Why Foreign Investors Cooled On U.S. Debt

calendar every year. Did you celebrate? I like, do people out there do a fiscal New Year's celebration? I mean, I know there's a lot of finance out there in Hong Kong, and so is that a thing out there or is that just it's not the same? Uh I. I confess that I didn't notice anyone um celebrating more than usual. I did write a high ku on Twitter, though, and my high ku, my high ku was about stress in the money markets, which is something that occasionally happens

at quarter ends. That there's been a thing lately and people are sort of in the final few days of the final week or a couple of weeks of the quarter, you start to hear people rumbling about, are we gonna see um see stress appearing in various money market and fixed income markets, And I feel like I don't have my head completely wrapped around why this keeps happening. Ah, well, then I know just the person who's going to be

able to help you with this. But yes, essentially, Uh, let's see at right before the year end, right before December thirty first last year, we did see a bunch of people talking about funding stress in the money market, which is just about the biggest money market that you can think of. And then just at the end of the first quarter we saw that yet again. So something is clearly happening in the market. At the same time, a big component of the money market, uh, something that

is often used as collateral for the money market. US treasuries are also undergoing massive, massive changes, some of which you might have picked up on in the US. Once again, I feel like this is an area in which I'm extremely weak on, like a lot of the sort of the deep plumbing of the financial system I wish I knew more about, and I'm I'm optimistic that maybe I'll learn more after today's episode, Joe, I know you know this, So you know the U. S. Treasury is selling basically

a record point thank you? Okay, a few Okay. So at the same time that the U. S. Treasury is selling a lot of debt, we have a bunch of changes sort of taking places in the underlying money market, and we're going to discuss all of those with someone who is really the foremost expert on this topic. So I'm very pleased that our guest for this particular episode is Reultan Posar. He's a strategist over at Credit Swiss.

He's also a former US Treasury advisor, So who better to talk about the massive changes underway not only in money markets but also in the U. S. Treasury market result in, it's so good to have you on the show. Thank you very much for having me. So I sort of alluded to this, uh in the intro, but we're going to be talking about money markets and and just to back up for Joe's benefit, obviously, can you tell us what is your concept of money markets? What are

we talking about when we say the money market? Thank you. I'm glad you asked this and didn't skip over this question because I would have. Yes, money markets, I think in my inserprevision, I think anything from overnight and introduced stuff out to I would say three months. And so that's the core of it. And you know money markets are hierarchical, and that that shows up in you know, the term aspect of it, the institutional aspect of it,

the instrumental aspect of it. But I think the core of it is definitely all the flows that happened in the financial system three months and in so very short term funding. And the people who are buying and selling this short term funding, they're basically rolling over it constantly right in in the overnight market usually or through the repo market where they sort of use the underlying securities as collateral to secure extra financing. Yes, so so there

is there is various types of players. Um, maybe we can start from outside in so you have you know, I guess the the every time you think about a carry trader, whoever is buying a bond and financing it short in the short term money markets. You know, Perry Merlin would say that they do money market funding of capital market landing another way of saying, shadow banking, carry trading,

all that stuff. Uh, that typically gets funded at the three month point, simply because most bonds paid coupons every quarter and so it's convenient. I guess it's just an industry convention. So if you are someone who is not a dealer and who's not a bank, you will tend to fund the three month points. And there are obviously any other end of the spectrum. You have players that fund overnight. Those would be banks and dealers that have

a deeper ability to roll this financing every day. And then the arbit treasures, I would say in the money market live between the overnight point and a three month point, because some of these arbitrast trades are about, you know, borrowing money for one months and lending it at the three month point and rolling it every three months I'm sorry, every month, or if you want to do shorter arm you can do one week to one month and one

day to one week. And so you know, the three months and the overnight points are the extremes and and the large gesips or whatever you want to call them these days, they are the ones that move the money between the overnight point and the three month point. But all these ending that end users of funding tend to

live at the three month points. So all these different players are engaged in different transactions, but essentially if they're borrowing at very short term rate for some sort of further trade, whether it's a lending or buying some bond out there that has a higher yield, how big and hoping the profit from the spread? How big is the money market? I mean, it's huge. It's uh, I never

counted it. It's probably north of five trillion dollars. And then if you just look at the the large groups of investors that borrow in it, I mean the most obvious investor example is governments. The U S. Treasury they have um, you know, trillions of bills outstanding. You have the large banks, all of which now have to fund their so called h qul A portfolios around the three month points, so that's that's another trillion. You have the federal homeland banks in the US, which issue easily a

