The Great Depression - An Economic History - podcast episode cover

The Great Depression - An Economic History

Nov 18, 202452 minSeason 4Ep. 46
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The Great Depression was the worst and deepest peacetime economic shock in the history of the industrialized world. It brought about profound social change and was a significant factor in the drift towards the Second World War. The depth of suffering during the Depression years is hard for many of us to imagine today. More than 1 in five children in the city were suffering from malnutrition by 1932, and the Great Depression was only getting going at that point, it lasted seven more years. So, why did events on Wall Street in 1929 reverberate around the world? Why did the depression last so long, and how did America and the rest of the world eventually dig themselves out of this financial hole? Patrick's Books: Statistics For The Trading Floor: https://amzn.to/3eerLA0 Derivatives For The Trading Floor: https://amzn.to/3cjsyPF Corporate Finance: https://amzn.to/3fn3rvC Ways To Support The Channel Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/PatrickBoyleOnFinance Buy Me a Coffee: https://www.buymeacoffee.com/patrickboyle Visit our website: https://www.onfinance.org Follow Patrick on Twitter Here: https://twitter.com/PatrickEBoyle Additional Reading: Milton Friedman on The Great Depression: https://amzn.to/4fvMYF6 The Great Depression by Robert S. McElvaine: https://amzn.to/40Szajt Essays on The Great Depression by Ben Bernanke: https://amzn.to/40Szajt Keynes letter: https://www.economicsnetwork.ac.uk/archive/keynes_persuasion/The_Economic_Consequences_of_Mr._Churchill.htm The U.S. Economy in the 1920s: https://eh.net/encyclopedia/the-u-s-economy-in-the-1920s/ Britain In The Great Depression: https://moneyweek.com/economy/uk-economy/602525/britain-didnt-have-a-roaring-20s-it-had-a-roaring-30s-heres-why Michael Pettis in The FT: https://www.ft.com/content/ec1b730b-0fbf-3a8c-896a-557c06f730cf The photographers of the Great Depression - Dorothea Lange, Walker Evans, and Arthur Rothstein Business Inquiries ➡️ sponsors@onfinance.org

Transcript

The Great Depression was the worst and deepest peacetime economic shock in the history of the industrialized world. It changed how economists thought about financial systems, giving birth to macroeconomics as a distinct field of study. It brought about profound social change around the world and was a significant factor in the drift towards the Second World War. The depth of suffering during the depression years is hard for many of us to imagine today.

According to a 1932 study by the New York City Health Department, more than one in five children in the city were suffering from malnutrition, and the Great Depression was only getting going at that point. It lasted 7 more years. It's easy to look at the Great Crash of 1929 as the start of the Depression. It's convenient to start with a dramatic and well known event and claim that it both started and caused everything that followed.

But of course, the real world is a bit more complicated than that. Ben Bernanke, a scholar of the Great Depression, famously said that to understand the Great Depression is the Holy Grail of macroeconomics. To this day, economists and historians disagree about the cause of both the crash and the depression that followed.

But the roots of these problems can be traced to the events at the end of the First World War. When Germany signed the Armistice in 1918, ending hostilities, its leaders at first thought that they were accepting a peace without victory, as was outlined by Woodrow Wilson in his famous 14 points. By the time the Allied leaders and representatives from Germany gathered in the Hall of Mirrors in Versailles to sign the final treaty, the mood had changed

significantly. Germany had been denied a seat at the negotiation table and the blame for inciting the war was placed squarely on its shoulders.

It was forced to accept the responsibility for the losses and damages suffered by the Allied nations and to pay several billion in reparations to rebuild the destroyed economies of Europe. Before the First World War, Europe had been the centre of global power, with empires that stretched across the planet, and it had been easy for goods and people to cross international borders. When war broke out, capital, instead of being used for growth, was being spent on destruction.

Over the five year period, the great empires were severely diminished, with some being essentially wiped out. International trade, which had only grown in the past, was now shrinking. The destruction that had occurred in Europe transferred financial power to New York as Europe had to turn to American banks for loans to rebuild their infrastructure and repay their debts.

The reparations and war debts fuelled international tension and weakened not just the domestic economies of some European nations, but also the international economic structure. European countries were now debtors rather than creditors of the United States. The First World War had brought unprecedented prosperity to American farmers. As with Europe unable to grow crops, the demand for American agricultural exports exploded, leading to rising crop prices and rising incomes.

