S2E12 – Prof. Saul Newman on political theology

The latest one is Political Theology, a critical introduction, and the next one coming up soon is Order, Crisis and Redemption Political Theology after Schmidt. Hello, soul, Professor Newman. Thank you so much for coming on our podcast.

And I've always found your writing on Max Sterner really engaging and eye opening. And so to begin, could you please tell us a bit more about how you read and understand these two thinkers and how you think they remain still relevant today?

uh and uh consequence uh for um you know the tradition of uh political thought and and and western philosophy. Um so if we start with uh Leboissy Um he uh kind of posed the sort of the eternal mystery, the eternal question of political power, which is why people obey authority, uh even tyrannical authority, when it's against their own interest to do so. um and when there's no uh direct coercion or violence involved. And this is what he referred to as voluntary servitude.

Or voluntary enslavement, voluntary obedience to tyrannical authority. Uh this was uh a text that he wrote back in the sixteenth century called Discourse. on voluntary servitude. Um and uh he was really struck by the by the um way in which people will um you know blindly and quite willingly, quite freely

uh go along with uh with with tyrannical authority. And the reason why I think this is still relevant today, perhaps um more relevant in our time today, is because um in the time when traditional structures of authority have largely broken down. um at a time when uh you know, politicians and elected representatives are kind of openly disdained and ridiculed.

um at a time where we see the the kind of the collapse of sort of hierarchical um structures of social authority, the people nevertheless obey like never before. Um And this perhaps explains the appeal of, you know, quasi authoritarian figures, you know, populist leaders.

Like Trump, for instance. Um and we have to ask the question, what precisely is the appeal of these, you know, so called strongman authoritarian types? Maybe people need and desire a master to to obey. Um As for Max Stirner, uh well, I mean Max Stirner kind of took a wrecking ball to the entire tradition of, you know, Western philosophy, um completely sort of rewrote the rule book, if you like, um, and uh

Um, you know, his writing of course back in the sort of nineteenth century, uh also, you know, very turbulent time politically. Uh and uh you know, he he said that the you know the own way in which we can be uh uh free, free if you like, from the the kind of the ideological abstractions which kind of a hangover from, you know, religion and from Christianity. The only way in which we can be um free from these spooks in the head.

um these mystifications is um is through a kind of a a new sort of philosophy and a new kind of um ethics, if you like, of what you call egoism. um, you know, based upon the kind of the uh the fact that the um the self is the only sort of ontological reality. And we we can only sort of proceed from from this kind of um you know f from the self from the eye.

and and and start anew. Um so I mean uh you know, he's probably the most sort of radical thinker of all time, which is also perhaps the reason why he's been so, you know, sort of historically marginalised. Um Uh but nevertheless I mean I think uh you know, even though these are two marginal figures in various ways, that they have had quite a a big impact, I think, on uh um you know

on various sort of traditions of of philosophy. And I I I I find I mean, for all kinds of reasons, um and certainly for the development of a kind of a an anarchist or a post anarchist theory, th these are two sort of crucial things.

Um, he in a way predicted that that this would um simply lead to the invention or even the desire for, you know, for a new master, for new structures of authority. And there's a certain thesis that um in a way sort of, you know, May sixty eight kind of um if you like, paved the way for um you know for kind of you know you know for sort of you know neo neoliberalism and uh neoliberal structures um uh and circuits of power.

So um All of these thinkers, these three thinkers, perhaps can and and and no doubt they're they're they're very different in in all other kinds of respects, but I think they can come they can sort of be brought together if you like. um with a certain sort of um or on the basis of a certain kind of awareness of the dangers of power and indeed the w um the seductions of power, the ways in which we are sort of enthralled

to um to to certain, if you like, um sort of structures of power which and authority which become internalized within the subject. So, you know, Stern was very concerned about the ways in which we internalise um in a new sort of humanist garb, a new secular garb. You know, the old ideas of, you know, God and um you know, kind of the sort of the um the thought structures or the belief structures if you like of of Christianity.

