Maziyar Ghiabi on Iran: the World's Most Fascinating Drug Policy

any type of drugs. Hello, Psychoactive listeners. Today we're going to talk about the drug problem and drug policies in a particular country. Probably no other country in the world has had such a fluid and counterintuitive history of rugs as Iran. So my guest today is a professor Maziar Gabi. We crossed paths a few months ago in Mexico City at the conference of the Society of Alcohol and Droyg

Historians UH. He's a distinguished professor or lecturer at the University of Exeter in the UK now where he heads the Center of Persian and Iranian Studies. He wrote a book about drugs and politics and Iran and it's a fantastic description of what's happened, especially during the years since Iran became the Islamic Republic with the revolution in nineteen seventy nine. So Masira, thank you ever so much for joining me on Psychoactive. Hi Don and hi to everyone.

It's a pleasure to be here. What I want to say is I've been fascinated by Iran. Really, I think early two thousand, Maziar and almost out of the blue, the government in Iran and the Minister of Justice basically issued a fatua. If I have these facts right, declare that method on maintenance and needle exchange, We're okay under

Islamic law. And I just found that fast. I remember I was at a conference at International Harmoniament conference, I think it was in in Northern Ireland, Belfast in two thousand five, and remember standing up as part of my speech there and talking about the fact that that I had told Iran it just issued a thought was saying that all of this was okay, and that meanwhile, our own, quote unquote I had told the United States would not

do something differently. So that's what initially caught my attention on this thing. But at the same time, Iran has been a country that's been highly repressive. It's had the death penalty for drug offenses, It's had huge, you know, battles with narco traffickers. So let me just start off by asking you the question what got you interested in

looking in this drug issue in Iran. You know, I was a student in my late twenties and I was doing fieldwork in Iran for other purposes, and I noticed that, you know, all around me and everyone I met basically, and also lots of organizations on the ground were active

in the field of drug policy and drug treatment. And I started looking for potential articles that could inform me a bit more, and I saw nothing, basically, and so I decided basically to take the case of drugs both historically and in terms of you know, like real life and life world. There's a case study and they spent about seven eight years on the subject, and I'm still

working on it and collaborating on it. One thing that's been striking about Iran is that, really, since the end of the war with Iraq in the late eighties, the drug issue seems to have been the number one issue in public opinion, at least in terms of social issues, um almost continuously for decades. I mean, tell me if

that's accurate. First of all, but I can also see why this is such a fascinating issue, why I must have been curious that there was so little writing about it give and how important it's been in Iranian politics and culture. Absolutely, of course during the eighties. You know, Iran had been through so much in just less than

a decade. Basically, we had the revolution in nineteen seventy nine, with all that a revolution means, you know, it's not simply an event, it's just a dramatic, profound change in people's life and in the way people imagine the futures as well. In the war, you know, a brutal war basically, you know, one of the war that was fought basically in the same way that First World War and Second World War we fought, so you know, trenches and you

know this kind of stuff. But at the same time, I should actually sort I mentioned that while all of this was happening, the drug issue and was still at the very sort of core of political issues and political concerns for their and in government right after the revolution. I mean, I just can't recall a statement by the late Ayatollahomany, you know, the leader of the revolution and the supreme leader of Iran in the eighties, that he said that we have to fight the war on two fronts.

The first front we all know about it, it's the war against Iraq an Iraqi aggression. But the second front, which was not at all less important, was the war against dragon addiction. So this is just to give you a sense of how entrenched it was with the political history of revolution in Iran and also the way basically it made me understand that it was a topic that had deep roots in the post revolutionary history of Iran and so it really needed to be discussed with all

your attention. Now, if we bring it down to the drug issue, one of the things that Iran has in common with other countries, especially in Asia, is opium has been part of its history for thousands of years. And if you jump to the present right now, um my understanding.

We all of times think about the US is having one of the biggest opia problems in the world, but if you look per capita, Iran and Pakistan and Afghanistan are probably the three countries with the highest per capita opium use and addiction rates by my opius, I say, opium and heroin and other you know opiates um in the world. So MASI are Now I've sort of provided

this broader context. I mean, what more can you tell us then about sort of the Iran special relationship with opium going back historically, you know, opium has had a very important historical role in both Iran's economy and in Iranian social sort of traditions and social life. From the late nineteenth century, the Iranian economy and I can culture shifts towards the cultivation of the poppy. That was connected also to the sort of increased demands for copy related products,

particularly opium, across the world. And that shifting agricultural production has profound effects on on the way Iranian if you want to shift to capitalism happens, you know, with capital accommodation, with new cash crops, you know, instead of uh, you know,

food crops. For a country which up to you know, a century ago, it was mostly agricultural and producing food for his own consumption, that was a massive, massive change which had its own effects of course on the rising opium consumption on the vast scale that you know, we witness of course from the early twentieth century with people oftimes failed to realize is that opium is integrated into

many societies in some respects, almost like alcohol. I mean, you have the United States in the late nineteenth century far more people using um opius in various forms than is the case today. It's in you know, loud and m liquid. Opius has used as you know, this is the day before they had aspirin or penicillan, so when they had bad sanitation. So opium is really sort of

a universal pain reliever throughout much of the world. Now, what you see happening in I think Southwest Asia and but also in Southeast Asia is that it's also very commonly used, not just among lower class but among upper class. It's seen as not just being something that's a soporific, but sometimes they can be a stimulant um. You know, it's not just you know, sort of opium dens but high end almost like cocktail lounge versions of these things. And you see this in China, you see it in

parts of India, obviously, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran. You see it among the Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia, but in the Iran do you think it goes even deeper than it does in the neighboring countries of like sat Pakistan and