trillion dollars um. The report market, we have daily statistics on it. It's at least a trillion dollars only at the overnight point, and the most of the report market is overnight anyway, So I think that's that's already around five trillion. And then The thing that's unmeasured, but it's very important and very huge is the f FX swap market, which is, you know, people think of it as a derivative and whatnot, but I mean, at the core of it,

it's it's really a funding market. One thing we know is that in Tokyo alone, the dollar yen f swap market UM is roughly one and a half trillion dollars in size, or that's what it used to be at

least UM through the end of twenty eighteen. The Bank of Japan they have a wonderful Financial Stability Report UM, and there's a chart they used to publish there where they broke down UH life insurers UM and large megabanks demand for dollars in the f S pop market UH and recently they stopped publishing it, but up to the point where they published that those numbers were north of

a trillion dollars. And you know, the f FX spop market is big, not only in Tokyo, but also in Europe and in uh in you know Satellite Europe as I call it, you know, Switzerland, Scandinavia, all these other places. So I think the money market is easily north of five chillion probably even seven trillion dollars, all right, So it's it's a big market to say the least. There are going to be a lot of super relatives used in this particular chat. But Salton, I'm glad you mentioned

the f X swap market. So this is basically the place where big investors hedge or convert their currencies. So you know, if you're buying US dollar debt and you're a Japanese investor, you probably don't want to be exposed to that currency risk, so you might do a swap um in the market to sort of offset that cost. Now, you argue that a lot of the flows that we've seen in money markets recently have been changing partly because of what's going on in the f X swap market.

Can you explain that there's obviously always two sides of the same coin, right, So on the one hand, if you are a foreign investor, like a Japanese investor who buys dallar assets, it's not only that you don't want to have that dollar f X exposure, it's not in your mandate to run with that risk, right, So by mandate you basically have to manage the FX risk of that position. And eliminate it. And that's what you use

the swap market for. And it's been, uh, it's been the case that for many years the primary destination for all these and again let's just you know, broaden this out, so this is not just about the Japanese life insurers. This is about Swiss life insurers, Swedish life insurers, Northern European UH long only pension funds and and and insurers.

Whoever is basically trying to escape a negative rate jurisdiction at home has been playing a game where they have been looking for UH decently yielding assets, primarily in the US UH and then buying those assets and hedging it

back to the local currency. And for as long as the curve treasury curve was steep in the US, that was an easy trade, right because if you could buy the tenure treasury at two and a half percent and pay UM one percent to hedge, the f X component of that of that bondy would still end up with one and a half percent, which compared to negative rates in the in the home country are great. UM. And you know, if you go back to twenty fifteen, that's been that's been the case. There were a couple of

structural things that happened. I mean, number one, basiltry was obviously introduced, and that raised balance sheet costs for all the intermediaries that we're providing these effects edges to to the life insurance the world over. And then we had a couple of episodes of financial reform, like money fund reform, like tax reform, which messed around with the spread that uh, these foreign investors had to pay over O I s, which is basically the feds preferred path for short term

rates UM. And and you know, sometimes these spreads periodically flared up and they raised hedging costs, but then hedging costs came back down after um. You know, these episodic storms have subsided. But the very important thing that has happened from twenty seventeen onwards is that the FED really started to hike interest rates. And as the FED started to hike interest rates, they flattened the curve completely. So basically, relative to three month bills, the tenure treasury barely yielded

a lot more. And then when you add up these post basal three spreads on top of very elevated front and rates, you basically ended up in a situation that where if you're a foreign investor, you just cannot buy treasuries on a hedged basis and make a positive spread. Okay, And you know, this has also been a theme that's

been going on for a while. And because treasuries were no longer attractive given hedging costs, another important theme in the US has been that all of the foreign flow has been going into the credit markets, anything from I G to high yield to c l os. So obviously that that helped, UH strong conditions in those markets, and you know, those assets trade at a reasonably you know, widespread the treasuries, and those widespreads were basically what offset

the rising hedging costs. Do these uh foreign institutional investors um And you mentioned earlier that currency risk was not part of their mandate, How does the credit risk of buying corporates fit into their mandate? Credit risk is fine, that's no problem for them, right because you know, the thing about FX pop market, the FX markets is that you know, currency is gonna can go up and down,

