Hello, and welcome to another episode of the Old Thoughts podcast. I'm Tracy all the Way and I'm Joe Wish. So, Joe, you like to talk about money, right? I love talking about money. I think where money comes from, its origin, stuff like that, or even just what it is is one of those topics that I can never get enough of. So what is that we're going to talk about today? Yeah, we are, um, but we're going to talk about a type of money that doesn't normally get a lot of
attention outside certain aspects of the financial community. We're going to be talking about euro dollars. So euro dollars, you know what I have to say, Like, this is one of those topics that I know, I'm supposed to know a lot more about than I do. I kind of vaguely at this idea that people use futures and euro dollars to bet on what they think the FED is
going to do. But then beyond that, like what and I guess that, And I kind of have this sense that their dollars held outside of banks that aren't in the US. But honestly, I know very I know embarrassingly little about them and how they actually work and what their point is, well, you're being very modest as usual. Actually this I'm really not like that. Just I just told you the extent to which I know, like I don't even really get how it works, Like I don't even get how you can hold a dollar at a
bank outside the US, Like in the first place. That's a very strange concept to me, because I have this conception of like how banks hold money, and I don't really understand how that can happen outside the US. So the whole day is very mysterious to me, and I'm glad we're finally doing an episode that will hopefully clear it up. And sometimes I'm modest, but this time I'm not. Okay, Well, mysterious is actually the key word here, So I just
to boil it down really simply before we start. Euro dollar based really refers to US dollar denominated deposits that are at foreign banks, and by foreign I mean non US or foreign branches of US banks. So that's the simplest explanation. But of course there there is a lot of sort of mystery and controversy swirling around these. Lots of people think this is a sort of form of like shadow bank liquidity that's floating around in the system
outside of the federal reserves control. People talked about it a lot during the financial crisis, and we are seeing some people talking about it again with the recent market sell off, and one of those people is our guest for today. Before we get into this, can I just say, uh, did anyone do you think anyone else like me first when they thought when they heard the word euro dollars, just thought that was what the euro was. That like,
the euro was short for euro dollars. Oh, Joe, I'm sure for years when I heard euro dollar, I just assumed that the euro was just the nickname for yar own dollars. I know that's not the case right now, but just to really emphasize how ignorant I am on this topic, that really is what I thought for years until I realized there's something else. Now, You're absolutely right, lots of people think you're a dollar is just the
exchange rate. So for the avoidance of doubt, we are not going to be talking about the euro dollar cross exchange rate. That that's not what this is about. This is about something much more interesting, about a specific type of money that's actually quite important to the way the financial system works. So without further ado, let's bring on our guest. It is Jeffrey Snyder. He is head of
Global Research at al Hambra. Jeffrey, thank you so much for joining us, good morning, Thanks for having me, Joe and Tracy. So, given Joe's lack of expertise in this particular topic, maybe we should start really really slow with Sorry Joe, that's very patronizing. Please, no, no, no, please, but let's start slow. What exactly is a euro dollar? Well, you know, I mean, it's a common misperception, and I
think you guys explained it pretty well. I mean, lots of people to hear the term euro doll and they think obviously euro because that kind of term and that kind of terminology isn't common in usage, and most people they've never heard of a euro dollar before anyway, so it's not uncommon for this to be a very confusing topic. And in fact, the term euro in front of a dollar simply means, as you both pointed out, that these are dollars offshore somewhere, and it could be anywhere around
the world. That could be, you know, a bank in the Cayman Islands, it could be a bank in Europe, as the original term was used. That's where the term came from. And in fact, it's not just dollars that are offshore. There's an entire currency ecosystem that exists, um including something that's called in euro euro. They're offshore euros in this euro euro market. That makes it even more strange and complex and I guess interesting at some place
as So. One of the things that I do understand to some extent about banking is that it's not like there's this fixed pool of money out there that gets shifted around. That banks are essentially creators of money, is one way to think about it. In banks issue loans, and those loans turned into deposits, and then the deposits are held at banks and then new money is created. So explain what's really happening. You mentioned a bank in the Cayman Islands. A customer holds euro dollars there. What
is where did these dollars come from? How do they create them? What is the mechanics in which they come into being? Well, yeah, and that's another thing. You know, The term euro dollars anachronistic. Originally it referred to actual dollars on deposit in the bank somewhere. When we talk about a dollar deposit, people think, probably quite correctly, that there are stacks of cash in a bank vault in the Cayman Islands, right. They think that's a dollar deposit, right,
because that's traditionally what you're told in school. That's what people refer to and in convention. But that's not actually what it is. It's eurodollars. In the beginning used to be you know, stacks of cash and a vault somewhere, but over time they have becomeing and they have evolved into simply bank liability. Some bank offshore somewhere has a dollar denominating liability. However it came about, um doesn't really matter.