Afghanistan and elsewhere. This is really interesting question. Um. Perhaps in the run um opium culture really sort of became a social practice that characterized really sort of the higher lead as well as the middle class and the lower class, but of course in different forms and different qualities of products being consumed. And this is particularly true when we speak about the sort of pre revolutionary period, I mean certain parts of around uh, the whole social life really

turned around meeting, drinking tea, smoking opition. And this was mostly done in private settings at home of well of people, which had you know, specific quarters and rooms where open was consumed smoked mostly through a specific type of pipe which in i run is called four. It's a valiation of a Chinese pipe. It's very peculiar to Iran and and also quite interesting and esthetically I would say pleasing when you when you look at it, I mean you know it's a pipe and the head of which is

in the shape of a poppy. Uh and uh. And and of course that many of course valiations and precious ones of course have inscribed poetic versus and poetical lines, which shows you how deeply ingrained opium consumption, particularly opum smoking,

had become by the turn of the twentieth century. It is true that opium has always more or less been part of social life in Iran and also the practice of self care and medical care in premodern times, but prior to the twentieth century it was mostly eaten in the forms of pills actually, you know, and Iran still now.

When someone is really uh, sort of a local and speaks, you know, with ease in public, people can always make a comment say, oh, he's a talio key, which in person means he's an opium music, because you know, maintaining calm and lucidity of thought while being in front of the public is not easy. I mean, we may say that the equivalent of this is, you know, some people use so called smart drugs, you know, pharmaceutical products that help them to maintain concentration and think faster when they

need to deliver speeching in public. I mean, you know, prior to the revolution, I mean, there was widespread acceptance even even in quarters of government, regarding opium use. Of course, this is shifting and has shifted. I mean over the course of the twentieth century, uh, you know, mostly by

adopting westernized ideas of consumption and entertainment. You know, so alcohol has become a less sort of stigmatized so do product, whereas drugs such as opium among the younger generation is seen as something that really belongs to another era and it's more stigmatized. I would say, So it is much more you sort of common to see someone drinking nowadays, in especially in the in the larger urban centers than

smoking opium among you know, new generations of it. Well, let me askee this because visu, the alcohol, I mean, alcohol is traditionally Haram. It's prohibited in Islamic culture. And you say, unlike say East Asia, where societies have alcohol and they have opium, in Iran you have a place where opium and I guess cannabis for that matter, are not Haran. They're not you know, technically forbidden under Islamic law.

But alcohol is. And is there something about the prohibition on alcohol that actually gives opium a more a sort of added special value. And it's in Islamic society and an Iranian society. The fact is that really what happens after nineteen seventy nine, with the revolution, is that Romany declares opium to be around, and that was embraced more

or less by the rest of the clergy. It is interesting because with the Islamization, you know, if you want of governance and government, the distinction between religion and sort of public law is blurred, and therefore what is forbidden in you know, in the legal order of the country. In that case, like all drugs, including opium, cocaine and whatever, they all become forbidden also for religion. So actually the country of what we would normally think that religion sort

of imposes, you know, it's decreased upon public life. It's it's the adoption of you know, the international sort of anti narcotic discourse that makes religious leaders to to ban religious to cree I mean by by by basically declaring a fatwa religious decree and and calling opium and other substances as around. So nowadays most of the clergy would have no doubt in saying that in Islam all narcotic

substances and all illicit drugs are also around. But what you said is interesting because prior to this sort of moment of embraced by very religious leaders of of of sort of drug prohibition opium and cannabis, but mostly opium was seen as less problematic, more indigenous than alcoholic beverages. So and that of course has had an effect on how people generally and the general population perceived the substance.

But it is also it is itself also sort of showing that these substances were widespread, whereas alcohol in general, fire the mid twenty cent tree was not really readily available across the country. So it may have been available in major cities, but you know, most people wouldn't drink. There is a sort of a tradition of kind of homebrew of beer or other sorts of things throughout the throughout Iran in rural areas. Of course, yeah, that these

traditions mostly connected also to minorities. So you know, Armenian and Jewish minorities in Iran, which were you know, rather large groups up to the twentieth century had the right, the legal right to brew and particular to produce wine. But also some Iranian producers. But I would say that it was less common for rural communities to drink the time, and drinking was mostly I wouldn't say exclusively but mostly a practice carried out by by you know, sort of

upper classes m h. Whereas open was classless. You know. Now there is a fascinating phase ease in Iranian drug policy in the seventies which I want to raise in part because I was in part shocked that I did

not know about it. I've talked in past episodes, as in Psychoactive, about what happens in the first half of the twentieth century when the global drug prohibition regime is emerging in you know, with the US playing a powerful proselytizing role, but other government's active as well, and they're and it's focused really on opium and opium control of conventions in the first nineteen o nine opium control of

conventions and the subsequent conventions. And as a result, what happens both in Southwest Asia and Southeast Asia is that opium control systems are set up, registration systems where people, generally the elderly in Southeast Asia is oftentimes the Chinese minorities can basically register, not unlike registering for say, a method on program, and then get their opium in clinics

or pharmacies. And the system is tax and it becomes a fairly orderly way of dealing with opium, and a somewhat more regulated way in both Southwest Asia and Southeast Asia. But then the kind of you know, prohibitionist mentality in the US results in that thing being shut down. Now, what happens in the middle of the twentieth century, um is that most of these opium monopoly opium control systems get shut down under pressure from the US, from the

League of Nations, from the United Nations. So that you get to the nineteen fifties and sixties, and basically there are essentially, as far as I know, no such opium maintenance systems in existence. And then out of the blue, at least from where I'm looking, the Shah in nineteen

sixty nine or seventy decides to reinitiate this program. And so by the middle late seventies you now have Iran, as I think, the only country in the world within opium maintenance regular story system like the ones that existed earlier in the century two thou people registered. So I mean, I it's reading about this in your book, mus I mean, how does this happen? Why does this happen? Why does the Shah who is so keen for close relationships with the you know, the US and so keen on modernization.

