Thawra Ep. 16 – Siege of Beirut

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Enter the dig, one word, at checkout to get 3 issues delivered in the mail, plus access to 20 years of paywalled writing for less than $3 a month. That's nplusonemag.com/thedig. Enter the dig, one word, at checkout. Welcome to The Dig, a podcast from Jacobin Magazine. My name is Daniel Denver, and I'm broadcasting from Providence, Rhode Island. This is the 16th and final episode of Fawehara. The digs series on 20th century Arab politics with historian, Abdel Rizak Tikriti.

Fawara is Arabic for revolution. It's a word that contains historical multitudes. Diverse political radicalisms and revolts that have swept across Arab lands over the past century. This is the last episode of the series, though we will be recording a substantial epilogue. We're concluding Fawrah in 1982, when Israel invaded Lebanon and then laid siege to Beirut.

It was a brutal assault on the Lebanese and Palestinian people that forced the PLO to evacuate the city, that had become not only its primary base of operation, but the headquarters for a regional revolution against American imperialism, Zionism, and Arab reaction. This episode marks the end of the entire period of Arab politics that we've spent dozens of hours analyzing.

A 3 decade wave of anti imperialist struggle kicked off by the Egyptian free officers' coup in 1952, which itself drew on rich traditions of struggle from the twilight of the Ottoman Empire through the years of European colonial domination of the Mashreq imposed after World War 1.

We finished the last episode discussing US policy under presidents Nixon and Ford, Henry Kissinger's effort to disunify Arab states, realign them against the Soviet Union, and isolate the Palestinians in their national question. This episode, we pick up where we left off.

As the balance of power shifted against the PLO, Yasser Arafat and Fatah led the Palestinian movement toward a diplomatic offensive that would accept, at least as an interim settlement, the formation of a sovereign independent state in just Gaza, East Jerusalem, and the West Bank. It would be a state at last, but only on 22% of historic Palestine.

As one might expect, this change in program was not uncontroversial, and it sparked descent from the Palestinian left, led by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, as well as the leftist wing of Fatah, who rejected anything that might sacrifice the PLO's goal of establishing a democratic and nondenominational state across the entirety of historic Palestine. But Arafat and his allies were motivated by the fear that Palestinians risked losing absolutely everything.

Ultimately, the PLO leadership's implicit willingness to concede a staggering 78% of historic Palestine in exchange for a state didn't matter. Despite the compromises of Palestinian leadership, the balance of forces that would have made such an offer tempting to Tel Aviv had been upended. In 1978, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat drove the final nail into Nasser's revolutionary coffin, and took the US up on its offer to recognize Israel at Camp David in exchange for the return of the Sinai.

Under Sadat, Egypt no longer posed a threat to Israel, which meant that Israel was no longer vulnerable to a war led by Arab nations that might challenge the settler state's borders, let alone put an end to that state altogether. The upshot was that the Palestinian revolution increasingly stood alone. In 1982, Israel, under far right Likud president, Menekhem Begin, launched its second invasion of Lebanon. The first of these, launched in 1978, had attempted to push the PLO back from the border.

Israel only withdrew after handing the occupation of the border region to a Lebanese proxy army they had created. The 1982 invasion sought to completely destroy the PLO as a force in Lebanon, with the Zionist military and allied right wing Maronite Philangist militias battling the PLO and its allies on the Lebanese left, namely the Lebanese National Movement. Syria, after having turned on the PLO and the Lebanese left in 1976, switched sides again to fight the Israelis.

But the Arab states, with lofty Pan Arab ambitions, now overwhelmingly neutralized, largely stood by as the Israeli onslaught caused widespread death and destruction, culminating in a murderous siege of Beirut. It was the most horrific Israeli attack against civilians until the onset of the present genocide in Gaza. The Arab world that had been led by Nasser would have fought back. But that world was gone, and Soviet power was fading alongside it.

The PLO and Lebanese national movement held out, but the civilian devastation proved to be too much. The PLO ultimately agreed to evacuate thousands of its fighters from the country in exchange for a guarantee from the United States that Palestinian civilians would be protected. Instead of respecting such a deal after the withdrawal, Israel oversaw its Philangist allies, orchestrating a brutal massacre of thousands of Palestinian refugees and Lebanese poor in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps.

The Palestinian revolution had, for the time being, received a debilitating setback. That also closed a chapter of an era of revolutionary Arab politics that we've dedicated this series to exploring, excavating, and analyzing. Our story began in the early 20th century as Arab thinkers, leaders, and masses confronted the British and French colonial domination imposed in the wake of the First World War.

That colonial domination's legacy included the imposition of reactionary monarchies, the orchestration of military coups, and imperial invasions. And at the center of everything, the Zionist settler project that the British launched in Palestine. That legacy, however, also contained the seeds of its own contradictions. One of the most vibrant, tenacious, and varied revolutionary traditions in world history. That tradition, if buried under the weight of tremendous violence, was never eliminated.

We've seen it resurface at moments when popular forces rushed back into politics. During the first and second in unity in Tafadas, in the fight against the American occupation of Iraq, interior square, and the wave of Arab revolutions after the global financial crash. It's a tradition that we see today in the endurance and resistance of Palestinians, who teach us again and again what it means to live in dignity and what a liberated future might look like.

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That's patre0n.com/thedig. Okay. Here's Abdel Razak Tikriti, who teaches history at Rice University. A scholar of Arab and Palestinian revolutionary movements, he's the author of Monsoon Revolution, Republicans, Sultans, and Empires in Oman, and the co author of the Palestinian Revolution Digital Humanities website. And that website, I am very happy to report. It's back up and running. There's a link in the show notes. Check it out. It's incredible.

Even in the face of a United States with this foreign policy utterly hostile to the Palestinian cause. In the mid 19 seventies, FATA, the DFLP, and other groups led the PLO toward diplomatic negotiations that included the possibility of establishing a Palestinian state on just a portion of historic Palestine. Something far short of the liberation of the entirety of Palestine and the establishment of a secular democratic state

for all. And this generated major opposition led by the PFLP, which which alongside other factions established what was known as the rejectionist front or in full, the front of Palestinian forces rejecting surrenderist solutions. How did questions around diplomacy and rejectionism emerge and then and then play out between different Palestinian factions, between various Palestinian communities and constituencies in and around historic Palestine and around the world.

And also, between the various Arab states that made it their business to be deeply involved in internal Palestinian politics, countries like like Syria and Iraq. So the the main thing that happens, and and and we've hinted at that already, is that after 73, there is, all this, approach towards solutionism in the region. There are all sorts of solutions being proposed, and these are focused on creating these agreements between the Arab States and Israel and, of

course, as we mentioned, excluding the PLO. So the PLO, wages a diplomatic campaign, that has, one dimension, which is gaining recognition. Of course, it succeeds in doing that through gaining recognition in the Arab League then getting recognition in the UN. But then the other thing that is happening is that, of course, it's, also trying to get a seat at the table. And to do that, it has to deal with, the established formula that the Arab states have accepted.

And the Arab states had accepted the established formula of UN resolution 242, unfortunately, for the Palestinians, so which is a resolution that is primarily focused on, the territories that were occupied in 1967.

You know, of course, all of these documents could be interpreted in a colonial and in an anticolonial way, and what we want in our interpretations of 242 is to interpret it as far as possible in an anticolonial manner saying that, actually, the vague formulation as to what constitutes territories means that they may also include the

territories that were occupied in 48. And, indeed, the the British the main British character that pushed it for the resolution was claiming that that's why he adopted a vague formulation in English. Resolution was claiming that that's why he adopted a vague formulation in English. In the French version, of course, of UN Resolution 242, there's a more specific formulation, that refers to not territories occupied in 1967. It says, yes, we withdraw from the territories.

In any case, the PLO had to engage then with this reality where the whole regional neighborhood is is is going down that track, especially with the states neighboring it and primarily Egypt and and Syria, the 2 most important. With the Syrians accepting that formulation, the Palestinians were left in a weak position because they knew that king Hussein accepts a formulation already. The the the Egyptians were definitely under Sadat, accepting that formulation.

There had already been, an acceptance of that formulation even earlier. Okay. So now it just gets even more in. And there were talks of a peace conference in Geneva that would include these Arab states and the Israelis. There were all sorts of talks. There was all this shuttle diplomacy that was going on that Kissinger was launching. So from the Palestinian angle, it became important to have a political program that reflected these transformations regionally.

And because the idea was if such a political program was not developed, then the Palestinians were gonna end up with nothing. That was the fear of Yasser Arafat in in in particular who saw this from the perspective of the regional balance of power. That's how he read everything. You know? He'd never fancied ideology. He was not particularly ideological person.

And for him, you know, the people who were saying, no. We should just, fight long term people's war, and we will achieve our objectives, just primarily the the PFLP, that, you know, you put the principle and you and you just fight for it to the very end. You don't adjust it, and you don't adjust your political program. You know, from the end, he was like, okay. We have to deal with the reality here. You know, I I've I've talked about this before, but I think he had a severe case of chronophobia.

You know, there's a sphere of time. There was a sphere of repeating the Mufti's position, which, you know, of course, Mufti did the right thing from point of view of principle by rejecting the partition resolution in 47. But, in terms of the the pragmatic dimension, you know, Palestinians did end up losing a lot of land. I'm not saying that they wouldn't have lost all of it regardless, and they probably would have lost all of it regardless given the prevailing balance of power

at the time. But, nevertheless, they would have had a better shot at preserving some of it, you know, had had there been, you know, a different position in in relation to that. Potentially, you never know. So that was the thinking that that that Arafatu had. Now there was another way of thinking about it, which came from the left. And and and here, we're talking about the DFLP. They had undertaken the position that a genuine Marxist analysis would have to be based on, reality.

And they were saying that a genuine Leninist position would consider that detachment from the prevailing balance of power is a form of infantile leftism. So so their idea was that, basically, if you had, the Soviet Union itself, except Brest Litovsk, really, an agreement which which lost the the Soviet Union enormous amounts of land, you know, then then then the same could apply,

to to to this case. You know? It's, and for the for them, they were saying for for Palestine that, you should not commit to accepting the loss of land. But the formulation they came up with was that you establish a a state on any, bit of land that is liberated. So that was the formulation they came up with. And and they emphasized that it would be a fighting state.

So so the formulation was, you know, any land that's liberated by the revolution, establish a state on it, and then that's a fighting state, that would be, you know, used as a base to liberate more more land. They were arguing that that would be the more realistic option and the more progressive one. Now in this this Palestinian arena was not detached also from external influences.

And there was strong support for such a move, of course, from the Soviet Union because the Soviet Union had been pushing in that direction. Let's say the Soviet policy was different. Had the Soviet Union been supportive of a single democratic state solution? Believe me, I don't think that the PLO would have come up with a 10 point program that that adopted this this vision of establishing a a state. The other, dimension is the Arab states. So Syria was initially not against this,

but later on, it changes its mind. It adopts a different stance. And Jordan was certainly not against it, although, of course, relations between the PLO and Jordan were were terrible, at the time. But but, you know, the whole regional environment, of course, Egypt was not against it. So, you had the situation where regionally there were also factors pushing the PLO in that direction.

Now on the PFLP side, and other, formations that that were connected to it, They initially accepted the 10 point program, but then, they had a major, fallout within the PFLP of, over it. And, of course, in some ways, the same was happening in Fatah, by the way. Like, the the this program, had to be passed in sneaky ways, and it faced major opposition. And I'll give you one example. The women's union, which was led by a Fatekh Persson, my departed friend, Maisai.

She she she she basically confronted the leader of her party and said, we we we vehemently rejected all the women in the women's union, had a unified position on this. It rejected entirely the the the the 10 point program. Other you which was a humiliation for Yasser Arafat, you know, to have his own representatives in something like that agree with the PFLPL representatives on a common, policy of rejecting the 10 point program. It was a big deal. Other fatik leaders rank and file, they they

had serious problems with this. And and they developed within fatah, a left that was rejecting this. It was saying that the only pathway is a revolutionary pathway that there has to be a rejection of all these solutions.