Once they obtain dollars in any format, they can then multiply them in various different other forms of bank liabilities. So it's essentially an inter bank international system where it's denominated primarily in dollars, and it's always and it's uh it's operated offshore or outside the United States. So the way in which these dollars come to existence is simply one bank somewhere says I want to do something, and another bank on the other side says, I want to
do something. They get together, they exchange liabilities and assets, and that's how it's done. As long as the bank on the one side has balance sheet capacity to quote unquote lend these euro dollars to the other bank, it can both banks except the transaction and it takes place. So there's no actual physical money, there's no actual physical currency. There no no actual physical anything in the system. It's simply led your money. It's just one bank on a
computer screen has a number. The bank on the other side has a computer screen. Those two numbers match. Therefore money has been created and the transaction takes place. So when it comes to money being created, and Jeff, I think you just mentioned um multiplying at that point, can you give us a specific example, like, let's say I'm I don't know, like a rich Arab shake or something that was Milton Friedman's famous example. And I have a million US dollars and I wanted to deposit it in
a non US bank. What happens to that million dollars and how much extra money or liquidity would be generated given that the foreign bank will still have some sort of reserve requirement. Well, you know, in Milton Friedman's example back in the in the late nineteen sixties early nineteen seventies, there were reserve requirements and those were applicable. But still, you know, in the way which it happened, there's a whole variety of ways in which these dollars become eurodollars.
In a lot of cases, is not just a you know, a foreigner who decides he has a dollar balance domestically in the United States and wants to put them in London because they can obtain a better interest rate. That's that's one of the the ways in which the euro dollar market first evolved was to take advantage of interest
rate differentials offshore versus on shore. But once those dollar liabilities came into existence, that opened up the whole range of possibilities in terms of this multiplier effect where um, you know, you mentioned earlier in the introduction, where euro dollars apply not just to foreign banks holding dollars, but also US domestic banks and their foreign subsidiaries, and so there were you know, over time, they're evolved away for
domestic US banks to transfer dollar liabilities to their foreign subsidiaries, often operating out of London. Again, the term euro dollar meaning Europe, and so there's any number of ways for these dollar liabilities to be created domestic and then get transferred overseas. And it's easy just to transfer back and forth from the from the domestic US bank to its
foreign subsidiary. And once those liabilities were created outside the United States, once they're transferred to their foreign subsidy on the euro dollar market, they can then be multiplied in any number of ways and any number of kinds of transactions.
And over time, the way in which that has happened, a way in which that has been banks have been able to do that is it's not just quantitative expansion, it's qualitative expansions any number any for any number of different exotic liabilities that can be created once those dollars are offshore. Now that there's a huge robust market for these dollars offshore, the sky's the limit, essentially, And that's
what's been over the last three or four decades. The eurodollar market has grown exponentially, or it had up until two thousand and seven, simply because it was, you know, offshore system. So does that mean that euro dollars are basically an extra source of liquidity in the financial system? Like? Is that how banks end up using them. That's how it started. The intent here was, you know, how do
we solve the you know, Triffin's paradox. What was left over from Breton woods and Bretton woods in the goal exchange system was constraining on global trade and globalization, and the rising demand for trade globally meant we need some form of international money to intermediate between different systems trying
to do merchandise trade. What the euro dollar did on what Milton Freeman showed in nineteen sixty nine, was that we could multiply dollars outside the United States that would not affect the domestic money supply, thereby solving Triffin's paradox. And over time that's exactly what happened in the nineteen sixties and early nineteen seventies is the euro dollar took over the liquidity adjustment functions of a global reserve currency.
