Why Would Anyone Want to Appease Hitler? - podcast episode cover

Why Would Anyone Want to Appease Hitler?

Sep 30, 202547 min
--:--
--:--
Download Metacast podcast app
Listen to this episode in Metacast mobile app
Don't just listen to podcasts. Learn from them with transcripts, summaries, and chapters for every episode. Skim, search, and bookmark insights. Learn more

Episode description

It seems ridiculously irresponsible with the benefit of hindsight, but the concept of giving Hitler everything he wanted was the policy among the UK and France as a way to keep the world from sliding into a second world war. Turns out it didn’t work.

See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Transcript

Speaker 1

Welcome to Stuff you should know, a production of iHeartRadio.

Speaker 2

Hey, and welcome to the podcast. I'm Josh and there's Chuck and we're just goose stepping to Jerry's orders like usual here on stuff you should do. Oh no, no, no, thank you. I'm glad you cleared that up for the new listeners who are like, oh, these guys are Nazis. They hadn't realized.

Speaker 1

No, this is I really enjoyed studying this one because I, as you know, am not the biggest student of war, so I never like sat around and watched the History Channel, and this one is very much a History Channel type of episode. So I feel like I have a much better understanding of the lead up to World War Two. And also it's amazing how much this reflects modern times and what's going on with Russia and Ukraine for real, for real, I kept going like, oh, oh, oh.

Speaker 2

Yeah, I mean it's there's a very clear line you can draw between what the Allies did to a peace Hitler and what a lot of people are concerned that the West is doing to appease Putin right now. And you can also see, though, I think there's another lesson to be learned too, where once you kind of understand what the Allies did pre World War Two, why they were trying to appease Hitler, which in retrospect from our position here in history, seems like the dumbest, most cowardly

thing you could have done. Yeah, if you understand what their actual reasoning was for that, and also that they didn't have the benefit of hinde in sight, yeah, then you can kind of understand a little more like what a weird position we're in right now, you know, or why people would even consider doing that to putin.

Speaker 1

Now, Yeah for sure. Yeah, so I guess broadly we should just say that appeasement was an official policy leading up to World War or you know, they didn't know there was going to be a World War Two. But looking back once again, leading up to World War Two that the Western Allies took where in a nutshell they were basically like, you know what, let's sort of let Germany, and we need to point out we're going to over and over that they did not know Hitler was the madman. We know him now, but.

Speaker 2

No, they mistook him terribly.

Speaker 1

Yeah, they were like, let's let Germany. I think Hitler just wants to kind of get Germany back on footing after World War One and after the Treaty of Versailles kind of wrecked Germany, and we need a strong Germany in Europe, and like, let's give him what he wants and he says he'll stop there, and we believe him.

Speaker 2

Yeah, And like you said, they took Hitler to be just like any other statesman leading a European power, which was that he was a patrician colonizer who at the end of the day answered to the aristocracy of his country. Yeah, and that really he was more a threat to other people, lesser people throughout the world whose lands he wanted to turn into colonies. And we just needed to bring him into the normal European way of doing things and Germany will be back on its feet again. What was the

kind of the darker explanation of appeasement. Another explanation was they had just been through World War One, yeah, a dozen years before when all this really kind of started, and no one was in the mood for a second

World war. So appeasement was the official policy by the UK and France and then some of their supporters over time that said, if we give you the stuff, you're asking for now, we're hoping that eventually you're going to reach your limit, you're going to get what you wanted, and you're just going to be calm and everything's going to be cool. From that point on, we won't have to get in your way militarily, thus will avoid war. So let's try this instead. So ultimately it was a

way to prevent World War Two. That was the entire point of appeasement really from the outset.

Speaker 1

Well, yeah, because I mean, at the time, like you said, after World War One, none of these countries what would end up being the Western Allies were in a great position. They were still trying to build up armaments, some slower than others. A Germany wasn't in a great position. So it's kind of interesting. At the end, we're going to go over a couple of like alternate histories of different tacks that could have played out, or different plans that they could have taken, and who knows how it would

have worked out. But I guess we should start with the Treaty of Versailles, right, Yeah, for sure. So this was after World War One and the Treaty of Versailles came along and was signed, and it really it really pounded Germany, and some historians even say like it went

too far as far as being punitive. Germany had to reduce their army from one point nine million troops to one hundred thousand, They had to get rid of most of their navy, and they had to hand back territories that it had taken over the last hundred years and then pay hundreds of billion dollars in reparations.

