In the name of God , the all-compassionate , the all-merciful . Welcome back , dear viewers and listeners to the Radio Resistance Podcast . Today we have a very important episode focusing on the resurgence of terrorism , more specifically , the threats emanating from the resurgence of terrorism and the Taliban's activities since 2021 .
I'm your host , kamal , and with me , as always , is my dear brother and co-host , zubair John . As always is my dear brother and co-host , Zohrae John , and today we're deeply honored to have Scott Richards with us . Scott is a national security advisor with extensive experience across physical , energy , cyber , economic infrastructure , environment and sociopolitical security .
He's worked on a wide range of critical issues , from terrorism and human trafficking to narcotics and wildlife trafficking . Scott founded the Presidium Network and Threat Studies Group , the Presidium Network and Threat Studies Group specializing in counter-threat financing , counter-organized crime and counter-network operations against organized threats .
His work's been instrumental in numerous high-profile operations , including the evacuation of high value targets in Afghanistan and the successful release of hostages held by Russian forces and the Taliban . Scott , thank you for joining us today .
It's a pleasure to be on .
Is there anything you'd like to , you know , add before we dive into our discussion and actually , if you can , briefly , you know , tell our listeners about your background and your work with the Presidium Network ?
Sure , I mean that was a very , very good summary and introduction , and I think a lot of people misunderstand what national security is . It's really a series of interconnected fields that relate to the health of a society . It's everything that a country needs to operate to be secure , stable and harmonious as a society .
So it really kind of touches everything harmonious as a society . So it really kind of touches everything .
But kind of the core specialization that I have in that setting is somewhere between the economic stability and social cohesion and also understanding the nature of organized threat , and that's why we kind of use organized threat in a fairly general term , counterterrorism into anything that can negatively impact a society , whether that's political , social , economic or violence
. The Presidium Network formed in and around August , september , 2021 .
We became an official entity a little bit later than that , but a colleague of mine , dominic Byrne , was working in a very similar field and we sort of connected while evacuating some sort of profiled individuals and at that time we had some fairly unique kind of political presence and we very quickly became part of the Afghan task force with Boris Johnson that was
set up by Minister Bali , sort of looking at the early stages of what evacuation means and what it means when the Talibs came to power .
So that was kind of a very intensive period , followed by an intensive period in Ukraine doing a lot of medical and food providing and evacuation of vulnerable people like orphans , and then , as you mentioned , it carried on with work on the British hostages held by the Taliban's GDI who were released in October last year .
Okay , great , and just to add , I guess , to a little bit of that background , I wanted to ask Scott what motivated you to focus on counterterrorism and the counter threat financing and organized crime in regions like you know , the Middle East and Afghanistan .
I had always . I started my career in Australia in political affairs and so I kind of built a background very early on . I was 25 when I started doing that and then when I kind of always stayed in and around sort of difficult crisis management scenarios . And that really changed when I came to Dubai in 2008 .
I began sort of working with sort of members of the retired special operations , sort of tier one community I've been working with since . We've been working with since , and so we realized that if you really want to deal with crime and you really want to deal with organized threat , you need to be able to operate across borders .
And that's the gap that criminality and terrorism and everything has been able to exploit extremely efficiently , because once a problem goes from one jurisdiction to another , there tends to be a lack of desire for one party to take responsibility .
And so that organization evolved and brought me into Afghanistan sort of 2014-15 for anti-corruption and to look at where you have the intersection of what we would call a crime-terror nexus . There really isn't anywhere quite like Afghanistan in the world .
I mean , we've dealt with other issues , from gold fraud and smuggling out of Africa , but Afghanistan was a very , very different and complicated animal for so many reasons , for so many reasons .
But if you want to destabilize a network , you need to destabilize its mechanisms for funding and you need to destabilize its mechanisms for decision-making and its ability to recruit , and at the heart of these things is finance generally , finance and ideology .
Right , financial ideology , right , um , and I guess , um , it's important for us to kind of just for for those who are listening . Obviously , our podcast is about the current situation in afghanistan , right post 2021 , specifically where , when the when the taliban basically were took over or handed over Afghanistan .
So you know , that's something to always keep in mind throughout our discussions the return of the Taliban and the initial impact on Afghanistan and its people , the international community's response at the time . So , I guess , how do you think that the Taliban's return to power in 2021 reshaped the geopolitical landscape of Afghanistan and the region ?
Enormously , I mean , to those events . I tend to have quite a front row seat to a lot of things and I think January 2021 , I was invited sort of back into the policy arena but more or less declined because I saw where the withdrawal was going and there really wasn't a plan .
And you felt it when you would call to elements of Jeroa or to whomever else , and there was a sense that the West wasn't going to leave . That wouldn't happen . As we moved into July , the takeover was very ready and apparent . I had written a paper for the United States government on July 24th , 25thth , on the impending takeover .
It was just such a peculiar flow of events . You know , to my mind it could have been ended so quickly because the Taliban somehow magically raised a mobile force of 70,000 or so fighters and they moved sort of from location to location . You know from .
You know it was a bull area initially and if they're moving in convoys , a B-52 could have just ended that and just ended that very quickly . But they were let to kind of go over and roll over the country Really , and so nobody knew what to do .
And so from that kind of onset , from the very first moment was , you had everybody in the international community at a very , very high level , somehow seemingly blindsided by this event , but with no real concept of how to deal with it once it happened . And so how this reshapes things is in so many ways To the Taliban's mind .
They defeated , you know , nato in the United States , drove them out of Afghanistan . They've then been able to , for the subsequent nearly three years , been able to have diplomatic meetings , they've been able to get concessions , they've been able to conduct frightening human rights abuses throughout and still receive $40 to $50 million a week .