How did and why does that happen at that time? Yeah, that's the question I have asked myself as well. And I mean the response I come up with, I hope is exhaustive, is that it was a sort of combination

of events and of situations. Basically, you know, first of all, something that comes as a surprise, often he's not a surprise because when we look back at the history of drug policy in Iran and the approach that sort of successive Iranian governments had during the twentieth century visa the opium, I noticed at least that there were examples of an interest in maintenance policies on opium already early in the twentieth century. This was right after the first convention of

open control in nineteen o nine. In nineteen twelve, but of course I ran you know, from then onwards starts to basically restrict the sort of approachated test towards opium. By nineteen sixty nine, after fourteen years of restrict militarized eradication of the poppy and opium economy in Iran, they shall decides as you said, to introduce this sort of

regulated market and medicalized program of open distribution. This happens basically because while I RUN had prohibited opening production and public cultivation from nineteen fifty five onwards, Afghanistan and Turkey kept producing large amounts of opium and opium, much of it you know, enter the Run illegally, and Iran having had, you know, throughout twentieth century a large population of opium and herron uses, and particularly from nineties and fifty seven

herron appeared in I RUN, so quite early on actually in terms of herring culture, the shah and and the entourage of course of the shah Uh, in order to put pressure on American allies, but mostly and And and the United States in particular, decided to go back to a regulated, medicalized program, which basically would cut the link between Afghan opium and opiate producers and Iranian criminal organizations distributing illicit opium inside Iran, and the state would basically

took over the opium economy. And what is interesting is that so we would expect that with the regulated market for the opium, you know, supervised by medical professionals, the approach towards drug offenses might be milder, you know, more lenient, but what happens is quite the country. We have a regulated, you know, state monopoly of opium, and the state actually

applies the death penalty against drug traffickers. What is the rational behind this, I mean, in the rational in my view, is that really the path of the state, and the Shah wanted to make sure that since now opium is in the interests of the state, it's you know, it's part of the state economy. They have no competitors and elicit criminal organizations basically do not increased prices in order

to compete with the legal economy of opium. And as I understand it, the market was sort of half older people over the age of sixty who had sort of more liberal access to the opium, and then a whole the other half of the where people were younger who could get it, you know, basically recommend it by a doctor, not unlike the way that medical marijuana has been recommended by doctors in the US, where it could be used

for pain or even for I guess, treating addiction. I mean, do I have that right from what I read in your book exactly exactly, so you know, over sixty people could just go and and get their basically ratio of opium easily from a pharmacy, and people under sixty needed you know, a GP, a doctor, a physician to prescribe you know them opium, and and the reasons for prescription were the most different. I mean, you know, it could be from you know, I have a chronic dependence to opium,

so I need opium and that was sufficient. Or I have back pain, I have a headache, I have you know, stomach problems. And there was really a long list of potential reasons for which you could be prescribed opium. Mm hmm. So why is he run the only country in the world to do this? I mean, other countries have powerful traditions that you know, going back hundreds of not thousands of years of opium use in Southwest Asia, Southern Asia,

and Southeast Asia, but none of them do it. I mean, to the extent that you've looked at other countries in the world, you have any idea why Iran was alone in doing this in the seventies. It's really a good question. I mean, it's often easier to say why someone does

something rather than why they don't do it. But I guess, I guess, you know, the sort of growing sort of assertiveness of past of Iran in the seventies is surely I think in case, I mean, in my view, from the cases absent foreign pressure, particularly US pressure on drug control have been really really influential in the shaping of policy, especially following the fifties. So after the Second World War.

On the other hand, I may say that, you know, Iran had a large portion of the population that consumed opium. Without this habits becoming a manifest problem, something that you know, would cause a sort of moral outrage in the public. I'm sure there are other cases in which in which there has been widespread use of opium without you know, what some people you know, called moral panic. But but in general, I you know, if you go beyond opium

and look at coca and cocaine. You know, countries in Latin America nowadays are trying to move towards a regulated market. I mean, of course, Latin America being too close to the northern neighbor to the US makes things very difficult. But you know, the interest and and sort of division is there putting it into place. Sometimes it is really costly and in a way. I mean, Bolivia and Peru do stand out as being somewhat unique in maintaining the

legal status of coca. I mean, right from the beginning, they make it clear that they're signing out international conventions, but they have a special p which to be abow to do this, which it seems that none of the countries that had opium as their core traditional uh sort of psychotropic psychoactive plant product, we're able to do early on. I think, I mean, it's I think this is an

excellent point. I mean, the fact is that although opium has always had a place in the cultural life of Iran and other countries where you know, open is important India, China, Afghanistan, Pakistan, I mean you and many other places including Turkey, it never became an uncontested substance. I mean, what I mean is that with modernization, with the establishment of the sort

of modern nation state across the world. You know, we're talking about the late nineteenth century, early tenth century, open was contentious because part of the population and part of the elites so as undermining the efforts to basically create a modern nation that was not indulging in you know, sort of unproductive habit and and and and of course part of the elites were also consuming opium, so you know there were different debates around around what to do

with these substances. I mean, Iran itself, you know, has had long, long debates since the nineteenth century about what to do with opium, whether to ban it, not to ban it, and these debates actually predated, you know, many of the drug policy debates that we you know, we've

been looking at starting from early twentieth century. So because the substance is indigenous to around and has been part of the cultural and political life, you know, the opinions are divergent, but you know, at different moments and different sort of political conditions, you know, specific groups had the upper hand. You know, some times where the prohibsionists sometimes we're not the prohibsionist. Again, let's let's the first shot. You know, he established a modern state in ninety five.

