has theories which which I don't personally know how how much credibility to give them, but I I thought that they were quite interesting as someone who had been on the inside in a number of different um uh different cap different capacities. And when he said he thought there was about ten people who needed physically eliminated. Um he was suggesting I think that the number of people who could be simply turned aside, could be pensioned off.

um was larger than you might think and the number of people who were didn't have a um who who simply there's there's no place for them uh in a in a in a a a post regime scenario for them to to to to be alive was actually quite small. Now whether they all ten of those were in the room. guarantee at least one of them was. Um I don't know. But uh the suggestion that that a regime that has has rotten so much morally and otherwise, um has a lot of people within it.

Who actually don't need that much of a of a push to decide that this is not a regime worth dying for. Um, that strikes me as very plausible. And the number, whatever it is, even if it's not 10. Probably pretty small, um, smaller than than one might think. Um, you weigh that, of course, against the fact that this is a huge organization, you know, the IRG.

tiny organization right and it's and it's it has other forms of resilience. But yeah, i i if a decapitation or leadership strike early on has the success that that that it appears to have had, then yeah, it it it it could potentially be um you know the the set and the match in in the first day. Yeah, pretty extraordinary, uh, that they got the Supreme Leader um

And s appears, as you say, to have been confirmed as for been confirmed um by the Israelis, by the US government. Um a pretty pretty good start if it is in fact just a start. Mike Warren, um You know, to Mike Nelson's point earlier, we have not seen much of a case from Donald Trump. for the United States doing what it's apparently begun to do here um with a regime attempted regime uh decapitation.

Um in the president's State of the Union speech earlier this week, hour and forty seven minute speech, he spent three minutes, all of three minutes on Iran and really presented nothing new, sort of a recap of Old grievances. He did the same in his eight minute uh address to the nation today, earlier today. And then within 12 hours of these first strikes, He was giving interviews to Barack Ravid at Axios talking about his off ramps, uh, his meaning Donald Trump's off ramp.

Is this the the the kind of limited engagement? I mean, Donald Trump famously campaigned against forever wars, uh, said that he was the peace candidate, wasn't going to get the United States involved, particularly in the Middle East. Is he signaling now that this is going to be that kind of a limited engagement? And if he and if he is, what does that say to the Iranians and the people left in the Iranian regime?

With everything that uh you know, all the answers that we are giving, with uh some of us having uh sort of more expertise than others, uh I I think the answer to that is We have to wait and see because it's it's there's so much that at this point seems to be out of even uh even Donald Trump's hands. And the thing that I've been thinking about. Uh with regard to Trump's commitment to this. W in the run up to uh these strikes.

You know, there's just all of these questions about was the president going to follow through and fulfill the promise that he gave? You've talked so much. uh in the last month uh where he said uh that you know uh go out there and and you'll you'll be backed, you'll be supported. Uh and then Then there was a month basically of Will he or won't he? We're moving, you know, strike uh groups into into the region. Uh, but there was no public case being made as as as my

piece I think lays out very well. There is a public case to be made uh for this, but the president wasn't doing it and he didn't do it in the in that uh in that State of the Union speech earlier this week. So the question that I I have is really up to I think what happens next. Because if we know one thing about Donald Trump's approach, it's not necessarily that approach that say sort of the most strident anti-interventionists in his camp.

maybe even including his vice president, uh have it's not it's not their view that that no military uh engagement is really worth any any of uh is is worth it. Um Trump likes to make these military engagements but I think he knows that the likelihood of success is high and the risk. to in that in that moment of failure is low. Um Operation Midnight Hammer is a great example of that. Um th he has not been unwilling

to use American military force, but it's been targeted, it's been in sort of uh slam dunk scenarios, and maybe they look that way on on the other side of them. Uh but he's got a track record on that. Um and you could even go back to the first term. Uh back in 2020 when uh when he uh ordered the strike on uh Solomani that I I would argue probably started the series of events that have led us to this moment now. Um

uh he's the he was the leader of the Koods force um and uh and sort of uh the main chief strategist for the RHGC. Um but but what happens next I I I mean I I just don't know and I think that you know, and we can discuss this because I think there's a lot of there's a lot of variance in sort of what happens next uh in terms of is there a is this regime truly been decapitated uh Who among the sort of

civil society in Iran kind of can rise up and take the reins? Is it uh is it just the next generation of the Republican uh revolutionary uh political you know coalition? Uh is it Someone much more liberal, something in between. the questions of sort of what happens in the next day, week, month, and what Donald Trump does and what the United States military does just depends on all of these unknowns. Uh

So so I I th it's the frustrating thing. I mean, I think it's important for us to talk about all of this on this day, uh and and and get all this expertise. But it's just hard to know and particularly hard to know when there's really been no communication. from the administration about its about what its plans are, what its goals are, and how we can't judge uh against something that we don't really know why why we're there and what we're doing and what's what's the ultimate end.

