Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, radio News.
The risk of a war in the Horn of Africa appears to be growing as Ethiopian troops mobilize on the Eritrean border.
Ethiopia's quest the sea access is irreversible.
Tensions between the two countries have been building for weeks, with the Ethiopian Prime Minister making clear the country wants to regain access to the sea.
I am a million percent sure that Ethiopia will not remain a landlocked country.
Really.
On this episode of The Next Africa Podcast, we'll look at what's behind these latest tensions and if they really will spill into a new regional war. I'm Jennifer's Abasajob and this is the Next Africa Podcast, bringing you one story each week from the continent driving the future of
global growth with the context only Bloomberg can provide. Joining us this week is our reporter Simon Marx, who is based in East Africa, and also Shattil Tronvoll, a professor at Oslo New University College and also an expert on the region. Thank you both so much for joining us this week. Simon, Let's just start with you. Your latest report is now available on Bloomberg platforms.
Get us up to speed.
What do we know about what's happening on the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Well, what we know for a fact is that in recent days and weeks there has been a considerable amount of trout mobilization inside Ethiopia by the governments of Abiyamas, and these troops, reportedly in their thousands, have made their way northward towards there atrea yes, but more importantly perhaps towards the border with the northern Tigrai region in Ethiopia, where there is a regional government currently hostile to Abyama. It's in some ways a repeat of what we.
Saw five years ago when there was a war between the Pigrian governments in that northern region and the government of Abyamas, who at that point was more recently in power in Ethiopia.
Chattiel, let me bring you in here, because Assignment was just walking us through this. How are we now at a situation where war potentially looks likely again? After we had thought there there was a piece deal and the conflict seemed to be in the rear view.
This has been a conflict long in the making, and we have to go back to the former War on Tigrind twenty twenty to twenty twenty two, where Ethiopian federal government where allied with Atitria in the war on the Tigrean regional authorities. It's to togrive People's liberation front. But when that war was settled with the secession of hostility agreement called the Praetoria Agreement in November twenty twenty two, that was only an agreement between the TPA lef regional
administration in Tigray and the federal authorities in Ethiopia. Eritrea, as a key actor to that war, was not included in the discussions or in the agreement, and we know that soon after that agreement was announced that President Decizequerki of Editrea was very skeptical to the secession of hostilities because his objective of entering that war was to crush the TPA Left Party one time and for all, to anhiliate the party and its structure, and the Pretoria agreement
saved the party and restored the party into gray as the dominant political force and the regional authority. So already from that time we saw that the relationship between Osmarra and Adis started toctoriate and since then that has escalated, so to say, the hostilities also because that Albi Ahmed a year and a half ago started to argue quite insistently that Ethiopia needed an outlet to see that it was an existential threat to Ethiopia that they didn't control
Red Sea access, meaning the subport of Editrea. The Federal government of Ethiopia has insisted over and over again that it is a necessity for Ethiopia to have a sustainable access to Red Sea, also to build a naval base, and that has then, of course been a worrying sign from Osmara, from Eritrea that it looked upon that as a threat, although that Europian government has been very skillful in playing what is called constructive ambiguity, saying that they
want an act to Red Sea through negotiations, but if that doesn't happen, well something else might come into play.
Let's just get into more of this new alliance, because you outline there really how this has shifted, the alliances have shifted over the past few years. Can you unpack more of what we are seeing between Eritrea and the breakaway to Gray region.
This is nothing new because this is how politics have been played in this region for centuries, that various regional powerholders are negotiating alliances and allegiances versus the center, so to say, to try to capture the political center. Because many people think it is quite strange that Editrea, which was probably the main perpetrator of the gross war crimes committed on the Tagrain people just five years back, that the Tigrain authorities now enter into an alliance with the perpetrators,
so to say. I think, as interpreted locally, it is because they feel that they are dying standing up, as they say, because it has been a kind of a containment strategy from the federal authorities versus degrai. They haven't been able to rebuild after the war. They haven't restored their territories, they haven't restored the full administrative powers, they have not been represented politically at the federal level. So
there are many grievances and they have barely survived. And the humanitarian situation in Tigray has also been deterror rating over the last two years. So from the local point of view of the powerholders in Mechle, they say that you know, we are dying as we are by starvation, so let's try to rock the boat to see if we can get a new momentum, and who can help us to create that momentum They need some new alliances.