You know, he was about to establish a republic of course, because he was a military leader, you know, so he was he was a soldier, so you know, there was no reason for him to establish a monarchy. But then under foreign pressure, republics were seen as more unruly and Le's culptable. You know, he was persuaded to establish a monarchy. And you know, as a soldier, you know, he really believed in you know, more than his ideas of nation

building through the army and development programs. But you know, also as in Iranian you know, he had developed the habit of smoking opium. This was quite ambiguous, you know for someone who you know, was westernizing Iran. So you know, from then onwards, really, you know, opium had this ambiguous

place in Iranian politics. And and sometimes the policy is put in place where not really representative of of the cultural practice or even of the ideas of people in power unless so people you know, like we're part of, you know, sort of ordinary social groups. We'll be talking more after we hear this ad. You know, I remember

I meant seventy nine and I was twenty two. I was graduating from college, And I mean the Iranian revolution that shot is out i Atollah many returns, the establishment of what appeared to us as a the theocratic dictatorship in the Iran and and people you know, they're you know, both political dissidents but also drug users and drug dealers

are being executed or tordtured or in prison. So that period of the nineteen eighties, Um, I mean, obviously there's this major war, you know, launched by Sodom Hussein that drags on throughout the eighties and like a half a million people die, most of the Iranian So this is amazing drain on Iran. But at the same time, Um, there is this war on drugs going on. And I

think there's a line you're using your book. I don't know if you're quoting somebody else or if it's yours, but you say, the prohibition of drugs and alcohol became a new religion. So this period, this first decade under Howmany and where the current Ayatollah how many how Many was at that point was the president in the eighties, I mean, is it all about just shutting down everything,

being as doctrinaire, as religious as possible. And is this a period in the last forty years when there is a sort of more religiously driven drug policy which then really morphs into something quite different thereafter. Yeah, I mean the line you met ancient his mind. I'm very happy about that line because in the way I actually believe that, you know, prohibitionist regime throughout the world are quite religiously driven,

I mean in their sort of dogmatism. But yes, with the Islamic Revolution, really with drugs entered the political realm, you know, openly, and you know they association with drugs are seen as country revolutionary and that means you know, punished with you know what is often the punishment of people being seen as country revolutionary, which is you know, through revolutionary courts and with very harsh punishments, you know, including the death sentence sold Holly, which was the first

public prosecutor of the Islamic Republic in nineteen seventy nine, nine eighty. This is so somehow forgotten from the annals of history. When he was appointed first public prosecutor, he was also appointed at the same time the first head

of Anti Narcotics of the Islamic Republic. So the two appointments went hand in hand because of course, you know, political repression and repression of narcotics were seen as you know, absolutely connected to each other, and often political opponents and people connected to the Patavi state and pat La vi elite. We're seen also as either indulging in a drug consumption

or involved in law skate transnational drug trafficking. This sort of framework of treatment of addiction and the sort of medicalized policy for opium uses is disbanded immediately after the revolution, but the political leadership provides a six month period two people who were on the program to kick their habit, basically, that's what they say, and they provide them with the

opium prescription. But they decide, and this is a clear ideological decision on behalf of the new revolutionary government to import opium from India rather than using opium from poppy fields in Iran, just to make sure that the message is clear, they will not tolerate the popular economy in Iran whatsoever. So clearly, the particularly the first two years after the revolution is the most sort of prohibitionist of all.

It is also instrumental, you know, after revolution, having very harsh punishments for something that's was more or less widespread prior was very instrumental to put people in jail, opponents in jail, or people who were like not useful, and and of course, I mean, you know, all sorts of terrible stories going on with you know, people using drugs in those years, and I refer to some of these in my book. These are also you know, sort of common knowledge and Run, and it's written in Run as well.

I mean that, you know, the treatment of drug uses following the revolution wasn't really particularly you know, sort of laudable or you know, right, I mean, it's I mean, it's harsh punishment, it's public shaming, all of the sort of primitive approaches that we sort of look compound with contempt.

I think even there at the day, I mean there was even some negative reaction from members of the Iranian public, I mean even legitimate sources who saw some of what kal Kali was doing is antithetical to some core Islamic principles,

right absolutely. I mean, you know what is interesting, and this is I think quite sort of I knew, I guess to for an audience that is not really sort of perhaps interested in the in Iran or you know, follows news about Irun mostly from newspapers and online outlets, that the debate within Iran, even during the height of

the revolution, has always been quite diverse. I mean, the you know, always multiple lines of criticism have existed within the history of the Islamic Republic, but also multiple lines of repression. Of course, that that needs to be said. People criticize really I mean, perhaps it is useful to know that today I told, really is not someone who

celebrated in Iran. Quite the contrary. He's seen as a as a tragic, shameful or somehow character of the revolution, but he basically represents the harshest face of that revolution. I mean himself. I mean I read his diaries and his autobiography. When appointed the head of the Anti Narcotics Bureau, he said that he was aware that this will leave you know, a terrible, a terrible legacy for himself in history.

