Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, Radio News. Hello and welcome to The Money Stuff Podcast, your weekly podcast where we talk about stuff related to money. I'm Matt Levin and I write The Money Stuff com for Bloomberger Pain.
I'm Katie Greifeld, a reporter for Bloomberg News and an anchor for Bloomberg Television.
What are we talking about today?
We're going to talk about the slow death of shorts and specifically the retirement of Nate Anderson. We're going to talk about evil bankers, my favorite cut. We're going to talk about ESG Evil ESG, Hindenburgh, Nate Anderson. This was surprising, was it? I was surprised. I mean, I don't know. You think about Jim Chainos retiring in twenty twenty three, he had a pretty rough run towards the end. Nate Anderson,
I feel like has had a lot of wins. And also he only started Hindenburg in twenty seventeen.
Yeah, I mean it's a hard business, you know, running a short. So Nate Anderson, the founder of short focused research from Hindenburg Research, announced that Hindenburg Research is no more and he's going to tend to his garden or.
Something, listen to some medium, listen to some.
Medim I don't know. It's a hard job. And I was trying to think about, like why now. And one thing that occurred to me is if you read his letter, a lot of these people, a lot of people who like run these short research firms, sort of style themselves as hedgehund managers, in part because that's like a cool thing to say, I'm a Hedgehong manager. And like, actually the SEC case against Andrew Left is hilarious because they like actually claimed that it was fraud for him to
call himself a hedgehond manager. Yeah, like imply that he had clients because he was like talking about his clients when he was just the third person, right, which I thought was like a little nasty of the sec Yeah, it was like, I good enough, it is the kind of a Hedgehne manager. But like you know, it's called Hindenburg Research, and when you read his life, he like describes it as a research firm. It's not a hedge fund.
It's not like in the business and making short trades, right, it's in the business of discovering bad stuff at companies, discovering fraud or accounting malfeisms or whatever, and then generating money from that somehow. And I don't know exactly how
Hindenburg generates money. Like the original way I think he was generating money was by going to the SEC and submitting like whistleblower, what's the word quast step steps yes, And so he would like say to the SEC, hey, there's front of this company and they would be like, oh, well, there is run at that company. They'd find the company a lot of money and they'd give him some of
the money. Or that was the idea. And I think, you know, I don't really know what Hindenburg does, but like a lot of these firms will sell research ideas to hedge funds, will then, you know, do the short trades. They have more capital and more diversification than a short only hedge fund would have. And like you know, we've talked about Hunter Brook. Hunter is in the business of finding bad stuff at companies and publishing them and then
among other things, bringing securitieslawaw suits. And they team up with plaintiffs lawyers to bring lawsuits against these companies. And if you were as in the business of like monetizing fraudit companies by like having your own capital or your investor's capital and doing short sales. Like that's a hard business, right, Yeah, that's a lot of ways to blow up. Whereas if you're in the business of like monetizing whistleblower rewards, that's
less capital intensive. It takes kind of a long time. Yeah, uncertain.
I mean it just seems like a hard way to pay the bills.
What whistle lawer awards, Yeah, yeah it is. It's it's lumpy, but like people have kind of professionalized it, more lawyers than researchers, but some researchers have professionalized that made up money in any case, Like if you think about like the landscape of these short research frames, like you kind of need all of those options. You read his letter, he talks about we've led to more than one hundred prosecutions and like investigations, like he is measuring his success
in getting regulatory and prosecutorial attention on the companies he targets. Right, it's not like we've caused stock prices to go down. It's we have brought fraud to light and how to be investigated. And when I think about what is happening right now, Yeah, I've written a lot in the last couple of weeks about how there have been a lot of like sec prosecutions, sec cases, a lot of other stuff. There's a big Justice Department anti trust case against KKR
filed this week. We're going to talk today about the CFPP case against Capital One nice Tia. So a lot of stuff that is happening now because it won't happen next week, right, Yeah, Like if you were in the business of like alerting regulators through fraud, you might think that's going to be a bad business starting next week and going for four years.
Yeah.
I don't know that that's actually his calculation, but it just feels like a week ago, if you said, oh, this company is a fraud, that would have a big effect, and like starting in a week saying oh, this company is a fraud might not have a big effect.
Well. Yeah, the thing is like there's no guarantee that the stock will actually go down and your short will work. You think about their last report was on Carvana alleging fraud, and Carvana stock has done really well so far in January.