And so that message it sends to the entire sort of Islamic extremist community is this is achievable . It changes everything . And then it changes the stability of . Obviously , pakistan's now been heavily impacted by , you know , a creature in so many respects of its own making , but it's also now creating instability in Central Asia .
There have been incidents in Iran and then there's the ability for Islamic extremism to become more sophisticated . I've said essentially a few times that what we've ultimately done is hand the capabilities and rights of a nation state to jihad .
They can create identities , they can create passports , they can I'm not sure of the genuine legality of this , but they can enter into contracts and agreements as a nation state , and so that's a very , very complicated animal , politically speaking , to have in the geopolitical terrain . It's uncontrollable .
It has a mission and , again , something that I try to remind people of that any super-theocratic state has a singular mission , and that is a religious mission , but it's also apocalyptic by nature , the objective being to create a super-theocratic state to induce prophecy .
And that's true of Iran , and that's true of the Christian evangelicals , and that's true of , to a degree , the current leadership in Israel . So , anytime you have this , it's a very difficult thing to manage , but we've enabled an incredibly dangerous political entity through this . So , yeah , it's vivid how it changes things .
I kind of describe what it's done in terms of just in every way .
Thank you , scott , for that detailed overview of the Taliban's return to power and its impact .
I fully agree with you , especially on that last point regarding the fact that they , despite not being recognized as a government in any official sense by any modern nation state , they do and they are positioned in being able to carry out certain functions of a nation state right and that's very sad and unfortunate .
Its consequences have been very dire for the people of Afghanistan . Nation state right , and that's very sad and unfortunate , it's it's it's content . Consequences have been very dire , uh , for the people , people of afghanistan , um , yeah , even for the diaspora .
Just recently , uh , one of the things that they did or announced was , um , the this is just this past week uh , banning of the um , or not allowing passports not issued by their quote-unquote Islamic Emirate right no longer being valid .
So , essentially , you know , diaspora Afghans who would like to go , you know , I don't know why anyone would want to go under these circumstances , but , let's say , for whatever reason , would like to visit or would like to use that passport for any purpose in Afghanistan , they wouldn't be able to do so .
So that's just one small matter , right , it isn't really all security related , but , yeah , it seems like , as zavarjan I , I think you wanted to mention something before we move on and shift our um focus to another topic .
Yeah , please , please , go ahead before you get to that , the next uh question or point . I just wanted to add on to what scott was saying , just to add some uh , provide some context for the listeners when , uh , you mentioned that there is an apocalyptic kind of prophetic motivation behind these terror groups .
See , I think that's very important for people to understand , for the general populace that follows what's happening in geopolitics and what's happening in geopolitics and what's happening in the world .
Some people will say , oh well , they like to do this kind of simplification , these simpleton arguments that , oh , al-qaeda or all these other terror movements and stuff , they're just funded by America when deemed fit , and it's all a conspiracy , and the West funds this group , and then they're all funded by america when , when deemed fit , and it's all a conspiracy ,
and you know the west funds this group , and then they're all agents of israel or whatever . Right , but the , the reality is what is what you said ? That they have ?
These are real groups that have real motivation , based off of um what's the word that I'm looking for like , uh , they , they have context , right , they have a like , for example , when you said the um , um , apocalyptic things .
That's based off of the whole islamic hadith , uh , transmission that at the end of times , um , you know , there's going to be the return of the Mahdi , who is like the savior that will come and fight the Antichrist .
And based off of this argument , right off of these texts , which they , you know , these extremist groups twist and use it in their own way to therefore establish these caliphates , to therefore establish Islamic states or Islamic caliphates throughout the Muslim world .
And that's important to know , because these groups have real motivations , they have real reason to attack these nation states , because the whole concept of the nation state is against their being , their ideology . They want to get rid of all these and , while doing that , fighting the West , which supports these nation states .
So I think that that's very important to understand that these are real groups that have real motivations , based off of their interpretation of religious texts , to sow terror in the world .
And that's how they justify it religious texts to sow terror in the world and that's how they justify it . You know , I do want to say something here . Both of you make a very compelling point . You know about these theocratic states and then the potential for , ultimately , terror and terrorism due to these apocalyptic motivations .
I have a little bit of a different perspective . I think the failure and terror associated with these theocratic states aren't necessarily inevitable . You know , the true issue lies in the misuse of religious ideology by these extremist factions .
You know , and I actually would like to make this argument based off of my take on the book right behind me , the leader of the National Resistance Army of Afghanistan , commander Ahmad Nasud's book , a memoir in the name of my father struggling for freedom in Afghanistan .
After reading this book I see his which this is inherited from his father and Peter Bergen actually writes a very well it's a very well written foreword in the book and he explains how the late hero , national hero and martyr , commander Ahmad Shah Massoud , who fought off the Soviets and helped end the Cold War , this hero introduced to the world a type of Islamism
right that can be integrated within the modern world because it doesn't pose any sort of threats . Islam itself is a beautiful religion and rational Islam , the true Islam that the vast majority of Muslims around the world , you know , whether it's a theocratic state or not , you know adhere to right .
It's only in Afghanistan where girls don't go to school , aren't permitted to school , despite , you know , some neighboring countries and other theocratic states having very harsh restrictions on their societies and oppressive policies .
There's no way whatsoever , in my humble opinion , that anyone can compare the plight of the people of afghanistan and I'm not saying that any of you who are doing that , but anyone can't compare their plight to that of those you know , others . They're just naturally different Again , one example of that being the matter of women's rights .
Right , the only country in the world where there's truly a gender apartheid being enforced is Afghanistan . Progress in , I would say , our overall cause for freedom and democracy and establishing this in Afghanistan , the conflation of issues in Afghanistan to that of some other nation states , you know . In any case , yeah , please , scott , go ahead .