Yeah, we we know we have many dispatch members uh joining us this evening. We also have a a big crowd. Beyond the dispatch. For those of you who who don't know the dispatch or are familiar with how we do business here, uh Mike's answer is the right answer. It's a good answer. We don't know, and we're not afraid to say that we don't know when we don't know. So we're not gonna pretend like we know and talk.

uh about things when it's appropriate to say we don't know. We'll just tell you that we don't know. Graham, I wanna go back to you on that question of of red lines. On the one hand, you had the president starting in late December using you know really forceful um encouraging the protesters to come out. I don't think that's why the Iranian people took to the

Um, but it certainly didn't discourage them. I mean, certainly encouraged them to come out and said, you know, if they if you shoot protesters, he said to the regime, we will shoot back, we will shoot. We'll shoot you on their behalf. He said this repeatedly, half a dozen plus times. And then in that crucial weekend, um, the basically first full weekend of January. when the regime slaughtered, you know, upwards of thirty thousand protesters potentially, depending on who on who you believe.

Uh the United States didn't step up. And there were concerns raised both in the Trump administration and uh in sort of more more broadly in the international community that this was a red line moment. They'd crossed the red line and we didn't respond. Does this response count in effect? Is he now making good on those threats, even though they came this comes much too late for the the people who were killed in the street? Yeah, I I mean uh in some ways it's not for me to say, it's for the

lost loved ones and so forth um in the massacres in in January. I mean, it seems fairly clear at this point that that When Trump said those things, um, there's a good chance that he wasn't uh thinking through the consequences for people who were about to be slaughtered. hours or minutes later. Uh and that he probably w was was simply briefed that, okay, doing something right now has a certain probability of of working out and that probability

Not that close to a hundred percent. So um you can either uh look like a fool temporarily for having promised something that you don't deliver. Or you can look for like a fool permanently for trying to deliver it and failing publicly uh everybody involved. So I I can see how there were a number of ways that face is face was gonna be lost.

in that scenario. Um there was one thing though that that that was several things that came from that wave of protests. Uh and in that sense the the thirty to forty thousand people who die didn't die in vain, which is that um the remaining vestiges of legitimacy for that regime. vanished into the air. Uh yes. And you know, it they were evanescent already. The last year it has seen a number of things. Um somewhat quietly in some cases.

Going away, like insistence on certain types of Sharia compliance that the regime used to describe as an existential. uh matter for it. Gone. They they just you'd see apparently I haven't been there in the last year, but you'd see people in the streets just not wearing hijab. Not something that you would have seen much before.

So all those things were on the way out and then for the regime then once it already looked like all signs were pointing toward collapse or t toward the necessity of some kind of serious reform to kill forty thousand people. uh made it even more difficult and in fact impossible to to pretend that the regime was anything but a a a brutal one without legitimacy. So um it it's a pity for the people who expected

Trump to act sooner, but uh I I think there might be some solace to be to be taken uh with what's happened since. Now what he said, uh if I recall correctly about the what what happens next, the Now's your opportunity, Iranian people. There might not be enough. Um I think that starts to limit expectations for for um what the United States will do and for what needs to happen from the Iranian people, um, which I think is in some ways appropriate. I mean

the Iranian people taking to the streets right now, uh, I think is more likely than not. And if if it happens, I I think it will will um You know, there there could be scenes like the end of Ceausescu's Romania that that happen over the next few days or there could not, but uh there's now r reason to believe that didn't exist a week ago for a lot of Iranian protesters that the success Yeah, that success is possible if they try to do that.

Yeah, I mean I think there are uh as you point out and as Mike Warren points out, so many unanswered questions, unanswerable at this moment. But one of them is how deep the roots of the regime really go. Um, you know, the the exile that you talked to suggested it, you know, if you if you take the top off of the regime and it decapited.

Um the the regime is sort of so unpopular and this is kind of so the moment that there really is an opportunity for people to rise up and take advantage of the space that Donald Trump has said he's created. for um, you know, non regime elements to to take power or at least to fight. On the other hand, um, you know, you talk to some experts in the in the the the region uh

Iranian expats, and they will say the roots of the regime actually go much deeper, you know, 3,000 people deep, 5,000 people deep. And those people are going to hold on to whatever power they have left. F ferociously right now because they don't want to be on the outs. And if they end up on the outs, unless there is some uh you know, some effort to give them some kind of amnesty. Uh they're gonna be in real trouble, like actually not surviving trouble. Um it Mike Nelson, when you look at

Sort of what we've begun. And the president said today that he Yeah, there are more there's more coming. Uh I think he actually mentioned the a week as a sort of rough time frame, or maybe said over the coming week. Um how much more work has to be done if these early reports are true. And do you have any sense um from talking to to uh folks in your world

of what these coming days might look like, what additional targets would be? Well, so there are there are a couple of different things to to take into account. There, first of all, to answer that question, we have to go back to the question of what are we trying And there have been four primary grievances. You know, it's it's more nuanced than this, but to bin them in four primary grievances we have with the Iranian regime.