He was aware, you know that the position and the situation, the revolution situation, uh would be violent, and this would of course mean that you know, his legacy in history would be associated to the violence of disease. So when we get to the late nineteen eighties, I mean, there's obviously this period of the drug war in the first decade of the Islamic regime um. But at the same time, heroin uses increasing, and you know, there's a phenomens beginning

to happen throughout other parts developing world. You know, also in East Agea, which has very you know, very harsh views on drugs, but you have the beginnings of concerns about the spread of HIV AIDS among drug users. You had the beginning have talk among health officials and civil society groups. And this happens not just an Iran, but other places about whether they need to adopt some of the measures in the in the West, like needle exchange,

like method on maintenance. But what's distinctive about Iran is that when this gets going, it gets going on a level and a magnitude that is unparalleled virtually anywhere else in the world. I mean, I remember being in Malaysia and nearly two thousands and there was a little couple a couple of small needle exchange programs in the big cities in the beginning of methanol programing. Has something similar

going on in in in Vietnam, something similar Indonesia. You had parts of India that have been repressed at beginning to embrace these sorts of things. Um, I mean, China starts to get into in a bigger way, also in the context of a very you know, harsh drug policy. But I'd say apart from China, Iran is the one that embraces this in a way. And you know, beginning in the nineteen nineties and certainly when you it into the arts, unlike really anywhere else in the world. And

so what explains that? Is it a magnitude the problem or a spirit of pragmatism or what do you say? Thanks for this question. I mean it really makes me think as well. While I'm speaking to a certain extent, I think that is something you know, which is inherent in revolutionary regimes, that they are prone to extreme policies, of course in the immediate aftermath and afterlife of the revolution.

But at the same time they are always always sort of capable of of change and dynamism in post intervention, contrary to you know, other states to school countries you know, where revolutions have not happened. I mean, what happens in Iran is again a conjuncture, I guess. You know. Of course, on the one hand, uh, there is an undeniable public health problem. You know, this is you know, basically in HIV epidemic which starts in prison, which affects regions, the

entire regions. I mean, these are regions mostly affected by the Iran Iraq War, which itself actually, you know, it's quite it's quite interesting because you see how the sort of deep, deep effect conflict leaves it stains, you know, on on on on the health of the wider population even decade a decade after that. So we're talking about the western regions of around that having initially an HIV epidemic,

which then moves the general population. You know, it starts from injecting drug uses incarcerated and then moves to their wives, their families, their children, and so on and so forth. So when you look at other elements of the Muslim world, you don't see that flexibility there much more like the US. And what I'm curious about, I mean, I mean in the Arab world, I mean, you see almost very little in the way of progressive drug policies, and it's very

difficult getting harm reduction going. And um, if you look um, you know in Muslim you know, countries like Indonesia, I mean, little bits, but very difficult to get it going. And what I wonder how much of this has to do with the fact that Iran is primarily as she Sa religion as opposed to Soony, is there is there a greater flexibility in the Shia perspectives on dealing with these issues that allowed this to happen, Or is it you

think primarily other elements. I mean, I personally think that this sort of shea element might have some influence in terms of the flexibility of interpretation that is given to religious tourists, but it's not a sort of determining fact. I mean the other issues I think that I have influenced this, and part of it has to do with

Iran's history of experiment action in drug policy. And this goes during the Islamic Revolution, during the Islamic Republic Empire, Islamic Revolution, so you know, the last hundred years of drug policy experimentation and the activism of social groups and even political elites that have been keen in looking at alternative policies, not only in the field of drugs, but in other fields of public health and social policy. You know,

I can make few examples. For instance, perhaps one example that my interest people listening is that from the late eighties onwards, Iran has a state sanctioned, state provided program for sex reassignment. So that means that if you you know, if people want to change their gender, and you know, and from men to women or woman to men, the Iranian uh public authorities prob I support for that in terms of financial support as well as psychological and health support.

Is this unique in the Islamic world? But in terms of drug policy, I see, I think that, you know, she a jurisprudence enabled flexibility in terms of finding a solution that is that can be basically seen as legitimate. So that would be the case in Sunny jurisprudence. Is that right? The fact is that in Suna jurisprudence there is not a clear jurisprudential order. There are different schools of taught and schools of interpretation, but the role of

the jurists is less prominent than in she Islam. In she Islam, every sort of every person has to during his life basically to follow a living jurists and as long as this person is alive, his interpretation of the law, which is connected also to everyday matters, very much like in Judaism. You know, can I do this or can I live? You know, as with someone who's doing this as a neighbor or things like that. Sometimes very trivial matters. I can refer to this person to basically explain me

what is the correct religious behavior? Well, you know, if I can mention something is that we did the study a few years ago in which we contacted the sort of leading religious jurists in the shil world, and we asked them whether they're, you know, proven that scientific research confirms that marianna has a medical benefit for people using it. Would you be fine with, you know, a government approving a medical marianna program, a medical cannabis program. And almost

all of them agreed with this assertion. None of them said, no, marianna is always and regardless of any situation, illegal or around. They all said, if there is proven medical evidence, of course a Muslim can consume marijuana for health benefits, very clearly and very shortly. So the fact is that she had jurious prudence claims to be always updated with the world of today, as it is also intalmoodic Judaism. Of course, the fact is that, you know, why do you have

rabbis interpreting the law constantly? Because the things of the world change and changing situation require changing interpretations. Of course, within a very conservative framework. Doesn't mean, you know, there's a sudden change in you know, like food processing, and you know a rabbi says, no, you know, you can eat this on Saturday. You know that's not not gonna happen, and the same as in she Adjurius prudence, of course.