So there's a reason they use the term super theocratic and not just sort of generally theocratic . I mean Iran is a super theocratic state run by Mullahs and Akhwamini , who's the ultimate power , power above the president . The Talibs don't consider Pakistan Islamic because of its remnants of a British constitutional influence .
They consider the only other true Islamic state to be Iran . And so , but their vision , you know , is connected to the idea that , you know , at the end of times there's one true Islamic state which precipitates the coming of the Mahdi .
And all of these books , the Abrahamic books , have a similar description of those end of times and they're often based around geographies . Same is true of Christians , same is true of Israelis , because it's the same prophecy .
Ultimately , when you look at what they're trying to spread and what the base belief of al-Qaeda is and al-Qaeda's influence over the Taliban , osama bin Laden's mission was to make Afghanistan the base of the new caliphate , and so when you look at the flags of al-Shabaab , jnim , it's the same flag .
When you look at what Boko Haram , which literally translates as Western education is forbidden and they kidnapped 400 girls in Nigeria . And you look at what they're doing in Mali right now and Burkina Faso , they're trying to spread a Talib-like government . They want to create little replicas of Afghanistan and they will have the same oppression .
Is there any reason to think the Houthi will behave any differently in Yemen , a population of 38 million people or racked with malnutrition , that these super-theocratic Islamist entities ? And that's not a criticism of Islam . It's in the same way that one can be critical of a Christian nationalist for their extremism or the way that Christianity .
For very many years , women were oppressed in the West . They only got the vote like 70 years ago . Anyone is capable of taking any ideology to an extreme , but the point is that that objective is Al-Qaeda isn't a series of different movements , it's one movement . Under Zawahiri , the franchises were given more autonomy .
That's not the case anymore and they have the same mission . They are the same organization . So in that sense is why I use the exact , why I distinguish between being theocratic and super theocratic , because of their values and their goal is ultimately a goal of prophecy . It's functionally what their purpose is . Otherwise they would be more moderate .
I often say you know , if you , you can't have a moderate talib , because to be moderate means you're not talib . Um , exactly , and that's everything that they do is focused on on their idea of a puritanical society down to the length of your beard . You know people , you know , even back in the 90s , when their own power would be beaten and tortured for that .
Um , they have a very , very rigid belief system that you know cannot accommodate inclusion , cannot accommodate that , cannot accommodate inclusion , cannot accommodate representation , cannot accommodate any opinion , because then they cease to be , in their eyes , their version of what they believe to be pure .
Right . But , scott , you see , even in that you know , like , I don't disagree with much of what you just mentioned . In fact , I agree , you know , with most of it .
And the part of , like you know , when you mentioned super theocratic right , like when you mentioned super theocratic right , that's actually the interesting part that the Taliban use this super theocratic state as a model , right , they're trying to establish something like that .
But whenever this discussion comes up , I think to myself very deeply and I'm like what is the difference beyond and besides these things , like the effects and impact on society and society itself ? What's the difference in terms of the theocratic structure itself ? Right , think about that . I come to the same thing that you .
You know the result and result that you uh reached as well , as far as there's no such thing as a moderate talib , and and beyond moderation and so on , and as far as their ideologies are concerned . These , the individuals , who are they right ? The personalities Siraj Haqqani , mullah Brader , haybatullah , all of these individuals , who are they ?
Not a single one of them are statesmen .
Not one of them have studied in any university in any of the related positions that they're trying to , you know , fool the world into holding Right , so , like , ultimately , the Taliban are just a proxy force for hire and are willing to sell themselves for , to work for whomever's and whoever's interests , whoever's willing to pay and , you know , feed them .
It seems that's , that seems to be the case , right , but it's , it's . It's very much clear come on , let me .
Let me add one thing here . Yeah , you could say that , sure , proxy right . But I think the point that scott was making when we originally made the point of apocalyptic hadith traditions and how they all have the same ideology .
Look , if it was any other group that had the opportunity to seize a nation and become the rulers of that nation , they would all be like the Taliban . It's not like they're going to be different . They're all going to start banning girls from school . They're all going to not allow women to go out dressed how they want .
They're not going to allow them to work right . They're going to force people to observe Islam the way that they want it .
And again , it comes from the ideology .
And we said that , kumail , we said that already . I said that when I had made the point that it's a twisted version of islam , that we don't agree here nobody here is is critiquing islam , that's no , no , no , no .
I understand , but the thing is even even the , even the taliban right , when you said like they haven't said no , where they study is is diobandi madrasas , and they also have that twisted ideology of what an islamic state is , of what jihad is , of what women are allowed to do .
So , all these terror groups , at the end of the day , they think the same , because and if they were to be different , then they wouldn't be terrorists , they wouldn't now , let me , let me just give a counter example , right , so so , or two , one is going to be historical .
Historically , you know better than I , zubair , I know this that many theocratic civilizations you know , such as like the Islamic golden age , it thrived and not only thrived but contributed significantly , you know , not just to the science but arts , culture , and their success was driven by , you know , the principles of knowledge , compassion , justice and not any sort of
apocalyptic prophecies . Right , these apocalyptic prophecies have existed always , during all times , but those , the civilization itself , those empires , that's not what they're . It wasn't a fear-based misuse of religious ideology , that was , you know , use of religious ideology , that was , you know , governing the people .
In short , it's not the theocratic structure itself but how it's implemented that determines its success or failure . I said I wanted to give two counterexamples . One was historically , as far as the Islamic Golden Age , and then I guess this is also historic , but very , very much relevant to both Afghanistan and specifically the resistance .
Scott , you know , I was born in 92 , 1992 , right , that's the same year .
That Commander , the late Commander Ahmad Shah Massoud , afghanistan's national hero and Professor , the late martyr , professor Rabbani , they had after , you know , defeating the Soviets and the Northern Alliance together , in a very united fashion , established , interestingly , what's called the Islamic State of Afghanistan .
