Welcome to the Sub Club Podcast, a show dedicated to the best practices for building and growing app businesses. We sit down with the entrepreneurs, investors, and builders. behind the most successful apps in the world to learn from their successes and failures. SubClub is brought to you by RevenueCat. Thousands of the world's best apps trust RevenueCat to power in-app purchases
manage customers, and grow revenue across iOS, Android, and the web. You can learn more at revenuecat.com. Let's get into the show. Hello, I'm your host, David Barnard, and with me today, RevenueCat CEO, Jacob Biding. Our guest today is Bruno Verlet, co-founder of the Grizzly Labs, makers of Genius Scan, one of the oldest and best scanning apps for smartphones.
On the podcast, we talk with Bruno about putting customers ahead of metrics, why there's still massive opportunity to build successful apps, and how a server crash turned into an accidentally successful A-B test. Hey, Bruno, thanks very much for joining us on the podcast today. Hey, David, thanks for having me. Jacob, really nice chatting with you today as well. Always, David, always. But I'm very excited to talk to Bruno because you were one of...
I think the 15 people who signed up for RevenueCat in 2017, like when we launched in December, you poked around. We never made it happen for a while, but like you were very, very, very, very, very early. And somehow we've never talked it.
directly before, but I always joke that the, I think about probably a lot of people like this, but I have always the first 20 signups to revenue cap burned in my head because I looked at them in the database so many times. So I'm very excited to get the backstory today. Yeah, you got some convincing, but you finally got me. Yeah, you know, five years later. No, more than that, seven years later.
Well, speaking of a long time in the making, Genius Scan and your company has been a many year journey, almost 15 years in the making. So I did want to kind of go back to the founding because I think a lot of people will be. interested to hear that whole story of how you got started, how you got that early product market fit, and then how you grew that to what today is a really incredible business. You have 5 million MAU, 10-person team.
Fantastic success story for a bootstrapped app. But yeah, tell us the story. Yeah, so Geniuscan is the main app that we developed as a mobile app development studio. And we started it like 15 years. Almost 15 years ago. It would be 15 years in June. Actually, we didn't want to, I mean, we didn't plan to start GeniusCAN. So it was my co-founder and myself, we were students at the University of Illinois and we were roommates. iPhone was quite new at that time. I mean...
Well, I guess the iPhone was 2007. Yeah, well, I think it's 2007, the iPhone, but then the App Store just opened publicly to third-party apps in 2009, right? I think at the... 2008. 2008? Okay. Yeah. So in 2009, basically, I mean, I was like, oh, maybe you should make an eye. It would be fun. I was more like in a Linux development before, but my co-founder was in my roommate, I guess at the time was in doing image processing research.
And so we thought, what could we do with that? We brainstormed and we had this great idea. It was to make an app to scan paintings in museums. You would go to the Louvre in France. You would scan a painting. I mean, take a photo of a painting and you would get all the information about it, like who painted it. Okay, so it was like augmented, almost augmented reality.
Yeah, it was augmented reality, like, you know, years before it was something. So we started working on that. After a while, I mean, we had it kind of working, but then we had... Two problems. One was that we used the technology, which was called SIFT. It was like basically features that you embed in an image and keep points that you can identify to recognize an image under any angle. I mean, yeah, it was a...
And the problem with this technology is that there were some patents on it. I knew at the time we were just students in a dorm room, I guess, and we were like patents who are going to be sued by Americans. This was in... late 2000s so like 2008 and 9 so this was before like kind of the modern AI revolution and all this stuff so this would have been like they wouldn't even called it machine learning at the time they would have called it like
Vision. Yeah, it was computer vision. Yeah. And actually, my roommate, Guillaume, was doing computer vision at the university. The kids don't have any idea how good they have it these days. Just being able to slap an image recognition in like with one API call. Throw more transformers at it. It'll figure it out eventually, you know? But yeah, CV was like a different ballgame.
So the pattern scared you. Yeah, I mean, there were alternatives. There were open source alternatives. And then also there was another problem that at that time, if you imagine someone going to the Louvre in Paris to scan... picture of you
Probably was a tourist, you know, coming from China or the U.S. And at that time, there were no like cellular. I mean, when you went abroad, like roaming fees were crazy high. So when I went to Europe in 2010, I had no cell phone for three weeks. Right. Like I went to Internet cafes. Yeah, exactly.
So you would have to download the database in advance on your phone. It was like huge because the database of images too, I mean, even because we only had signatures of the images. So it would be huge. I mean, and so we were sort of like, I mean, who's going to do that?
But the thing is that when preparing this app, so the way Guillaume was doing, he was like taking photos of Van Gogh painting on his desk all the time. And actually, I mean, we were detecting the painting on his desk and we were like... okay, we could detect any kind of document like that. That's how we said, okay, maybe we will start doing a document scanning app and we'll go back to the paintings later.
And so, you know, 15 years later, we are still on the document scanning. And that's how it started. And the funny story is that I was, what triggered actually the start of the development was in, I think it's May 2009. Basically, it's a tech, but it was developed in MATLAB on the computer. It was not like a mobile app. And in May 2009, I was going back to France for a wedding. And actually, I got stuck in the Chicago airport.
because of the Icelandic volcano. Remember like the, I don't remember the name. It's like, I used the journal Flúr. And so I was actually, I had flown to Chicago and I got my ticket refunded by... by the airline i don't know how but it happened and i was like i saved the money of the trip to paris And so I went to the Apple store in Chicago, purchased a MacBook because I didn't have one at the time and went back to Champaign, Illinois. And that's where I started. So I started developing the app.
That was in May and in June 22, 2010, the app was launched on the App Store. So basically, the first version of the app was a month and a half of the month. Picked up really quickly. So I don't have the exact numbers in mind, but it was like, we put it as a free app in the App Store and it just shut up the rankings.
Was it the first or one of the early scanning apps? I mean, there was another one. Yeah, I think it was the first app. I mean, like the first that was working quite well. Yeah, this was like one of the non-obvious, like... life-changing, important utilities that a great camera and a good phone could do. It never crossed my mind that I don't need a scanner anymore. I can get a good enough scan just with an app that knows what it's doing and a camera.