Yeah, they could be wrong, right, They always be wrong. They are specifically in the business of waving their hands and saying to regulators, Hey, look at this company over here, this is a fraud. Right, Sometimes they will be wrong and the regulators won't look at it. But like sometimes they'll be right and the regulators won't look at it.
And like, my suspicion is that the incidents of that will go up soon because like you will have a much less enforcement intensive regulatory regime everywhere in the US economy starting next week.
That's interesting.
That could be like way off base.
But I don't know.
It's like my little sp but perhaps there's a political angle here.
I don't know that he's thinking that. I just think I think it like I would, like, you know, i'd be worried if my business model was calling regulatory attention to frauds because like I don't know, Like I don't want to say the name. Never mind, I'm gonna move right along. We're not gonna say, like some companies.
That I don't know, you even name some names. You can do anything once anyway, you know, well really don't don't.
I don't need that matter, all right.
Well, moving softly along firs all In terms of how they make money, there was an FT article talking about this small New York based firm called Kingdon Capital that works with Hindenberg on a number of its trades.
So, right, like you sell ideas to or a partner with, yeah, somebody who is not.
And then you're the public face.
Yeah, you're the public face of the short idea. But also like they're the people who have like long short capital because like just being a short seller, as Jim Chaina has found, is hard because slacks mostly go up.
Yeah, that is painful. Well related to this. So he's winding up the firm, he's working through the last of the ideas, and then they're handing off the tips on suspected PAZI schemes to regulators. So there's probably some investable ideas in there. And also maybe they'll get some of these whistleblower rewards.
Yeah, I assume there's some tell where like like the whistleblowers thick, really long time to come.
How much can you make I'm interested.
I mean they've given out I believe, several nine digit awards. Don't They've hid out hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars.
I wonder what the average award is.
You know, they paid out press basis for the big ones. I don't know, but like they're not small. Like this sort of the way it works is kind of like the sort of the rack rate is kind of fifteen to thirty percent of what the SACI covers.
That's wild.
Yeah, you always get that and takes a long time and it's like controversial. But like if you bring them a big fraudt they get a big fund, you get a big check.
Yeah, lumpy, Like you said, it kind of reminds me of being a freelance journalist if that's how you make your living. I'm too risk averse to ever just rely on.
Oh but compared to like shorting stocks, yeah, capital.
Intensive, Yeah, I think I'd rather just be a TV anchor. In any case, what I'm excited about is that over the next six months, Anderson plans to work on a series of videos and materials on Hindenberg's models so that others can learn how the firm conducted its investigations. That sounds like some good viewing and I don't know, maybe more people will be inspired to take up the mantle now that they have the tools.
Is it a Barnes and Noble This weekend go on and I went to the business section and they're still these like for dummies books like investing for dummies, and I was like picking them up and leaving through them. I really want like a Nate Anderson activist short selling for dummies. It sounds like you, you know, it's like he's a good expert to record a series of YouTube tutorials on how to be a short seller.
Well soon, so the firm has eleven employees, and also in his letter, he said that for now I will be focused on making sure everyone on our team lands where they want to be next. So the alumni class of Hindenburg Research, I mean, who knows if all of them will go into short selling, but it'll be interesting to follow that.
Yeah, I think the letter suggested that I've read between the lines a little bit to suggests that like there will be a continuation of Hindenburg. It won't be called Hindenburg and he won't work there, but like several of the people there will continue to kind of do the same work in a similar format.
Yeah, I want to know what he does next. Again, only he.
Suggested like like literal gardening.
And did he I read the part where he said this has been really hard. I'm tired. And also I want everyone to go get jobs. Now you think he's really gonna get down in the dirt plant some petunias. Yes, we should.
Ask him, Yeah, we should have him. Nate, come on the pot. I met him once at a book party.
Huge. I feel like there's he's at least the fifth person I've mentioned and Matt has said, yeah, I saw them at a book party. It seems like book parties are sort of where you spent your free time. Barnes and Nobles and this.
Podcast and book parties are my social life.
Wow.
The Barnes and Noble is like party is like my actual social life is children's birthday parties. But like, but now I'm in like the drop off phase of children's birthday parties. So it's like I go to the children's birthday party, I'm angle for two minutes. I leave. Yeah, I sit in my car and read a book. I drafted Bardes and Noble and read a book.
