Can China Control North Korea?

China is one of the 21st century's most consequential nations. It has never been more important to understand how the country is governed and what its leaders and its people actually want and believe. Welcome to Pekingology, the podcast that unpecks China's evolving political system and the trajectory of China's domestic and foreign policy. I'm your host, Henrietta Levin, Senior Fellow with the Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSU. This is Pecchynology.

Coming out of the big summit in China between President Trump and President Xi, it stood out to me that even though the two sides' public readouts differed. Quite a lot. The US and China both confirmed the leaders did at least discuss the situation in North Korea. And now we are hearing that President Xi may travel to Pyongyang in the next. Few days. This would be his first trip since 2019 and only his second as president. So this seemed like a good time.

For a deep dive on China's complicated relationship with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. And for that, I am really excited to be joined today by Adam Ferrer, who brings tremendous expertise and experience on exactly these questions. Adam previously served as special advisor to the Vice President for the Indo-Pacific Space and Intelligence, as well as director for the Korean Peninsula.

and Mongolia at the White House National Security Council. He is currently a senior geoeconomics analyst with Bloomberg and a non-resident senior associate here at CSIS with our Korea Chair. Adam, thank you so much for coming on the show. Great to be here. To start, hoping you can tell us a bit about yourself. How did you end up focusing on all things Korea?

It was a meandering path that led me to Korea. I actually started my career in the intelligence community focused elsewhere. And in fact, uh despite my deep interest in Asia was was focused on uh parts of Middle East. And North Africa, which would surprise very few people looking back at how the United States was positioned in the late 2000s and where a lot of our national security focus was.

but had the opportunity to keep pushing and and trying to find ways to work on Northeast Asia, moved into the counter proliferation space and very quickly found uh North Korea as a key topic of discussion. both for the work I was doing and personal interest. And so all of that eventually led me to come on board in the end of the first Trump administration as the Korea director with a deep focus on at the time the pressure campaign on North Korea.

as President Trump obviously had taken a deep interest in North Korea at the start of his term with fire and fury and eventually all of the pomp and circumstance of summitry with Kim Jong un, although that ended up

not moving in the direction that he had hoped or Kim Jong-un had hoped. And so when I came in, the focus really was about trying to maintain pressure on the North and bring them back to the table. And so from that, moving into the Biden administration, had the opportunity to continue thinking about how to address this

major geostrategic question of how to address North Korea and how to try and bring in both our allies and partners and then other key international partners like China to address the issue. And so in that time had opportunities to work with China and Russia. to try to bring North Korea to the table, to try and lower the tension on the Korean peninsula and find a a path forward that didn't lead to further escalation.

We'll talk about how the conversation the US has with China on these issues has evolved since then, but in a way even a better throwback to thinking about working with Russia on things. What a time. Truly. Uh really astounding to think back to sitting at a a Russian guest house outside of Moscow having these deep discussions about where we could work together on North Korea.

I will say those conversations were were not uh immensely productive, uh, not surprisingly, but the fact that they were happening w did speak to just a different time. Really striking to think about now. Well, speaking of now, let's start with the Trump she summit. So in looking at how both sides characterize the meeting, we have the US saying that President Trump and President Chi confirmed their shared goal to denuclearize North Korea.

in the context of kind of a a broader commitment to what's now being called a constructive relationship of strategic stability, basically the two sides looking at International issues as something to be addressed together, or at least the US wanting to see things that way. From the Chinese side, the Korean Peninsula was discussed. So that's what we have.

Hoping to get your take on what does that mean to you? What do you see in at the very least the common understanding that both sides want to be known publicly, that the issue was discussed, but then you can hear, you know, some perhaps dissonance. in the tone with which they want to present the issue. How are you thinking about the summit?