American farmers expanded production to meet this demand by moving on to marginal farmland and buying machinery like tractors, ploughs and threshers. The debt of American farmers grew over this period as they borrowed to invest in both land and machinery. When the war ended, agricultural production in Europe recovered faster than many expected and Europe no longer needed to buy America's surplus farm production.

This led to a short depression in 1920 when American farm prices collapsed and the consumer price index fell by 11.3%. Despite this downturn, at the start of the decade, America's economy was growing healthily. In the 1920's. The war had brought new inventions and innovations in mass production. When people think of the 1920s today, certain images come to mind. Speakeasies, flappers, the Charleston bathtub, gin, Duisenberg and Auburn cars.

The 20s have been described as an era when America withdrew from the world and went into an orgy of self indulgence. The decade's been given many names like the Jazz Age, the Prosperity decade, the New Era, the Era of Excess, the Ballyhoo years, and the Dry decade. The good times all unfortunately ended with the 1929 crash, not just in the United States, but all over the world. So why did events on Wall Street reverberate around the world? And why did the Depression last

so long? And how did America and the rest of the world eventually dig itself out of the financial hole? Between 1920 and 1929, the American economy was growing rapidly. Worker productivity soared by 63%. Henry Ford had perfected his assembly line to the point where a new Model T was being built every 10 seconds. Airplanes in the 1920s were becoming more widely used for commercial purposes, and the decade is known as the Golden

Age of aviation. By 1929, there was one car to every five Americans, and 1/3 of American homes had a radio. This new invention, which would have sounded like magic a decade earlier, was now being seen as essential from a tiny base. In 1922, sales of radios had increased by 1400%. By 1929, there was a similar, if not quite so spectacular, explosion in the sales of household appliances like vacuum cleaners, electric irons, refrigerators and washing

machines. All of these new industries explained the economic boom of the decade. The way people spent their leisure time was changing too. Recreational activities like travelling, going to the movies and professional sports became major businesses if the economy was to keep growing. Someone of course had to buy all of these products, and a culture of consumerism grew as more goods reached more people than ever before.

Despite the booming economy, many bought the new goods on credit, leading to a significant increase in household debt by the end of the decade. There was a mild recession in 1924 and another in 1927, which is blamed on Ford closing all of its production auction lines for six months to retool for the new Model A. That gives you an idea of how important the automobile industry was at the time. Not everyone shared in the benefits of America's rapid

industrialization. In 1810, eighty 1% of Americans had worked in agriculture. By 1920, agricultural employment had declined to 22% as farming became more mechanized and people moved to the cities to work in factories. In 1920, the farmers that made-up 22% of the population received 15% of the national income. Eight years later, in 1928, farm families accounted for just 9% of national income as the price of farm produce was falling.

By 1929, the annual income of a farm worker was 36% of what was being earned by the average American. While farm workers suffered heavily during the Great Depression, it's worth remembering that they'd been suffering in the decade leading up to the Great Depression, too.

It's argued that the Great Depression had roots in a number of global economic dislocations that arose when European agricultural production came back online after the First World War. The chronic overproduction of agricultural produce both in Europe and the United States drove produce prices down, making it even harder for countries with large external war debts, like Germany, to earn the hard currency they needed to make interest payments to their

foreign creditors. Overproduction from the perspective of farmers doesn't mean producing more food than the planet can eat. There was a severe famine in Russia in the early 20s. Overproduction from a farmer's perspective just means producing more food than there was a paying market. For farmers, difficulties were compounded by the rise of the automobile in the 20s, as cars replaced the demand for beasts of burden that farmers had bred

and provided to the country. The First World War had also increased the power of organised labour in Europe, much more so than in the United States. This made it difficult for European employers to cut wages when deflation was boosting the real income of workers and wiping out the profit margins of employers. European businesses were forced at the time to choose between worker layoffs or bankruptcy,

and they chose layoffs. While the cultural memory of the 1920s and 30s is of a great economic boom in the 20s followed by depression in the 30s, that is a very US centred view of history. In Britain the economic experience was reversed. The 1920s were hard years for the British economy, particularly in industrial regions which were plagued by high unemployment, weakly growth

and deflation. The British economy started its recovery in 1931 when it came off the gold standard and the pound was allowed to fall to its natural level. So why was Europe so different to the United States? Well, World War One had destroyed the economies of

Europe and left the European powers heavily indebted. the US had displaced the UK as the world's banker, and Britain was struggling to repay its wartime debt while trying to restore the British pound to its former role as the world's reserve currency. In 1925 Winston Churchill, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time, made his first significant policy initiative to restore the gold standard after the country had suspended convertibility 9 years earlier so that it could freely

finance its war effort. The Bank of England were pushing this idea, which Churchill initially opposed.