You know it's gonna say so if you're looking to find Matt out in the wild Capital one, Matt, I knew you were a banker, but I didn't know you were evil.
I worked at Goldman at like the peak of Goldman is a great vampire squid wrapping its blood funnel around humanity or whatever the line is. I was pretty evil, but like you know, I was like evil adjacent and I always had a soft spot for evil.
Yeah, I could. It really came through in this column, of course, we're talking about the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. It alleged that Capital One cheated customers out of two billion dollars by keeping them in the dark about a savings program that offered higher interest rates on their deposits.
There's like really no dispute about what happened. Heret okay. There's like three kinds of bank accounts whatever the treat guns are like floating red bank acount. There's check accounts pay basically you're interested. There's savings accounts which exists which also seemed to pay zero interest. Like when I go to my bank and I like click on the they're like, oh,
to open a savings account. I click on it, and it's like you could get interest as much as zero point zero three percent with a million dollar bounce right. And then there's a thing called the highield savings account, which is distinguished from a regular savings account by paying like something more than nominal interest. And in like twenty thirteen, Capital One opened highield SAVIS account called three sixty Savings and they were like, this is a highield Savis account.
You'll get the best interest rate, and so people open their accounts and they did this for like seven years, and the rate would go up and down with like you know, interest rates, and then in twenty twenty, in twenty twenty, they like quietly deprecated it, where they basically said everyone who was in that account stayed in that account, their rate dwindled to like zero point three percent, so like a lot more than my bank is offering on like regular SAVIS account, but a lot less than like
fed funds or like yeah, you know, really a lot less. And meanwhile they launched a different product called three sixty Performance Saving, which is difference from three sixty Savings, and three sixty Performance Savings is the new product that they marketed to new people, and they're like, oh, this will have the highest right and it did in fact have like a you know, PID like four percent or whatever.
And so if you were like looking to open a highield Saves account at Capital One in like twenty twenty three, they were like, oh, yeah, here's our four percent rate opened three sixty performance savings and you did, and they got your money. But if you already had a three sixty saves account, your rate dwindled to nothing and nobody called you to be like, hey, you should move your money to the higher yielding exact similar product. And so
they got a lot of money. They had a lot of deposits from people who just didn't notice and kept their money at the low yielding thing. And the CFPB says they saved two billion dollars in interest sixpence by doing this.
So you seemed pretty sympathizic.
I'm like, giggling now is.
Such a good Yeah?
Well, I mean your position seems to be like dah, this is how banking works.
The point of a bank is like they take cheap deposits, right, yeah, Like I don't want to call it my bank. I have no problem with them. But they offer me zero points zero three percent on savings. Well, you know, because like they can do that, I.
Will say, okay, So this is how banking works. You talk about how like the deposit franchise system is based on people not knowing what the not checking.
The interest rates.
Like banking theory is that when interest rates go up, the cost the deposits of banks doesn't go up as fast because there's a thing called deposit beta. Like some people just don't move their money out or don't ask for a higher interest rate, and certain banks can save money.
And it's like really important to the stability and health of banks that people don't demand every last basis point of market interest rates on their savings accounts because loosely speaking, the collapse of like Silicon Valley Banking twenty three is like because people like demands of market rates on their interest on their bank deposits.
I mean you still see the after effects of that, because you take a look at money market funds and I think they're still close to seven trillion dollars depending on what you look like.
And I like exaggerating when I say because SPV was like had like solvency problems. Yeah, but like the aftermath of that was very much. People are like, ooh, my regional bank, that's weird. And then they're like, oh wait, I can get more on a money market fund and
it's all on treasuries and it's safer than my regional banking. Yeah, So like everyone moved their money to money market funds, and so the cost of funding for regional banks went up so much because like basically all these deposit franchises got like rerated to market interest rates. Yeah, and Capital One it's not getting rerated to market interest rates because it was paying zero point three percent to all these people who weren't paying attention.
Well, quick segue. It seems like that is the dynamic that's going to exist for a while because Okay, there's seven trillion dollars in money market funds and it's just not coming out, even though the FED has lowered rates by like one hundred basis points. There's a bunch of bullish people in the stock market who are saying that's
cash on the sidelines that belongs to the market. But then you have people on the other side saying, like, no trillions of that came in the wake of sb BE collapsing because people realize that's a much better way to earn interest on their savings.