And so, yeah, I can imagine being one of the first and like just locking that down. Yeah. And it was kind of magic because, uh, for, for users, I think that was, it worked really well because you, it was like one of the first apps that kind of bridge the physical world and the. Digital world, it's almost like AR, right? You take a document and then we would warp it and present it to you very clean. So I think it was fun to use. And the plan was to put it as a free app for a few days.
because it was like a launch offer. So we would do that. And then after a few days, we would just put it paid and then make some money. And so after a few days, I put it as a paid app. Immediately we went from like, I don't know, thousands of downloads a day to one, two downloads a day. I think it was 99 cents to be, to be. Wow.
wow that just shows and this is 2010 so this is like i think people forget how much debasement there was of apps in the early days of the app store like there was a free fall from like being able to make money like selling an app for you know ten dollars or twenty dollars on the desktop to a race to the bottom happened very very quickly yeah that was a race to the bottom exactly so basically we panicked and we put it back as a free app
We were worried later. I mean, we were just students. We didn't have to make a living out of that. Yeah, I mean, a few thousand free users is better than $2 a day. You know what I mean? After that, we were lucky to be featured by Apple in the months after that. I think that was the summer, I may remember incorrectly, where iAds launched to the, you know.
Supposedly super high quality ads from Apple. And they had like, at the time, they had like a crazy high eCPMs. I think you had like $10 eCPMs. No, like $30 and $40. I launched with iAd. Were they just, was Apple just... Just spending, just paying developers basically. No, no, no. They set it up with brands. So like massive brands like Disney. I worked on the dang SDK.
You were inside Apple? Yeah, yeah, yeah. When iAds was coming out, yeah, yeah, it was, yeah. Yeah, it worked really well. So we were like, okay, that's interesting. We are starting to... make some money with app even though it wasn't like really the plan at the time so we kept it free and i think in december 2009
So we introduced the paid version of the app. So there was a free version and there was a paid upfront version. The next year, I think that in-app purchases were introduced. So then we added in-app purchases in the... Lifetime, you know, that was basically to remove the ads. Yeah. And that was to remove the ads and slowly we introduced like, uh, advanced features. If you want to export to Dropbox quickly. So this was called genius can plus.
that was a premium plan right that would have been fairly early like back in i mean i guess if you were doing not as a subscription but as a as a one-time in-app purchase i think it was as soon as uh i mean we basically apple announced it and then we announced in-app purchases
and we benefited from that. Yeah, I wish I could go back in time and do a better freemium strategy for some of my old apps. I mean, people don't even realize how good we have it these days with subscriptions and everything else because my apps, I had a... free version so my like one of my early abs was gas cubby attracts fuel economy and vehicle maintenance it was actually quite successful i sold it and did really well from it but i had gas cubby light that was a
free version that had limited features. And then when you hit the limit, you got pushed to the paid upfront app. And so, I mean, man, back then it was just such like, there were no kind of free trials and like. the multiple SKUs and ugh. Early days of the app store. It's crazy how much better things have actually gotten on the monetization front. But I mean, happy accident, honestly, because if you would have been paid up front, we wouldn't be here today. I think, yeah. What was the story?
you and your co-founder from it becoming this like side project sort of like curiosity to like hey this is this is something worth working on like when did you make enough money that you could like not have to worry about a job. We didn't want to be entrepreneurs. Like, I mean, originally, it's like, we wanted to make an app. And we're not predestined to be entrepreneurs, basically. So when we did this app in 2010, and then we graduated in the summer. So Guillaume...
My co-founder went back to France and he started working for a company in France. And I stayed in the U.S. and I went to Seattle and started working on Amazon. And then we kept working on it nights and weekends. It kind of picked up. I mean, it kept growing, you know, slowly, but it kept growing with that work. I think we did, I don't think I remember when, but we started the Android version of the app.
And after a while, then I moved back to San Francisco actually to work for a YC company. And the funny story also that they contacted me because they found the scanning app and they had scanning needs. 1,000 memories and they were doing like a scanning of old photos, family photos. And I kept working on the side, you know, on Genius Scan. So after a while, we were like, okay, we work for our day job, but we also work on that.
We really like, I mean, it means that we really like that. We should go full-time. And that went in 2014. We went full-time on it. We had, you know, enough money to make, to... make a living out of it because it was already making enough money that you didn't have to like starve yeah that's i mean we can talk about that later but basically to we didn't have to raise funds right we just do it yeah i think also too did did you find that once you had
made the jump and like once this was your main thing did you find it i mean obviously you have more time to work on it but i also feel like if it's your only source of income you're a little more like aggressive and motivated to like make it work better and like grow it and things like that if it's all you've got So I think when we started, we had like some, I mean, we could live out of it. So we were not like grinding to make a living.
I think if it was just enough to live, maybe what you described is true in our case. Yes, I mean, we were full-time on it. We had the time to maybe explore some things that we couldn't have otherwise and then grow a team.
something we didn't want at the beginning but you know for those listening and kind of maybe tuning out at this point thinking i don't have a time machine to get back to 2009 and build a scanning app i actually think today we're kind of seeing this new way with like AI, AR is coming.
Like what was unique? What's so interesting about this story is that there was a combination of multiple technologies that came along that you leveraged into a business and it grew over time. So today there's all sorts of new stuff coming out. AI with new sensors with new. And so like, there's been so many different points along the history of apps that new things have come out that create new opportunities to create new businesses. And sometimes it does take years and years.
years to grow you know indies out there listening when you know it's like three years in and you haven't made that much progress but then the fourth year it's like wow i can actually go full time like it happens and i think it can still happen today yeah and even at the time Everyone was saying the goal rush was over.
So maybe it's not the gold rush of the early App Store days, but I think subscriptions came, for instance, and they started a new dimension for monetization themselves. So you can always say it's too late, but maybe it's too late to do... I mean, the thing is, is by the time you recognize people being successful, those people, it wasn't obvious when they did it, right? Yeah, we don't go compete with Microsoft, right? Right, exactly.