um Le Boisier was concerned with the ways in which we um kind of internalize authority. Um, you know, I mean his whole point was that the, you know, the power of the tyrant is really nothing without the sort of the voluntary obedience, the voluntary consent of uh of his subjects. Um so in a way that you know the power of the tyrant is really kind of like a figment of our imagination. We we sort of project onto this figure.

our own you know, the abandonment of our own freedom. Uh uh th thereby constructing him. And thereby constructing him as all powerful. And his point was that if we simply Turn our backs upon him, turn away from him, reclaim our freedom. um then then then the power of the tyrant simply dissipates. So once again it's a certain kind of, you know, internalisation or a certain kind of um sort of psychological mechanism.

uh which is going on within the subject which kinda makes us desire our own repression, desire our own servitude. Uh So so there is a kind of a I mean, even though, you know, Stirner and Leboissi are not you know, they're not psychoanalysts obviously and they're kind of writing the uh you know, in time before before the invention of psychoanalysis, um

And th they're not really talking about the kind of the uh you know, about sort of psychology in the sense that um in the sort of modern sense. Uh nevertheless, I mean they're they're kind of very aware I think of the internal as it were, sort of psychic dynamics of power and and obedience, um, and the ways in which you know external structures of authority kind of become sort of internalized within the uh within the subject.

quite sort of, you know, dangerously naive in some respects. I mean, you know, the trouble is that, you know, we have a tendency to always kind of, you know, reinvent new forms of power. in the in the ruins of the old system. But you know, and this has been the the fate of every revolution, hasn't it? It's only kind of perpetuated and reinvented uh structures of power and authority.

um for Stirner and Leboissé and perhaps also to some extent for Lacan, I mean they're very kind of aware of the of the s sort of the pitfalls of the kind of the classical model of revolution, uh, which always assumed that man naturally desires freedom, um, and if and and that if only the kind of the external structures of

you know, oppression and violence were removed then then would be, you know, reconciled with our own freedom and and reconciled with our own humanity. I think all of these thinkers are kind of suggesting that um it's actually a bit more complicated. that there is a certain kind of um desire or um if you like passionate attachment.

to our own um our own servitude, which we need to um we need to come to terms with. So every revolution uh has to start with what Stoner called the insurrection, a kind of a micro political revolt. whereby we extricate ourselves from our own desire for domination. Um it begins with a kind of a work on the self, um, and then you know the consequences follow from that.

Um but if we simply assume that if we um you know get rid of capitalism or get rid of the state that that we'll we'll we finally free um i is uh is is a is an illusion I think as far as the three thinkers go.

you know, we'd simply be left with the conclusion that, you know, man always desires his own enslavement. Um but I think if you read Leboissi in the way in which he intended, uh it's actually quite emancipatory. I mean what you know what he's saying is, you know, power itself is an illusion. Um, you know, there there is no such thing as power. Power is sim simply something which we've invented. Um and therefore it it uh can be quickly or very easily demolished if we simply stop

Obeying it. In other words, all power ultimately comes from us. And we simply need to kind of reclaim this power, reclaim this power over ourselves that we've kind of, you know, given up or abrogated. Uh and that's actually very optimistic, isn't it? It's very optimistic, I I think, because he says that, you know, if you know, if he's really kind of um

uh proposing some notion of ontological freedom. We're always free. Um we just don't know it. We just don't know it. We simply need to kind of realize and acknowledge the freedom that we um that we already have.

Well I like to ask you first of all to give us maybe a brief introduction to what is political theology, and maybe also see tell us how it's linked, if it is linked to post anarchism.