So it became very tense. And after the p especially after the PFLP, changed its initial It's easy for people on the the left probably for many listeners to this podcast to to say in retrospect that that, of course, the radicals were right, that Fatah was wrong to move toward what would obviously be a capitulation to their enemies. But these sorts of questions are are genuinely difficult the answers the answers to these questions should be guided by ideology.

But really, ideology doesn't provide the actual answer. You need to use the ideology to assess the conjuncture, the objective conditions as best you can. Right. And and and it's and that's, of course, an evidence given the fact that you had such a severe, difference of opinion amongst Marxists on this. And and we're talking about committed ones. I mean, if you were in the democratic front, these were genuine Marxists at the time. You know? In fact, they came from the left of

the movement of Arab nationalists. Their split with the PFLP was over them accusing the PFLP of being traditional nationalists, not genuine Marxists. Okay? So, and and and those folks you know, and I've talked to them about this. I mean, I've interviewed a bunch of them. One of them is, of course, Qaysad Al Kareem, who who who who who actually wrote down the 10 point program. And I have a long interview with him

that is available online. By the way, we have it on the Learn Palestine YouTube channel, you know, which is connected to Palestinian Revolution website. And and and in his case, he's, of course, an Iraqi cadre, by the way, on a side note, and that tells you about the internationalism that was prevailing and the strong Arab connections within you know, he was the he's the number 2 person in the FLP, but he comes from Iraq, very committed. And and he comes for ideological reasons. You know?

This is somebody who believes in Marxism very deeply, and views it from that lens. Others who also, were committed Marxists had a different position, and and, you you had major debates over it. But everybody, nobody could ever claim that that position was was based on principles. That's the issue here, and that's the difficulty for Palestinian

in relation to this. How do you come to a a people that has been enslaved, occupied, dispossessed, completely destroyed, and now, of course, subjected to logics logics of elimination and all sorts. And tell them, okay. You have to adjust to reality. In reality, it says that you have to give away 78% of your land. That's a very difficult thing to do. So as a result, you always had a different tradition in Palestine. They were saying, first of all, this is a trick.

Americanization means Israelization. It's a trick, and and there's no seriousness in applying anything like that. But secondly, if if that puts then a ceiling on Palestinian Liberation, then it's not worth the price. And that's why there was such a deep division over this. There was fear that it would mean that the refugees would lose their rights. It was fear that, it would, this would lead to 1948

passing is losing their rights. It was fear that it would lead to a mini state that is dominated and controlled by Israel and the West Bank and Gaza. All of these were serious fears and equally realistic, as realistic as the balance of power that was prevailed.

Given that Fatah, by the late 19 sixties, was calling for a singular democratic state for all And that by the 19 seventies, they were willing to at least temporarily concede the loss of 78% of historic Palestine to the Zionist settler state known as Israel from which they had been ethnically cleansed. Given all that, how is it then that Palestinians get consistently painted as the rejectionist party vis a vis Israel very much to

this day. By contrast, of course, Israel and the US have constantly rejected anything short of full capitulation from Palestinians. And indeed, as we'll discuss in our epilogue, that's what Israel and the US really finally secured through through the Oslo Accords. But how did this how did this upside down world painting of of of Palestinians as the party that refuses to negotiate get painted? Well, it's it's a byproduct of Orientalism, racism, settler colonial thinking,

and we've seen it before. I mean, how many times have indigenous peoples in in this country been painted as rejectionists, as being noncooperative, as people who only understand the the the the role of force? How many times it were the ANC accused in South Africa? Why are you opposing banthastans? That's very reasonable, self rule, and you'll get your own states and you'll get, like, arrangement. You know? So you have this this is part of the racist

colonial way of viewing the world. In the case of Palestine, however, it's promoted by this, social and political movement that we've referred to, which is Zionism in extreme ways because they keep pumping it out. It's a way of structuring the way we view the world around us. So so, there are parameters that are set around Israel, and you're not allowed to think of it in any different way. One one aspect of it is Israel is generous. The Arabs are rejectionists.

The Arabs never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity. Palestinians are just hostile to Israeli existence. The, Israeli state has a right to exist. You know, they create all of these axioms. And and then somehow, the whole conversation becomes a conversation around the existential, status of the state of Israel, not not Israeli people. K. Not the Jewish people as as as a whole. Not anybody. It's it becomes a state.

Somehow, we're all supposed to either preserve it, reserve this ideological state and and enhance it and support it, or we're being rejections. And and and and this is, like, of course, like, super horrific, but it it is part of also how the imperial logic of power works. In other parts of the world, the US empire has has done this as well. There was twisting of reality in Vietnam. There was twisting of reality in many other

parts of the world. So so but in settler colonial context, particularly in context, like that of the Israeli state becomes more intense. And when you have huge amount of intellectuals working on behalf of this project, committed to it out of commitment and love for the project, they'll come and and and engage in all sorts of sophistry. Honestly, sophistry is the best way to to to think about this. These are rhetorical conceits.

1974 marked a a major diplomatic event for the PLO with with Arafat delivering his landmark speech to the UN General Assembly. In the speech, he he placed the Palestinian struggle in the context of armed national liberation movements across the third world, struggles that had already been victorious, like Algeria, and those that remained in progress, like like those across Southern Africa.

And really interestingly and movingly, he he painted a picture of a future liberated Palestine by by first celebrating the anti Zionist revolutionary socialist Jewish Israeli, Ehudadev, who who had been imprisoned by Israel alongside alongside other members of a group called the revolutionary communist alliance red front. He also celebrated Catholic archbishop, Hilarion Capucci, who who had been imprisoned by Israel for smuggling weapons to the PLO in the West Bank.

And Arafat in the speech declared, quote, let us work together that my dream may be fulfilled, that I may return with my people out of exile, there in Palestine, to live with this Jewish freedom fighter and his partners, with this Arab priest and his brothers in one democratic state where Christian, Jew, and Muslim live in justice, equality, and fraternity.

And notably, the the camera, at least in the video I watch, pans the room and Israel's seat in the general assembly is empty and and so is South Africa's. And, Arafat famously concludes the speech by saying, quote, today, I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom fighter's gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. I repeat, do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. What was the significance of this moment in terms of of what it revealed about the Palestinian struggle?

And and also, more broadly, in terms of what it reflected about the UN General Assembly becoming during this era, this powerful tribune for 3rd worldism and and decolonization and really remaking the world along very different lines. Yeah. So, you know, one interesting fact to note here is that the UN had played this role earlier, was starting to play this role in the fifties. There's a lot of work that has been done on Algeria, for example,

and the usage of the UN arena. And and interestingly, of course, we've mentioned this in previous episodes, Ahmed al Shukeri, the the the the founder of the PLO, helped in that battle, in the diplomatic battle for Algeria and and the UN. As more and more African and Asian nations began to gain their independence and join the UN, the character of that organization changed substantially.

And that's why, for example, you would have never had a partition resolution of Palestine had that vote taken place a few years later, not in 47, had taken place, like, let's say, in 53 or 54, would have been a completely different environment. It took place in a u UN General Assembly where much of the world because of direct colonization remained disenfranchised in this world body. Absolutely correct.

And, one of the more interesting facts about the 1974 speech by Yasser Arafat was that the reason why it could happen, of course, was due to the Algerian presidency of the general assembly at the time. Algeria, of course, throughout played a big role. Even by the way, the Algerians, under, Boumediene played a big role in facilitating the PLO recognition, both that that previous, you know, they facilitated from 73 onwards an Arab, situation that would create that.

They had they had been just very steadfast in supporting Palestinian efforts, period. And that's due to the that special relationship that we've alluded to over and over again. It's a very real thing, by the way, anti colonial solidarity. A lot of people question it, but anybody who who's been to Algeria and comes from Palestine, anybody who's been to Ireland comes from Palestine nowadays will feel it and and vice versa. I I believe, like, there's there is an

unspoken understanding between people's own experiences. And, of course, South Africa. I mean, look at what South Africans have done in in in in the in in the international court and elsewhere. This is this is a true and real thing. But in any case, you have this speech given. I actually consider it to be one of the greatest speeches of all time. It is anybody I recommend that our listeners read it. And that's not because,

Arafat was a great orator. He he was not he's actually notorious in Palestinian circles for not being the best orator by any measure. However, the speech was representing the Palestinian people in very significant ways. And and the best Palestinian talent went into, phrasing it, formulating it, you know, with their wish, played a big role in this, you know, of course, Edward Said had

a role in the English version. You know, these were these were superb, writers and intellectuals, and and it comes out of that collective spirit. Sometimes, by the way, there's this thinking around speeches of this kind as products of individual genius. What's beautiful about this speech is that it actually did represent the people through the voices of of great intellectuals that crafted it for the national representative who was, of course, the chairman of the PLO.

But he did something remarkable there, and I think it communicated the Palestinian position in in very significant ways because it actually communicated the principle. That speech, there's so much richness. That that setting up actually the settler colonial context and the and the comparative settler colonial context. It's there. A lot of, you know, people sometimes claim, well, settler colonial analysis came after establishment of the journal of, settler colonial studies

in 2 1011. I'm like, what what the hell are you talking about? That is that's the weirdest new thing that people who, I don't know, write for The Atlantic Magazine are saying. It's so weird. Or Eric Wolf, like, you know, or Patrick Wolf or whoever, like, you know and it's like it's not when Eric Wolf writes, about a pleasant instructions in the it's not when Patrick Wolf writes about, comparative settler colonialism

or or or anything like that. It comes much earlier from the revolutions and the revolutionary movements themselves. So, anyways, so so there is that dimension. There is, again, this emphasis on, a joint vision, a vision of a joint future for Palestinians, for Jews, for Arabs of different faiths in this land, for people, who fought for an international vision in in different ways. It's it's a wonderful, wonderful document.

At the same time as this document, though, was being proposed, of course, we had the 10 point program, simultaneously in operation. But what is interesting about this period is there's an ambiguity in the 10 point program, And and and that's a byproduct, of course, with the internal Palestinian arena. You couldn't come and say, like, you know, Bin Arafat couldn't do it in Fatah And even somebody with his weight and enormous influence.

And and and he was the weightiest Palestinian figure in in modern Palestinian history that way. He couldn't push something like that, so early on, like, saying 2 state solution, and I don't think he wanted to. There was a a sort of a vagueness that allowed for that possibility should there be an international process, but that also, gave an an uncommitted approach to to this thing. Now all of this, by the way, then gets disrupted by the Lebanese civil war, which I'm sure you'll ask about.

Yeah. That's what I wanna talk about now. Lebanon, where civil war broke out again in 1975 and 76. It was it was the beginning of a long complex multifaceted conflict, which which pitted the PLO and its leftist Lebanese allies against right wing, Maronite Christian phalangists, a conflict that would last for a decade and a half and that would, at various points, draw in Syria, Israel, and the United States.

We've discussed some of the this background in prior episodes, but let's let's get into the situation here in 1975 and 76 before before we discuss how it all plays out. Why does the Lebanese civil war explode when it does and the way that it does? And and what sort of situation does that put

the PLO in? Because as we discussed with regard to Black September in Jordan, Fatah had a principle of in the internal affairs of Arab states, while while the left wing PFLP and DFLP supported the revolutionary overthrow of reactionary governments across

the Arab world. And all of this within a context where there are conflictual dynamics between a nation state subject to Israeli reprisals and a stateless people waging an armed liberation struggle against Israel, the settler state right next door. Right. So so, Daniel, the the difficulty with the analysis of Lebanese civil war is that there's, so, many different perspectives on it that have nothing to do with Palestinian realities.