Stand you know hearing or listening to that today right Like it's Long State . Oh my God , this was in what 92 , 1992 . But what was the ideology ? What was the whole ? It wasn't necessarily a theocratic state . Unfortunately , due to both bad neighbors interfering in our affairs and some bad actors of our own , we went down . A really bad thing .
But anyway , the point here was just that the Islamic State of Afghanistan was established and the moderate , rational Islam that Commander Ahmad Shah Massoud and Commander Ahmad Massoud in his book speaks of and speaks of , about the need for the revival , even how essential this is , how essential it is .
We see in the region you know , scott , better than I that there's these groups growing day by day and more groups growing day by day , right . So these reform groups within what is deemed and seen as resistance and based off of Islamic , based off Islam , any sort of Islamic ideology . That is very much essential in my humble opinion .
But in relation to the original point , again , I think it's more so the theocratic structures themselves , the fact that the individuals , the personalities behind this movement are not statesmen they're not and how it's implemented ultimately determines its success or failure .
And when I say success or failure here I mean , of course , how you know there are in society the impact .
I've lived in the Islamic world for nearly 20 years and I have a deep love of Islam , and the Islam that I know is the Islam of compassion . The Islam that I know is the one that places the value of taking care of the sick and the elderly and the poor as our highest form of prayer .
It's an Islam that embraces knowledge , but that's not the Islam of the Talib . If you look at any super-theocratic state , the Catholics in the 13th century were brutal and you had a papal leader .
You had a supreme leader , and so what you have with Iran and what you have in Afghanistan today is you have a supreme leader who is considered to be in some way , the ultimate voice on Islam . In some respects , the idea of their caliphate and Afghanistan being planned as the base is to lead Islam from their caliphate .
That's their objective and that's not anything to do with Islam itself . That's to do with extremism . Radicals and any political ideology can become radicalized . It's not unique to any group , it's not unique to any society . I mean Chairman Mao radicalized communism and 50 million people died of starvation .
Somebody who has a narcissistic tendency to want to be a supreme leader and the ultimate voice of the religion of Islam and that's what , functionally , habitullah , in many respects , is the supreme leader of jihad .
I mean , that's what he wants to be and that's in some respects he is , because he has the domain where these terrorist organizations can operate with impunity . And one thing I'd like to qualify with the term terrorism , because somebody will come up and say , well , one man's terrorist is another man's hero . That's never the case .
A terrorist , by definition , uses violence for political ends , by killing civilians . That is the definition . You are not a freedom fighter , you are not a hero if you kill civilians to pressure a government , and that definition is very , very important .
And so when I use the word terrorism , I'm expressly talking about people who use violence against civilians for their own political objectives , which is how the Touls came to power ultimately .
Yeah , I don't disagree with you , scott , it's more so in theory , practically speaking , unfortunately , we don't really have a good model today , in today's world . But I my apologies for you know , going on on that tangent , for so long .
I mean , it's important to delve into . And then , when you look at the power structure , you know it's the Kvetashira , that's what it is and it functions the same way . Hyper-tweller is the boss of the Kvetashira and then he has his . There's 30 appointees in it and they're all the names that we know and that's how they operate .
And you know , as Zubair said , their education and the only education they care about is what comes from . You know those madrasas it's Diobandi madrasa and that's how they create and recruit more people like themselves . But the problem with a nation is and my problem with the Taliban specifically is they've taken a nation of 38 million people hostage .
And so in some of my earliest interactions with them after the fall because I had cordial relations with them until September 7th when the ISI came in , because there was a reality of having to deal with them and you could talk to them at that point to some degree the first thing they asked me was can you remove the sanctions ?
Can you get us off the blacklist ? It's like no , to get off those lists , you need to stop doing what got you on them . And so they appointed a cabinet I think you know 31 people or whatever it is , and like 21 , maybe 23 of those are sanctioned .
And so the objective from day one was to hold Afghanistan hostage and the welfare of 38 million people to pressure the international community to drop the sanctions . And the Talibs have managed to get concession after concession from the West without giving anything back . And Haibatullah has said many times we will never compromise our beliefs , ever .
You have to compromise yours , and they want a seat at the UN . You have to compromise yours and they want a seat at the UN . You have to compromise your beliefs although they violate every principle of being a UN member to the very original charters . But they've managed to play this for three years .
They've managed to just dissemble and say , well , terrorism's not back here and it's vividly evident that it is . And it's frustrating because of almost how absurd it is . But the cost to the Afghan people is just extraordinary and they are holding the nation hostage .
What they want is the sanctions dropped , and could you imagine what would happen if they were connected to the banking system ? It would just be catastrophic . And we're just inducing their greater capability to be a source of instability . It's a fact you don't make . I think it's 38 now . It used to be 33 al-Qaeda camps . I think it's gone up .
They don't have 38 camps as a summer retreat for jihadists . They're going there to learn how to project violence . When they finish in those camps , they're sent to Iraq and Syria for a work experience . And so the Talibs ?
This idea that the Talibs say , oh , they've never attacked anyone , they're letting their territory be used , they're part of al-qaeda and the planning and the operations , their management , they're providing resources , they're providing equipment , they're providing food , they're even providing wives to these people .
And so the this whole notion that that they aren't part of the pan-jihadist movement is just nonsense . You know , al-qaeda and the Taliban have pledged allegiance to each other many times over Many .
So this idea that Taliban are only intra-looking , not when you had the Haqqanis in their whole role during the 20-year war , they were super interlocutors between crime and terror D-Company . During the 20-year war , they were super interlocutors between crime and terror D Company . Isis first emissary from Haqqani was into Syria in 2014 .