uh the sovereign state, the state of exception, certain kind of legal, juridical and political categories. That's something which um Carl Schmidt um uh was writing about in his uh very famous sort of

touchstone work, if you like, political theology back in nineteen twenty two. But but it's all it's also in a way, political theology is also broader than that in the sense it i it kind of refers to the the general relationship if you like between, you know, politics and religion as well as, you know, theological constructs and and and and and and and and political constructs. But, you know, since Schmidt's time it's it's become much more sort of uh diversified. Um

uh y you know, the Trouble Trouble Schmidt's model of political theology is that it's um it becomes a political religion. The translation of theology into politics simply becomes a way of um uh authorizing, legitimizing and bolstering the the kind of the authoritarian sovereign state. Um I mean Schmidt was a kind of a a conservative uh thinker, a kind of a radical Hobbesian, if you like, who who was concerned with the way in which the uh

political order, um, at the time of the Weimar Republic, which was when he was writing this uh this work, Political Theology, the political order, you know, had no real sources of legitimacy after the sort of the collapse of of religion and, you know, we kind of moved into this kind of Sort of time of secularism, atheism, you know, liberal individualism. And he was really pondering the question: where does authority come from? What are the sources of political legitimacy?

This is why he wanted to kind of recruit theological concepts into um into in uh or use them or utilise them as a way of um you know bolstering the the political order. And and hence he came up with this notion of the state of exception whereby the sovereign uh exceeds the uh you know, the normative um order of the law and and if you like suspends the constitution.

But but you know, th there's also much more radical uh readings of political theology, which is what I've been interested in. in my various uh writings on the subject, um which have been, you know, very critical obviously of the Schmidtian model. Um I mean even in Schmidt's time, you know, his his concept of branded political theology was was sort highly

controversial and and contest it. And um Uh so so I suppose what I've been interested in doing has been to um look at the way in which, you know, religion and theology from many different traditions, not just Christianity but also from you know from the Messianic traditions of Judaism, for instance. um can you know, c can be used to co uh can can be if you like, um mined for resources for um

for uh you know, helping us understand um emancipatory movements, um anarchist forms of politics. I mean there's there's even sort of Christian anarchism, um, which I which I've written about. So, you know, it seems to me that uh

you know, religion is not always on the side of political conservatism, um, even though that might seem to be very much the case today. That um, you know, that the theology, insofar as it actually contests the legitimacy of the political order, insofar as it's it says that you know that you know your real kind of authority kind of comes from God, not from the state. God is is not is not a concept which can kind of be uh articulated in in in political terms.

that that you know, taking that kind of notion um that in a sense kind of displaces and destabilizes the the political order. Uh in various ways. So so you know, I'm kind of interested in the way in which you know religion and and spirituality can have a sort of a role to play in recontesting the uh the political space.

by introducing a certain kinds of ethical dimension, if you like, into politics which which um you know, w which kind of profoundly unsettles the uh you know, the political order and the order of uh of authority.

you know, once again, you know, the coming of the uh Messiah is you know, is the end of all existing political orders. Um some you know, something Paul was talking about in the time of the Roman Empire, of course.

So so what I'm what I've been interested in is a way in which um you know, redemption the idea of redemption can sort of be understood, if you like, in secular terms. Um Which is to say, you know, um w which which is to say that, you know, we we can think about politics in terms of hope, faith, justice. Perhaps not in a kind of a final absolute sense because I I'm slightly resistant to that idea. But certainly, you know, with regards to to the um

to to a certain kind of redemptive politics we like in the in the here and now. Um so in other words we don't it's not s not about sort of waiting for the great sort of revolutionary event, but it's about sort of finding spaces of emancipation and f you know, forms of hope in the present moment, even in sort of a sort of sort of micro political

scale, for instance. It's interesting you brought up this um this this idea of uh you know techniques and, you know, technological domination, um and the way in which, you know, religion well, firstly the way in which that that becomes a certain kind of religion in a way, the you know, religion of technology.

And also in the way in which um that peps can only be sort of you know, technological domination can only be contested through you know, through a a new kind of sort of spirituality, for instance. So um so you know, I'm I'm quite interested in the sort of the emancipatory uh promise o of certain kinds of um, you know, religious and and spiritual notions.

I was I was wondering how do you s how you interpret this and how you think it might be possible maybe to um on the one hand criticize the idea that those uh religious conservatives truly are religious in a sense, and maybe open up the religious imagination to an emancipatory stance.

you know, kind of the Christian evangelical movement in the United States or, you know, religious conservatives around the world. I mean what they're trying to do is kind of, you know, if you like, take over the state, um, or at least kind of influence the uh the political agenda.

