Why a Strong Dollar Causes Most of the World Major Pain

trade war. Do you remember that. I don't remember the specific thing per se that you're talking about, but I feel like this has been a reoccurring theme for us and a couple of things I've written and you've written for a while now, thinking about like just this idea that if the world is going to deglobalize, and arguably it is an arguably President Trump, that's part of his mission, that finance might be really where you see it emerged first, right,

Because I think what tends to happen when people talk about trade tensions or a trade war is people start thinking about tangible goods, you know, like semiconductors and chips and I don't know all sorts of commodities, but people rarely actually stop and think that, well, all that global trade is something that is being financed by someone, and the financiers in this case are financial institutions or large banks, and so it would make a lot of sense if

they also get hit by the trade tensions. Absolutely, And if you look at the history of finance, and I remember this is something we talked about years ago on the podcast I think we're talking to Emmanuel Derman. If you look at the history of finance, so much of it corresponds to globalization and even the sort of explosion

of derivatives and other measures designed to hedge risk. A lot of it is designed to sort of mitigate the risk of trading across to different countries with different currencies and so forth. So you really you can't talk about globalization without talking about all these instruments that have been built up by Wall Street banks. Very true, and you

mentioned currencies just then. And the interesting thing is that even though we're talking about global trade and cross border financial transactions, of course the vast majority of these are still denominated in the U. S. Dollars. So you have this weird sort of space where things are happening between countries, between all these different entities, companies and banks, but many

of the transactions are dollar denominated. And of course what we've seen recently has been about of US dollar strength, and the speculation has been that that has added to the pain of the trade war, at least up until rec on link. Yeah, there's a lot of different substories going on right now with the trade war with actions

taken by the Trump administration. One of them that hasn't got a ton of attention is whether any of this is going to eventually contribute to the undollarization of the global economy, because people have been predicting that for a long time that maybe somehow global different trading partners might find an opportunity to come off the dollar, but nothing really has even come close to emerging that would actually

replace the dollar. The Euro has flaws, the Chinese, you n for obvious reasons, is not in a position to really replace it. But with the various actions that the Trump administration has taken, obviously people wondering if there will be a renewed effort on part of various actors to

get out of the dollar system, so to speak. Right, and even if there isn't a push to replace the dollar in some way, you can imagine that there will be renewed focus on the potential for a currency war, right devaluations to sort of increase your competitiveness when it comes to trade, so that seems to be the minimum. Anyway.

The reason this intro is slightly disjointed is because we have a guest on today who not only can talk about everything from trade to cross border flows to currency regimes, but pretty much anything else cryptocurrency, financial stability, big tech, credit markets, overheating, you name it, he can talk about it. Yeah, exactly.

So like we have this really unwieldy intro touching on all these things because our guest is so unusual and unique in his ability to pull together and cover all these uh, all these different strands of what's going on in world financial markets, in the economy. Exactly. We're going to see if we can narrow it down a bit, but without further ado. Our guest for today is hyun

Sung Shin. He is economic advisor and head of research for the Bank for International Settlements and uh, if you haven't been following his research already, I highly encourage you to do so. Ken, it's so nice to have you on the show. But Tracy, hello, Joe, it's good to be here. Hello. So apologies again for that unwieldy intro, but I think it does speak to the breadth of

your research, which is really wide and varied. Could you maybe just to begin with give us a sort of rundown of what your mandate actually is at the b I S. Yeah, I mean the b I S, as you know, is the oldest international financial institution we were set up in It's a body to foster the cooperation among central banks. We have around sixty member central banks and I'll task us to um IS to focus those discussions, help to facilitate cooperation among the central banks, both for

monetary policy and for financial stability. We also host many of the international regulatory committees that that oversee some of the discussions, like the Basel Committee and the Financial Stability Board. It tell us about your role there because you the b I S puts out quite a bit of research. You put out quite a bit of research. What is the sort of overarching goal of what you're pursuing with

the things you've been working on. You know, we're here to serve central banks and how they conduct monetary policy and also how they can serve as a guidians of financial stability, and so you know this is this is a very broad remit. As you can imagine so we have to be you know, pretty broad in our approach. You know, it's very kind of you too to be so complimentary, but I think this is you know, we

regard this as being part of our job. And I think you you give a very good introduction to where we find ourselves in the in the global economy right now. And we had a very strong thousand seventeen in global growth. But since the middle of last year, we you know, we had this slowdown which at first seemed like just a reversion to the mean, but you know, it turned into something a little bit more, something a little bit deeper, where we saw the manufacturing and trade you know, contract

even as employment, you know, remains strong. Um and consumption was was pretty strong, underpinned by the strong services sector. And what we try and do is to try and join the dots, and the dots actually could be in somewhat unfamiliar places in terms of the standard way that we classify, the way that we subdivide the different areas of economics, and and I think trade, manufacturing, global growth all turns out to be quite closely related to financial forces.