Speaker 2

Yeah. So not only was it like financially strapping them, remember this is the time when German hyper reinflation happened during the Weimar Republic, which is allion World War one and two. This is why. And then also it was like demoralizing. It was meant to basically smack Germany down and be like you're lesser. Now we're punishing you. And so I saw a quote I forgot to send it to you. I don't remember who said it, but essentially they said, this is not a treaty, this is an

armistice for twenty years. And it was somebody who looked at this in nineteen nineteen and twenty years later World War two broke out. Because it was so punidle, there was no way that the German people were not going to eventually rise up in retaliation for this, and we

were going to have a second World War. So a lot of people point to that treaty as being the thing that didn't necessarily directly lead to World War two, but it laid all the groundwork to create a populace that was in a vengeful mood, that would be willing to support somebody with such nationalistic fervor as Hitler.

Speaker 1

Yeah, and that's what Hitler was cooking up from the beginning. He was basically like, Hey, we want to get Germany back together. We need to get all of our rightful lands basically where any Germanic peoples are and where anybody is speaking German. And also, as we'll see, help out any German minorities to our east, you know, which is Russia and the Soviet Union at the time, because they're

going to come into play. And he whipped up this nationalistic fervor that everyone in Germany got behind, and that's you know what eventually would of course lead to World War Two. But I guess we should take it sort of chronologically, because there were a series of appeasements starting in nineteen thirty five, kind of one after the other until finally, you know, they could take no more.

Speaker 2

Yeah, and just bear this in mind. Well, you're hearing all of these like high points of how we moved toward World War two thanks to Germany. Hitler followed this awareness, or this belief by the UK in France that what Germany really wanted to do was climb back out of from under the Treaty of Versacience, just get back to where they were before. So Hiller followed that to a t. All of his demands, all of the aggressions that he

made were based on the Treaty of Versailles. And yet in retrospect now we realize now these were he was always going to try to go way further than that. He was just playing upon the suppositions of the Allies at the time.

Speaker 1

Oh god, I mean, after studying all the stuff, he played them for such suckers he did.

Speaker 2

And what makes it a little worse though, too, is he wrote all this stuff out in nineteen twenty five, and top it's all laid out that push to the east you're talking about where he wants to make more room for German nationals that are outside of Germany, the lebens Schrom, which basically says we're going to Russia eventually, Like they knew this for ten years before he really became a huge problem, and everybody just ignored it.

Speaker 1

Yeah, oh yeah, he's like I wrote a book about it, and I guess you guys don't read German because I basically said what I was going to do, right, all right. So nineteen thirty five was the first sort of wave of appeasement, and this was the Anglo German Naval Agreement, basically where Britain said, you know what, we know that you're breaking the Treaty of Versailles because we know you're building up your navy even though you were supposed to scuttle your navy and go ahead and build a new fleet.

A lot of people saw that as just sort of an initial surrender to what Hitler wanted. But Britain knew that they were cheating already. They had six on the ground, specifically an agent named Carl Krueger in their U boat design office, which was a secret program at the time, and they thought, hey, maybe we can get them to build fewer U boats by endorsing them building these really big, expensive battleships. It costs a lot of money and a lot of raw materials, and it'll kind of kill their

U boat program. It didn't exactly work. They were supposed to build seventy two submarines and ended up building fifty four. But I don't know if they were like hooray about that.

Speaker 2

So yeah, that in and of itself is a problem. Like this grand policy of like making them spend resources, it really didn't lead to that big of a reduction politically speaking. It basically said the UK was endorsing now Germany breaking the Treaty of Versailles by agreeing with them that Germany could build its navy back up. Yeah, there was also another thing that had nothing to do with Germany,

but really played into this later on. France was led by a couple of different appeasement pro appeasement prime ministers or premiers during this time, and they were good friends with Italy, and Italy invaded Ethiopia, as you'll remember from our Holly Selassie episode in nineteen thirty five, and France said, you know what, go with it, Italy, we don't care

about that. Just promise us that if things go down, if the S hits the Fan or le S hits Lifhan you will be on our side against Germany, and Italy said, yes, definitely, you got it one hundred percent, and then they just went and ravaged Ethiopia.

Speaker 1

Yeah, and we all know how that turned out in the.

Speaker 2

End, exactly.

Speaker 1

That was those first two were thirty five. In nineteen thirty six, Germans west the Rhineland. They wanted to remilitarize that area. That again went against the Treaty of Versailles, because that was supposed to be a buffer zone the western part of Germany. And they had there was a chance here to force fully respond here because they had Czechoslovakia and Romania saying like, hey, you know, we got your back if you want to do anything, but France had Britain basically did nothing.

Speaker 2

No Again, Frances kind of said, nah, we're kind of busy with our own stuff, as we'll see, right, And a lot of people also and who were heading the politics in Western Europe at the time, were like, yeah, good on them. Germany. They got that taken away from him in the Treaty of Versailles. Let him have it back. That's Germany, you know.

Speaker 1

Yeah.

Speaker 2

There was also the Anschluss, which was a different category after the remilitarization of the Rhineland because this was where they annexed Austria. Austria was a sovereign it was not a part of Germany before World War One as far as I know, Please God, don't let me be wrong about that one. And Germany just said, Austria, you're now part of Germany. You guys are Germanic by heritage, so

you're just part of Germany now. And the world just turned their heads and said, yeah, I guess that's fine too. You know, Germany's doing it's Germanic thing.