But what I mean is when that that specific cultural, social, and political conditions in which, for instance, cannabis might be seen as ptomatically useful within the I running context, for instance, or for that matter, opium, it is not unlikely to think that there would be a religious fatua a decree that will legitimize the use of it. But it was the most I realize I'm working, I have so much

talk about we're gonna be running out of time. So one thing that's to an Iran that is common what you see in other places is that part of what gets harm reduction going in the late eighties and nineties, both what you're talking about the United States, we're talking about Europe, or in a later period developing world, it's basically has some combination of kind of activists harm reduction activists of sort of courageous physicians, of people in public

health circles who are aware of what's going on in the nationally who see the threat of HIV eights taking off both in the broader society or in prisons. And it seems to me that also happens in Iran, and you have some heroic characters. I had a little bit

of contact with them in past years. One Bijon I don't know how to pronounce his last name, and then and then the two doctor brothers to say a little bit about something, the role that they play and who their allies are, and really getting harm reduction going and ultimately embraced by some of the more theocratic leaders within Iran. Yeah, I mean the sertain harm reduction is is the multilayered one. So they were different actors, some of whom, of course

you met, but there were many others as well. Some of them, you know, operated below the radar, as I say in my books. Some of them were within the government teams itself, you know. So you had policymakers and lawmakers that were persuaded that, of course, at the time they existing laws were really harming public health for the general population, not only for drug use. So they embraced harm reduction basically, as one of my interlocutives said, lights off,

so like driving lights off. So they started implementing, you know, sort of programs. This is early two thousand's, so a few years before I run legalizes harm reduction in two thousand five, and so you have this sort of alliance between people in government and geo's so civic society groups and drug uses sort of pressure groups and the epidemic, which is the contextual event that kind of puts pressure

on everyone. And at the same time you also had ahead of judiciary and he was he was an Ayatolla himself, who who very conservative, you know, not prone to you know, sort of liberalizing ideas or things like that. He's convinced after a few meetings with high ranking people in the

in the public institutions to adopt harm reduction. I mean, there was sort of negotiations between those who were working on the ground and implementing sort of informal harm reduction policies and interventions and people in government who basically conveyed the ideas and the practices that were put in place to those who could actually you know, change the law. But I think the even more extraordinary event is not simply a the run adopted harm reduction, but it's the

scale of the programs that were adopted. So in the method of you know, a few years, I mean by two thousand tents, So in five years, Iran adopted method on maintenance programs, and then introduced needle exchange programs, and then later introduced opium tincture which is basically delivative of opium, so that the actually illicit drug and two hundreds of thousands of people, you know, the methodon program in Iran, together with the programorphine program, which is slightly smaller, you know,

may have more than a million. I mean, if you think about it, more than a million. I mean out of a population of eighty three million, you're talking about more than one and a hundred. I mean, the analogy the United States would be is if three and a half million people were on method Honor brupern orphane, which you know, we're nowhere close to that. I mean, it's

a fraction of as so far as I'm aware. So you're talking about a magnitude both of illicit drug you know, addiction with regarding opioids, as well as treatment that probably

is number one in the world. It is I think, you know, I'm not you know, sort of super keen and quantitative approaches, but I guess you know, if you look at it in terms of ration be compared across the world, I would be surprised if there's any other country that has such a huge scope of substitution programs, and we might just you know, add that besides these sort of vibrant, you know to harm reduction and maintenance program that around put in place, there was an explosion

of addiction treatment facilities, which of course it's much more contentious than the harm reduction one because it is unregulated. But it means that you know, a large portion of the population and basically every single family in the country is either touched directly or indirectly by you know, the drug the drug issue. Let's take a break here and go to an egg. So let me ask you about There's two moments you describe in the book a sort

of shocks to the system. And the first one is when the Tally Body leadership I think it's two thousand, a year or two before the war in Afghanistan in nine eleven UM basically declares that it's going to eradicate opium in Afghanistan and more or less succeeds for a year. And obviously, at this point Iran is perhaps the biggest market for Afghani opium in the world. So there's suddenly a major shortage in Iran. Prices going up, availability going down.

What impact does that have on not just the Iranian drug problem but Iradian governmental thinking about how to deal with the drug problem. Yeah, and again I think, yeah, that that was like really incredible moment. I think, you know, in Afghan history and you know in global drug history, the Taliban put the band the first time basically Afghanistan

managers to eradicate the poppy. We don't know whether that was an expedient to increase the prices or it was actually done, uh, to eradicate the poppy from from the country. But in ir and there is you know, widespread panic with the country having let's say on top of one or two million opium uses. It meant that, you know, lack of supply. It didn't mean that people would give up the habit. It meant that people would adopt more dangerous drug using behaviors, mostly shifting from opium to heroin

or to adulterated substances. And that's what exactly happened actually in in the ear two thousand, some of the running officials at that time started contemplating introducing poplic cultivation in Iran to bring exactly exactly by basically saying, okay, you know, the situation is this. You know, the afghan is not gonna send us opum anymore, and our people will need opium because you know, we have a large part of the population who uses it on a daily basis, and

we need to provide them with that. It's either recalled debate the poppy or introduced method. These were the two options. This was quite outspoken and to set an extent actually radical reformer within public institutions. And there was also I think you describe a brief consideration of offering to Afghanistan to buy their opium crossing and use that to supply Yeah, and that doesn't where obviously, of course it didn't get

anywhere also because it ran in Afghanistan. So the Islamic Republic has been probably the staunchest enemy of the Taliban regime. You know, while in the eighties, you know, the US was supporting the Taliban against the Soviets, Iran was fighting them, and then they came very close to you know, a

sort of hot war situation in the nineties. M Now you describe a second shock to the system ten years later, right when basically I think it's when when the sort of populist, authoritarian minded president Ahmadinejad Um is re elected in a controversial election, and there's the Green movement, and then there's a crackdown, and you describe a sort of growing demoralization happening. Not I mean it already precedes that,

but even gets escalated as a result. And you see major change is happening in a ranging society, a big drop in the birth rate, the age of marriage increasing, premarital sex going up tenfold, increase in in sexually transmitted diseases UM. At the same time, you know, there had been a growing kind of modern population happening in may Ran that was hooked into consumers and all this sort of thing. So you have this other kind of broader

cultural shock. But in the midst of this, this populist leader Um, who you know in the US has seen in a very very negative light because of many of his international policies and declarations. Nonetheless, kind of doubles down on harm reduction. I mean, he steps into the shoes of a previous president Khatami, who had been a reform minded one who was sort of helped move this stuff forward.