So to start with, I think if you remove it from the context of Trump and the Trump administration, what we've seen in Trump two point oh, it's pretty normal to hear that China and the United States, when having a high level meeting, would discuss North Korea, right?

you know, direct neighbor and a and a threat they've seen for a long time to regional security. And then from the United States, that same question of of the threat North Korea poses to its key ally, South Korea And increasingly to the United States itself with its growing intercontinental ballistic missile force.

and nuclear capability, although some of those systems remain untested. But in this context, I was pleasantly surprised that actually in the first readout that came out from the Chinese after they cleared their throat on Taiwan, we had this comment that they discussed the Korean Peninsula. But the surprise for many of us though was the wording that the United States chose to use when it released its fact sheet

not until Sunday after the meeting, specifically using the term denuclearization and of North Korea itself. And I'll break that down for a second. On denuclearization, traditionally, that is something that China has aligned with the United States on as a as a long-term goal. Now, the how we get there was always a question, and how much pressure and work China was willing to put in with Pyongyang is the question that we've had to work through over the last

several decades and we can talk more about that. But starting with President Xi's meeting with Kim Jong un in September on the sidelines of his massive parade. to celebrate the victory in World War Two, we actually saw denuclearization fall off of the read out for the first time. And a lot of people took note of that and saw it as potentially China adjusting its policy.

trying to move in a direction to placate Pyongyang who, you know, under Kim Jong-un have made the nuclear issue from their perspective non-negotiable. And we saw from Russia over the last several years an actual acceptance of its nuclear program, which was a big shift for Russia as well.

And so the fact that theoretically they discuss denuclearization is in and of itself interesting and potentially, if it was true, a message to Pyongyang that China is not willing to go that far yet, that there is still work they have to do in that relationship. The second part is of North Korea. Traditionally, China has liked to focus this question of denuclearization not on North Korea itself, but actually on the Korean peninsula, sharing kind of this concept with North Korea at times.

that denuclearization needs to include the removal of all nuclear threats and nuclear capabilities from the peninsula. And that's a veiled reference to the United States extended deterrence commitment. to South Korea and the regular display of US nuclear capable assets in the peninsula, et cetera.

And so using North Korea is in and of itself interesting. Now we have to be clear that this was in a US only fact sheet. It doesn't necessarily reflect what China actually said in the room, what she said to Trump. But one important thing to take away is that despite the fact that it seems to be going further than China is willing to often talk about this issue, when the MFA was asked about this, they did not actually choose to push back on the US framing.

Now they certainly did not say that they said those words or repeated denuclearization. In fact, they they used the language of peace and stability and and urging de-escalation and compromise and diplomacy as they did when she and Kim Jong-un last met. But they didn't push back. And to me what that says is that there is some tacit acceptance of the fact that this conversation was discussed and that denuclearization was still part of the conversation.

So it sounds like maybe the US is overstating the degree of alignment on this issue, but there is still some foundational concern shared between the two sides. To the degree that China isn't totally averse to having some impression of public common understanding between the two sides.

Which is interesting because it often seems like even when China is genuinely frustrated with North Korea for whatever reason, it often feels like they are quite hesitant, at least in recent years, to appear to express that frustration with the US. For fear that that actually diminishes their leverage over the North. So, how do you parse this in the context of that dynamic that we've seen in more recent years?

The dynamic as you're getting it here is incredibly complicated between Beijing and Pyongyang, going back honestly to the origins of the relationship in the Korean War and the support Chinese volunteer forces that moved into Korea. and really were a huge part of the victory, or at least the ability of North Korea to push South Korea and US forces back to the demilitarized zone.

What we're seeing here though, I think aligns very much with my experience when I was serving in the White House w you know, in in moments where we sat down with Chinese interlocutors, including Leo Xiang Ming, the special representative for the Korean Peninsula. or Qingong at the time, the ambassador here, is this odd back and forth where when pushed, particularly from the US side, China often claims it it doesn't actually have leverage. It doesn't have the space to push.

Pyongyang, that, you know, on economics, if it were to do that, it would lose its influence, and therefore it can't actually, you know, raise the temperature in a manner that would lead to changes or or certainly not in the way the United States asks of it. But simultaneously, when the United States seeks to go around Beijing, as we saw to some extent when President Trump was doing his outreach to Kim Jong-un and setting up his summit.

All of a sudden, Beijing is knocking on the door insisting that the everything has to go through them, that without them there can be no lasting deal, that they are the key to Pyongyang. And so it is this reality that they recognize they have limits on what they can do, but simultaneously don't want to be left behind. They don't want to not have someone at the table or at least have some say on the outcome. And the big change here, though, now and that complicates this is the Russia dynamic.

and the reality that Russia's growing relationship with Pyongyang, built on this military partnership out of Russia's necessity for military aid out of the Ukraine war, has just changed the dynamic and increased stress in Beijing about how to manage this relationship.