Speaker 1

Yeah, and you know, we're going to talk a little bit about public opinion here and there. But at the time, this was March nineteen thirty eight, and this was Nebel Chamberlain as PM in Britain, and the Bridge didn't want to get involved. There was about a twenty five percent in a survey were in favor of, you know, a determinate policy, so you know, I guess that's not aggression, but determine.

Speaker 2

Yeah, most people were in favor of continuing to just kind of go along with Germany restabilizing or regaining what it had before the Treaty of Versailles. Because again, this is what people are thinking. But if you'll notice, we started to pick up speed a little bit here, like bigger things are so var to happen. That was March of nineteen thirty eight when they took over Austria, and then in September Hitler had been basically making speeches where

he was saying, hey, there's this part. He called it the rump of Czechoslovakia that butts up against Germany. That's really actually Germany. It's called the Sudan Land, and it's just basically this mountain range. Czechoslovakia doesn't care about it, but we care about it because we're reuniting Germany again. So we want that and we're going to go take it,

whether you want us to or not. And Neville, Chamberlain and PM Edouard de Dalier all ran to Mudich to meet with Hitler on his own ground and said here, what do you want. Well, let's make a deal.

Speaker 1

Yeah, And Hitler said, well, I've told you what I want. I want this northwestern part of Czechoslovakia. We call it the Sudetan Land. And they said, all right, you can have that, but you got to promise, like, you know, put your hand on this Bible, raise your right hand, and you got to promise you to do anything else. In Czechoslovakia. That's it. It stops there. And this is where things are really I feel like echoing what's going

on in Ukraine like a putin. You know, eventually you're going to get this stuff that you've conquered, but you're going to stop there, right, And that's what happened back then. The Czechs were an ally to France. In Britain at the time, they were not even invited to the summit,

again echoing things that we see going on today. And at the time there were even some German generals that thought, like early on in September thirty eight when this happened, they were like, hey, listen, if the Allies get behind Czechoslovakia here, we could be in trouble. So there was some kind of bluff calling happening basically, but Britain kind of said no, let's let them do this, and they steered France to do the same and pressure Czechoslovakia to submit, and that's what happened.

Speaker 2

Yeah, and Czechoslovakia is like, fine, they can have the sue date and land. We weren't even invited but we'll go along with it because our ally, France is telling us to keep in mind, an ally is not just like we're friends with you, we think you're pretty cool, and ally means like you usually have some sort of documents or treaties saying, Okay, somebody tries to take part of your country, we're going to come back you up militarily. And when the Chips came down, France said no because

Great Britain was steering them. And one other point about all this that's kind of hidden in there. Great Britain was in a position to steer France because you could make an argument that it was still the world's superpower. The Empire was on the wane, but still by the thirties, twenty five percent of the global population and twenty percent

of the earth's land masks were under British control. So Britain was in a global position to basically set the stage of how to deal with Germany, and the UK decided appeasement was the way to go, so everybody else kind of follow it along.

Speaker 1

Yeah, all right, So that's September of thirty eight. They give them the you know, they say you can have this portion of Czechoslovaki as long as you promise not to go in seven months later in March of nineteen thirty nine, and he went into the rest of Czechoslovakia just like he wrote in his book basically, so you know, Hitler renigged on that promise of course to leave Czechoslovakia

the rest of it alone. And that was like the real decisive moment because I think I feel like that's when Hitler was probably like, man, these guys are are cowards and they're letting me do whatever I want. And very quickly thereafter that was March of thirty nine. September of thirty nine is when he invaded Poland, and then it was on.

Speaker 2

Yeah, and even before he invaded Poland, once he renegged on the Czechoslovakian deal, the Munich Agreement, he showed the world like you like I'll tell you whatever you want to hear, I'm not going to back it up. So he immediately destroyed the policy of appeasement. Like appeasement policy had about as much traction as like yesterday's non winning lotto ticket that you'd find in the gutter, covered in gum and maybe a little bit of blood from somewhere Yeah,

like that was appeasement. After we'll put after the invasion in Czechoslovakia, I got there eventually.

Speaker 1

Yeah, but you know, Poland was invaded, and that's really what kicked off. Like the beginnings of World War two. Hitler tried to provoke war with Poland by saying, hey, I want Danzig, not the band, no, but still the city of Danzig and Prussian territory that was granted to you in nineteen nineteen after World War One. We feel like it is ours. And Britain and France, you know,

they made guarantees to Poland at the time. But in August, it was pretty shocking at the time, the Nazis and the Soviets signed a pact to partition Poland out and basically said you come in from the east, we'll come in from the west, and Poland is ours. And two days later, Britain and France declared war on Germany.