But what you would have might have expected Ahmadinajad as a more populist authoritarian figure to do and cracking down. He does the opposite. And is that basically just because the problem is so monumental? Is it because he has the support of the religious authorities and of Amy. What's going on with that? Yeah? I think, you know, sort of coming to power of ahmadina Jad is a very interesting moment in modern Iran. In history and as a

political figure. He's probably the least understood of old uh and the and the most difficult to understand. I mean, of course, a clear populist before populism became the rule around the world, I mean in contemporary times, very very radical in his public speaking, but also completely unorthodox, including for a run. You know, let's remember the ahmadina Ja compared to his pre the celtsors. He was not a religious figure. He was not a cleric. The most Iranian

presidents have been coming from the clerical establishment. He was, you know, an ordinary man, an engineer, was elected on the populist platform with very religious, extreme religious ideas. But because of his heterodoxy really in politics and religion, he was not really scared to adopt positions that were at odds with the religious establishment or with you know, with

the political establishment of world uh. For him, the harm reduction issue didn't really represent the problem, but rather an opportunity. What happened in those years is that harm reduction is expanded, maintenance programs are expanded, the private sector jumps in and provides the majority of method and substitution programs in Iran, and there is the whole world of treatment of addiction

that explodes. As the said earlier, partly also you know, supported by ahmadinejab himself, who you know attended narcotics anonymous meetings, you know they you know, he was very much outspoken about the need of treating addiction in Iran. Well, it's also dramatic contrast with if you look at say kal Khali in the early years of the revolution early eighties,

who is all about shaming drug users. You describe a scene where where Akhmadenija actually is in a stadium of twenty thousand former drug users and describing himself as their brother who is committed to their recovery. So I mean, that was, I mean, really quite something. Although it's also interesting because there's a period also I don't know if it's when he becomes president. But some of the pioneers of harm reduction who were more outspoken, so I mentioned

before the brothers Kami Areas Alayi. I'm not sure if we're not going to name right or Bijan Nasermanesh Right, those guys and some of others like them, they are either forced to flee the country or there are rested, they're sent to prison. Um. They're the ones who are kind of more out there, They're a little more connected with the West, and so there's a sense of kind

of um suppressing. UM. I don't and I don't know the exact stories in these cases, but I really kind of you know, the pioneers being really knocked down and really hurt badly, while at the same time the government's

embracing the policies that they had pioneered. Absolutely. I mean, you know, there is no doubt that these years, I mean the years uh during which Ahmadina that comes to power, you know, witness and secretization of of civil society groups, particularly those groups that have a connection with the West and the United States in particular. So all sort of drug policy reforments, harm reduction is that had been you know, sort of establishing networks of collaboration and support with the

outside world are put under pressure on the scrutiny. There is absolute distrust towards foreign governments, Western governments particularly, and so people who had connections with the outside world, you know, they decide to leave or you know, they go to jail and then they leave, which is the case of the people you mentioned and you know, of course, and

that's been the story since then. You know, most sort of social activists working on contentious issues, not all you know, harm reduction is went to jail, and some of the most connected to the outside world. You know, we're affected. The field and in Iran is very very vibrant and active, and the number of organizations is expanding. And some of these people left, but many remained and you know kept working.

Of course, the conditions changed as well, and so they were careful not to kind of pass the red lines. The problem is no the red men, right must you mentioned before narcotics anonymous and that must be surprising to our audience because you know, reading your book, I mean arconics anonymous and even some alcoholics anonymous chapters emerging Iran. You know, the clerical authorities are initially wary and suspicious

of them, but ultimately embrace them. And you described Narcotics Anonymous becoming one of the largest kind of non governmental organizations solicite organizations in the country and having an associated nonprofit that becomes enormously influential. So part of my question is to explain how and why Narcotics Anonymous emerges to be perhaps the bigger in Iran anywhere else in the world. And then secondly, how much of this is connected, um

to you know, the growing use of meth amphetamine. And then obviously there's I really I'm throwing a third thing here at you because we're running out of time and there's so much here. The dramatic growth in these treatment camps, which you see also in East Asia of hundreds of thousands of people sit being sent to quad like prison

like environments. Um many of them private, some of them government run, which are not prisons but are sort of prisons where people are expected to get clean quote unquote before they can get out. So a whole bunch right there. But pick them off whether you want to sart off with the Narcotics Anonymous question or the next question, which

everyone you think makes more sense. So the ruse of narcotic anonymous is spectacular and completely surprising as many of the events that kind of happened in the history of drugs in i Run. I believe that, you know, something exceptional happened. They're basically a sort of coalescing of synergies. Narcotics Anonymous basically established in Irun at the end of the nineties, and so this is a period of course of great changes in in the sort of world of

drugs in Irun. You know, uh, you know, we're talking about the post war period. As we mentioned earlier, people can going back from the front having lots of substance abuse problems and not finding much support in the sort of civil society organizations that at the time we're not still that active or in the public health sector, and so the self health groups emerge as a way to sub define the identity of people with substance abuse problems