People that you're looking at, folks who are struggling to start right now, and you're looking at folks that are successful and be like, oh, I missed the boat. It's like, well, you missed that boat. Right. There's always another boat. At least there has been for 1500 years. Like we've been always like inventing another boat you can catch. But the, the root story of like recognizing an unfilled technological niche, building something you guys took a, like.
you know one path which was like slow burn build it on the side eventually have enough like that there's many different versions of that you can do but it all starts with like finding something that people don't have that they want right yeah and
I mean, and you are giving us credit for that, right? Because to be honest, we started like, it was like a several MDPD, right? When we started scanning up, we had the needs because we were, you know, students in the US. We were always like, we're moving around. We didn't have much stuff. So we would scan.
documents we had to register for you know immigration stuff so we are always had documents to scan so we kind of had a need but like everyone yeah i think also you must factor in like a like the luck factor to be sometimes the right place at the right time Yeah. No, but the luck factor with us, you named the company after yourself, clearly. It's why you run equal, right? Yeah, the luck factor is that you got right the first time.
like that's the luck you know what i mean like i think if well actually you kind of didn't it was the second time it was the second time because the mona lisa scanning app never went anywhere right i like that whole idea of the catching the boat kind of thing i mean we see this in remedy cat day
We should do this, Jacob, do an analysis of apps founded in different, like different launch dates of apps. And I bet every single year we could find an indie, a big company, a mid-sized company, a bootstrap company. a funded company. It's like in 2000. 15 there's a cohort that launched and some became huge and some are indie success stories in 2016 it's like there's boats leaving the harbor every yeah we have we have now seven years of cohorts and with the exception of maybe
the first year when they were very thin cohorts of very few people, like every cohort has somebody in it still alive, still thriving, still growing, still compounding. So that's the luck aspect of it. Like it might not always be you in that cohort, right? But like, it'll be
somebody right there's a boat to catch you know yeah and also i think when you find what these ideas like these people who jump on the boat then you will find uh you know after this boat you will find a lot of you know other boats trying other boats to copy what you know to do the same
like take the same wind and, you know, like for us, now there are many scanning apps and many of them are like, I think doing well. I don't know how profitable they are, but they've been around for a while. So I think every idea then you can like... replicate it to some extent after a while, maybe the market is saturated and then you need to catch another, you know.
Yeah, it gets harder. But like, I mean, that's a good that's a good point to talk about, because when did Apple like iOS has native scanning now, right? Yeah. You not only have a ton of competitors and it's another kind of fun part of the story. You not only have like hundreds.
of scanning apps in the app store now. It's been like one of the more popular categories for people to go try and build an app. But not only that, then Apple introduced scanning native and now you have AI and like, it like seems so obvious.
Like, how do you think about competing and how have you thought about competing in this landscape where it's just like a thousand flowers are blooming, but you're one of those? I mean, we worried about it a lot early. I think when the news... scanning apps, we're launching.
Our competitors were launching new features in the early years where we were like, oh no, we are done. What are we going to do? You know? And even worse, like with, yeah, I think WWDC after like, first it was fun. And after a while you had like every, every. year you had like this uneasy feeling of what are they going to announce that might
you know, affect us in a bad way. And scanning, like when they released like scanning, so when they released the view of scanning in notes in the files app, I think we were like, okay, maybe, I mean, how good is that for us? And you know what everyone says that... I mean, Apple covers like the basic needs and when you want to go deeper, you will find a more specialized app. They will also, you know, make...
People are aware that, oh, you can do scanning with your device. So as it affected us in a bad way, like we never saw, you know, Apple release scanning and our growth stalls or we lose customers. I mean, we have like anecdotes, you know, some people telling us, oh. So I stopped choosing your app because, or why would I use your app? Because I use scanning in notes, but.
I think in practice, we are fairly confident now that our scanning is better. I'm biased, but the quality of the scanning, the speed of it is actually better. And we offer also a bunch of features. Scanning is like, you know, scanning, organizing your documents, exporting them. People are really like surprising how, I mean, important it is less to pass, you know, for people. Make it easy to export. For instance, we have features like where you...
scan a document it will auto export it to a specific folder in dropbox depending on the document name imagine there's a lot of like prosumers that use exactly yeah yeah and could be like small you know small companies they need like they want something a bit more advanced easy We want something that scans well, for instance, in low light conditions, which others don't do maybe as well. And a lot of small factors that when people do some research, they will still like go to...
People like us. So now we are more like, I mean, we are less worried about competition and we have like, you know, we have, because we have the competition from other independent companies. We have competition from the platform. So Apple and Google have... introduce scanning, but also every major cloud storage, so Google Drive, Dropbox, they all have a scanning module in the app. I mean, we're still growing, so maybe we would grow more if they didn't.
exist maybe yeah two observations is one in this category there's a lot of charlatans right as david was kind of alluding to there's a lot of people who just make the cheapest fastest whatever pump it with ads do cross promo it's actually a piece of junk So I think you all being like one of the few reputable brands, it's probably you and Adobe.
You know what I mean? Who actually are like kind of a trustworthy brand in this. That's probably a huge advantage that nobody can replicate. You can't replicate that earnestness, right? And that reality. So you're somewhat differentiated, even if.
not by features even but just by brand but then also i think and this kind of goes back to the bootstrap point that you guys are bootstrapped that you haven't taken capital i think like it depends on your expectations for return on investment too right and that's up to you if you and your co-founder are the sole owners and you guys can kind of decide like what your expectations are you can survive well in a very competitive environment. Most...
businesses in the world are in extremely competitive environments and they're still great ways to spend your time and build things. It's when you need to win a winner-takes-all market that competition becomes a problem, right? Yeah, it's like food delivery apps, you know.
like in europe i don't know how it is in the u.s but they have been like uh you know killing each other like buying each other some have a bankrupt and and it's super competitive because they you know they raised huge funds and they need to basically to take the market. And now there are like a few. In France, you have Deliveroo, Uber Eats, and that's it. It has to be a monopoly given how much money has been pumped in it, right?
Otherwise, it's not worth the return on investment. And in our case, we see that very differently. We want to be profitable, but we invested time in it. time for money at the beginning. But otherwise, we don't need, I mean, we don't have a need for ROI. And currently, you know, but me and my co-founder, we have kids. We want to spend time with them. That's, we have the freedom of doing that and to like really spend time with them. And we would.
have raised money or we would be super aggressive in our monetization. Maybe we wouldn't be able to... You might end up like one of those charlatans I mentioned, right? Exactly. It's important to know why you are in business. I mean, what are you in business for, right? And I know your motto is like, help developers make more money, but it's also like...
You know, help like... Only as much as you want to make, you know, and not a dollar more. Exactly. I mean, help us live the life we want, like in a way, right? Yeah. Really, you have to think about what's success for you.
And maybe it's not just the most profitable. And about that as well, like, I've been worried about, like, I mean, we have tried to improve, like, ASO in the App Store and we are fairly, I mean, well ranked. So if you look for scanning, you will find us in a... five results and i've looked at the you know with the one above us and i'm like why are they above us and i have tried to understand all the reasons why they could be
on top of us. And, and I mean, there is no like reason, I think due to our, the way we named the app or we have like a very good number of, uh, ratings per downloads, everything up figures, you know, recommend you do well. And, and there is one thing is like the download velocity. I think that's important. Like the more downloads you have, the more you raise in the rankings in the search results, but you know, it's kind of the.