He consulted a number of economists, which is always a mistake, who endorsed the change and so in his first budget he controversially announced the return to the gold standard at the pre war exchange rate of £4.25 to the ounce, the rate that had been set by Isaac Newton when he had been Master of the Royal Mint in 1717. The British pound had fallen to as low as $3.40 in gold based dollars in 1920 and while it was rising back to its old value it was still about 10% overvalued

at that price. John Maynard Keynes wrote to Churchill at the time explaining the consequences of this decision. It meant that British exports would be too expensive and imports too cheap. This would harm British businesses and workers. During this period, due to physical gold shortages, most nations other than the United States had stopped domestic circulation of gold and held their international reserves in the form of either U.S. dollars or British pounds.

International transactions used dollars or pounds and sometimes French francs, all of which were pegged to gold at fixed exchange rates. The Overvaluation of the pound and the undervaluation of the franc at the same time caused all sorts of problems. The British trade deficit led to a capital outflow, higher interest rates, and a weak

economy. The French trade surplus led to the importation of gold that the French government didn't allow to circulate so that it wouldn't expand the money supply. The International Monetary arrangements of the 20s were destabilizing because they were not allowed to operate as a price mechanism promoting equilibrating adjustments.

Gold convertibility had historically constrained trade in important ways, as trade imbalances were limited by the ability of a country to maintain convertibility into gold. Large trade imbalances like exporting too much or importing too much, threatened convertibility as each country's promise to exchange currency for gold became less credible when foreign holdings of the country's currency rose relative to its central bank's gold reserves.

This system, despite its many problems, did keep global trade broadly balanced. Countries that exported more than they imported would experience an inflow in gold, raising the supply of money, which would spark inflation. In response, exports from that country would decrease and imports would increase as foreign products became more

competitively priced. The opposite would occur when countries imported more than they export supported, as the outflow of gold would cause deflation, making goods more attractive for export. Because of this mechanism, demand contraction in deficit countries was always matched by demand expansion in surplus countries. Everything balanced out. This system changed in the wake of the First World War, as there were massive reconstruction costs which the victors had imposed on Germany.

Germany made its first reparations payment in 1921, but after that paid little in cash and fell behind in its deliveries of commodities like coal and timber. When Germany defaulted in 1923, French and Belgian troops occupied the roar. Germany responded with passive resistance to the occupation and the government printed money to pay the idle workers which fuelled the hyperinflation which was destroying the German economy. The DOS plan of 1924 was set in place to ease the problem.

Under the plan, Americans lent money to Germany to pay reparations to the European allies, who in turn made debt payments to the United States. This arrangement kicked off American foreign lending on a massive scale. the US was running a large trade surplus at the time, exporting much more than they imported, not unlike what China does today. Finished goods left the country and gold came in, and America could afford to lend money abroad.

This lending financed foreign purchases of American goods. American foreign lending hit $900 million in 1924 and 1.25 billion in both 1927 and 1928. This financing of foreign purchases of American goods helped the unbalanced U.S. economy where more goods were being produced and could be consumed domestically, and it helped it avoid collapse for a few years. But ultimately it made the crash even worse when it eventually came.

The British had fulfilled the role of the world's banker before the First World War, and British lending in the 1800s had generally been counter cyclical. When times were good at home, domestic investment opportunities drew British capital away from international loans. But during slumps in the domestic economy, the British expanded foreign lending. This ebb and flow had a globally stabilizing influence. American foreign lending in the 20s and early 30s followed an opposite pattern.

In the late 1920's, the US was a huge exporter, but the American farmer was still suffering as overproduction had continued to depress the prices of agricultural goods. In the lead up to the 1928 election, Senators Smoot and Hawley put forth the idea that raising tariffs on imports would alleviate the overproduction issue. Now, while there had been an increase in imports of manufactured goods, manufactured exports were rising even faster.