in Iran without being stigmatized. Initially, the government is very suspicious, mostly because of course naconics anonymous have this sort of confession style which is seen, as you know, derived from Catholyticism in the in the view of the Iranian sort of religious leaders mostly but then eventually through negotiations and an understanding of the role that Narcotics Anonymous can have

within the system of intervention on addiction. It is fully embraced and the number of sort of meetings is really incredible. I mean, it's my current project actually deals with with Narcotics Anonymous, and I can tell you that, you know, like the whole thing has been ranized and has become a different thing from Narcotics Anonymous elsewhere, mostly because the people participating bring their own cultural baggage and the cold cultural understanding of the world and of addiction. So it

is not really an exclusively related to the rise of methamphetamines. Actually, I would say that, you know, many of the people coming to the meetings of Narcotics Anonymous have a background in opium or heroin abuse. Most methamphetamine users tend not to attend any meetings. There are other groups that compete with any by the way, and they are not probably as popular, but they are there. They're very much active.

So it's a whole world that of Narcotics Anonymous, and it's you know, cultural reach goes beyond the issue of addiction. And you can see that you know, iran and films and cinema refers to you know, the issue of narcotics anonymous. Uh, you know, it's it's becoming a thing I can tell you. And this connects also to your last question about churchment sentence. And most of these treatment centers adopt a sort of twelve step program and so they are sort of under

the patronage of an a Iran. The phenomenon is huge. It's difficult to speak about it in in in in simple terms or just by you know, giving you a paragraph of response, because you have all sorts of treatment facilities, from the ones you mentioned which adopt very violent and ruthless sort of interventions to uh, you know, sort of

compassionate sort of help for reenter interventions. But what is sort of probably interesting to know is that these treatment centers have come to occupy a social place in ordinary life in Iran. And so the sort of sentence, oh, I'll take you to the camp. The camp is the word for the treatment center in person. Camp like the English camp, but you know, with the positive meaning if you want, has become ordinarily in everyday language. So you know, just to give you an idea of how you know,

this phenomenon is central to today's life. So as you get to the end of the book, you describe a period I think it's around sixteen where there's even conversations going on about things like opening up a safe injection site in Tehran, maybe a heroin maintenance program, some consideration of further decriminalization of possession, even discussions of maybe trying

to legally regulate the opium and cannabis cultivation and distribution. First, it was remarkable that those conversations are happening, and I'm wondering um mazier to bring it up to date, and especially given the election last year of a quite conservative president in Iran, what's happening now? Are any of these things moving forward? Have some of them actually happened or things in a much more quieter or more repressive phase right now. The thing is that sort of I was

expecting some change, or perhaps I was hopeful. That's from the date of publication of my book two thousand nineteen. Today, you know, we would have had probably the first safe injection room and that didn't happen, but the proposals have been moved to an assessment stage, so you know, perhaps it would take another couple of years, five years who knows, depending on you know, also how the world politics develops, and that affects a lot of dissipation in Iran. Not

an easy time. I would say safe injection might be might be introduced, more artful about herroing so to prescription programs. But they did this sort of election of vacy to the presidency. It gives even more influence to the whole judiciary security apparatus in Iran. That means that in a way, those who were always skeptical about drug policy reform are

in charge. It is not necessarily a negative thing because we have seen in history of drug policy that often it is conservative governments, you know that take the bolder action simply because it's harder to criticize them or to accuse them of being you know, soft on crime or soft on drugs. But so far there is little interest and the sort of main focus has been that of living addiction treatment sentence to interview more broadly and to go through sort of self have groups and what they

call detoxification programs, so you know, non pharmaceutical interventions. Mm hmm. Well, masire, listening, I so much appreciate your taking the time to have this conversation. With me and for our audience. Your book is truly fascinating and I think for I think probably of all the episodes I've done, this has to be perhaps one of the most eye opening for even people

are quite knowledgeable about drug policy around the world. So thank you for your scholarship and thank you for this conversation. Pleasure to talk to your Hope to see you soon. Yes, I hope so too. If you're enjoying Psychoactive, please tell your friends about it, or you can write us a review at Apple Podcasts or wherever you get your podcasts.

We love to hear from our listeners. If you'd like to share your own stories, comments, and ideas, then leave us a message at one eight three three seven seven nine sixty that's eight three three psycho zero, or you can email us at Psychoactive at protozoa dot com, or find me on Twitter at Ethan Natalman. You can also find contact information in our show notes. Psychoactive is a production of I Heart Radio and Protozoa Pictures. It's hosted by me Ethan Naedelman. It's produced by Noam Osband and

Josh Stain. The executive producers are Dylan Golden Ari Handel, Elizabeth Geesus and Darren Aronofsky from Protozoma Pictures, Alex Williams and Matt Frederick from My Heart Radio, and me Ethan Nadelman. Our music is by Ari Blucien and a special thanks

to A. Brios F. Bianca Grimshaw and Robert BP. Next week I'll be talking about the issue of psychedelics law, especially the issue of patents and intellectual property with Graham Petenik, perhaps the leading attorneys specializing in this area, and sort of my thesis for starting my firm was that there were ways for smaller inventors to get involved with the patent system and to also use the patent system to keep off a company like a mon Santo or a

Philip Morris from entering the cannabis space and sort of taking it over and dominating it. And so taking that kind of thinking through to the psychedelic space. I think that was part of the kind of fortune that let me see that there were these issues around pulocybin patenting for instance. Um, perhaps a bit earlier than you know, maybe some others did subscribe to Cycleactive now see it, don't miss it.