Did you miss it? The DoD Inspector General Office released their report summarizing what they called their evaluation into how the DOD has handled the UAP issue. But what, if anything, can we learn? Well, to my surprise, a lot more than you might think, let's explore the highs, and the lows, and everything in between. Join me, John Greenwald, Jr, as we take a deep dive into what we can all take away. So stay tuned, you're about to journey inside the black vault.
That's right, everybody. As always, thank you so much for tuning in and taking this journey inside the black vault with me. I'm your host, John Greenewald, Jr, founder, creator of the black vault.com. And today, we're taking a deep dive into that new DoD inspector general report that summarizes their what they call evaluation into how the DoD handled the UAP
issue. Now, there was very, very little known about this, and I tried through FOIA to get more, we got a little bit of a glimpse, I'm gonna go through some of those documents to give you a little bit better of a background. But then go over the report itself. I know deep dives are not for everybody. So after the live version of this, I'm gonna put channel markers so that way, if you want to skip around, you can do so. Because
again, a lot of detail is not for everybody. But in this instance, it's absolutely worthwhile to take a little bit of extra time to truly understand this. So let's just go ahead and get get into it here. Let me go ahead and pull up the PowerPoint presentation. I've got a bunch of slides to go
over with you. So let's just go ahead and dive in. If you missed it, here is the cover page of the report that was was released on January 24 2024, titled unclassified summary of Report Number DoD IG Dash 2023 Dash 109 evaluation of the DoD actions regarding unidentified anomalous phenomena, August 15 2023. Now, what's the date difference there? August 15 2023, was when they finally came out and said that they finished their evaluation, which was first started in May of 2021. That
classified report that came out in August of last year. But we we the people had to wait until a unclassified version or summary, if you will, of those findings came out. So that's what we're gonna go over. Now, just so you're aware, in August, the moment that this was announced, I went after that through what's called a mandatory declassification review, or MDR, that essentially mandates them to review that classified product and hopefully in hopes that will get some type
of release, whether or not that's going to happen. Your guess is as good as mine. But let's before we dive into that report, let's get a little bit of history, in case you guys have not followed this. Don't know what I'm talking about. Let's go ahead and take a look at this. May 3 2021 was when we all found out about it. And again, when I say all the general public, this was something that was announced on
the website. This was something that the DoD IG talked about openly but details were very thin about what exactly it was that they were doing. You can see from this memo dated May 3 2021. Evaluation of DOD actions regarding the unidentified aerial phenomena and then it gives a long project number we plan to begin the subject evaluation in May 2021. The objective of this evaluation is to determine the extent to which the DOD has taken actions regarding unidentified aerial
phenomena or UAP. We may revise the objective as the evaluation proceeds and we will consider suggestions for management for additional or revised objections object objectives, excuse me. So, in other words, there was not a whole lot known there really wasn't. And this was it. This was all we were allowed to to essentially understand about it. And when this was announced, I immediately started going after records. And I've, as I've already mentioned, we'll get into some of those that came
out. But looking at the original announcement, very, very little was known about it. This was the distribution of this memo. So this memo essentially instructed them, hey, we need some liaisons from your agencies for this evaluation. That way we can take a look at the UAP Issue. Issue, you know, essentially how the IG works is they'll evaluate the issue, and then submit some recommendations or whatever their findings are, and go from there. So they needed those liaisons that were connected to
those agencies. And here's a list of those agencies. I won't go over all of them. Everything is linked in the show notes below. So you can follow along with me with the documents or
take your time and read it more in detail at your leisure. But you can see here, CENTCOM was on there North calm, Special Operations Command, DARPA, dia DTRA, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Missile Defense Agency, the NSA, the NRO, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, so essentially, they were going across the gamut on who they wanted to speak with during the course of their evaluation. Again, what did that evaluation
entail other than what was in the memo? Well, I tried shortly after that memo was issued to contact the IGs office at the DOD, and say that I was covering the topic which I was not only on this YouTube channel, but but on my website, the black vault.com as well, trying to inform all of you what is going on, because there was a lot of rumors at this time to one of the one of which being that they were evaluating how they were treating Luis Elizondo. As time went on, it was known that he
submitted a inspector general complaint. So some people believe that this was part of that. So what was it so I reached out to them. And as you can see here, the DOD does not have any additional information to offer, beyond what is published on our project announcement that gives the big old long address. And here was the announcement page. I already read to you, very briefly the memo. But this is where you could download that memo. You see down here, the related
documents. That number here is for that that memorandum that I went over, but essentially, it was the same very scant detail announcement where they say we plan to begin the subject in May of 2021. The objective is the evaluation to determine the extent to which the DOD has taken actions regarding unidentified aerial phenomena UAP, the exact same wording. So there was absolutely nothing helpful of trying to figure out what this was. So that's when I started hammering through FOIA.