And so originally the intent was how do we finance globalization, how do we finance the growing need for global trade. But over time, especially in the late eighties in the early ninety nineties, it started to get into other forms of financialization and in different functions, and so it became instead of just a strictly global trade, currency system, intermediation, that kind of thing. It became an entire financial ecosystem whereby you know, you go back to two thousand and eight,
why we're German banks being nationalized over a US housing bubble. Well, the reason is because they were financing those US dollar assets on the eurodollar markets, and so it became something very different over time, and it kind of really towards the end got really out of control. But this is really interesting, and this is something that I hadn't really
put together before in my understanding. When we talk about the dollar as the reserve currency, and it's by far the most stable medium of exchange, and someone in Turkey might want to trade with someone in China, but neither of them want the other countries currency per se. This is sort of the role that the eurodollar market can play and essentially this common third currency for parties all around the world that can then be exchanged via any
two banks. Right, And that's you know, there's a lot of misconception about what when we talk about a global reserve currency, what does that actually mean? And Joe, you just described it perfectly. A lot of people think, you know, reserve currencies you know oil gets priced in dollars. Well, that's part of it. That's a benefit of having a global reserve currency. But there is a function, there's a there's a mechanical need for a reserve currency to perform
the role. Just as you said, how do we get different systems that want to trade with each other because trade, free trade is definitely a good thing. How do we get those to be able to do that without having everybody around the world have to hold everybody else's currencies or be able to process payments and somebody else's currency.
And so, you know, it was historically the British pound performed that role originally, and then the Breton Wood system added the US dollar to the role of global reserve. But that created again Triffids paradox, where the fixed the dollar supply was fixed by gold, and therefore it was not necessarily the best way to allow this intermediation to
happen under a rapidly globalizing system. And so the euro dollar arose at the right time and in the right place and then the right way to be able to take over that role so that globalization and global trade could be unhampered by a constricted supply. Because Essentially, that's
what we talked about before. Because it's an offshore currency system, because it's a bank ledger system, it's interbank system, there really isn't as a lot of restrictions on it placed on it that constraints the flexibility the liquidity that is
is necessary to perform these roles. Right. So one of the I mean, I don't know if you would call it a criticism, but one of the things that people point out about your dollars is it's something that the Federal Reserve doesn't necessarily have a lot of control over um in the same way that they might be able to affect the banking system and other kinds of liquidity by raising interest rates, are changing reserve requirements. Can you
explain how exactly that comes about. Well, I would argue they have no control and they have actually no very little influence at all in the eurodollar market, which is why two thousand and eight happened. Um, the Federal Reserve did a whole bunch of stuff in two thousand eight, nothing worked. The reason is because it was a eurodollar panic, not a dollar panic. And that's you know, we talk
about the eurodollar in the term itself being anachronistic. What we really mean is that it's a bank centered system. It's a credit based monetary system. Therefore, what matters and what's that what's at the center of the system are these global banks that are creating and trading all of these dollar denominated liabilities, and so the Federal Reserve has
very little input into that system. Most of them mostly it had been just psychological, the idea of a greenspan put but it's starting in two thousand seven, banks began to realize that the Federal Reserve was really powerless. And this, by the way, it was one of the earliest criticisms
of the euro dollar system. We go back into the nineteen seventies and eighties, some of the officials and some of the economists that actually studied the Euro dollar system kept warning, you know, we have this international supply of dollars outside the United States, out of the reach of any central bank anywhere, and so that could be a problem because there's, first of all, it's nonreservable, so there
aren't really reserves there. And second of all, there's no way to create them because there's no central bank operating in any of these places. Because it's offshore from everywhere and so um and one. In one sense, it was good because it performed the roles that were required for globalization and global trade. But in another sense, there was
nothing to restrain it. There was nothing to make sure it was a robust system that could withstand even some of the UH some of the things we saw, especially with the housing bubble and the massive credit growth in the in the last decade. I think this is a
really key point to helping people understand the system. So I want to drill down further, like if I have a bunch of money at a US bank, like say City Group or JP Morgan, and people perceive that to be pretty safe because even in the worst situation, City Group or JP Morgan could pledge collateral to the FED and get liquidity and get dollars, and you know, my
deposits is going to be pretty good. If I have millions of dollars and UH deposits with some non US bank that doesn't have that same relationship with the Federal Reserve in a panic, there's no easy way for them to get a stable supply of dollars to meet that liability. And of course I guess this is why the FED had to engage in dollars swap lines with other central banks around the world during the crisis, so that those regional central banks could then supply dollar liquidity to their
banks or attempt to supply attempt. Yeah, and you know that was one of the misunderstood aspects of the crisis was where, what, what why do we need all of these dollar swaps. And at one point it was, you know, six billion, the massive amount of dollars that the FED was trying to put out there into the market. But it wasn't. It wasn't the right kind of liquidity. It was you know, bureaucratic, it was rigid, it wasn't it wasn't a good enough replacement for malfunctioning euro dollar system.