I think that's right, and like anecdotally, like that is my experience. I had my saviors and accounts, and eventually someone was like, you should really put that in the money market, but like I'm not, that's not going into equities.
No, No, that would probably go back to banks.
But we'll go to the money market plans.
You're just going to stay there for the rest of your life.
Cool power to unless Capital One or someone else offers me.
A higher rate on not going to be capital one. My question, So what you were saying this I like a good trade. This is how banking works. And it sounds like they weren't necessarily lying.
When they were lying at all, They just weren't calling their customers proactively to be like, hey, we have a better rate elsewhere.
But doesn't this doesn't this sound bad? It sounds like they were basically told to keep this secret because you put in block quotes that the bank this is according to the cfp BE, the bank told frontline ambassadors associates who work in the bank's physical branches, they must they must not proactively mention the ability to convert three sixty
savings accounts to three sixty performance saving accounts to customers. Similarly, the bank forbade its ambassadors from forwarding three sixty saving account holders to Bank Voice, the bank's units that handles account conversions, unless the account holders asked directly about the ability to convert accounts. That seems bad, Matt.
It's like converting to judaism. You have to ask three times. It's bad customer service. Yeah, there's no doubt about it. Is it fraud?
Why did they launch three sixty performance Savings in the first place?
It's a great question. I assume the answer is because, like, you do want to gather deposits, and the way to do that online as a bank is you do, like legitimately advertise the best rate. Right, if you say our highield save as account, you'ld four point three percent, come join us, right, and then people do so. They would advertise this new product to get new deposits in, and they had to pay a market rate to do that. But like, well, I raise the rate on the old deposits.
So you launched a new product and then the old product can pay less and less than less. I was also shady, right.
It seems it smells so stinky, Matt. And I was gonna say it seems like false advertising. But you do point out that you know they advertise this is the best and the highest interest rate.
I think it was like it's false advertising because in twenty nineteen they said it was the best rate and then in twenty twenty three, I was like, well, this is different.
Years, I guess, but if you know that, you know the vast majority of deposits and who knows if it was the vast majority are in there because you advertised it as having the higher rates straight and then that changed. Shouldn't you tell them?
Yes, the CFPP says, and yes, if you're like a good upsetting vide you're a bank, you know, it's like a different story. I had a friend when I was at Goldman. I had a friend who managed his family's cash balances. He would like put money at Hyta and every like month he would check the rates on hoyotav And there's always someone who is better than someone else, right,
because like this is what you do. You advert has a high rate, you draw in money, and then you figure people aren't going to pay close attention, so you could have like not quite the highest rate right now. Usually they were all kind of fairly close to each other, but like each month someone had a like essentially promotional rate to get in money. And so if you move your money every month, you could earn a higher rate
every month. But you had to be kind of weird to do that and the banks for keep banking on people mostly not being that weird and mostly like leaving their money there even if they didn't offer the highest rate all the time. And Capital One did a sort of extreme version of them. Yeah.
Well, they report earnings next week. It'll be interesting to see if there's any commentary on this on the call.
Yeah. I'm gonna say two other things about Capitol one. On one is that before the pandemic, I would meet people for coffee and they'd be like, where can we meet for coffee near Bloomberg? And I had a whole list of places, and they all close during the pandemic. And now when people say where can we meet for coffee near Bloomberg, I'm like, well, there is a Capital One cafe in our building, and that is the only
place I meet people for coffee. And it used to have the advantage that it was kind of like large and quiet and so you could always find a seat. But then that stopped having that. Everyone meets at the Capitol One cafe.
Oh my god, So it used to be in h and M. It's literally in the Bloomberg building. I love the Capital One And I met your brother for coffee isn't that bizarre. Yeah, we have a memory together at the Capital One Cafe. Uh Viil Donna Hirich was also there and my brother Greg and some other guy. That was quite a strange meeting of the mines. Capital One Cafe. It's a great place to get a kind of soggy sandwich.
You don't have to bank there, but I believe you get a disc of you do great stuff. I feel, you know, in addition to loving a good trade, I sympathize at the Capital One because they provide me my meeting space. The other thing I want to say is that what happened is the CFP brought a case right and like next week you'll be a new CFPV. This is like they are rushing to get everything out the
door before the new administration comes in. And you know a lot of the defendants in these cases are kind of saying that they're like, ah, this is the last ditch effort by the CFPB to bring a politically motivated case and like it won't really stand up and there might be something to do to that. Like, I think this is a this is kind of a novel theory here, because like the CFPB is not really alleging that they lied.