There's uh pursuit of a nuclear weapon, their nuclear program. There's their regional proxy networks and the regional destabilization that they cause. the short range ballistic missile uh program that they have or or weapons that they have on hand and the threats that those represent to the regime. And then there's oppression of the Persian people.

All of those are four different problems, but there is one solution, or no to my mind, only one solution that solves all four. And the president just laid that out last night. Now in in my piece, I said in the State of the Union, I felt he was walking it back.

Taking kind of walking back support for the protesters as though that is something that he had prevented it becoming worse through his threats and that he was focused on the nuclear program. Last night's comments and what we've heard since suggest that we are seeking regime change to address all four of those. What I think that the administration needs to be able to answer to themselves and eventually to the American people is if this continues.

And we do not see a very quick toppling, which of those five four priorities are in order, in sequence, those that we are trying to pursue. Additionally, that last one, the oppression of the Iranian people, and reversing that, is something that he has largely led to or left to the Iranian people.

Suggesting that they should rise up. And we saw reports that there was hacking of Persian prayer apps telling them to rise up against their government today. So this seems to be something that we have seeded and are trying to stoke, but we are to some extent. using hope as a method that that this will result in a popular uprising that not only will seek or gain traction, but also will gain enough momentum to overcome that that deeply rooted regime that you've talked about.

Yes, we have seen that they have cut down the top layer and they are probably going to continue to do that over the next couple days and weeks. The question is if that gets down to a level that the popular uprising, in so much or or whatever that becomes, rises up to a level that it can overcome it. And one of the things that I think we need to keep in mind is. There is not necessarily a monolithic uh resistance. There is not a monolithic uh uh counter state within Iran.

There are several pretenders to this uh mantle outside of Iran, the Pahlavis, for example, pres uh acting as though they're ready to fleet back in, just like Ahmed Shalibi in in in Iraq did. Um you've got the MEK sitting, you know, internationally and next door in Iraq pretending that they are a legitimate entity that could play a role in a in a counter-revolutionary or uh post-revolutionary um uh uh Iran. And then you also have

Uh, various ethnic minorities. You have Kurdish pockets and Baluch pockets throughout Iran that have their own separatist agendas. So what comes together to oppose the regime is still largely a question. As this continues and as we create pressure on the regime, if it does not collapse under If it resists in some way.

And we see, you know, General Kani, the commander of the uh the Kutz Force who replaced Suleimani, he's still out there. Larajani, by no means an unsavvy actor within governance in Iran, is still out there. There are people who can continue to leave, even though Khamenei is dead. Uh and that's a good thing. Um, but We have to see how much pressure we're going to be willing to continue to exert.

how much of that is going to come from the limited amount of standoff weapons and precision guided munitions that we have, and then how many ballistic missile defense uh capabilities we have to to suck up the the responses.

as we as we continue this um this offensive. So it may take a different look in terms of our precision to keep the the pressure on. And we may have to question uh how much support we're willing to give. And then the last thing I'd point out is Twice the United States has engaged in political changes from the air or from the air and sea only. That was Kosovo and Libya. In one case, that created stability and transition in the form of Kosovo. In the other form, it was complete chaos.

Well, in Kosovo, after the Serbs withdrew, we helped install a security force that managed the transition. In Libya, we did not. So the question is if the regime topples. What's next? And are we going to have any role in guiding it or are we just going to, you know, mark off the perimeter of Iran and leave them to themselves?

Well another question to you, Mike. You know, obviously before the US invasion of Iraq in March of 2003, and then throughout much of the the aftermath of the US invasion, there was talk of the pottery bar and If if you break it, you you own it. President Trump doesn't really talk in moral terms. that way. Um, and you know, if you look at what he's done in Venezuela, he sort of shrugs his shoulder, shoulders at the idea of uh any moral obligation for the United States.

to step in um or or a sense that you know the pottery rule pottery barn rule might apply but separate apart from the moral question Um and I think there are pretty profound moral questions if you undertake something like this. I think you you do we do owe it to the people remaining to try to create some stability. But separate from that, just in terms of our interest. Th given given the diverse set of actors that you just described and what seems to be an inevitable power vacuum.