How did you say? In French, we say snake eating its own tail, but... Chicken and egg problem. Chicken and eggs, yeah. The chicken and eggs problem. And because if we're not in the top results, then... And I looked at the top ones, but then...
If you look at them, you see that most of them, they purchase App Store ads. So in the end, they are before us in the rankings. They are purchasing ads, but what's their profitability? When you see their revenue numbers in app figures, that doesn't deduct how much they pay for ads. Yeah, they're probably running incredibly thin margins, maybe even negative margins because they're leveraged. They might be borrowing money.
Maybe, I don't know. Maybe not, but I'm sure they are not as profitable as they look on the app figures revenue numbers. Again, you have to look at it. You have to know exactly where you are and if you are maybe not at the top one, maybe you are doing well enough.
You have more equity in your app than somebody else, right? That may be above you in the rankings and the fact that, you know, it actually is profitable or more profitable and that, that increases the like value. And then there's, I think this is, this is, it gets a bit philosophical, but you know.
We tend to talk about equity and an asset in terms of the dollars it would get at market. But then you were alluding to there's more than just the dollars that we get at market as to the value it is to you and your co-founder and your team. It's like it's meaningful work. It's something to do. It's like a way.
to live it's it's all of these things and even the like the independence we have like um we really because we have been approached a few times like by community interested in you know the first you start talking with them but after a few times like you say just no i mean We like what we are doing if we were...
acquired, we would work two years for you. And then what would we do? This app is super interesting to work on it. We have customers who love the app. When we add a new feature, we can see the effect. We have customers thanking us for it. It's super rewarding.
You're starting to make it sound like you don't like money and that the app is just like this stagnant annuity that sits off in the other. I said it's growing, David. It's not stagnant. No, but that's what I was going to bring up is that part of the reason you actually approached me about coming on.
the podcast and is that over the last few years, you've actually been doing a ton of experiments and actually trying to grow the app and have been very successful, grown MRR almost three X in the last couple of years. So I did want to like start digging into. to like now you're a subscription app, the story a lot of people can't relate to all the early days of the app store and stuff. But I think what a lot of people will be able to relate to is
3xing revenue by experimenting with stuff. So I wanted to dig into that. So what are the things that you've done in the last couple of years that really moved the needle on that? It's interesting because we, yeah, we, I mean, we started using subscriptions, I think when they were introduced in 2017. And at the time we didn't want, you know, to force subscription on our users because they, um, I feel like utilities, it was one of these things where it's like, uh, subscription gonna fly.
You know, people are going to pay for this. And people didn't receive subscribers. I mean, yeah, you could get a lot of backlash from... your customers right and so what what we did is basically we added a subscription for a new service called genius cloud so to backup and and your documents in the cloud and and actually we kept the one-time purchase for the
premium features. And so basically the customer were paying for this backup PUNSIC in the cloud, but they were buying storage and they were understanding that you buy storage, there is a recurring fee. You know, it was more like a... And that wasn't, I mean, we didn't get any backlash. And I think in 2020, what we did is that we switched. We started adding premium features to that subscription.
We renamed it from like Genius Cloud to Genius Scan Ultra. And we had two tiers of subscription. We also had the Genius Scan Plus tier. So that was the former legacy one-time purchase became a subscription. And what we did, we grandfathered all our existing users. So the one who have purchased it in 2010, they for 99 cents. They still have it like the premium, most of the premium. Trust me, taking something away from somebody, even if it's 99 cents.
almost never worth it. Yeah, exactly. And they can go to the premium, more premium plan if they want to. Yeah, give them paths to upgrade. You don't have to give them more stuff. I think you give them, you know, you can hold back features and stuff like that. But like, I think I've seen folks like...
Sometimes there are reasons to go back and raise prices, but like typically it's just the backlash is just not worth it. That can cost you your whole business. Especially if you're in a, I think it's still like a growing market, expanding market where, you know, you have.
more users coming, you don't have like a fixed user base. You don't have to nurture your existing user base, right? And so at that time, 2020, we had like two subscription tiers. We had GSCAN Plus, which was I think 99 cents a month. and just got Ultra, which was $3 a month. Equivalent pricing for yearly. After that, we didn't make any experiments at the time. We just thought two tiers went for all.
lower-end purchasers and more premium purchasers. And after last year, we started experimenting. And what we did is that we removed the plus tier. Everyone keeps using it, right? And we kept the ultra tier. And that's what we noticed is that Daemon's Curve is not elastic at all. Like people who were like, we had a hundred purchase per day split between plus and ultra.
We still had 100 purchase per day, but it was a... ultra you're very far off of like where the main of elasticity right that doesn't surprise me was it still 99 cents when you no no no so now i mean well i mean yeah the low tier was 99 cents yeah i bet that was because i would have guessed that that's probably already on its own way underpriced so you were probably
preventing a bunch of users who would have paid more for that and happily paid for the ultra but they were just like this is good enough and so by it make yeah it doesn't surprise me but these are things you don't know that until you try it you know that's gonna make a difference What we did is, last year, we had still like the ultra subscription with a monthly and yearly subscription. And both were exposed at the same level. And basically, we buried the monthly subscription.
So you could still access it, but it was, you would have to go a bit further in the payroll. Same thing. We had most people switched to the yearly, I mean, everyone switched to the yearly subscription. Ultra subscription now is was, I think was. it was 20-ish 25 maybe in 2020 and now it's four
T I mean like four dollars a month three four dollars a month, right? Yeah, which I would bet I don't know what your competitors are priced at but I would bet that you guys are still probably comparatively low I mean, it depends because I think most, lots of competitors do like stuff with weekly subscriptions, you know? Yeah, sure. Sure.
yeah i was gonna say that even that 99 cent price point that you guys were able to run for a while i think that's doable for you because you weren't dependent on paid acquisition you kind of had your own destiny and by doing that you preserve
a tremendous amount of brand equity you probably were you know that that's what endeared you with the customers and so even though like you maybe left three dollars per month on the table on that you have to imagine like what you may you probably also gained which is like a still a position
position against Adobe, you know, like $100 billion company. Yeah. And also for us, it was natural because we switched from, I think it was $9.99 one-time purchase at the time. We switched that to $9.99 a year. It's already, like for us, if some people stick like a few years, it's already a great upgrade, right? And so that's where it came from. And I think it's fine. I mean, you have to, easy to have regrets, but we can keep experimenting on that. Looking at the pricing, increasing it.