Their job was to link up with other terror groups , and the moment they come into you know maybe the somewhat more inward-looking but no less kind of spiritually ambitious Haibatullah , and when you get Al-Qaeda there , it's not the same thing that it was in 1996 .
It's a much more dangerous , capable organization and they are at the heart of what's going on in global jihad . Osama bin Laden's objective was always global jihad . That's the point of al-Qaeda . The impact of this if we continue to allow it and if Yemen goes fully to Houthi control , then they've got a .
They can just , they've got control the vital shipping lanes . The Iranians have control district , we get , you know , can impact the strata home news , the Red Sea . Then their whole area is in trouble and they can spread weapons fighters ideology through East Africa , down as they are , and Then the whole thing topples .
And then then we'll start to see Libya , which is a big al-qaeda target , come under threat . Then there's Tunisia , then there's Algeria , then there's Morocco . We've already lost Burkina Faso and Mali . We're in a very , very precarious place for losing not just the tragically 38 million people living under this hostage situation .
We're talking hundreds of millions of people living under a Taleb-like government and I'm not sure if it's preventable at this point .
Yeah , I definitely agree . I think those are important points that you know a lot of people are not , you know , paying attention to . But just to add to that , I guess , scott , you know the relationship you mentioned Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan . How has that , the relationship been between the Taliban and other terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda , iskp ?
How has that evolved since 2021 ?
Enormously . I mean you've got , you've got . You've got Lashkar-e-Tayyab there . You've got LEJ Everyone's got a camp . You've got JNIM has camps there . Al-shabaab's been in . Hezbollah was there in November last year in Kabul . So each of these al-Qaeda franchises has a training camp .
Which ones ? You said the . Is that the Lebanese ?
Yes , they in Kabul . They went to Kabul in November 2023 . Wow , crazy . And to the Ministry of Interior .
These are reports that are like public . No , is it .
The information is around . Information has been said publicly , but not as such a public report From my desk . Only when certain information becomes public to a degree can I elaborate on it . But the presence of Hezbollah there has been spoken about by some others and I can attest that we have the same things .
Al-shabaab , Boko Haram have all been through , and so you have the reason why that's so surprising , by the way , or why I ask , is because it's like since August and September of 2021 , I've been like wondering , or one of the riddles I I call it is it's like adversaries right are investing in the same terrorist organization , right they're not adversaries .
Well , no , what I'm talking about is , like our government here , the united states , they're not adversaries , are hosting , providing safe haven to those proxy forces , militias of those adversaries of ours right . So that's the part , that's just , it's mind-boggling , right ?
Yeah , I mean Zubaira , and I touched on this before the call started . So there's an idea that it could be looked at as something else or something untoward .
You know there's an idea that it could be looked at as something else or something untoward you have to understand is that there wasn't a plan and Biden just followed the roadmap laid down by Trump , and that wasn't a great roadmap and maybe with maybe , trump might have been more aggressive and he probably would have pulled the money that's going to them , because
he does like to use levers and coercion , but so Biden has the withdrawal .
You know , october , I think , we heard the bin Laden boys were back in Afghanistan , and then November , we heard that Zawahiri was there , and you know , but nobody wanted to talk about it because if al-Qaeda had come back , al-qaeda central , because al-Qaeda never really left , but their leaders did , you know Saif Adel and friends in Iran , and so they come back
and then they grow , and they grow quietly and now they've got capacity to produce passports . They very quickly . The first reports we got of passports was in September 2021 . They were already on it .
So now we don't know who the bad guys are , what identities they've been given , and so this is a huge political embarrassment and you know I can't really talk about the dimensions of where . You know I might send a briefing to , but there was fear of Biden's response , because it's to avoid embarrassment .
And so now they're in this position where they don't know how to manage it . They don't know how to get the Tullams to behave and I've said this to many diplomats they fought the West , living in caves , hiding from drones . You think they're going to become moderate over some tea and biscuits ? And that's the reality .
I mean , they're in such a golden place for them with , and it is absurd , we're sending them money . It is absurd , particularly in october , with what happened between israel and hamas that changed al-qaeda . They had been very , very , very quiet , very subtle , very busy , but not visible . And then so this is the first time we really see safe .
You know , sheikh Ardl come out and threaten the United States , threatens the United States directly , threatens the United States interest in Syria and Iraq , which we've seen since November , increases in attacks and it's like where do you think those guys are getting training ?
Where do you think those forces it's coming out of the camps in Afghanistan , and so now we're just starting to see , I guess , because you know , coming up to election time in November , a little bit more willingness to face some of this . But it was just political obstinance for fear of embarrassment . There's nothing clever in here , and they may .
You know that as clever as it might get is that maybe the us or the west decides . Well , it hasn't really worked out with hyper tool though . Let's try siraj or yakub um , and then that's not going to work any better . Um , you know , and pit , pit them against each other . It's just incompetence and self-interest , but it's made the world tremendously dangerous .
And when I say tremendously dangerous , you know again we were talking about it a bit before is I don't have an issue with someone being a Taleb Be the best Taleb you want to be . But the moment you use violence or fear to force somebody else to be Taleb , then there's a problem .
And their whole ambition of , you know , kind of Al-Qaeda or whatever else , is to expand this belief system and to have it run under a single supreme leader . And to have it run under a single supreme leader , that leader would control every territory that they take .
Yeah , Thank you , Scott . That's incredibly enlightening to know . You know these relationships with the groups , and this brings us to a very , very crucial point the broader regional and global impacts of these developments you mentioned .
So what are the current threats emanating from Afghanistan that neighboring countries are facing , and is it just neighboring countries or beyond ?
it's far beyond um . You know . It's sort of going back to what I was saying before with zawa . Here you operate with the franchises , operate with more autonomy . That's not the case anymore and so you've got a lot more mobility between um , between groups , and a lot of them come in . Aqim , aqap , will come in .