Later that year, in 2021, I was able to get out some documents that shed not much, but a little bit more light on it now going over this, not only for the history, but to show you guys, this is how you piece together the puzzle, and try and figure out and unfold what they're doing behind the scenes. Because as I got the response from the IG, a little bit more again unfolded where they declassified a
PowerPoint presentation that talked about the evaluation. Now I say declassified actually wasn't classified it was CUI or controlled unclassified information. But essentially, you know, has to go through a review process, not everything is able to be released to the public. So you still have that review process. The FOIA yielded it. There's a video on this channel if you want to go ahead and see even more of what was revealed. But I'm just going to show you a couple key points.
This was that cover of the PowerPoint presentation, you can see that it was made in June of 2021, only took them about a month to create this presentation. Not exactly known. Exactly what for it was exactly what it was for. But rather it gave a little bit more detail on this evaluation. You can see here by this slide the evaluation process it this was the little more light I was talking about, on what they were
going to do. They were going to be doing data requests, interviews, site visits, documentation, review and analysis during their evaluation, fieldwork, so doesn't really tell us much, but at least it tells us that they were going to be actively looking into things, interviewing people and so on. They were going to create a draft report to where they were going to have official management, look at it, have about a month to review it,
submit comments, so on and so forth. The final response, same deal, they were going to make sure that everybody had their two cents in there. So it just gave a little bit of an idea of how it was going to unfold. The other thing that was fairly interesting about this was the list of people that were involved in this evaluation from the IGs office, the majority of them were redacted. Now, that's not too uncommon. A lot of times these agencies will redact for privacy reasons, people that
work for their agency or that are involved in projects. Why? Well, we're seeing a little bit of a glimpse of it. Now, if you're paying attention to NASA's different meetings and broadcasts that they've talked about their UFO personnel that were studying these phenomena for the depth for that agency, and were subjected to quite a bit of harassment from the general public. Dr. Shawn Kirkpatrick has come out, he was talking about harassment from the general public, to him in
his office, and even his family. Apparently, somebody showed up at his house and was arrested, I guess they got federal authorities involved. So there's a lot of reason to cover up. But I don't mean that in a negative way, but to cover up and redact those types of names, you did have a couple though Randolph
stone, he was the one that that signed the original memo. So when you have more public figures, that's when you more get a glimpse, Michael Ruark, the Deputy Inspector General for evaluations, his name was on there, again, obviously much more public name. And then stone was the Assistant Inspector
General for space, intelligence, engineering, and oversight. Now, even though these names here were all redacted, you can at least see where they came from, again, shedding that little more light space missile and nuclear division, sensitive activities, division, intelligence, division, research and engineering division, and then all these project managers and
evaluators and an auditor in there as well. So you get an idea of how big the team was, where they were coming from, and again, just those different types of offices that they were coming from. So that was a little bit of a help, before this report came out to see how it was going on behind the scenes. Now, fast forward to August of 2023. You can see here on the website, this was a public posting of the classified
report from that evaluation. So So we've gone over the 2021 material, but it probably but but you know, there was absolutely nothing else until August 15 2023, when they announced that the classified report was done. But it was just done. That was it, we didn't get to see it. And we didn't get to understand anything about what they found, what they concluded what they recommended, what they wanted to do next. Nothing,
nothing was given to the general public. All we were told was that at a later date, a unclassified report would come out. Now, as I've already mentioned, I'm going after that classified report, some of you may say, Hey, that's a big fat chance, there's no way you're gonna get that. Well, I've gotten the previous one of any way the classified UA UAP reports submitted to Congress, although it was partially released, it still spoke volumes about the classified level of
what they were talking about. Same here, I hope to have the same luck. And there's other cases as well, which will probably have very similar outcomes where he won't see everything, but you'll start to get a better understanding of what's in that classified version. So now, last week, now we're caught up. Now that unclassified version came out. And we get a idea about the evaluation, what they did, what they talked about, and what they recommended for the Department
of Defense. So let's get back into that report. Again, this is the cover page, all linked in the show show notes below. So you have it this to the classified version of the evaluation, or excuse me, a classified version of the evaluation of the DoD is actions regarding unidentified anomalous
phenomena form the basis of this unclassified summary. So just pointing out a punching the note, this takes from that classified version, and puts on there, essentially, the, the shield, if you will, for the classified information softens everything makes it a lot less interesting and boring. And that's why it's unclassified. I'm not going to read the whole
report to you, it's not really long. But for the sake of time here, we're just going to kind of focus in on the most important parts, but the way that it did start was a historical background. And it gives you all the way back to the 1940s of how the US government collected UFO information looked into case files, talked about Project Bluebook and then they themselves fast forwarded into
the year 2000. That's what I'm going to zoom in on because I know that this created quite a firestorm when it first came out a lot of our has a lot of I told you so and all of that good stuff. Specifically, people really honed in on this Hi lated portion. The DoD did not officially look at UAP again
until mid 2000. When select members of Congress initiated and funded a program to study UAP called the advanced aerospace Weapon System Applications Program, or all SAP, as many of you have heard it referred to, well look, this yet adds another muddy layer on a already very muddy and convoluted story. I have followed this since day one
since October of 2017. When we learned of what what Luis Elizondo called a aerial threat Research Program, never said a tip never said OS app, and rather just more talked about aerial threats. So I've followed it since then, and have tried to unravel the mystery. It wasn't till the next year that we learned about this offset program. And as we continued to dig, then we realized that December 2017, New York Times article was wrong in a lot of areas. And don't take my word
for that. You know, I'm not trying to take a shot at them, but rather take the director of offset that's not disputed. Dr. James McCaskey from the DIA take his word for it, that he published a book and in there, I'm paraphrasing this part. But essentially, he said I'm here to set the record straight. So he said that the New York Times was not accurate when they portrayed what they had labeled a tip. But in reality that $22 million went