And I think here is where the where the currency dimension comes in because it's it does seem from the accumulated evidence that the that the broad dollar index has something of the character of a of a barometer of global risk appetite. Mhm. Right, So, in some of your research before, you've actually published this really great chart that basically shows when the dollar strengthens, trade kind of drops and vice versa. Basically there's an inverse relationship between the

green back and global trade. Can you walk us through exactly what's happening there and why does the dollar matter so much when it comes to this particular issue. But those of your listeners who are not perhaps familiar with this chart, I would just point them to the speech I gave in Berlin at the German Federal Minister of Finance. This was in the middle of May. And you know, if we chart the ratio of global exports to global GDP,

that displays a very interesting pattern. And that ratio is a very interesting ratio because you know, trade is measured on a growth basis, in that you know, whenever shipments across the border, you can just tally it all up and it's measured in gross terms, and that you don't take into account the fact that some of the inputs into the exports were actually themselves imported. Whereas GDP is

a value added measure. It's you know, it measures what is the total value of the goods produced as measured

by the final output. Right, So if you take that ratio which is gross exports to GDP and you know, we can sum it up to the global level, what it gives you is the degree of double counting that happens when we measure gross exports, and that you know, if the same component is used for you know, as an input into another intermediate good, and then that intermediate good is exported into another country, which then gets processed

into a further intermediate good which is than exported. The more times a particular component crosses the border, the larger will be the disparity between you know, grows exports and GDP. So you know, that ratio does fluctuate a lot, and it's a useful proxy for the activity of global value chains. So manufacturing has been the driver of global trade growth in the last few decades, and within the manufacturing trade,

it's been the growth of the global value chains. It's a it's a supply chains that have been very, very important, and no country has been more important in this development than China. In fact, China has emerged. If you look at one of the charts in the in the in the brilliant speech that I mentioned, that's a very striking chart shows China going from somewhat of a small node in the year two thousand before they entered the w t O to really the the connecting lynchpin in the

global trading system. Now, what do you need to sustain very elaborate global value chains like that. Well, for this to actually work, what you need is all the intermediate goods to be financed while they're in the intermediate good stage. So if you look at the just think about a corporate balance sheet when you have lots of intermediate goods that are whizzing back and forth, I mean they all be appearing either as inventories or they will be appearing

as accounts receivable. You know, if if that good has crossed the boundary of the firm, and these are assets of the firm which need to be financed somehow, and typically they have been financed either through the firm's internal resources. But what we know very well from other studies is that the global banking system has been a very important source of funding for the the short term assets that

that underpin the global value chain. And the other thing that we know from the other studies, some of it, you know you've already mentioned, is that financial conditions in dollars and and the dollar exchange rate itself is very closely correlated, and that when the dollar is strong, um this is when dollar credit tends to be somewhat tight and the funding conditions go up. The in particular cross

border element seems to be very sensitive. So if you put two and two together and we combine it with the prevalence of dollar invoicing, what we have is the combination of the following fact that you need short term assets to be financed in order to support global value chains.

You need the dollar financing to be rather free in order for the dollar financing to support those short term assets, and that means that you tend to see an expansion of trade when the dollar financing conditions are more accommodative, and that's when the dollar is weak. This ratio of the global exports to global GDP tends to move in the opposite direction uh to the strength of the dollar.