Shouldn't the United States want to play a role rather than just say, boom, we took out your leaders now have at it? Um doesn't that sort of chaos feels to me inevitable. at this point, unless we have sort of a Delce Rodriguez. And there's no indication yet that that we do. Um I think the Iranian people would be much more than that.

happy with that than the Venezuelan people apparently are willing to tolerate. Uh just in terms of interests, doesn't the United States won't the United States have a role to play beyond just kinetic I I would argue yes. And and going back to your how you led into this, I believe we do have a moral, but moreover, a a an obligation in our own interests, as you as you laid out. Um, this is similar to a theory that one of my old professors, Anna Simons, wrote about. She called it the sovereignty.

If a country is causing you, you know, uh uh causing you bother, you can come in and conduct punitive attacks and then you leave them to sort themselves out. And if it happens again, you conduct further punitive attacks, but it's not your job to sort them out. Um, the problem here is, as we've seen with other places where chaos has broken out, Syria, most notably.

The the massive migration flows that came out of Syria into Europe in the last decade were not fleeing ISIS, they were fleeing Assad, they were fleeing the conflict. If if there is chaos that happens here, this is a population of 90 million, as Tucker Carlson famously told.

So those are people who will seek to leave the chaos. Those are people who s who need stability and and reintegration if there is some kind of change in their body politic, in the in the way that the that they seek governance and and and everyday service. It is within our interest. to main to help manage that transition if it happens, and particularly not just because of the chaos that will immediately ensue, but to make sure that another nefarious regime does not rise to the top.

And I think oftentimes when there are multipolar revolutions that take place or or multifactional revolutions that take place, often it is the most savage. It is the most brutal, it is the the the most um ideologically repressive that float to the top. We saw this in the Cuban Revolution, we saw it with the Russian Revolution, we saw it with the factionalization in the Irish Revolution in the 1920s. So that tends to happen if it's not managed along.

And I think that's a real threat if just uh if all we are pr uh producing is air pressure that that topples the regime and then leaves it to its own devices. Now that doesn't mean that potentially there is not a multinational that is not American led, that other people have interests in this too. And I and I think the president has been on board with other international actors need to play their roles. But it's likely not going to happen without US leadership, at least not happen effectively.

Mike Warren, I want to come to you uh about the politics uh of this in just a moment. But Graham, before we do that, um, am I am I right? I mean, you you've done so much reporting on uh on Iran over the years. Um Am I right that the Iranian people are much less likely to be sort of tolerant or accepting of i if there were some um you know arrangement that we learn about in the coming days that would be akin to the uh Maduro Delcy Rudrey.

Where we in effect put in somebody from the old regime that we think we can manage. Um, it it feels very unlikely to me that that would be satisfactory to the Iranian people or to huge swaths of the Am I r am I wrong about that? Am I overreading that? I do think that there's a lot of uh Iranian people who don't think that uh putting in place a new autocrat

uh is what uh their friends, neighbors, children died for. So um there would be a lot of ver very unhappy people about that. The other thing about Iran too is that Although it was not a democracy, is not a democracy, uh there are aspects to it that do include um the trappings of democracy, including public debate about things. And they in a way have had within an autocratic system a mock democracy that that every Iranian is familiar with.

Uh and so the idea that you could go from um From a a state that has uh a supreme leader at the top and then hi highly stage managed democracy. uh i as well to one that has a permanently uh non-democratic nature, uh I think would be pretty uh unacceptable to a to a lot of Iranians in that in that way.

Yeah, I th I th I I think it would be pretty striking. I uh you know, we don't know again, we don't there's a lot we don't know right now. Um but the the there was a kind of split screen during the president's State of the Union address where he spoke, you know, in one moment about the horrors of the Maduro regime and what they'd done on human rights cases and and sort of celebrated people that survived.

that and what was at a genuinely emotional uh moment, um, but then celebrated at the same time the imposition of Delcy Rodriguez on the Venezuelan people, who was a key part of previous regime. It just it feels like that's tension that is would be less acceptable to the Iranian uh people if at least if my read is is correct on this. Mike Warren, uh on the politics of Um, you know, much has been made of the sort of neo isolationist uh

faction of the current Republican Party. I would say growing. neo-isolationist uh faction of the current Republican Party, led in part by people in the administration like JD Vance, maybe Tulsi Gabbard, uh and people outside like Tucker Carlson, who uh came out today and blasted the president for Uh, yeah. How much does that factor um in the president's ability to maintain support uh g those given those splits? Or is this largely likely to be driven by whether it works or whether it doesn't?

Yes. Uh to that to that question. I mean, I I would say I would I was thinking about this in the run up to uh what I did not know would be would be today's strikes. I didn't know if they would happen or or that would it would be today, but it seemed that the president's Uh sort of a

The the the way it was difficult to pin down what he was planning to do. It wasn't just simply, oh, you know, Trump is crazy like a fox. He, you know, you don't know what he's gonna do next, and that's his kind of superpower on the international stage. It felt a bit and it continues to feel a bit like managing the coalition and a big part of the coalition. And I want to sort of separate out. Actual voters.

from power brokers like who you mentioned, JD Vance, Tucker Carlson, uh people within the kind of um the medium range coalition that make up MAGA, up because I think the voters In large part are gonna go with drug. And they're particularly going to go with Trump if it is successful.