They should have been proactively telling customers about it. And we'll see like what the new CFPB does and and sort of where this goes. But like this might go nowhere, and Capital one on the call might say this is nothing, and they might be right.
Wow, Perhaps Nate Anderson had some political considerations in mind. Perhaps CFPB did as well.
We're not going to talk about the SEC case against the Elon Musk no on this podcast.
Thanks, we're short out time, but yeah, well you know what we.
Are going to talk about ESG, Yes and American Airlines.
Turns out if I had did an AUTO like we're gonna talk about Elon.
Would be crazy. I would just stare at you, slackshod and walk out of the room. So American Airlines pilots are assuming American Airlines in Texas for ESG. As you point out, this plan by black Rock didn't have any.
American Airlines runs like a four O one K fund Yes pro one K plan for its pilots. Right and one pilot brought a class action saying that this plan violates its fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries to the pilots because it is ESG and ESG environmental, social and governance investing is not putting the financial best interests of the pilots first. It is enacting Americans or black Rocks like evil social goals rather than caring only about financial returns
the pilots. As I pointed out in my column, there are no ESG funds.
Yeah, this four on K plan.
They's just like, at no point does anyone make any investment decision that's like, oh, we can't buy coal plants because like they're not ESGA. Right, no ESG funds. But what there is, though, is that there's regular index funds, and the index ones are managed by black Rock and
Blackrock for a while not anymore. For a while, Larry think the CEO of Blackrock would send like a yearly letter, like a public letter to CEOs of public companies saying you need to care about your impact on communities and we're going to be very focused on climate change and all these things that seemed in the very different days of like twenty twenty one to be like really good
marketing for Blackrock. Yeah. Oh, look at Blackrock. It's like a socially responsible long term steward of capital, and it thinks about things like climate change and social impact of businesses and like, now that's all not allowed. And so these pilots, you know, sued and the argument was that by Blackrock out these letters and thinking about ESG and sometimes of voting like in favor of like climate proposals at portfolio companies, it threw its beneficiaries under the bus
and it wasn't putting their interests first. And also American by hiring Blackrock and by not yelling at them to stop doing ESG violated its duties of loyalty to its pilots, and therefore, you know, is liable for like not running its four h one k plan under the law. And they brought this case in like this federal court in Texas with like a sort of famous conservative judge who like, you bring your conservative cases in Texas because he'll ruin
your favor. And he said, that's right. ESG by definition doesn't prioritize investors' financial returns and so it's not allowed. And uh, an American violated its duty of loyalty.
Yeah, that's really interesting. I mean we've talked about ESG on the podcast before obviously, and the question that I always ask is like, what are the motivations of ESG. Are you investing to do good or because you think that if you don't invest to do good eventually things will happen to your business that are bad.
I think that most mainstream ESG investors, certainly including black Rock, would say it's the latter. They would say, formally, what we are doing is considering long term risks to the businesses that we invest in. Climate change, and like the transition away from fossil fuels is a giant long term risk that we are analyzing and predicting, and so we want companies to be positioned for it. We want airlines to think about how to you just feel more efficiently.
We want oil companies to think about transitioning to cleaner energy because like that's the long term future. Yeah, And like similarly with like social issues, right, it's like diverse companies perform better, and diverse companies, like in a more diverse world will perform better. And so when we take the long view, we think that diversity is important, even if it's like expensive. Now, I think that this has always been the mainstream of how people who work in
ESG have described. Now there are two big cavists that one is that a lot of people don't believe that. And the judge talks about this, he's like, yeah, they pay lip service to the idea that it improves financial returns, but it's not real. And I think that, you know, there is kind of evidence both ways, and like the performance of ESCH funds is hard to untangle from like influence into es CHI funds. You know, he cites like ESG funds underperformed the S and P like in twenty
twenty three or whatever. Again, no ESG funds in this portfolio, so it's an irrelevance iation but whatever, ye yah, yeah. But the other problem with this is that I think everyone who worked in ESG, if you like pressed them on this issue, would say it's about considering long term risks to the portfolio. They also definitely benefited from, like creating the impression that they were investing to do good. Right.