And, actually, the current Lebanese analysis of it and the internal Lebanese arena is almost premised on not actually having a serious analysis of it and just laying the blame on on on Palestinians or others. You know, the best example of that is that this was a a quote, a girl, which is the the a war for the for the others as as Hassan Toine, the famous, Lebanese, journalist put it. In reality, of course, there were internal Lebanese dynamics that

led to this war. The development of Lebanese capital had to do with the story. Lebanon had increasingly developed in in the 19 fifties, as an alternative, to the port trade that had existed in Haifa in Palestine. Beirut took that trade.

It became also the main banking center for the region, a region that was expanding in oil reserves, and it was very much depending on that, on relationships, with a global economic project that had ties to the US, had tied to countries that were related to the US, to, you know, Gulf Capital and so on, in the in the in the region. So, it became like a transit hub and a and a hub for financial services. That benefited, of course, a certain type of

bourgeoisie there. And it's a it's a certain type of bourgeoisie that did not want to be aligned with, the sort of socialist projects that were being promoted by Nasser and and Syria and others. You know? That's that's on the one hand. Then you have the sectarian dimension. Okay. The sectarian dimension that we've talked about over and over again there, and I think our listeners,

understand it by now. But it meant that you had a a Maronite elite that were opposed to any form, of, an adjustment to the arrangement that had been done by the French, in terms of the allocation of political power in the country. So, you know, you had the president, you had the army, you had distribution of power disproportionately benefiting them. And, you know, of course, the Sunnis were

the junior partner in this. They got some of the seats, but they were never able to to break that that hegemony. Other groups didn't get anything. So we have this problem internally going on, and and we saw it explode, of course, in 19 fifties. Now what is the solution after 58? Which is building the a strong Lebanese state. And, again, a state that would defend capital, protect capital, expand capital, while at the same time, not necessarily clash

with surrounding Arab states. You know? So it was built on an arrangement with Nasser even. And, additionally, that would have, some kind of, element of building a new national identity, unifying national identity. All of this came at the expense of Palestinians, though, in this final phase because, you know, they they were completely disregarded in this project, and in fact, they were subjected to extra security surveillance and oppression

in the spirit. So by the time the past year revolution comes, a new variable is entering that allows for changing the the map there. 1, all the groups that had been marginalized by the sectarian system, and I'm here talking about sectarian groups. The major sects didn't get, their what they saw as their first share of the pie or that did not want to have a sharing of the pie model at at all based on sectarian lines.

They saw a potential in the arrival of this phenomena, which is the Palestinian revolution because this brings in people who are armed, people who have a revolutionary vision, people who have radical ideas. At the same time, you have the Lebanese right, and especially the Maronite forces, that were identified with the right, they're seeing this as a menace. It's a very dangerous thing. It changes their own situation internally in terms of the

balance of power. And and this causes a serious, issue, that leads to major, major explosion internally. Now another thing that needs to be added, and this is something that, one of the most wonderful people have served on, doctoral committee for doctor Nathaniel George, who teaches now, at University of London at SOAS. You know, he he calls this, a a global civil war that took place. It's not just a civil war. It's it's actually a global one.

And he emphasizes the fact that their right was very much infused, with actually American and capitalist ideas. You know, the main theorist of the right was very close actually to American civilizational discourse. He had excellent relations with American right, with with heads of major companies, Coca Cola, etcetera. All of these people were telling him he's a great visionary. This is Charles Malik,

of course. And and, I believe that, Nate is is is publishing a major, piece on him, and and and it's gonna appear in the American Historical Review. So I encourage our readers to check it. But, like, basically, there is very much, a civilizational framing of this. And it's very much framed as a clash between capitalism and communism, a clash between the forces, of Christianity and Islam,

a clash between civilization and and darkness. These binaries play out big time in in the way the ideological engineering of the war, took place. What is very important to also note is, there were reasons why this war, could happen internationally. The Maronite leadership sensed that they could draw upon external support to be able to make this happen. Had they not believed that, they would not have carried it out. So how how does the war start? And and how would you characterize the basic camps

of the conflict? It it was a sectarian war, obviously, but but only one side embraced violent sectarianism. The PLO and its allies absolutely rejected it. The war started with a bus that was carrying, Palestinian civilians, actually, Palestinians in a bus. They were going on a trip. They pass through a a a Maronite Christian area, and, they they get massacred in that bus. So that that actually becomes the the initial, you know, event that that that leads to the explosion of of of the fighting.

Now, of course, there is many things that happen in the lead up to that, but, this this results, in a situation where, you have a process of attacks on the part of Maronite forces also on, neighborhoods, that are seen, as as being within the orbit of Christian majority areas and and that are, mixed ethnically. Mixed stories and sector mixed sects. Like, it's mixed religiously, but also may may contain, Palestinians.

So they're they're attacking systematically these areas, and, actually, they're engaging in a project of sectarian cleansing. And so the the idea is to create some form of Christian separateness within Lebanon, and to enforce also within Christian communities,

a certain ideological conformity. So let's say you're a Christian, but you belong to the Communist Party or you belong to the left, and and there were many examples of this, your house would be demolished or or your family would be attacked or there would be forms of, like, essentially, ensuring that you're, destroyed. So the the the the the progress of the war depended on a series of events that were connected to to these kind of practices.

And and this is something that that that is that is very clear to me. There was no equivalent ideology or policy on the other side because you did have the Lebanese national, movement, which was the main alliance running the the Lebanese side of the of the Lebanese civil war, that was representing progressive parties for the most part, you know, that either belong to the communist wing of the Arab Liberation Movement, that we've been talking about all

these weeks or the, nationalist one. But the nationalists, of course, had undergone a a process of radicalization. So include all the Nasserists, the Baathists, the communists, you know, it was a broad umbrella that included all of these forces, plus, of course, Kemal Jomblatt who was, the Druze leader and that that represented a party called the Progressive Socialist Party. Now those forces were claiming to be anti sectarian, and and there's no reason not to believe

that. They they were they did not have an idea of sectarian cleansing, certainly not the communist or the Nazareth or or the Baathist. And and they were mixed in terms of sectarian background. The same was the case in the Palestinian revolution, which is, of course, was the muscle behind this this this movement at this stage at the early stage of

the war. So on the Palestinian side, when we've talked about DFLP and PFLP regularly throughout, They're both led by Christian figures, for example, but they they did not buy this idea. Naif Hawatmeh or and George Havers did not believe that that this was a fight between Christianity and Islam.

They they they believed that this was a fight actually, between a narrow vision of what they called an isolationism and a a broader integration and and, and regional unity, which, of course, they were favoring. So so that's how they characterize this this fight. They saw it as a manipulation of, minority causes towards establishing a minoritarian vision that was separatist and along sectarian lines.

So they deeply rejected this. They also saw it as deeply tied with certain interests of capital that use populist forces towards their own agendas. So that that is their analysis of it. Of course, in the case of Fatih, as as you've seen with Yasser Arafat and you've read parts of his speech, Yasser Arafat was very keen

on promoting ecumenical visions. He was not a secularist like Hawat Mahan Abbas, But he he spoke all the time about, you know, Muslim, Christian, brotherhood in the in the the the you know, he took it further after this unified national state program. He talked about Jewish brotherhood. He he had the an all encompassing vision of, like, this is the holy land that we're fighting for that represents everybody. It's a very ecumenical approach. So that was his his, his, tendency.

And and that that is the official position of all the major Palestinian movements in in this war. How does this phase, this early phase of the Lebanese civil war actually play out? And specifically, why does Syria, which has forces in the country, why does Assad's purportedly radical anti imperialist Syria sell out its allies, the PLO and the left wing Lebanese national movement, and instead, side with the right wing Maronites.

Ultimately, during this period of the war, Philangists carried out a massacre in the East Beirut Palestinian refugee camp of Tell el Za'atar, right under the eyes of Syrian troops. What how did this phase of the war play out, and what specifically did this reveal about Assad's Syria in terms of its relationship to the emerging political situation in Lebanon and and about its desire to control the PLO and and about its relationships with Iraq, Israel, the United States, the Soviet Union.

Yeah. So on the on the Syrian front, Daniel, we have, this, very perverse situation, which is, of course, connected to the overall, geopolitical, fight that was carried out by Syria at this stage. When the Syrians were observing what was happening in Lebanon, I've noticed that the alliance, that was led by the PLO, basically, the Lebanese National Movement plus the PLO forces, had essentially taken over almost, 3 quarters of the of the country, if not a bit more.

They were on the pathway to victory. The PLO was was much stronger than than than these Maronite militias. There have been a special movement, was was also gaining strength and, in the various battles that took place between 1975, the outbreak of the war, and, 1976, the moment of Syrian intervention, the forces of the, what what the PLO called the the isolationists were were were actually losing major ground. That, meant that they turned to to to Syria.

From Hafiz al Assad's perspective, Lebanon was going to be a Syrian sphere of influence as far as he's concerned. This was not a file that he was willing to give to the PLO or anybody else. Secondly, he did not want greater PLO autonomy. Should the PLO control, or play a leading role in Lebanese politics as far as he's concerned, that would, mean that it would would gain in its independence from Syria.

And he was worried that, that Yasser Arafat was not actually towing the Syrian line in relation to the broader negotiations process that was going internationally. You know? And here, we go back into the distrust between different state leaders and and major conflicts.

Remember, Hafez al Assad came out of the 73 war being very embittered with his, partner in the war, Anwar Sadat, who, you know, Hafiz thought that Anwar would would would on going with the fighting, and would allow, therefore, the Syrian army to do do greater achievements on the Golan front. Now the the Syrian army was was disappointed because, you know, it had to with with the Egyptian, moves, were not as aggressive as they should have been, from a Syrian perspective.

The Israelis were allowed to to actually regain momentum and and to push back, the Syrian forces. So, now he did want to, go into the negotiation process that was initiated by Kissinger and the Americans, But he was feeling that increasingly, what Kissinger was doing was isolating the Egyptians, taking them in a different direction, and and and the Syrians were being left out. And he's noticing another pattern, which is Yasser Arafat is refusing to put all his eggs in the Syrian basket.

And that's the demand that Hafez has opened. As you stand with us in this regional, arena fully, and, you know, you don't go with with the, you know, you don't indicate any engagement with the Sadat side of it. And, of course, Yasser Arafat has a different outlook. His main fear was always that, you'd have greater Syrian control over the internal Palestinian arena. And he doesn't want to be just a tool of this of whatever regime is there is in Syria.

You know, he has a deep understanding of Syrian politics, and and he's experienced it. He spent time there. He got imprisoned there. So, as as we know from previous episodes. So, his his outlook is, but he's also equally extremely connected to Egypt, much more connected to Egypt, of course. He grew up there and and has enormous understanding of the Egyptian arena. So he's trying to balance the 2, and that's not the demand that's coming from from Hafiz.

Hafez wants a situation in Lebanon where nobody wins, and the image are clear. He wants a situation in in Lebanon where Gamal Jomblats, declared objective or program, which was as the head of the Lebanese national movement of overthrowing the sectarian system. He doesn't want that because that means then that, the the country would would not be in this in his orbit, and and could could take a very different direction than his.

