This Is Why The China Bubble Never Seems To Pop

you're talking about? Yeah, sorry, I was very super cryptic, but yes, this idea that we have seen this sort of what some people might characterize as kind of a V shaped recovery on the industrial side, sort of an impressively fast and resilient restart of the factories and so forth, by not so much on the demand side yet, at least from the data. And maybe you have a better sense of this from the Hong Kong perspective, but it still seems like consumption shopping and going out to eat

still still kind of tame. Yeah, I think that's exactly right. Although I have to say in Hong Kong we are starting to see a little bit of a pickup, mostly because everyone is stuck in the city. They can't actually leave. Um when they have to come back, they have to go into two weeks quarantine. So everyone is taking staycations and going out quite a bit lately. But with that exception made, yes, we are seeing a stronger supply driven

recovery than we are on the demand side. And one thing that I find interesting about that is that it sort of speaks to the very nature of China's economic model. I guess one of the benefits of having a command economy is that when times are bad, you can kind of command everyone to go back to work, and you can tell companies to maintain jobs and start making products again. But of course, you know, the downside of a command economy is that you might not necessarily get as strong

a consumer as you want. Right So, the the industrial side, the corporate side, is very much an extension of policy, much more so than consumption. And so this this this sort of dual speed recovery that we're seeing in China. It may be a cue right now, but it speaks to something much broader. And I'm thinking also, we had a recent discussion with Matt Klein just this sort of general idea that the Chinese economy has never really been as sort of consumption focused, household focused as it is

uh investment and production focused. Yeah, that's exactly right. And of course the other big theme that's cropping up at the moment is what China is doing to support its financial system. So we know that the authorities are trying to walk this fine line between cropping up the banks but also you know, avoiding moral hazard and trying not to accumulate even more debt. So that's something else that's

going on at the moment. So all these things are like kind of like microcosms or cute versions of stories that I mean, you and I haven't covered, um talked about the world economy for years now, literally since I think the first day that I, you know, been covering the news. You just hear forever about the China bubble, and it's the most obvious bubble, and there was all this debt supposedly and all this bad debt, and it's sort of taken for granted that it must come to

an end, that there must be a reckoning. And we know people shorting China forever and talking about how how dysfunctional the system is. But you know, it's been years and years since we've been talking about this and the great sort of Chinese I don't know, reset bubble popping. It never quite seems to happen. Yeah, China is forever a debt crisis sort of on the brink, and yep,

it never seems to happen. There's always these fall starts, like you'll see something it's like, oh, some apartment developer couldn't sell their units, and everyone like, this is it. This is the moment we've all been waiting for. The Chinese real estate bubble is popping. And then six months later it's like apartment prices hit new all time highs and that goes away. Yeah. I mean, I would say

in recent years you've had some bigger ones. So you had Bao Schang Bank, which actually um failed, which was very unusual. And now it's really interesting is you're starting to get some losses on wealth management products that a

lot of banks sold to retail investors. That's another thing that lots of people thought was going to tip over the financial system into some sort of crisis because people weren't going to buy the products anymore and they would pull funding for the banks essentially, So yeah, you have a lot of things that could go wrong, but the consequences never seem as dire as people originally predicted, exactly right.

So anyway, I think that you know, raises an interesting question of well, why is this, Why does this, Why does the doomsday bubble crash collapse scenario that so many people just assume is inevitable? Why has it not happened? Is it going to happen? We're gonna be talking about that today with our own colleague, a special episode with one of our Bloomberg colleagues. They were going to be

speaking to Tom Orlick. He is the chief economist here at Bloomberg, and he has a new book out on exactly this topic called China The Bubble That Never Popps. So Tom, thank you very much for joining us. Thanks Joe, and I especially enjoyed your manly attempts to frame the subject without accidentally using the title of my book before you introduced it right, kind of guided it right there

without quite using it. But it really has been a thing, and even before I was aware that you had this book in the work, so that you're coming out, congratulations, By the way. This has been like a sort of like weird head scratcher, because for as long as I've been following this stuff, it just seemed inevitable that China must be the most obvious bubble ever, and then it was only a matter of time before it's crashing down. The only debate seemed to be when and not if

it was going to happen. Yeah, that's completely right. So so I lived in China from two thousand and seven to two thousand and eighteen, mainly focused on improving my table tennis game, but I did a little bit of economics as well, and that was the persistent narrative right from the Great Financial Crisis and that famous four trillion nuan stimulus which Premier Wen Jiaobao launched, all the way through.