Speaker 2

Yep, and I think that is a great place to stop.

Speaker 1

Yeah, boy, what a robust set up.

Speaker 2

We'll be right back, So chuck where we left off. Hitler had just invaded Poland and the UK and France declared war on Germany. It took a lot what that showed everybody was that appiasement was dead. The whole policy had just shifted down to either containment or out and out war now that they had had declared war. But this was like there was a lot of reasons for

appeasement to have been tried. We talked about some of them, but a big one was the UK was really holding on to that that world's greatest superpower status as hard as they could, and another world war put that in like real Shepard put him in a precarious position.

Speaker 1

Yeah, I mean they were, you know, everybody was trying to rearm themselves, like I said earlier, since World War One. Some a little quicker than others. I think the United States, as will learn, wasn't making the greatest rearmament effort because Congress is kind of chilling the purse strings back when they could do stuff like that. But the writing was

on the wall for the UK. They were like, we were not in any position, even though we're supposedly the world's greatest superpower to fight Germany, Japan and Italy all at the same time to prevent them from expanding their territories. Like that's just not a possibility. And we might have to enter an alliance with the US. If worst comes to worse, we might have to enter into an alliance

with the USSR. And that's just gonna make them, I mean, that's gonna lessen their their their stance and their power worldwide if they have to do stuff like that.

Speaker 2

Yeah, and with their their prestige or power lessened like on world stage, that's the kind of thing that can spark decolonization movements. So they were worried about Jamaica, they were worried about India, they were worried about Nigeria. All of a sudden, being like the UK has overextended itself,

now's the time to declare independence from the UK. And not just the prestige that was lost, but more to the point, the resources or aw materials, all the stuff that Great Britain extracted from these colonies that would be lost as well. So what Great Britain wanted was no war please, at least in part to preserve its empire.

Other people who were in the British Parliament and the government basically said, we're going to have to go to war, it's inevitable, but we're supporting appeasement right now because we need to stall for time to rearm ourselves, like you were saying.

Speaker 1

Right, which, as we'll see, also allowed Germany to do the same yea, either through rearmament by building things or by storming Czechoslovakia and all of a sudden they had all their stuff. But appeasement was popular for a long time. Throughout most of the nineteen thirties. The public didn't want to go to war again. They were shaking off of

World War One hangover. Still, no one wanted to go to a war that was more technologically advanced, like pretty rapidly since World War At the end of World War One, for a second World War, I think in nineteen thirty seven, sixty two percent of British men said they wouldn't volunteer and seventy eight percent of women said they would not

urge their husbands to go fight mm hm. And even after the Munich Agreement, when Czechoslovakia was left hanging out to dry, seventy five percent still approved of appeasement in Great Britain.

Speaker 2

Yes, and so there was like a lot of anti war anxiety. Apparently people had died by suicide, there were mental health problems. All of the appeasement pro appeasement sentiment was also bolstered by the Times and I believe the BBC two, which portrayed Hitler as a moderate, basically saying like it could get way worse than that, let's just

deal with this guy. And then the reason why this matters is because at the time Britain had recently enfranchised it's women, like more and more people were voting, so the public opinion about stuff mattered more and more to the people calling the shots politically. And we'll also see that also turned the politician's views against appeasement as public opinion changed on appeasement. Two.

Speaker 1

Yeah, for sure, and you know there was a string of pms that were all for it. Neville Chamberlain was the third British PM. He was in there from thirty seven to forty during this time of appeasement, so it

wasn't just Chamberlain. I think he's kind of There's two things I feel like from Great Britain that are remembered is and you know, it depends on how you want to look at it, but I think a lot of people eventually framed Neville Chamberlain as a coward and Winston Churchill as a hero because he was one of the only ones that was like this guy Hitler, like, I don't think you guys see the right on the wall here, He's not going to stop and this appeasement thing is no good.

Speaker 2

Yeah. And he also, I mean he still alone basically in his party. The conservatives were like, yeah, we're all pro appeasement at least at the time. So he definitely stood on his own in France. France also had lost a lot of people and a lot of money in World War One and was not very eager to do a redo of it. But they were still anti Germany. Like France was not a friend of Germany. They did not want to be friends of Germany. Their alliances were

against Germany. But ultimately, and this is what's crazy to me, it was racked by far right and far left internal political conflict.

Speaker 1

Yeah at the time, yeah, yeah, they were kind of in an inter stalemate almost, right.

Speaker 2

And so they were whether they wanted to be or not. They were fairly drawn into domestic affairs rather than foreign affairs, and it wasn't until Edouard d' laudier became Prime minister that they really started to branch back out into foreign affairs. But even then they were pretty pro appeasement, so they didn't really have much of a stomach for going into a second World War, understandably, but they didn't feel like they were in a place to do anything, so essentially

they just went on the defense. They did not they weren't going to go into a policy of containment or anything like that.