you know, five fairly easily. I think in the credit world, if you don't have anything systemic or anything sector specific, and for as long as you're diversified, and I mean it's very hard to get mark down. Is that big? So we've we Tracy started this or in the intro we talked about all of this, the weird stuff we keep seeing at the end of each quarter in these markets. And I'm what is that all about? So what what's changed such that the final several days of each quarter

become this period where suddenly stressed starts to emerge. I think in simple terms, UM, we now have a regulatory regime which banks are following chapter and verse. And this regulatory regime has changed the economics of a bank's balance sheet. And there is certain days when you have to report uh, your leverage ratio. It used to be, you know, the

focus used to be UNRISC created assets. Now this is just a simple leverage ratio where demotional size of your balance sheet cannot be bigger than x. You have liquidity ratios, term funding ratios, you have interday equidity requirements UM so called g CP scores, which means, you know, the bigger and the more complex you are, the more search arts you have to carry as capital in future periods. And

you know, the the system takes these reporting dates extremely seriously. UM, and every time these deporting rates come come by, you know, quarter ends, year ends, year in particular, UM, banks just shrink their balance sheets because they have to meet certain targets. And when these balance sheets shrink, the market disappears, right because a lot of these markets that we're talking about, RIPO and f X pops are basically intermediated through banks

balance sheets. UM. I think academics have this tendency to think about markets as some you know, magical cloud on a chart that always clears. I mean, there's nothing magical about them. It's basically people putting balance sheet on the line, and if they take that balance sheet away, you have a vacuum. And when you have a vacuum, great spot. So UM, I want to go back for a second to what we're discussing about how it's becoming more difficult

for foreign investors to buy US treasuries. Uh this basic idea that you know, they used to be able to buy them and then hedge them and still make one and a half percent on something like the tenure, and now that's not possible, partly because the FED has raised rates, but also partly because of what's been going on in the FX swap market. How has that changed the body of buyers for US treasuries, How has that been different

in recent months or years? And also why should we care about a different group buying up US treasuries as opposed to an old group like Japan these banks. So I'll tell you the punchline first. You should care about this because I think all of these impacts the FEDS ability to taper entering the balance sheet tremendously. And I think that that concept is is he'll understood. So let's let's start with the past and they will come to

the present. So it's been the case that foreign investors used to be very you know, avid buyers of treasuries at auction and again for as long as the economics of it were there, you know, could buy treasuries and hedge it back for a positive carry. You did it. Um. What changed over the course of last year, and particularly during the fourth quarter of last year, the foreign buyers for all intents and purposes, you know, the bread and

butter hedged buyers, they disappeared. Because what happened in the fourth quarter of last year, actually coming into the fourth quarter, is that the yield curve um outright inverted relative to foreign investors hedging costs. Okay, so I guess one important observation is that people tend to obsess over the inversion um.

Then they tend to obsess about it in a way where they measure it using three stands, and actually, like looking at the curve shape using the three month bill yield versus the ten year yield actually is not very meaningful these days, because the reason why we did that metric ten years ago, when by uh that metric had meaning to it, was because everybody used to fund around the three month bill yield, and everybody used to fund around the three month bill yield because we didn't have

Basil three. Bank balance sheets were an unlimited supply, so basically banks were arbitraging funding spreads all the way until they roughly equaled three month billiards. And that's obviously not the case anymore. So looking at curve slopes using three

stands makes no sense. Under Basil three, what you need to do is actually you need to look at actual funding costs relative to the ten year point, and that those relative funding costs are term repo, three month lib or three month hedging costs, and all of these rates are going to be you can translate, as you know, three month bills plus twenty three month bills plus forty three month bills plus okay, and so those are your actual funding costom when you look at UM the level

of these actual funding rates relative to the tenure, relative to all of them. The curve has inverted last October, the first week of October UM. And the reason for that was obviously you had the year and turn was getting priced into the FX pop markets UM, so you had a big pop in hedging costs. Library was going through its typical year and UH widening, which has been a mainstay of of of the post Bassal three regime. And you know, collateral supply and treasury issuance was heavy

and that was pressuring GC rates. And so you know, interestingly, you know, even though the outright inversion only happened one or two weeks ago, relative to the rates that matter, we've been living in an inverted curve environment since last October, which I cannot find it important to highlight because sometimes you can still read fat speeches that say, while I'm not worried about the inversion just yet, because it only lasted two weeks, and I want to see deeper than