part of the next experiments we want to run with, with revenue gets. Yeah. I mean, if you're building new things and you're providing more value, like keep messing around with it until you, you know, it'll always probably be worth it. I mean, we're still looking at our pricing like every year, every other year, especially.
on like like our sold side like there's it's more easy to experiment there i wanted to like kind of jump back but like it's related all this stuff but when did you all like bring because you mentioned hiring people like that's kind of a big jump to go from you and your co-founder to like now you're an employer right when when and why did you make that decision so in 2014 i moved back to france and we started working with guillaume and i think in in 2015 we started hiring first employee and
What prompted that, I think, was that we had too much on our plate. We were like... doing so many things and we needed a new another iOS developer to help and we recruited him and that's still how we do things now is like when we feel like we feel a bit of pain you know we start hiring it doesn't mean that we overwork but it's just like
when during your day you are i'm still developing and i i don't you know i like for instance last year i was doing like a product and and support and developments administrative work and i can't do all that if i want to still you know do some development then i have to upload product and
support, for instance, to other people. And that's how, for instance, we hired like a support person three years ago, a product manager like this year, for instance. It's interesting. There's an implicit choice you made there that maybe you didn't even think about, but you could have not hired somebody and just done less stuff, you know?
But you did choose, you did choose to, instead of taking the path of like dialing back and just being happy with what you had, you said like, no, okay, let's make an investment and like, let's take some risk. And you say an investment, but we, yeah, it's not, again, it's a bit different, I think from venture funded.
companies where you, you know, you make a business plan, you say, if I raise this much money, I will hire this many people in, you know, sales and developers and that the plan never goes as planned.
Yeah, I just stopped making plans. I made two of those and they were fantasy. So I was just like, we're just not going to do that. We do what you do. I do what you do. Just be like, what hurts the most? And then we hire there. Still, when you talk to other people, I mean, when you raise money, you need this plan.
because they want to know how it's going to be used, right? And so that was also, for us, it's not an investment. I mean, that could be the other path. We could say, okay, we are going to invest in more people to... to grow. I mean, because we think that if we hire, for instance, this iOS developer will do this feature and then we'll get more growth. And it's not really the reasoning. It's more like we have so many things to do that we want to do.
it's not necessarily like they are growth driven it's like It's just, I have too much on my plate. I need someone. I'm slow walking you, Bruno, into realizing you're a cold-hearted capitalist. I don't know if you realize what's happening, but we don't have to call it an investment. We can call it whatever you want. I mean, there's a reality there that like...
I think this is, I mean, Miguel and I went through a very similar transition. Like we went a different path. Once you raise money, it was like hire people, whatever. But I think it wasn't as clear to me. And hopefully you've seen this too. It's like.
Good people, you hire good people, they solve problems, right? And you can just do more things. And it's, there's like two big phase shifts in somebody building a thing. There's like, I'm building a thing that's a project. Then there's the first jump, which is like, okay, I'm building a thing. It's now my thing.
it's now my main thing and then that that second transition which we're talking about now which is like okay this is now a concern for other people that i'm going to bring into this thing and like now it's a business that's a company in a business i think beyond that it's actually kind of more of the same right it's like okay like there might be no bigger transition than those two
and i don't know i think there's a lot of really successful indies that are kind of in that between those first two decision points where you know david you've always kind of been maybe in between those two where you've like
worked with the contract, you kind of like strung it together. And arguably maybe if like you had gotten some commitment and like, you know, there would have been a benefits to that. Right. But it's, it's scary, right? It's a risk. Yeah. And well, it was always a conscious choice on my part too, though. I mean, I talked to these. in like 2008, 2009. And I made that conscious choice was like, I didn't want to be on that.
treadmill and i didn't want the complexity of managing people like to me i chose the passion side of it was like it was really fun building apps and i knew it was not going to be fun managing employees making payroll all those kinds of things. And it was a very conscious choice of mine. And, you know, looking back, I could have built a bigger business and in some ways maybe have been less stressed.
yeah it depends it depends on who you hire yeah i mean it could have like flamed out or it could have like gone even better because i mean and you know what i figured out over time was like my model with contractors and everything else came with its own like massive headache
and problems and it was there were many times along the journey i was like i should have just hired somebody because this whole contractor like working part-time you know not working for months and it had its own mess but but yeah i mean there's choices all along the way i remember jacob We sat on the patio of the Airbnb at the 2019 Revenue Cat offsite with five employees or however many. We were like seven people total at that time. And I remember having a conversation with you.
like Revenue Cat could be this just amazing little cash generating business and the seven of us travel the world and surf. And I remember that being like a decision point for you. It's like. You'd only raise like one and a half million. There weren't like massive expectations. Hopefully Jason doesn't listen to all these podcasts because I was always fully intended on returning him his capital in multiples. But there's like micro decisions all along. And I'll tell you, I mean, not to.
not to make this about me but like i think those decision points kind of never stop like as you're scaling a business bruno you're going through those now it's like every year it's like okay do we double down or do we kind of just be happy with what we got do we take more risk you know it depends i feel like it depends on also
where you are in life. I'm with young kids. I don't maybe want to spend too much time working. When I spend nights and weekends doing work, I was 25. I had the time to do that. So it's different. I think that, for instance, we are 10 employees now and that's still, you know, we could be 20, but what you have to be taking?
Also in accounts, the nature of what you do will change. And as David said, I like doing some development, but we are 10 people. I can still do some development. If we are 20, it will be less and less development. I will be doing more like synchronizing people, product management.
yeah people problems i mean it's just and it depends on who you hire in the company culture and stuff like that but yeah i mean we are very lucky that we are very little i mean we try to hire like a very independent like people and so we
We have very little management to do. We have a low turnover. So yeah, it really depends on who you hire. And you have to be mindful of that, I guess, when you hire. Yeah, but even that itself, that's hard work. I think for a lot of technical people who are makers, ask me how I know. But getting a team right, it's technical. It's hard. It's just hours. And then it's very emotionally taxing, too, because inevitably...