And for Xi, who I think most accounts would say does not have a great personal relationship with Kim Jong un is often I think frustrated by the reality that he has to in any way deal with this s relatively small country that can cause big problems for him. I think there's an acceptance that they have to be more creative in how they try and balance and keep Pyongyang tied into the system.

We'll get more into the Russia piece, but first because you bring up this question of leverage and whether China does or does not have usable leverage over North Korea. How would you think about what leverage Beijing actually has? where the US or others might overinterpret their influence. And then under what circumstances is China willing to actually use the leverage it does have? Because we have seen moments where China

you know, cracks down on border trade. I mean, of course there was a moment that is seemingly long in the past where they actively supported sanctions at the UN, so recognizing that's not where we are now, like There does seem to be triggers that genuinely open Beijing's kind of use of leverage. So what's the leverage and when will they actually use it?

So to start with, I think hands down the biggest form of leverage is simply economic trade and access to the global market for North Korea, which all for the majority of the modern era have run through China. and at the Lagresse of the government in Beijing. And so when we look at, you know, pre COVID, that was the case. And now post COVID, we've seen trade, you know, double, if not septuple, depending on the numbers you look at. And that

speaks to the importance of China for growth and kind of stability of North Korea and the North Korean economy. To be clear, the North Korean economy is still really struggling, but without access and the ability to both import and export goods through China. They would be in a much worse position. That said, though, China's primary focus with North Korea is trying to maintain stability.

And limit the potential for escalation that could draw in the United States or lead to a wider conflict that China is not interested in seeing happen. And that actually is the root of both its willingness to act and its unwillingness to act. And so you brought it up before. If you go back to Kim Jong-un's first period after he took power and the escalation in nuclear testing and ballistic missile testing and rhetoric at large moving into Trump's first term.

There was deep concern in Beijing the situation was spiraling out of control, and that North Korea, if not checked in some way, was actually going to go down a path that could lead to a conflict. that would draw in the United States and risk China's security and economic future. And so that's why we saw them take relatively strong action, supporting hands down, the broadest scope of sanctions that were ever put in place.

that saw North Korean trade fall considerably and the economy falter as a result in twenty seventeen in particular. But here at the same time, that's the reason they're held back from acting as well, is that they feel that yes, they could cut off North Korean access to goods, whether that be agriculture or anything else they need.

But they worry that that would lower the stability of the regime in Pyongyang and risk instability and the potential collapse eventually. And so they're not willing to do that. And now we have this added question of them trying to compete with Russian influence. And so if they were to do that they'd see that Russia would just fill that void in some respect, even though Russia economically can't replace China in any way.

It seems like if China is calibrating its leverage, primarily around an idea of stability, but more or less over time around pursuing a goal of denuclearization as well. How do you see China's actual policy on denuclearization right now? I mean, you mentioned already that they have stopped bringing up the term in public. Which itself I think is a significant departure, but doesn't necessarily reflect what their internal preferences might be. I think there's a conventional wisdom that

China might not care about advances in the North Korean Missile Program. They might see that as a US problem, but do they actually want to see a new nuclear test? Probably not. So what is Chinese policy on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula? I think it's less an active policy as much as it is trying to work on the margins to limit steps that they feel undermine their own interests.

So as you just brought up, nuclear tests, for instance, China has no interest in seeing North Korea do that. And they will actively take steps to and have taken steps from things we've seen to try and make clear to Pyongyang that they think that's going too far.

And one of the primary reasons for that is that one of the things they worry about the most is the growth and, you know, kind of building out of the trilateral relationship between the United States, South Korea, and Japan, moving beyond the rhetoric of diplomacy between the three and actually moving to some form of an alliance.

or a true security partnership. And the reality is we actually have seen that happening, right? In the Biden administration, we saw key steps taken to build out a shared missile defense picture, potentially looking at broader missile defense capabilities that would integrate US, Japanese and Korean capabilities. And simultaneously, despite real questions right now about the United States commitment to Japan and Korea and Asia at large and its allies, Korea and Japan, I J My Young and Takaichi,

have been, you know, meeting and trying to grow the relationship themselves, looking at this shared worrying threat picture from North Korea, but also from China. And so that really kind of colors how Beijing looks at this situation. So from their perspective, They certainly don't want to see the North Koreans keep expanding the program. And I think they also see risks of the rhetorical shift from them to accept the nuclear program.