One more dynamic that needs to be brought into the equation, and this is something that that the, people closer to Assad will emphasize to his, to his credit according to them is that they saw the potential threat of victory in that for the for these movements as providing an excuse for the Israelis, to strike an alliance with the Marahamites and then to encourage some kind of an insurgency that would be an Israeli led one, and might lead to then threatening Syrian national

security. So there all sorts of complex dynamics in this, Daniel. Now what happens next, however, is that, of course, the Israelis want to weaken the PLO. And, of course, the Americans love this idea. And, therefore, you have, this, situation where the Americans encourage and bless, the, the idea that, that is proposed to them by Hafez al Assad of a Syrian entry into Lebanon to support and back the Maronites and weaken the PLO. And, the documents, by the way, speak openly in

these terms. Those negotiations take place. They're available now for people who wanna check them out. You know, you can you can find them in the American National Archives. And the the gist of it is, the Americans give their blessing, for for this move. And, of course, the Israelis, through them, communicate their their their support for it because it's a major blow to the PLO if you have this this entry. Now the Syrian entry was supposed to be

much more comprehensive. It could have led to the destruction of the PLO as a whole. They suffered major military losses. They, for example, tried to take, over, and there, they they get bombarded with RPGs, their tanks. They enter, like, many tanks, and dozens of them get destroyed by PLO fighters. Nevertheless, they're able to enter their into Lebanon. And, by doing so, they prevent the fall of the Maronite forces and they weaken the position of the PLO.

They further facilitate attacks on the part of those forces against Palestinian refugee camps. That's where the Talazator Massacre happens, for example, which leads to the killing of thousands of Palestinians. One quite shocking note about this period that I kept coming across, The PLO actually provided crucial security to US personnel in Lebanon. All while the US was the principal sponsor of Israel and refused to even officially speak to the PLL, let alone recognize it. What was going on there?

So, there was a track that was opened by Yasser Arafat. He really wanted engagement with the US. Okay. He saw that the US was leading the process, in the diplomatic process in the region. It was not the Soviet Union that was in the driver's seat. And although he was becoming close to the Soviets, he wanted to keep also a channel open to the to the Americans.

At this stage, the Americans were refusing to talk to the PLO, obviously, but what you did have was the availability, of establishing, some context through security organizations, especially the CIA. I know that our listeners will find this weird, but the CIA actually had had more openness in relation to the PLO than any of the diplomats in in Washington. It's generally actually the intelligence services are not by necessity the most extreme ones,

and neither are the military ones. My my, colleague, Bob Bosanko, he wrote about Vietnam in relation to this in the military establishment in in Vietnam. I knew what the radical history of that, but he showed basically that that the actually, the political establishment in Washington was far worse than in the security establishment on these questions. Not because the security establishments are good, but it's because they they

have something to lose on the ground. Their job is to run, empirical calculations based on realities on the ground and so on. They do assessments in a different way. So, in any case, the, attempt to open up these channels, took place through, major Palestinian leader Ali Hassan Salameh, who was a federal leader that was entrusted with certain

types of security operations of this kind. By the way, he's a he's a figure that's, that attracts a lot of attention because, you know, he's a good looking guy, used to go to the gym, was married to miss Lebanon, Georgina Reza, this, you know, fabulous character, but he had all these kind of, engagements. And And the Israelis, of course, assassinate him as a result, because they they they do not want, the opening of a front where the PLO is talking directly to the to the Americans.

He cultivates a lot of relations with the CIA through giving them so creating a series of, like, quid pro quos and and different engagements. I give you some some info here. You give me info. You know, that kind of level of work. I wanna briefly pivot back to the struggle within within the 48 territories and then also the 67 territories because it was within the state of Israel on March 30, 1976 that the first ever Land Day protests by Palestinian citizens took place. What is Land

Day, and how did it begin? And what what does it reveal about the situation of Palestinians struggling against the Israeli state from within the 48 territories and and relatedly also in the newly occupied territories of Gaza, East Jerusalem, and the West Bank throughout the 19 seventies.

So land land day is a very important event because it restores to the heart of the Palestinian scene those Palestinians that were occupied in 1948 and and that were, of course, for many years cut off, from their compatriots, you know, who are living in the 67 occupied territories or elsewhere in the Arab world. And in some cases, they were even accused of betrayal,

for becoming Israeli citizens. We're accused of, you know, all sorts of mean things, even though, of course, they never wanted to to be Israeli citizens. They never wanted to have Israeli rule over their heads. They were, in fact, the people that managed to survive the Nakba, stay on the land. And and by doing so, they became a thorn on the side side of of Zionism. That population, comprises almost a 5th of the population of the Israeli state.

These Palestinian citizens of Israel were subjected to military rule as we mentioned before in previous episodes until 1966. From between 4866, they are subjected to all these awful acts. You know, they continue to be treated as third class citizens to this, very day. And one of the most awful forms of discrimination, but also assaults on them, settler colonial assaults, was the expropriation of land.

And you had this project, of expropriating land, of course, from the very beginning, and it took place over many different phases. But in 1976, there was a big project to even expropriate way more than than than before. It was it was framed as part of a plan to Judaize, the Palestinian areas, in regions, like the Galilee, in which there was still a large Palestinian presence.

In 76, one of the government decisions was to confiscate huge amounts of land towards, these racist visions, racist settler colonial visions. In order to do that, they had to, impose a curfew on on the major villages, in the area that was gonna be affected by this expropriation. So, you know, you had, Sechni and their Hannah, Tamra, Rabi, and Kabul, these villages, they get subjected to this.

This is when, you had a call and a political call in which, the leaderships actually of the communist party played a big role, especially the mayor of, of Nazareth, of Nasr, Tofi Zayat, the, well, not poet and and the communist, mayor of Nasser. You know, they call for a day of action, against us. Demonstrations took place. People went out, in in a very strong way to fight this land grab, this this this theft of land.

People were were killed by Israeli forces, because, colonists never respect the lives of the colonized as we know very well even if they're given, citizenship, and and and, therefore, you had the the the killing of of of 6 martyrs. You you also had the killing of of of children. The most of the people that were actually killed were were or all of them, were under 25. I mean, this is the sad, reality. That day, Yom el Ar, land day, became an important event in the Palestinian calendar.

As soon as it happened, the PLO actually adopted this as part of its its, its message of the unity of the Palestinian people, because it was it was a magnanimous event in the sense that it restored the position of 48 Palestinians. It showed that there's Palestinians everywhere subjected to colonialism, but that they're also fighting it, and they're fighting on their land for their land in this in this case. So So you have all these PLO posters that are produced on

land day. You have songs, you know, this famous singer, Abu Arab, who's who was one of the great singers of the revolution. He he sang Kirmalek. All of these songs that were done for for Lande came out in that period. Was it was an incredible, event that way, and it continues to be commemorate commemorated. And, of course, you know, the commemoration takes many different forms. Poets write about it. Mahmoud

Delweiss, the great poet, wrote about it. And every year, on the 30th March, we we mark it. Coinciding with what was going on in inside the 1948 areas of Palestine, it's had an impact on 6, 7 territories because you had this intensification of feeling of the unity of the Palestinian people, and it led to mobilizations also, there, in support of the, those that that have come out to defend their land, on land day in support of of of those that had had fallen.

And, this is quite significant because, of course, in the seventies, the Israelis were pursuing a policy in the occupied territories of, encouraging quietism. So you had this this dimension where they were trying as much as possible to, create conditions that would prevent

the eruption of major revolts there. Of course, that policy was to change, but, you know, this was the overall focus, in the 19 seventies, to prevent the PLO from establishing strong mobilization, and at the same time, to encourage an economic policy which would allow for labor engagements with 1967, territories occupied territories, which would, allow for economic openings or more feed shots to to to people to stay to stay quiet. So there was always mobilization in the 67 territories despite,

the this this this policy. And throughout the seventies, what we see is this constant process of, different Palestinian Fidai groups from outside establishing a strong presence on the ground in the West Bank in Gaza. So in Gaza, for example, throughout the early seventies, you have that phenomena called Gevara Gaza, which is, you know, a PFLP, who who is nicknamed, Gevara after Che Gevara, of course. He had led a series of operations against Israeli forces.

These were armed operations, and many of them were very successful. They also targeted, Israeli operatives that that came from, from Palestine, but that were working as collaborators. Of course, you know, Givara gets killed and and the and the his members of a cell get arrested. You know, that was a big phenomena in the history of Palestinian resistance in occupied territories in the seventies.

In the West Bank, you had, you know, so many mobilizations in East Jerusalem, and dozens of people as a result, get actually exiled. This was the period when the Israeli solution for, the people that were trying to, engage in resistance, was to exile them and prevent them from coming back. And so it was actually really, a systematic policy of expulsion that that affected, hundreds of people that that that that were, fighting for freedom in in in that part of the the world. And, of course, there

was mass imprisonment as well. This was a big big aspect of putting down mobilizations in this period. One more thing that was going on politically was that the Israelis were trying to create, forms, that would undermine the development of, PLO allegiance, and essentially, like, you know, mobilization under nationalist leadership. Essentially forms of indirect rule? Yes. Or forms of, in this case, more like collaborator rule. Yeah. Like, they were they were creating,

projects. Like, for example, they created this idea of, village leagues, people that are connected to them and their collaboration networks, and they would be anti revolutionary, anti PLO, anti national representation. They were also trying to infiltrate different civic bodies and and different institutional bodies, and, of course, there was a lot of resistance, to them on on all on all spheres.

But whenever there was a resistance, they they went very heavy heavy handed, and so many of the, people that tried to resist them were also subjected to violence. So for example, nationalist mayors, the patriotic mayors were subjected to attacks, and and one of them, for example, Bassem Shekha, the mayor of Nablus, was a major and as this figure, was was subjected to a bombing. You know? They almost killed him. He had to receive intensive

care and and and so on. So there are so many examples, of Israeli violence in this period. Hi. This is Olufemi Otaewo, and you're listening to The Dig. You can support the podcast at patreon.com. This episode of The Dig is brought to you by our listeners who support us at patreon.com and by Haymarket Books, which has loads of great left wing titles, perfect for dig listeners like you. One that you might like is the black antifascist tradition by Janelle k Hope and Bill v Mullen.

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for an Arab head of state. He visited Israel and addressed the Knesset opening, a diplomatic push that in 1978 led to the Camp David Accords brokered by the United States. Egypt recognized Israel in exchange for Israel's return of the occupied Sinai. Meanwhile, Palestinians were totally sidelined and consigned to this newly horrible reality that Egypt, which under Nasser had led a regional Arab struggle against imperialism, was now normalizing the Zionist settler colonization of Palestine.

Sadat's move also, of course, left Syria out because it did nothing to end the occupation of the Golan Heights. How did Camp David come about, and what were its consequences for for the region in general and for the PLO and the Palestinian struggle in particular? What what did it mean for Egypt to swing from being the leader of the revolution to the vanguard of reaction?

Yeah. So, the context of Camp David Daniel has to do, both with domestic, Egyptian factors, as well as, the international situation prevailing in the 19 seventies. Domestically, we saw a shift under Sadat from a Nasserist policy, which was committed to a vision in which Egypt's geopolitics, would be concentrated on independence and sovereignty.

And that means, creating some sort of regional formula in which, Egypt would play the biggest role, but where the country would drive strength from having, that leadership role and and where it would be able to mobilize regional forces in a coordinated fashion, and thus be able to project, power in in regional and international affairs.

And this was, of course, it coincided with a focus on creating a strong, non aligned movement, and that was an effort, that Egypt played a big and an important role in under Nasr. Now Sadat had a different vision. He considered that all the cards in the region were with the United States. He said, America holds all the cards in the Middle East. That's what that that's one of his most famous statements. He considered that Egypt's, role had to be reconceptualized.

Egypt had to enter into the American orbit, and that this would, allow it to regain the territories it lost, and then also, pursue a policy, that would take it away from the previous socialist policy that had been adopted by Nasser domestically and pursue a policy as well, that would entail, receiving arms from the United States rather than

the Soviet Union. So this was about a complete realignment in many ways, and that means realignment in international affairs, but also an abandonment of, socialism locally and reintroduction of various forms of of capitalism and reversing many of the reforms that were benefiting the poor in Egypt under Nasser, including land reform that that was reversed, actually. The the there was reintroduction of, large, land ownership.