We're also talking about this before , about the intermarriages . They're consolidating a jihad bloodline . You know where you get the bin laden sons and married to , I think , yakub's daughter and the zawa here he's married to somebody else and anas's mother was , you know , aqap .
They're consolidating a dynasty right now with a host of intermarriages across the jihadist groups , because that way they can keep more cohesion . It's rational , it's what England or Europe did in the medieval ages you have a war with another country , then you marry a princess to a prince and you find peace that way .
But it is obviously Central Asia is heavily directly in the line of fire and they didn't want to acknowledge that risk for a long time , except for Tajikistan . And obviously the fighters move through the Tajik border not with permission of anybody . They just sneak across and then they go into Uzbek .
But thank the West , we left them drones , the Talibs , and I think they have at least five Eagle scans running so they can put those drones up , watch a border , they can see when it's a good time to move narcotics or people . We've given Jihad state-of-the-art abilities and it was insane .
They can see , they could see God rotations , they could see whatever they want , they could see gaps and they're running . Those drones are up .
Wow , you know , when we mentioned the neighboring countries , speaking of , you know , pakistan , how would you say , uh , that the situation there is between you know , the current uh taliban in afghanistan , their regime , and the ttp , who pakistan , you know , is now complaining about um saying that , oh , the taliban is not fighting them or not taking care of them or
giving them shelter in afghanistan . What , what is up with that ? That nexus there is is is there much of a difference between um , the taliban in afghanistan , versus the ttp in afghanistan in your opinion , and none in my opinion . The ttp .
the t in your opinion ? None in my opinion . The TTP swore allegiance to the Taliban after Hibbertullah came in . They functionally have the same belief system and what we can see happening in North Waziristan is they're trying to set up the groundwork for a Taliban-style government , ttp .
And if you talk about the Durand Line and various other things , the Talibs don't see areas of these territories as being part of Pakistan . I made a comment on social media to the effect that the Taliban , in terms of attacks on Pakistan , probably don't think of them as attacks on Pakistan because they don't think of that territory as Pakistan .
But there's no way that the Talibs could ever truly fight the TTP . They never would . It doesn't make sense . And the TTP can use their expertise and their methodologies , and we're seeing it in North Waziristan . We're seeing that they came out wanting to ban girls' education there this year .
We're seeing a Talibanization of it that reflects the values that come out of . Kandahar . We're seeing a Talibanization of it that reflects the values that come out of Kandahar . I think Pakistan thought that they could control the Talibs , you know , because of their longstanding relationship with the Haqqani network . You can't .
You know , the US has tried to use proxies through the Cold War in Latin America and other places and it never works because they have their own mission , and for a little while . If you can get trained and funded and get an arsenal of weapons , why wouldn't you ? And in the case of withdrawal , they got left $8 billion of equipment and then got sent another .
What is it ? $3 , $4 billion in cash by now ? Yeah , so they're making out like bandits and they don't have to give anything back . So pakistan made a huge , huge mistake , thinking that they could control um , control this ideology , and they can't .
So it's like is it it like a Frankenstein's monster that they've created ? Because I feel like people would make that argument from the 90s right that it was their project . They created this Frankenstein and now it's kind of turned against them , is that ?
true , do you think ? Yeah , I would say it even goes back further than that , to the 70s and 80s , because they had strategic depth coming out in the early 70s you had Jalal ad-Din Haqqani Siraj's father , you know really forming up in the 70s and Pakistan sheltered them for so long and the Haqqani network and the ISI were always very close together .
But you know , from what I understand is the younger Talibs in Kabul are drifting towards Kandahar and away from the Haqqanis , and so the Haqqanis just don't have the power . Siraj is a very , very sophisticated man . They all are . As Eamon Dean sort of said about Al-Qaeda in the 90s . They are not stupid by any degree .
They're very , very , very capable and they've been fighting the West , fighting it , for 30 years and in the 80s they were part of you know , trained into some element of arms , so they know us , and now they've learned how to fight us .
In the 80s they were trained into some element of arms , so they know us , and now they've learned how to fight us in the diplomatic world , in the political world , and they have won every round .
But when it comes to Pakistan and that TTP situation , what I don't understand is , um , if you know the taliban , who was their project or their , you know their proxy for so many years , if suddenly we go with this narrative that they've kind of became their own , they've grown their own mind , they've become independent and now they're not listening to orders from
from pakistan , from their masters , let's say right , to put it simply 't we won't support them anymore .
And to go as far as saying that you know , we're not going to recognize this government and we would even support those who oppose this group , because I mean , if they're actually supporting the TTP and sheltering them , which we see that they are right- then , they're going hand in hand with them , and those and that group is attacking the pakistani state and
killing civilians , hundreds upon hundreds of civilians and soldiers , then what is in it for for pakistan ? why won't they just abandon this ? Um , these guys next door ?
Because it's like you know , on on the one hand they oh , you know we criticize them and we're against them , but then , on the other hand , they're also trying to say , you know , push , if they can , for their recognition . You know , it's like you can't , you can't do this double game , and this has been going on for for so long .
So that's , that's what I'm wondering .
And just to add , before you answer Scott , to that , as you know , beyond Pakistan , the region in general , right as you mentioned , the threats are beyond just the region as well , right , in relation to Pakistan , could do you think , relation to Pakistan , could do you think a possible scenario or effective strategy be having those more of the regional countries
involved in making sure that Pakistan stays in check and in line with kind of what Zubairjian was just mentioning as far as , like actual effective measures to you know , make sure that Pakistan's a very complicated place .
I had to explain power in Pakistan to Congress in 2021 after the fall , because the president has certain powers , the military has other powers and the ISI has other powers . But within the ISI you've got a series of directorates and they have different opinions to the other directorates .