You'll make mistakes along the way. You'll have to like give people tough news. You'll have to give, you know, like it just depends on what energizes you and what, you know, and that's, that's a decision that, you know, honestly, like. I'll say like when we made that first choice to go raise money and kind of do this versus.
versus stay in that first zone. Unless you've done it before, I don't think it really, you don't really understand what that's like. You probably have a taste of it now, but I think also it's nice that you have control over your destiny there and you can kind of decide at what pace. i want to like bring this on and like like i kind of i'm forced to and in some degrees right like i kind of have to sometimes life
If you have no choice, it's a little bit easier because you don't have to worry about it. But, yeah, you can take it every day. You can take it day by day. You know, when your kids are older or maybe you have a little bit more time, like maybe it changes. Like your mindset changes around it, right? Maybe there won't be any... more documents to scan. There you go. There you go. That's a good point. That's a good point. Maybe you should call those M&A people up just in case.
Well, we've been talking about like all the growth and the journey, but every journey has a bunch of fails. And when we were prepping for the podcast, you wrote down some really great fails. So I want to make sure we got to these. So tell me about some of the like massive screw ups. made along the way and and how you recovered from them david's a little math masters groups a little editorializing there well i mean he shared them with me there's some big ones
They are mainly related to conversion, like to the paywall conversion. So it's very relevant to revenue get, I guess. Basically, we were always measuring like paywall, like how many times our paywall is displayed from...
what feature in the app, but in the app, when you, you are trying to use some premium features, that's where we're going to show you the, the paywall. And it could be, you try to export to Dropbox, that's paywall, or you can, you would try to use a text recognition OCR that's also behind the paywall. And so. A few years ago, we did an update where we...
Redid the UX of a screen where you see your scanned document. That was a really nice screen. I mean, much better, much nicer. And after a while, I'm looking at analytics and I'm... seeing that our paywall is actually displayed much less than it used to be. So I'm trying to investigate and I don't know it's linked to this refactoring of the screen.
So I figured out that it was linked to this caused by this change of the screen. And the reason why was that we had one of the reasons people were opening the paywall for was because they tried to access the... OCR of the document and on the former screen, we had a button on the scan document that... you would tap and it would show the OCR text. And after this refactoring, we had moved this button in the drawer and it was not directly visible. And the effect on the paywall displays was like...
maybe like 10, 20%. I don't know the exact number. Which is a direct 10, 20% to your sales, right? It was actually, I think, also a high intent purchase. So it was maybe even higher, more than the relative presentation. So maybe it was like, you know, 10% less displays and 20%. And that's something I noticed like months after.
So for months, your revenue had gone down, but you couldn't quite, like you thought maybe like the market was shifting. Exactly. That's where it's hard. You have so many factors. You have seasonality. You know, it's Christmas. People are buying more phones. So you get a big job.
in maybe in purchases, but then in March, I think it happened in March, like maybe, you know, the Christmas time is over and people stop purchasing. Maybe it was that. It could be, yeah, market shifting. Maybe it could be ISO that has changed. a small team, we don't have a data person looking at this data every day, which I guess if we had maybe- Do you now? No. No, but we are looking at the metrics more regularly and we try to-
I mean, you are the data person, right? I think it's just about making it easy for you to look at that stuff every day. Yeah, exactly. That's so crazy. One of the primary upsell features you accidentally broke, essentially. Did you put it back in that same place and then everything came back? We clearly saw the result. Yeah, it was. And there is another instance of that fairly recent. We had...
So in the free version of GenuScan, we have an ad banner. It's not a third-party ad banner because we removed that a while ago, but it's like an ad banner, but it promotes the premium version. What happens is that, so this ad banner... a banner has some text like i think it was geniuscan ultra and some text and if you tap on it you show the payroll and it's directly on the main screen of geniuscan so it's fairly visible it's one of the
leading entries to the baywall. And this banner is served by a server, so we can change the text and... remotely, and what happened is that the server went down. One of the reasons that we tracked taps on the banner and the integer. uh on the database overflow it was not a big int it was just an int so i have a friend of mine whose like favorite phrase is like when we're setting up apps like stuff he's always he's like always use big end you got to be optimistic you know and so so
The app was nicely designed because we had in the app, hard coded, we had a fallback ad. So if the remote ad banner wasn't displayed, we would show the fallback ad. And what happened is actually I noticed in the paywall. metrics that our purchase had increased for a while. I guess I should have told the story the other way, but I noticed our purchases had increased. I started investigating why. And that's when I linked that back to the ad banner.
that wasn't displayed from the remote server anymore and the fallback banner that was displayed most of the time. So it was like a... Accidental A-B test. Accidental A-B test, yeah. So the fallback banner was converting twice as much as existing banner. We restored the, I mean, we fixed the remote server and we served two banners, one with...
old text and one with the same text as the fallback banner. And this confirmed that the text of the fallback banner was, I mean, the text and the icon was slightly different. But I mean, you saw the images in the document. I don't understand how. With such small changes, Ken, I mean... The problem is that you're not a thousand people, right? You're one person, right? And you just have to test these things. Otherwise, it's really difficult to reason about.
Right. But even just, yeah, the effect of changing the text test is like, I guess it blows my mind that just changing a text, changing an icon has such an effect on conversion. I really don't, I mean, it's... Yeah, I've long learned that.
even if you're a person with really good product sense or you think you have really good product sense there's a limit there's just a limit you just can't know like what there's some obvious rules that are almost always followed but like fewer steps it's almost always better showing the paywall more is almost always better but besides that
Like, I don't think there's a way to deterministically understand like what's going on. And it's just, it's much faster to just do something. It's, it's interesting that what you did on accident there is this kind of concept I try to run in management and just life is like injecting variants. Like just even if you're unintentional a little bit, like change stuff.
And you'll learn things. Well, it's like, it makes me think of Netflix. I think they had the, I don't know how it was called. They had the Crazy Monkeys. It was like a series that would kill around. Oh, Chaos Monkey. Chaos Monkey, right?
Yeah, they would break random services. To make sure that they have these variants in their backend that make sure that if it actually happens for... a bad reason someday then they they're ready for it right yeah yeah yeah i i think it's it's super important and like i think sometimes it can be unsettling in my leadership style david can probably attest to this but like i will just be like yeah i don't know what we're gonna do but we're just gonna do something different
gonna break it and see what how how we reassemble it and not try to analytically solve every little thing we do and justify every little thing we do because like probably we'll learn more just by trying it and then we will by it we'll certainly learn more by trying something semi-thought through than not doing anything and just thinking about it for a very long time right And also, you could be completely data-driven, but it's boring, you know? Where's the fun in that?