Even though I think logically, and we've heard this from many experts, practically North Korea is a nuclear state, right? North Korea has nuclear weapons, it has a capability to deliver those nuclear weapons. And Kim Jong-un has made clear they're not going anywhere. And certainly if Kim Jong un's looking out at other countries in recent history, including very much Iran, what he's taking from that is I need my nuclear weapons for regime survival.

But with all of that in mind, the reality is Beijing worries that if it were to take a step to actually meet what Pyongyang is asking for, which is recognition. that could push both the trilateral alliance to a new level, but it could also add wood to the fire of these growing questions of nuclear proliferation in South Korea and

which is absolutely something that China is not interested in seeing, both from a general instability perspective, right? The breakout period could risk North Korea taking some action that could lead to a broader conflict. but also the outcome where South Korea and Japan have nuclear weapons, and that changes considerably the freedom of action potentially for Beijing in the region.

Maybe that's a good transition into the Russia piece because it's where we see, I think, a genuine divergence between how China and Russia look at North Korea, where China really does care about stability at least. They might not define that in the same way the US would, but they have like a deeply held substantive set of goals for the peninsula.

Whereas Russia seems to be more focused on whatever they need to do to get support for the war in Ukraine and North Korea's willing to provide kinds of support that others aren't and

maybe getting some fringe benefits of the appearance of international standing and influence on the margin. But I don't see the Russians kind of taking a considered approach to a particular outcome or balance they want to see on the Korean peninsula in the way that China would, which is interesting because, you know, over the past few years we've obviously seen China and Russia double down on their partnership in a pretty profound way.

and intentionally, I think, put aside historical areas of friction in pursuit of this broader strategic partnership. And then you have North Korea. which seems to just like be a particularly naughty problem for Beijing as it thinks about its relationship with Moscow, but then also what that means for leverage.

So how do you see the development of that China, Russia, DPRK, Nexus to the degree there is one? Because of course we're really talking about different bilateral relationships. And then what does China think about it? So the last point is really important, right? People talk about crink, right? They talk about all these countries working together in

I think the reality so far is that we haven't seen that materialize, particularly in a trilateral format between Putin, Xi, and Kim Jong un. And I think it's important to think back, you know, people look at that photo on the DS in Beijing It was a pretty dramatic photo. It is a great photo and one that I'm sure Kim Jong un sees as you know one of the peak

With Xi flanked by Putin and Kim Jong un on either side, which I was actually really surprised to see. Yeah. Because it seems like China generally wants to like bilateralize those relationships and it's not like that photo happened by accident. No, and I think in some ways, you know, taking a side excursion on this question, I think that was how you got Kim to come, right? This was the sell, was that this was a an opportunity for him to stand shoulder to shoulder.

A funny side note is that actually ten years prior when they held the seventieth anniversary, it was the South Korean president who was standing there, not the North Korean president. Which is a really interesting separate conversation. But nonetheless, despite again that really important photo, and I think something again that Kim Jong-un will talk about for generations to come, there was no trilateral meeting between the three.

Very explicitly so. There were bilateral meetings between the three leaders. And I think that speaks to the complexity of the relationship and the deep differences that Beijing has with how Russia is approaching its growing relationship. with Pyongyang. You know, as you'd kind of talked about as well, Russia sees their relationship with North Korea very much through the lens of its domestic needs.

Particularly as it looks to its ongoing war in Ukraine and its efforts to kind of push back against Western pressure. And so it is willing to provide technologies and increase cooperation to a level that China certainly is uncomfortable with. when we look at what that could do to both increase North Korean capabilities, but most importantly, North Korean confidence to potentially act.

at some point in a manner that undermines again China's short term and potentially long term goals in the region. And so that I think is very much the reality on how Beijing views it. But simultaneously, it's not enough to counter the importance of the China-Russia relationship. And I think Beijing, while certainly I imagine that at certain levels this conversation happens and there is a discussion, like maybe don't go so far. You know, what are you giving the North Koreans?