All sorts of other domestic policies were taking on a capitalist character. So that referred to this as the policy of openness in fitah. So we have a lot that was going on. Now domestically, of course, this also required Sadat to find allies that would be able to support this program because this is not an easy thing to do to depart from Nazirism completely after so long. And, Nasser had a great deal of popularity. His funeral was the biggest in modern Arab history. It was

you know, it was an incredible event. It was, it was a lot of, love and support for Nasser and and Egyptian's society and and, of course, beyond. Sadat needed to find allies to marginalized and isolated forces, so, he, brought back the Muslim Brotherhood. A lot of them had been in exile in Saudi Arabia. A lot of them had been in jail. But Sadat, essentially, now was presenting a vision, in which Egypt would be, the land of the faithful. You know, he was saying, it's the land of the 5th.

So, this this also had major social effects, by the way. That period witnessed besides the production of, of, or reintroduction of capitalism, a great deal of, conservative push. Like, there was a growth in, social conservatism, that accompanied the return of of the of the Muslim, brotherhood. So a lot was going on here, and this was, of course, connected as well to policy around Palestine and the policy that led to Camp David.

Because if you're gonna Americanize and if you're gonna, you know, pursue, closer relationship with the United States, one of the requirements would be to have a close relationship with the Israeli state, or at least to exit from the orbit of conflict with it. And that was the main American focus at the time.

Ironically, it was under Jimmy Carter that we saw an intensification, of, this attempt to get Egypt out of the Arab orbit, and to, essentially, by doing that, damage the Palestinian cause immeasurably. And I say ironically because later on, Jimmy Carter spent much of his career advocating for a Palestinian state and so on. You know, he wanted, like, some kind of a 2 state solution, 1967, along 1967 lines.

But in reality, of course, more than any other president aide, he actually did the most damage to the prospects of that happening, by sponsoring this accord that that marginalized, the Palestinians completely. It's amazing how much mystification is accomplished by the phrase peace process. Absolutely. This was never a peace process. This was a process of formalizing the integration of a settler colonial state into a region that was originally hostile to the idea of settler colonization.

And that that's always been what what what this so called peace process is. It's not about rights. It's not about justice. It's not about a common future for the settler colonists and the native people on that land. It's it's about formalizing and and normalizing settler colonization. So in the case of the the the Egyptian state, it marketed this, and Sadat marketed this by,

doing a few things. 1, was to launch a, major attack on Nasser and his policies, basically saying, look, Nasser harmed, Egypt, Nasser got us into socialism, he got us into, these wars that led us nowhere, and that became basically a standard line, that you still hear in Egyptian society today because if you keep on repeating this kind of vision, it will, eventually, like, stick in people's minds. Then you had also an attack on on Palestine and the Palestinians.

You know, why why are we fighting for them? There was this Sadat was encouraging this kind of localized Egyptian identity now. So the the main the main focus was on on saying that we fought all these wars for Palestinians, and why why should we care about them? We are Egyptians. We we don't belong to this whole, like, belonging to an Arab nation was an asterisk fantasy. We should go down our own path, defend Egypt's interests. Egypt's interests come first.

And and that's that's basically, the logic that that was promoted by by Sadat, very, very successfully. In terms of the impacts that this had on the ground in Palestine, I I I found this one quote from a a mayor of a West Bank city that said, quote, after Camp David, the Israelis felt able to use live ammunition against our demonstrators. How did Camp David just remake the basic dynamics of the struggle between the Palestinian people and the PLO and the Zionist Israeli settler state?

Well, it it it definitely emboldened, the the the Zionist, settler colonial state in major ways. Because, once you have Egypt exiting the equation, that means that, you cannot have a major war waged against the Israeli, settler colony. You know, there's there's a saying and I I might have referred to it earlier in in this podcast that there is no war without Egypt and there is no peace without Syria. That's the usual, that's a very common saying in the Middle

East. I think, for the most part, it is it is true because you you you cannot have a situation where the biggest Arab state in terms of, population and, in terms of military capacity, which is Egypt at the time. Additionally, you have another factor, that is very important to focus on, which is there were changes within the Israeli state itself. A settler colonial society was witnessing a shift

to the right, believe it or not. Not that there was ever real left there because this is this whole idea that that, Ben Gurion and and the the the party that that he established, this Labour Party, was was was a left wing party, is a is a total mess. It is such a colonial party that adopted some leftist language and some practices that benefited some of the sections of the settler colonial society, but definitely not not the native population.

But you could always get more insane and hardcore settlers in in any sort of colonial context. And by insane, I really mean it in the sense of, it is actually a mad idea to think that you you wanna completely eliminate, the the native population even beyond the elimination that you've carried out. But that's, of course, the line that that that really lies at the heart of of of of Zionism. So, you know, all colonialism is madness, but you could get more

extreme versions of of madness within it. In this case in this case, Menachem Begin. Menachem Begin, who, is of course a follower of Vladimir Jabotinsky, the founder of revisionist Zionism. And Vladimir Yabutinski's line was, in a way, it's a more honest line than the labor, Zionist line. He was he was the biggest competitor and enemy of of Ben Gurion. And his position was we we have to be honest about,

Palestinian Arabs. They are an indigenous population, and he actually compares them, to the populations in Latin America and Australia. And he says, look, like any, indigenous population, it will fight back when it's confronted by, colonialists. He actually refers, by the way, to to to the Zionist movement as a colonialist one. This is in his in its famous booklet, The Iron Wall.

And he's like, okay. The only solution for us then is to create such an impossible situation for them where they're confronted within with this iron wall, this Palestinian, indigenous population, an overwhelming force that they cannot defeat. And then, you know, they'll bang their heads against the wall until they find the refutes out, and, and then we impose on them our our terms essentially.

So he was saying basically that, Labor Zionists are lie are in a way lying when they're pretending that, oh, let's reach an agreement with the with the with the with the Palestinians because he's like, that's not what they really want, you know. They want the same thing as as us revisionist Zionists, but they're just lying about it pretending that this is about Kumbaya moments and holding hands. It's not. It's about actual force and forcing the native population out essentially.

So when it comes to, Begin, he gets elected, and and, of course, it's it's under him that we see an intensification of a set of policies that, take the the political repression to the next level. It had always existed, but he expanded it significantly. And, of course, he expanded the geopolitical ambitions of the Israeli central colonial state in this period emboldened by Camp David. So we see him, for example, invading, Lebanon. That's quite a big deal. It causes a lot of damage.

Before we get to the the invasion of Lebanon in 1978, where where does Camp David leave leave Syria? Its ally in the 1973, 1967, and 1948 wars with Israel, but but which was left with Israel still occupying the Golan Heights within firing distance of Damascus. Yeah. I mean, this was a big blow for the Syrian, government. It was was a disaster for them. Even even if you accept the concept of a settlement, a peace settlement, along the unjust lines of 1967.

Even if you want to throw the Palestinians under the bus, okay, and you you you don't facilitate for the right of return or for an actual, you know, full rights for for those Palestinians living in 1948, etcetera. Even if you do all of that, even if you don't, even if you're a Palestinian state along 67 lines, You know, what what you would want to have if you're Syria is a unified Arab front, a deal that that that is more comprehensive. Separate deals means that

you could end up with a situation. That's what happened in the case of Syria, where, you know, you essentially never get back your territory because alone, you're not able to provide, the level of direct threat, a military threat that would force the US to engage with you and to kind of encourage its its client state in this case. I mean, it's not exactly a client state, but you know, the state it supports and sponsors, in this region

to take a different line. So when Egypt and Syria were working together, they did provide that that kind of military threat. And of course, we saw that in 1973. But the American solution was, okay, so now we divide them. And one of them, we take the bigger one, we give it back its territories, but in exchange for it exiting this orbit of confrontation with the Israeli state. And essentially, since then, there's been a severe Americanization

of Egypt in every sphere. And to this day, we see that because the the Egyptian army receives, of course, the 2nd largest aid package from the United States after the Israeli one. They they get and of course, it's much smaller than the Israeli one, but still, compared to other countries, it's pretty big and it's important for for them. They received their weaponry from the United States. Their their their main source, of supplies now is is the US.

So the US starts playing a huge role in in in Egyptian, politics and and society. That means that Egypt, would not support, of course, any Syrian move to regain its territories because it's out of the equation. Syria wants to find a a way around this, and it can't at this stage. It tries, various means to regain the Golan, but to this day, of course, things even got worse with with Trump, recognizing the Golan as as as Israeli territory. So

yeah. I mean, of course, that's illegal under international law, but but it's it's happening. This this process of normalizing the occupation of Syrian lands there. As you just referenced, in 1978, Israel, under Lukud founder and the 1st Lukud prime minister, Menekim Begin, Israel invaded southern Lebanon after years of cross border fighting with the Palestinian Fedayeen. How did this Israeli invasion come about? How did it fit into the longer history

of Israeli reprisals on Lebanese territory? And then was this something just to be expected of of Israel as the Zionist settler state that it was, the belligerent state that it was? Or is there are there important things here to understand about about Begin and his leadership, the direction it was taking Israel? Yeah. I mean, it's it's very important to understand Begin for us to understand this period, and its its entire political current and thinking.

You know, of course, Begin, comes from Belarus. That's where he was born. He was born into a family of committed, Zionists. And, when he ended up moving to Palestine as a as a colonist, and became a, you know, he came under the influence of Jobutylskaya's thought. Of course, he was close to that way of thinking. He ended up establishing a major terrorist organization called the Irgun. And, of course, they carried out numerous attacks

against, civilians. They introduced, by the way, the idea of bombings into this region, into this part of the world. They bombed numerous, markets, buildings, they attacked, you know, civilian targets mercilessly. They bombed the King David Hotel, you know. They they did a lot of operations of this kind. So they were classified, even by the British Empire as as as engaging in in in terrorism. Yeah? And and Begin played the the biggest role

in this. They played a huge role in in in the ethnic cleansing in 1948. So, they attacked YAFA for example. They were behind that and they were behind driving Yafa's population out of the city. Begin was personally responsible for planning that and and carrying it out. And this is connected to the today's situation in Gaza because, of course, a lot of a lot of these refugees did end up, in in Gaza. And all the all the refugees south of the Afro, definitely, a lot of them ended up in El Raza.

So Irgun, has a has a long and dark history. Menachem Begin has a long and dark history, and these people were celebrating that history. You know? Netanyahu comes from that lineage. His his father was personal secretary to, Menachem Begin's, mentor, Jabotinsky. And these people, of course, do not even believe that the boundaries of the Israeli state are just between the river Jordan and the Mediterranean. They go beyond from the river to the sea. I mean, they see,

Jordan as being part of this. Some of them have even a more maximalist vision. They have all sorts of outlooks, that are that are very expansionist, at at at their core. You know, sometimes out of political realism, they'll say, oh, well, okay. So we're we've given away territory to the Palestinians by keeping Jordan as as Jordan. That's the Palestinian state. So this way of thinking is very problematic, of course, but I'm I'm not saying that it's by the way, that it differs in its core

in major ways from labor Zionism. It's just a more extreme version of of settler colonial ideology. So that's a that's an important point because sometimes people try to distinguish between them too much and then they create a fake binary where we're supposed to, you know, condemn the Israeli right, but believe in the this myth that there's an Israeli left that we

can support. And, you know, that means then, whitewashing the crimes of this labor current in Zionism, including some of these leaders that are sometimes celebrated in in in in West in the West. So people like, Rabin, people, like Shimon Peres, these were war criminals. These were, you know, people that committed major massacres and and and their ideology didn't differ significantly.

In any case, we have, therefore, under Bacon, a situation where the idea is you have to eliminate the Palestinian presence from the region. That's the strategy that he's focused on. And that means weakening the PLO, combating it, and and and trying to get it as far away as possible, from anywhere bordering the Israeli state. And that meant essentially a focus on Lebanon.