I think as an advertising matter, as a you know, accumulating of assets matter, blackrock positioning itself as like a steward of the environment was appealing to some people, whether or not it improved their returns, right, Like they wanted the world to you know, they wanted like to fight against climate change, and they had like the vague impression that putting their money at Blackrock would help in the
fight against climate change. And I think that like confusing those two issues, confusing like are you investing for social good? Are you considering long term risks to your portfolio? Was
like really beneficial to ESG investors during the rise of ESG. Yeah, And like there's really bad for them now because they're getting lawsuits like this and they're getting pushed back from like politicians saying, well, you're not actually putting your clients interest first, You're like only trying to do, you know, achieve your social goals, which I think is not what they would have like officially said, but it's kind of what they implied a little bit, So it's not on them in trouble now.
I do want to go back to the lip service thing, because that just don't I don't, I don't know. So the judge said that oftentimes Blackrock couched its ESG investing in language that specifically pledge allegiance to an economic interest, but Blackrock never gave more than lip service to show how I mean, how do you distinguish what is actually a lip service. What if they were giving lip service to the ESG part but actually only cared about the economic impact. I feel like we can't know that.
Yeah, And like what I wrote is the Black cair complex has a lot of skin in this game, right, Yeah, Like Blackrock and plays a lot of investment professionals who are like rewarded for doing well, right, And so if like they were constantly undermining the economic interests that they're trillions of dollars of funds, they might stop doing that, right.
Blackrock also like has a lot of clients, right, And like it's clients range from you know, individuals to like very sophisticated pension funds who have like you know, principle Asian problems, to like you know, big endowments, like all sorts of clients who you know, it's the biggest asset
manager in the world. Presumably those clients like think it's helping them make money, right, Like, like maybe they're all deluded, but it's weird to be like, you know, the people who invested like trillions and trillions of dollars to the black crack are all wrong about it trying to make them money. And I a judge in Texas am right, and I know that those people are all that like Blackrock is actually not looking after them. It's a strange like like, what's the evidence that that it was only
lip service? Well, he doesn't really say, you know, there's like test the money in a trial. Maybe he heard something very convincing. But to me, like if Blackrock was not trying to make money for its investors, it's kind of weird that it's got so many investors.
I do wonder what this means reputationally for Blackrock going forward, especially the thing like on.
That point, like Blackrock is not involved in this lawsuit. Yeah, it's like a weird because it's like, right, like black Rock is getting its name drive through the mud and it's not even still.
I mean, you you raise the point that it's possible in twenty twenty one corporate managers who might have been afraid to be critical of ESG might have you know, hired Blackrock for four one ks to curry favor with Blackrock.
A point in this lawsuit that's important. It's like Blackrock is one of the biggest shareholders of American and so like can American criticized BlackRock's THEESGV.
Is I mean you. You could on the flip side, see a company considering, you know, who to hire for their for one k, see what's happening in Texas and be like, maybe we should just go with Vanguard or like Fidelity or something because we don't want this rhcstoria or.
Like the anti woke right right? Who I really like? You know, there's all these people like springing up to like oh up this pie right, get all the.
Anti Yes, But yeah, I don't know. I would love to talk to Larry Think. Just sometimes I think about who are the people I would love to talk to in a completely honest setting like this? Yeah, I come on, just like, do you regret it? I know that black Rock is backed away ESG.
I could answer for that. Heats it. Yeah, he regrets it because he's a businessman, you know.
Like he's a business common man.
Yeah. Like the story in this case that like Larry Think is like a crusader for my environmental justice. Who will put that over the interests of money is like crazy?
Yeah.
I know, back leaned into ESG because it was great marketing and now they're leaning way out of ESG because it's.
Terrible market But you know, if we asked Larry on this podcast or in any other public forum, he would be like, he wouldn't say that he regrets it necessarily, he would say fancy words.
He would say, I think we are stewards of our investors' capital, and we consider the long term risks of that capital. We thought and think that, like things like social contribution and climate change are material long term risks, and so as sensible stewards of capital, we considered those risks, and I tried to convey that financial motivation and some letters and people are misinterpreting those letters. So I think it's all true, but like those letters are kind of written to be misinterpreted.
Larry Fink, come on the podcast, Go do It.
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