But your point being is exactly right. I mean, we have this international money system, and again, because it's largely an inter bank system, the issue isn't so much for a US based a positive who has money out in dollars outside. It's really what happens to a bank in the Caymans that says it has a dollar liability and has been trading off dollar liabilities when all of a sudden funding those kinds of of of transactions becomes difficult because the market starts to break down. Who do you
turn to. Well, if normally you turn to any number of banks operating in the market, and all of a sudden, all of them are very kiddish and nervous and don't offer you any good terms to fund your liability structure. You have no recourse to anything. And so that's why, you know, two thousand and eight was mostly a bank
panic among banks. It was an inter bank panic more than it was you know, something like the nineteen thirties where you saw people lined up trying to convert to cash outside of you know, the local country bank anywhere in the United States. It was an inter bank panic because this monetary system is itself an international inter bank
money system. Okay, so in two thousand eight you have basically an interbank funding crunch that manifests itself in the euro dollar market as well as some other markets uh repo I guess being the one other famous example. The Fed comes in provides extra dollar liquidity and um that
solves the problem at least for a little while. Can we fast forward to today, Jeff, because you have some interesting um theories that you've been writing down on your blog talking about how the recent market sell off might have its origins in a sort of similar collateral crunch that's taking place in the eurodollar market. Yeah, well, we look at the euro dollar system. You know, there's because it's been somewhat of a mystery for so long and
because officially, you know, it doesn't exist. Central banks do not admit that there's this offshore money market because how could they, because there's a whole lot of information about it. We don't have a lot of good statistics, but you know, what we've seen anecdotally, what we've seen in prices, and what we've seen in the statistics we do have is that the system broke down on August nine, two thousand and seven, and then it never It was never restored,
it never got back to operations. So there's been for the last eleven years ongoing intermittent euro dollar squeeze, as I call it, where we have these episodes. This would be the fourth one if if that's exactly what's taking
place right now. There's these episodes where the system goes from you know, partial recovery back to nervousness, and then then the system contracts and we get into these globe downturns um financial markets go back into turmoil, and then it'll it'll get to a point where it can go into a reflation period where things seem to be getting better and things loosen up a little bit, and then all of a sudden, it will turn back into another downturn. And again, we've seen this three times before, and I
think we're seeing it again for a fourth time. And the reason is because the system has never been able to go back to before August ninth, two thousand seven and operate in the way that it did before. And the reason is because people realize that the risks involved here.
Whereas you know, before two thousand and eight, two thousand and seven, the belief was common that there was no risk that you could just grow and expand and take on any form of liability, any form of assets that you wanted to do, and as long as you were growing, everything would be fine. And it come along two thousand seventy two, they finally the system finally realized and began to doubt itself. Hey, there's a whole lot of risk here,
and we're not being compensated for that risk. And so banks have been pulling back from their money dealing activities in these Euro dollar spaces for eleven years, but they don't do it all at once. They do it again in these intermittent episodes, and I think that's what we're seeing right now, all right? What is the data that you look at to assert that a we've never really gotten back to the pre crisis sort of behavior of
this market. And then when you talk about this is the third or fourth of these episodic um stresses within the euro dollar market, what are you looking at or what are you seeing specifically that tells you that that's the sort of the key thing to understand about these markets? Sellofs well, there's uh. Some of the data is just priced data. For example, you look at the repo rate
general collateral U S Treasury repo rate. In a system that worked before August nine, two seven, the repo rate should be less than the unsecured you know, federal funds LIBE or whatever it be, because you know a collateralized transaction is less risk. But what we've seen since a special the end of two thousand eight in the Institution observed the report rate is no longer tied to the
unsecured rate. There's a breakdown and hierarchy. In other words, there should be a repro rate negative spread to something like federal funds. But there are these very specific periods where the report rate will just go crazy, and in in this case and in each of the four cases UH subsequent cases, the report rate will go way above federal funds, which makes no sense. I mean, a hierarchical structure of predictable money market function, we should see the
repo rate be less than federal funds. But yet in these very specific periods where we see all this financial distraction and we see global economic concerns, UM, the report rate will be well above federal funds. And that happened earlier this year. UH. The repot rate got to be almost fifty basis points above and maybe even more fifty. I'm going off a memory here, but it got to be a substantial amount more than the reverse repot floor that the Fed sets for UM. It's money market corridor.