What one could reasonably conjecture about the events of two thousand eighteen into the early part of two thousand nineteen, is that this was indeed the period when you know, we saw the dollar strengthened, and two thousand seventeen was a was a year when the dollar was actually quite weak. This was a period in spite of the fair increase in its policy rate, we saw very accommodated financial conditions. Now, it's I think important just to point out here that

the dollar is an endogenous variable. It's a financial market price. So there isn't any particular causal story as to why the dollar is strong and why you might actually get these things going from the dollar to these other real variables. But if you want a barometer, if you want a concurrent indicator of what's going on, you cannot do much better than to look at the value of the of the broad dollar index. I mean that that was fantastic, and that was just sort of a rate explanation of

what's going on. Actually pulled up your chart that you're referring to while you were explaining it. And what's really striking is, again we talk about deglobalization and the age of Trump. But as you pointed out in your speech and as the Church shows this ratio of world goods exports to GDP has really been falling ever since two

thousand eleven. And in fact, if you even bigger picture, what you see from your chart is that from two thousand and one until about the start of the Great Financial Crisis, trade as a percentage of GDP had been going up. And that was also a period of significant dollar weakness and a lot of angst about oh, is there something the twin deficits and is the Euro get to replace the dollar and all that stuff, And then after the Great Financial Crisis you see a brief jump

in a world trade that ratio, but then it's declining. So, as you point out, the dollar itself is not the causal variable, say it's a concurrent, it's endogenous. What is the story then that explains some of this deglobalization trend since the early aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis, or what might be some of the explanatory factors. Yes, Joe, I think that's so. That's a very good observation. And you know, for the for your listeners, the charts only

plotted from the year two thousand. If you extend that back further, of course, you know there was a golden age of globalization when trade to GDP rose tremendously over a very very long time. So I think that's probably you know, the over the longer horizon if we go back to the seventies, eighties, and nineties, and the golden age of globalization was the was the late eighties and the nineteen nineties, that's probably much more to do with

liberalization to you know, these longer range forces. But the but the period from two thousands three up to the crisis, that's probably better understood, as you say, in terms of what was happening to the dollar, but in particular what was happening to the banking sector and the ease with which you know, you could get credit from the banks. And you know, we we now know the full story with the benefit of hindsight. That was a very very

special period. And what we've seen since the crisis is the banking sector hasn't really been hasn't really recovered its mojo if you like, they have been better capitalized. We are now well over the crisis. But what's happened is the environment, you know, financial environment in terms of the slope of the yield curve, in terms of their interest margins of the banks. That has been very far from the story before the crisis, which was really very much

more conducive to the increase in leverage. The child itself is is a very striking one because, as you say, this ratio of exports to global GDP never really went back to the pre crisis peak. It's been on this downward trend since two thousand and eleven, with only a brief respite in two thousand seventeen, which uh, you know, turned out to be a little bit of a blit um in in retrospect because this was particular period when

financial conditions were were looser. Tracy. You know, one other thing that occurs to me looking at this chart of global trade relative to g d P, it looks a lot like a chart that you would get if you plotted emerging market stock prices relative to developed market equities, because that's one of those things where e ms did great pre crisis, and then they massively outperformed in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, but then they've just been

totally mediocre ever since then. So kind of a clue perhaps too what drives em equities, right, and that sort of gets back to that cross border dynamic. But um here and I wanted to concentrate on on one thing, which is I guess it's sort of expected that banks play an outsized role in transmitting um financial conditions or monetary policy to the rest of the world or the

real world, if you will. And I'm just wondering, given that monetary policy has been so easy host two thousand eight, and yet we've seen cross border lending sort of contract or global trade contract by your measurement, does that mean that the bank's transmission mechanism is effectively broken? Is banking not doing what it's supposed to be doing. Asked to whether financial conditions have been have been loose or tight,

I think it's it's very much. It has been very accommodative in the sense that long term interest rates have been low. This has been very conducive to the issuance of fixed income instruments, especially corporate bonds. If we look at the composition of of the increase in debt, it's far less the liabilities of intermediary It's it's far less bank lending that's been at the center of the story. It's much more the issuance of long term instruments, long

term capital market instruments like corporate bonds. If you look at one of the charts that in the in the speech, what we see is that even as bank lending denominated in dollars has really been quite weak since the crisis, dollar denominated issuance of corporate bonds has been has been

very strong. Now for the purpose of supporting trade. The problem is that, you know, trade relies very much on the short term funding coming primarily from the banks, and you know, as well as the firm's own own equity. So you know, for a while, when balance sheets were quite strong in the corporate sector, the weak bank lending probably wasn't such a big break on on trade and

global value chain activity. But what we've seen is that over time, especially in the emerging markets, especially firms in China, there has been a lot of long term dead isssudants

by the non financial corporates. And so when you are starting with already quite a leverage balance sheet and you see conditions tightening, that is a very different story from when you start with a pretty strong balance sheet and you have a lot more internal resources that you can deploy, and the banking sector really isn't anywhere there to give

you that support. So it's it's really the combination of the banking sector still repairing, still somewhat to subdued because of the of the very special yield cut conditions since the crisis, together with the cumulated debts that have happened since the crisis. And so what you've seen is that you know, these things are coming to a head more recently.