Now there's been this massive rise in debt, and the question everybody has had has been, well, how long can this continue? And what's it gonna look like when it melts down? So give us a summary of the weaknesses in China's economy or the financial system that people have seen for this long. What is it that they are seeing, what is it that they're concerned about? So I break it down in three ways Tracy. So the first is

the size of the debt bubble um. So if you go back to two thousand and eight, China's debt to GDP looking at the whole economy was around a hundred and if you fast forward to two thousand and sixteen, two thousand and seventeen, it's gone all the way up to two D two hundred and six. So that's an astronomical increase in debt in a really short period of time. The International Monetary Fund scanned the world. They went back

in history too, I think World War two. They couldn't find another country which had taken on so much debt so quickly, but they did find a bunch of countries that have taken up that had taken on less debt and still had a financial crisis. So that's the first thing, just a huge amount of debt taken on very quickly.

And then the second thing, if we look at the borrower side of the Chinese economy, who's borrowing the money, Well, it's state owned enterprises investing in excess capacity building steel mills when no one wants any more steel, cement kilns, when they wone wants any more cement. It's real estate developers building those ghost towns in the desert or those empty apartment blocks, and its local governments building the roads

to nowhere. So on the borrower side, we've got a bunch of people making investments in things which have got low returns, so how are they're going to pay the money back? And then on the lender side, you've got state owned banks. State owned banks operating more on policy directives than commercial incentives, they're probably making some bad lending decisions, and you have the explosive growth of a shadow banking sector.

Shadow banks don't have the capital to absorb losses, are lending to really low quality borrow is the risks they're going to be high. So this I have a million questions already just based on that, but I'll start with one.

And you know, one of the things that's really been popular conversation in the last couple of years, and partly popularized by their eyes of say modern monetary theory, is that there is a distinct difference between private sector debt and public sector debt, and that public sector debt just doesn't have shouldn't be thought of with the same kind

of credit risk. And I'm curious whether to some extent, we can start getting our heads around the Chinese debt bubble by the fact that you know, you mentioned state owned enterprise, state banks, local governments, which presumably are implicitly at some level backed by the federal government. The sort of difficulty that outside analysts have in distinguishing what's truly private sector credit versus public sector credit, and how much

does that lay to the misconceptions about the and sustainabuilding. Yes, so that's a really important point, Joe. And one thing which really distinguishes China from the rest of the world, or at least the liberal capitalist rest of the world, the US, Europe and so on, is state participation in the economy and in many sense, in many instances just state ownership of the key players. So let's say we have a bad loan in the US system, Well, how

is that going to be resolved? Well, maybe there's some initial negotiations between the borrow and the bank, and then maybe there's some legal recourse for the bank if the borrower can't repay it, they try and reclaim their collateral. How does that look in the Chinese context, Well, probably the local government owns the bank, and they own the corporate and they have some tax revenue or other sources

of income they can put into play. And so that entire conversation, that entire negotiation is taking place within the

state family. And as long as China continues to grow, and remember China continues to clock not in this COVID nineteen year, of course, but in general China continues to grow around five six, then the government just has a lot of resources that they can continue to shuffle around the system, and that allows them to resolve a lot of problems behind closed doors without a blow up taking place.

Just on that note of sort of shuffling things around the system and also having this closed circuit of state owned enterprises and banks that all sort of have relationships with each other. How much does the fact that we're essentially talking about a closed economy factor into China's resilience here, because of course, you know, there has been some degree of opening up, but you still have hefty capital control. So how much does that actually insulate China from problems? Yeah,

that's a that's a really important point, Tracy. You often hear people saying that that China learned the lesson of the Asian financial crisis, right, they learned the lesson of the Asian financial crisis, and that's why they've been stable. What was the lesson of the Asian financial crisis that they learned? Essentially, it was don't let Wall Street in, don't let foreign capital in. In China, they actually have a have a phrase for sort of foreign speculative investors.