Some of those directorates have worked very closely with Jihad for 30 years and I consider they probably are the same thing at this point , whereas other directors , in their arts , there's no cohesion in Pakistan in terms of power , whereas other directors , in their arts , there's no cohesion in Pakistan in terms of power .
And then we had the civil government of Imran Khan the first time in a long time , maybe ever , and that didn't really end up that well .
It was a very fragmented country in terms of power , and one of the things that we would see a lot of in end of 21 , especially , was I , I , I SKP , if you want to call them that what you know coming out of Pakistan through Nangarhar or into Nangarhar Um , and you know , one has to look at the whole situation . You look at who I SKP kills .
It's predominantly Kandahari talibs , and so whose interest is that in ? It's more in Pakistan's interest , you know , and so I look at all these things , even in 2017 , when I was looking at the kind of terror threats in Afghanistan , iskp was kind of like a go-to for anyone who wanted to kill someone else .
It was just an easy group to banner something up under . And it's amorphous . And again , it always seemed to me to be more of an instrument of HQN than sort of something emergent organically from Afghanistan . So you get into a mire of dirty games and power .
But there's something more subtle in here A fully functional , democratic Afghanistan that was aligned to the West United States .
If you look at that in the context of the Iraq War as well , if the US had succeeded there , then it would have built two westernized democracies on Iran's border , and then Pakistan would be economically threatened by displacement or whatever from Afghanistan .
So it was never in the interest of Iran or Pakistan to have a successful Afghanistan , not one line to the west . So it was always , always , always being undermined throughout that whole process . And there's another reason that the mission lost and it may have at some point , you know , kind of been an objective , like you know .
Well , if we can stand up this westernized democracy , maybe we can lean on Iran harder . So it's just it's . Afghanistan needs its own future and it needs its own future that represents the people that live in that country and it's , it's . It's an ethnic tapestry and it's it produces many brilliant people .
But unfortunately those futures , under the Taliban , just don't have an opportunity to be realized . The Taliban are an economic and political cul-de-sac . They cannot create a society capable of ingenuity or creativity in really any aspect . It's not possible .
And that's another one of the many , many , many tragedies , the moral injury to Afghans , to everybody who supported trying to help your people have a brighter future . I've said many times over , some of the smartest people I have met in my life are Afghans and many of them are Afghan women Brilliant , far , far smarter than I am , and that bothers me every day .
Just these futures put on hold .
But you know , but you know how we , you know how you find your way out of it is the , the people of the country , I guess , have to realize that they have one common enemy and it's an enemy of humanity , because it restricts your ability to use your talents to be an independent thinker , to to have really any form of of creativity . You couldn't .
It's not , you know . To go back to what you said about the golden age of Islam , that did produce incredible mathematics and science , and their culture doesn't , the Talib culture doesn't allow that , um , and it's not . It's not an Islamic thing , it's a Talib thing , it's an extremist thing , but it's , you know , the people of Afghanistan collectively .
Hopefully one day , sooner than later . You know , the NRF has distinguished itself as a model of resistance for a number of reasons .
We touched on this before the conversation because the NRF has focused only on military targets , so there's a legitimacy to the resistance of the NRF , whereas the Talibs' aggression was directed at civilians , was directed at destruction , was directed at destroying schools , was directed at destroying bridges , roads , directed at destroying social cohesion and hopefully , at some
point , the collective international community realizes that it's been talking to the wrong people realizes that it's been talking to the wrong people .
You know , scott , that's spot on your points about Afghanistan needing to shape its own future .
That's , I think , the most vital message , along with the message of unity , that being the prerequisite in all honesty and fairness , um , but the afghanistan needing to shape its own future , the issue of self-determination , you know , this is something that today , in many parts of the world , is a is , is a matter , um , and you know , with the doha deal
specifically , right um , that's a matter where we , every time I think about it , it's , I remember , the betrayal that , not just for the people of afghanistan , but the people of the united states of america as well , I , as an american , feel betrayed as well , not just as an avian , right um , we were not included in any part of the Doha deal as well , right ,
so , but in any case , you know , give what you touched on right now at the end , your insights on the NRF and the , the national resistance front , mentioning how you know it is an independent , well , also , and it is an indigenous force playing a significant role in this .
Given what you've mentioned about the NRF , what kind of counterterrorism strategies do you think ? I know this is your field of expertise . I'm asking you know what strategies have proven effective in the region so far ? And then , how can you know international organizations ? You did mention that you know .
maybe the international community should start engaging with the right people , and that being the nrf right , but how can these organizations and local communities collaborate more effectively with groups like the NRF to support Afghanistan in securing its own ?
future . There's two different states that you're in in a counterterrorism situation . One is where you're a sort of a functioning democratic or whatever whatever it doesn't have to be democratic or a functioning society which has a tradition of rule . Be that , however , it is Peace and security . Yeah , that comes under attack from a group that's seeking to take power .
We're in a situation where that force has taken power and , you know , albeit and people need to understand the word de facto in this context actually means illegitimate . De facto in this context means assumes power by means , not in a constitutional or process . It actually we just don't say illegitimate , that's what it means legally speaking .
It actually we just don't say illegitimate , that's what it means legally speaking .
So , where this goes and this was something I think I probably wrote a paper on in 2017 or 18 , that if the Taliban came to power eventually , it would most likely devolve into a bifurcation of the country , with sort of the tall sort of stronghold in the south , because they won't be able to economically maintain the country as one body for for a period of time
. So a devolution or a collapse is inevitable , and then they all harden up and then revert to becoming a , you know , a proto-narco state .
So realistically , um , you know'd have to look at it area by area , whether that's in the northern area that comes under not necessarily NRF control , but capture of territory and then some kind of civil element to that territory and then some kind of civil element to that , because the role of recapturing a nation from a despotic force isn't to have the military
assume power , it's to hand it back to civil control . And the moment that you can have somewhere that's secure and safe , then you can start to stage the humanitarian aid and intervention from somewhere that's the territory that's under control and then you can start to create more economic activity .