Now Begin begins this policy by claiming, that he is, engaging in reprisals against Palestinian action or it was Palestinian fide action. You know, we know that this is not true because, you know, every Palestinian action was preceded by an Israeli action. It's not like these things come out of the, blue, but also more importantly, it's it's in a context of a structural context, where where there's a national liberation, war essentially, against the colonial state. So so that that's

the reality. However, in the west, you know, so it always comes as as a convincing argument if you come and say, well, they just attacked me now, so I have to I have to strike back. And then I strike back like a 100 100 times stronger. But We were talking earlier about the classic American imagery of the the Indian in the in the in the in the cowboy western galloping up to the train to attack it. For for what reason? Who knows why?

Exactly. And and and then, you know, of course, the images of savagery, scalping, and so on and so forth, raping of white women. We we know we know these discourses, again, from indigenous struggles in the United States, from African American struggles in the United States, solely as the dangerous black man lurking in the in the shadows that is attacking the the the poor,

whites. And, of course, that that that structurally is the furthest thing from the truth because it's it's it's the groups that are suffering the most from violence, that get accused of being violent. And and I I'm sure the listeners of the dig have thought about this in domestic settings extensively. But in the case of Palestine, I think we need to we need to repeat it over and over again that this imagery has not been challenged enough in the in the mainstream.

You know, of course, even when it comes to domestic US issues, we still have a long way to go when it comes to mainstreamizing a more progressive way of thinking around them. But, but when it comes to Palestine, we're still way behind. And Begin knew that and understood that. He understood that he will get a carte blanche if he wants to, expand his attacks. And, of course, the natural place to do that was Lebanon.

So how did this first major invasion play out in terms of the the just kind of mechanics of the Israeli invasion, the various forces on the ground at the time in Lebanon, and then how this phase ended with Israel withdrawing, but handing the occupation of Southern Lebanon over over to allied forces in a organization called the South Lebanon Army.

So so the the main Israeli strategy was to look at the South of Lebanon and focus on it, first of all, and and and essentially, examine the the sectarian divisions and cleavages existing within it. So so, their idea was, if they could manipulate, sectarian divisions and if they could manipulate social divisions towards creating a hostile environment for Palestinians and, of course, their allies in the Lebanese National Movement, that would be a great achievement as far as they're concerned.

And, of course, this meant, that they had to, find willing collaborators. Now that was not the most difficult thing to do because this region had been brutalized by constant Israeli raids. And part of the Israeli strategy was to essentially create a situation where the local population, would feel alienated from Fidei presence, because they they they every time there was a FIDAY base nearby or or there was a FIDAY operation, nearby, it was the civilians that were being punished.

So their villages would be attacked and bombed and and, you know, and in this period, of course, these areas were very poor. So already, like, there was a delicate, situation when it comes to people's living standards. And when you come and and bomb further and make people lose their their their property and and, and whatever little they owned, it's it's it's a lot of social pressure. So that's one dimension.

And the other, element that they were trying to create was, to look at areas in which there was any form of sectarian tension. So the South is a very diverse place in Lebanon, like the rest of the country. There are Christian villages, there are, you know, Shia villages. The majority are Shia, of course, but there's all sorts of diversity there.

And part of the Israeli policy was to try, to get the Christian villages, or or or the villages within them into their, sphere of influence, but also to attract as many Shia collaborators as as possible through either financial, incentivization, providing, security support, encouraging different forms of collaboration, based on even, sometimes, you know, gangster methods. So sometimes it they'd get, like, information on a person and and they would blackmail them into collaboration.

But anyways, out of this, they created, like, a, a network. And, eventually, the idea was was, was to create what eventually, will became the the South Lebanon Army, which which, was was entirely, funded, supported, and armed, and trained by by by the Israeli state.

The operation itself in 1978, in terms of the the direct operation, the idea was to take over the the region up to the the Lithuania, river and to create, you know, a situate situation of enormous pressure on, FIDADIs that were present, across the region. So invasion had been expected, by, FIDADIs for quite a while, But this one, you know, was carried out on a large scale. It caused a lot of damage. A lot of bridges were destroyed. A lot of infrastructure was destroyed.

Heavy fighting took place, you know, and and, essentially, this was the most significant, engagement direct engagement between forces and, the Israeli army since the the beginning of FIDAY work. Because, you know, you had, for example, engagement in the Karame battle, but this was much more extensive. This, you know, this was just 7 days of of constant engagement. So, the effects of this on the on the Palestinian movement

were quite big. There was, a feeling that that the ranks, of the Fedayi ranks had to be bolstered. There was an increasing focus on on trying to, procure heavy armaments, that sort of thing. And that already, there was a trend, towards greater formalization of of what were before more loose units in the Palestinian arena.

That trend was criticized internally, because part of the original lure into Fidei work was guerrilla warfare and the life of, the egalitarian life that it that it had, the lack of ranks, the this kind of organization. Now, we see increasingly from the from 1970 onwards, from Black September onwards, a trend where, more and more army style methods are used. And and those were relied, you know, the the the leadership in the pillow relied on actually former Jordanian army officers to to

be able to do that. So Saad Sayel, who was who was a former Jordanian army officer, became essentially responsible for trying to create some kind of, unified command with ranks, with more formalized ways of fighting that were closer to a classical army style. Of course, this transformation

didn't fully take place. There's still guerrilla character of the epidemic movements still continued, but but but there was this thing, going on and it was referred to internal Palestinian discussions as the ASKARA. Also, Palestinians were needing to try to find, ways around, protecting themselves against, any future invasions. And that meant, of course, creating better supply lines in in places like Beirut, thinking about, different urban centers, how to protect them.

And and eventually, of course, the invasion did come in in in 1982. Around this time, Saddam Hussein's Iraq was in a major conflict with the PLO and was backing something called the Abu Nidal Organization, an Iraqi affiliated Palestinian faction dedicated above all else to assassinating Palestinian leaders. How in the years since the 1968 Baathist coup did did Iraq come into this

intense conflict with the PLO? And and what did that conflict have to do with Iraq's conflict with another party that was constantly intervening in the Palestinian national movement, the Syrian Baathists? So, this this is an example of the situation in the Palestinian, arena that we've been referring to throughout, the series, which is the amount of intervention, by Arab states,

inside this arena. Now, of course, the the revolutionary Arab states had a special status because, a lot of them claimed Palestine as a as a core part of their ideology. That was certainly the case, for the the the 2 bath, states in in Iraq and in Syria. In the case of, Syria, we've discussed this before. They had an extensive level of engagement. They had the Saqqah, which was, of course, a direct arm of the Ba'ath party, but they also had, former Ba'athists in Saifatih that they were connected

to. They also had, you know, leverage over a very wide wide range of Palestinian movements. And part of this leverage had to do with the fact that Syria borders Palestine is close by. A lot of, Palestinians that fought in the revolution were from refugee camps in Syria. A lot of headquarters of Palestinian organizations were in Syria. So intervention was was, was possible. Of course, the biggest units of the Palestinian Liberation Army, with official army of the PLO, were in Syria.

So all of this meant that you had, disproportionate influence that could be exerted by the state. And, of course, in the Lebanon years of the PLO, Lebanon borders Syria. Syria is the most important, country in Lebanon. And so Lebanon is part of its sphere of influence, and and it was intervening heavily throughout. On the Iraqi side, Iraq is further away, but, ideologically, there's this, pronounced commitment to the cause.

And, of course, you have major interest in this cause throughout the I mean, remember, Iraq is is a country that fought in every major war for Palestine even though it does not have, borders. It's in fact the only Arab state that doesn't have borders that fought in a serious way in in these, in these wars. I mean, of course, Saudi Arabia fought in 48 and so on, but they they never sent serious detachments. But Iraq did. So it has a level of involvement that is high in in this, arena.

It has some Palestinian refugee, communities, you know, not not very big, not nearly as big as Syria or or Lebanon or, of course, Jordan, but, you know, there's a, a small Palestinian refugee population there. There were Palestinian students throughout that were sponsored by the Iraqi government. At any given moment, you'll find thousands of them in in Iraq at the time. So there is this involvement, but it's less intense and direct than the than the Syrian one.

However, Palestinian file is also important for projecting power regionally on the part of any state. So Iraq had to have a role in it, in in some way. Now the way, they played that role and during the Baathist period is, they had an organization called the Arab Liberation Front, which was, fighting as part of the Palestinian Revolution and was, of course, part of the the Palestine Liberation Organization.

So throughout the seventies, they had also attempted to get fedah, to take a direction that's closer to the Iraqi positions. This was, an up and down, process. Sometimes they would engage more intensely. Sometimes they would retreat. You know, sometimes they would host Fatih opposition, figures. For example, for a while, the Iraqis, hosted people like, Naja al Loosh and and and others, who are important, Palestinian, thinkers. They hosted them in in in in Baghdad.

They they they encouraged the split and fateh around that. And, of course, the most prominent figure in that split was this guy called Sabeel Banna, who is, Abu Natal. He was a character that was disgruntled with, Yasser Arafat, and with the rest of the leadership. They they found patronage in Baghdad. He had been, having tensions, with, Yasser Arafat since,

the post black September period. You know, there were intense discussions inside Fatih over, the performance in that period and over what the Palestinians should do, after the withdrawal from from Jordan. You know, they were accusing increasingly Arafat of, selling out by, engaging more and more with, you know, the plans around the 2 state solution and all of these negotiations in the seventies.

So the Iraqis essentially engaged in low level interventions against, Arafat's leadership in the PLO, but it was an up and down relationship. Now part of, their disquintlement with Arafat also had to do with the fact that he had a big engagement with the Iranians after in the late 19 seventies. You know, he he had a close relationship with Ayatollah Khomeini who is, of course, the

biggest enemy of the Iraqi state. So it's it's a complex picture, but Saddam, for example, never breaks relations fully. He just, you know, would use the, Abu Nidal connection on the one hand to exert pressure, but at the same time, he still had direct links with with Arafat, still engaged with the with the PLO. It wasn't a situation as clear cut as, let's say, Assad, where where the the relationship had just, like, totally broke broken down for for years.

And and it and it was impossible to have a serious connection between between the 2 for, you know, and and between the the PLO leadership and the and the Syrian government. Because the Syrian government had had a project to establish a parallel leadership. I wanna briefly touch on 1981 when when Saudi Arabia's King Fahd made a a proposal for Arab Israeli peace as as it's phrased with a 2 state solution at its core, and it sparked opposition from the PFLP, DFLP, and Assad.

How did Fatah respond, and why did this proposal emerge at the time that it did in the way that it did in the wake of Camp David and with the situation in Lebanon continuing to intensify? So, yes, Yasser Arafat was always obsessed with the regional balance of power. That's how he read politics. That's how, he conducted politics. So that's already quite different than parties that have clear ideological commitment. In his case, what he was seeing what was that Egypt had already done this deal.

Saudis are American allies. Yes. They they they had a, a position around Palestine that was quite clear on their face off, but that was not going to be, sustainable under Fahd, who was far less committed to to this cause than than than his predecessors. So the the Saudi declaration, while it was read by the, Palestinian left and rightly so, is weakening the Palestinian position when it comes to, anything outside the boundaries of 1967.

It was seen as useful by those who were trying to angle for a 1967 deal. It essentially was a message for the Americans. Look. Here's here's a, an incentive for the Israelis to enter into a con a serious conversation around, Palestinian state. You know, they'll they'll get out of it, Saudi recognition and support. They'll get regional, regional integration.