Food exports had been falling, but the value of food imports from abroad was actually very small. Overall, the United States was a huge exporter, and these tariffs made no sense whatsoever. Herbert Hoover, who was running for election in 1928, pledged that as part of his program to help farmers, he would seek higher duties on agricultural imports. And once elected, he called a special session of Congress for the purpose of selective

revision of the tariffs. Public discussions about the tariffs centred on helping the American farmer and equalizing production costs at home and abroad. These arguments couldn't have been more wrong, as once trade partners retaliated, farmers ended up losing more from increased costs on items they import than they gained from price increases for their products, most of which faced almost no foreign competition anyhow.

An American Farm Bureau Federation study indicated that American farmers would gain $30 million from the increases in agricultural tariffs and lose 330 million in increased costs. Hoover's special session dragged on, and the House of Representatives eventually passed the act in May 1929.

If the United States wasn't going to buy goods from other countries, there was no way for other countries to earn dollars to buy from Americans, and, more importantly, no way to earn dollars to meet the interest payments on American loans. By September 1929, Hoover's administration had received protest notes from 23 trading partners. Some countries just protested, while others also retaliated with trade restrictions and tariffs of their own.

American exports to the protesting nations fell 18% and exports to those who retaliated fell by 31%.

Many scholars have argued that while the Smoot Hawley tariff had disastrous economic effects that it can't be blamed for the stock market collapse of October 1929 since it wasn't signed into law until the following June. Others argue that investors were aware that the tariffs were in the pipeline and would have tried to anticipate the likelihood of the ACT passing and it's expected economic effects.

If investors did anticipate the effects of the tariffs and sold their stocks, they might have been wise to do so as exports fell from $7 billion in 1929 to 2 1/2 billion dollars by 1932. Federal spending was only $2.6 billion in 1929 and reached 3.2 billion in 1932. The tariffs didn't exactly help the American farmer either. Trade accounted for 17% of farming come before the tariffs, and farm exports were slashed to a third of their 1929 level by 1933.

On the eve of the crash, the United States was actually in good economic shape. There was no shortage of productivity enhancing technological innovation, which meant that the same amount of Labor now produced significantly more goods. Businesses like Ford were doing well and were able to pay their workers well. America was applying science and invention to industry like never before, and even management practices were being revolutionized by men like Alfred Sloan at General Motors.

RCA, which was the hottest tech stock of the 1920s, rose by 940% between 1925 and 1929. It's PE ratio at the peak was 73, which is high, but we've also seen higher and for slower growing companies the stock bubble encouraged A rush of new IP OS. It's not true, however, that everyone was speculating madly in 1929. Just 3% of Americans owned any stock at the time, and only around 1% owned enough stock to keep an account with a broker. The majority owned only a few shares.

The Great Depression can't be simply blamed on the bursting of the stock bubble or the imposition of tariffs. Real life is, of course, a bit more complicated than that. By 1920, the United States held around 40% of the world's monetary gold. France had been accumulating gold too, and its share of the world's gold supply rose from 9% in 1927 to 17% by 1929 and reached 22% in 1931.

Before the crash in 1928, the US Fed was worried about its loss of gold and also about the ongoing boom in the stock market, and so it hiked interest rates to stop the outflows. As the US and France accumulated more and more of the world's monetary gold, other central banks took measures to stem the

outflow of gold too. In country after country, these deflationary strategies began contracting economic activity, and by 1928 some countries in Europe, Asia, and South America had fallen into recession due to a shortage of money. More countries economies began to decline in 1929, including the United States, and by 1930 a depression was in force for almost all of the world's market economies. Contrary to popular beliefs, the 29 crash was not a two day

event. Instead it was a long rolling downward slide that went on for weeks from September the 3rd until November 13th. There were brief upsurges after some of the worst days, but down and down it went. A week before Black Thursday, Irving Fisher, an economics professor at Yale, announced that the US stock prices had reached a permanently high plateau. Given the growth in productivity and technology, it was reasonable for earnings to only trend higher, he said.

The stock market had unfortunately been slipping for over a month at that point, and on Black Monday dove 13% in a day, falling a further 12% the next day. Over the next three years, the US stock market declined almost 90%, reaching its low in July 1932. The market didn't return to its prior peak until November 1954 / 25 years later. This collapse if it didn't actually 'cause it coincided with the start of the worst economic shock in the history of the industrialized world.