They call them. I'm probably gonna get this wrong, but it's like that inn wrong, are you, which means big financial crocodiles. So the big financial crocodiles came, and they came and gobbled up soul, they gobbled up career, they destroyed much of the Asian great story. And China saw that and said, you know what, We're going to finance our own development. We don't need these foreign funds coming in, which are great when they're coming in and everyone's really happy,

but when they leave, the system crashes down. And so because China's growth story has really been domestically finance, that gives China an important basis for stability that you just don't see in other emerging markets. This is like a really key point, just this idea of local denomination of debt. Basically, I mean, as long as debt is in a UM, it's an a currency that you can print that makes it more sustainable. Because of Chinese incredible growth, it hasn't

needed to use foreign money to finance itself. Joe, I knew you'd find a way to work modern monetary theory into this conversation. I knew it, you know, just trying, just trying to see if, like you know that we're all speaking the same we're all speaking the same language. Yeah, And actually I'm I'm not as familiar with the with the precepts of m m T as as Joe as

Joe is. But from what I from what little I do understand understand about it, I think China has actually been pursuing a kind of quasi m MT type polar see for the last twenty years without cooling an MMT. So there's there's kind of you know, I'm thinking back to like the over the last decade, and I feel like the China debt bubble story is actually sort of two prongeduniority alluded to both of them. One was on the pure financing side, but the other one was just

about this sort of misallocation of capital. And it doesn't matter really what currency investments are made in. If they're bad investments, they're bad investments. And I remember, like all those videos that used to be on YouTube that I forget. The hedge fund manager used to go to those cities out in the middle of nowhere and nobody was in the in the cities. Did those ever get filled up? Like what happened to those ghost cities we were talking about,

like eleven? Did people eventually move into those apartments? Oh, Hugh Hendry, that was the That was the fund manager that went made all those YouTube videos showing all these like empty series. I remember the name. I remember the name. It's a shame there were no drones in those days. He could have saved a lot of himself a lot

of time. So that's a really interesting story, and and it speaks to another one of the themes in my book, which is had China's policymakers have policy instruments available to them which enabled them to move the dial on the macro economy in ways which other other countries just wouldn't be able to do. So let me tell you a story about a trip I made to Guayyang, the capital of Guajo Province, back in two thousand and seventeen. And

Guayang had a serious ghost time problem. They've built a bunch of shiny new tower blocks, but no one wanted to live in them. Um, so what did the local government do. They got out the bulldozers and they went and knocked over everyone's house. And then they said, okay, sorry, we're not saying of your house. And by the way, we're going to have the l and your house was on but don't worry. Here's some money. Go and move into the shining new apartment block. That's one way to

do it. The real estate developers who built the shining new apartment blocks were happy because someone had come and brought them. The local government now had some land. The real estate developers, who and I flushed with cash, brought the land off the local government. So the financial circle was complete and the real estate, the empty real estate have been used up. And that wasn't just a gay

Yang story. That was a national story that happened to millions of people every year for the last decade in China, there was a national program that the government sort of euphemistically called its slum clearance. Millions of people every year for the best part of a decade getting their old home knocked ober and getting some money to move into

a new home. And when you can do that kind of thing, which China can and I don't think any other country in the world can, then problems like massive real estate o stay suddenly become a little bit easier to deal with. Can we talk about the downsides of having this sort of closed circular command economy system, because you know, you're we're talking about the misallocation of capital.

And one thing that you do tend to see in the Chinese market a lot is there is a lot of excess cash and it sort of just rolls into one thing after another. So you know, it'll go into property, and then it will go into stocks, and then it will go into something else, and people do lose money on those investments, and every once in a while you do hear stories of outrage at someone who's from someone who's lost their entire savings on you know, appear to

peer loan scheme or something like that. What are the downsides of having that kind of circularity in a closed system? So I think the first thing to say is that there are some very serious social damage sites. Right just think about that slum clearance example. Did those millions of people want to have their homes builders so that the government could solved the problem of real estate over capacity. I think there's a reason democratic countries wouldn't be able

to do that, basically because people don't like it. So there's some very serious social downsides to it. There's also economic downsides as well. If you have very large scale misallocation of capital, then you have very low return on assets, very low productivity growth. And ultimately, when China has used up all the space, it has to catch up with the US, to catch up with Germany, to catch up with Japan in terms of its use of modern technology,

it's use of modern management techniques. Then that's going to come back to bite really hard, and China's great is going to be very weak, and we are going to see a day of reckoning in the economy and in the financial system. That day just as much further away than most people realize. I'm member. There's that one street in Beijing where a lot of the really big state owned enterprises have their sort of headquarters offices, and a friend of mine used to refer to it as the