I want to use my intuition. I mean, I'm ready to, you can prove me I'm wrong after I use it, but at least let me use it, right? We are humans building companies. Otherwise, you just replace the company by AI. It's just like... Yeah, the human element. Maybe that'll...
go away. Once the computers are so good, they can replicate the human element. But the question, again, the question, what are you doing a company for? You know, are you because you're having fun or because you want to make money? And I think part of us is we want, I mean, it's like you gather a group of people to have.
fun building something you know so yeah but it's like if you're just executing sort of mechanically a playbook on strategy there's nothing differentiated there you're not going to beat the market if it's some you know just being like we're going to a b test and only do that and not use intuition like you don't have an advantage you have nothing unique about that because it's just like unless you maybe like maybe duolingo is a good example they just were really really good at
testing better than anybody in the world yeah but even that they had to have the creativity you know to create like a yeah and talking to the product manager we had him on the on the podcast a product manager at duolingo one of the things he said was that that the the founders i think end up reviewing a lot
of the like winning and will sometimes decide to not pick a winning a b test yeah i mean there was a period i think at facebook where they were just only following a b test stuff and like you kind of saw the product get a little wonky and then i think they they pulled this was a big
Big meme in the 2010s, right? My favorite quote on this was Thomas Petit, who of course will make it crass. But if you A-B test enough, you're going to end up with a porn app or a gambling app. And I mean, like if you A-B test enough, test without intuition, without thinking about differentiation, without thinking about like being customer centric, which I want to talk more about, like how you think about being customer centric, but like if you AB test without a
framework above and like jacob like you were talking about like you tear things down and rebuild and everything like that but we have such a clear mission here revenue cat to help developers make more money that you can apply that framework against these decisions we're making to, like, make progress in the direction of serving the goal. It's not like by blowing up the thing, we don't know where we're trying to get eventually still, right? I mean, for instance, if you're an AP test, you...
It's hard to A-B test on the very long time. I think like Shopify does that. They keep like experiments running for like years, but most people, you know, you do an A-B test for a month and then you say, okay, that's better. But then, as you said, like you're going to end up with a... interesting point. For a while, in the free version of Junuscan, we monetized it with advertisement.
And we noticed that the best performing advertisements, there were like for, you know, casino games or whatever is legal to be displayed, but the ugliest, you know, worst quality advertisement are the one performing better, at least at the time. We are like, I mean, we don't want advertisement in the app. It was ruining the quality. It was like ugly. We don't like, you know, making people buy shit they don't need. It's just like...
So we decided to remove it, but if we had A-B tested, like, I mean, what's better? Like clearly it was better to keep the advertisement. But long-term, I'm not sure. The people who still use the free app have a very good experience. They are the ones recommending to their family. Maybe they recommend their kids use it because there is no advertisement and it's safe to use or whatever. That's a value you can't measure, but you... you can make a choice as a
as a leader of the company to go that direction. This might blow people's minds. We've never run an AB test. I mean, we've run very, very small like marketing page AB tests here, but like we've I've never really run like simultaneous tests on Reviticat, the product, because like.
it's it's harder with what we do but then also kind of for that reason i just look at the data like kind of what you were saying there was a point here i wanted to like express to our listeners which is like this idea of like you don't need a data person you don't need like a whole data analyst shop just Have like somewhere where you can see your five or 10 most important things and look at them every single day. I get an email.
the first thing i do every morning my alarm goes off i grab my phone i go and i look at my i look at my like founder update email and it tells me all the Kind of like the paywall views like that, which should be probably something you're looking at every single day. Like what is the total number of paywall impressions?
Even that, you know, you have like, you know, it's Christmas, your paywall view will dry up. Like for us, we are in Europe and it's like it's Monday, September 1st. I was like, where are the paywall views done? Okay, it's Memorial Day or whatever.
And so you have still to take back an account and like... yeah i feel like you can you can do and i do you know look at the metrics very often but you also have to i think look once a month i'd like more you know yeah you need you need to look at it multiple scales right you need to look at it at the daily scale the monthly scale
You want to take the pulse and you also want, you know, to have the higher level, higher overview of the metrics. This conversation has brought up like 20 revenue cap features we need to start working on, Jacob. Better A-B testing tools because I never did a pay.
while a pricing test until revenue cat released experiments and I was able to do it easily. So now we need AB testing tooling to make this easier. We need impressions. We need to be tracking paywall impressions. Like we have it with our paywalls, but like.
building that in natively and making it in the charts and stuff like that. What you were just saying, what I love about your charts, because you're such a data nerd, is that you have rolling averages over different timeframes. That needs to be in our dashboard too. Yeah, yeah. you see that so i always chart the we're just getting into charts my chart theories here but like i always chart the like daily value
And then the 30-day rolling average and the 90-day rolling average. And basically, if I want to know if a metric is healthy and increasing, if the 30-day is above the 90-day, we're good. If the 30-day is below the 90-day, we're trending in the wrong direction. But then also the individual days, I think, are useful.
what you said like oh did something happen yesterday right was there a big pop somewhere so yeah charts charts 3.0 there you go why are you building this great stuff for yourself and not delivering it to your customers jacob i want that i got i got all kinds of stuff to do
I got, what did you say? People alignment to do, Bruno? Or like something like that? And speaking of customer centric, there's something we were talking about before we hit record. I wish we had to hit record when we were just chatting. And there's so many good conversations happen before we hit record on the podcast.
So we can try and recreate the magic, but we were talking about AI chatbots and like pretending to do customer service with AI. And you brought up like how un-customer centric that is. Keep pulling on that thread of just how... customer-centric you think in building Genius Scan. And one of the main things, we don't have values on our website, but one thing is that we try to build the app we want to use, right? And when part of that is that...
When you have a problem, you contact support and you get the answer you need. And, you know, it could be, I mean, you can go on the knowledge base and find the answer, but you can also. want to talk to someone and they give you an appropriate response. I mean, we are so used on websites and apps. There's a chatbot that's supposed to help you. And then what you just keep typing is like...
Talk to a human. Talk to a human. I want to talk to someone. I want to talk to someone and they will never let you until you go deep in their decision tree and bail out because they don't know how to answer. And I feel like it's such a bad experience. If you have a problem in the app, you're maybe in a situation of distress, you need to talk to a person. I think it's a need as a human in that case, and we want to offer that.