And as much of a a capitulation as as that proposal may have been, compare that to the deal that Saudi Arabia had been hammering out with the US to normalize and recognize Israel in the

months leading up to October 7th. Yes. I mean, it's, it it's got it's getting worse and worse and things, you know, I mean I mean, this is the the the original, American position on this on on this actually, and they've been saying it for a long time that they need to derabize the policy of Arab states around Palestine. So so they they were historically committed to pressuring these states,

to make more and more concessions. So they start, you know, these states start by absolute rejection of the idea of settler colonial state being established. And then, you know, gradually, they start saying, okay, we'll accept it within the boundaries that came about, as a result of the 48th war. And then, now, there's this idea that even that doesn't matter. Like, we'll find some ways around this saying, oh, let's have some Palestinian state emerging, but we don't know what

its boundaries are. We don't know what what what kind of sovereignty it would have, and essentially that's that's what's what's going on now. The Saudi Arabia has articulated its current price for this. They want the defense agreement, of course, with the United States now, and they want a peaceful nuclear program. That's a relatively, by the way, cheap price for, I mean, this is this is how ridiculous this has got. It wouldn't have been possible under Faisal, for example.

King Faisal had a serious commitment, when it came to Palestine, and, he pursued it. But, you know, as as we enter through the reign of Fahad, and and then, you know, we get into now, very different, you know, reign under under under Mohammed bin Salman, We we see like an, we see things taking that that that that turn, which has great repercussions because Saudi Arabia is not a minor regional

player. It is it is the biggest Arab state since Egypt exited, the realm of of serious Arab politics under Sadat. Since Nasser's death, Saudi Arabia progressively became the strongest and most influential state in the region. So so it's a big issue for the Palestinian people. One of the ironies in this, Daniel is, the current king, the father of the crown prince who was making this policy, for the longest time was the head of the solidarity committee, with the Palestinians in Riyadh.

And it's it's true. Like, for many years, Salman used bin Abdul Aziz was, was the chairman of that committee. He was seen as a as a Palestine friendly very Palestine friendly person in in in Saudi Arabia. But his, his son currently takes, a very different stance. Why are we focusing on individuals, by the way, when we talk about Saudi Arabia? Because it matters. And In the monarchy, it matters big time.

Yes. Because all the power is concentrated. I mean, that's part of the critique, of course, radical critique of of monarchical absolute is monarchical rule. The actual dispositions of the monarch matter. Like, their personality matters, unfortunately. Because they could wake up one day and be like, okay. I don't like this Palestinian

thing. It's constraining me too much. Now, of course, structural factors do matter as well, but, you know, the state will adjust its policy according to the whim of the monarch, and and and we've seen that. I would argue actually that the Saudi foreign policy establishment, you know, took, a very different position than MBS historically. But he signals basically, now we're changing direction. They have to change direction.

Same with Abu Dhabi. Under Sheikh Zayed, there was not a commitment, towards major engagement with the Israeli settler colonial state partly because what's the reason? I mean, they're not even bordering that state. It's not the Emirates is a rich place. I mean, there are financial benefits from having a a relationship now, and that's what they focus on when they promote this, peace agreement that they've arrived at with the Israelis. But in reality, I mean, it's a very wealthy country.

It it already has, enormous resources. The pressure on it, you know, was not the main reason why it it took this move. And the last thing I wanna do is compliment Sadat, but there's more of a there's more of a straightforward logic to what Egypt was getting in exchange for Camp David, which was the Sinai back. Yes. Of course. Now I should note, what what what the Emirates now got out of, the Abraham Accords, was actually getting a direct line to Washington that away from Saudi Arabia.

So so this is, and that's a conversation, that is a more about contemporary affairs and history. But honestly, if you connect it to the history of the region, you'll see that, the main strategic fear for all the smaller Gulf States along the coast was from Saudi Arabia and, of course, Iran and Iraq historically. Now in contemporary times after, of course, the Gulf War, Iraq is out of the equation, and definitely after the invasion and occupation of

Iraq. So it's Iran and Saudi Arabia that are the 2 big, countries that that, the smaller Gulf states need to grapple with. Saudi Arabia was trying since, the the, the independence of these states to incorporate them within its sphere of influence. And in many ways, it succeeded initially, with varying degrees, of course. However, there has been a trend to challenge that, and to assert greater independence.

And the best way to do that is to establish a direct relationship with Washington, and and the the the pathway has has been this Israeli pathway. In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon on a mission to destroy the PLO, linking up with right wing Maronite Philangist militia allies to lay siege to West Beirut. The assault was absolutely brutal on civilians who were besieged,

cut off from food and water. Even so, the PLO and allied Lebanese left wing forces, alongside Syrians who finally switched back to the side of the PLO and the Lebanese left, they held out with remarkable strength. But but given the incredible death toll that Israel and the phalanges imposed on civilians, The PLO ultimately agreed to withdraw its forces from Beirut with with strict guarantees provided by the US that Palestinian civilians would be protected. That,

of course, is not what happened. Some very horrific massacres took place. But but before we get to that, what prompted the Israeli invasion and then the siege of West Beirut? I mean, again, I think I think that that invasion has to be, read in terms of the overall Israeli strategy, which was they wanted the PLO out. And that and that we already, you know, talked about how how how Begin, was pursuing that. He was waiting for a moment that would be opportune to do this.

And with with the region suffering from the effects of Camp David, you know, we see, him, entering into a situation where increasingly, something like an actual, invasion of of, Lebanon would be possible. So what took place was not possible if the Americans had, said no. What took place was not possible had the Soviet Union taken a stronger stance, And this is an another interesting, situation that we we were, witnessing now. I mean, none of the major, global powers,

were willing to to to stop this. Of course, the Americans gave a green light for it. Not only they were not willing to to to to stop it. You know? And people will will focus, will tell you, well, you know, this American president or that American president didn't didn't want things to go that far. Reagan was surprised or, you know, now Biden doesn't like it, but it's not a convincing argument. They're the ones that are protecting these actions.

The the least they could do is is get the security council decision saying this is major aggression immediately. You know? Like, there there could have been like, now in this, look at look at the situation now. So, similarly, what we were having in in 1982 was a major American complicity, of course, and and all what was going on and and the crimes that were committed, against civilians. These were huge crimes. I mean, there was a commission, the McBride Commission,

that that documented many of these crimes. I encourage our listeners to check out the the commission report. It was never widely, advertised or popularized, unfortunately, but it contains a lot of, useful information from from from from that time. And and, you had, up to 20,000 people, getting killed. You know, you had the use of this cluster, off of cluster bonds, the destruction of a huge amount of Beirut's buildings. Of course, it all started with a plan that that used to be called

the accordion accordion plan. That's how it was referred to at the time, which is to, try to essentially create a situation where the Palestinians would be in the middle and then they're crossed from from from two sides, you know, that's why it was referred to as the accordion. There were multiple sites of attack that were happening simultaneously. The invasion utilized a huge amount of forces, Israeli forces, and and major, air power was was was used, major bombardment was used.

The Palestinian situation initially, there was a collapse in the South. And and, there was quick withdrawal from the South as well. And I mentioned this now because that led to, huge repercussions internally within the Palestinian movement after the war ended, after the withdrawal from Beirut, because there were demands for holding those accountable that were responsible for for this collapse in the South and for the quick withdrawal.

But the military performance improved significantly after passing forces concentrated in Beirut, and they were able basically to to defend it, for for 2 months. There was no, military collapse, actually. In many ways, the basic services continued to be there. The supplies were there. As I mentioned, there was good preparation before,

1982 on that front. The the women's union played a big role, by the way, when it came to the coordination of things like bread, the bakeries, distribution of of of bread and and water and basic necessities. A lot of the things that go into defending a city, we don't think about them, but they have to do with sustaining life. And and, essentially, life was still sustainable even under that siege.

The horrific siege, brutal siege and even under all the destruction that was going on, which was unprecedented by the way until Gaza now happened. Like, this is, you know, the Gaza genocide takes things to the next level, but that that was Beirut was a vicious Israeli attack, honestly. Before we get to the end of this story and the ultimate PLO evacuation, Who was allied with whom on what side? If you could just sort of lay lay that out.

So we we continue to have, the the same situation that had prevailed, during the Lebanese civil war, of course. Same alliance. It was still, at play. You had the Lebanese national movement, on the one hand, along with its, ally, the PLO. And then you had the sectarian Mennonite forces, and they were aligned with the with the Israeli state, of course. So those were 2 major players. The Syrians, of course, were playing a role with the PLO and and the Lebanese national movement.

Although, by the way, most of their focus was on defending the Damascus Beirut, road. So they they did not do full military deployment, there. This is, quite important, and partly because they've it had a major air force failure, you know, that the the Israelis were able to destroy many many Syrian fighter jets.

And that was an important, by the way, event in the cold war because it showed the, superiority of American, Air Force Technology at this stage over the Soviet fighter jets that were used by the, Syrian, military. Their radar systems were not as developed. There were many major flows. So the Arab states did not, intervene in in any serious military way, and and this was very significant because you had essentially an Arab capital being invaded, and there was no action. This would have

been unthinkable under Nasser, let's say. In 1967, he had mobilized his troops, withdrew u n the UN troops from Sinai, over information given by the Soviets and others that that Israelis were mobilizing on the border with Syria. So, you know, even a mobilization on the border with Syria caused something like that. Now we have a situation where the Israeli state is invading an Arab country, besieging an Arab capital,

and there was no serious action. So that tells you a lot about this post Camp David atmosphere. Similarly, on the on the Saudi front, you know, there was no no major, intervention that would, you know, seriously get the Americans to stop this this this war. You know, it was it was just like total, exemplified the collapse of of, a a joint Arab security formula, in in the post Nasser period. How did the war end with with the evacuation of thousands of armed PLO Fedayeen in the presence

of a multinational military force? And and what sort of moment did this mark in the in the Lebanese civil war and, of course, for the Palestinian revolution? The difficulty for the PLO throughout, in in in its presence in Lebanon was that, it was not operating on Palestinian territory. It was in Lebanon, which is a country that is, of course, culturally and socially and and, ethnically close to Palestine, but it was not Palestine.

You know, and there were natural allies for the PLO within Lebanese society. By the way, at least as many people were killed in from the south as as there were Palestinians fighting in Palestinian for their ranks within Palestinian for their ranks. So, there was a huge amount of love and support and commitment for the Palestinian cause,

in in Lebanese society. And and, you know, as much as there there was hatred for it from some sections, that were driven by, isolationist ideology, you had you had enormous support for the cause from from other sections of the population. And definitely, the entirety of the Lebanese left, for them, Palestine was was was a major priority throughout. But there were there were limits to what you could do in in a situation like this.

Arafat could have decided to stay in Beirut, but it would have been a Stalingrad option, and it would have meant the destruction of the whole city. And the scenario was getting close to that as the weeks went on and on, and there was no Arab action. There was no international action to stop the Israelis. So it's was kinda like the genocide now. You know, all these people were like, stop

it. Stop it. Stop it. But, like, nobody knows what to do to make the Americans and and everybody else, like, intervene, you know, or to stop actually supporting invasion. So he was under enormous pressure from within Lebanese society to leave. And it got to a stage where actually the his own Lebanese allies were telling him about my unit to leave now.

So so there are recollections, by, George Howie, for example, the, you know, the Lebanese communist and leader and others, Moss Ibrahim and others, all of these major Lebanese leftist leaders were like, look. You you you you guys have have to leave now. Like, otherwise, the whole country will be at the store. So I think he could have said no, but he he decided that this was the only thing he could do, at this stage, the best thing he could do at this stage.

He also thought that he might be able to come back, by the way. And and and that's part of the story because he did try to make a comeback. And and he was, of course, stopped by the Syrians when he did try to make his comeback. But anyways, now the main question for Arafat when it came to leaving, was a, how to do it in a manner, that, would not lead to major massacres against Palestinian civilians that would be left.

And secondly, how to do it in a manner that would retain the power of the PLO regionally and would minimize its losses out of leaving such an important space as Lebanon. And he basically had to reach a deal with the Americans. Americans had an envoy, Philip Habib, who was sent, to broker essentially a PLO departure.