street where capital goes to die. We need, we need photos of that the street work to die. But Tom, I want to press you on that last point, because you referred to a day of reckoning. Will it be a day? I mean? And I mean that kind of literally in the sense that when we think about, say, the US housing bubble haven't collapsed. Okay, it took place over a period of time, but you know there's like a few days that really stand out. The Lehman Brothers

collapsed and so forth. In the China context, Is there gonna be a day when it collapses? Or will it just be that at some point you expect we'll look back and say, years and years of misallocation and other bad decisions lead to a degradation of growth and productivity that clearly set it back. Is it gonna be a crash or just sort of like a bad period? Yeah, I think it's a It's kind of the is it

Lehman or is it Tokyo? Right, being the kind of the moment where everything went wrong, and and Tokyo being the kind of the example of an economy which just kind of lost its moxi moxire, is it mojo? But maybe both over an extended period of time. And I think the point I come back to is that what China's government needs in order to successfully backstop the system

is continued growth in its resources. Right, if the government has continued growth in profits from state firms, continued growth in profits from state banks, continued brace in tax revenue, continued land sales revenue, then it's got money that it can carry on shuffling around the system to make everybody whole right, to paper over over over the cracks, and

to have those things. What it needs is growth. For me, the point when the bubble pops, whether it is the kind of the beginning of a long stagnation or a kind of a crisis, point is the moment when the growth stops. So the question is when's that going to be? And one powerful way of thinking about that is, well, where is China relative to the technology frontier? Where is China relative to the level of productivity that we see in the United States and Japan and elsewhere. And the

answer is actually still a really long way. G d P per capital in China is a third of the level that it is in the United States. Japan fell over, Japan's GDP per capital was already at US levels. Based on that way of thinking about things, China still has quite a long way to run, So I'd be curious to get your take on what you think China see as its role in the global financial system, Like what is China actually trying to achieve with some of its

capital markets opening up. You mentioned this idea that it wanted to keep a lot of the Western speculators out earlier um And is there a moment at which China's global financial ambitions may be become constricted by that closed

economy that we've been describing. There's a real cost to autarchy, Tracy, some of those points that you were mentioning so much money slashing around in the system, chasing returns on P to P schemes today and equity tomorrow and real estate on Thursday, and so China's policymakers recognized that there are some benefits in terms of efficiency to having a more open system, to allowing money to go on to come

in and out of the country. At the same time, there's still a real fear about what might happen if they open up too quickly. I spent to one senior executive in a Chinese who said, opening up all of the weaknesses we have in our banking system would be like it would be like seeking death. So they want the efficiency gains, but they want to do it gradually

so they can try and minimize the costs. M I want to ask you a question that sort of um not necessarily the focus of your book, which had obviously been in the works for a while, but it's sort of of acute important importance. You mentioned post the last crisis, the four trillion dollar stimulus got a lot of attention. There was this big sort of commodities boom associated with it, sort of between two thousand nine two thousand and eleven.

It was a huge amount of enthusiasm towards emerging markets, which they faded over the subsequent decade, but at least initially coming out of the crisis, all kinds of sort of after effects from that sort of massive move on the demand side. We haven't seen that this time around. It feels like the measures have been more limited in that we just started this conversation talking about sort of

dual speed nature of the recovery. Could you see China doing something like that again, particularly if global demand for their goods remains soft, just to do the sort of slow reopening of the West and elsewhere. I think there's there's two big differences between two thousand and eight when they did that massive shock and or stimulus and today. So the first is they just don't have as much policy space as they did. There is a cost to running a massive credit stimulus for a long period of time,

and the cost is you can't do it again. And then the second thing is actually that stimulus didn't work out so great for that. It was a stimulus which was very popular with the rest of the world, but that's because it created massive positive spillovers for the rest of the world. The benefits, yeah, there were benefits for China, but because a lot of the money went to importing iron ore, for example, a lot of the benefits spilled over to Australia and Brazil in the form of more

volumes and higher prices for their commodity sales. So China this time they're running a pretty big stimulus. We think the fiscal deficits going to go up to eleven of GDP this year. That's not nothing, but it's certainly smaller than it was in two thousand and eight, and it's kind of it's meaner, right, it's more smartly focused to the benefits are much more going to stay inside China. We're not going to see those those big positive spillovers