Um but even if it's not successful, I think or if it's if it's sort of um halfway successful or it's It's not what uh what those who are actually concerned about the future of the regime uh or or or you know the the future of the Iranian people or stability in the region, but it it it does just enough to kind of get him through the next couple of of weeks or months. the the MAGA voting base will go with him. I think what's more interesting

And will be interesting to follow depending again on what happens and and a lot of these things these things are out of Trump's control. Is what does that neo isolationist or hyper-realist or uh I mean there's a million sort of names what we call them, but that faction of the Trump coalition, which appears ascended.

uh in the form of JD Vance, right? JD Vance at the moment appears to be uh, you know, the sort of the odds-on favorite. Maybe nobody serious will challenge him uh for the Republican nomination for president in 2028. Does this change? Does what happens in Iran change that? I don't know. I think it will be interesting to watch. I think it's interesting that somebody who we are all told uh is not interested in running for president in twenty twenty eight, Marco Rubio, the secretary of state, um

is not from that particular faction on on foreign policy. He is uh he has been much more forward leaning on um uh uh on sort of this attack kind of halfway regime change idea uh within the within the administration. Um does does he look better depending on how things go? Uh on the on the other side of this, uh in the sort of uh in the Republican uh political understanding of sort of who's up and who's who's down.

Does JD Vance look like he was he's sort of maybe trying to lead something from behind uh if he does end up sort of coming around as I think he will publicly and sort of supporting the president and whatever he does? Those kind of machinations and people trying to position themselves.

will will be something I I'm going to obviously be following as a as a journalist and a reporter, but I think it's so dependent again on what happens, what Donald Trump does and how he responds to the next days, weeks, months, and years. Uh I I think there is a lot of consternation within the neo isolationist wing right now. They don't quite know what to do. You can you can, you know, sort of gnash your teeth like Tucker Carlson. You can

be photographed in a room somewhere like JD Vance and Tulsi Gabbard to sort of this is this is posted by the way by the White House. Um It's not clear that he was they were in the same room as the president, uh monitoring what's going on in Iran, uh, and just sort of bide your time. Uh, but I think that I think this, particularly if it's more successful than than uh than than not.

This poses a problem for that part of the coalition and uh it certainly makes things more interesting as we sort of think about what the Republican Party looks like after Trump uh is is no longer in office.

Yeah. Let me uh move to some questions that we've gotten in the YouTube comments. Um question from William Bates. Without people on the ground, what makes us so certain that Kami is dead? Uh my understanding, and you all jump in and correct me if if I'm wrong about So I haven't given a complete answer, is that um the Israelis have seen uh photographic evidence uh and that they may have had people on the ground who helped identify this. And there is a debate, I think, right now.

confirm that he has actually been killed. Anybody have anything to add to that? Is that your just understanding? Just y the as you've said, it it's and to to to explain it a little further, it's probably not Israeli people on the ground. It is that Mousad has successfully infiltrated the Iranian government so thoroughly.

that these are Iranians who have uh collected this information and passed it to Musad. Uh and that uh that has been at least reported by Reuters in I-24 that they've said that the that Netanyahu himself has seen the pictures. So that's what's telling. Yeah. Um question for Graham here. Uh uh we have it looks like Gajatha.

Writes, I think the Iraq war led eventually to ISIS. Do you think the power vacuum in the Iranian regime will lead to such similar to similar such terrorist groups or states? It should be noted. Uh, Graham, that you literally wrote the book on ISIS. Um do you agree with that characterization that the Iraq war led led to ISIS and what how should we think about the the

um the work of terrorist groups now in in Iran that might be unleashed by this. Um many of them, Hamas Hezbollah and others have been uh badly uh damaged by the events after October 7th, uh several years ago. Where does that stand and do we do we expect to see that kind of terrorist It's kind of a complicated thing to to describe, but but um in some ways, yes, because there's a power vacuum, uh there is a total vacuum of governance. And then of course

Iranian backed Shiite factions come in and create an extremely sectarian environment in Iraq where Sunnis band together. And that's where ISIS came from. So where did it come from? It came from Iran in that sense. as a response to that. Um did it come also from the background chaos that that was created by the Iraq war? Yeah, absolutely. That's true too. Um I think what what uh there's a lot of ground between here and the creation of a new ISIS because of a of chaos in Iran.