to OS app. Well, here's where it gets even kind of more muddy is that the government has denied that OS app, which was nicknamed a tip nine unless you listen to Luis Elizondo, and he says it was a program but regardless, because it gets really, really bad when it comes to the confusion. But back to the government, they say no, these were not UFO research programs. But what a lot of people forget is the government finally
amended their statement and stance. This was an article I published in 2021, the government made kind of a cobbled together but much larger statement about a tip. Now why is that messy? Well, they're really calling it. They're calling it a tip, but really, it was all SAP. And that's just by their own documentation. But regardless, they gave this longer statement of the A tip program, and essentially said that they utilized some UAP material for
OS app, but it was not a UAP research program. Rather, it was aimed to investigate foreign advanced aerospace weapon system applications with future technology progress projections over the next 40 years. And to create a center of expertise for advanced aerospace technologies. The goal was to help understand the threat posed by unconventional or leap ahead aerospace vehicles and technologies that could have national security implications for the United States. It goes
into much more details. But down here is obviously kind of like that, I would say one at a little bit, where they kept saying no, it did not deal with UAP. And then all of a sudden, they say in developing the reports and exploring how to create a center of expertise. The contract allowed for research drawn from a wide variety of sources, including reports of UAPs. However, the examination of UAP observations
was not the purpose of a tip. Now again, kind of confusing, but this is something that they were referring to as a tip, but in reality was more so awesome. Now, this was submitted in 2021. But even as early as last year, in 2023, The New York Post's specifically Stephen Green Street, got more statements in detail from the Pentagon on all of these issues. And essentially, they reinforced that these types of programs off
SAP, a tip were not UFO or UAP. specifics. So this seems to be the current stance of the Department of Defense in the Pentagon. So where did that thing go arrive in this new report? Or is it arrived? Meaning is it now accurate that these were created for UAP research purposes? We only know what has come out thus far. So in addition to this report, I
went over the PowerPoint presentation. Well, in other FOIA requests, I was able to determine that during the course of this evaluation, they spoke with Luis Elizondo, and they spoke with David grush, both of which were connected to the evaluation. So how much did they dig? Did they listen to these guys and formulate that section of The report based on the testimony there and just not fact, check it beyond. Is this the absolute gospel? I don't know, I don't know the answer to
that. All we know is this material came out, and we know who they spoke with. So I reached out to the Inspector General's office again, tried to figure out the answer to that stated that the official Pentagon stance has been X, why are you guys stating why? They told me that they are working on that, but by the recording of this, they have not given me any answer whatsoever. And I've tried to follow up a couple times. It's why it took me nearly a week or so to record
this video piece. Because I can't I can't get an answer. And I wanted to get an answer for you guys. Regardless of what the answer is, I'll bring it to you, and I'll report it. But it's just so weird, right? It doesn't matter what you believe you could think that it was a UFO research programming, you think it wasn't? It doesn't matter. We should all agree on how absolutely horrible the government has been describing these programs. Why is that? What, what's wrong with it? And
whose fault is that? If anybody's why are we getting mixed messages? I don't have an answer for you on that. But it is fascinating to see unfold, because here we are years after we first heard the acronym ative, and they still can't keep their story straight. Who knows what's right or wrong. But we can't keep our stories straight here on the side of the government. And and that's absolutely ridiculous. It really, truly is. So hopefully, somebody will add clarity and
maybe I can do an update video to this. But as of now, absolutely nothing has been clarified. I also wrote to Susan Goff in the Pentagon, but but also the IGs office and their media affairs and said, Hey, you guys are completely contradicting each other. Can you please tell me what's going on? And well, nothing yet. So back to the report. We have this
section here chapter six, title 10. United States Code establishes the authorities of combatant commanders who are responsible for detecting, deterring, and preventing threats and attacks against the US and its territories,
possessions and bases. After a review of the laws, policies and guidance issued by Congress, the DOD and other federal agencies, we determined that while the services and components have an important role to play, the combatant commands would be the logical organizations to detect, report, collect and identify UAP incidents to arrow, it was kind of an interesting thing to put into this report, to note that the combatant commands would be
kind of at the forefront of this, because maybe they aren't, maybe they haven't submitted that. And it's kind of interesting that, for example, some of these commands are where the UAP material has leaked from especially the Middle East material over Baghdad or over Missoula. So we're obviously talking about a very interesting point on top of that's where the leaks are coming from. So not really sure if there's a
correlation there. But it should be interesting to note, but if you're not familiar with the combatant commands, here they are, here's a list of them, including Africa Command, CENTCOM, Cyber Command, Space Command, Strategic Command, full list is on your screen there. So that's, that's an idea of, of maybe where they're going with this, that maybe it's the war zones, the active military presences that really are the ones that are driving a lot of these sightings. Obviously,
that's been their focus from what we've been told. But it sounds like that they want a little bit more coordination out there with their commands, in the introduction part give a
little bit more detail on the objective, not much. The objective of this evaluation was to determine the extent to which the DoD military services, defense agencies and military department counter intelligent counter intelligence organizations took intelligence, counterintelligence and force protection actions to detect, report, collect, analyze, and identify UAP. Not a whole lot different than then the very, very, I would say, brief objectives that they originally
published. But it shows you that they really didn't update their objectives. They did note in the past, especially in that original memo, they may actually update. It's clear they didn't they were just looking at how the DoD was handling the UAP issue. Now, one thing and this is primarily for all my FOIA people out there that you're kind of exploring documents, these are the best things to look for. And generally, they're in finer print, buried at the bottom of the pages. These are
the citations. It gives, in some cases, gives FOIA fodder, meaning stuff to go after, or start Just to paint pictures about things that we didn't know a whole lot or and all about prior, for example, some of the citations in the beginning of the report, look at this classified annex to the Senate Armed Services Committee report on the fiscal fiscal year 2020 NDAA. enclosure two entitled advanced operational capabilities, collection, exploitation, and research.