In the United States, economic output collapsed by a third. Unemployment reached 25%, or closer to 33% if a modern definition of unemployment was used. The Depression was a global catastrophe that saw prices and output decline in almost every economy in the world. Only Germany saw a severe and economic decline. As in America, international trade shrunk by 2/3 as countries tried to hide behind tariffs and import quotas to defend their

internal economies. The Soviet Union, with its planned economy, was the only country that appeared to be unaffected. The deflation that took place in the first three years of the Great Depression was the most dramatic deflation that the US has ever experienced. Prices dropped an average of 7% per year between 1930 and 1933. Deflation led to business bankruptcies, bank runs and rising rates of unemployment. Between the summer of 1929 and early 1933, the wholesale price index fell 33%.

President Hoover, in trying to boost American spirits after the crash, told journalists that the fundamental business of the country, that is the production and distribution of commodities, is on a sound and prosperous basis. A year later, in 1930, he told Americans that prosperity was just around the corner, and he likely believed it at the time, as recessions and depressions had always come and gone within

a year or two. Other than during the First World War, business activity had fallen in only seven of the last 60 years, and the only two year set back had been nineteen O 7 to 19 O 8. Historically, the average annual decline in real GDP during a slowdown was 1.6%, and the worst decline had been 5 1/2 percent. This time around it was a lot

worse. Production fell 9.3% in 1930 and a further 8.6% in 1931. At the very bottom, in June 1932, GDP was 55% below its 1929 peak, so roughly 10 times worse than the worst example that had been seen up until that point. And rather than lasting one or two years, the downturn would last a decade. Even during the boom of the 1920s, American economic growth had been below its long term

growth trend. Starting in 1870 when the United States was in its hyper growth phase, a number of recessions and depressions had hit the United States during that prior period of growth. But the historian Robert Mcelvain, in his excellent book The Great Depression, notes that

each slowdown over that period had hit harder than the prior. 1 He argues that as the United States became less agrarian and more industrial, less rural and more urban, an ever increasing percentage of the population became susceptible to the vagaries of the market economy. In the less industrial era, Americans had of course been victims of economic collapse, but they had mostly been able to feed themselves and their families during hard times as they were mostly farmers.

By the 1930s, Americans were more dependent on wages as the nation had industrialized. Urban working class people who rented their homes and worked in factories found themselves in desperate straits when they lost their jobs and couldn't find new ones. And over time there were more and more of these people, and the population was sensitive to economic conditions rather than growing conditions.

Herbert Hoover is often accused of doing nothing for the people in the early days of the Depression, but that's not really fair to say. He did spend heavily on public works, schools, roads and hospitals, and in fact engaged in more peacetime spending than any president had done before him. But it simply wasn't enough. The international part of the crisis began in 1931 when the credence styled Bank of Vienna collapsed, starting a domino effect that spread to the rest of Europe.

The reason this collapse was so impactful is that it was not just the largest bank in Austria, but it was larger than all of the other Austrian banks combined. It had a strong ties to the rest of Europe and it's collapse led to a Europe wide crisis. The runs on gold in Europe LED Britain to leave the gold standard in 1931 and devalue the pound. Leaving the gold standard was a politically controversial move at the time.

It was by no means a cure all, but overall devaluation helped Britain to become more competitive and the 1930s proved a far less painful period for the UK than they were for most other major economies at the time. A more competitive British pound allowed for a strong British recovery and significantly greater middle class prosperity.

While on the gold standard standard Britain had been forced to slash spending and raise taxes, which were not exactly flowing in due to the depressed business environment and high unemployment. While things were now improving in the UK, they were only getting worse in the United States. Technological improvements in the 1920s, like mechanized plowing and harvesting, had made it possible to operate larger farms in the United States

without higher labor costs. With insufficient understanding of the ecology of the Great Plains, farmers had been plowing the virgin topsoil, displacing the native deep rooted grasses that normally trapped soil and moisture even during periods of drought and high winds. The Plains entered an unusually dry era in the summer of 1930, and over the next decade the Northern Plains suffered 4 of their seven driest calendar

years in recorded history. The dry weather caused crops to fail, leaving the plowed fields exposed to wind erosion. The soil eroded and was carried eased by strong continental winds. This catastrophe intensified the economic impact of the Great Depression in the region, and farming families who had already been suffering for a decade were forced to abandon their farms and migrate to other parts of

the country seeking work. The catastrophe led to widespread hunger, homelessness and poverty. Over the decade of the Great Depression, about 3 1/2 million people migrated as Dust Bowl refugees out of the Plains state. Robert Mckelvin writes in his book on the Depression that history is usually viewed from the top or through the eyes of elites by examining the activities of governments and intellectuals.