to the rest of the world. I think we'd be remiss if we didn't ask you a little bit about the ongoing trade attentions with the US and what those mean for the Chinese economy. But how much damage do they actually inflict on China, Because there's an argument, at least domestically in China that in some ways, by you know, closing off the country from the rest of the global market, you're sort of encouraging it to double down on its domestic focus and maybe even speed up the development of

its own domestic market even faster. I think there's there's a couple of things. So trade war is definitely a trade war is definitely not good for China, and a trade war at the same time as they are managing this painful deliveraging process trying to manage down some of that debt they took on after the Great Financial Crisis, and at the same time as they have the COVID nineteen crisis is definitely painful. So they certainly don't want tariffs to go back up. I'm sure they'd like them

to come down. But then the second question is is a trade war going to fundamentally derail China's development process? And I think the answer to that is no, and it's for the reasons that you suggested, Tracy. So firstly, China's domestic innovation engine. I mean, China does not have a Stanford or a Harvard, but China's domestic innovation engine is pretty powerful. No one spend No one apart from America,

spends more on R and D than China. If you look at the innovation rankings, China is punching way above its weight relative to its level of development. It's important to remember that it's actually really hard for other countries, other countries to decouple from China. Right The US has really moved aggressively in that direction, but they can't move completely in that direction because the apples and the call coms of the world are deeply invested in the China relationship.

And that is also true of the big multinationals in Europe and the big multinationals in Japan. So trade war is definitely bad. Trump in a sense is kind of like the anti Nixon. Nixon opens China up. Trump it seems to be doing his best to close it down. Um, I don't think he's going to succeed ultimately. I don't think this is going to be anything more than a

little bump on China's development traject. What about um? And no one seems to talk about this as much anymore, or only when you hear about it seems to be about failures or disappointment. But the endeavors of the Belton Road initiative or just creating all of these, you know, financing investments in other countries which might theoretically one day be sources of demand for China and further opportunities for growth. What's is that stalled out? Is that not going as planned?

What's happening with that? So She Jimping came into power, and he basically had a different conception of China's role in the world. Right, the dumb shaping famously said, we should bide our time and hide our strength. Right, we should just stay quiet, benefit from favorable global conditions and develop. And She Jimping came in and said, you know what, we've arrived. We want all the medals of the Olympics. We've got the biggest part exchange reserves with the biggest

exposture in the world. We're here, and we're we're not going, We're not gonna, We're not going to hide it anymore. So you had a bunch of initiatives from Shi Jimping. We had the Belt and Raid scheme, which was basically announcing their arrival as a kind of a geopolitical power. You had China where they announced their ambition to kind of own the future of technology. Both of those things

were frankly pr disasters for China. Right the entire rest of the world said, what you're going to be taking over Africa and owning AI and robots. That's not acceptable. So it's not a coincidence that the announcement of the Belt and Raid scheme and the announcement of China came immediately before the shift in the global perception of China towards are basically a more sort of cautious, hostile view of what China's rise men. And it's also not a

coincidence that China has stopped talking about both of these things. Right, China doesn't really talk about China anymore. They do really talk so much about the Belton Road anymore. And that's not that's not because they're not doing them still. It's because they've realized that it doesn't actually strategically make sense to make these bold claims. I have like a semi

interesting analogy about table tennis and the Chinese economy. Oh yeah, yeah, yeah, tell us that you You hit a great thread on Twitter about this, and I want our listeners to hear it. So before we go, tell us how table tennis explained the resilience of the Chinese economy. Um so so. I spent a lot of time in China playing table tennis. I actually moved to China partly because I wanted to be a China economist, but mainly because I wanted to be a better table tennis player. Wait for real, I

was young and foolish. I played in I played in sweaty basement clubs. I played in the headquarters of some of China's biggest stay owned banks. I played with the Shanghai University Ping pong team, who are really good at table tennis. There are YouTube videos. YouTube videos come from table tennis match in Shanghai. Yeah, I just look these up. Oh, Tom, that was a mistake telling us Laura, can we get

some sound in here, just some like pinkness. I love that sound of the So China's table tennis has some really serious problems. The men's team went on strike a few years ago because they weren't happy because there was some backroom political deal which got rid of the coach they really liked. If you speak to professional players in China, they all have stories about bribes and corruption and payments they did their parents needed to make to get them