Speaker 1

Yeah. Yeah, as far as the US goes, at the time, we had FDR in there, Roosevelt was in there, and he endorsed appeasement, like officially, he endorsed the Munich Agreement. They were into isolationism at the time and trying to

stay neutral. And we were also in no position militarily because, like I mentioned, we were kind of you know, we were also depleted by World War One and moving along a little slower than even other eventual Allied countries because Congress was kind of pulling those purse strings a little tight as far as building the military back up.

Speaker 2

Yeah, and I think that you can make a case that any country that was involved in World War One really lost its appetite for war after that, like, yeah, to an amazing degree, understandably for sure. And then there was another group of pro appeasers who was the Britain's aristocracy, and the reason why is because they wanted things to just basically, let's just go back to where we colonize

other places. And really it's the aristocracy running things. And we're all related, and I'm your cousin, you're my cousin, and we're all three somehow married, but we all run everything. We're all just crazy rich let's keep doing that. And they saw Hitler as somebody who could help keep that kind of status quo or get back to that kind

of status quo. The group that was opposed to Hitler though, they were the Soviets, and they were communists, and the aristocrats, who enjoy wealth inequality do not typically like communism more communists, so they wanted to steer Britain away from any kind of alliances with the USSR that could support communists or socialists in Britain and their causes, and more towards Hitler because Hitler's policies kind of jobbed with the aristocracy's views a little more.

Speaker 1

Yeah, And I mean they were sort of actively courting one another because they saw Hitler as somebody who could you know, like you were saying, kind of let them keep their their lifestyle in check right and Hitler in Germany did nothing to make them think otherwise. You know, they were playing on those peers of communism for sure. They're like, you know, you got a lot of dough. You know what happens when communism happens, And that, you know, sent a chill through the British aristocratic scene.

Speaker 2

Yeah. They were known to say, croiky.

Speaker 1

Right, break time or shall we go on with Churchill?

Speaker 2

Give me a break, Chuck, break me off a piece of that ad break bar, Oh.

Speaker 1

Boy, we'll be right back all right. So that might have been the best ad segue ever.

Speaker 2

With the R.

Speaker 1

So I just I didn't see an allusion to kit kat oh in this episode.

Speaker 2

Thanks all right.

Speaker 1

So we mentioned Churchill sort of briefly before. Churchill was like, we said, one of the sort of few outspoken dudes that was like, no, we can't do this. He visited Germany in nineteen thirty two and he was like, these Nazis mean business. I don't think you guys understand what's happening here. And he said, if we can see to Hitler, things are going to get much worse. We have to re arm ourselves, you know, quicker and get those factories to work. But you know, that's the kind of thing

that can wreckon economy. So that's if people are wondering, like, well, why didn't they all just rearm as fast as they could, it's because it costs a ton of money and people. So it's not great for the economy to have to build that war machine backup. But he was founding the drum to do so.

Speaker 2

Yeah, and his whole take on Hitler, including the Munich Agreement, which he called a total and unmitigated defeat. This is where the Allies went to Hitler and said, we'll let you have part of Czechoslovakia, just don't invade the rest of Czechoslovakia. He like, when Neville Chamberlain came back to the UK, he was like basically waiving the agreement and saying he had negotiated a peace for our time that essentially, like aggression from Germany was done. We were all going

to live in peace again. And it lasted a year before we were at war with Germany. So it made Chamberlain look pretty bad. It made Churchill look like very foresightful and exactly the kind of guy that you would want to fight Hitler. So essentially, after they got rid of Chamberlain, the UK went to Churchill and said, you don't like Hitler. We understand that we don't like Hitler anymore now and so Europe.

Speaker 1

Yeah, and you know a lot of people said that was his aim, was to increase his political profile, and you know who knows it. That was his aim, but it worked. He took overs PM in nineteen forty after Chamberlain, like you said, and he wanted he basically later on was like, hey, if we would have had a policy of deterrence instead of appeasement, we might have prevented this

war to begin with. You know, Britain and France should have strengthened our relationship, and that was our best hope was maybe to form what he called a grand alliance with the Soviet Union, even in eastern European countries. But the Soviet you know, there was a lot of distrust of the Soviet Union, especially you know, like we mentioned the aristocracy who wanted to hang on to their pounds, and of course what Stalin was doing, you know, they

didn't trust that either. So he was not going to get support from the British or the French to sort of be tougher.

Speaker 2

No, but as we'll see later, it was not a bad plan. Could have changed things dramatically. Yeah. One of the other things that made Churchill such a strident voice about opposing Germany is that he had intelligence. I guess as a Minister of Parliament, he had men on the inside. Yeah, and he had an intelligence report from somebody in Germany saying that Germany had a mean spirit of revenge, brutality, amounting in many cases to best reality and complete ruthlessness.