At the end of the day, all of that is secondary to the importance of the relationship that Putin and she have. And, you know, she, I think, very much looks to Putin as a shared political soul in some ways, as an important bulwark against the pressure from the West. and increasingly a a key economic partner, but in that vein, as so far it appears, not tried to make North Korea a key issue. Now there there may be a point at which it actually is something that he has to bring up.

But I imagine they will continue to work on the periphery of the problem, trying to shape how Russia engages. But the big difference here is that Russia is tangibly a more reckless actor in this space in Northeast Asia. They are less concerned about the long term stability of the region. In fact,

Sometimes I think they would be perfectly happy to see things spiral, not potentially fully out of control, but more out of control than they are, to draw US attention away, and even quietly maybe to cause a problem for Beijing as well.

you know, as much as there is alignment, there is a systemic competition between those two countries that is uh in the long run going to likely emerge again. And Moscow doesn't like being the junior partner. And certainly we even saw before Putin arrived in Beijing recently. There was some commentary in Russian media about how Moscow is not the junior partner and that Beijing should show more respect. It's very convincing when you have to insist.

Yes, op ads are usually the best way to get that across from what I've seen. It seems like if you look at the North Korea Russia relationship with the transactions that anchor it. Beijing's probably, I mean, fine with the support that North Korea is providing to the Russians when it comes to the war in Ukraine. I mean, Beijing itself is providing systematic, large scale support for the war effort, but stopping short of direct

finished lethal assistance'cause they're more worried about sanctions in a way that North Korea just isn't. I mean, that side of the relationship might actually be convenient in a way for filling in the gaps in support China wants Russia to have, but can't provide itself. But then the support in the other direction seems much more problematic from Beijing's perspective to your point because of how Kim Jong un could be I mean, just psychologically emboldened to take greater risks that could

undermine stability, but also there's like a real capability question of what the Russians are providing. But it seems like if China's trying to do anything about this. It's not going to be using leverage with the Russians or using leverage with the North Koreans'cause they seem to believe in this and I mean many other scenarios that using kind of pressure tactics would only decrease their influence. I guess that's a charitable interpretation.

that I'm sure also intersects with just not wanting to deal with a difficult issue because to some degree all bureaucracies are alike.

But regardless of how kind of that calculus played out, where Beijing appears to have landed and how to deal with this problem is charm offensive. And we've seen a real uptick in diplomatic engagement. between Beijing and Pyongyang over the past few months, I mean even longer now. So could you walk us through the charm offensive, the heightened pace of diplomacy between the two sides, what that really means, if anything. So there's no doubt when we look at the

just simply at the number of engagements over the past year plus now, that it you know, we've seen a big uptick in engagement. And that really started with, you know, what we've already discussed, which is Kim Jong un's historic visit to Beijing for the World War Two victory parade.

and then has been followed by other high level back and forth visits, particularly at the foreign ministry level, but also Premier Li Chung visited Pyongyang shortly after that parade as part of a major commemoration in Pyongyang. And so all of that from my perspective though is less a charm offensive and more just trying to recoup from their perspective their influence and control of the situation as much as possible.

possible. Now we certainly don't know what's happening in those closed door meetings and what's being promised. And as I already mentioned, right, North Korea China trade has increased drastically in this period. But if you just look at what's been announced and even the language being used short of this question of denuclearization, there just hasn't been an evolution in the relationship.

And the fact that she so far has yet to visit Pyongyang is interesting. I mean, obviously she is a unique character on the international scene. He likes to travel less and less. But he hasn't visited since twenty nineteen. Putin has visited since then. And the question now is kind of how far does China really willing to go to move the relationship forward?

Uh, I think a visit to Pyongyang is necessary if they want to hold or increasingly keep their leverage or at least demonstrate the value of the relationship to Pyongyang. It will be intriguing though in that same sense if they did agree in some way to this denuclearization language that was put into the US fact sheet, what message they're trying to send to Pyongyang at this moment, right? I mean, it's right before this potential visit.

It may be an attempt to kind of remind them that Beijing has its own red lines, that Beijing is not willing to go as far as others, but we'll have to wait and see. I don't wanna over-emphasize the Xi visit. I imagine that even if it happens, we won't see much come out of it. But nonetheless, in this current environment, it doesn't seem to me that they have taken clear steps to kind of bring North Korea back rather than kind of reestablish more of a normal order that they had before.