But the Great Depression, he argues, needs to be examined through the eyes of the ordinary person to understand how it caused a fundamental shift in the values of the American people. Older Americans will remember how their parents or grandparents who lived through these times scrimped and saved even when times were good, and were careful not to waste anything in case hard times were

to come again. Mckelphain writes that the initial reaction to the depression by its many victims was bewilderment, defeat and self blame. People who had taken credit for the success that they had enjoyed in the 20s felt that they had little choice but to accept responsibility for their unfortunate circumstances in the 30s as they tried to understand the calamity that had befallen them. Conditions were particularly bad for farmers who were now in the second decade of their

depression. By 1932, a bushel of wheat would fetch only 10% of what it had bought 12 years earlier. The farmer now had to deal not only with low prices for his products, but also with general deflation. Farmers crushed by long term debt were threatened with foreclosure. Penny auctions were one example of how bankrupt farmers stuck together. Neighbours of a bankrupt farmer would prevent, by thread of force if necessary, realistic bids to buy a foreclosed farm.

They would then buy it back for a nominal fee, often $1.00, to return it to its original owner. Workers lined up hopelessly outside factories looking for work, knowing full well that none was available. Hardworking Americans, used to supporting themselves and their families, felt great shame lining up in bread lines and at soup kitchens. In rural areas, hungry people sometimes turned to eating weeds, and urban dwellers turned to rooting through garbage cans

and city dumps for food. A Chicago widow reported that she would remove her glasses before eating spoiled meat as the sight of it was so revolting. Records of the time describe how the lack of money, work and self esteem caused problems at home too, as when a father's dignity was based on his occupation and his role as a provider. The loss of his job meant a decline in his status within the

family. People often withdrew socially to hide the shame of being out of work, not realizing how many of their friends were in the same situation. Men over the age of 40 became unemployable. They would often spend their last few pennies on a second hand suit of clothes so that they would look decent when applying for jobs. They began to look and feel

older than they actually were. The lack of nutrition left them underweight, and their shabby clothes with frayed collars, worn shoes, and their missing teeth added decades to their appearance. Women lost proportionally fewer jobs than men during the Great Depression, as the type of work that they did at the time was more personal in nature.

School teachers, domestic servants, and clerical workers were more valued by their employers as individuals, and they weren't considered interchangeable like factory workers and farmhands were. When the New Deal was introduced, even more roles which were considered women's work, like social work and clerical work, were created than had existed before the Depression. Additionally, because women earned less than men, they were cheaper to keep on during hard times.

A 1940 study found that in the five most depressed sectors, women represented only 2% of the workforce. In stark contrast, women held 30% of the jobs in the industries which experienced the least layoffs. Employment discrimination, both in terms of what constituted a female job as well as the wage gap, kept more women in steady work than men. Racial minorities fared the worst during the Depression, often being the first to be laid

off and the last to be rehired. I should mention that many today only see the bleakness of the Great Depression, and it was a bleak time, but this is partially due to the stark black and white photographs that remain to this day. The novelist Josephine Herbst writes that there was also an almost universal liveliness that countervailed universal

suffering. The home, she says, became a center of leisure activity, with an evening by the radio, a reading aloud from books, which provided a cheap form of family entertainment. She went on to say that talking was the Great Depression pastime. Unlike the movies, talk was free. By the election of 1932, the American voter had had enough with Herbert Hoover, who they blamed for the economic

downturn. Franklin D Roosevelt aligned himself with the growing public hostility to bankers and greedy businessmen and swept to power in 1933 when his party won its biggest advantage in the Senate and the House since the Civil War. Even in the prosperous 20s, nearly 7000 American banks had failed. Most of these had been small country banks, and their failures had hardly been noticed. In 1930, the situation got a lot worse.

There were 1345 failures that year, including a large bank, the Bank of the United States, in New York. More than 2000 banks failed in 1931, and depositors of the time were unable to distinguish good banks from bad. As his first act in office, FDR declared a nationwide bank holiday where banks were closed until examiners could decide if they were good or not. He submitted to Congress an emergency banking bill drawn up largely by bankers, and both houses passed the bill without debate.