That's from July of 2019. Another citation references the same document, but enclosure 13 unidentified aerial phenomena, that would be an excuse me, not the same report. Exactly. But same report, but that one for fiscal year 2022. Sorry about that. And that was from October 19 2021. So you start to see a little bit of a picture. Obviously, that's very minimal, we don't get to see the classified annex, or at least not yet. But now we know it's there. Now we start to see what
the enclosures are about. And you piece these puzzles together, to move forward and see if you can get a hold of it at a later date. So I could be wrong. But I don't believe that report was ever known before. I searched to see if maybe there was a public annex that was out there a public report that may have had this kind of stuff. And know the only references that come up, especially when you're using search engines are actually going right back to this report. So there's not a
whole lot known about this report, if at all. So very interesting to take a look at those citations. So I bring that up, because those are great things to look for. When you're trying to piece together, things to look for later, through FOIA or at least trying to get a picture of those classified annexes and reports and so on. This was a very important part of the IG report and one that really deserves a mention. The DOD does not have a comprehensive coordinated
approach to address UAP. We reviewed the DOD has policies, procedures and actions for detecting, reporting, collecting, analyzing and identifying UAP and determined that, among other things, the DOD has not used a coordinated approach to detect, report, collect, analyze and identify UAP DoD components have largely excluded geographic combatant commands, which are responsible for detecting, deterring, and preventing threats and attacks against the US and its
territories possessions and bases in their respective areas of responsibility, and developing UAP policies and procedures. That's obviously the combatant commands we talked about earlier and how they've kind of been it seems like excluded from all of this. And finally, DOD components develop varying
processes to collect, analyze and identify UAP incidents. As a result, the DoD may not have developed a comprehensive and coordinated strategy for understanding identifying and protecting against the UAP that may present a safety threat to military personnel and territory. The DoD has not
issued a comprehensive UAP response plan. The DoD has not issued a comprehensive UAP response plan that identifies roles, responsibilities, requirements and coordination, procedures for detecting, reporting, collecting, analyzing and identifying UAP incidents. As a result, the DoD response to UAP incidents is uncoordinated and concentrated within each
military department. Officials from the military services and MD CEOs stated that they have been waiting for the DOD to issue comprehensive UAP guidance before developing their own guidance. Essentially, what they're saying there, the DoD as a whole should create some type of central procedure, something that all the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, can model their procedures after and the DoD never did it. We'll touch on that again in a second. DOD components have largely excluded
geographic combatant commands and UAP processes. So they're punching this point again. We interviewed senior officials at Oh USD ins, the military services, the MDC o's and the defense agencies to learn how their organizations detect, report, collect, analyze and identify UAP incidents. We concluded that these organizations generally adapted existing systems and that the DoD components existing UAP processes largely exclude the role of the geographic combatant
commands. We also reviewed the geographic combatant commands processes for responding to UAP incidents, and determine that the commands processes also generally adapted existing systems to report UAP incidents. Chapter Six title 10 US Code establishes the authorities of combatant commanders who are responsible for detecting, deterring and preventing threats and attacks against the US and its territories possessions
basis. Therefore, the combatant commands would be the logical organizations to detect, report collect and identify UAP incidents to arrow. So they're really punching that point. And you'll see there's a lot of repetitiveness here also. So the report kind of would have been better served to be trimmed down even more. But hey, that's just, you know, that's just me. footnote here at the bottom though don't miss this. We made other classified observations and findings that are not
included in this unclassified summary. So obviously, there's a lot more here that's kind of a given, but it's always good to see it in writing. So let me ask you something. And this is something I think that we have to deal with. Take yourself out of the storyline that we've heard from some of these individuals and look at it with a broader lens from 2007 to 2008, depending upon who you listen to, all the way to 2023.