what we can actually see in three stands. Well, actually it didn't happen only two weeks ago, but since last October, and depending on what funding rids you look at, it's been as deep as thirty or forty basis points. So so these things, these things are changing as we speak. So we are living through this inversion. And importantly, you know, to get back to your question, Tracy, when this inversion happens, you basically knock away a few by buyers potential buyers

of treasuries. So if the foreign hatched buyer cannot buy this buy treasuries at auctions, then that's one buyer base that goes away. If you're a bank and you cannot fund that the three month point in the CD and CP markets and buy treasuries at a positive carry, you're not that buyer base away. So you just basically start to eliminate all the buyers that have been coming to

the treasury market. But then there's a very special buyer base, which is the dealers who by law have to buy if nobody else buys um and that's what you do as a primary dealer. That's by auctions don't fail in the US at least and if nobody else buys, but the dealers have to. You know, the dealers don't have

the money. The dealers are funded entities. And if you end up in a situation where you have to take down a large chunk of treasuries unexpectedly because the auctions go bad, then you basically need a lot of repo funding to take those treasuries downe and finance them. And that's precisely what happened during the fourth quarter of last year. You had this shock where you know, hedging costs and all these other funding rates got to on economic levels.

The dealers had no choice but to take down the treasuries. They had no choice but to fund it in the report market. And basically the way that transpired was they leaned extremely heavily to a handful of large banks, and into those large banks hqu a portfolio, and they completely stressed out the report market because of that. So I guess before we get further into the details, I guess you know what I just told you about how this

impact is the FEDS a bit of the taper. The The important thing here to appreciate is that once you get into overnight markets where these dealers tend to fund their inventories if you lean very heavily onto the onto the overnight repo market and you stress out rates there. Basically the way that manifests itself is that report rates are going to trade our outside the fat's target range for the overnight funds rate. UH and you know, as they like to call it, the constellation of short term

interest rates. And you know, as a central bank, UH, the FED cares deeply about where overnight rates print relative to the band because that's one of the most important mandates you have as a central bank to make sure that that overnight rates print print within the target. And once you have difficulty in controlling that, then you you know,

open up a whole new kind of worms. And that's what basically forces you to rethink how much you can actually taper, because whether report rates print within the band or outside the band ultimately come down to how many

reserves there are in the system. Yeah, no, this is this is the part I think I could use and maybe some listeners could use a lot of clarification about, because obviously the fact that the FED is going to halt its wine down of the balance sheet this year is a very a lot of people talking about it without much understanding, and people like, oh, they're they they were stopping. They think maybe there's some I mean, it feels like the debate is like, oh, is this some

economic thing or is this some technical thing? And it feels like a lot of people think of some economic thing where something is telling the Fed, oh, you can't keep winding it down, and the Fed is trying to say, no, this is just sort of we wanted to be boring. This is more of just about the sort of technical stuff. So explain this further. What is going on in the market that requires them to, uh, you know, the demand for federal for reserves that they can't go below a

certain level. Okay, So I know that question wasn't particularly articulate. No, no, it's it was. But I think it was a broad question, right, So I said, you know, how do you go from stresses in the report market to ending taper? So I think it was a little bit more complicated than there were actual reasons for it, and then there were technical reasons for it. I think the macro is that, you know, the period we're talking about the end of last year

coincided with a global ip cycle. Slow down. You know, our economics team is quite prolific about you know, tracking all that stuff and and so. Um. Just you know, give you a nutshell version of this. You know, IP cycles are regular, and the Central Bank tends to overreact to them. Markets tends to be driven by them. Um. So every time you have these episodes where the IP cycle is troughing and things get dark, you know, people blues confidence about you know, the genevity of the cycle

and uh and whatnot. So so that was one one part of it. The other more technical part of it would be that, you know, the fact that we had this sell off and risk assets during the fourth quarter. Okay, um. Some of it again has to do with the IP cycle, but some of it also has to do with the fact that if you think about a dealer's balance yount

given house Air's balance sheets are post basal tree. If you are a dealer that by law has to now absorb two hundred billion of treasuries during the fourth quarter because there's nobody else's buying it, you have to make room on your balance sheet to absorb all that paper. Okay, So if your balance sheet is limited and you have no choice but to buy this stuff, you have to

make room by selling other stuff. And when you look at dealer inventories by component during the fourth quarter, as they were absorbing the two hundred billion dollars worth of treasuries, they were trimming their inventories in virtually all other asset classes.