And it is true that one of the really, really bad scenarios would be the creation of of a uh very unpredictable, very bad civil war, which, as Mike Nelson said, elevates the absolute worst people in almost every case. I will say this. Um, you know, the Iranian revolution of nineteen seventy nine. was very ISIS-like in that it had an enormous ideological component.

even an apocalyptic component that the regime itself tried to suppress later on when the apocalypse didn't happen and it did you know there were people who thought that that the Ayatollah Khomeini was actually secretly the hidden Imam. And that when he came back to power, that it would usher in the basically the end of the world. Um and when it turned out not to be the case, they pretended they never said that, they pretended they never thought that.

So there's already been this very long period of disillusionment and Kind of de-ideologization of the the um formerly Shiite just jihadist state that was extremely ideological. So what we see right now, it's not as if there's no one in the regime who believes this stuff, but there's a lot of people who are making very familiar rational calculations.

that are legible to to to um people who aren't you know part of that ideology. So it's not, I think, as if there's gonna be a bunch of people who believe in the end of the world and who who take uh extreme and and uh uh religious positions and then act that out to t uh and and you know die in large numbers because of that. Um there's plenty of terrible situations that that Could come about if the worst scenarios apply. But I don't think an immediate growth of an apocalyptic cult is one of them.

Think It's obviously a very It's very juicy. Libre Berry Crush. The new fruity floral fragrance. Yves Saint Laurent.

Yeah, Mike Nelson. Speaking of chaos, um the Question from FPL Underdog. Do we think neighboring countries were on board or even informed before the strikes? Were Bahrain, UAE, Kuwait, etc. prepared for Iranian retaliation and strikes? It's notable that they In in their public words, at least, uh, leaders of these uh other Sunni Gulf countries um opposed. uh this kinetic action um wouldn't allow the United States to use um air bases or or resources in their countries, I think, hoping to avoid

uh what we saw from the Iranians. So question where are those what's sort of the thinking in those Gulf states to the extent that we can oversimplify and describe it broadly. Um number one and number two, what were the Iranians? in lashing out um right now. So uh uh To look at the the Gulfies as a as a as a monolith I think would be a little bit of a mistake. And we've seen, for example, Oman has has reacted very angrily about this, and I think that's sincere.

Oman was trying to act as the neutral broker in negotiations and they seem upset at the fact that this is has been for decades, it should be noted. Right. Um the Qataris as well play a little bit of a Uh uh in a in a in a kind way, saying that they try to be the the go-between between all uh in a less kind way, they tend to be duplicated. You don't need to be kind. Right. You should you should just be accurate. Right. So the the the Qataris try to have it both ways with all parties.

The other Gulf states, the Emiratis and the Saudis in specific, have oftentimes been more adversarial towards the Iranians. Sometimes publicly and sometimes behind the scenes. Uh we saw it was reported back in in in the build up in around two thousand eight when it looked like there might be a strike, uh either American or Israeli against uh an Iranian nuclear program.

that at one point in time it didn't look like the Israelis could range it. It didn't look like the Americans were allowed refuelers. And that the plan was they would fly due to a desert landing strip in KSA in Saudi Arabia. And then take off undisclosed. That the Saudis were on board with an Israeli strike. Um, and this was, like I said, this was you know, 15 years ago or so.

Um so the Saudis have often and and under MBS particularly have have been a little adversarial against the the uh Iranians. These the Saudis released a statement today, uh after the initial strikes or after the the the counter reaction from the The Iranids that they were on board with the coalition. Um, I think that most of the Emirates and the Saudis, particularly, were probably aware that something was coming.

and are secretly very happy that it's happening. If if they're not overtly happy that it's happening, I would argue that again, I think the Omanis and the Qataris are the only ones who are probably dissatisfied. The Qataris getting caught in the middle again. um is the the home to A UAB, but uh Al-Ud Airbase.

Um uh but I think that most of the region is going to see this, most of the the the SUNY portions of the region are gonna see this um as as an opportunity uh to to uh not only work on behalf of the Persian people and bring them potentially back into the the the community of nations, so to speak, but also to uh finally deal with their largest regional adversary.

Yeah, I th I think that's right. Uh question from Brad Peters. In what scenario could you all see that the US would have boots on the ground in a similar way to what happened in Iraq? I'll take a first crack at that. Uh I think that's a very, very unlikely scenario. I mean, everything that that Donald Trump has said, look, it must be said.

In my view, Donald Trump doesn't have much of a worldview. I don't think there is such a thing as a Trump doctrine, and it's accurate to say that he's an ad hoc to. So stipulating all of that. One of the things he's been reasonably consistent about, um, again to the extent that he cares about consistency, is that he doesn't want to send uh US troops to be

the policeman of the world, you know, fill in the blank for whatever reason. He doesn't, you know, said repeatedly he doesn't want to do And I think, you know, if you're Donald Trump or the people who support and defend him, and you look at what he's done here, you look at what he did with midnight. you look at what he did in Venezuela, the way that they can sort of square the circle is by saying these aren't forever.