These guys here on the screen, which includes Luis Elizondo with a tip excuse me, there we go, Luis Elizondo with a tip, you've got Dr. Shawn Kirkpatrick with Arrow you've got Dr. James McCaskey with us AP, you've got John J. Stratton, J. Stratton is generally how he's referred to with the UAP Task Force. All of
these guys collectively have 16 years of leadership. And if you believe all of them and take the controversy of whether or not this is a UAP, you know, research effort with or SAP or a tip or was a tip a program, take all of that out of the equation for purposes of this. For 16 years, none of these guys were able to develop any type of program policy or procedure that
the DoD could utilize. Now, let's just say some of these individuals were in on the ground floor, and their intentions were 100% genuine and they wanted to make this happen. Fine. But why is it that no one was able to make it happen all through those 16 years, that these guys lead their respective programs, even those that aren't disputed as being UAP? specific efforts? What happened during those years? Now, I'm not trying to specifically blame these guys, but they are the leaders.
A lot of people out there throw a lot of hate at Dr. Shawn Kirkpatrick. And you know what, maybe, and I would even say myself that it is deserved. But if you blame him, you have to blame the others that came before him. What did they do? It
should be noted. Now, I'm sorry, it has to be noted that there is not a single UAP research report from our SAP, or from a tip that leads us to believe that they did anything from a investigative standpoint, the material that came out through the offset program was all things that were non UFO related. The exception was the one dird report that talked
about UAP effects. But the one that leaked out and was published, I believe, first by Popular Mechanics was actually different from the one that dia submitted and released out via a FOIA request. So what happened there? Are they hiding it? Well, maybe. But let's just say for a moment that there was UAP angles
to all SAP? Where is that material? And this is an age old question that some out there are so sick and tired of me asking, but we have to keep asking it. What happened to the 10s of millions of dollars if this really was a research program devoted to UAP where's that material? And if it's sitting in the private sector, well, they don't own it, the DIA and the taxpayers do. So you know, I can go off on a whole tangent on on
OS app alone. And the idea and concept and allegation and rumor that they with taxpayer money, meaning bass, the contractor purchased databases like MUFON, which, you know, I know that Bigelow did get involved with that. But was it taxpayer money? Was this something that the DIA wanted? Fast forward to a tip?
Was it a continuation of all SAP? Specific to UAP? Nuts and Bolts, aerial threats, not the paranormal stuff that Skinwalker Ranch, but specifically to that, okay, let's say it is where is there any supporting documentation to support that? And what were they doing for years, it wasn't just Luis Elizondo, he had other people, right. It wasn't just James kasky. He had other people, right. What happened there fast forward to the UAP taskforce and J. Stratton. What happened there?
So there's a lot of unanswered questions here that yeah, I've asked for years, but we need to continue asking them because it's a fascinating tale to see unfold. And the story is not told yet. And it doesn't matter if you believe me or support the questions that I asked. The bottom line is we still don't have the answers. And what's even more interesting about this is those that you see on the screen here, don't agree about
the relationship between their own programs. For example, if you read and hear and listen to James McCaskey from the DIA, DIA and his leadership of OSS app, he contradicts Luis Elizondo. Why is that why why don't more people care about that? What happened there? What's the disconnect? So those types of
things? Yeah, I mean, may have an easy answer. But you know what, the longer it goes without answers, without these gentlemen actually addressing it, the more interested I get, and the more loud I will become asking the questions because there's something there, there's something there that they don't want us to see. Not about UAP, but about these programs themselves, and what is that? And we can speculate until our eyes fall out. But until we get those answers, that's all what
we're left to do. So let's just keep asking, keep pushing. And hopefully, we'll get some clarity. Because yes, it is absolutely important to these topics. And yes, it is important because it shows how we got here today. It's the foundation, we can all at least agree to that right. It was the foundation that led us to Congress doing what they're doing today, and creating the legislation, the legislation that they have. And so if this is the foundation, then let's understand how strong
or how weak it is. That's why it's important. Some people just want to shove it to the side. They're like, yeah, yeah, leave it alone, John, you're really annoying. Well, maybe. But I'm not going to leave it alone. Because again, this is the foundation that everything that we talked about, in 2024 and beyond, is built on. And if that starts to crumble, then everything else will crumble along with it. And are we seeing that as we speak? Is that something that's going on? Is
Congress losing interest? I said it a little while ago, to be honest with you, I'll stand by that. There's not a whole lot of people that are out here advocating for the issue. There's some, but there's not a lot. And some of those that were champions a year and a half ago, kind of fall off the map. They haven't really been around. You've had some others that have come forward. But their strength, let's just say and
that's not supposed to be disrespectful. But the power, the strength of the power they they yield within the Senate or Congress is not necessarily as strong as it was maybe a year and a half ago. So what's going on? What what are we? What are we seeing unfold here. So that's why a lot of that history is important. And that's why we need to figure it out because it makes a lot of these other things that makes it a lot
easier to understand and grasp. Back to the report and some of the findings, DOD components developed varying processes to detect and report UAP incidents. The NDAA of 2022 assigns arrow under the Oh USD ins responsibility for synchronizing and standardizing the collection analysis and identification of UAP incidents. However, the DOD has not yet issued comprehensive UAP guidance. So again, Kirkpatrick is just to blame
just as those other guys in the early days. In the absence of DOD level guidance, the DoD components have developed varying informal processes to detect and report UAP incidents. For example, an Air Force remotely piloted aircraft, and airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance technical adviser, stated that the Air Force designated UAP as a special interest item, which requires air crews to document and report UAP observations within 24 hours of engine