So that's one way to look at it. There are others. Just the exchange value of the dollar. For example, you know, in the middle two thousand's, up until two thousan dollar was falling consistent with rising eurodollar supply on these markets since then, the dollar has been rising and people trying to figure out why, how could that be um and what it is is it's simply this this eurodollars squeeze.
When there are periods where euro dollars are hard to come by, that the value of the dollar goes up because these people on the other side of these transactions, banks and foreign locations who are short synthetically these U S dollars because it's of their internet interbank liabilities. When it becomes difficult for them to fund in U S dollars as they have to do, the price of the dollar goes up. So it's almost like a short squeeze. But in terms of actual data, physical debt and I
want to say physical data, but actual concrete data. We can use things like the Treasury departments take data. Most people think of tick as you know, how much are foreigners buying and selling US treasuries and in a given month, But there's a whole bunch of other data that the Treasury Department collects, including the cross border US dollar activities of US banks. What you see there again is the
same thing. Up until two thousand and seven, you have a parabolic rise in these cross border dollar transactions, and since then you have these intermittent periods of ups and downs. Were over the last eleven years that the cross border dollar activities between US banks and foreign banks has stagnated, It stopped. There's no more growth in that kind of business anymore. And you can see it justin if you follow the balance sheets of the total asset structure of
of these global banks. You know, look at JP Morgan. JP Morgan's balance sheet was growing exponentially until two thousand and eight. Now it's it's essentially flat over the last decade. Banks don't grow anymore. So, Jeff, if you're right, if if we are seeing another bout of stress in the euro dollar market and it is manifesting itself in a stronger dollar as people look for alternatives to euro dollars, how does that or how do you think that's going
to play out in the market. So we get the dollar strengthening, and presumably that might cause tighter financial conditions, which maybe means that we see some risk assets sell off. Or does the sell off necessarily come through the fact that liquidity in the form of euro dollars is evaporating. I think it's a little bit of both. I mean, and there's also sentiment to consider too, because we have
to think about this in economic terms. What's established all these ups and downs is that the global economy, especially global trade because then the euro dollar and it's hard it's supposed to be about intermediate global trade. If there's a problem in the euro dollar market, there's a problem in the global trade system and therefore the global economy.
And therefore, you know, a sentiment turns on the lack of opportunity in the economic risk of all of these things too, So you have you have a bunch of different feedback if X that all feed into the same direction, which is rising nervousness and eventually fear, which which permeates into you know, all sorts of liquidation events. You think about China. Recently, Chinese stocks have been liquidated since they're reopened from a golden week that has its its its
origination in this dollar problem. U S stocks are probably more about sentiment than actual liquidity. But still, you know, it all feeds back into the same thing, and over time, if it goes far enough and it continues in this direction,
it becomes self reinforcing. Like we saw in two thousand fifteen, for example, or two thousand eleven and two thousand and twelves, where the economy starts to fall off or roll over, which feeds into more uncertainty and fear in these dollar system, which causes the dollar system constrain even more, which causes the economy to get even even more precarious, and so
on and so on. Is there a plus side in the fact that we have these episodic stresses, that we're not building up to something big and catastrophic like we saw in two thousand seven and two thousand and eight, and instead we just sort of have these, you know, many many blow ups, but that sort of relieve pressure from the system overall. Well, I would argue this is actually the worst case. I'd rather have a crash at
this point. Really, I know that's counterintuitive in a way, but you know, the global economy has never recovered from two thousand eight, and time as a big factor in that, and so the cost of the system malfunctioning the way it has, in my opinion, aren't strictly economic anymore. We took we suffered the economic consequence. As you look at places like Italy, for example, the Italian economy is slow, is smaller today than it was in two thousand and
it has never recovered. The European economy has never recovered. The U S economy has never recovered. I know people are talking about how it's booming right now, but the US fell off trend ten years ago and it's getting further and further behind that trend. And so to me, these periodic episodes are the reason that the economy hasn't recovered, and therefore they're taking us further or further away from