I think that's the way that I would say. So if you go back to the pre crisis era, obviously we saw rapid expansion in global trade, which, as you point out, was a period of easy lending and banks being quite willing to finance things, but of course we all know how that ended with a gigantic financial crisis

economic collapse. Is there a way to get back to the pre crisis era from a trade perspective, in a more sustainable manner, so we can actually see that line turn up again for a while, but it not inevitably lead towards disaster. What all this raises is the intriguing possibility that you know, although we we like to make this very sharp distinction between the real economy and the financial markets, and then you know, think about excess is

only happening in the financial markets. Well, you know, there there is a sense where some very very extended global value chain structures may only be sustainable with really really extraordinarily lose financial conditions. And so so if you like, you know, there could be you know, bubble like features of real activity as well if it's really very heavily extended. And so we should think about you know, um, one of the things that we emphasize here at the b

I S is long term sustainability. So what is sustainable in the long term? What kind of economic activities are resilient to to sharks, and and what can policymakers do to bring these things about? So, I mean, those are the things that we tend to focus on. We try to have a longer term perspective on these things. And and within that broad framework, you know, you could argue that just pushing on the acceleator, just trying to extend

the global value chains further. You know, that may be okay to boost the real quantities you know, in the process of lengthening, but then you are setting yourself up for a more you know, a sharp pullback when when conditions tighten. Well, I wanted to sort of press on this point because you mentioned that, you know, host two thousand eight, a lot of this global financing is coming in the form of bonds being issued by corporates rather

than your typical bank loans. But the thing that those two things often have in common is their currency, so all dollar denominated. And this gets back to Joe's emerging market point as well. I'm just wondering how vulnerable do you think the world economy is to a dollar liquidity

squeeze at this point. On that question, I think we have to distinguish between the kinds of acute episodes that we saw in the run up to the two eight crisis, which have to do with very rapidly leveraging, very rapid contraction of wholesale funding by banks and bank like intermediaries. I mean, that was a very very sharp pullback, and that was a very acute episode. I don't think we have the same kind of vulnerabilities in the banking set are right now. I mean, if anything, the banks have

been quite subdued as we have just talked about. But in fact, the you know, the vulnerabilities, you know, they're more you know, longer term, you feel like I mean they have to do with the debts of non intermediate non banks. You know, they're more chronic, if you like, I mean they rather than acute. In in some countries, especially those countries that didn't experience the worst of the global financial crisis, the household debt has continued to rise.

House prices are now very high, Corporate debt is high pretty much across the board, both advanced and emerging economies, and so you know, those forces can act as a break on potential stimulants towards really really economic activity. I mean, there's a there's a limit to how much that households would take on. You know, there may be you know, limited room for further monetary policy tools to stimulate growth,

for example. So one of the things that we we have been saying here this year is that, you know, we need to have a more balanced mix of policy. So rather than simply relying on just one engine monetary policy, we have to think of this as a as a jumper jet with with four engines. Right, So it's monetree policy. But not only that, we have fiscal policy, macropodential frameworks, and not last, but not least, you know, structural reforms I mean, and structural reforms doesn't mean just cutting jobs

and the reducing work is protection. I think it's it's more to do with finding ways to you know, reinvigorate growth through very key you know, investments in key sectors. And this of course is linked to the infrastructure investment angle as well. So you know, things are certainly not as precarious as they were in two thousand seven, but certainly, you know, we haven't really seen uh, you know, the return to vigorous growth that we would really ideally would

like to have seen by now. It's I think, you know, to do our jobs better, we have to take a step back and try and get the right diagnosis for this. And and I think this is where these longer term studies like you know, the trade to GDP, you know, how the financial system is evolving. I think these are longer term developments really important as kind of you know,

as the as the backdrop for our policy discussions. When you talk about grow prudential tools as being one of the engines to restimulate growth, what are you referring to specifically, So you know, macroprudential frameworks have to do with ways of complementing monetary policy so that the financial system is resilient, that it can be that it can function in a way that helps us to you know, route the benefits of cheap financing conditions more broadly, but target the you know,