And this is at a time when Chamberlain and Daladier are basically saying, like, Hitler's our friend, we just need to keep keep negotiating with him. He's getting reports about how they're just brutal and ruthless, and those panned out to be true.

Speaker 1

Yeah. Uh. We mentioned FDR in the US earlier that officially they supported a peacement because they would not, you know, sign any kind of formal agreement with the UK or France. But on the inside, the administration was definitely trying to kind of say, hey, UK, you gotta you got to change your stance here. You gotta, like Hitler means business and only your military can can deter this guy. At this point, but on the outside they were, you know, officially, like, hey,

we're not involved. This appeasement sounds pretty good to us. And like we said, you know, the people of Britain were largely for it, and most of the people were didn't want to go back to war until the Crystal Knacht on November nineteen thirty eight. That's when Germany, you know, for the first time, attacked its own citizens and destroyed Jewish businesses and synagogues, killed about one hundred Jews and

arrested about one hundred thousand. And that's when the public at large, kind of all around the world was like, oh, okay, that's what this guy's about. This cannot stand right.

Speaker 2

And remember now with the UK having all of these new voters, their opinion mattered, so that helped change things too.

Speaker 1

Yeah, I wish I knew how to say too late in German.

Speaker 2

You don't. You didn't learn that in high school.

Speaker 1

No. I was trying to think of I.

Speaker 2

Can think, can you sound it out letter by letter?

Speaker 1

No?

Speaker 2

Oh wait, you'd have to know the word to do that.

Speaker 1

No. I remember what Canuts in the Mouse did and at Hans Peter's house because I remember reading that chapter over and over and over.

Speaker 2

What did he do?

Speaker 1

I really don't remember, but that the my friend Rad and the cartographer in Montana. He'll be the only person in the world that gets that joke, because it was just a lot of stuff about canuts in the mouse and his owner Hans Peter, who was you know that German textbook stuff?

Speaker 2

Okay? Was that like the German high school classes equivalent of the Little Prince in the French Probably gotcha, I understand exactly what you mean.

Speaker 1

Yeah, it's fun on a big show like this to make a joke for one human.

Speaker 2

So why not. So there's one other group, chuck that we didn't talk about what they thought of a peace man. That was the Nazis themselves in Hitler, and they loved it. Yeah,

probably not a big surprise. They saw it as a clear sign of weakness by the world's leading powers, that they that Hitler in Germany could do whatever it wanted and France and the UK were just gonna bow their knees and their heads in front of Hitler and the people of the of Germany itself also picked up on this too, like Hitler had, remember, he had taken power. It wasn't like you know he wasn't fully supported yet. There was like a courtship period that was still things

were up in the air. But when he came back and said, I got back the Rhineland, I got back to dayton Land, I got us Austria. What's next, you know? And I did it all without a single shot fired. Yeah, these guys just gave it back to us because that's what they think of Germany. With me leading it, the German people just went nuts. And Hitler was was the guy.

Speaker 1

He was Derfer.

Speaker 2

That was the day Hitler became der Feurer.

Speaker 1

Yeah, that's it, man, You just walked off of a History Channel show. You dropped the mic in the sound studio and left. One thing we can say is that appeasement did achieve the aim of rearmament. That was kind of one of the goals, Like we said a few times, is that, you know, everyone was trying to put this off so they could build back up their war stock

or whatever, and that happened. Britain spent less on arms than Germany did from nineteen thirty five to nineteen thirty nine, but they had the highest proportion of their GDP devoted to building up their armaments in nineteen forty, and in nineteen thirty they rebuilt the navy to the you know, once again the world's strongest navy. Shout out to British Seapower, one of my favorite bands. And early on, you know,

they had outpaced Germany. And you know, we're going to talk about the alternate histories here shortly, like what if they had done something. They're in a pretty good position. They between Britain and France. Their coalition had a five to one armament superiority over Germany early on and France. The fallow of France in nineteen forty apparently, and I don't know enough about this stuff, but from what I've read, it wasn't because they were unprepared and didn't have enough

bombs and things. Apparently it was about poor leadership at that point.

Speaker 2

Yeah. I couldn't find enough by that myself to speak confidently on it. All I know is that France did not put up much of a fight from what I remember from the history books. Yeah, well, let's talk about that, Chuck, Let's talk about those alternate histories, especially with the view of armament. Because Neville Chamberlain, when he basically couldn't get a coalition government together anymore after Hitler rinegg Don the Munich agreement, and he was replaced like we saw with

by Winston Churchill in nineteen forty. That same year he died of cancer after Chamberlain was removed. But he spent that time basically saying like I bought us time. Appeasement bought us time to rearm. And he's right, like you showed like Britain did have a chance to rearm. But there was a really critical window that we know about now where that policy of appeasing in order to rearm didn't make sense, and that was about nineteen thirty to

nineteen thirty nine. And the reason was is because France and the UK were rearming at a rate close to Germany and were actually even overtaking it a little bit, and they could have put up a fight against Germany and probably one especially together combining their stuff in nineteen thirty eight. By nineteen thirty nine things had changed. Germany had gone even further overdrive into war production, but more to the point, they had taken over Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia had

all sorts of munitions factories. Czechoslovakia had all sorts of people you could could script into free labor aka slave labor. There's all sorts of stuff that happened when they took over Czechoslovakia and it tipped the balance whipped way up

in favor of Germany's military after that. So that period nineteen thirty eight to nineteen thirty nine, appeasement did the exact opposite, and it made the war way worse than it would have been had the UK and France said this is as good as going to get we gotta go now.