So whether you look at I G or high yield or UM, you know, any any imaginable form of risk assets, equities, if you think about the amount of balance sheet that you want to deploy to I don't know, equity futures and funding you know, hedge funds, long positions in in the equity market, you have to tream all that stuff. When you trim it, it doesn't do anything good to equity valuations or credit spreads, right, So you know, George

Source would say that things are reflexive. So sure, you have an IP cycle making people feel dead about the world, and then you actually have these technical adjustments that have to go through dealer balance sheets, which it's probably informed by the I P cycle, but it's also making the IP cycle's perception worse because you risk assets are doing ugly things. So you know these things are there. They were basically happening all at the same time to get

into the super technical aspects of this. Why do reserves and balance sheet taper matter? Well, they they matter because you know, post puzzle three, I think an important feature of the system is that every possible trade or flow inter bank or dealer to bank or non bank to bank settles through the movement of reserves. Okay, And so

that's point number one. Point number two. It used to be the case that before Basil three, non banks leaned heavily on clearing banks for intraday credit, and then the clearing banks and the large banks leaned on the ft

for interday credit. Uh, And that intraday credit provision doesn't really happen anymore simply because there is stigma associated with tapping the FED for credit even on an intraday basis, and the price of interey credit provision between non banks and and clearing banks has gotten a lot more expensive. So basically, the system is trying to get trades and flows done with the amount of reserves that are in

the system. Taper, for all intents and purposes, is impacting that quantity of reserves, right because every time bonds come into the system and the FED takes cash out, you just reduce the amount of reserves in the system. So the s degree if you will, that settles all the

flows is getting, you know, scarcer and scarcer. And you know, days like December thirty one, when report rates popped four basis points outside the target band happened precisely because when it comes to clearing some of these trades, uh, there's just not enough tokens in the system to get this

stuff done. And you know, December thirty one and the fourth quarter of last year was a particularly bad kind of quarter end because not only was it a year end, but also you had this outright inversion that the system had to deal with, and the dealers had to fund the inventories they got backed up with. December thirty one was also a settlement date, so everything that could possibly go wrong went bad. But you know, funding a bank and financial markets are not a science. I mean, bad

days happen. And the important thing that we've learned on December thirty one is that really there's one or two large banks that have the amount of reserves ready to

help the report markets clear. And then those one or two banks reached the amount of reach the limit of how much reserves they can lend into the market, bad things happen, and I think it's just not good policy and not good for financial stability when you have one or to private institutions like that and you have no formal backstop provided by the FAT for example, that would you know, preclude the system from having to deal with days like that. Again, So here's something I always wonder.

Do you think that in the course of creating, you know, post financial crisis regulation like new basil requirements, like the High Quality Um Liquid Assets Rule h q l A, this this notion that banks had to hold a bunch of you know, liquid and top rated stuff, and in the core formulating unconventional monetary policy. Do you think the Fed ever thought what it would look like if those

two things sort of collided together. Do you think they were thinking that much about the interplay between the new regulations and what was happening to their balance sheet. I'm sure they were thinking about it. I think no one really knew what this what this tipping point was, you know, so everybody knew that basil she was out there. Everybody knew that banks have to hold h q l A. What does that standford high quality liquid assets reserves and treasuries.

I think where where people get a bit fuzzy was that, you know, the conventional wisdom was that, okay, well there's h l A and there's level one H and level two H. So when we taper, all we're really doing is we are taking away one type of level one h l A, which is reserves, and we are replaced seeing it with another which is treasuries, which is fine, but from A. And this is actually very interesting, right because all these lcrs, the liquity coverage ratios that require

the banks to hold the liquid assets are based on end of day balance sheet snapshots. Okay. So that means that if your liabilities are this and x amount of these mature within dirty days, you need to hold um level one h q A against them to back them up and to comply with your liquidity coverage ratio. But um, you know end of DAI liquiity snapshots that require you to hold liquid assets that will cover your outflows over the next dirty days. None of that requires that your

asset has to be able to provide intra day liquidity. Okay. And and this is where this is where things get complicated, because reserves are basically my for banks that banks keep at the FED. And every time flows happened between banks during the day, literally reserves go from one bank's account at the FED to another bank's account at the FED a million times a day. And the only instrument that you can take that that you can use to take