A rolled up newspaper was used to symbolize the proposed legislation until the still wet copies of the bill arrived. Roosevelt signed it into law 8 hours after its introduction in Congress. The ACT provided assistance to private bankers and gave them a government stamp of approval. It created the FDIC, which began insuring bank accounts at no cost for deposits of up to $2500 per customer.

The ACT additionally gave the president executive power to operate independently of the Federal Reserve during times of financial crisis. In 1933, Roosevelt abandoned the gold standard, delinking the value of the dollar to gold, which caused the dollar to fall 11 1/2%. In 1934. He relinked it at a lower gold content than before. Roosevelt was elected for four consecutive terms, while there was a tradition of only serving 2 terms. There were no presidential term

limits in law at the time. Roosevelt's first 100 days in office saw an unprecedented amount of legislation being passed. He established a number of agencies and measures designed to provide relief for the unemployed and to end the Depression. The Federal Emergency Relief Administration distributed relief to state governments. The Public Works Administration oversaw the construction of large scale public works like

dams, bridges, and schools. The Rural Electrification Administration brought electricity to rural homes, and the Civilian Conservation Corps hired 250,000 unemployed man for rural projects. FDR expanded Hoover's Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which financed railroads and industry. He gave the Federal Trade Commission broad regulatory powers and provided mortgage relief to millions of farmers and homeowners.

Roosevelt passed 2 securities acts, one in 1933 and another in 1934, establishing the Securities and Exchange Commission and the securities regulations that we have today. He set up the Agricultural Adjustment Administration to increase commodity prices by paying farmers to leave land

uncultivated and cut herd. This was probably his most controversial act, as in order to drive up agricultural commodity prices, he ordered the slaughter of over 6,000,000 pigs, the plowing under of 10 million acres of crops, all at a time when Americans were struggling to feed themselves. There had been 30 deaths from starvation in America in the very year when all of this food was being ordered to be spoiled.

The Agricultural Adjustment Administration concept of limiting agricultural production was no better in a country where people were able to feed their children and agricultural workers couldn't find work. Roosevelt tried to cut the federal budget too. This included a reduction in military spending and a 40% cut in spending on veterans benefits. Half a million veterans and widows were removed from the pension rolls and benefits were

reduced for the remainder. Federal salaries were cut and spending on research and education was reduced too. The veterans were well organized, protested, and won the right to transform their benefits from payments due in nine years time to immediate cash. This change pumped enough money into the consumer economy to have a major stimulus effect in 1936 when it was paid out.

In his second term, Roosevelt introduced the minimum wage and Social Security. While Social Security will have helped reduce elder poverty eventually, it was quite a flawed piece of legislation as it excluded the neediest workers, farm and domestic workers, and it worked as a form of payroll tax, taking spending money out of the economy where

it was needed. Workers badly in need of spending money had to start paying into Social Security right away, and no future payments were scheduled until 1941. The most important part of the Second New Deal was the Works Progress Administration, which divided $5 billion among several different agencies to create work for the unemployed. There were problems with the WPA. The pay was very low, amounting to half of the subsistence wage at the time.

The reason for the low wages was that firstly there was not enough money to go around, but also because Roosevelt wanted to be sure that work relief was not attractive in comparison with private employment. So wages were kept low and the projects taken on were mostly unimportant as it was designed to not compete with private businesses.

The Public Works Commission, on the other hand, was seen as a means of bringing about recovery but also providing valuable public infrastructure to the American people. The PwC was headed by Harold Ike, who refused to spend for the sake of spending, so much of the money was spent on materials, engineers and skilled workers. Private contractors often did the work.

The agency was efficiently run and left public structures like bridges, dams, schools, municipal building, sewage systems, port facilities and hospitals. The clear purpose of PwC projects and the careful spending kept it above much of the criticism that was levelled at other New Deal programs. Scarcely anyone in government at the time, including Roosevelt, liked the idea of the dole.