And then it seems to be that Editrea was ready then to enter into a dialogue with the political leadership integral to safeguard their own interest versus our Disaba. And the federal government of Ethiopia has been accusing Editrea repeatedly for the last two years to fund insurgencies in Ethiopia, the Amhara Pharmo insurgency, but possibly also the Rumo La insurgency.
So this falls into a pattern that editrea strategy versus Ethiopia is destabilizing strategy to weaken the security control of the federal government in order to deter them to attack Editria.
And we'll just pause right there. Stick with me, both guys. When we come back, we'll look more at how serious the chances are a major malitary confrontation.
After the break, we'll be right back.
Welcome back today on the podcast, we're discussing the growing fears of a war between Eritrea and Ethiopia in East Africa. Simon Marx is still with me, Simon, how dangerous could a war in this region be, especially considering what we've seen over the past few years and what Shatil was just explaining to us about what some other population has still been experiencing.
Well, the last thing the whole of Africa needs, goes without saying, is another war. You already have a lot
of conflict in this region. Obviously in neighboring Sudan. For the last three years there's been an absolutely gruesome civil war going on between the Army and the Rapid Support Forces, and that has attracted a whole host of proxies regionally, with the United Arab Emirates backing their Rapid Support Force and other countries like Saudi Arabia Egypt for example, being more closely aligned with the army, and you're seeing these
proxies play out also to some extent inside Ethiopia. So any ignition of war could very likely see a repeat effect inside Ethiopia and Eritrea, where you have the Saudis and Egypt reportedly being quite close with the government of Isaias and the Emiratis having substantially backed Abby financing and
political support as well there. So there is a huge risk for escalation, and recently you've seen these proxies play out to some extent on the issue of access to the Red Sea, where you have Saudi Arabia closely aligning with the government in Somalia and the United alb Emirates aligning very closely with the breakaway region off Somali land. So you're seeing these these proxies pop up all over the region, and that will only fuel any war that
breaks out. And as for the humanitarian situation, obviously, globally, right we've seen a huge cut in funding for food and humanitarian aid, largely from the US but also from other countries in Europe, and there hasn't really been much in the way of other regions stepping in to fill
that gap. So it's a very precarious situation inside Ethiopia. Economically, it took a long time to recover from the last war as well as the COVID pandemic, you know, which really cripple the economy and send Ethiopia on a pathway to defaulting on its debt. It's only just beginning to sort of address that now with creditors, so really it's not worth contemplating how disasters it could potentially be.
And we should just add that the UAE does officially deny providing support to the RSS. It's also interesting when you think about Turkey's Urduan was in the region over the past few days, and when you think about the proxies and the different relationships that these countries have, two countries that are outside of the region. Chetio, I wanted to get your opinion on that as well. I mean, I see you quoted as saying you could you potentially
foresee a bigger conflict. What's your take on whether other countries could be drawn into this if in fact we do see that playing out.
So both Editrea and Ethiopia are already engaging in the Sudanese War theater on each other's side. And then you have as indicated that Egypt is a very strong back of Eritrea because of its own interest to destabilize and weak in Ethiopia. So Ethiopia will not exploit the Blue Nile and the Good Dam, potentially weakening egypt control of the line. And the Saudi is linked into that alliance,
directly assisting Editrea politically but possibly also financially. In the run up two air confrontation, the Somaliland and Emeratis are linked on them Ethiopian side, and where Somalia Mogadishu is on the Eritrean side, and in the tripatriot agreement between Egypt, Editrea and Mogadishu, this has the potential to really escalate. And I was just talking on the Norwegian podcast earlier today and we started to characterize this as a potential
Africa's second World War. When you remember we call the Congo War the Africa's First World War some years back, indicating that you can actually have states from three continents Europe, Middle East, Asia and Africa involved in the Editrea Ethiopian conflict as proxies. It's very very serious.