At the end of the day, there were guarantees given to the PLO that if it departs, the Palestinian civilians that would be left, would be protected and would would would not be attacked. There were also international guarantees over the fighters, you know, leaving with their weapons, going somewhere else, like, you know, without being attacked. The, you know, so there was a formula that was arrived at, to achieve this. And that became a big problem in the internal Palestinian arena, of course.

One important piece of the equation when we're talking about the pressures besides the local Lebanese pressures on Arafat. The other, element that's important to remember is that he was worried about also all sorts of international pressures. He was he was worried that there would be a scenario, where eventually Israeli state would be given a green light to continue operating, until, you know, not only it destroys the country, but it destroys the PLO as a whole.

There might be even other forces that might come to its aid. You know, there were all sorts of, rumors about, you know, all sorts of Western forces intervening. The French were pressuring, the Americans were pressuring. And and as I mentioned earlier, the Soviets were doing nothing. So like the situation in Gaza today, by the way, that was a moment that created, however, major solidarity with the Palestinian cause.

And it was in many ways pretty much the first time that you had a huge wave of, solidarity movements, developing in Europe on a big scale around Palestine. So there there was a a a great deal of awareness built, around Beirut because of the level of destruction and the horrors that were unleashed on the population. Unfortunately, that solidarity came at a very high price, and it was too small, to to be able to change events.

In the United States, it did not develop in a big in a big way probably because the the coverage at the time was so controlled. You know, so the US was one of the places where it did not spread as as, as as much as it should have. But definitely in in Western Europe, you had big movements developing. And, of course, in other parts of the world that were sympathetic, you had a lot of solidarity around 82.

As we've mentioned, the PLO evacuation was only agreed to on the condition that Palestinian civilians would be protected. But instead, IDF flares illuminated the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps while Israel's right wing phalangist allies carried out horrific massacres.

How did these massacres take place? And then what were the consequences for this for for the United States, for Israel, for Lebanon, for so many Arab states that did nothing as Israel violently expelled revolution from Beirut, and above all else, for the PLO, which had now evacuated as these massacres were taking place. What sort of moment did this mark in the Lebanese civil war and for the Palestinian revolution? So the the the Palestinian, forces, left, Beirut, as we know, in 1982.

Yasser Arafat, of course, boarded a a Greek ship and ended up being received by, Papandreou, the Greek minister at the time, and, essentially, the leadership, off of the movement and most of its fighters had exited the scene. In the meantime, what the Israelis did was to go around every major area and take thousands of prisoners. They essentially imprisoned most of the men, the young men of fighting age, and, they put them in a in a major concentration camp, called Ansar.

And then, essentially, that left a lot of the the the women and the and the, elderly, and the children, in the Palestinian refugee camps, without without any protection because the armed fighters had been taken out or deal with the withdrawal. The remaining, young men were in in this these concentration camps, horrible concentration camps, by the way.

And in in the in the meantime, Ariel Sharon, who was really one of the masterminds behind the whole of the 82 invasion, episode, but was also, an extremist, Zionist, visionary in many ways because he had a vision for elimination of Palestinians that that goes back decades. I mean, he's he's he's done massacres for a long time. And, you know, in the fifties, he did massacres. In in in 82, He he designed Sabra and Shetila massacre, actually.

And, of course, the people that implemented the massacre were, Israel's clients, the phalanges, and and their their allied forces. But, you know, it was done, as you mentioned, through Israeli forces encircling the camp, lighting it up, coordinating the logistics around it, and really authorizing the whole operation. So it was an Israeli massacre done done through, the the evangelist, tool. The the massacre was was was was was horrific.

I mean, you just had these these, killers, essentially, entering and and just, wreaking havoc, and and taking the lives of of just women and and children and and and elderly people and even, animals in the in the in the refugee camp. They they destroyed everything they could destroy. They killed everyone they could kill. And and it was, it this was not their first, time of doing that. And Tal Azadar, of course, they they they did it, and and they've been doing it for a long

time. It's systematic. But the Sabra Institute now just took it to a a very, very, horrible level. There's, of course, an important book on this that was, documenting the massacre that was produced by the great Palestinian historian, Bayan Muhed al Uhud. We mentioned her before in this series, but she she's wrote a very important book for those listeners that wanna check check it out.

In any case, with, Sabra and Shatila, there was no guarantee for Palestinian safety or security, in in the post, PLO withdrawal period in in in in Lebanon. I should note that Palestinian divisions within the PLO increased and within Fatah itself increased in this period, partly because of the way the withdrawal happened. Many people did not want to withdraw. They thought that Arafat took a singular decision without consultation, or enough consultation and without transparency, it landed.

They, were against the withdrawal from the south and the way it happened, the disorderly withdrawal from the Lebanese south at the beginning of the war. And, essentially, the Syrian state was behind crystallizing their demands into an active movement in Fatah.

So Assad essentially sponsored around, these, legitimate critiques, you know, the critique of of, the disorderly withdrawal from the South and the and the leadership, they they they created a situation where, essentially, they they would they would split the movement. And they encouraged the Fatiha left, to make a move against Yasser Arafat within the movement.

So you had, figures associated with that left, Abu Salih, and then, of course, with them, there were military figures that were not necessarily ideologically left wing, but that had the critiques over the military performance. Mainly Abu Musa, who used to be an officer in the Jordanian army, but then joined the the the PLO. And then, Abohail Ederhamle, another, officer. These figures were joined by ideological

leaders in the PLO. The head of the Jordan Bureau, was very important, Qadri, and a major intellectual, their main theorist was a major intellectual who used to be a professor actually in in the in the US before leaving and joining, the the the revolution, in the seventies. You know, so you had Elias Chufani, who was a professor in the US and and and then left. He became the theorist and then left to join the revolution. He became the theorist of of of the

split in many ways. So it was a big and major consequence, that happened at at at at the at the time. And we can we can talk about about it more extensively, later. What did this mean in terms of the strength of the Soviet Union and and the status of its foreign policy, specifically its orientation toward revolutionary projects around the world and and willingness and or ability to actively support those projects. Because

at this point, they had invaded Afghanistan. They were also deeply involved alongside Cuba and fighting colonialism and apartheid in South in Southern Africa and Angola and Namibia, why weren't they willing or able to protect the PLO? I mean, this has to do with, you know, general decline in the Soviet, position, globally under Brezhnev, actually. Essentially, Brezhnev was was, the leader in 1982.

It was, his last days, the period under under Brezhnev, you know, towards the end of his his rule, so, a lack of action. You know, he died, by the way, in November 82. So already he was, you know, decline in a declining position. The Soviet Union was already, committed in Afghanistan at the stage, and it was getting embroiled in a in a deep, military situation there. It was it was its own Vietnam in many ways.

So, many people believe that, for example, had Andropov, been in the Soviet leadership at the time, they might have taken a more decisive position. I don't know if that's the case, but, possibly because, you know, in his brief tenure, which did not last long, basically, a bay just lasted for a year, Andropov did, engage with the region more extensively. But, obviously, in the last days of Brezhnev, there

was no serious action taken. And and that hit, that was a huge hit for the Soviet prestige in the region. Because it caused major problems, for for the Soviet Union. And I think I think that in many ways, it illustrated to the whole world that this when it came to, what is the most sensitive file on the global regional agenda, which is the actual question of Palestine file, at the at this stage because because it has has to do so much with the entirety of the Middle East

region. You know, the Soviets were were basically out. The the the Americans now were as as as Sadat mentioned or predicted years earlier, they were holding the the cards. In our epilogue, we'll cover in a more general sense what came next from the 19 eighties through the present for the Palestinian National Movement, for Lebanon, for the entirety of the Arab East. But but this does seem like the place to end the story that we've been telling in Thawda.

In in 1983, Fata cofounder Khaled Al Hassan said, quote, we have to say that the Arabs, as a united power, does not exist. And therefore, the Americans are at ease. Their interests are not touched. And so it seems fair to say that that the Arab nationalist and left wing anti imperialist project was always correct. It was it was indeed Arab unity that was key to defeating colonizers and imperialists because meanwhile, the the colonizers and imperialists were

were dedicated to sowing Arab disunity. And what we see by 1982 very clearly is that they have succeeded. Is 1982 where we're finishing this episode? Is this the moment when it became clear that that reaction had for the time being, triumphed, marking the end of this era of Arab revolutionary politics that we've spent so many hours discussing?

I mean, I'm always hesitant when it comes to answering questions on when when when is the moment of of, dusk, and and when do things end, when do things unravel. But definitely, 1982 was, a huge blow, to the whole region and to the Palestinian cause and to other causes associated with with, with progressive agendas, in in the region. There was, American paramountcy increasingly, growing. It witnessed a situation, where it seemed that most progressive forces were on their retreat.

But is it the moment when all of this happens? No. This is part of a cumulative process that we've referred to aspects of it before, and there were always moments of potential regeneration. Unfortunately, however, by 82, the regional map was no longer favorable, for revolutionary action. The, main revolutionary states, were now essentially taken over by bureaucratized, and militarized, organs of the state.

Some of these states, were under the whims of basically rulers that were very random in their approach, for example, Libya. And and and Mohammed Gaddafi's position, 82, was actually representative of of of this trend. He said that Palestinians should should stay and die in Lebanon. That's the honorable thing to do, you know, which of course was rejected by by then. The Iraqi, government did not intervene in any major or serious

way to stop what was going on. Of course, it was for more focused on its war with Iran, which we'll talk about later. The Syrian government became focused now, on ensuring, that, it, gets out of the 82 withdrawal and and the FEED, a greater amount of influence within the PLO by, creating the split within within Fateh. So, they were just angling, basically, for an improved and an enhancement of their their position.

In the meantime, the Arab states that were not revolutionary were just seeing how they could engage with the Americans, more in this in this in this phase. The Saudis, you know, were were limiting, their engagement within acceptable US parameters. The, Jordanians were doing the same. The Egyptians were doing the same, and that that meant that all of, the, revolutionary dreams of the past

had taken a huge huge hit. People were stuck between 2 types of states, one that was no longer, one type that was no longer focus, focusing on on providing an emancipatory horizon. In many ways, when it came to personal freedoms and and and political freedoms, they were actually creating stark realities on the ground. On the other hand, you had the, the monarchical regimes, stabilizing and, essentially engaging with the American agenda more and more.

Internally, these regimes are going also through a new set of challenges. So, and and we'll talk about these challenges later, but these challenges had no longer had to do with the left. They had to do with with the with the religious white, and and and they had to do with forces that they had mobilized against the left in the past, but that were now, mobilizing against them.

So, for example, Saudi Arabia had a huge challenge in the aftermath of the, Iranian revolution, and we'll we'll talk about it again later, when when the, the the holy sites, were actually, taken over by, a radical religious group that that that they had to deal with. And and, there that those are the kind of internal threats that they were dealing with now.

It was no longer, the the leftist movements that they had suppressed and and and whose members they had imprisoned in the past that that were becoming their major threat. That major threat was coming from elsewhere. That was the 16th and final episode of Fawada, the dig series on 20th century Arab politics substantial epilogue. Abid is a substantial epilogue. Abid is a scholar of Arab and Palestinian

revolutionary movements. He's the author of Monsoon Revolution, Republicans, Sultans and Empires in Oman, and the co author of the Palestinian Revolution Digital Humanities website. An incredible resource that's now back online. Click the link in the show notes. Thank you for listening to The Dig from Jacobin Magazine. As Marx once said, after noting that revolutions are the locomotives of history, while other podcasts have only interpreted the world in various ways,

our point is to change it. We're posting new episodes most weeks. The Dig was produced by Alex Lewis. Our associate producer is Jackson Roche. Music by Jeffrey Brodsky. Our communications coordinator is Sylvia Atwood. Our senior advisors are Fiorio Franco's and Ben Mabey. Check out our vast archives and newsletters at the dig radio dot com. Follow us on Twitter and also now Instagram at the dig radio and find us wherever you get podcasts and subscribe to this podcast.

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