shutdown and mission completion using the Marauder system. An army Senior Advisor for Science and Technology and Innovation, stated that army personnel also use the Air Force's Murata system to document and report UAP observations. Because the
army has not developed its own UAP specific processes. The military services and MTC O's have sent some UAP incident reports to arrow, but the DOD does not currently currently formally require them to do so. That is an explosive and in my opinion, one of the more important parts of this report all that stuff about the Air Force and how the Air Force is
collecting even informally, the UAP incidents and reports. So, the one military branch that has mysteriously been mum, for years, they don't talk Got this kind of stuff, really at all. Now all of a sudden, we find out that they've got this special interest item label over UAP. And that they are using systems to catalog these reports and in some cases, or maybe all, send
them over to arrow. So that that to me was a pretty interesting part of this because when you look at the citation on the same page, US Air Force Special Interest item, unidentified aerial phenomena reporting April 8 2022, Air Force Lifecycle Management Center Marauder mission reporting User Guide,
September 2021. The broader system provides the Global Mission reporting capability on the secret Internet Protocol router network, including report drafting, quality control, rejection and approval pipeline to ensure fidelity of reporting, publication of reports for Global Access and export of
published reports for analysis. In other words, they're using a established system that ties into this Marauder mission, and labeling UAP special interest items and gender and using that system to generate the reports and potentially get them over to arrow for analysis. So even though it's all in formal, they're taking action, and they have been proactive to do their
own reporting procedure. To me, that's absolutely fascinating because again, this is the Air Force, that military branch that denied any interest for decades since project Bluebook, then was mysteriously mom when the Navy's just blurting out stuff. Every day, it seemed like there for a little bit. On UAP, the Air Force was quiet now we're seeing that they were actually doing a lot behind the scenes. The DoD is lack of a comprehensive coordinated approach to address UAP may pose a threat to
military forces and US national security. We determined that the DOD has no overarching UAV policy. And as a result, it lacks assurance that national security and flight safety threats to the US from UAP have been identified and mitigated. So obviously, they're not doing much. They're doing these informal things. But beyond that, not so much. Now, according to the press release for this report, there were 11 recommendations that were generated by the IGs office five
of which were listed in the report itself. Now, I know it gets a little bit tedious reading these, but I think it's important not only for the audio version of this particular podcast, but on top of this to really hear it out loud and to understand exactly what the IG determined what they want done
and whether or not anything was done about it. Recommendation one, we recommend that the Undersecretary of Defense for intelligence and security, in coordination with the all domain anomaly Research Office Director, issue a Department of Defense Policy to integrate unidentified anomalous phenomena roles, responsibilities and requirements and coordination procedures into existing intelligence, counterintelligence, and force protection policy and
procedures. The policy should include methods and address unidentified anomalous phenomena incidents, and should align with policies and procedures for the protection of the US person's civil liberties. So now they're just trying to address everything that we've gone over. And it seems again, like it's
pretty repetitive in this report. They're trying to address it create some kind of, you know, uniform system for this Undersecretary of Defense for intelligence and security and all domain anomaly resolution office comments. The Undersecretary of Defense for intelligence and security responding for the owe us the ins and the arrow director
agreed with the recommendation. The Undersecretary noted that the findings that inform excuse me, that informed the recommendation appear to be based on observations that largely predate the established of air the establishment of aro organizationally aligned under the Oh USD ins on July 2020 22. The Undersecretary also commented that the report describes aro as having been operational at the time of its established establishment, when in fact, the office was not at
initial operational capability. The Undersecretary stated that arrow will achieve full operational capability using the resources provided in the in the future year defense plan, beginning in fiscal year 2020. For the under the undersecretary also stated that arrows progress and detecting, identifying and resolving UAP includes the development of analytic framework science plan, operational framework of strategic communications plan, and implementing guidance on the
UAP related roles and responsibilities of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, arrow, combatant commands, military services and combat support agencies. The Undersecretary stated that arrow is developing policy guidance including Recently released General Administration guidance through the Joint Staff to the combatant commands to delineate UAP roles, responsibilities, requirements and coordination
efforts, or excuse me procedures. This guidance will modify existing intelligence, counterintelligence and force protection policies and procedures as well as adhere to all policies and procedures for the protection of US persons civil liberties. Our response are the IG comments from the Undersecretary of Defense for intelligence and security fully addressed the recommendation. Therefore, the recommendation is
resolved but open. We will close the recommendation when the Oh USD ins in coordination with Arrow provides us with the issue of DOD policy to integrate UAP roles, responsibilities, requirements, and coordination procedures into existing intelligence, counterintelligence and force protection policies and procedures and procedures. A mouthful from top to bottom. But you can see that it looks like
the DoD is starting to take action. The second recommendation we recommend that the Secretary of the Army issue interim guidance for unidentified anomalous phenomena while waiting for the Department of Defense to issue policy at a minimum, this guidance for unidentified anomalous phenomena should a integrate existing intelligence counterintelligence and force protection policies and procedures be integrate procedures for coordinating with geographic combatant commands,
see incorporate roles, responsibilities and requirements for the military services and their respective military department counterintelligence operations.