He said he was not going to get the United States involved in in forever wars and instead was going to look out for US interests. That's what he's doing here. And he's not interested in forever wars. He's not going.

uh he's not gonna put boots on the ground. I think, again, going back to what I said a little bit earlier, both given the the time and attention that he to to use one example spent on it in in the State of the Union, but also the lack of case for war in Iran suggests to me that we're not like that kind of a broad um effort and a US presence to try to determine and drive outcomes in post strike Iran. Any of you think that that's crazy or have a a different view or s or something else to add?

No, I I I think you're right that um if it came down to between tailoring back some of our expansionist goal or our maximalist goals of the campaign or introducing ground forces, he would probably tailor um the the end state to make it something that we could achieve from a distance or or negotiate uh an end state at that point in time.

I I do think that there's the potential, um, like what we saw in uh the negotiated settlement in Gaza, where the uh the ISF, the International Security Force, is being led by an American, Jasper Jeffers. uh but Americans are primarily putting together a coalition of of other allied nations that are going to do it. I think there's something we could do there, but I don't think you're gonna see anything like

uh Operation Iraqi Freedom 2.0 uh rolling towards Tehran. I I don't think that's within I don't think that's within the scope of what the president had in mind.

Yeah, I think that's right. Uh putting together a couple of the questions that we've gotten. W what should we um expect to see and hear from Russia and China? We're um Iranian allies. Sometimes in in fact, often in at least rhetorically, um What does this do to them, both in terms of their ability to extend their influence in the region? Um, but also what kind of responsibilities, uh, I mean, what kind of reactions might we see from them, Grant?

Yeah, uh one of the questions that we should be asking in addition to that is what were the reactions we were going to expect if there was no action that was taken against it? And um already there were there were you know questions about what exactly is China gonna offer to Iran in terms of defense capabilities? Uh what is Iran going to offer in exchange for that lifeline?

bases in the Persian Gulf, who knows? Um so one of the things that that I think w m was part of the calculation or should have been is there's a cost to waiting, uh, to finding out uh w whether Russia and and China are going to help out and what they're gonna get in in return. Um Russia is I am led to believe uh busy with uh some other things right now. Um so lacking bandwidth to actually save a regime. Um and then both China and Russia, I think this is

Very important that they are actually um they're close with many of Iran's allies, in some cases closer than they are with Iran in in in many ways. Uh more trade, for example. Um w the places that they are are uh that they rely on. Um include, you know, the Gulf, uh include Saudi Arabia, uh, and they have close connection to Israel too. So they could choose uh to invest heavily in keeping Iran and the Islamic Republic afloat.

um but they would have to probably really anger some of their other um constituencies um by doing that. What of of course China in particular. just as a matter of doctrine. Um I won't say whether it's in practice as well. Simply says we consider other countries territories sovereign and we will not interfere in their in their

um in what they do, uh even when they kill tens of thousands of their own citizens. So um in in this case, th this is a challenge to that doctrine um in in pretty stark terms. So I I think as a matter of principle you could Expect them to react very strongly in that Well one thing I think it's important to point out, this will have other effects within another theater of war.

The Russians are largely dependent on Iranian Shahead drones resupplying them in their f their front in Ukraine. That's about to dry up, and they're not going to get further resupply, at least not in the short term, and potentially if this achieves its its ultimate goal, not in the long term. So there are other effects that are beneficial to other theaters of war that that are of interest.

On the other hand, Mike and Mike Warren, I'll start with the y you on this. If you were um China right now and you were um contemplating starting some trouble, um whether it's more in the South China Sea, whether it's with respect to to Taiwan, whether it's messing with the Philippines. What wouldn't now be a pretty good time to do it? I mean the United States, if you look at the I I heard one thing, um sort of came pass through f from Aaron McLean, who's very smart about these things.

said something like and I I may get this uh not precisely uh right, uh you know, half of the US deployable naval assets are sort of occupied now. Um w we've got a lot of stuff. in the region. Wouldn't that be an attractive moment for China to stir up some trouble or just test and probe in advance, even if they're not planning to do anything serious for a year or two years, three years? test and probe right now to to

try to gauge our our will. Mike Warren. I think test and probe is the most likely given the way that China sort of proceeds s slowly and deliberately uh on these things. I also think that what happens over the next I keep saying it days and and weeks and months and what how the United States handles uh what happens and what transpires. Does it s is is there any sort of support?