We really do that. I mean, we don't do like phone support because it's not scalable as an app, but we do support for everyone. We have been doing that for like past 15 years. We just do email support for a very long time. It's me and my co-founder. We were replying to support ourselves. And I think that's super helpful.
Because that's, you get such a good pulse of the problems and you even get like in your, you know, we, for a very long time, we didn't have any, and still now, we don't have a complete backlog of, you know, feature requests. We just, we let that. you know, sync. Every time we hear about a feature you eat once, twice, 10 times, you know, you know, you know in yourself that that's a need, right? That's been super helpful. And we are still like...
Today, we are still like reviewing support as founders of the company. We still do like every day I go and I help for like more technical issues or more specific problems. Well, one, doing tickets is painful, kind of. You know, you got to write these responses. It's kind of a pain. So I think, like, in some ways, it creates this interesting mirror empathy situation where, like, the customer's in pain reaching out to you. You're doing tickets, which kind of sucks. So that's pain as well.
you're both in pain especially if it's a product problem that you created now now you like physically feel their pain i mean i think that motivates you to like do something about it i'm actually bad about that i mean when i could i did all of the tickets right and then it became you know it becomes too big and then you get it off and systems and whatever but just having that moment to like really empathize like
Take that break, that beat. Because you can look at it in aggregates, right? You can know, oh, 47% of users had this problem. That doesn't hit as well as like seeing a single individual person struggling with that problem. Yeah, that's the only way you have to connect with people.
do like user research in person. You bring people and you can do that, I guess. Do you talk to users? Do you call them ever? No. I mean, sometimes people ask us to call them, but it's, I mean, most of our users are USBs. We are based in... So it's, you know, time difference makes it complicated. It happens that we did, but mostly it's email.
And I think it would help with empathy to have people on the phone. I was just listening to a podcast with David Lieb on the YC podcast. He talked about doing customer interviews. And one day he just was like, exported the top 100 most active users. sent all 100 of them an email and talked to them like
wanted like 15 minutes with all of them. And I was just like, ah, like that would be a fantastic, I think every app developer could do that. It's just try that, like grab your a hundred most active users and talk to all, just make a, make a list of just talk to all of them, not as a support case, but just like. It's terrifying, right? They might not talk to you, but I guarantee you learned something super interesting on that call. Yeah, and it gets back to so many...
things we've touched on in the last hour is like that focus on customers just helps you make better decisions. And it's ultimately differentiating, you know, those scammy. Scanner apps that aren't talking to users that are only running a B tests that are thin on margins. Like they're not differentiated in part because they don't care. They don't talk to their users. They don't build what they want. Yeah. I think they don't see, they don't see their users are.
as a people, maybe, you know, as you see, it's a source of money. And there are things like, I mean... dark patterns that these students would do, like, for instance, I don't know if it's still considered as a dark pattern, but, you know, showing... We don't have an onboarding, for instance. We don't show the payroll onboarding. And if you talk, you know, to... paywall specialists. They will tell you that's the biggest mistake. Bruno, what if I told you I could triple your revenue in 2025?
You know, I think there is probably a right way of doing it. And I'm not saying you shouldn't do that. But when you get the paywall on onboarding and where, you know, there is a little cross at the top right that fades in slowly so that you think that the only option is to pay. For you all, so many utility apps do that.
where they're not going to let you go any further or they make it very hard to get the freemium experience. Everything I hear about your product and your brand and the way you run the company, I think that's actually your differentiated value. And also, I think it's a benefit in the long term because customers... of these apps, I'm pretty sure they churn fairly high because they don't have a good experience. Whereas our users, we have like three users.
And some of them convert in the long term. And they are also like a benefit because they recommend like the app to their, we know that for a fact that they do that to friends, family. And that's, I think that the best, like the best recommendation you can have is like from your.
fellow, you know, if someone tells you, oh, this app is super nice, they show it to you in a bar or whatever, and it's like, okay, I'm going to download it. I mean, one of the biggest indications of product market fit or successful product is just how, what percentage of your growth is word of mouth. That's like a very hard to fake.
One trick for you and our listeners, just ask customers. Maybe it's hard without an onboarding, but you could put for 5% of users, pop them a survey. And it's like, how did you hear about us? Three big buttons and make it really easy to cancel. It'll be a little bit of a sacrifice of customers. experience but like you'll get enough data to like notionally
I didn't think that would be all that helpful. We put it in RemedyCat and I look at that every day. I look at what everybody answered every day because we also have Freeform, which is really fascinating. We learn about ways people are... That's how I learned that ChatGPT was...
people to use revenue cat when they asked how to in-app purchases people like all of a sudden i saw claude chat gpt like all the llms i was like oh i wouldn't even thought to ask about that it's really fascinating so open-ended surveys on that can be directional right you're just learning directionally
Yeah, for us, open-ended surveys, they end up with, my email doesn't work. Sure. You get that too. It's interesting. It's like, we have like a very, I mean, we have people, you know, in small businesses, but we have really like... Everyone, like from students, stay at home. It's like for such a wide variety of customers. It's so nice. I mean, it's to have that.
I think it's a great place to wrap up. You've built something truly great with this business, like something you can be proud of, and also something that has a ton of opportunity to continue growing. And like Jacob was saying, if you were very aggressive with your paywall, you probably could triple.
revenue in 2025, but that may not be the right move, but you might find something that works with your brand the way you want that freemium experience to happen with the way you want your product to feel to your customers. still double revenue. The crazy little like accidental AB test was honestly so inspiring for me because there are just so many little ways in a product that's working, in a product that has some level of product market fit.
There are probably thousands of different ways to continue growing that product, even from just changing the text in the default ad. You just got to do stuff. Yeah. Yeah, it's inspiring, but it's still scary, I find. Because it can go up or it can go down. And you might add a feature that kind of hides a bit another one. And yeah, but that's what makes it interesting, right? It's like there's some risk in it.
Yeah, it makes the game fun, right? Exactly. Well, anything you wanted to share as we're wrapping up, we're going to share a link to your Twitter and Blue Sky profiles. I guess everybody should just go download Genius Scan, huh? Yeah, just give it a try and let us know if you... like it or dislike it, we would love to. Honestly, we like feedback from customers. Well, it's been so much fun chatting with you today. Thanks for joining us. Thanks for inviting me. It was really fun and nice.
Talking with you, they take it. Finally. I'll say we'll talk again in seven years. Thanks so much for listening. If you have a minute. please leave a review in your favorite podcast player. You can also stop by chat.subclub.com to join our private community.