It is interesting, I mean, if she really goes at a time when he's doing very little international travel and he's been skipping like twenty, uh bricks, like the the stuff that he normally does, admittedly it's an easier trip. To North Korea. So maybe maybe there's like some logistical

Yeah. Yeah. I don't know if you feel this way, but I feel like coming out of my time at the White House, I always wanna when I'm trying to like come up with the big conspiracy for why a head of state like does or doesn't go to a big summit. I'm much more inclined now to be like, maybe they were busy. Maybe they had other stuff.

Well, I think that's certainly the case for Xi on a regular basis. I mean, he just doesn't like to travel and he likes to stay in Beijing. Uh he likes to send others in his place. The fact that for the eightieth workers' party celebration anniversary in October of last year, he sent Lee Chiang instead of himself. I mean, in and of itself, I think is is a sign of his both kind of cautiousness on travel for his own reasons, but also his hesitance on on the relationship with North Korea.

But now he's gonna go. Potentially uh we'll we'll see. After this kind of like spree of foreign leaders coming to Beijing, it's maybe particularly striking that the one time she will actually go out and see a partner on their terms might be North Korea. Which doesn't seem like the kind of, I don't know, optic that she or that China would normally try and put forward. Yeah, I think that's a really good point and a question for how they're viewing this.

if we take a step back, right, President Trump just visited Beijing. Within days, President Putin arrived. Now I actually think that was more a result of President Trump delaying his visit than it was them trying to push these two summits close together.

But nonetheless, people have taken something away from that, the willingness to meet with a country that is seen in direct competition with the United States so immediately after the summit. But then if you throw on North Korea as well, it does send a a message that Beijing has to be carefully trying to

to monitor in terms of how they're aligning themselves and could speak to their comfort with the broader relationship with the United States at this moment and the fact they don't expect much pushback for going to Pyongyang. In fact,

Maybe President Trump and President She discussed that and President Trump was thrilled that he was going and asked him to relay a message. Obviously I I don't know that, but you could see that conversation. So in this environment, we'll see if he goes, but there's no doubt folks will take note of that.

So let's briefly take the North Korean side of this. If she does go, what is Kim Jong-un looking to get out of those meetings and all of the symbolism associated with them? So to start with it's she's showing up. Right. I mean, the symbolism of it, the fact that the Chinese president would travel to Pyongyang and show his respect not only to Kim, Kim's family, but the state of North Korea is a very big deal and something that they will trumpet far and wide.

Simultaneously it is this other question of denuclearization, right? Of finding ways to continue to erode China's position on that issue and, you know, theoretically try and bring them along to where the Russians find themselves today. It's also about ensuring and getting a sense from Beijing on how they will protect North Korean interests, push back against the United States and the West, if and when we return to more of a pressure oriented approach, which I think North Korea is always wary of.

and using all of that to increase their leverage. The other part though is that Kim is is using these engagements to demonstrate that North Korea is a normal state. Right, that North Korea is a key player in the international environment. And that's both a domestic message and one that he takes pride showing internationally. And so showing a world leader of the second largest economy in the world showing up.

uh will do a lot for him in that regard, as much as, you know, kind of building on President Putin arriving and his visit to Beijing last year. So we're almost out of time. I wanna bring it back to the US. sitting here in Washington, I think there's a perpetual hope, dream, aspiration that the US can kind of partner with China on this issue. We see of course those hope.

Being brought to the fore and the public messaging coming out of the summit as we've discussed. So, what do you think is actually realistic? In terms of what the US and China can do together on the Korean peninsula. Like if you were advising President Trump and how to think about next steps following this consensus achieved, maybe in Beijing, what would that look like to you?

So to start with this question of kind of what's achievable, I think the reality is it's just small things on the margins and things where China is almost already moving in that direction. For example, trying to restrain North Korean action in extremists like a nuclear test or potentially a full-range ICBM test. Which is obviously a a deep problem for the United States, but for Beijing also raises issues because it draws more attention to the issue. It raises tensions writ large.