And so how imminent could a potential conflict be Chete.
I think what we see now with the huge military mobilization and redeployment of troops and heavy material up north, is not by coincidence though to say the timing of it, both the clear warning letters sent by Ethiopian government to the UN and directly to Editrean government. But also we have to keep in mind that with this we are entering now the seasons of warring in Ethiopia. Traditionally it is also a date coming up which is very symbolic
in Ethiopia. It's the second of March, which is the Adva Day, when in eighteen ninety six the Ethiopian Imperial Peasant Army managed to crush the invading Italian colonial army
up north in Adwa Intigrai in the heartland Ltigrai. And we have seen earlier, for instance, during the nineteen ninety eight two thousand war between Eritrea and Ethiopia, that the major offensives from Ethiopia to reclaim what they said it was the Etu Open territory started in the end of February nineteen ninety nine, the operations Sunset, as it was called, and then later the final offensive started then in March two thousand to push back at a train and troops.
This is because of the historical significance of this time, but also because of the seasonal changes. They have to win the war before the rains start in early June, so February, March April May is the key warring season in the region.
Maybe finally, Simon, we've seen peace deals in the past, as you know we started the podcast talking about them. Is there any scope for a return to the negotiating table or is it too far gone.
Well, as it stands, it doesn't look too likely. The regional government in t gray at the moment, after the last war, it's factionalized, and there was a camp of senior TPLF officials which aligned themselves more closely with the federal Government of Ethiopia. And then there were more so called hardline members of the TPLF which separated and did
not join that political force. And at the moment, the pro government faction has seemingly lost power in Tigrai, many of whom have left the Tigrai region gone to the capital in Addis Ababa to take refuge, and it's the hardliners who are in charge of there. It doesn't really seem that the Vittoria agreement is something that's alive in kicking. If anything, Ethiopia, through its foreign minister, has hinted that the terms of it are no longer valid.
You know, we have seen over the last couple of weeks on a much more intense diplomatic activity Saudi Arabia. For instance, both Foreign Minister Saudi Arabia recently visited ODIs and his deputy visited Asmara, in talks to Tye to meeting a conflict. Rugan, as you mentioned, was just there in this a few days ago, also addressing the issue. As far as I hear, he was not given any guarantees by Abbi that a conflict would not break out. AU had offered itself to mediate between Tigray and all this.
But the sources say that that Youpen government clearly told a you to back off. This is an internal affair. You shouldn't meddle into that one. The party which have a potentially could have a leverages of course USA, but it seems to be that the US engagement is just anchored in the State Department. The White House is not on board, and as long as Trump himself or his special envoys are not tasked to address the issue, it doesn't have the political clout to make an impact on
either of this. Mechila or Asmaro.
Thanks so much, Simon, and thanks again to Settil Tranvel from Oslo New Universe Today College for walking us through what is increasingly a growing concern in the Horn of Africa. You can read Simon's report on Bloomberg platforms. Now we'll put a link to that in the show. Notes. Here's some of the other stories we are following across the
region this week. The Democratic Republic of Congo struck a deal to tender copper from a major Glencore operation in the country, expanding the state miners trading of a medal that's key to the energy transition. And Nigeria's government will channel more of the proceeds from its oil and gas production directly into a central account, a move aimed at boosting state finances. You can follow these stories across Bloomberg, including the Next African Newsletter. Of course, we'll put a
link to that in the show notes. This program was produced by Adrian Bradley and Tiba Adebaio. Don't forget to follow and review the show wherever you usually get your podcasts. But for now I'm Jennifer's Abistoga. Thanks as always for listening.