care of these intra reserve account flows are reserves. You know, treasuries you can sell today, but you only get liquidity tomorrow. And if you land in the report market today, you will only get your money back the next day. Right, So, so I think where things got complicated and where things where the market? And and I guess um the Central Bank wasn't thinking too clearly about is that these intra day flows matter. And for some of these flows you

can only use reserves. And when you cut too deep into the reserve needs of the system for inter day purposes, you have you have hiccups like December thirty one. December thirty one is a day where interday liquidity needs are especially high. But again, you know, bad days can happen anytime, and and and the December thirty first episode just tells us that, you know, we are quite close. We are basically two hundred billion away from from having these bad

days potentially be more regular. So in theory, reserves and treasuries should they should be essentially the same quality asset um on the bank's balance sheet, but because of their different daily liquidity or intraday liquidity characteristics, they don't exactly serve the same purpose. So what is there something that should be done from a regulatory basis to avoid days like December thirty one or other periods in which it's essentially the stress imposed by the regulations itself that caused

the tension. Well, I think it's it's a philosophical question. I think I think the superstructure of of the regulatory a work is correct. I think, um, you know, the rules are clear, banks are living with those rules. I would say that what's needed is not a tinkering with the architecture of bottle tree or the interpretation of it.

But what's needed is is a is a simple plumbing fix where if you have some days where reserves get scarce for whatever reason, you should have an entity in the system that is going to put those reserves into the system on a temporary basis to control prices staying within the target band. Um. So I think that's the that's the path of least resistance, and that's that's where the should that's where the solution should be coming from.

So basically, I think, you know, it's it's either providing more balance sheet elasticity for the private system through tinkering with regulations, or having a central bank that's willing to ride that balance at elasticity because they can and because that's their job and roll. Basically, so I think the path of these resistance politically and technically and from all sorts of angles is is a central bank doing what a central bank golf to do. All right, Sultan, I

think we're going to have to leave it there. Sultan Posar from Credit Swiss, thank you so much. That was fantastic. Thank you very much. Thank you for having me. Joe. I've really enjoyed that conversation, if only because it really puts the yield curve inversion from the past few weeks in perspective, like everyone is going nuts because the old curve has inverted, and Sultan comes on and he's like, no, no, no, it's been inverted since October. Yeah. I really like that conversation. Actually,

it was exactly what I needed. I just think that you know, as I said in my intro, I really didn't know very much about this topic, and I think my sort of incoherent questions sort of proved that. But it was exactly the sort of very clear conversation that I needed. And now I'm going to like read much more note and actually have some sort of understanding of

what this is all about. Yeah, I think it's a really good reminder that often the way a lot of people talk about the market isn't necessarily reflective of the way that market actually functions. And I mean there's a reason we do it, because if we started talking about demand for U. S. Treasuries in FX hedge terms and things like that, I think, you know, we would never

get a full sentence out. But it's actually really really important to consider things like currency hedging costs when we're talking about demand for U. S. Treasuries, And so rarely do we hear the thing I think that we do, or maybe I'm just projecting and I do it's just sort of abstract away um various technical factor that could

be impacting the market. So even something like that last point, where in my mind I tend to think of reserves held at the FED and treasuries as being equal quality assets, the fact that under the current regulatory system, because of their different liquidity characteristics, they are different and there are times when they are not substitutes for one another that that is going to have an impact on things that

show up in the market. So, in other words, all these things, like you know, the basil requirements, like the sizes of the balance sheet, like they're real and we can't just sort of um abstract them away, and I

sort of think that they don't really matter. Yeah, absolutely, But if anything, you know, the next time you hear that primary dealer inventories of U S. Treasuries are at an all time high, you shouldn't necessarily see that as the sort of end of the world, but as a function of some of the big changes in money marks markets that we have been discussing. Should we eve it there? We've got there, and you know, like I still have a lot to learn, but I do feel after this

conversation maybe I'm getting a little bit more understanding. We'll have Sultan on again. I'll talk more in the meantime. This has been another edition of the All Thoughts podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me on Twitter at Tracy Alloway and I'm Joe Wisintho. You could follow me on Twitter at the Stalwart, and you should follow our producer on Twitter. He's told for Foreheads. His handle is at foreheads T, as well as the Bloomberg head of podcast,

Francesca Levi at Francesca Today. Thanks for listening.