But the inevitability is that the Taleb model will drive it to collapse at some point and probably compounded with our chaotic weather that we have affecting agriculture . The North is probably more capable of reducing agriculture than the South . We have greater strain , so there'll be a number of confluent factors that come in .
But if you had a stable zone of control that you can gradually expand out from , you know Pangea is a great defensive area . You know Punggye is a great defensive area , but it's hard to maintain an economy there despite its emeralds and other wealth . You've got to be able to transport those . You've got to be able to sell those .
You've got to get it to market . If you talk about border areas , I mean unfortunately the Talibs have just created so much terrorist or extremist force in Kunduz and Badakhshan you'd have to write them off . But places like Herat Maz . Herat's got good tribe water area .
You can trade with your neighboring countries , you can have degrees of stability there , but you have to have some sort of zone of control that you can grow from . But at a point the Tau'abs may just collapse under their own weight and that's .
There's something I do a lot of called scenario modeling , where you project the trajectories of certain events and the intersection of certain events to try to understand where things can go , and then you watch what happens to see where it's headed and which of the scenarios is most likely to outcome .
And then you have a plan for those scenarios , because you don't want to be caught in a situation where there's a catastrophic collapse of , say , the Taliban and that causes a devolution into civil war with competing jihadist powers .
Isis makes a play , or one of the other tribes makes a play for control , al-qaeda makes a play , or one of the other tribes makes a play for control , al-qaeda makes a play , and then the whole thing becomes even worse . So you want to have a plan to say , look , this is getting out of control . This is the way that we can have some modicum of stability .
That's somewhere else , you know , it's not Kabul , it's not Kandahar , but we have to create a zone where we can begin to work from .
Thank you , Scott , for those valuable insights . This has been an enlightening discussion . Dear viewers and listeners , thank you for joining us on this episode of the Radio Resistance Podcast . Before ending , Scott , I didn't ask you did you have any final thoughts , remarks , anything you wanted to add , I do .
I mean , I spend a lot of my time with reasonable degrees of accuracy , being able to anticipate where events go , and where we are now is I don't have an answer for .
We're in such a point where the problem has become so great and its implications beyond Afghanistan so significant that finding our way out of this I talk a lot about off ramps and and those sorts of things from violence or something of it .
I've been , I've been dealing with Israel , hamas for a great deal , trying to find off ramps and dealing with that at an extremely high level . But I can't sort of look at the collective weight of instability at the moment and we really need to do better .
We really need to have different thinking inside the west , whether that's in the us or in london or in paris or germany or geneva , because if we don't find a way out of this soon , it's going to be that much harder to deal with and the costs to humanity will be that much greater .
And when I use the word humanity , I don't mean that in a general sort of way .
I mean to the suffering of individuals , to the mothers , to the children , to those people affected by these things , to the children , to those people affected by these things and to be in a position , for me personally , where I just could generally get a good feel of what was going to come next .
It's incredibly disconcerting to not we talked about trajectories and scenario models .
It's so hard right now to kind of work out where one can act to best effect in the interests of preserving human life and and afghanistan is so much at the heart of so much it just feel , I think , that people just don't understand how important it is and when we come back again , and how important that it has self-determination , that it decides its own future
, and when . That was something that I had when I was in afghanistan in these various roles . And when we come back again , and how important that it has self-determination , that it decides its own future , and that was something that I had when I was in Afghanistan in these various roles .
You know , I would always want to listen to , I wanted to hear what the Afghan people I was lucky enough to work with had to tell me to teach me about your country .
I was a visitor but you know , and there's brilliant , brilliant minds in that country and they need to be given the opportunity for self-determination more than capable , and the youth , particularly that didn't grow up with the culture of corruption so much that believed in a future , need to be kind of rehydrated with that amazing passion and energy that they have ,
and we need to listen to Afghans , like you said , excluded from Doha , excluded from conversations vital to the future of the country .
We cannot make those mistakes again and , yeah , I worry for the future of the country , but I also do believe that the Talibs will collapse under their own weight at some point and that I just hope that , when that moment comes , there's an element of preparedness so that something better can follow .
Thank you , scott . Thank you , thank you so much for those final remarks . You know , truly , your insights have been incredibly valuable , as always , and , uh , we both deeply appreciate , you know , the depth of your expertise and the clarity you bring to these very complex issues .
It's not just not here on this , in this conversation , discussion , uh , today , uh , following you on social media , I think , think , to our dear viewers and listeners . Please do follow , scott . The clarity again is something rare nowadays .
Thank you for having me on . It's a privilege , scott . I always say that Afghanistan as a country gave me so much more than I brought to it . You know , it's truly an experience that shaped me as a human being .
My time there , my time with yourselves , my time with others it's been just such an important part of helping me become who I am , as a better person , and I'm honored for that and honored to have spent time in the country .
God bless you , scott .
You know it's these bonds , it's these bonds that , truly , despite the betrayals and abandonments by governments , it's these bonds that are forever the eternal ones , that , no matter how plagued a nation may get by some sort of cancer , like the terrorism , like the Taliban , the true spirit of Afghanistan , you know , is allied today with the rest of the world , like
yourself , and we have allies like yourself . That's what I'm trying to say . So , yeah , thank you again , um uh for joining us and , you know , sharing your profound uh knowledge . Um , I appreciate it to be a guest yeah , thanks for joining us to our viewers , uh , and listeners . Thank you again for tuning in to the radio resistance podcast .
Do not forget to subscribe to our youtube channel , follow us on social media and stay up to stay updated on our latest episodes . Stay informed and stay safe until next time . Take care . Thanks for watching .