It was believed that direct relief payments stripped people of their sense of independence and their sense of individual destiny. Roosevelt, who spoke directly to the American people on the radio in his fireside chats, the first time an American president was able to communicate directly with voters, received masses of mail from the public, which were a treasure trove of information for historians trying to

understand the times. Americans wrote to the president asking for work rather than Dole. Robert Mcgillvane provides excerpts from these letters in his book. My pride took an awful beating when I had to apply for relief, a Minneapolis man wrote. But I feel different about the WPA. Here I am working for what I'm getting, a woman wrote in saying it means that I can look people in the eye because I'm not on

the dole. Another man wrote that the work allowed him to sleep nights instead of lying awake thinking of desperate things he might do. Roosevelt won his third term in 1940, winning 55% of the popular vote. There was a strong class division in the vote, and a survey conducted after the election found that 80% of those on relief had voted for Roosevelt, as had 60% of those who said that they wouldn't get by without relief for one month

if they lost their jobs. The unemployment rate in 1940 was still at 14.6%, and even in 1941, as the defense industries moved into high gear exporting arms to Europe, the mean unemployment rate was still 9.9%, representing almost 6,000,000 Americans who wanted to work. Industrial production, which had finally surpassed its 1929 level, soared 30% above its 1929 level level in 1941. The Great Depression was a global phenomenon.

By the late 1930s, every country had replied to economic difficulties by devaluing their currency and raising tariffs, all in an attempt to push economic distress from their country to others. The failure to cooperate on economic matters had said every country against its neighbors. Economic failures had led to political failures, and extremist governments took power in many countries. When war kicked off in Europe, nations around the world moved gold to the United States for safety.

American banks filled with gold were now willing to land again. Military spending boosted American exports and possibly saved the reputation of the New Deal and the Roosevelt presidency. Without the military boom, Roosevelt's presidency might have been remembered as compassionate and helpful, but ineffective in solving the fundamental problems of the Depression.

Whether you owned a business, had a job, invested, borrowed money, or even just had a bank account in the 1930's, the Depression found a way to hurt you financially. Globalization, and then the retreat from globalization meant that the effects of the Great Depression were felt around the world. The economic effects hit Germany particularly hard, leading to the rise of Hitler, who used the despair of the German people as a rallying call.

In the 1950s, Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz began compiling historical data on monetary variables.

As they examined the data, they say that it became obvious that the data was at odds with the standard Keynesian explanation for the Great Depression. In their 1963 book Monetary History of the United States, they presented the evidence that led them to the conclusion that the Great Depression was not the necessary and direct result of the stock market crash of October 1929. Friedman and Schwartz argued that the Depression was brought about by the Fed's failure to

carry out its role as the lender of last resort rather than providing liquidity through loans. They say that the Fed just watched as banks dropped like flies, oblivious to the effect this would have on the monetary supply. They say that the Fed could have offset the decrease created by bank failures by engaging in bond purchases, but it didn't do so.

They say that the Federal Reserve System should have engaged in large scale, open market purchases of government bonds, providing banks with additional cash to meet the demands of their depositors. This would have ended or at least sharply reduced the stream of bank failures and would have prevented bank runs from reducing the quantity of money. Unfortunately, the Fed's actions were hesitant and small. In the main, it stood by idly and let the crisis take its

course. In 2002, Ben Bernanke, then a member of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, publicly acknowledged that the Federal Reserve's mistakes contributed to the worst economic disaster in American history. Michael Pettis, when writing about Chinese overproduction, compared it to American overproduction in the 1920s. He explained that the 1929 crash cut off funding for countries

who are buying US exports. If foreign countries could no longer absorb US overcapacity, he argues, then the US needed to either increase domestic consumption or cut back on domestic production. One way or another, production and consumption needed to balance. He says that there was, of course, more to the story than just a drop in foreign demand for American goods, and that with the collapse of parts of the domestic U.S. banking system, domestic private consumption also fell.

He says that the slack in demand should have been taken up by US fiscal expansion, but instead of expanding aggressively, both Hoover and Roosevelt expanded cautiously. Since US production exceeded US consumption, the need for demand creation most logically resided in the United States. But the US had other ideas. Rising unemployment pressures prompted US senators to respond with tariffs.

With the tariffs, Washington was trying to create additional demand for American goods by upping the prices foreign made goods, forcing the brunt of the adjustment onto trading partners who of course retaliated, causing international trade to decline by nearly 70% in three years.

Without global trade, each country had to adjust domestic supply to match domestic demand, but in such a situation, export driven economies, which the United States was at the time and China is today, are more vulnerable to a reduction in trade than countries who mostly buy foreign goods are. Thanks for tuning into this week's podcast. If you want to support making content like this, you can do so on Patreon using the link in the show notes. Have a great week and talk to you again soon.

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