And also serves as a key supporter for enlarging the trilateral security partnership and US military action in the region or at least deployments in the region. So I think there's always space for that. I think there may be the potential, if again, this denuke language was really something that was negotiated with Beijing, of trying to keep Beijing from taking that next step.

of recognizing in any way North Korean nuclear capabilities and North Korea's a nuclear state. I think there's some possibility there. More broadly, there's the potential of trying to at least encourage Beijing to quietly push the Russians not to share certain types of technology.

and making clear to Beijing and Beijing making clear to Moscow the repercussions and risks of that, that if North Korea were to gain certain technology and and become, you know, more confident and and move on that, that the United States would have to take actions. uh in the region that would be destabilizing to China's interests.

But all that said, you know, when we really look at where we stand today, I think we're actually kind of in our weakest position with Beijing on this. Because in some ways, you know, with the idea that Beijing really only acts when they see it as in their own interest, looking at their core interests.

The extremes are far more interesting for Beijing in terms of influence. On one hand, you have the idea of a deep commitment to US engagement in the region, building out and supporting its allies, showing that the extended deterrence is not only still there, but growing.

trying to look at how that could be broadened further in this question of nuclear sharing. All of that would put pressure on Beijing. It would raise questions as to how far the US is willing to go and how much of that would limit their actions in the region and maybe get them

To try and limit North Korean action. On the other end of the spectrum, though, one that the Trump administration is somewhat leaning towards in some ways is this idea that actually resolving the North Korea question could lead the United States to withdraw from the The United States would be less interested in being in South Korea. We wouldn't need as many troops in Japan.

And in that vein, you could also see China potentially being more willing to engage and try and help negotiations move forward with the idea that actually it would increase their control and and influence as the United States withdraws.

But currently the US is kind of sitting in the middle, right? We're at the lower levels. We're still pushing forward with trilateral and bilateral cooperation with key allies. But overall, we're not doing a ton of it at the leaders level and they're not seeing the follow-through that many would like to see.

On cooperation. We haven't seen those trilateral meetings at the leader level. And simultaneously, while we've threatened to remove troops and we're doing global force posture review, there's no discussion.

So in that moment, I think Beijing is kind of just sitting back and waiting and unwilling to really risk its relationship with Pyongyang to push the relationship to get the United States and and North Korea to the table because they're not sure what outcomes would come of that and if it would actually benefit Beijing.

Do you think pressure from the US on China related to North Korea can play a productive role here? Like there have been times when the US drew on financial sanctions, for example, targeting certain Chinese entities that are responsible for facilitating the nuclear program in North Korea. Do you think that makes a difference in China's thinking or is it kind of peripheral to their broader strategic direction?

I think it's generally peripheral, particularly because the United States has been remiss to actually take the actions that would have enough of an impact to change the calculus, right? The United States has not gone after or instituted financial sanctions against key Chinese financial institutions that have facilitated the flow of goods and cash in and out of North Korea.

And the reality is without doing those things, you're not actually impacting the North Korean regime and you're not raising the cost high enough for Beijing. The other part here, though, to keep in mind is that it's rather subsumed by the broader US-China relationship and the reality that from both perspectives, North Korea is peripheral to that, and neither currently is showing a willingness to really risk it.

even President Trump on his way back from Beijing talked about potentially removing some of the sanctions they just put in place on Chinese refineries related to the import of Iranian oil. And that's a place the United States is currently at war, right? And currently trying to resolve a very difficult situation in the Middle East. And yet even there

The president is willing to consider backing down from sanctions because of Chinese interests. And in that environment, it just doesn't seem like the United States is willing to increase the pressure to a level that would cause China to shift their approach.

There is the again, the potential on the periphery for cooperation. North Korea leverages a lot of illicit activities, including cyber theft, a lot of that in the cryptocurrency space, and they use China or at least Chinese networks to do some of that. China's probably not thrilled with some of that activity, and there are probably little things that could be done to increase pressure or go after some of those perpetrators.

But again, not enough to shift the overall situation or change Pyongyang's calculus, particularly now that Pyongyang has this release valve, which is the relationship with Russia.

Adam, thank you so much for coming on the show. It was great to be here. Great conversation. As always, for our listeners, we would love to hear what you thought of today's conversation. You can write to peckingology at csis.org. And if you haven't already, please rate, review, and subscribe to the show. We will be back in your feed very soon.

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