into the best training programs. The best players in China, they had to start training when they were eight or nine, drop out of school to have any chance of making it. So you've got you've got corruption, you've got nepotism, you've got a kind of mechanical, almost in human approach to training. And yet China's table tennis team are indisputably the best in the world. Go and check the International Table Tennis Federation rankings. Look at the top ten for men, the

top ten for women. There's a lot of Chinese people on that list. So why is that? Well, there's a few reasons. The first is there's one point three billion people in China and they all try table tennis, so there's a massive talent pool to pick from and huge economies of scale. The second reason is they have a really well planned approach to ensuring that they're going to

be the best. If a foreign player develops a good serve or a good shot and wins a few games against the Chinese team, they'll get a video camera, they'll record the foreign player, they'll take the video home, they'll break it down, they'll analyze it, they'll make sure they've mastered that technique. So the technique might work once against the Chinese team, but it's not going to work twice and written large those benefits of the Chinese table tennis

system has also the benefits the Chinese economy has. China is the most populous country in the world, which means they have absolutely enormous economies of scale. China's trade with the rest of the world means that they can learn foreign technologies and foreign techniques. And when you put together the foreign technologies and the foreign techniques with China's massive scale, what you end up with in table tennis and in the economy is the potential for for a world beating system.

I love it. I'm so glad, we I'm so glad we got this in but it's perfect and uh, you know, just the idea you can you can mismanage a lot, but when you have that much raw resources, you can still be the best. That's exactly right by my book, China the Bubble that Never Problems, by the book People. Well, thank you so much, Tom. Now I want to do one on Russian chest during the Soviet year. I wonder how many analogies there are between Chinese creampo and the

dominant of rush a chess. But can we can talk about that another time? Thanks again, Tom, congratulations, Thanks so much so, Joe. I really enjoyed that conversation, not least because it has led me down the internet wormhole of watching Tom Orleck table tennis videos from years ago. That's fun, but also because it is interesting to think of China as sort of one of the first examples of a real quasi MMT economy with all the benefits and also

the downsides that that might entail. Yeah, I was thinking, you know, back to our you know, and I think about this episode a lot, remember a fottel Kaboo, But I think that was last year, or maybe it was two years ago, and talking about sort of MMT in the developed developing market context, and of course most countries don't really have the sort of industrial or technical or

growth capacity the way China has had. But that is sort of just like this very different model of not relying on external financing to grow and their costs and benefits. But one benefit is you don't have those sort of financial crises the same way where suddenly you have a huge obligation and a foreign currency. Yeah, and I mean you have to say that there are some advantages to having a command economy in times of crisis, and specifically, I guess in times of national pandemics as we've seen.

You know, the US might struggle or at least take some time to institute job safety measures, whereas in China, like I think, they're much much more used to telling people in companies what to do, and so you see that sort of economic machinery start much faster. Yeah. I think that's right. And I think the key thing that I took away from that is not that there aren't massive risks to the Chinese growth model, and there clearly

are and they are all kinds of problems. And building cities if no one wants to live in them is going to be an issue. Or building steel plants that for steel that goes unused is going to be an issue. I think what what the key thing is just sort of being clear about identifying what the risks are. And if you're looking for the sort of Lehman moment or something like that, it's probably not going to be that, but more along the lines of like an ongoing degradation

and productivity. If they, if they, if you build an economy of stuff that nobody wants. So I think what maybe perhaps analysts got wrong is not about the sustainability or unsustainability per se, but about what the aftermath looks like if things go bad. And I think that's where Tom's perspective is really helpful. Yeah, cities full of streets where capital goes to time. And now I'm gonna spend the rest of the day watching compund vicas. This has

been another episode of the All Thoughts podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me on Twitter at Tracy Alloway and I'm Joe Wisn't though you could follow me at the Stalwart. Be sure to follow our guest on Twitter tom Orlick. He's at tom Orlick, and check out his new book, China, The Bubble That Never Popps, and be sure to follow

our producer Laura Carlson. She's at Laura M. Carlston. Followed the Bloomberg Head of podcast, Francesco Levi at Francesca Today, and check out all of our podcasts at Bloomberg under the Twitter handle at podcast. Thanks for listening one