Or is there a lack of support for any kind of effort to say build a new regime in in Iran or or you know a a new government? Um uh do does the United States sit back and allow that next generation to kind of step up uh and and take up and continue uh the the revolutionary regime. Um I think China is watching that very closely uh as they as they test and probe uh potentially uh just to see sort of what at least this president's result.

uh and uh what he's willing to do uh how far he's willing to go in terms of taking action. And and it's and it again it's one of the reasons why this Why is this so concerning, uh, given in particular that the president is Donald Trump? Look, there are a lot of people who Uh, have been advocating for regime change in Iran for lots of good reasons. I think. Look, Mike Nelson put lays this all out, lays out what the case.

in his piece for the dispatch yesterday, uh uh about the uh the case for this. But you ha when you have a president like Donald Trump, who who seems to be you said it earlier, Steve, uh he makes decisions ad hoc. He also seems to be uh driven a lot by sort of what appeals to him in the here and now and what seems achievable what seems um frankly uh exciting right he likes he likes to make sort of big splashy uh uh you know efforts to to say hey we we we accomplished this

Uh this is you can see this in the way he uh talked about say Midnight Hammer, for instance. Um and and then the follow through just kind of depends on whether things go well or whether he's distracted by something else. Um so I think you know, certainly China and and another potential adversaries around the world are sort of watching what this president does and um and I f I hope that China does not use this as an opportunity, use that uh the fact that there is are so many of our assets.

uh in the Middle East right now uh to to to try to say invade Taiwan. Um it's a concern. I I would say that my guess is that they'll be a little more deliberate um uh but but they'll be watching and taking notes.

Yeah. Mike Delson, I wanna ask a a little bit about sort of the the commander in chief, uh in a moment like this. Um You know, I I think there's been a a really good case for um something like this for the better part of two decades. In fact, I think there's probably a stronger case for this before Operation Midnight Hammer than there is today. You're right, as you said very early in our conversation, that there there's at least a a sense of some

Perhaps more urgent than we might have imagined. But again, in the president's state of the union, he claimed that Iran's nuclear uh program had been obliterated. And you know, now he's saying that there's an imminent threat coming from Iran. There's reason to be cynical about that. case that he has made, the limited case that he's made and especially about the case that he hasn't made. Where

What do you do if you're somebody like me? And somebody who would, you know, with with a um in a moment like this with a commander-in-chief that I respected and trusted. Um and believed in or Could be enthusiastic about something like this, but I have real reservations about sort of character and judgment at a time like this. in this president. So what I guess not really about me, but the the people who are charged with carrying out these acts of war.

How much does that matter when when you're when you look up at the commander in chief? Are you thinking about that? Do you d do you Does it matter to you as you carry out your responsibilities or is it much more This is my job. This is what I'm told to do. I'm doing it. Yeah. Well I I think the first and uh first and foremost, the United States military are professionals who will carry out the lawful orders of the civilian leaders appointed above them.

President Trump is the lawful president, and this uh even though I argue in the piece from yesterday that he should have gone to Congress largely for political reasons. to get the the support for something if this turns into a longer campaign. But I would argue that this does, you know, I'm not a lawyer, didn't stay at a holiday in last night, but still um th this largely this probably this this discrete argument falls within his article two power. So this is this is a legal

uh operation that he has ordered and the military is duly carrying it out. I can tell you having spent you know five years under the CENCOM umbrella directly, if there's one thing Sencom prepared for, it was striking Iran and and and taking out several critical targets.

This is something that the the professionals in the military in um AFCENT, Air Force Central and Fifth Fleet have prepared for and trained for. And there is no doubt that Iran is at every opportunity over the past seven forty seven years. have proven that they will choose to be an enemy of the United States rather than the counter. So I do not think that there is any question about the legitimacy of the orders, of the legitimacy of the mission. It is a just as

In 2003, I did not feel there was any question about the legitimacy of me uh uh invading and deposing Saddam Hussein. What made it messy was what happened after. It was the day after Paul Bremer got there and we debathified and and demobilized the army. So the next steps are going to be what makes the story of. Um uh Epic Fury. uh whether it's viewed as a success or not. So I think that's what matters.

I do think that a model for us all to look at today is is the way John Bolton's reacting to this. He's had very unkind things to say about the president's character. He's currently being prosecuted, some would say, out of political reasons. And he is cheerleading this on because he believes it is the right thing to do, just as I do.

Uh well that's a good place to leave it. Uh we thank you all for joining us. Mike Warren, Mike Nelson. Graham Wood. Uh I will push anybody watching to go read Graham's piece, an Iranian network is ready to act, published today in the Atlantic. And Mike Nelson's piece, there's a case for striking Iran. President Trump needs to make it. That is at the dispatch, thedispatch.com. Um, so thank you for joining us and talking through this.

Pretty significant moment, I would say, uh, in in the Trump presidency, maybe in the history of the United States. And thank you all for joining us. If you are uh currently a dispatch member, thank you very much for being a dispatch member. If you are not yet a dispatch member, you can go to thedispatch.com/slash join. Sign up there and avail yourselves of more of these kinds of conversations and the the good textual work that we do every day. Thanks again for joining us.