So what they're really doing is politics. I mean they're they're pushing a certain kind of, you know, uh, you know, conservative sort of ideological agenda which which really has very little to do with with any sort of genuine uh you know, religious or theological position.

You know, but this isn't always the case. I mean you know, like um You know, I mean I mean to give you an example, I mean in this country, for instance, uh, you know, many sort of Anglican theologians have been, you know, extremely critical of uh of of government policy, particularly, you know, most recently in the um you know the government's uh

uh you know, Rwanda uh asylum policy, for instance, it was sort of roundly condemned by um you know by sort of religious leaders and uh um you know senior members of the of the clergy. So religion isn't always, of course, on the side of um, you know, kind of you know, socially conservative policies, but certainly in many contexts around the world, United States and many countries in Europe, you know, Hungary and Poland would be good examples. In many cases it is.

often the politics of the left um really wants nothing to do with um with religion. But but you know, uh like I said, I mean what what I've been trying to do is to show the way in which um a more sort of genuine um you know reading of uh Christian theology can um can have sort of um you know, emancipatory um consequences can can actually kind of align itself with um you know with kind of radical political struggles around, you know, ecology and uh, you know, climate justice, racial justice.

uh social and economic equality, you know, human rights and so on. Uh and indeed many of the um you know German theologians which are kind of writing um after the Second World War, people like Jürgen Moldman, uh Johann Baptist Metz who were kind of part of this sort of liberation theology movement.

you know, had a very different kind of understanding of the the kind of the political sort of ramifications or or political um implications of of Christianity and they they kind of uh associated Christian theology with um with emancipation rather than uh the sort of uh the old sort of conservative Catholic Church and in many ways kind of broke away from from that conservative model of um of politics and religion.

And in the case of political theology, I was just curious to ask you what you think is the specific um maybe contribution that to to the debate to your mind that comes from the Jewish tradition rather than from the Christian.

uh that's uh you know and and these were thinkers who were kind of associated with um you know with with with anarchism or with um you know sort of you know sort of revolutionary politics. Jakob Taubes would be another example, it's one of uh Schmidt's interlocutors Uh yeah, I mean Jakob Talbs who was actually a rabbi Um once said that um you know, Carl Schmidt and I are both thinkers of as thinkers of the apocalypse.

Um but Schmidt thinks the apocalypse from above, which is to say the um the apocalypse imposed by the sovereign state of exception, which in a way destroys the political order in order to conserve it. Whereas I, Jakob Taubs, thinks the apocalypse from below. In other words, the gen you know

the sort of the you know, the apocalypse is really about, you know, the revolution from below, not from above. It's not the revolution imposed by the state, it's revolution which kind of um undermines the state. So um so so you know that there is a there is this kind of you know radical um um dimension, if you like, to um

to um you know, to certain kinds of strands of of of of Judaism which uh you know which is very sort of interesting. Um I I mean, you know, Benjamin said that the the Messiah can kind of appear at any moment, you know, which means that um, you know, the revolution can kind of come at any moment, not necessarily at the end of time, but it can it can kind of appear um in the present moment.

I mean Martin Buber's also another very interesting example. I mean his his thought is often read as a kind of an anarchistic theopolitics, which says that, you know, if all authority comes from God then then the state uh and governments have no legitimate authority. Alright, so you see you can see you can see you can see the immediate connections with with a certain kind of anarchism. Because I mean you know, God's not really present, right? I mean God isn't

God's not really present or or visible, doesn't really intervene in the world. But if if we take the idea that, you know, we're we're only you know, we should only really obey something which doesn't actually exist or recognize someone which doesn't exist and that that kind of completely um undermines and unsettles all established worldly secular forms of of of of authority.

And in the case of your field, I would like to ask you if you could contribute a few volumes to the shelves of our library. Are there any books that you would recommend that we add?

And well like let's say uh Macston is the ego on its own. Um because he would say, you know, the the current world has to come to an end before uh before the new one can be uh the new world of of um of of the of the sort of the ego, if you like. Um, or the unique one can be born.