The Secretary of the Army comments, the Senior Advisor for Counter Intelligence Deputy Chief of Staff of army G to responding for the Secretary of the Army agreed in principle with the recommendation, the Senior Advisor stated that army counterintelligence plans to integrate existing intelligence, counterintelligence, and force protection policies and procedures into interim guidance for UAP IGS comments from the Senior Advisor for counter-intelligence Deputy
Chief of Staff of the Army G to fully address the recommendation, therefore, the recommendation is resolved. But open. We will close the recommendation when the Secretary of the Army provides us with the issued interim UAP guidance. The third recommendation, we recommend that the Secretary of the Navy issue interim guidance for UAP while waiting for DOD to issue policy at a minimum, and it goes through essentially the same points again. So I'll jump down
to Secretary of the Navy comments. The Secretary of the Navy did not provide official comments for inclusion in our final report, as requested. However, the director of intelligence Deputy Undersecretary of the Navy, intelligence and security responding for the Secretary of the Navy after our final report issuance agreed with the recommendation and stated in the response that the Navy began developing interim guidance for UAP. Here's what's odd about
this. The Navy years ago, already had UAP guidelines. That story was first broken by Politico and Brian bender. I went after it through FOIA, I'll have to look back, I actually forgot to look at it. But regardless, that case is still open. I don't have an ETA, I don't think that's what I wanted to check. But the case is still open. So clearly, there's there's kind of a disconnect there, where they have this guidance years ago about how the Navy was going to report UAP.
And then fast forward, IG recommends them to do it again, and they're going to do it again. So it's like, Well, what happened to all that stuff from years ago? It's just really weird when you try and truly unraveled some of these details, and how you thought certain things were done. And it was reported as being done and then all of a sudden, we find out
it's not or it's being redone. Who knows. But IG stated in the report, comments from the director of intelligence Deputy Undersecretary of the Navy Intelligence and Security, Department of the Navy fully addressed the recommendation. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved. But open we will close the recommendation when the Security Secretary of the Navy
provides us with the issued interim UAP guidance. We recommend that the Secretary of the Air Force issue interim guidance for UAP get I'm gonna jump down it's again, just a recommendation that the Air Force do the same as the Navy and the Army and previous recommendations. Secretary of the Air Force comments. The Secretary of the Air Force did not provide official comments for inclusion in this report, as
we requested in our draft. However, the strategic programs and Policy Associate Director Secretary of the Air Force Inspector General, responding for the Secretary of the Air Force provided us in formal comments, stating quote in coordination with OSI and our Secretary of the Air Force inspector general's special investigate shins directorate, Deputy Director. We concur without comment and look forward to the final published report. Man, these titles get so
difficult and wordy. So sorry about that. But obviously they're they're acknowledging it in a informal comment way. IG responds the strategic programs and policy. Associate Directors in formal response stated that the Air Force agreed with the recommendation. However, this response did not provide the specific actions that the Air Force would take and the dates for for those actions. Therefore, this recommendation
is resolved. But open, we will close the recommendation when the Secretary of the Air Force provides us with the issued interim UAP guidance. Here's the last recommendation that they have. In this particular report. We recommend that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued guidance to the geographic combatant commanders regarding UAP detection, reporting, collection, analysis and identification with their
area within their area of responsibility. At a minimum, the guidance should include tools to help commands determine the threats posed by UAP. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not provide official comments for inclusion in our final report, as we requested, however, in official from the Joint Staff J three responded and agreed with the
recommendation. Further, the Joint Staff issued guidance to the geographic combatant commanders on UAP detection, reporting, collection, analysis and identification within their area of responsibility. Our response, the formal response from the joint staff fully addressed the recommendation, therefore the recommendation is resolved and closed. Yet one
thing that it's always fun to see, but frustrating to see. And interesting all at the same time, is how the Office of the Inspector General within the DOD can't get their own military branches to respond properly. And obviously, they have ample opportunity to do so. So it seems like these offices have power that again, wield a lot of power in their respective ways cannot get answers. You look at the Senate, you look at the house, you look at politicians that also wield their own
respective power. And they try and get answers from different either, and even the inspector general. But other military branches and offices and the Pentagon itself, you look at that and you realize, man, our own government will not talk to each other. They will not help with reports that are aimed to help pilots be safer in the skies to help Americans be safer where they live to help national security concerns. They don't
talk. So you see it. And like every recommendation, we asked for this, but we didn't get it. It's like come on, like try and talk to each other to help us understand what's going on number one, but number two, what are you doing about it. And that's something that's really important to look at. The last slide that I want to talk to you guys about is the scope and