a stable position. I think that's why you've seen the rise of populism, the rise of distrust in establishment, or wherever you want to call it. It's because economic opportunity has largely disappeared because of the malfunctioning the international reserve currency. So how do we fix that? And I don't think you could fix it, but I just keep doing allowing it to go the way it is. We need to get to a stable currency system so we can get
to stable an actual real economic growth again. And the way you do that is to get people to to pay attention to this euro dollar system that doesn't work. So, okay, this doesn't work. What should be done? In your view if this sort of basic system of international finance is
inherently flawed. You mean, how do we replace the euro dollar problem with something that isn't so susceptible to Yeah, like it ultimately, like the problem with the gold standard was sort of manifest saw in two thousand and eight that there's the euro dollar wasn't a perfect solution either in your view, is there a solution to this dilemma? Or will we always be stuck with the problem that if we want to stable global trading currency, there's going to be the challenge that the supply of it will
inherently be limited. Well, yeah, and I think you're right, Joe, because you know, the pendulum has swung too far in the other direction. You know, the goal exchange system under Breton Woods was too constraining. The euro dollar system was way in the other direction. It was far too free and unconstrained. So the answer may be somewhere in the middle. But how do you actually design a system that replicates the good features of the euro dollar system, which there
are many. Uh, it's not perfect and it got way too far in the wrong direction, but there are some good elements the euro dollar system, including the ability to flexibly supply money to where it's demanded, So how do we get how do we keep those characteristics but also put some kind of constraints on it so that doesn't
get out of hand again. And that's that's It's a incredibly complex question, especially when you get into the really into the shadow spaces of what actually takes place in these kinds of interbank transactions internationally, because they are incredibly complex and exotic and they don't lend themselves to easy analysis. So this might not be surprised. Sounds like, sounds like a whole separate episode. Yeah, maybe, all right, Well, um, I guess we'll have to leave it there in that case.
Jeffrey Snyder, head of Global Research at al Hambra. Jeff also has uh something called the euro Dollar University if you want to check that out and actually get more than just a half hour primer on euro dollars. So
that's on YouTube as well as the macro Voices podcast. Jeff, thanks so much, Thanks Jeff, Thank you, Joe, Thanks Tracy, so Joe, I'm so glad we finally got to devote an entire episode to the euro dollar, and I thought that was a really great primer as well as a really interesting theory about what might be driving the recent market sell off. Yeah, I mean, I definitely would disagree on this sort of big picture that we haven't had
a global recovery and so forth. But it's certainly true that the recovery has been disappointing around the world since the crisis, and looking at the financial roots of that
may be one important aspect. But that aside, I do think this idea of the mechanics of money creation, and I hadn't is really important, and I hadn't really thought before about the inherent challenge of what it means when everyone wants to trade in a stable currency, but not everyone has the same equal access to that currency, and so the opportunityy or you know what, the euro dollar the problem that the euro dollar market solved, but also
the inherent risks of that. Yeah, and also Jeff's point about how euro dollars have essentially grown in tandem with globalization was really interesting. And you know, I wonder about the link between what we've currently been saying in terms of trade tensions and the recent eurodollar stress, like that seems like a natural connection to potentially make right. And I do think this is going to be one of
the biggest stories. And we've talked about it for a long time, but just sort of like deglobalization as a whole, and we talk about it a lot from the trade perspective all the time. We don't talk about it as much from the financial system perspective. But it feels like we have a financial system very much designed for an ear of expanding globalization and an economic system and political system where the gears seem to be turning the other way.
So I think you're absolutely right that it's going to be really interesting to see the interplayer. Right. No one ever thinks about the euro dollar as ground zero for de globalization. People think about you know, apple supply chains and stuff like, right, right, exactly right, all right, Well, this has been another episode of the Odd Thoughts podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me on Twitter at Tracy Alloway. You can also follow Jeff Snyder. He is
at Jeff Snyder Underscore. A I P and a shout out as well to one of our listeners at goub Mint Cheese for suggesting Jeff in the first place. And I'm Joe Wisenthal. You can follow me on Twitter at the Stalwarts, and you should follow our producer to for for Foreheads on Twitter. He's at foreheads t as well as the bloomberg head of podcast, Francesco Leavy at Francesca Today. Thanks for listening year to