Speaker 1

Well yeah, and you know, it also possibly made the war worst and a lot of people say it definitely made the war worse than it would have been because in nineteen forty Britain's holding out against Germany and they're both seeking resources all around the world that you needed to get to win a world war, and that just expanded the war basically made it into a global thing,

a much larger thing than it might have been otherwise. Right, deterrence might have avoided all of that if they would have formed a grand alliance and bonded their powers early on. You know, because I mentioned earlier there were even generals within Germany's it's kind of a bluffing game. Like, hey, if these guys get together, like, we're not the best position right now. And so while they were buying time, it helped Germany increase their war chest. And yeah, that's the rest is history.

Speaker 2

Right, But speaking of alternate histories, there were other options that the UK had on the table, and now speaking about them, like in retrospect, it's mind boggling to even think. But the first one's a little more understandable or palatable. Had the UK simply just not declared war after Germany invaded Poland, that was an option to them on the table. They didn't have to do it. France had already set the precedent of not backing up Czechoslovakia when it was

taken over by Germany. The UK could have just not done that too. And one thing that could have backed this up, that could have supported actually that position in the UK just sit back and let it play out on its own, because it was inevitable essentially for the USSR in Germany to clash because of that Lebenschrom policy. That policy of the East actually belongs to Germany and we're going to go take it right.

Speaker 1

Yeah, And you know that played out by eventually with Operation Barbarossa with the invasion of the Soviet Union in June nineteen forty one. Some people say like, and you know, of course this sounds completely ridiculou to think up now with hindsight. But some people are like, you know, the UK could have allied with Germany early on. They I mean, I think one of the reasons they didn't. It's not because they knew this Hitler guy was a madman. Again,

that came later. It was because of the colonies that you were talking about that they had all over the world, right, Germany also had colonies all over the world, and they had a conflict. I think Britain wasn't gonna say here, why don't you, why don't you take our African colonies? And Germany definitely didn't like the way Britain looked at race.

They had a pretty different idea on that. And so if they had any kind of alliance, they would have had surrendered their liberal imperialism and they really weakened their status as in international superpower.

Speaker 2

Yeah, they would have had to fall in line with basically the way Germany viewed the world. Yeah, just wrapping your mind around that is not easy to do. Like the UK doing that, and Kyle, who's our man on the end in the.

Speaker 1

UK, right, Yeah, he's right in I six agent exactly.

Speaker 2

He pointed something out that I thought was pretty interesting too that he basically said, the fact that Crystal knocked and the news of what the Germany had done to its own Jewish citizens, Yeah, how that turned British public opinion just basically showed like, even if Britain did try to allie with Germany, it was never going to work out. Yeah, it was probably the least likely of all of it.

And then also, Chuck, you can't help us being Americans to wonder could America have sat out World War two?

Speaker 1

Yeah, you know, we declared war after Pearl Harbor on Imperial Japan. That followed or following that, Germany declared war on US in December nineteen forty one, and you know, maybe we could have evaded getting involved in the European theater. We definitely got mired in the Pacific theater with Japan. We weren't really It's not like the US wasn't on the Nazis radar, but we weren't really a big part

of their foreign policy in the nineteen thirties. Yet right, because again, isolationism was kind of our bag at the time. Our army wasn't very big. We had in nineteen forty we had five divisions compared to Germany's one hundred and forty one. And Congress definitely was not going to like get behind Roosevelt entering the European theater at the time. So there were a lot of reasons why it looked like the US maybe could have avoided that mess.

Speaker 2

Yeah, but historians say probably we were going to get drawn in one way or another, because, like you said, Germany did declare war on the US essentially to show Japan like, hey, we're in this together. You guys, just handle the US. So that was going to happen, whether we tried to stay out of it or not. And then he also knew that we were a threat and that we would eventually be online armament wise to really make a significant contribution. He predicted by nineteen forty two.

I think we started before then. And then even more than that, Roosevelt was already giving permission for US battleships to shoot and destroy U boats that were operating in the Atlantic because they had started targeting American shipping and Hitler was not very happy about that, So the US was probably not going to be able to stay out of World War two.