methodology. And you look again, won't read the whole page here but we interviewed senior officials and requested UAP related data and organizational policies, procedures and guidance from the following DoD organizations, oh Usdi and s arrow military services like the Army, Navy and Air Force, military service intelligence command components army G to Navy and to Air Force A to MDC owes, which include the army counter intelligence NCIS Office of Special Investigations, that
would be for the Air Force, Defense Intelligence agencies which included the DIA, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, or NGA, the National Reconnaissance Office or NRO and NSA, the National Security Agency. You know what that is,
that is a list. Now that we have a a roadmap for someone like me, and any of you that are watching on who was directly involved with this particular evaluation, spoiler alert, I have filed requests to each and every one of those that I just went over to look at what was the coordination between the IG during this evaluation and those respective branches, offices and so on. That will help us so a lot of people were let down at this report, you know, I don't know what they expected. I'm not
sure what they wanted to see. I don't know I think it's across the gamut when you when you talk to to various people and, and and groups and so on, that they they have their heart set on something. For me. I always I've learned over the years learned over the decades actually don't have any expectations, because
you never know what you're gonna get. And that's kind of why I wanted To do this particular deep dive, when you look at that information, and you look at what they have told us, your expectations, if you have them way, way too high, it's going to be blown out of the water. But when you look at it for what it is, you look at it for, for, for trying to get some more puzzle pieces and put this picture together. That's when it becomes
really interesting. And in this respect, there was so much that someone like me and all of you out there that do FOIA requests and look for things. There were so many leads in this. And that was actually unexpected. Again, I try not to have expectations, but I didn't expect that many leads. Because this now offers an opportunity to go and dissect not only that list I just went over. But all those citations that I said, Hey, look, look at
look at these, I can't go after congressional records. But I can go after Air Force policy and procedure, I can dig in there, I can go into communication between the IGs office and these respective agencies. Because keep in mind that classified report may take a while to get that MDR case that I talked to
you earlier about in this presentation. But what won't take as much time is the information that was passed on, let's say, from the army, or the Navy, or NCIS or aft OSI, that information is processed at the agency itself, not the IGs office. So the report itself is going to take a while because it has to coordinate with all of those offices. And then it has
to wait until the end. But the information I can go after directly with AF OSI or the navy or whatever, specific to this DoD IG evaluation, that will not take as long and why am I telling you that because I know some of you are bored stiff, it's the way you have to look at this. And and I always try and throw in those FOIA tips and hints if I can, for those that may be thinking about using it or may maybe you've started but you're not entirely sure what to look for. That's what you look
for. You look at every single word and character in reports like these, because it's not the main brunt of the report, that's the most interesting, it's the fine print. And it's those little things that you can pick up on and used to create one or two, or 10 or 20 other FOIA cases, to all of these other
agencies. So that's something to look out for. Overall, again, this was a great, I think, a great report for the research end, not necessarily for telling the public anything other than the DoD hasn't done anything to set up UAP policies, procedures that are uniform, DOD wide. That's the bottom line. So the general public is going to walk away with very little from this,
again, other than the DOD has failed. And we do have to ask that one question 10s of millions of dollars at least have gone into these programs over the course of that 16 years. So what is it that they've done? These are a lot of failure marks from the Inspector General's office. And those recommendations, the ones that we could read should never be in there if everybody else was doing their job. And let's just say the most structured effort, likely or arguably, being arrow,
what have they been doing? Like, why can't they get some type of a system down? As the general public, we are not privy to everything? So again, maybe there is a fair answer. Maybe there's a fair answer with why a tip didn't do it or why OSS app didn't do it. There's a lot of, you know, question marks there. But the bottom line is they didn't do their job. And that's what we have to look into and ask why and how are we going to fix it? Obviously, the IG issued their recommendations, will the
DoD take action? Time will tell. But I had a lot of fun going over this report with you guys. Hopefully, you learned at least one thing in the past hour or so. So thank you for joining me. If you can, if you're watching the live stream version or the the replay version, please click the thumbs up if you can. That's a huge, huge help here on YouTube. Or if you are listening on any podcast platform for the audio version, please please take a moment give a rating put a review if you can shoot for
five stars. All of that helps me in the grander scheme because then accusin All those podcast platforms or YouTube Hey people like this channel. The biggest help is that on top of if you find the content worthwhile, please just share it. I don't ask for anything but that if you if you find it worthwhile, post the link out there to your respective followers. Hopefully they'll find it of interest as well. While and if you feel so inclined, there are different ways that you can support the
channel with donations. The 100% of everything that comes in goes right back into the channel itself goes to FOIA cases, which do yield charges on. Sadly, a growing number of cases nowadays, web hosting fees keeping this channel alive. That is a huge huge help. links are all down below. So thank you guys for listening and or watching. This is John Greenewald, Jr, signing off, and we'll see you next time.