target those measures to those sectors or to those areas where you know you'd expect the vulnerabilities to be to be highest. So you know, if you're worried about FFX debt, then regulations that are targeted to those sectors, you know, maybe appropriate. If you're if you're worried about mortgages, you

know that maybe one other area. So it's not going to be a magic bullet in the sense that you know, this is not going to be you know, watertight, and that it's going to be immune to circumvention and so on. But nevertheless, you may be able to deal with you know, emerging financial vulnerabilities without having to resort to monetary policy, which will have a much broader impact. And so, you know, together with fiscal policy. It's it's just one of the

various many tools that policy makers should be using. Right So if you've spot risks building up in the system, then the better tool to deal with those might not be a sort of change in the benchmark policy rate because that affects a bunch of things at the same time. But maybe some sort of macro prudential limitation that would target that specific area. So on that note, UM, I gotta ask, do you think that policymakers have made enough use of macro prudential tools in the years since the

financial crisis? And also have they done enough with macro prudential tools specifically when it comes to the US and its credit market. I mean, the answer to your question is yes. I mean, there has been quite an extensive move towards both putting on the books these policies to be you know, to be wheeled out whenever necessary. But the emerging markets have really you know led the way they've shown advanced economies how these additional tools can be used.

And you know, in a way for the emerging markets, there is nothing new under the sun with macroprudential instruments. I mean, they are an apart and parcel of the policy mix. You know, it now has this new shiny label, but it's really old wine in new bottles. You know. I think for the US, the use of the stress tessel the banks. Um, you know that that's been a

very important tool. You know, the US having gone through the very sharp crisis in two thousand and eight, two thousand nine, it's one of those countries which, um, you know, if you look at all the aggregate measures, looks you know, probably in in UH in reasonably good shape because it's the leverage of the banking sector is household debt is pretty low, you know, the the you know, the corporate sector like anywhere you has seen you know, great area

stitions of corporate debt. There is the there is a leverage loan discussion, but on the whole, the US doesn't seem you know, that badly placed, nor the you know, nor the ur area. I think, if anything, the ural area is UM is one of those areas what apart from the very high sovereign debt levels it in terms of household debt it is on the low side as well.

So I think we are in terms of the lessons from two thousand and eight, UM, I think we you know, we should never be complacent about this, but I don't think we are in you nearly in as bad a state as in two thousand and six, two thousand seven. But having said all that, you know, we we know that you know, these things never happen in exactly the same way. And so I think this is where, you know,

clear thinking is needed. And I think this is where you know, we need to sit around and be you know, imaginative and just use our imagination as to what, uh, you know, what might happen, and then just test those conjectures uh and say you know, well, you know that's a good story, but through the numbers, uh, you know, actually actually back up your story. And so this is what we do, uh pretty much has our day jobs here.

We um, we take these scenarios and we put them through their paces, and I think this is the way that we try and um, you know, come to a more balanced few. So looking to the here and now, and you talked about how in seventeen it looked like the global economy was looking fairly robust. Then it started slipping in early eighteen. It looked like it might just be a sort of reversion to the mean, but then it got a little deeper. It went a little longer

than just something temporary encyclical. Wide perception is now the global economy is not doing that great, and we've recently seen the federal reserve take a more dovish stance, pretty much signaling the clear end of the raid hiking cycle and the likely commencement of a rate cutting cycle or at least some rate cuts. So in your view, sort of what is the story of the last two years and right now, like what explains why this downturn was

perhaps a little more deep than people expected. And is this the start of a meaningful turn where the shift and FED policy might reinvigorate the global economy or our central bankers really just sort of trying to squeeze water from a stone here with further easing from the ECB and the FED, where you know, maybe you give a little bit of a pop to financial markets, but at this point we're just leaning way too heavily on one of the four engines to do anything meaningful. Yeah, Joe,

that's a very good question. I wish I knew the full answer to that, but I think, you know, if we just look back over the last couple of years, uh, In the two thousand seventeen was a very interesting year because this was a year when on all accounts, the FED was on its steady course in normalizing monetary policy. See and yet the dollar is weak and financial conditions were loosen, so there was no you know, one for