Speaker 1

Yeah, for sure.

Speaker 2

The alternate history, I guess that gets meatchuck is was the earliest when Germany remilitarized the Rhineland and flagrant violation of the Treaty of Versailles. Had the UK and France intervened, this is nineteen thirty six. I mean, imagine if they had just done something then and contained Hitler then, and remember there was this courtship period or whatever, where you know, Germany hadn't really wasn't really sure about Hitler at the time.

Had he been undermined that thoroughly on the international stage, who knows would have happened to him as the leader of Germany, right, And they could have done something because at the time France had one hundred thousand troops near the border with Ryanland. Germany only moved thirty five thousand troops into the area. Prints could easily repel that and been like, it's your move, Germany, what are you gonna do?

And Germany might not have done anything. And even if Hitler had done something, it probably would have been against the advice of his military advisors. So now he would have personally been taking Germany to war. That's a lot to seek your reputation on. And that one thing in nineteen thirty six could have completely avoided the death of tens of millions of people and it didn't do it because of internal left right politics.

Speaker 1

Wow, oh man, that that was good stuff. Like this is my favorite kind of stuff. You should know when forty five minutes later, like I know, probably one hundred percent more than I knew before about World War Two.

Speaker 2

Very nice, Chuck. Yeah, I didn't know almost any of this either. I love that stuff too. And I know we just talked about the US and in the UK and France's alternate history. But if you want to come up with an alternate history of for World War Two in your country, let us know, hit the history textbooks and come back with what you got. And we'd love to get that kind of thing. In the meantime, while we're waiting for your listener mail, we'll listen to Chuck with a new listener mail.

Speaker 1

Yeah, somebody just sends this man in the High Castle no plagars and please, which I never saw or read.

Speaker 2

I didn't either, but it's supposed to be pretty good.

Speaker 1

Yeah, maybe I'll check that out at some point. It sounds like it'd be right up my own.

Speaker 2

It's too depressing for me, that kind of stuff. That Yeah, and like things that normalize billionaires, I can't take it anymore.

Speaker 1

Like d Snyder, All right, what is this? This is from Chris? Oh yeah, this is just a nice thing. Hey, guys, wanted to write in for a while now. First of all, I always appreciate the wide variety of topics you cover, especially the ones born of your own natural curiosities. As a former middle school science teacher, I saw my primary role as instilling curiosity in my students and modeling for them how to chase those curiosities, and your approach really

resonates with me. But the one thing I didn't pay enough attention to back when I was in the classroom was the art of communication that you guys display in every episode. If I still had a classroom full of students, I would use your show not only for the content,

but also for lessons in respectful communication. So much discourse we hear today is loud and angry and doesn't give people space to express themselves without being interrupted, mocked, or refuted somehow, you guys seamlessly pass the baton of communication to one another without speaking over one another, contradicting each other's in complete thoughts or negotiating the communication flow through

general awkwardness. Even when one of you have a follow up comment that may provide a differing or correcting perspective, you always give space for the other to finish their thought before weighing in, and the follow up comments are thoughtfully delivered and received. Thanks so much for all you do. I appreciate your authentic, respectful delivery of interesting content. You guys keep my brain awake and smiling. And that is

from Chris Christine Sewell in Bloomington, Illinois And Chris. One of the reasons is because we almost always agree with each other on this stuff. I disagree, so it makes it kind of easy.

Speaker 2

Yeah, no, for sure. And that's something that still kind of surprises me to this day, where like just our common view is so in step with one another. Where I mean, like there's so many things that are different about It's like our personalities are pretty different.

Speaker 1

Bladly different.

Speaker 2

Yeah, I would say, will we sure, I'll go with that, Okay, But when you come down to like, what do you think about this? What do you think about this? What do you think about that? It's generally in the same not even ballpark, in the same hot dog stand of the same ballpark.

Speaker 1

Yeah, I don't think the show would have worked for so long if you and I just were sort of at odds over every little thing. And I think that stuff that Christine is talking about too is so much of media today is set up to do that because that gets ratings, I guess. So they'll put people that they know have different viewpoints and put them down in chairs next to each other and that's just like.

Speaker 2

The Yeah, but it's like the Simpsons taught us, if you just don't look, it'll eventually go away. So you don't like that kind of media, just don't watch it.

Speaker 1

Yeah, agreed.

Speaker 2

Well, thank you Chris. That was really really nice. We'd love hearing that kind of stuff. That's just a really kind email, and we thank you for it. If you want to be like Chris and send us a kind email, we are always open to receiving one of those. You can send it off to Stuff Podcasts at iHeartRadio dot com.

Speaker 1

Stuff you Should Know is a production of iHeartRadio. For more podcasts, My heart Radio, visit the iHeartRadio app, Apple podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.

Transcript source: Provided by creator in RSS feed: download file
For the best experience, listen in Metacast app for iOS or Android