one relationship with the first monetary stance. I think that's, uh, that's worth thinking about because that's also very useful in thinking about why the first half of two thousand nineteen has been pretty challenging, even though you know, over the end of the year the Fed went on a more patient you know, I went on a pause. Now. It's it's true that the dollar has weakened, and you know the biggest beneficiaries of that weakening have actually been emerging

market currency. So you know, if that trend were to continue, and we think that the previous relationships are going to reassert themselves, and you know, that should be a course for some comfort. Now having said that, at every turn, uh, you know, we are starting with a different stock, right, so you know, stocks do change over time, and so the same kind of push that would that would actually push a small car may not have the same impact you know, when when when it's fully laden and it's

a larger car. And so you know, I don't think we can really say for sure, but as a you know, as a market observer, as an economic commentator, who who cares about the twists and turns of the global economy. I think, you know, we could do far worse than than track. You know how the dollar shifts visa via the emerging market currencies, So so let's see how that plays out. Well, it's been amazing having you on the program.

Thank you so much. I think we managed to hit basically a lot of big topics in the short amount of time. So thanks again, excellent, excellent, Thank you so much. That was great. So Joe, I really and avoid that conversation. And again, if I haven't said it already, Um Huan's research work is really great and definitely worth reading. And I think at this point he must have a library. I mean I remember papers of his going back to like two thousand eight, so he has this huge body

of work. I gotta say, it's pretty difficult to narrow it down to a thirty minute podcast, but hey, we tried. Can I just say there were two things that really jumped out at me Um about that conversation. So one is I really enjoy the sort of way he was able to blend these sort of big theoretical insights with

very tangible real world consequences. So all these ideas about the relationship between financing conditions and the state of global trade and the state of the economy, and then being able to actually put sort of meat on the bone, so to speak, and to show how it plays out in the actual data. I think it was really cool. And also I was just really impressed by the sort of clarity of the conversation, because I always find the

b I S work to be kind of intimidating. I don't know if I should admit that, but I click on their papers that I read them, and it's the sort of austere gray and I'm like, oh God, this is going to be above my head and I'm not going to be able to understand it, and it's going to use all this stuff that I don't know about. But I just found it to be an incredibly clear and simple to understand conversation. So I really appreciated that. Well, I don't think you're alone in finding the b I

s intimidating. And I'm going to admit that my dad, who's my sort of benchmark for mainstream America, definitely thinks the Bank for International Settlements is some sort of like shadowy cabal that controls the world economy. And global business. So um, there is that conspiracy theory out there. But on a serious note, h there was one thing that that came through to me in that conversation, and it's the notion of the Federal Reserve as the sort of

world's central bank. And I don't think like you know, that narrative or that question pops up every once in a while, but not nearly as much as as it should,

especially given the attention on trade at the moment. Yeah, absolutely, and especially and of course at the June press conference, FED Sherman Powell making very clear how much world events and world conditions were influencing the FEDS thinking right now, So any notion that the FED can just oh, just look at the data within US borders clearly not a realistic thing to do in t right, But also vice versa, because there's this weird chicken and egg situation where yes,

the US can be impacted by external events and the rest of the world, but then by reacting to external events, the FED ends up influencing them as well. And again it's so weird that people don't talk about it more. And we have this debate again sort of like on the fringes about whether or not the FED has a another mandate in the form of um worrying about how it's monetary policy actually impacts say, emerging market economies or other parts of the world. Well, and also to that point,

I really liked his last point. I think it was one of his last points about even there the sort of undirect relationship between FED policy and financial conditions as exemplified by seventeen, in which it looked like the FED or the FED was in fact on a very steady series of hikes to move rates higher all the while it was a year of a week dollar and loosening financial conditions. So even the relationship between what the FED does and what the ultimate outcome on financial conditions is

is itself sort of very unlinear relationship. Yeah, basically, it's all very complicated. That's my conclusion. It's all very complicated. That's my conclusion to all Right, this has been another episode of the All Thoughts podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me on Twitter at Tracy Alloway, and I'm Joe Why Isn't All? You can follow me on Twitter at the Stalwart, and you should follow our guest on Twitter, Hun Song Shin. He's at Hyun Soong Shin, and be

sure to follow our producer on Twitter, Laura Carlson. She's at Laura M. Carlson. Follow the Bloomberg head of podcast Francesca Levie at Francesca Today, and check out the home of Bloomberg Podcasts on Twitter at the handle at podcasts. Thanks for listening.